Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
RFC 8481
| Document | Type |
RFC - Proposed Standard
(September 2018; No errata)
Updates RFC 6811
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Last updated | 2018-09-26 | ||
| Replaces | draft-ymbk-sidrops-ov-clarify | ||
| Stream | IETF | ||
| Formats | plain text pdf html bibtex | ||
| Reviews | |||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Document shepherd | Keyur Patel | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show (last changed 2018-07-17) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | RFC 8481 (Proposed Standard) | |
| Consensus Boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date | |||
| Responsible AD | Warren Kumari | ||
| Send notices to | Keyur Patel <keyur@arrcus.com> | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | IANA OK - No Actions Needed | |
| IANA action state | No IANA Actions | ||
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R. Bush
Request for Comments: 8481 Internet Initiative Japan
Updates: 6811 September 2018
Category: Standards Track
ISSN: 2070-1721
Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based on
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
Abstract
Deployment of BGP origin validation based on Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) is hampered by, among other things, vendor
misimplementations in two critical areas: which routes are validated
and whether policy is applied when not specified by configuration.
This document is meant to clarify possible misunderstandings causing
those misimplementations; it thus updates RFC 6811 by clarifying that
all prefixes should have their validation state set and that policy
must not be applied without operator configuration.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
received public review and has been approved for publication by the
Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8481.
Bush Standards Track [Page 1]
RFC 8481 Origin Validation Clarification September 2018
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Evaluate ALL Prefixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. Set State, Don't Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. Introduction
Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation is hampered by, among
other things, vendor misimplementations in two critical areas: which
routes are validated and whether policy is applied when not specified
by configuration. This document is meant to clarify possible
misunderstandings causing those misimplementations.
When a route is distributed into BGP, the origin validation state is
set to NotFound, Valid, or Invalid per [RFC6811]. Operational
testing has shown that the specifications of that RFC were not
sufficient to avoid divergent implementations. This document
attempts to clarify two areas which seem to cause confusion.
The implementation issues seem not to be about how to validate, i.e.,
how to decide if a route is NotFound, Valid, or Invalid. The issues
seem to be which routes should be evaluated and have their evaluation
state set, and whether to apply policy without operator
configuration.
Bush Standards Track [Page 2]
RFC 8481 Origin Validation Clarification September 2018
2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Suggested Reading
It is assumed that the reader understands BGP [RFC4271], the RPKI
[RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482], and
RPKI-based Prefix Validation [RFC6811].
4. Evaluate ALL Prefixes
Significant Clarification: A router MUST evaluate and set the
validation state of all routes in BGP coming from any source (e.g.,
eBGP, iBGP, or redistribution from static or connected routes),
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