[Ballot discuss]
The Gen-ART Review by Alexey Melnikov on 14-Jan-2012 raised two
  concerns.  The authors and Alexey seem to have come to agreement
  on the appropriate changes, but they have not happened yet.

  1) Please reference RFC 4648, Section 4 for base64.

  2) Please update the ABNF as follows:

    spf-dns = "SPF-DNS:" [CFWS] ( "txt" / "spf" ) [CFWS] ":" [CFWS]
              domain [CFWS] ":" [CFWS] quoted-string [CFWS] CRLF

Upon approval of this document, IANA will complete the following actions:

ACTION 1:

IANA will register the following Feedback Report Type Value at
http://www.iana.org/assignments/marf-parameters

Feedback Type: auth-failure
Description: email authentication failure report
Published in: [this memo]
Status: current

ACTION 2:

IANA will register the following Feedback Report Header Fields at
http://www.iana.org/assignments/marf-parameters

Field Name: Auth-Failure
Description: Type of email authentication method failure
Multiple Appearances: No
Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure
Published in: [this memo]
Status: current

Field Name: Delivery-Result
Description: Final disposition of the subject message
Multiple Appearances: No
Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure
Published in: [this memo]
Status: current

Field Name: DKIM-ADSP-DNS
Description: Retrieved DKIM ADSP record
Multiple Appearances: No
Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure
Published in: [this memo]
Status: current
Field Name: DKIM-Canonicalized-Body
Description: Canonicalized body, per DKIM
Multiple Appearances: No
Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure
Published in: [this memo]
Status: current

Field Name: DKIM-Canonicalized-Header
Description: Canonicalized header, per DKIM
Multiple Appearances: No
Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure
Published in: [this memo]
Status: current

Field Name: DKIM-Domain
Description: DKIM signing domain from "d=" tag
Multiple Appearances: No
Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure
Published in: [this memo]
Status: current

Field Name: DKIM-Identity
Description: Identity from DKIM signature
Multiple Appearances: No
Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure
Published in: [this memo]
Status: current

Field Name: DKIM-Selector
Description: Selector from DKIM signature
Multiple Appearances: No
Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure
Published in: [this memo]
Status: current

Field Name: DKIM-Selector-DNS
Description: Retrieved DKIM key record
Multiple Appearances: No
Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure
Published in: [this memo]
Status: current

Field Name: SPF-DNS
Description: Retrieved SPF record
Multiple Appearances: No
Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure
Published in: [this memo]
Status: current

[Ballot comment]
Section 2.3 states:

  base64 is defined in [MIME].

Well, base64 is also defined in RFC 4648. :) Perhaps it would be better to say:

  This specification mandates use of base64 as defined in [MIME].

Section 3.1 states:

  Delivery-Result:  As specified in Section 3.2.2.  This field is
      OPTIONAL, but MUST NOT appear more than once.  If present, it
      SHOULD indicate the outcome of the message in some meaningful way,
      but MAY be redacted to "other" for local policy reasons.

I think "redacted" is not right here (causes confusion with the redaction I-D). I suggest "set".

Section 3.1 also states:

  For privacy reasons, report generators might need to redact portions
  of a reported message such as the end user whose complaint action
  resulted in the report.  A discussion of relevant issues and a
  suggested method for doing so can be found in
  [I-D.IETF-MARF-REDACTION].

I don't think you can redact an end user. :) I suggest "an identifier or address associated with the end user..."

Section 6.2 states: "These reports may be forged" and "DKIM failure reports may produce reports". I suggest changing "may" to "can" and "might", respectively.

Section 6.3 states:

  Limiting the rate of generation of these messages may be appropriate
  but threatens to inhibit the distribution of important and possibly
  time-sensitive information.

Do you mean "MAY"?

Section 6.5 states:

  The use of this for "near-identical" incidents in particular causes a
  degradation in reporting quality, however.  If for example a large
  number of pieces of spam arrive from one attacker, a reporting agent
  may decide only to send a report about a fraction of those messages.
  While this averts a flood of reports to a system administrator, the
  precise details of each incident are similarly not sent.

Do you mean "MAY"?

[Ballot discuss]
The Gen-ART Review by Alexey Melnikov on 14-Jan-2012 raised two
  concerns.  The authors and Alexey seem to have come to agreement
  on the appropriate changes, but they have not happened yet.

  1) Please reference RFC 4648, Section 4 for base64.

  2) Please update the ABNF as follows:

    spf-dns = "SPF-DNS:" [CFWS] ( "txt" / "spf" ) [CFWS] ":" [CFWS]
              domain [CFWS] ":" [CFWS] quoted-string [CFWS] CRLF

[Ballot comment]
- Section 2.4 (esp the title) is a bit odd, I'm sure its
there for a reason but its not at all clear to this reader.
(But I don't mind)

- 3.1 - who's SOURCE-IP is meant here? Might be clear from
ARP but not so clear from here - same for REPORTED-DOMAIN.
Better to be crystal clear really.

