Duplicate Address Detection Proxy
RFC 6957

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                          F. Costa
Request for Comments: 6957                              J-M. Combes, Ed.
Category: Standards Track                                    X. Pougnard
ISSN: 2070-1721                                    France Telecom Orange
                                                                   H. Li
                                                     Huawei Technologies
                                                               June 2013

                   Duplicate Address Detection Proxy

Abstract

   The document describes a proxy-based mechanism allowing the use of
   Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) by IPv6 nodes in a point-to-
   multipoint architecture with a "split-horizon" forwarding scheme,
   primarily deployed for Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) and Fiber access
   architectures.  Based on the DAD signaling, the first-hop router
   stores in a Binding Table all known IPv6 addresses used on a point-
   to-multipoint domain (e.g., VLAN).  When a node performs DAD for an
   address already used by another node, the first-hop router defends
   the address rather than the device using the address.

Status of This Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6957.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Background  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Why Existing IETF Solutions Are Not Sufficient  . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Duplicate Address Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Neighbor Discovery Proxy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.3.  6LoWPAN Neighbor Discovery  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.4.  IPv6 Mobility Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Duplicate Address Detection Proxy (DAD-Proxy) Specifications    6
     4.1.  DAD-Proxy Data Structure  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  DAD-Proxy Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       4.2.1.  No Entry Exists for the Tentative Address . . . . . .   7
       4.2.2.  An Entry Already Exists for the Tentative Address . .   7
       4.2.3.  Confirmation of Reachability to Check the Validity of
               the Conflict  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  Manageability Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.1.  Interoperability with SEND  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.2.  Protection against IP Source Address Spoofing . . . . . .  11
   7.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Appendix A.  DAD-Proxy State Machine  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

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1.  Introduction

   This document specifies a function called Duplicate Address Detection
   (DAD) proxy allowing the use of DAD by the nodes on the same point-
   to-multipoint domain with a "split-horizon" forwarding scheme,
   primarily deployed for Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) and Fiber access
   architectures [TR-101].  It only impacts the first-hop router and it
   doesn't need modifications on the other IPv6 nodes.  This mechanism
   is fully effective if all the nodes of a point-to-multipoint domain
   (except the DAD proxy itself) perform DAD.

   This document explains also why the DAD mechanism [RFC4862] without a
   proxy cannot be used in a point-to-multipoint architecture with a
   "split-horizon" forwarding scheme (IPv6 over PPP [RFC5072] is not
   affected).  One of the main reasons is that, because of this
   forwarding scheme, IPv6 nodes on the same point-to-multipoint domain
   cannot have direct communication: any communication between them must
   go through the first-hop router of the same domain.

   It is assumed in this document that link-layer addresses on a point-
   to-multipoint domain are unique from the first-hop router's point of
   view (e.g., in an untrusted Ethernet architecture, this assumption
   can be guaranteed thanks to mechanisms such as Media Access Control
   (MAC) address translation performed by an aggregation device between
   IPv6 nodes and the first-hop router).

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2.  Background

   Terminology in this document follows that in "Neighbor Discovery for
   IP version 6 (IPv6)" [RFC4861] and "IPv6 Stateless Address
   Autoconfiguration" [RFC4862].  In addition, this section defines
   additional terms related to DSL and Fiber access architectures, which
   are an important case where the solution described in this document
   can be used:

   Customer Premises Equipment (CPE)
         The first IPv6 node in a customer's network.

   Access Node (AN)
         The first aggregation point in the public access network.  It
         is considered as an L2 bridge in this document.

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   Broadband Network Gateway (BNG)
         The first-hop router from the CPE's point of view.

   VLAN N:1 architecture
         A point-to-multipoint architecture where many CPEs are
         connected to the same VLAN.  The CPEs may be connected on the
         same or different Access Nodes.

   split-horizon model
         A forwarding scheme where CPEs cannot have direct layer 2
         communications between them (i.e., IP flows must be forwarded
         through the BNG via routing).

   The following figure shows where the different entities are, as
   defined above.

