When deploying IPv6, whether IPv6-only or dual-stack, routers are
configured to send IPv6 Router Advertisements to convey information to
nodes that enable them to autoconfigure on the network. This information
includes the implied default router address taken from the observed source
address of the Router Advertisement (RA) message, as well as on-link
prefix information. However, unintended misconfigurations by users or
administrators, or possibly malicious attacks on the network, may lead to
bogus RAs being present, which in turn can cause operational problems for
hosts on the network. In this draft we summarise the scenarios in which
rogue RAs may be observed and present a list of possible solutions to the
problem. We focus on the unintended causes of rogue RAs in the text. The
goal of this text is to be Informational, and as such to present a
framework around which solutions can be proposed and discussed.
Working Group Summary
Working group commentary was quiet but supportive.
The commentary on the document has stated that it is clear and to the
Fred Baker is shepherd for this document.