@misc{rfc5746,
    series =    {Request for Comments},
    number =    5746,
    howpublished =  {RFC 5746},
    publisher = {RFC Editor},
    doi =       {10.17487/RFC5746},
    url =       {https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5746},
    author =    {One Way and Marsh Ray and Steve Dispensa and Eric Rescorla},
    title =     {{Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication Extension}},
    pagetotal = 15,
    year =      2010,
    month =     feb,
    abstract =  {Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) renegotiation are vulnerable to an attack in which the attacker forms a TLS connection with the target server, injects content of his choice, and then splices in a new TLS connection from a client. The server treats the client's initial TLS handshake as a renegotiation and thus believes that the initial data transmitted by the attacker is from the same entity as the subsequent client data. This specification defines a TLS extension to cryptographically tie renegotiations to the TLS connections they are being performed over, thus preventing this attack. {[}STANDARDS-TRACK{]}},
}