Edwards-Curve Digital Security Algorithm (EdDSA) for DNSSEC
RFC 8080

Received changes through RFC Editor sync (created alias RFC 8080, changed title to 'Edwards-Curve Digital Security Algorithm (EdDSA) for DNSSEC', changed abstract to 'This document describes how to specify Edwards-curve Digital Security Algorithm (EdDSA) keys and signatures in DNS Security (DNSSEC).  It uses EdDSA with the choice of two curves: Ed25519 and Ed448.', changed pages to 7, changed standardization level to Proposed Standard, changed state to RFC, added RFC published event at 2017-02-14, changed IESG state to RFC Published)

[Ballot comment]
I am a little suprised to read this:

"A sufficiently large
  quantum computer would be able to break both. "
What's sufficiently large in terms of quantum comupting? Is it really already necessary to say this?

And here:
"Reasonable projections of the abilities of classical computers conclude that Ed25519 is perfectly safe."
What's perfectly safe?

However no need to change anything... was just wondering.

(Via drafts-lastcall-comment@iana.org): IESG/Authors/WG Chairs:

The IANA Services Operator has completed its review of draft-ietf-curdle-dnskey-eddsa-02.txt. If any part of this review is inaccurate, please let us know.

The IANA Services Operator understands that, upon approval of this document, there is a single action which we must complete.

In the DNS Security Algorithm Numbers located at:

https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/

two new algorithm numbers are to be registered as follows:

Number: [ TBD-at-registration ]
Description: Ed25519
Mnemonic: Ed25519
Zone Signing: Y
Trans. Sec.: *
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]

Number: [ TBD-at-registration ]
Description: Ed448
Mnemonic: Ed448
Zone Signing: Y
Trans. Sec.: *
Reference: [ RFC-to-be ]

The IANA Services Operator understands that this is the only action required to be completed upon approval of this document.

Note:  The actions requested in this document will not be completed until the document has been approved for publication as an RFC. This message is only to confirm what actions will be performed.

Thank you,

Sabrina Tanamal
IANA Services Specialist
PTI

The following Last Call announcement was sent out:

From: The IESG
To: "IETF-Announce"
CC: curdle@ietf.org, curdle-chairs@ietf.org, daniel.migault@ericsson.com, draft-ietf-curdle-dnskey-eddsa@ietf.org, "Daniel Migault" , stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie
Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org
Sender:
Subject: CORRECTED Last Call:  (EdDSA for DNSSEC) to Proposed Standard


The IESG has received a request from the CURves, Deprecating and a Little
more Encryption WG (curdle) to consider the following document:
- 'EdDSA for DNSSEC'
  as Proposed Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2016-12-16. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


  This document describes how to specify EdDSA keys and signatures in
  DNS Security (DNSSEC).  It uses the Edwards-curve Digital Security
  Algorithm (EdDSA) with the choice of two curves, Ed25519 and Ed448.




The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-dnskey-eddsa/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-dnskey-eddsa/ballot/


No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.


The document contains these normative downward references.
See RFC 3967 for additional information:
    draft-irtf-cfrg-eddsa: Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)  (None - Independent Submission Editor stream)
    rfc7748: Elliptic Curves for Security (Informational - Independent Submission Editor stream)
Note that some of these references may already be listed in the acceptable Downref Registry.

The following Last Call announcement was sent out:

From: The IESG
To: "IETF-Announce"
CC: curdle@ietf.org, curdle-chairs@ietf.org, daniel.migault@ericsson.com, draft-ietf-curdle-dnskey-eddsa@ietf.org, "Daniel Migault" , stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie
Reply-To: ietf@ietf.org
Sender:
Subject: Last Call:  (EdDSA for DNSSEC) to Internet Standard


The IESG has received a request from the CURves, Deprecating and a Little
more Encryption WG (curdle) to consider the following document:
- 'EdDSA for DNSSEC'
  as Internet Standard

The IESG plans to make a decision in the next few weeks, and solicits
final comments on this action. Please send substantive comments to the
ietf@ietf.org mailing lists by 2016-12-16. Exceptionally, comments may be
sent to iesg@ietf.org instead. In either case, please retain the
beginning of the Subject line to allow automated sorting.

