Analysis of OSPF Security According to the Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) Design Guide
RFC 6863
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RFC - Informational
(March 2013; No errata)
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Last updated |
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2015-10-14
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draft-hartman-ospf-analysis
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IETF
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Submitted to IESG for Publication
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Document shepherd |
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Brian Weis
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Shepherd write-up |
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(last changed 2012-08-13)
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RFC 6863 (Informational)
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Responsible AD |
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Stewart Bryant
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Brian Weis <bew@cisco.com> is the document shepherd.
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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Hartman
Request for Comments: 6863 Painless Security
Category: Informational D. Zhang
ISSN: 2070-1721 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
March 2013
Analysis of OSPF Security According to the
Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) Design Guide
Abstract
This document analyzes OSPFv2 and OSPFv3 according to the guidelines
set forth in Section 4.2 of the "Keying and Authentication for
Routing Protocols (KARP) Design Guidelines" (RFC 6518). Key
components of solutions to gaps identified in this document are
already underway.
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for informational purposes.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6863.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Hartman & Zhang Informational [Page 1]
RFC 6863 OSPF Analysis March 2013
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements to Meet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Current State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. OSPFv2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. OSPFv3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Impacts of OSPF Replays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Gap Analysis and Specific Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Solution Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction
This document analyzes the current state of OSPFv2 and OSPFv3
according to the requirements of [RFC6518]. It builds on several
previous analysis efforts regarding routing security. The OPSEC
working group put together an analysis of cryptographic issues with
routing protocols [RFC6039]. Earlier, the RPSEC working group put
together a detailed analysis of OSPF vulnerabilities [OSPF-SEC].
Work on solutions to address gaps identified in this analysis is
underway [OSPF-MANKEY] [RFC6506].
OSPF meets many of the requirements expected from a manually keyed
routing protocol. Integrity protection is provided with modern
cryptographic algorithms. Algorithm agility is provided: the
algorithm can be changed as part of rekeying an interface or peer.
Intra-connection rekeying is provided by the specifications, although
apparently some implementations have trouble with this in practice.
OSPFv2 security does not interfere with prioritization of packets.
However, some gaps remain between the current state and the
requirements for manually keyed routing security expressed in
[RFC6862]. This document explores these gaps and proposes directions
for addressing the gaps.
Hartman & Zhang Informational [Page 2]
RFC 6863 OSPF Analysis March 2013
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