      +------+         +----+
      | CPE3 |---------| AN |
      +------+         +----+
                         |
                         |
      +------+         +----+
      | CPE2 |---------| AN |---+
      +------+         +----+   |
      +------+            |     |
      | CPE1 |------------+     |
      +------+               +-----+
                             | BNG |--- Internet
                             +-----+

                Figure 1: DSL and Fiber Access Architecture

3.  Why Existing IETF Solutions Are Not Sufficient

   In a DSL or Fiber access architecture depicted in Figure 1, CPE1,
   CPE2, CPE3, and the BNG are IPv6 nodes, while AN is an L2 bridge
   providing connectivity between the BNG and each CPE.  The AN enforces
   a split-horizon model so that CPEs can only send and receive frames
   (e.g., Ethernet frames) to and from the BNG but not to each other.
   That said, the BNG is on the same link with all CPEs, but a given CPE
   is not on the same link with any other CPE.

3.1.  Duplicate Address Detection

   Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) [RFC4862] is performed when an IPv6
   node verifies the uniqueness of a tentative IPv6 address.  This node
   sends a Neighbor Solicitation (NS) message with the IP destination
   set to the solicited-node multicast address of the tentative address.

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   This NS message is multicasted to other nodes on the same link.  When
   the tentative address is already used on the link by another node,
   this last one replies with a Neighbor Advertisement (NA) message to
   inform the first node.  So, when performing DAD, a node expects the
   NS messages to be received by any node currently using the tentative
   address.

   However, in a point-to-multipoint network with a split-horizon
   forwarding scheme implemented in the AN, the CPEs are prevented from
   talking to each other directly.  All packets sent out from a CPE are
   forwarded by the AN only to the BNG but not to any other CPE.  NS
   messages sent by a certain CPE will be received only by the BNG and
   will not reach other CPEs.  So, other CPEs have no idea that a
   certain IPv6 address is used by another CPE.  That means, in a
   network with split-horizon, DAD, as defined in [RFC4862], can't work
   properly without additional help.

3.2.  Neighbor Discovery Proxy

   Neighbor Discovery (ND) Proxy [RFC4389] is designed for forwarding ND
   messages between different IP links where the subnet prefix is the
   same.  An ND Proxy function on a bridge ensures that packets between
   nodes on different segments can be received by this function and have
   the correct link-layer address type on each segment.  When the ND
   Proxy receives a multicast ND message, it forwards it to all other
   interfaces on a same link.

   In DSL or Fiber networks, when the AN, acting as an ND Proxy,
   receives an ND message from a CPE, it will forward it to the BNG but
   none of the other CPEs, as only the BNG is on the same link with the
   CPE.  Hence, implementing ND Proxy on the AN would not help a CPE
   acknowledge link-local addresses used by other CPEs.

   As the BNG must not forward link-local scoped messages sent from a
   CPE to other CPEs, ND Proxy cannot be implemented in the BNG.

3.3.  6LoWPAN Neighbor Discovery

   [RFC6775] defines an optional modification of DAD for IPv6 over Low-
   Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN).  When a 6LoWPAN node
   wants to configure an IPv6 address, it registers that address with
   one or more of its default routers using the Address Registration
   Option (ARO).  If this address is already owned by another node, the
   router informs the 6LoWPAN node that this address cannot be
   configured.

   This mechanism requires modifications in all hosts in order to
   support the ARO.

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3.4.  IPv6 Mobility Manager

   According to [RFC6275], a home agent acts as a proxy for mobile nodes
   when they are away from the home network: the home agent defends a
   mobile node's home address by replying to NS messages with NA
   messages.

   There is a problem for this mechanism if it is applied in a DSL or
   Fiber public access network.  Operators of such networks require that
   an NA message is only received by the sender of the corresponding NS
   message, for security and scalability reasons.  However, the home
   agent per [RFC6275] multicasts NA messages on the home link and all
   nodes on this link will receive these NA messages.  This shortcoming
   prevents this mechanism from being deployed in DSL or Fiber access
   networks directly.

