Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Validation Reconsidered
RFC 8360
Document | Type | RFC - Proposed Standard (April 2018; Errata) | |
---|---|---|---|
Authors | Geoff Huston , George Michaelson , Carlos MartÃnez , Tim Bruijnzeels , Andrew Newton , Daniel Shaw | ||
Last updated | 2020-01-21 | ||
Replaces | draft-huston-rpki-validation | ||
Stream | IETF | ||
Formats | plain text html pdf htmlized with errata bibtex | ||
Reviews | |||
Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
Document shepherd | Chris Morrow | ||
Shepherd write-up | Show (last changed 2016-10-26) | ||
IESG | IESG state | RFC 8360 (Proposed Standard) | |
Action Holders |
(None)
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Consensus Boilerplate | Yes | ||
Telechat date | |||
Responsible AD | Alvaro Retana | ||
Send notices to | "Chris Morrow" <morrowc@ops-netman.net>, aretana.ietf@gmail.com | ||
IANA | IANA review state | Version Changed - Review Needed | |
IANA action state | RFC-Ed-Ack |
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) G. Huston Request for Comments: 8360 G. Michaelson Category: Standards Track APNIC ISSN: 2070-1721 C. Martinez LACNIC T. Bruijnzeels RIPE NCC A. Newton ARIN D. Shaw AFRINIC April 2018 Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Validation Reconsidered Abstract This document specifies an alternative to the certificate validation procedure specified in RFC 6487 that reduces aspects of operational fragility in the management of certificates in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), while retaining essential security features. The procedure specified in RFC 6487 requires that Resource Certificates are rejected entirely if they are found to overclaim any resources not contained on the issuing certificate, whereas the validation process defined here allows an issuing Certification Authority (CA) to chose to communicate that such Resource Certificates should be accepted for the intersection of their resources and the issuing certificate. It should be noted that the validation process defined here considers validation under a single trust anchor (TA) only. In particular, concerns regarding overclaims where multiple configured TAs claim overlapping resources are considered out of scope for this document. This choice is signaled by a set of alternative Object Identifiers (OIDs) per "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" (RFC 3779) and "Certificate Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)" (RFC 6484). It should be noted that in case these OIDs are not used for any certificate under a trust anchor, the validation procedure defined here has the same outcome as the procedure defined in RFC 6487. Furthermore, this document provides an alternative to Route Origin Authorization (ROA) (RFC 6482) and BGPsec Router Certificate (BGPsec PKI Profiles -- publication requested) validation. Huston, et al. Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 8360 RPKI Validation April 2018 Status of This Memo This is an Internet Standards Track document. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841. Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8360. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Huston, et al. Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 8360 RPKI Validation April 2018 Table of Contents 1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Certificate Validation in the RPKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. An Amended RPKI Certification Validation Process . . . . . . 7 4.1. Verified Resource Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.2. Differences with Existing Standards . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.2.1. Certificate Policy (CP) for Use with Validation Reconsidered in the RPKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.2.2. An Alternative to X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers (RFC 3779) . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Show full document text