Remote Direct Memory Access Transport for Remote Procedure Call Version 1
RFC 8166
Yes
No Objection
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 10 and is now closed.
(Spencer Dawkins; former steering group member) Yes
(Alexey Melnikov; former steering group member) No Objection
(Alia Atlas; former steering group member) No Objection
(Alissa Cooper; former steering group member) No Objection
(Ben Campbell; former steering group member) No Objection
(Deborah Brungard; former steering group member) No Objection
(Jari Arkko; former steering group member) No Objection
(Joel Jaeggli; former steering group member) No Objection
(Kathleen Moriarty; former steering group member) No Objection
(Mirja Kühlewind; former steering group member) No Objection
(Stephen Farrell; former steering group member) No Objection
- 3.4.5: Can a requester DoS a responder by asking the latter to read giga- or tera-bytes? And the same question the other way about for 3.4.6. - 4.4.1: not having access to memory allocated for "cancelled RPCs" also seems like a potential DoS that ought be noted. Is it? - General: I was surprised see no mention of DoS. Is that covered in some reference? Even if so, I'd have expected some discussion of DoS attacks and mitigations. - 8.2.1: "Protection below the RDMA layer is a more appropriate security mechanism for RDMA transports in performance-sensitive deployments." I think that's a bit over-stated. A deployment could be performance-sensitive but yet prioritise application layer crypto for various reasons. As you're really just talking about trade-offs, and I think that's sufficiently explained already, I figure you could omit that sentence.
(Suresh Krishnan; former steering group member) No Objection
(Terry Manderson; former steering group member) No Objection