Increase the Secure Shell Minimum Recommended Diffie-Hellman Modulus Size to 2048 Bits
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From: The IESG <email@example.com> To: IETF-Announce <firstname.lastname@example.org> Cc: The IESG <email@example.com>, firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com, Daniel Migault <firstname.lastname@example.org>, email@example.com, firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com, firstname.lastname@example.org Subject: Protocol Action: 'Increase SSH minimum recommended DH modulus size to 2048 bits' to Proposed Standard (draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-dh-group-exchange-06.txt) The IESG has approved the following document: - 'Increase SSH minimum recommended DH modulus size to 2048 bits' (draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-dh-group-exchange-06.txt) as Proposed Standard This document is the product of the CURves, Deprecating and a Little more Encryption Working Group. The IESG contact persons are Kathleen Moriarty and Eric Rescorla. A URL of this Internet Draft is: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-dh-group-exchange/
Technical Summary The Diffie-Hellman (DH) Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport layer Protocol specifies that servers and clients should support groups with a modulus length of k bits, where the recommended minumum value is 1024 bits. Recent security research has shown that a minimum value of 1024 bits is insufficient against state-sponsored actors. As such, this document formally updates the specification such that the minimum recommended value for k is 2048 bits and the group size is 2048 bits at minimum. This RFC updates RFC4419 which allowed for DH moduli less than 2048 bits. The update of RFC 4419 is mentioned in the header, the abstract and the introduction. Working Group Summary No controversy were noted Document Quality At least one Open Source implementation has implemented this: OpenSSH: http://freshbsd.org/commit/openbsd/2a2c1e4e7e3fcc787fa334f50347ee1d282fac45 Personnel Daniel Migault is the document shepherd, Eric Rescorla is the AD.