Deprecation of TLS 1.1 for Email Submission and Access
RFC 8997
Document | Type |
RFC - Proposed Standard
(March 2021; No errata)
Updates RFC 8314
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|
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Authors | Loganaden Velvindron , Stephen Farrell | ||
Last updated | 2021-03-23 | ||
Replaces | draft-lvelvindron-tls-for-email | ||
Stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
Formats | plain text html xml pdf htmlized (tools) htmlized bibtex | ||
Reviews | |||
Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
Document shepherd | Valery Smyslov | ||
Shepherd write-up | Show (last changed 2020-01-15) | ||
IESG | IESG state | RFC 8997 (Proposed Standard) | |
Action Holders |
(None)
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||
Consensus Boilerplate | Yes | ||
Telechat date | |||
Responsible AD | Alexey Melnikov | ||
Send notices to | Valery Smyslov <valery@smyslov.net> | ||
IANA | IANA review state | Version Changed - Review Needed | |
IANA action state | No IANA Actions |
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) L. Velvindron Request for Comments: 8997 cyberstorm.mu Updates: 8314 S. Farrell Category: Standards Track Trinity College Dublin ISSN: 2070-1721 March 2021 Deprecation of TLS 1.1 for Email Submission and Access Abstract This specification updates the current recommendation for the use of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to provide confidentiality of email between a Mail User Agent (MUA) and a Mail Submission Server or Mail Access Server. This document updates RFC 8314. Status of This Memo This is an Internet Standards Track document. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841. Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8997. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction 2. Conventions Used in This Document 3. Updates to RFC 8314 4. IANA Considerations 5. Security Considerations 6. References 6.1. Normative References 6.2. Informative References Acknowledgements Authors' Addresses 1. Introduction [RFC8314] defines the minimum recommended version of TLS as version 1.1. Due to the deprecation of TLS 1.1 in [RFC8996], this recommendation is no longer valid. Therefore, this document updates [RFC8314] so that the minimum version for TLS is TLS 1.2. 2. Conventions Used in This Document The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 3. Updates to RFC 8314 OLD: | 4.1. Deprecation of Services Using Cleartext and TLS Versions | Less Than 1.1 NEW: | 4.1. Deprecation of Services Using Cleartext and TLS Versions | Less Than 1.2 OLD: | As soon as practicable, MSPs currently supporting Secure Sockets | Layer (SSL) 2.x, SSL 3.0, or TLS 1.0 SHOULD transition their users | to TLS 1.1 or later and discontinue support for those earlier | versions of SSL and TLS. NEW: | As soon as practicable, MSPs currently supporting Secure Sockets | Layer (SSL) 2.x, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0, or TLS 1.1 SHOULD transition | their users to TLS 1.2 or later and discontinue support for those | earlier versions of SSL and TLS. In Section 4.1 of [RFC8314], the text should be revised from: OLD: | One way is for the server to refuse a ClientHello message from any | client sending a ClientHello.version field corresponding to any | version of SSL or TLS 1.0. NEW: | One way is for the server to refuse a ClientHello message from any | client sending a ClientHello.version field corresponding to any | version of SSL or TLS earlier than TLS 1.2. OLD: | It is RECOMMENDED that new users be required to use TLS version | 1.1 or greater from the start. However, an MSP may find it | necessary to make exceptions to accommodate some legacy systems | that support only earlier versions of TLS or only cleartext. NEW: | It is RECOMMENDED that new users be required to use TLS version | 1.2 or greater from the start. However, an MSP may find it | necessary to make exceptions to accommodate some legacy systems | that support only earlier versions of TLS or only cleartext. OLD: | If, however, an MUA provides such an indication, it MUST NOT | indicate confidentiality for any connection that does not at least | use TLS 1.1 with certificate verification and also meet the | minimum confidentiality requirements associated with that account. NEW: | If, however, an MUA provides such an indication, it MUST NOTShow full document text