Definitions of Managed Objects for Mapping of Address and Port with Encapsulation (MAP-E)
RFC 8389
| Document | Type | RFC - Proposed Standard (December 2018; No errata) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Yu Fu , Sheng Jiang , Bing Liu , Jiang Dong , Yuchi Chen | ||
| Last updated | 2018-12-18 | ||
| Replaces | draft-fu-softwire-map-mib | ||
| Stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Formats | plain text html pdf htmlized (tools) htmlized bibtex | ||
| Reviews | |||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Document shepherd | Yong Cui | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show (last changed 2017-12-20) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | RFC 8389 (Proposed Standard) | |
| Action Holders |
(None)
|
||
| Consensus Boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date | |||
| Responsible AD | Terry Manderson | ||
| Send notices to | "Yong Cui" <cuiyong@tsinghua.edu.cn> | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | IANA OK - Actions Needed | |
| IANA action state | RFC-Ed-Ack | ||
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Y. Fu
Request for Comments: 8389 CNNIC
Category: Standards Track S. Jiang
ISSN: 2070-1721 B. Liu
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
J. Dong
Y. Chen
Tsinghua University
December 2018
Definitions of Managed Objects for
Mapping of Address and Port with Encapsulation (MAP-E)
Abstract
This memo defines a portion of the Management Information Base (MIB)
for Mapping of Address and Port with Encapsulation (MAP-E) for use
with network management protocols.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8389.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Fu, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]
RFC 8389 MAP-E MIB December 2018
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ....................................................2
2. The Internet-Standard Management Framework ......................2
3. Terminology .....................................................3
4. Structure of the MIB Module .....................................3
4.1. The mapMIBObjects ..........................................3
4.1.1. The mapRule Subtree .................................3
4.1.2. The mapSecurityCheck Subtree ........................3
4.2. The mapMIBConformance Subtree ..............................4
5. Definitions .....................................................4
6. IANA Considerations ............................................12
7. Security Considerations ........................................12
8. References .....................................................13
8.1. Normative References ......................................13
8.2. Informative References ....................................14
Acknowledgements ..................................................15
Authors' Addresses ................................................16
1. Introduction
Mapping of Address and Port with Encapsulation (MAP-E) [RFC7597] is a
stateless, automatic tunneling mechanism for providing an IPv4
connectivity service to end users over a service provider's IPv6
network.
This document defines a portion of the Management Information Base
(MIB) for use with monitoring MAP-E devices.
2. The Internet-Standard Management Framework
For a detailed overview of the documents that describe the current
Internet-Standard Management Framework, please refer to section 7 of
RFC 3410 [RFC3410].
Managed objects are accessed via a virtual information store, termed
the Management Information Base or MIB. MIB objects are generally
accessed through the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).
Objects in the MIB are defined using the mechanisms defined in the
Structure of Management Information (SMI). This memo specifies a MIB
module that is compliant to the SMIv2, which is described in STD 58,
RFC 2578 [RFC2578], STD 58, RFC 2579 [RFC2579] and STD 58, RFC 2580
[RFC2580].
Fu, et al. Standards Track [Page 2]
RFC 8389 MAP-E MIB December 2018
3. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
4. Structure of the MIB Module
The IF-MIB [RFC2863] defines generic managed objects for managing
interfaces. Each logical interface (physical or virtual) has an
ifEntry. Tunnels are handled by creating a logical interface
(ifEntry) for each tunnel. Each MAP-E tunnel endpoint also acts as a
virtual interface that has a corresponding entry in the IF-MIB.
Those corresponding entries are indexed by ifIndex. The MAP-E MIB is
configurable on a per-interface basis, so it depends on several parts
(ifEntry) of the IF-MIB [RFC2863].
4.1. The mapMIBObjects
4.1.1. The mapRule Subtree
The mapRule subtree describes managed objects used for managing the
multiple mapping rules in MAP-E.
According to [RFC7597], the mapping rules are divided into two
categories: Basic Mapping Rule (BMR) and Forwarding Mapping Rule
(FMR). According to Section 4.1 of [RFC7598], an F-flag specifies
whether the rule is to be used for forwarding (FMR). If set, this
rule is used as an FMR; if not set, this rule is BMR only and MUST
NOT be used for forwarding. A BMR can also be used as an FMR for
forwarding if the F-flag is set. So, the RuleType definition in the
MAP-E MIB (see Section 5) defines bmrAndfmr to specify this scenario.