Abstract


  This document describes how to specify EdDSA keys and signatures in
  DNS Security (DNSSEC).  It uses the Edwards-curve Digital Security
  Algorithm (EdDSA) with the choice of two curves, Ed25519 and Ed448.




The file can be obtained via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-dnskey-eddsa/

IESG discussion can be tracked via
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-dnskey-eddsa/ballot/


No IPR declarations have been submitted directly on this I-D.


The document contains these normative downward references.
See RFC 3967 for additional information:
    rfc4033: DNS Security Introduction and Requirements (Proposed Standard - IETF stream)
    rfc4035: Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions (Proposed Standard - IETF stream)
    draft-irtf-cfrg-eddsa: Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)  (None -IRTF stream)
    rfc4034: Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions (Proposed Standard - IETF stream)
    rfc7748: Elliptic Curves for Security (Informational - IRTF stream)
Note that some of these references may already be listed in the acceptable Downref Registry.

As required by RFC 4858, this is the current template for the Document
Shepherd Write-Up.

Changes are expected over time. This version is dated 24 February 2012.

(1) What type of RFC is being requested (BCP, Proposed Standard,
Internet Standard, Informational, Experimental, or Historic)?  Why
is this the proper type of RFC?  Is this type of RFC indicated in the
title page header?

The request for draft-ietf-curdle-dnskey-eddsa-02 is an RFC of type Proposed Standard. This is appropriated as the current draft describes a protocol to compute a signature and check the signature. The intended type is indicated in the header of the document.

(2) The IESG approval announcement includes a Document Announcement
Write-Up. Please provide such a Document Announcement Write-Up. Recent
examples can be found in the "Action" announcements for approved
documents. The approval announcement contains the following sections:

Technical Summary

  Relevant content can frequently be found in the abstract
  and/or introduction of the document. If not, this may be
  an indication that there are deficiencies in the abstract
  or introduction.

  This document describes how to specify EdDSA keys and signatures in
  DNS Security (DNSSEC).  It uses the Edwards-curve Digital Security
  Algorithm (EdDSA) with the choice of two curves, Ed25519 and Ed448.
 
Working Group Summary

  Was there anything in WG process that is worth noting? For
  example, was there controversy about particular points or
  were there decisions where the consensus was particularly
  rough?

  The definition of the signature format was straight forward as it already exist in DNSSEC. In addition the computation and verification of the signature is defined in [I-D.irtf-cfrg-eddsa].
 
  The only discussion was upon the use of using Ed25519ctx versus  Ed25519, but the consensus was reached easily. The same discussion also occurred for draft-ietf-ipsecme-eddsa and draft-ietf-curdle-pkix with the same conclusion. The absence of context follows the recommendations of Section 10.3 of I-D.irtf-cfrg-eddsa and avoids unnecessarily complexity.

  """
10.3.  Use of contexts

  Contexts can be used to separate uses of the protocol between
  different protocols (which is very hard to reliably do otherwise) and
  between different uses within the same protocol.  However, the
  following SHOULD be kept in mind when using this facility:

      The context SHOULD be a constant string specified by the protocol
      using it.  It SHOULD NOT incorporate variable elements from the
      message itself.

      Contexts SHOULD NOT be used opportunistically, as that kind of use
      is very error-prone.  If contexts are used, one SHOULD require all
      signature schemes available for use in that purpose support
      contexts.