4.  Duplicate Address Detection Proxy (DAD-Proxy) Specifications

   First, it is important to note that, as this mechanism is strongly
   based on DAD [RFC4862], it is not completely reliable, and the goal
   of this document is not to fix DAD.

4.1.  DAD-Proxy Data Structure

   A BNG needs to store in a Binding Table information related to the
   IPv6 addresses generated by any CPE.  This Binding Table can be
   distinct from the Neighbor Cache.  This must be done per point-to-
   multipoint domain (e.g., per Ethernet VLAN).  Each entry in this
   Binding Table MUST contain the following fields:

   o  IPv6 Address

   o  Link-layer Address

   For security or performances reasons, it must be possible to limit
   the number of IPv6 addresses per link-layer address (possibly, but
   not necessarily, to 1).

   On the reception of an unsolicited NA (e.g., when a CPE wishes to
   inform its neighbors of a new link-layer address) for an IPv6 address
   already recorded in the Binding Table, each entry associated to this
   IPv6 address MUST be updated consequently: the current link-layer
   address is replaced by the one included in the unsolicited NA
   message.

   For security or performances reasons, the Binding Table MUST be large
   enough for the deployment in which it is used: if the Binding Table
   is distinct from the Neighbor Cache, it MUST be at least the same

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   size as this last one.  Implementations MUST either state the fixed
   size of the Binding Table that they support or make the size
   configurable.  In the latter case, implementations MUST state the
   largest Binding Table size that they support.  Additionally,
   implementations SHOULD allow an operator to inquire about the current
   occupancy level of the Binding Table to determine if it is about to
   become full.  Implementations encountering a full Binding Table will
   likely handle it in a way similar to NS message loss.

   It is recommended to apply technical solutions to minimize the risk
   that the Binding Table becomes full.  These solutions are out of the
   scope of this document.

4.2.  DAD-Proxy Mechanism

   When a CPE performs DAD, as specified in [RFC4862], it sends a
   Neighbor Solicitation (NS) message, with the unspecified address as
   the source address, in order to check if a tentative address is
   already in use on the link.  The BNG receives this message and MUST
   perform actions specified in the following sections based on the
   information in the Binding Table.

4.2.1.  No Entry Exists for the Tentative Address

   When there is no entry for the tentative address, the BNG MUST create
   one with the following information:

   o  IPv6 Address field set to the tentative address in the NS message.

   o  Link-layer Address field set to the link-layer source address in
      the link-layer header of the NS message.

   The BNG MUST NOT reply to the CPE or forward the NS message.

4.2.2.  An Entry Already Exists for the Tentative Address

   When there is an entry for the tentative address, the BNG MUST check
   the following conditions:

   o  The address in the Target Address field in the NS message is equal
      to the address in the IPv6 Address field in the entry.

   o  The source address of the IPv6 Header in the NS message is equal
      to the unspecified address.

   When these conditions are met and the source address of the link-
   layer header in the NS message is equal to the address in the Link-
   layer Address field in the entry, that means the CPE is still

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   performing DAD for this address.  The BNG MUST NOT reply to the CPE
   or forward the NS message.

   When these conditions are met and the source address of the link-
   layer header in the NS message is not equal to the address in the
   Link-layer Address field in the entry, that means possibly another
   CPE is performing DAD for an already owned address.  The BNG then has
   to verify whether there is a real conflict by checking if the CPE
   whose IPv6 address is in the entry is still connected.  In the
   following text, we will call IPv6-CPE1 the IPv6 address of the
   existing entry in the Binding Table, Link-layer-CPE1 the link-layer
   address of that entry, and Link-layer-CPE2 the link-layer address of
   the CPE that is performing DAD, which is different from Link-layer-
   CPE1.

