Teredo Security Updates
RFC 5991

Note: This ballot was opened for revision 10 and is now closed.

(Jari Arkko) Yes

(Ron Bonica) No Objection

(Stewart Bryant) No Objection

(Gonzalo Camarillo) No Objection

(Ralph Droms) (was Discuss) No Objection

(Lars Eggert) No Objection

(David Harrington) No Objection

(Russ Housley) (was Discuss) No Objection

Comment (2010-06-02)
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  The first paragraph in the Security Considerations section states the
  goal of comparable address prediction resistance with respect to a
  host directly attached to an untrusted Internet link, but nothing in
  the Security Considerations section indicates how close the technique
  in this document comes to achieving that goal.  A short discussion of
  the 13 random bits and this goal should be added.

(Tim Polk) (was No Record, Discuss) No Objection

(Dan Romascanu) No Objection

(Peter Saint-Andre) No Objection

(Robert Sparks) No Objection

(Sean Turner) No Objection

Comment (2010-06-02 for -)
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I support Tim's DISCUSS.  An additional location for more information on random #s: ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/rfc4086.txt