      Contexts are an extra input, which percolates out of APIs, as
      such, even if signature scheme supports contexts, those may not be
      available for use.  This problem is compounded by the fact that
      many times the application is not invoking the signing and
      verification functions directly, but via some other protocol.
"""
 
Document Quality

  Are there existing implementations of the protocol? Have a
  significant number of vendors indicated their plan to
  implement the specification? Are there any reviewers that
  merit special mention as having done a thorough review,
  e.g., one that resulted in important changes or a
  conclusion that the document had no substantive issues? If
  there was a MIB Doctor, Media Type or other expert review,
  what was its course (briefly)? In the case of a Media Type
  review, on what date was the request posted?

  The document has been reviewed carefully. Examples have been generated with prototypes. Although no implementations have been reported in the document, there are ongoing effort. Ondrej Sury reported:
  """
PowerDNS has a preliminary implementation of Ed25519 support using SUPERCOP.

And I have written crude RRSIG generator to generate examples in DNSKEY draft using python3 library from cfrg-eddsa draft:
https://gitlab.labs.nic.cz/labs/ietf/blob/master/dnskey.py
  """

  Who is the Document Shepherd? Who is the Responsible Area
  Director?
  Document Shepherd: Daniel Migault
  AD Director: Stephen Farrell
 
(3) Briefly describe the review of this document that was performed by
the Document Shepherd.  If this version of the document is not ready
for publication, please explain why the document is being forwarded to
the IESG.

  I reviewed the document. The document is ready in my opinion.
 
(4) Does the document Shepherd have any concerns about the depth or
breadth of the reviews that have been performed?

  No. There has been a few reviews by the appropriated persons. Comments and remarks have been addressed.


(5) Do portions of the document need review from a particular or from
broader perspective, e.g., security, operational complexity, AAA, DNS,
DHCP, XML, or internationalization? If so, describe the review that
took place.

    The document has been reviewed by people that are also active members in DNSOP. Thus I believe a cross area review has been done.

(6) Describe any specific concerns or issues that the Document Shepherd
has with this document that the Responsible Area Director and/or the
IESG should be aware of? For example, perhaps he or she is uncomfortable
with certain parts of the document, or has concerns whether there really
is a need for it. In any event, if the WG has discussed those issues and
has indicated that it still wishes to advance the document, detail those
concerns here.

None.

(7) Has each author confirmed that any and all appropriate IPR
disclosures required for full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78
and BCP 79 have already been filed. If not, explain why.

Ondrej Sury and Robert Edmonds explicitly mention they are not aware of any IPR.

(8) Has an IPR disclosure been filed that references this document?
If so, summarize any WG discussion and conclusion regarding the IPR
disclosures.


(9) How solid is the WG consensus behind this document? Does it
represent the strong concurrence of a few individuals, with others
being silent, or does the WG as a whole understand and agree with it? 

8 people have reviewed the document including the authors. Regarding the group I am considering there is a consensus.

(10) Has anyone threatened an appeal or otherwise indicated extreme
discontent? If so, please summarise the areas of conflict in separate
email messages to the Responsible Area Director. (It should be in a
separate email because this questionnaire is publicly available.)

No.

(11) Identify any ID nits the Document Shepherd has found in this
document. (See https://www.ietf.org/tools/idnits/ and the Internet-Drafts
Checklist). Boilerplate checks are not enough; this check needs to be
thorough.

The two errors reported by ldnit with the verbose mode are:

  ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational draft:
    draft-irtf-cfrg-eddsa (ref. 'I-D.irtf-cfrg-eddsa')

  ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 7748

draft-irtf-cfrg-eddsa describes the elliptic curve signature scheme
Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA).  The algorithm is
instantiated with recommended parameters for the edwards25519 and edwards448 curves.
RFC 7748 specifies two elliptic curves over prime fields that offer
a high level of practical security in cryptographic applications: Curve25519 and Curve448.

This document is from the IRTF which does not define standards. The current document describes the use of this algorithm.  The draft is in the RFC Editor Queue and has been approved by the IESG.

The Downref is justified by RFC3967 as it falls into the following case:
  o  A standards track document may need to refer to a protocol or
      algorithm developed by an external body but modified, adapted, or
      profiled by an IETF informational RFC.