   The BNG MUST check if the potential address conflict is real.  In
   particular:

   o  If IPv6-CPE1 is in the Neighbor Cache and it is associated with
      Link-layer-CPE1, the reachability of IPv6-CPE1 MUST be confirmed
      as explained in Section 4.2.3.

   o  If IPv6-CPE1 is in the Neighbor Cache, but in this cache it is
      associated with a link-layer address other than Link-layer-CPE1,
      that means that there is possibly a conflict with another CPE, but
      that CPE did not perform DAD.  This situation is out of the scope
      of this document, since one assumption made above is that all the
      nodes of a point-to-multipoint domain (except the DAD proxy
      itself) perform DAD.

   o  If IPv6-CPE1 is not in the Neighbor Cache, then the BNG MUST
      create a new entry based on the information of the entry in the
      Binding Table.  This step is necessary in order to trigger the
      reachability check as explained in Section 4.2.3.  The entry in
      the Neighbor Cache MUST be created based on the algorithm defined
      in Section 7.3.3 of [RFC4861], in particular by treating this case
      as though a packet other than a solicited Neighbor Advertisement
      were received from IPv6-CPE1.  Thus, the new entry of the Neighbor
      Cache MUST contain the following information:

      *  IPv6 address: IPv6-CPE1

      *  Link-layer address: Link-layer-CPE1

      *  State: STALE

      The reachability of IPv6-CPE1 MUST be confirmed as soon as
      possible following the procedure explained in Section 4.2.3.

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4.2.3.  Confirmation of Reachability to Check the Validity of the
        Conflict

   Given that the IPv6-CPE1 is in an entry of the Neighbor Cache, the
   reachability of IPv6-CPE1 is checked by using the Neighbor
   Unreachability Detection (NUD) mechanism described in Section 7.3.1
   of [RFC4861].  This mechanism MUST be triggered as though a packet
   had to be sent to IPv6-CPE1.  Note that in some cases this mechanism
   does not do anything.  For instance, if the state of the entry is
   REACHABLE and a positive confirmation was received recently that the
   forward path to the IPv6-CPE1 was functioning properly (see RFC 4861
   for more details), this mechanism does not do anything.

   Next, the behavior of the BNG depends on the result of the NUD
   process, as explained in the following sections.

4.2.3.1.  The Result of the NUD Process is Negative

   If the result of the NUD process is negative (i.e., if this process
   removes IPv6-CPE1 from the Neighbor Cache), that means that the
   potential conflict is not real.

   The conflicting entry in the Binding Table (Link-layer-CPE1) is
   deleted and it is replaced by a new entry with the same IPv6 address,
   but the link-layer address of the CPE is performing DAD (Link-layer-
   CPE2), as explained in Section 4.2.1.

4.2.3.2.  The Result of the NUD Process is Positive

   If the result of the NUD process is positive (i.e., if after this
   process the state of IPv6-CPE1 is REACHABLE), that means that the
   potential conflict is real.

   As shown in Figure 2, the BNG MUST reply to the CPE that is
   performing DAD (CPE2 in Figure 1) with an NA message that has the
   following format:

   Layer 2 Header Fields:

         Source Address
               The link-layer address of the interface on which the BNG
               received the NS message.

         Destination Address
               The source address in the Layer 2 Header of the NS
               message received by the BNG (i.e., Link-layer-CPE2).

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   IPv6 Header Fields:

         Source Address
               An address assigned to the interface from which the
               advertisement is sent.

         Destination Address
               The all-nodes multicast address.

   ICMPv6 Fields:

         Target Address
               The tentative address already used (i.e., IPv6-CPE1).

         Target Link-layer Address
               The link-layer address of the interface on which the BNG
               received the NS message.

     CPE1      CPE2       BNG
      |         |          |
   (a)|         |          |
      |         |          |
   (b)|===================>|
      |         |          |(c)
      |         |          |
      |      (d)|          |
      |         |          |
      |      (e)|=========>|
      |         |          |
      |         |<=========|(f)
      |         |          |

   (a) CPE1 generates a tentative address
   (b) CPE1 performs DAD for this one
   (c) BNG updates its Binding Table
   (d) CPE2 generates a same tentative address
   (e) CPE2 performs DAD for this one
   (f) BNG informs CPE2 that DAD fails

                           Figure 2: DAD Failure

   The BNG and the CPE MUST support the unicast transmission on the link
   layer of IPv6 multicast messages [RFC6085], to be able, respectively,
   to generate and to process such a packet format.

