Message Header Field for Indicating Message Authentication Status
RFC 5451

• Status
• IESG evaluation record
• IESG writeups
• Email expansions
• History

• Versions
• 20

Network Working Group                                       M. Kucherawy
Request for Comments: 5451                                Sendmail, Inc.
Category: Standards Track                                     April 2009

   Message Header Field for Indicating Message Authentication Status

Status of This Memo

   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
   improvements.  Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
   and status of this protocol.  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
   publication of this document (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.

Abstract

   This memo defines a new header field for use with electronic mail
   messages to indicate the results of message authentication efforts.
   Any receiver-side software, such as mail filters or Mail User Agents
   (MUAs), may use this message header field to relay that information
   in a convenient way to users or to make sorting and filtering
   decisions.

Kucherawy                   Standards Track                     [Page 1]
RFC 5451          Authentication-Results Header Field         April 2009

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Purpose  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.2.  Trust Boundary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     1.3.  Processing Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     1.4.  Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     1.5.  Definitions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       1.5.1.  General  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       1.5.2.  Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
       1.5.3.  Email Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     1.6.  Trust Environment  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   2.  Definition and Format of the Header Field  . . . . . . . . . .  8
     2.1.  General Description  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     2.2.  Formal Definition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     2.3.  Authentication Identifier Field  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     2.4.  Result Values  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       2.4.1.  DKIM and DomainKeys Results  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
       2.4.2.  SPF and Sender-ID Results  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
       2.4.3.  "iprev" Results  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       2.4.4.  SMTP AUTH Results  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
       2.4.5.  Extension Result Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
     2.5.  Authentication Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
       2.5.1.  Definition of Initial Methods  . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
       2.5.2.  Extension Methods  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   3.  The "iprev" Authentication Method  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   4.  Adding the Header Field to A Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
     4.1.  Header Field Position and Interpretation . . . . . . . . . 19
     4.2.  Local Policy Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
   5.  Removing the Header Field  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
   6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
     6.1.  The Authentication-Results Header Field  . . . . . . . . . 22
     6.2.  Email Authentication Method Name Registry  . . . . . . . . 22
     6.3.  Email Authentication Result Name Registry  . . . . . . . . 24
   7.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
     7.1.  Forged Header Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
     7.2.  Misleading Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
     7.3.  Header Field Position  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
     7.4.  Reverse IP Query Denial-of-Service Attacks . . . . . . . . 28
     7.5.  Mitigation of Backscatter  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
     7.6.  Internal MTA Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
     7.7.  Attacks against Authentication Methods . . . . . . . . . . 28
     7.8.  Intentionally Malformed Header Fields  . . . . . . . . . . 29
     7.9.  Compromised Internal Hosts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
     7.10. Encapsulated Instances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
     7.11. Reverse Mapping  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Kucherawy                   Standards Track                     [Page 2]
RFC 5451          Authentication-Results Header Field         April 2009