(12) Describe how the document meets any required formal review
criteria, such as the MIB Doctor, media type, and URI type reviews.

No need for such reviews.

(13) Have all references within this document been identified as
either normative or informative?

Yes.

(14) Are there normative references to documents that are not ready for
advancement or are otherwise in an unclear state? If such normative
references exist, what is the plan for their completion?

No.

(15) Are there downward normative references references (see RFC 3967)?
If so, list these downward references to support the Area Director in
the Last Call procedure.

Yes. see section (11)

(16) Will publication of this document change the status of any
existing RFCs? Are those RFCs listed on the title page header, listed
in the abstract, and discussed in the introduction? If the RFCs are not
listed in the Abstract and Introduction, explain why, and point to the
part of the document where the relationship of this document to the
other RFCs is discussed. If this information is not in the document,
explain why the WG considers it unnecessary.

No.


(17) Describe the Document Shepherd's review of the IANA considerations
section, especially with regard to its consistency with the body of the
document. Confirm that all protocol extensions that the document makes
are associated with the appropriate reservations in IANA registries.
Confirm that any referenced IANA registries have been clearly
identified. Confirm that newly created IANA registries include a
detailed specification of the initial contents for the registry, that
allocations procedures for future registrations are defined, and a
reasonable name for the new registry has been suggested (see RFC 5226).

DNSSEC Algorithms are mentioned here:
http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers/dns-sec-alg-numbers.xhtml

The following parameters are needed:

    - Number (Assigned by IANA)
    - Description
    - Mnemonic
    - ZoneSigning
    - Trans. Sec. stands for transaction security. Possible values are Y/N *
    - Reference  (The current document) 

The document Section 8 specifies all necessary parameters:

            +--------------+---------------+---------------+
            | Number      | TBD          | TBD          |
            | Description  | Ed25519      | Ed448        |
            | Mnemonic    | ED25519      | Ed448        |
            | Zone Signing | Y            | Y            |
            | Trans. Sec.  | *            | *            |
            | Reference    | This document | This document |
            +--------------+---------------+---------------+

    * There has been no determination of standardization of the use of
                this algorithm with Transaction Security.

(18) List any new IANA registries that require Expert Review for future
allocations. Provide any public guidance that the IESG would find
useful in selecting the IANA Experts for these new registries.

No expert reviewers are mentioned in the previous page.

The following page: http://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-parameters/dns-parameters.xhtml

mentions the following experts:
[Donald_E_Eastlake] Donald E. Eastlake, III mailto:d3e3e3&gmail.com 1997-11
[George_Barwood] George Barwood mailto:george.barwood&blueyonder.co.uk 2011-06-06
[Jim_Reid] Jim Reid mailto:jim&telnic.org 2008-01-21
[Michael_Patton] Michael Patton mailto:map&bbn.com 1995-06
[Patrik_Faltstrom] Patrik Fältström mailto:paf&frobbit.se 2015-01-05
[Phillip_Hallam_Baker] Phillip Hallam-Baker mailto:phill&hallambaker.com 2011-04-07
[Sam_Weiler] Sam Weiler mailto:weiler+iana&tislabs.com 2005-12
[Wolfgang_Riedel] Wolfgang Riedel mailto:wolfgang&cisco.com 2016-02-26
[Wouter_Wijngaards] Wouter Wijngaards mailto:wouter&nlnetlabs.nl 2010-02-17

The most recent experts are:
[Patrik_Faltstrom] Patrik Fältström mailto:paf&frobbit.se 2015-01-05
[Wolfgang_Riedel] Wolfgang Riedel mailto:wolfgang&cisco.com 2016-02-26

(19) Describe reviews and automated checks performed by the Document
Shepherd to validate sections of the document written in a formal
language, such as XML code, BNF rules, MIB definitions, etc.

No need to be done.