@misc{rfc8750,
    series =    {Request for Comments},
    number =    8750,
    howpublished =  {RFC 8750},
    publisher = {RFC Editor},
    doi =       {10.17487/RFC8750},
    url =       {https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8750},
    author =    {Daniel Migault and Tobias Guggemos and Yoav Nir},
    title =     {{Implicit Initialization Vector (IV) for Counter-Based Ciphers in Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)}},
    pagetotal = 8,
    year =      2020,
    month =     mar,
    abstract =  {Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) sends an initialization vector (IV) in each packet. The size of the IV depends on the applied transform and is usually 8 or 16 octets for the transforms defined at the time this document was written. When used with IPsec, some algorithms, such as AES-GCM, AES-CCM, and ChaCha20-Poly1305, take the IV to generate a nonce that is used as an input parameter for encrypting and decrypting. This IV must be unique but can be predictable. As a result, the value provided in the ESP Sequence Number (SN) can be used instead to generate the nonce. This avoids sending the IV itself and saves 8 octets per packet in the case of AES-GCM, AES-CCM, and ChaCha20-Poly1305. This document describes how to do this.},
}