Updated Security Considerations for the MD5 Message-Digest and the HMAC-MD5 Algorithms
RFC 6151

Note: This ballot was opened for revision 08 and is now closed.

(Russ Housley) Yes

Comment (2011-01-05)
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  I think this documnet would be more useful to people trying to choose
  an algorithm if Section 2 were structured to present the conclusions
  at the beginning, and then provide the details in the susbsections.  I

   MD5 was published in 1992 as an Informational RFC.  Since that time,
   MD5 has been extensively studied and new cryptographic attacks have
   been discovered.  Message digest algorithms are designed to provide
   collision, pre-image, and second pre-image resistance.  In addition,
   message digest algorithms are used with a shared secret value for
   message authentication in HMAC, and in this context, some people may
   find the guidance for key lengths and algorithm strengths in
   [SP800-57] and [SP800-131] useful.

   MD5 is no longer acceptable where collision resistance is required
   such as digital signatures.  It is not urgent to stop using MD5 in
   other ways, such as HMAC-MD5; however, since MD5 must not be used for
   digital signatures, new protocol designs should not employ HMAC-MD5.
   Alternatives to HMAC-MD5 include HMAC-SHA256 [HMAC][HMAC-SHA256] and
   [AES-CMAC] when AES is more readily available than a hash function.

Alexey Melnikov Yes

(Peter Saint-Andre) Yes

(Ron Bonica) No Objection

(Stewart Bryant) No Objection

(Adrian Farrel) No Objection

(Tim Polk) No Objection

(Robert Sparks) No Objection

(Sean Turner) Recuse