Security at the Attribute-Value Pair (AVP) Level for Non-neighboring Diameter Nodes: Scenarios and Requirements
RFC 7966

Document Type RFC - Informational (September 2016; No errata)
Last updated 2016-09-23
Replaces draft-tschofenig-dime-e2e-sec-req
Stream IETF
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Stream WG state Submitted to IESG for Publication
Document shepherd Lionel Morand
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IESG IESG state RFC 7966 (Informational)
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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                     H. Tschofenig
Request for Comments: 7966
Category: Informational                                 J. Korhonen, Ed.
ISSN: 2070-1721                                         Broadcom Limited
                                                                 G. Zorn
                                                             Network Zen
                                                               K. Pillay
                                                      Internet Solutions
                                                          September 2016

          Security at the Attribute-Value Pair (AVP) Level for
       Non-neighboring Diameter Nodes: Scenarios and Requirements

Abstract

   This specification specifies requirements for providing Diameter
   security at the level of individual Attribute-Value Pairs (AVPs).

Status of This Memo

   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
   published for informational purposes.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Not all documents
   approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
   Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7966.

Tschofenig, et al.            Informational                     [Page 1]
RFC 7966               Diameter AVP-Level Security        September 2016

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Security Threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Scenarios for Diameter AVP-Level Protection . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11

Tschofenig, et al.            Informational                     [Page 2]
RFC 7966               Diameter AVP-Level Security        September 2016

1.  Introduction

   The Diameter base protocol specification [2] defines security
   protection between neighboring Diameter peers.  Diameter mandates
   that peer connections must be protected by Transport Layer Security
   (TLS) [6] for TCP, by Datagram TLS (DTLS) [7] for the Stream Control
   Transmission Protocol (SCTP), or by security mechanisms that are
   independent of Diameter (such as IPsec [5]).  These security
   protocols offer a wide range of security properties, including entity
   authentication, data-origin authentication, integrity protection,
   confidentiality protection, and replay protection.  They also support
   a large number of cryptographic algorithms, algorithm negotiation,
   and different types of credentials.  It should be understood that
   TLS/DTLS/IPsec in the Diameter context does not provide end-to-end
   security unless the Diameter nodes are direct peers, i.e.,
   neighboring Diameter nodes.  The current Diameter security is
   realized hop by hop.

   The need to also offer additional security protection of AVPs between
   non-neighboring Diameter nodes was recognized very early in the work
   on Diameter.  This led to work on Diameter security using the
   Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [3].  However, due to the lack of
   deployment interest at that time (and the complexity of the developed
   solution), the specification was never completed.

   In the meanwhile, Diameter had received a lot of deployment interest
   from the cellular operator community, and because of the
   sophistication of those deployments, the need for protecting Diameter
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