4.1.2. The mapSecurityCheck Subtree
The mapSecurityCheck subtree provides statistics for the number of
invalid packets that have been identified. [RFC7597] defines two
kinds of invalid packets:
o The Border Relay (BR) will validate the received packet's source
IPv6 address against the configured MAP domain rule and the
destination IPv6 address against the configured BR IPv6 address.
o The MAP node (Customer Edge (CE) and BR) will check that the
received packet's source IPv4 address and port are in the range
derived from the matching MAP rule.
Fu, et al. Standards Track [Page 3]
RFC 8389 MAP-E MIB December 2018
4.2. The mapMIBConformance Subtree
The mapMIBConformance subtree provides conformance information of MIB
objects.
5. Definitions
The following MIB module imports definitions from [RFC2578],
[RFC2579], [RFC2580], [RFC2863], and [RFC4001].
MAP-E-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN
IMPORTS
MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-TYPE, mib-2,
Unsigned32, Counter64
FROM SNMPv2-SMI --RFC 2578
TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
FROM SNMPv2-TC --RFC 2579
ifIndex
FROM IF-MIB --RFC 2863
InetAddressIPv6, InetAddressIPv4,
InetAddressPrefixLength
FROM INET-ADDRESS-MIB --RFC 4001
OBJECT-GROUP, MODULE-COMPLIANCE
FROM SNMPv2-CONF; --RFC 2580
mapMIB MODULE-IDENTITY
LAST-UPDATED "201811260000Z"
ORGANIZATION
"IETF Softwire Working Group"
CONTACT-INFO
"Yu Fu
CNNIC
No. 4 South 4th Street, Zhongguancun
Beijing 100190
China
Email: eleven711711@foxmail.com
Sheng Jiang
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
Q14, Huawei Campus, No. 156 Beiqing Road
Hai-Dian District, Beijing 100095
China
Email: jiangsheng@huawei.com
Bing Liu
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
Q14, Huawei Campus, No. 156 Beiqing Road
Fu, et al. Standards Track [Page 4]
RFC 8389 MAP-E MIB December 2018
Hai-Dian District, Beijing 100095
China
Email: leo.liubing@huawei.com
Jiang Dong
Tsinghua University
Department of Computer Science, Tsinghua University
Beijing 100084
China
Email: knight.dongjiang@gmail.com
Yuchi Chen
Tsinghua University
Department of Computer Science, Tsinghua University
Beijing 100084
China
Email: chenycmx@gmail.com"
DESCRIPTION
"This MIB module is defined for management of objects for
MAP-E BRs or CEs.
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to
the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set
forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info)."
REVISION "201811260000Z"
DESCRIPTION
"Initial version. Published as RFC 8389."
::= { mib-2 242 }
mapMIBObjects OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {mapMIB 1}
mapRule OBJECT IDENTIFIER
::= { mapMIBObjects 1 }
mapSecurityCheck OBJECT IDENTIFIER
::= { mapMIBObjects 2 }
-- ==============================================================
-- Textual Conventions Used in This MIB Module
-- ==============================================================
Fu, et al. Standards Track [Page 5]
RFC 8389 MAP-E MIB December 2018
RulePSID ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
DISPLAY-HINT "0x:"
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Indicates that the Port Set ID (PSID) is represented as
hexadecimal for clarity."
SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE (2))
RuleType ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Enumerates the type of the mapping rule. It
defines three types of mapping rules here:
bmr: Basic Mapping Rule (not Forwarding Mapping Rule)
fmr: Forwarding Mapping Rule (not Basic Mapping Rule)
bmrAndfmr: Basic and Forwarding Mapping Rule
The Basic Mapping Rule may also be a Forwarding Mapping
Rule for mesh mode."
REFERENCE "bmr, fmr: Section 5 of RFC 7597.
bmrAndfmr: Section 5 of RFC 7597, Section 4.1
of RFC 7598."
SYNTAX INTEGER {
bmr(1),
fmr(2),
bmrAndfmr(3)
}
mapRuleTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF MapRuleEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The (conceptual) table containing rule information for
a specific mapping rule. It can also be used for row
creation."
::= { mapRule 1 }
mapRuleEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX MapRuleEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Each entry in this table contains the information on a
particular mapping rule."
