The eduroam Architecture for Network Roaming
RFC 7593
| Document | Type |
RFC - Informational
(September 2015; Errata)
Was draft-wierenga-ietf-eduroam (individual)
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Last updated | 2017-03-15 | ||
| Stream | ISE | ||
| Formats | plain text pdf html bibtex | ||
| IETF conflict review | conflict-review-wierenga-ietf-eduroam | ||
| Stream | ISE state | Published RFC | |
| Consensus Boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Document shepherd | Adrian Farrel | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show (last changed 2015-06-21) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | RFC 7593 (Informational) | |
| Telechat date | |||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | IANA OK - No Actions Needed | |
| IANA action state | No IANA Actions | ||
Independent Submission K. Wierenga
Request for Comments: 7593 Cisco Systems
Category: Informational S. Winter
ISSN: 2070-1721 RESTENA
T. Wolniewicz
Nicolaus Copernicus University
September 2015
The eduroam Architecture for Network Roaming
Abstract
This document describes the architecture of the eduroam service for
federated (wireless) network access in academia. The combination of
IEEE 802.1X, the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), and RADIUS
that is used in eduroam provides a secure, scalable, and deployable
service for roaming network access. The successful deployment of
eduroam over the last decade in the educational sector may serve as
an example for other sectors, hence this document. In particular,
the initial architectural choices and selection of standards are
described, along with the changes that were prompted by operational
experience.
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
published for informational purposes.
This is a contribution to the RFC Series, independently of any other
RFC stream. The RFC Editor has chosen to publish this document at
its discretion and makes no statement about its value for
implementation or deployment. Documents approved for publication by
the RFC Editor are not a candidate for any level of Internet
Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7593.
Wierenga, et al. Informational [Page 1]
RFC 7593 eduroam September 2015
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3. Design Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4. Solutions That Were Considered . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Classic Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.1. IEEE 802.1X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.2. EAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2. Federation Trust Fabric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.1. RADIUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3. Issues with Initial Trust Fabric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.1. Server Failure Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2. No Signaling of Error Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.3. Routing Table Complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.4. UDP Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.5. Insufficient Payload Encryption and EAP Server Validation 16
4. New Trust Fabric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.1. RADIUS with TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.2. Dynamic Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2.1. Discovery of Responsible Server . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2.2. Verifying Server Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.2.3. Operational Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2.4. Possible Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5. Abuse Prevention and Incident Handling . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.1. Incident Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.1.1. Blocking Users on the SP Side . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.1.2. Blocking Users on the IdP Side . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.1.3. Communicating Account Blocking to the End User . . . 25
5.2. Operator Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.3. Chargeable User Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.1. Collusion of Service Providers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.2. Exposing User Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
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