Teredo Security Updates
RFC 5991
Yes
(Jari Arkko)
No Objection
Lars Eggert
(Dan Romascanu)
(David Harrington)
(Gonzalo Camarillo)
(Peter Saint-Andre)
(Ralph Droms)
(Robert Sparks)
(Ron Bonica)
(Stewart Bryant)
(Tim Polk)
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 10 and is now closed.
Lars Eggert
No Objection
Jari Arkko Former IESG member
Yes
Yes
()
Dan Romascanu Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
David Harrington Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Gonzalo Camarillo Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Peter Saint-Andre Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Ralph Droms Former IESG member
(was Discuss)
No Objection
No Objection
()
Robert Sparks Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Ron Bonica Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Russ Housley Former IESG member
(was Discuss)
No Objection
No Objection
(2010-06-02)
The first paragraph in the Security Considerations section states the goal of comparable address prediction resistance with respect to a host directly attached to an untrusted Internet link, but nothing in the Security Considerations section indicates how close the technique in this document comes to achieving that goal. A short discussion of the 13 random bits and this goal should be added.
Sean Turner Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(2010-06-02)
I support Tim's DISCUSS. An additional location for more information on random #s: ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc4086.txt
Stewart Bryant Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Tim Polk Former IESG member
(was No Record, Discuss)
No Objection
No Objection
()