A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)
RFC 6482
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Lepinski
Request for Comments: 6482 S. Kent
Category: Standards Track D. Kong
ISSN: 2070-1721 BBN Technologies
February 2012
A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)
Abstract
This document defines a standard profile for Route Origin
Authorizations (ROAs). A ROA is a digitally signed object that
provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has
authorized an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes to one or
more prefixes within the address block.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by
the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further
information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of
RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any
errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Lepinksi, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]
RFC 6482 Route Origin Authorization February 2012
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................2
1.1. Terminology ................................................3
2. The ROA Content-Type ............................................3
3. The ROA eContent ................................................3
3.1. version ....................................................4
3.2. asID .......................................................4
3.3. ipAddrBlocks ...............................................4
4. ROA Validation ..................................................5
5. Security Considerations .........................................5
6. Acknowledgments .................................................6
7. References ......................................................6
7.1. Normative References .......................................6
7.2. Informative References .....................................6
Appendix A: ASN.1 Module..........................................8
1. Introduction
The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
is to improve routing security. (See [RFC6480] for more
information.) As part of this system, a mechanism is needed to allow
entities to verify that an AS has been given permission by an IP
address block holder to advertise routes to one or more prefixes
within that block. A ROA provides this function.
The ROA makes use of the template for RPKI digitally signed objects
[RFC6488], which defines a Crytopgraphic Message Syntax (CMS)
[RFC5652] wrapper for the ROA content as well as a generic validation
procedure for RPKI signed objects. Therefore, to complete the
specification of the ROA (see Section 4 of [RFC6488]), this document
defines:
1. The OID that identifies the signed object as being a ROA.
(This OID appears within the eContentType in the
encapContentInfo object as well as the content-type signed
attribute in the signerInfo object).
2. The ASN.1 syntax for the ROA eContent. (This is the payload
that specifies the AS being authorized to originate routes as
well as the prefixes to which the AS may originate routes.)
The ROA eContent is ASN.1 encoded using the Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER) [X.690].
3. An additional step required to validate ROAs (in addition to
the validation steps specified in [RFC6488]).
Lepinksi, et al. Standards Track [Page 2]
RFC 6482 Route Origin Authorization February 2012
1.1. Terminology
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
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