Using Advanced Encryption Standard Counter Mode (AES-CTR) with the Internet Key Exchange version 02 (IKEv2) Protocol
RFC 5930

Note: This ballot was opened for revision 07 and is now closed.

(Jari Arkko) Yes

(Sean Turner) Yes

(Ron Bonica) No Objection

(Stewart Bryant) No Objection

(Gonzalo Camarillo) No Objection

(Ralph Droms) No Objection

(Adrian Farrel) (was Discuss) No Objection

(David Harrington) No Objection

Alexey Melnikov (was Discuss) No Objection

(Tim Polk) (was Discuss) No Objection

(Dan Romascanu) No Objection

(Peter Saint-Andre) No Objection

(Robert Sparks) No Objection

(Russ Housley) Abstain

Comment (2010-05-04)
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  I cannot see the justification for using AES-CTR to protect IKEv2
  traffic.  There is a strong justification for AES-CTR in ESP where
  there are high data rates.  The data rates for IKEv2 traffic ought
  to be quite small, so the performance improvement is not really
  needed.  Also, the use of counter mode requires care to ensure that
  the same counter value is never used more than once under the same
  key.