Remote Triggered Black Hole Filtering with Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF)
RFC 5635
Yes
No Objection
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 04 and is now closed.
Lars Eggert No Objection
Section 3.2., paragraph 4: > Step 1. Select your Discard Address schema. An address is chosen to > become the "discard address". This is often chosen from 192.0.2.0/24 > (TEST-NET [RFC3330]), or from RFC 1918 [RFC1918] space. Given that both RFC1918 and RFC3330 address space comes with the note that "addresses in this block should not be used on the public Internet", it may make sense to at least also mention if not recommend the option of using a chunk of the operator's assigned public address space for this purpose.
(Ron Bonica; former steering group member) Yes
(Adrian Farrel; former steering group member) No Objection
I was looking in the Security Section for something about the risk associated with source-based RTBH announcements received from customers. Giving up, I paged up and found immediately above... As a matter of policy, operators SHOULD NOT accept source-based RTBH announcements from their peers or customers, they should only be installed by local or attack management systems within their administrative domain. Would it be possible either to echo this in the Security section, or provide the reason in the previous section?
(Cullen Jennings; former steering group member) No Objection
(Dan Romascanu; former steering group member) No Objection
(Ralph Droms; former steering group member) No Objection
(Robert Sparks; former steering group member) No Objection
(Tim Polk; former steering group member) No Objection