Analysis of BGP, LDP, PCEP, and MSDP Issues According to the Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) Design Guide
RFC 6952
| Document | Type | RFC - Informational (May 2013; No errata) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Mahesh Jethanandani , Keyur Patel , Lianshu Zheng | ||
| Last updated | 2015-10-14 | ||
| Stream | Internent Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | plain text html pdf htmlized (tools) htmlized bibtex | ||
| Reviews | |||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Document shepherd | Joel Halpern | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show (last changed 2012-09-12) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | RFC 6952 (Informational) | |
| Action Holders |
(None)
|
||
| Consensus Boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | |||
| Responsible AD | Stewart Bryant | ||
| IESG note | Joel Halpern (jmh@joelhalpern.com) is the document shepherd. | ||
| Send notices to | (None) | ||
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Jethanandani
Request for Comments: 6952 Ciena Corporation
Category: Informational K. Patel
ISSN: 2070-1721 Cisco Systems, Inc
L. Zheng
Huawei Technologies
May 2013
Analysis of BGP, LDP, PCEP, and MSDP Issues According to the
Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) Design Guide
Abstract
This document analyzes TCP-based routing protocols, the Border
Gateway Protocol (BGP), the Label Distribution Protocol (LDP), the
Path Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP), and the
Multicast Source Distribution Protocol (MSDP), according to
guidelines set forth in Section 4.2 of "Keying and Authentication for
Routing Protocols Design Guidelines", RFC 6518.
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for informational purposes.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6952.
Jethanandani, et al. Informational [Page 1]
RFC 6952 BGP, LDP, PCEP, and MSDP Analysis May 2013
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Current Assessment of BGP, LDP, PCEP, and MSDP . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Transport Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Keying Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. BGP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4. LDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4.1. Spoofing Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4.2. Denial-of-Service Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.5. PCEP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.6. MSDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3. Optimal State for BGP, LDP, PCEP, and MSDP . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1. LDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. Gap Analysis for BGP, LDP, PCEP, and MSDP . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1. LDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2. PCEP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. Transition and Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Jethanandani, et al. Informational [Page 2]
RFC 6952 BGP, LDP, PCEP, and MSDP Analysis May 2013
1. Introduction
In their "Report from the IAB Workshop on Unwanted Traffic March
9-10, 2006" [RFC4948], the Internet Architecture Board (IAB)
described an attack on core routing infrastructure as an ideal attack
that would inflict the greatest amount of damage and suggested steps
to tighten the infrastructure against the attack. Four main steps
were identified for that tightening:
1. Create secure mechanisms and practices for operating routers.
2. Clean up the Internet Routing Registry (IRR) repository, and
secure both the database and the access, so that it can be used
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