Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based on Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
RFC 8481

Document Type RFC - Proposed Standard (September 2018; No errata)
Updates RFC 6811
Last updated 2018-09-26
Replaces draft-ymbk-sidrops-ov-clarify
Stream IETF
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Stream WG state Submitted to IESG for Publication
Document shepherd Keyur Patel
Shepherd write-up Show (last changed 2018-07-17)
IESG IESG state RFC 8481 (Proposed Standard)
Consensus Boilerplate Yes
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Responsible AD Warren Kumari
Send notices to Keyur Patel <keyur@arrcus.com>
IANA IANA review state IANA OK - No Actions Needed
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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                           R. Bush
Request for Comments: 8481                     Internet Initiative Japan
Updates: 6811                                             September 2018
Category: Standards Track
ISSN: 2070-1721

            Clarifications to BGP Origin Validation Based on
               Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)

Abstract

   Deployment of BGP origin validation based on Resource Public Key
   Infrastructure (RPKI) is hampered by, among other things, vendor
   misimplementations in two critical areas: which routes are validated
   and whether policy is applied when not specified by configuration.
   This document is meant to clarify possible misunderstandings causing
   those misimplementations; it thus updates RFC 6811 by clarifying that
   all prefixes should have their validation state set and that policy
   must not be applied without operator configuration.

Status of This Memo

   This is an Internet Standards Track document.

   This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
   (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
   received public review and has been approved for publication by the
   Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further information on
   Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8481.

Bush                         Standards Track                    [Page 1]
RFC 8481             Origin Validation Clarification      September 2018

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Evaluate ALL Prefixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Set State, Don't Act  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   8.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5

1.  Introduction

   Deployment of RPKI-based BGP origin validation is hampered by, among
   other things, vendor misimplementations in two critical areas: which
   routes are validated and whether policy is applied when not specified
   by configuration.  This document is meant to clarify possible
   misunderstandings causing those misimplementations.

   When a route is distributed into BGP, the origin validation state is
   set to NotFound, Valid, or Invalid per [RFC6811].  Operational
   testing has shown that the specifications of that RFC were not
   sufficient to avoid divergent implementations.  This document
   attempts to clarify two areas which seem to cause confusion.

   The implementation issues seem not to be about how to validate, i.e.,
   how to decide if a route is NotFound, Valid, or Invalid.  The issues
   seem to be which routes should be evaluated and have their evaluation
   state set, and whether to apply policy without operator
   configuration.

Bush                         Standards Track                    [Page 2]
RFC 8481             Origin Validation Clarification      September 2018

2.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  Suggested Reading

   It is assumed that the reader understands BGP [RFC4271], the RPKI
   [RFC6480], Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482], and
   RPKI-based Prefix Validation [RFC6811].

4.  Evaluate ALL Prefixes

   Significant Clarification: A router MUST evaluate and set the
   validation state of all routes in BGP coming from any source (e.g.,
   eBGP, iBGP, or redistribution from static or connected routes),
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