- 3.2.1 - the "policy" value is a bit vague, but that's ok
I guess.

- I'm not 100% clear about the rule for handling DKIM and
redaction. Is it that the sender just chooses whether to
send the unredacted possibly-DKIM-valid value or the
redacted version with no DKIM info, or are you just supposed
to never (as in MUST NOT) send a redacted message if the
message had DKIM header fields? That might be there but I
missed it if so.

[Ballot comment]
I find it a little odd that the requirements language for what's optional/required in the different reports (s3.2.*) appear in the section titles but not in the text.

State changed to In Last Call from Last Call Requested.

The following Last Call Announcement was sent out:

From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
To: IETF-Announce <ietf-announce@ietf.org>
CC: <marf@ietf.org>
Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org
Subject: Last Call: <draft-ietf-marf-authfailure-report-09.txt> (Authentication Failure Reporting using the Abuse Report Format) to Proposed Standard

The IESG has received a request from the Messaging Abuse Reporting Format
WG (marf) to consider the following document:
- 'Authentication Failure Reporting using the Abuse Report Format'
  <draft-ietf-marf-authfailure-report-09.txt> as a Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2012-01-18. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract

  This memo registers an extension report type to the Abuse Reporting
  Format (ARF), affecting multiple registries, for use in generating
  receipt-time reports about messages that fail one or more email
  message authentication checks.

The file can be obtained via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-marf-authfailure-report/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-marf-authfailure-report/

No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.

This I-D normatively references Experimental RFC 4408.

IANA has one question about the registrations requested by this document.

QUESTION: should the status for all these registrations be set to "current"?

ACTION 1:

Upon approval of this document, the following feedback type will be
added to the Feedback Report Type Values registry at
http://www.iana.org/assignments/marf-parameters

Feedback Type: auth-failure
Description: email authentication failure report
Registration: (this document)

ACTION 2:

The following headers will be added, with this document as a reference,
to the Feedback Report Header Fields registry at
http://www.iana.org/assignments/marf-parameters

Field Name: Auth-Failure
Description: Type of email authentication method failure
Multiple Appearances: No
Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure

Field Name: Delivery-Result
Description: Final disposition of the subject message
Multiple Appearances: No
Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure

Field Name: DKIM-ADSP-DNS
Description: Retrieved DKIM ADSP record
Multiple Appearances: No
Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure

Field Name: DKIM-Canonicalized-Body
Description: Canonicalized body, per DKIM
Multiple Appearances: No
Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure

Field Name: DKIM-Canonicalized-Header
Description: Canonicalized header, per DKIM
Multiple Appearances: No
Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure

Field Name: DKIM-Domain
Description: DKIM signing domain from "d=" tag
Multiple Appearances: No
Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure

Field Name: DKIM-Identity
Description: Identity from DKIM signature
Multiple Appearances: No
Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure

Field Name: DKIM-Selector
Description: Selector from DKIM signature
Multiple Appearances: No
Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure

Field Name: DKIM-Selector-DNS
Description: Retrieved DKIM key record
Multiple Appearances: No
Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure

Field Name: SPF-DNS
Description: Retrieved SPF record
Multiple Appearances: No
Related "Feedback-Type": auth-failure

We understand the above to be the only IANA actions for this document.

[Ballot comment]
I have no objection to the publicaiton of this document as an RFC, but
here are a few trivial nits.

---

Please expand "AF" on first use in the Abstract, and show it as the
abbreviation of "Abuse Report Format" on first use in the Introduction.

---

Section 3.1

  Delivery-Result:  As specified in Section 3.2.2.  This field is
      OPTIONAL, but MUST NOT appear more than once.  If present, it
      SHOULD indicate the outcome of the message in some meaningful way,
      but might be redacted to "other" for local policy reasons.

s/might/MAY/

---

Section 3.2.2

Please expand ADMD

---

Section 3.2.3

Please expand DKIM

---

Section 3.2.5

Please expand ADSP

---

Section 3.2.6

Please expand SPF

State changed to In Last Call from Last Call Requested.

The following Last Call Announcement was sent out:

From: The IESG <iesg-secretary@ietf.org>
To: IETF-Announce <ietf-announce@ietf.org>
CC: <marf@ietf.org>
Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org
Subject: Last Call: <draft-ietf-marf-authfailure-report-07.txt> (Authentication Failure Reporting using the Abuse Report Format) to Proposed Standard

The IESG has received a request from the Messaging Abuse Reporting Format
WG (marf) to consider the following document:
- 'Authentication Failure Reporting using the Abuse Report Format'
  <draft-ietf-marf-authfailure-report-07.txt> as a Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2012-01-04. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract

  This memo registers an extension report type to ARF, affecting
  multiple registries, for use in generating receipt-time reports about
  messages that fail one or more email authentication checks.

