Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Validation Reconsidered
RFC 8360
| Document | Type | RFC - Proposed Standard (April 2018; Errata) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Geoff Huston , George Michaelson , Carlos MartÃnez , Tim Bruijnzeels , Andrew Newton , Daniel Shaw | ||
| Last updated | 2020-01-21 | ||
| Replaces | draft-huston-rpki-validation | ||
| Stream | IETF | ||
| Formats | plain text html pdf htmlized with errata bibtex | ||
| Reviews | |||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Document shepherd | Chris Morrow | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show (last changed 2016-10-26) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | RFC 8360 (Proposed Standard) | |
| Action Holders |
(None)
|
||
| Consensus Boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date | |||
| Responsible AD | Alvaro Retana | ||
| Send notices to | "Chris Morrow" <morrowc@ops-netman.net>, aretana.ietf@gmail.com | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | Version Changed - Review Needed | |
| IANA action state | RFC-Ed-Ack | ||
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) G. Huston
Request for Comments: 8360 G. Michaelson
Category: Standards Track APNIC
ISSN: 2070-1721 C. Martinez
LACNIC
T. Bruijnzeels
RIPE NCC
A. Newton
ARIN
D. Shaw
AFRINIC
April 2018
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Validation Reconsidered
Abstract
This document specifies an alternative to the certificate validation
procedure specified in RFC 6487 that reduces aspects of operational
fragility in the management of certificates in the Resource Public
Key Infrastructure (RPKI), while retaining essential security
features.
The procedure specified in RFC 6487 requires that Resource
Certificates are rejected entirely if they are found to overclaim any
resources not contained on the issuing certificate, whereas the
validation process defined here allows an issuing Certification
Authority (CA) to chose to communicate that such Resource
Certificates should be accepted for the intersection of their
resources and the issuing certificate.
It should be noted that the validation process defined here considers
validation under a single trust anchor (TA) only. In particular,
concerns regarding overclaims where multiple configured TAs claim
overlapping resources are considered out of scope for this document.
This choice is signaled by a set of alternative Object Identifiers
(OIDs) per "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers"
(RFC 3779) and "Certificate Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI)" (RFC 6484). It should be noted that in case
these OIDs are not used for any certificate under a trust anchor, the
validation procedure defined here has the same outcome as the
procedure defined in RFC 6487.
Furthermore, this document provides an alternative to Route Origin
Authorization (ROA) (RFC 6482) and BGPsec Router Certificate (BGPsec
PKI Profiles -- publication requested) validation.
Huston, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]
RFC 8360 RPKI Validation April 2018
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8360.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Huston, et al. Standards Track [Page 2]
RFC 8360 RPKI Validation April 2018
Table of Contents
1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Certificate Validation in the RPKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. An Amended RPKI Certification Validation Process . . . . . . 7
4.1. Verified Resource Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. Differences with Existing Standards . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.1. Certificate Policy (CP) for Use with Validation
Reconsidered in the RPKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2.2. An Alternative to X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses
and AS Identifiers (RFC 3779) . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
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