Using Advanced Encryption Standard Counter Mode (AES-CTR) with the Internet Key Exchange version 02 (IKEv2) Protocol
RFC 5930
Yes
No Objection
Abstain
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 07 and is now closed.
(Jari Arkko; former steering group member) Yes
(Sean Turner; former steering group member) Yes
(Adrian Farrel; former steering group member) (was Discuss) No Objection
(Alexey Melnikov; former steering group member) (was Discuss) No Objection
(Dan Romascanu; former steering group member) No Objection
(David Harrington; former steering group member) No Objection
(Gonzalo Camarillo; former steering group member) No Objection
(Peter Saint-Andre; former steering group member) No Objection
(Ralph Droms; former steering group member) No Objection
(Robert Sparks; former steering group member) No Objection
(Ron Bonica; former steering group member) No Objection
(Stewart Bryant; former steering group member) No Objection
(Tim Polk; former steering group member) (was Discuss) No Objection
(Russ Housley; former steering group member) Abstain
I cannot see the justification for using AES-CTR to protect IKEv2 traffic. There is a strong justification for AES-CTR in ESP where there are high data rates. The data rates for IKEv2 traffic ought to be quite small, so the performance improvement is not really needed. Also, the use of counter mode requires care to ensure that the same counter value is never used more than once under the same key.