Guidelines for Use of the RTP Monitoring Framework
RFC 6792

Note: This ballot was opened for revision 18 and is now closed.

(Robert Sparks) (was Discuss, Yes) Yes

(Ron Bonica) No Objection

(Stewart Bryant) No Objection

(Gonzalo Camarillo) No Objection

(Benoît Claise) (was Discuss) No Objection

Comment (2012-09-25)
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Thanks for addressing all my points. 

For the record, I want to stress I didn't request, part of my review, the addition of the following sentence (added in version 22) part of my review:

   New RTCP XR report block definitions should not define new performance
   metrics, but should rather refer to metrics defined elsewhere

(Wesley Eddy) No Objection

(Adrian Farrel) No Objection

(Stephen Farrell) No Objection

Comment (2012-09-11 for -19)
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Saying "encryption of the monitoring report is recommended"
seems a bit trite. I'm not asking that you define precisely how
to secure all possible RTP deployment choices, but perhaps the
right thing to do here is to say that these metrics SHOULD be
secured to the same extent as the RTP flows that they measure.
(Or some such.)

How could you encrypt traffic for a 3rd party monitor without
knowing who that monitor is? That seems somewhat impossible
in general. So, as pointed out by the secdir review [1] the
document should at least recognise the problem and maybe 
describe some environments where it can in fact be solved.


(Brian Haberman) No Objection

(Russ Housley) No Objection

Comment (2012-09-09 for -18)
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  The authors report than changes are pending to handle the editorial
  comments raised in the Gen-ART Review by Meral Shirazipour on
  31-Jul-2012.  I hope the updated I-D will be posted prior to IESG
  approval of this document.

Barry Leiba No Objection

Comment (2012-09-12 for -19)
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Please consider expanding "RTP" in the first line of the Abstract.

(Pete Resnick) No Objection

(Martin Stiemerling) No Objection

(Sean Turner) No Objection