INDEX { ifIndex,
mapRuleID }
::= { mapRuleTable 1 }
Fu, et al. Standards Track [Page 6]
RFC 8389 MAP-E MIB December 2018
MapRuleEntry ::=
SEQUENCE {
mapRuleID Unsigned32,
mapRuleIPv6Prefix InetAddressIPv6,
mapRuleIPv6PrefixLen InetAddressPrefixLength,
mapRuleIPv4Prefix InetAddressIPv4,
mapRuleIPv4PrefixLen InetAddressPrefixLength,
mapRuleBRIPv6Address InetAddressIPv6,
mapRulePSID RulePSID,
mapRulePSIDLen Unsigned32,
mapRuleOffset Unsigned32,
mapRuleEALen Unsigned32,
mapRuleType RuleType
}
mapRuleID OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (1..4294967295)
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A unique identifier used to distinguish mapping
rules."
::= { mapRuleEntry 1 }
-- The object mapRuleIPv6Prefix is IPv6 specific; hence, it does
-- not use the version-agnostic InetAddress.
mapRuleIPv6Prefix OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddressIPv6
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The IPv6 prefix defined in the mapping rule that will be
assigned to CEs."
::= { mapRuleEntry 2 }
mapRuleIPv6PrefixLen OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddressPrefixLength
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The length of the IPv6 prefix defined in the mapping rule
that will be assigned to CEs."
::= { mapRuleEntry 3 }
-- The object mapRuleIPv4Prefix is IPv4 specific; hence, it does
-- not use the version-agnostic InetAddress.
Fu, et al. Standards Track [Page 7]
RFC 8389 MAP-E MIB December 2018
mapRuleIPv4Prefix OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddressIPv4
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The IPv4 prefix defined in the mapping rule that will be
assigned to CEs."
::= { mapRuleEntry 4 }
mapRuleIPv4PrefixLen OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddressPrefixLength
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The length of the IPv4 prefix defined in the mapping
rule that will be assigned to CEs."
::= { mapRuleEntry 5 }
-- The object mapRuleBRIPv6Address is IPv6 specific; hence, it does
-- not use the version-agnostic InetAddress.
mapRuleBRIPv6Address OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX InetAddressIPv6
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The IPv6 address of the BR that will be conveyed to CEs.
If the BR IPv6 address is anycast, the relay must use
this anycast IPv6 address as the source address in
packets relayed to CEs."
::= { mapRuleEntry 6 }
mapRulePSID OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX RulePSID
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The PSID value algorithmically identifies a set of
ports assigned to a CE."
REFERENCE
"PSID: Section 5.1 of RFC 7597."
::= { mapRuleEntry 7 }
mapRulePSIDLen OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32(0..16)
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
Fu, et al. Standards Track [Page 8]
RFC 8389 MAP-E MIB December 2018
DESCRIPTION
"The bit length value of the number of significant bits in
the PSID field. When it is set to 0, the PSID
field is to be ignored."
::= { mapRuleEntry 8 }
mapRuleOffset OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32(0..15)
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of the mapRuleOffset is 6 by default to
exclude the system ports (0-1023). It is provided via
the Rule Port Mapping Parameters in the Basic Mapping
Rule."
DEFVAL {6}
::= { mapRuleEntry 9 }
mapRuleEALen OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32(0..48)
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The length of the Embedded Address (EA) defined in
mapping rule that will be assigned to CEs."
REFERENCE
"EA: Section 3 of RFC 7597."
::= { mapRuleEntry 10 }
mapRuleType OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX RuleType
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Indicates the type of mapping rule.
'1' represents a BMR.
'2' represents an FMR.
'3' represents a BMR that is also an FMR for mesh mode."
REFERENCE
"bmr, fmr: Section 5 of RFC 7597.
bmrAndfmr: Section 5 of RFC 7597, Section 4.1 of
RFC 7598."
::= { mapRuleEntry 11 }
mapSecurityCheckTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF MapSecurityCheckEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
Fu, et al. Standards Track [Page 9]
RFC 8389 MAP-E MIB December 2018
DESCRIPTION
"The (conceptual) table containing information on
MAP security checks. This table can be used for
statistics on the number of invalid packets that
have been identified."
::= { mapSecurityCheck 1 }
mapSecurityCheckEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX MapSecurityCheckEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Each entry in this table contains information on a
particular MAP security check."