The file can be obtained via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-marf-authfailure-report/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-marf-authfailure-report/

No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.

PROTO writeup for draft-ietf-marf-authfailure-report

(1.a) Who is the Document Shepherd for this document? Has the
Document Shepherd personally reviewed this version of the
document and, in particular, does he or she believe this
version is ready for forwarding to the IESG for publication?

I (Murray Kucherawy) am the Document Shepherd. I have personally reviewed
the document and I believe it is ready for IESG consideration.

(1.b) Has the document had adequate review both from key WG members
and from key non-WG members? Does the Document Shepherd have
any concerns about the depth or breadth of the reviews that
have been performed?

The document has been through two Working Group Last Calls, including
spontaneous WG reviews and some I solicited directly. I have no concerns
about any lack in coverage of those reviews.

(1.c) Does the Document Shepherd have concerns that the document
needs more review from a particular or broader perspective,
e.g., security, operational complexity, someone familiar with
AAA, internationalization or XML?

I have no such concerns.

(1.d) Does the Document Shepherd have any specific concerns or
issues with this document that the Responsible Area Director
and/or the IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he
or she is uncomfortable with certain parts of the document, or
has concerns whether there really is a need for it. In any
event, if the WG has discussed those issues and has indicated
that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those
concerns here. Has an IPR disclosure related to this document
been filed? If so, please include a reference to the
disclosure and summarize the WG discussion and conclusion on
this issue.

I have no such concerns. There are no relevant IPR disclosures of which I am
aware. The document has a demonstrated need.

(1.e) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it
represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with
others being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and
agree with it?

The WG as a whole has reviewed it through two WGLCs, including some specific
members that I approached for reviews. The WG understands its need and
the contexts in which it will be useful.

(1.f) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme
discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in
separate email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It
should be in a separate email because this questionnaire is
entered into the ID Tracker.)

There have been no such indications.

(1.g) Has the Document Shepherd personally verified that the
document satisfies all ID nits? (See the Internet-Drafts Checklist
and http://tools.ietf.org/tools/idnits/). Boilerplate checks are
not enough; this check needs to be thorough. Has the document
met all formal review criteria it needs to, such as the MIB
Doctor, media type and URI type reviews?

All such requirements have been met. No specific review criteria need to
be met for this work.

(1.h) Has the document split its references into normative and
informative? Are there normative references to documents that
are not ready for advancement or are otherwise in an unclear
state? If such normative references exist, what is the
strategy for their completion? Are there normative references
that are downward references, as described in [RFC3967]? If
so, list these downward references to support the Area
Director in the Last Call procedure for them [RFC3967].

The document contains an appropriate normative/informative split of its
references.

There is a normative reference to draft-ietf-marf-redaction which is also
in Working Group Last Call. It will advance to the IESG shortly.

(1.i) Has the Document Shepherd verified that the document IANA
consideration section exists and is consistent with the body
of the document? If the document specifies protocol
extensions, are reservations requested in appropriate IANA
registries? Are the IANA registries clearly identified? If
the document creates a new registry, does it define the
proposed initial contents of the registry and an allocation
procedure for future registrations? Does it suggest a
reasonable name for the new registry? See [RFC5226]. If the
document describes an Expert Review process has Shepherd
conferred with the Responsible Area Director so that the IESG
can appoint the needed Expert during the IESG Evaluation?

The IANA Considerations section is present and complete; it updates existing
registries as needed by the remainder of the document.

(1.j) Has the Document Shepherd verified that sections of the
document that are written in a formal language, such as XML
code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc., validate correctly in
an automated checker?

I have run the ABNF through a checker via the WG Chairs' tools page. Errors
it found have been corrected.

(1.k) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document
Announcement Write-Up. Please provide such a Document
Announcement Write-Up? Recent examples can be found in the
"Action" announcements for approved documents. The approval
announcement contains the following sections:

Technical Summary

This memo registers an extension report type to ARF for use in
reporting messages that fail one or more authentication checks
performed on receipt of a message, with the option to include
forensic information describing the specifics of the failure.

Working Group Summary

This memo underwent two Working Group Last Calls because of the amount
of last-minute feedback generated during the first. There was no
controversy of note.

Document Quality

There is substantial deployment of ARF, upon which these extensions are
based. There is one widely deployed open source implementation of the
extension with more under development which will see widespread use.
Reviewers and expressions of intent to support included PayPal and Hotmail.