Analysis of BGP, LDP, PCEP, and MSDP Issues According to the Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) Design Guide
RFC 6952

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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                   M. Jethanandani
Request for Comments: 6952                             Ciena Corporation
Category: Informational                                         K. Patel
ISSN: 2070-1721                                       Cisco Systems, Inc
                                                                L. Zheng
                                                     Huawei Technologies
                                                                May 2013

      Analysis of BGP, LDP, PCEP, and MSDP Issues According to the
  Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) Design Guide

Abstract

   This document analyzes TCP-based routing protocols, the Border
   Gateway Protocol (BGP), the Label Distribution Protocol (LDP), the
   Path Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP), and the
   Multicast Source Distribution Protocol (MSDP), according to
   guidelines set forth in Section 4.2 of "Keying and Authentication for
   Routing Protocols Design Guidelines", RFC 6518.

Status of This Memo

   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
   published for informational purposes.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Not all documents
   approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
   Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6952.

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RFC 6952            BGP, LDP, PCEP, and MSDP Analysis           May 2013

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Current Assessment of BGP, LDP, PCEP, and MSDP  . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  Transport Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Keying Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.3.  BGP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.4.  LDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.4.1.  Spoofing Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.4.2.  Denial-of-Service Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.5.  PCEP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     2.6.  MSDP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   3.  Optimal State for BGP, LDP, PCEP, and MSDP  . . . . . . . . .  10
     3.1.  LDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   4.  Gap Analysis for BGP, LDP, PCEP, and MSDP . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.1.  LDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.2.  PCEP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   5.  Transition and Deployment Considerations  . . . . . . . . . .  13
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

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RFC 6952            BGP, LDP, PCEP, and MSDP Analysis           May 2013

1.  Introduction

   In their "Report from the IAB Workshop on Unwanted Traffic March
   9-10, 2006" [RFC4948], the Internet Architecture Board (IAB)
   described an attack on core routing infrastructure as an ideal attack
   that would inflict the greatest amount of damage and suggested steps
   to tighten the infrastructure against the attack.  Four main steps
   were identified for that tightening:

   1.  Create secure mechanisms and practices for operating routers.

   2.  Clean up the Internet Routing Registry (IRR) repository, and
       secure both the database and the access, so that it can be used