INDEX { ifIndex }
::= { mapSecurityCheckTable 1 }
MapSecurityCheckEntry ::=
SEQUENCE {
mapSecurityCheckInvalidv4 Counter64,
mapSecurityCheckInvalidv6 Counter64
}
mapSecurityCheckInvalidv4 OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter64
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Indicates the number of received IPv4 packets
that do not have a payload source IPv4 address or
port within the range defined in the matching MAP
rule. It corresponds to the second kind of
invalid packet described in Section 4.1.2."
::= { mapSecurityCheckEntry 1 }
mapSecurityCheckInvalidv6 OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter64
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Indicates the number of received IPv6 packets that
do not have a source or destination IPv6 address
matching a Basic Mapping Rule. It corresponds
to the first kind of invalid packet described
in Section 4.1.2."
::= { mapSecurityCheckEntry 2 }
-- Conformance Information
Fu, et al. Standards Track [Page 10]
RFC 8389 MAP-E MIB December 2018
mapMIBConformance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {mapMIB 2}
mapMIBCompliances OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mapMIBConformance 1 }
mapMIBGroups OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mapMIBConformance 2 }
-- compliance statements
mapMIBCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Describes the minimal requirements for conformance
to the MAP-E MIB."
MODULE -- this module
MANDATORY-GROUPS { mapMIBRuleGroup , mapMIBSecurityGroup }
::= { mapMIBCompliances 1 }
-- Units of Conformance
mapMIBRuleGroup OBJECT-GROUP
OBJECTS {
mapRuleIPv6Prefix,
mapRuleIPv6PrefixLen,
mapRuleIPv4Prefix,
mapRuleIPv4PrefixLen,
mapRuleBRIPv6Address,
mapRulePSID,
mapRulePSIDLen,
mapRuleOffset,
mapRuleEALen,
mapRuleType }
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The group of objects used to describe the MAP-E mapping
rule."
::= { mapMIBGroups 1 }
mapMIBSecurityGroup OBJECT-GROUP
OBJECTS {
mapSecurityCheckInvalidv4,
mapSecurityCheckInvalidv6 }
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The group of objects used to provide information on the
MAP-E security checks."
::= { mapMIBGroups 2 }
END
Fu, et al. Standards Track [Page 11]
RFC 8389 MAP-E MIB December 2018
6. IANA Considerations
The MIB module in this document uses the following IANA-assigned
OBJECT IDENTIFIER values recorded in the SMI Numbers registry:
Descriptor OBJECT IDENTIFIER value
---------- -----------------------
MAP-E-MIB { mib-2 242 }
7. Security Considerations
There are no management objects defined in this MIB module that have
a MAX-ACCESS clause of read-write and/or read-create. So, if this
MIB module is implemented correctly, then there is no risk that an
intruder can alter or create any management objects of this MIB
module via direct SNMP SET operations.
Some of the objects in this MIB module may be considered sensitive or
vulnerable in some network environments. This includes INDEX objects
with a MAX-ACCESS of not-accessible, and any indices from other
modules exposed via AUGMENTS. It is thus important to control even
GET and/or NOTIFY access to these objects and possibly to even
encrypt the values of these objects when sending them over the
network via SNMP. These are the tables and objects and their
sensitivity/vulnerability:
mapRuleIPv6Prefix
mapRuleIPv6PrefixLen
mapRuleIPv4Prefix
mapRuleIPv4PrefixLen
mapRuleBRIPv6Address
mapRulePSID
mapRulePSIDLen
mapRuleOffset
mapRuleEALen
mapRuleType
Fu, et al. Standards Track [Page 12]
RFC 8389 MAP-E MIB December 2018
Some of the MIB model's objects are vulnerable because the
information that they hold may be used for targeting an attack
against a MAP node (CE or BR). For example, an intruder could use
the information to help deduce the customer IPv4 and IPv6 topologies
and address-sharing ratios in use by the ISP.
SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 did not include adequate security.
Even if the network itself is secure (for example by using IPsec),
there is no control as to who on the secure network is allowed to
access and GET/SET (read/change/create/delete) the objects in this
MIB module.
Implementations SHOULD provide the security features described by the
SNMPv3 framework (see [RFC3410]), and implementations claiming
compliance to the SNMPv3 standard MUST include full support for
authentication and privacy via the User-based Security Model (USM)
[RFC3414] with the AES cipher algorithm [RFC3826]. Implementations
MAY also provide support for the Transport Security Model (TSM)
[RFC5591] in combination with a secure transport such as SSH
[RFC5592] or TLS/DTLS [RFC6353].