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5.  Manageability Considerations

   The BNG SHOULD support a mechanism to log and emit alarms whenever a
   duplication of IPv6 addresses is detected by the DAD-Proxy function.
   Moreover, the BNG SHOULD implement a function to allow an operator to
   access logs and to see the current entries in the Binding Table.  The
   management of access rights to get this information is out of the
   scope of this document.

6.  Security Considerations

6.1.  Interoperability with SEND

   The mechanism described in this document will not interoperate with
   SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) [RFC3971].  This is due to the BNG
   not owning the private key associated with the Cryptographically
   Generated Address (CGA) [RFC3972] needed to correctly sign the
   proxied ND messages [RFC5909].

   Secure Proxy ND Support for SEND [RFC6496] has been specified to
   address this limitation, and it SHOULD be implemented and used on the
   BNG and the CPEs.

6.2.  Protection against IP Source Address Spoofing

   To ensure protection against IP source address spoofing in data
   packets, this proposal can be used in combination with Source Address
   Validation Improvement (SAVI) mechanisms [RFC6620] [SAVI-SEND]
   [SAVI-MIX].

   If SAVI mechanisms are used, the SAVI device is the BNG, and the
   Binding Anchor for a CPE is its MAC address, which is assumed to be
   unique in this document (cf. Section 1).

7.  Acknowledgments

   The authors would like to thank Alan Kavanagh, Wojciech Dec, Suresh
   Krishnan, and Tassos Chatzithomaoglou for their comments.  The
   authors would like also to thank the IETF 6man WG members and the BBF
   community for their support.

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8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
               Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC4861]   Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
               "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
               September 2007.

   [RFC4862]   Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless
               Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862, September 2007.

   [RFC6085]   Gundavelli, S., Townsley, M., Troan, O., and W. Dec,
               "Address Mapping of IPv6 Multicast Packets on Ethernet",
               RFC 6085, January 2011.

8.2.  Informative References

   [RFC3971]   Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure
               Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.

   [RFC3972]   Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)",
               RFC 3972, March 2005.

   [RFC4389]   Thaler, D., Talwar, M., and C. Patel, "Neighbor Discovery
               Proxies (ND Proxy)", RFC 4389, April 2006.

   [RFC5072]   Varada, S., Ed., Haskins, D., and E. Allen, "IP Version 6
               over PPP", RFC 5072, September 2007.

   [RFC5909]   Combes, J-M., Krishnan, S., and G. Daley, "Securing
               Neighbor Discovery Proxy: Problem Statement", RFC 5909,
               July 2010.

   [RFC6275]   Perkins, C., Johnson, D., and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support
               in IPv6", RFC 6275, July 2011.

   [RFC6496]   Krishnan, S., Laganier, J., Bonola, M., and A.  Garcia-
               Martinez, "Secure Proxy ND Support for SEcure Neighbor
               Discovery (SEND)", RFC 6496, February 2012.

   [RFC6620]   Nordmark, E., Bagnulo, M., and E. Levy-Abegnoli, "FCFS
               SAVI: First-Come, First-Served Source Address Validation
               Improvement for Locally Assigned IPv6 Addresses", RFC
               6620, May 2012.

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   [RFC6775]   Shelby, Z., Chakrabarti, S., Nordmark, E., and C.
               Bormann, "Neighbor Discovery Optimization for IPv6 over
               Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs)",
               RFC 6775, November 2012.

   [SAVI-MIX]  Bi, J., Yao, G., Halpern, J., and E. Levy-Abegnoli, Ed.,
               "SAVI for Mixed Address Assignment Methods Scenario",
               Work in Progress, May 2013.

   [SAVI-SEND] Bagnulo, M. and A. Garcia-Martinez, "SEND-based Source-
               Address Validation Implementation", Work in Progress,
               April 2013.

   [TR-101]    The Broadband Forum, "Migration to Ethernet-Based DSL
               Aggregation", Issue 2, Technical Report TR-101, July
               2011, <http://www.broadband-forum.org/technical/download/
               TR-101_Issue-2.pdf>.

