The Use of AES-192 and AES-256 in Secure RTP
RFC 6188
Yes
(Robert Sparks)
No Objection
(Adrian Farrel)
(Gonzalo Camarillo)
(Jari Arkko)
(Peter Saint-Andre)
(Ralph Droms)
(Ron Bonica)
(Stewart Bryant)
(Tim Polk)
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 06 and is now closed.
Robert Sparks Former IESG member
Yes
Yes
()
Unknown
Adrian Farrel Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Alexey Melnikov Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(2010-12-24)
Unknown
3.1. Usage Requirements When AES_192_CM is used for encryption, AES_192_CM SHOULD be used as I think the 2nd AES_192_CM should be AES_192_CM_PRF the key derivation function, and AES_128_CM MUST NOT be used as the s/AES_128_CM/AES_128_CM_PRF ? key derivation function. When AES_256_CM is used for encryption, AES_256_CM SHOULD be used as the key derivation function. Both AES_128_CM and AES_192_CM MUST NOT be used as the key derivation function. Same comments as above.
Gonzalo Camarillo Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Jari Arkko Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Peter Saint-Andre Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Ralph Droms Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Ron Bonica Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Russ Housley Former IESG member
(was Discuss)
No Objection
No Objection
(2011-01-02)
Unknown
Please consider the nit and editorial comments from the Gen-ART Review by Richard Barnes on 10-Dec-2010: > > [Section3] In the first sentence, should "AES_CM PRF" be changed > to "AES_CM_PRF"? > > [Section3.1] Do you want to say explicitly that stronger KDFs MAY > be used? That you could use the AES_256_CM KDF with AES_192_CM as > the bulk encryption algorithm, or use either 192 or 256 with 128?
Sean Turner Former IESG member
(was Discuss)
No Objection
No Objection
(2011-01-05)
Unknown
#1) Support Russ' and Tim's discusses. #2) Section 3: In this note, the AES-192 counter mode PRF and AES-256 counter mode PRF are and are denoted as AES_192_CM_PRF and AES_256_CM_PRF respectively. extra words "are and"? #3) Section 3.1 (similar to Russ's 2nd comment): Should the rationale include a MUST? For example: The cryptographic strength of the key derivation function MUST meet or exceed the cryptographic strength of the encryption method.
Stewart Bryant Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Tim Polk Former IESG member
(was Discuss)
No Objection
No Objection
(2011-01-04)
Unknown
Please note Hilarie Orman's secdir review. (1) In particular, she notes: The block counter "b_c" is two octets, but the "default key lifetime" is 2^31. Is this perhaps the "maximum" key lifetime? Should implementors introduce an internal counter to keep track of the history of key usage (across sessions?)? Perhaps earlier documents explain this? Should implementers use the rollover counter (ROC) from RFC 3711 in combination with b_c, or is there another mechanism that the authors had in mind? (2) You might consider moving the rationale to the front of the section as an alternative to Hilarie's suggestions on section 3.1,