Further, deployment of SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 is NOT
RECOMMENDED. Instead, it is RECOMMENDED to deploy SNMPv3 and to
enable cryptographic security. It is then a customer/operator
responsibility to ensure that the SNMP entity giving access to an
instance of this MIB module is properly configured to give access to
the objects only to those principals (users) that have legitimate
rights to indeed GET or SET (change/create/delete) them.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2578] McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J.
Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Structure of Management Information
Version 2 (SMIv2)", STD 58, RFC 2578,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2578, April 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2578>.
[RFC2579] McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J.
Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Textual Conventions for SMIv2",
STD 58, RFC 2579, DOI 10.17487/RFC2579, April 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2579>.
Fu, et al. Standards Track [Page 13]
RFC 8389 MAP-E MIB December 2018
[RFC2580] McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J.
Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Conformance Statements for SMIv2",
STD 58, RFC 2580, DOI 10.17487/RFC2580, April 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2580>.
[RFC2863] McCloghrie, K. and F. Kastenholz, "The Interfaces Group
MIB", RFC 2863, DOI 10.17487/RFC2863, June 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2863>.
[RFC4001] Daniele, M., Haberman, B., Routhier, S., and J.
Schoenwaelder, "Textual Conventions for Internet Network
Addresses", RFC 4001, DOI 10.17487/RFC4001, February 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4001>.
[RFC7597] Troan, O., Ed., Dec, W., Li, X., Bao, C., Matsushima, S.,
Murakami, T., and T. Taylor, Ed., "Mapping of Address and
Port with Encapsulation (MAP-E)", RFC 7597,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7597, July 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7597>.
[RFC7598] Mrugalski, T., Troan, O., Farrer, I., Perreault, S., Dec,
W., Bao, C., Yeh, L., and X. Deng, "DHCPv6 Options for
Configuration of Softwire Address and Port-Mapped
Clients", RFC 7598, DOI 10.17487/RFC7598, July 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7598>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
8.2. Informative References
[RFC3410] Case, J., Mundy, R., Partain, D., and B. Stewart,
"Introduction and Applicability Statements for Internet-
Standard Management Framework", RFC 3410,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3410, December 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3410>.
[RFC3414] Blumenthal, U. and B. Wijnen, "User-based Security Model
(USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMPv3)", STD 62, RFC 3414,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3414, December 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3414>.
Fu, et al. Standards Track [Page 14]
RFC 8389 MAP-E MIB December 2018
[RFC3826] Blumenthal, U., Maino, F., and K. McCloghrie, "The
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Cipher Algorithm in the
SNMP User-based Security Model", RFC 3826,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3826, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3826>.
[RFC5591] Harrington, D. and W. Hardaker, "Transport Security Model
for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)",
STD 78, RFC 5591, DOI 10.17487/RFC5591, June 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5591>.
[RFC5592] Harrington, D., Salowey, J., and W. Hardaker, "Secure
Shell Transport Model for the Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP)", RFC 5592, DOI 10.17487/RFC5592, June
2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5592>.
[RFC6353] Hardaker, W., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport
Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)",
STD 78, RFC 6353, DOI 10.17487/RFC6353, July 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6353>.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the following individuals for their
valuable comments: David Harrington, Mark Townsley, Shishio Tsuchiya,
Yong Cui, Suresh Krishnan, Bert Wijnen, Ian Farrer, and Juergen
Schoenwaelder.
Fu, et al. Standards Track [Page 15]
RFC 8389 MAP-E MIB December 2018
Authors' Addresses
Yu Fu
CNNIC
No. 4 South 4th Street, Zhongguancun
Beijing 100190
China
Email: eleven711711@foxmail.com
Sheng Jiang
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
Q14, Huawei Campus, No. 156 Beiqing Road
Hai-Dian District, Beijing 100095
China
Email: jiangsheng@huawei.com
Bing Liu
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd
Q14, Huawei Campus, No. 156 Beiqing Road
Hai-Dian District, Beijing 100095
China
Email: leo.liubing@huawei.com
Jiang Dong
Tsinghua University
Department of Computer Science, Tsinghua University
Beijing 100084
China
Email: knight.dongjiang@gmail.com
Yuchi Chen
Tsinghua University
Department of Computer Science, Tsinghua University
Beijing 100084
China
Email: flashfoxmx@gmail.com
Fu, et al. Standards Track [Page 16]