ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2
RFC 8442
Yes
No Objection
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 03 and is now closed.
Alvaro Retana No Objection
(Alexey Melnikov; former steering group member) Yes
(Kathleen Moriarty; former steering group member) Yes
(Adam Roach; former steering group member) No Objection
I agree with EKR's discuss -- specifying semantics for these ciphersuites with TLS 1.0 and 1.1 is a material change, and the proposed mechanism (in which servers are encouraged to infer 1.2 support even in the absence of explicit indication) is a bit baffling. Given the scope this document covers, I recommend adding "1.2" to the title of the document. (e.g.: "ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security Version 1.2 (TLS 1.2)")
(Alia Atlas; former steering group member) No Objection
(Alissa Cooper; former steering group member) No Objection
(Ben Campbell; former steering group member) No Objection
I support Ekr's DISCUSS position.
(Benoît Claise; former steering group member) No Objection
(Deborah Brungard; former steering group member) No Objection
(Eric Rescorla; former steering group member) (was Discuss) No Objection
The citations to TLS 1.3 still seem pretty muddled. I think you should just stop referencing and discussing 1.3. S 2. I'm not sure that the discussion of the PRF is helpful here in mandating the non-use of these cipher suites with TLS 1.1 and below.
(Mirja Kühlewind; former steering group member) No Objection
(Spencer Dawkins; former steering group member) No Objection
Ciphersuite drafts for TLS are usually above my pay grade, but I understand most of EKR's Discuss, and agree with Adam's suggestion to change the document title to "ECDHE_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security Version 1.2 (TLS 1.2)" at an absolute minimum.
(Suresh Krishnan; former steering group member) No Objection