Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
RFC 8481
Document | Type |
RFC - Proposed Standard
(September 2018; No errata)
Updates RFC 6811
|
|
---|---|---|---|
Author | Randy Bush | ||
Last updated | 2018-09-26 | ||
Replaces | draft-ymbk-sidrops-ov-clarify | ||
Stream | IETF | ||
Formats | plain text html pdf htmlized bibtex | ||
Reviews | |||
Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
Document shepherd | Keyur Patel | ||
Shepherd write-up | Show (last changed 2018-07-17) | ||
IESG | IESG state | RFC 8481 (Proposed Standard) | |
Consensus Boilerplate | Yes | ||
Telechat date | |||
Responsible AD | Warren Kumari | ||
Send notices to | Keyur Patel <keyur@arrcus.com> | ||
IANA | IANA review state | IANA OK - No Actions Needed | |
IANA action state | No IANA Actions |
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Bush Request for Comments: 8481 Internet Initiative Japan Updates: 6811 September 2018 Category: Standards Track ISSN: 2070-1721 Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Abstract Deployment of BGP origin validation based on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is hampered by, among other things, vendor misimplementations in two critical areas: which routes are validated and whether policy is applied when not specified by configuration. This document is meant to clarify possible misunderstandings causing those misimplementations; it thus updates RFC 6811 by clarifying that all prefixes should have their validation state set and that policy must not be applied without operator configuration. Status of This Memo This is an Internet Standards Track document. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841. Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8481. Bush Standards Track [Page 1] RFC 8481 Origin Validation Clarification September 2018 Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Evaluate ALL Prefixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5. Set State, Don't Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1. Introduction Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation is hampered by, among other things, vendor misimplementations in two critical areas: which routes are validated and whether policy is applied when not specified by configuration. This document is meant to clarify possible misunderstandings causing those misimplementations. When a route is distributed into BGP, the origin validation state is set to NotFound, Valid, or Invalid per [RFC6811]. Operational testing has shown that the specifications of that RFC were not sufficient to avoid divergent implementations. This document attempts to clarify two areas which seem to cause confusion. The implementation issues seem not to be about how to validate, i.e., how to decide if a route is NotFound, Valid, or Invalid. The issues seem to be which routes should be evaluated and have their evaluation state set, and whether to apply policy without operator configuration. Bush Standards Track [Page 2] RFC 8481 Origin Validation Clarification September 2018 2. Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 3. Suggested Reading It is assumed that the reader understands BGP [RFC4271], the RPKI [RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482], and RPKI-based Prefix Validation [RFC6811]. 4. Evaluate ALL Prefixes Significant Clarification: A router MUST evaluate and set the validation state of all routes in BGP coming from any source (e.g., eBGP, iBGP, or redistribution from static or connected routes),Show full document text