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Appendix A.  DAD-Proxy State Machine

   This appendix, which is informative, contains a summary (cf. Table 1)
   of the actions done by the BNG when it receives a DAD-based NS
   (DAD-NS) message.  The tentative address in this message is IPv6-CPE1
   and the associated link-layer address is Link-layer-CPE2.  The
   actions are precisely specified in Section 4.2.

   +------------+--------------------+--------------------+------------+
   | Event      | Check              | Action             | New event  |
   +------------+--------------------+--------------------+------------+
   | DAD-NS     | * No entry for     | Create an entry    | -          |
   | message    | IPv6-CPE1 in the   | for IPv6-CPE1      |            |
   | reception. | Binding Table.     | bound to Link-     |            |
   |            |                    | layer-CPE2 in the  |            |
   |            |                    | Binding Table.     |            |
   |            | * Entry for        | -                  | Existing   |
   |            | IPv6-CPE1 in the   |                    | entry.     |
   |            | Binding Table.     |                    |            |
   |            |                    |                    |            |
   | Existing   | * Link-layer-CPE2  | -                  | -          |
   | entry.     | bound to IPv6-CPE1 |                    |            |
   |            | in the Binding     |                    |            |
   |            | Table.             |                    |            |
   |            | * Another link-    | -                  | Conflict?  |
   |            | layer address,     |                    |            |
   |            | Link-layer-CPE1,   |                    |            |
   |            | bound to IPv6-CPE1 |                    |            |
   |            | in the Binding     |                    |            |
   |            | Table.             |                    |            |
   |            |                    |                    |            |
   | Conflict?  | * IPv6-CPE1        | -                  | Reachable? |
   |            | associated to      |                    |            |
   |            | Link-layer-CPE1 in |                    |            |
   |            | the Neighbor       |                    |            |
   |            | Cache.             |                    |            |
   |            | * IPv6-CPE1        | Out of scope.      | -          |
   |            | associated to      |                    |            |
   |            | another link-layer |                    |            |
   |            | address than Link- |                    |            |
   |            | layer-CPE1 in the  |                    |            |
   |            | Neighbor Cache.    |                    |            |
   |            | * IPv6-CPE1 is not | Create an entry    | Reachable? |
   |            | in the Neighbor    | for IPv6-CPE1      |            |
   |            | Cache.             | associated to      |            |
   |            |                    | Link-layer-CPE1 in |            |
   |            |                    | the Neighbor       |            |
   |            |                    | Cache.             |            |

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RFC 6957                        DAD-Proxy                      June 2013

   | Reachable? | * NUD process is   | IPv6-CPE2 is bound | -          |
   |            | negative.          | to Link-layer-     |            |
   |            |                    | CPE2, instead to   |            |
   |            |                    | Link-layer-CPE1,   |            |
   |            |                    | in the Binding     |            |
   |            |                    | Table.             |            |
   |            | * NUD process is   | A NA message is    | -          |
   |            | positive.          | sent.              |            |
   +------------+--------------------+--------------------+------------+

                     Table 1: DAD-Proxy State Machine

Costa, et al.                Standards Track                   [Page 15]
RFC 6957                        DAD-Proxy                      June 2013

Authors' Addresses

   Fabio Costa
   France Telecom Orange
   61 rue des Archives
   75141 Paris Cedex 03
   France

   EMail: fabio.costa@orange.com

   Jean-Michel Combes (editor)
   France Telecom Orange
   38 rue du General Leclerc
   92794 Issy-les-Moulineaux Cedex 9
   France

   EMail: jeanmichel.combes@orange.com

   Xavier Pougnard
   France Telecom Orange
   2 avenue Pierre Marzin
   22300 Lannion
   France

   EMail: xavier.pougnard@orange.com

   Hongyu Li
   Huawei Technologies
   Huawei Industrial Base
   Shenzhen
   China

   EMail: lihy@huawei.com

Costa, et al.                Standards Track                   [Page 16]