The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol
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From: The IESG <email@example.com> To: IETF-Announce <firstname.lastname@example.org> Cc: RFC Editor <email@example.com>, sidr mailing list <firstname.lastname@example.org>, sidr chair <email@example.com> Subject: Protocol Action: 'The RPKI/Router Protocol' to Proposed Standard (draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-26.txt) The IESG has approved the following document: - 'The RPKI/Router Protocol' (draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr-26.txt) as a Proposed Standard This document is the product of the Secure Inter-Domain Routing Working Group. The IESG contact persons are Stewart Bryant and Adrian Farrel. A URL of this Internet Draft is: http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-rtr/
Technical Summary In order to verifiably validate the origin ASs of BGP announcements, routers need a simple but reliable mechanism to receive RPKI [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] prefix origin data from a trusted cache. This document describes a protocol to deliver validated prefix origin data to routers. Working Group Summary There was significant discussion on-list about authentication protocols to be used between the 2 parties in play (router/cache), this did wind down to a conclusion though, which is a positive result. There was significant discussion during and after IETF Last Call on the implications of various TCP security models, and the draft has been updated to reflect the conclusion of these discussions. Document Quality There are no concerns over the quality of the document. As observed by reference in the document there are multiple implementations of the protocol. Personnel Chris Morrow is the Document Shepherd. Stewart Bryant is the Responsible Area Director.