@misc{rfc9319, series = {Request for Comments}, number = 9319, howpublished = {RFC 9319}, publisher = {RFC Editor}, doi = {10.17487/RFC9319}, url = {https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9319}, author = {Yossi Gilad and Sharon Goldberg and Kotikalapudi Sriram and Job Snijders and Ben Maddison}, title = {{The Use of maxLength in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)}}, pagetotal = 13, year = 2022, month = oct, abstract = {This document recommends ways to reduce the forged-origin hijack attack surface by prudently limiting the set of IP prefixes that are included in a Route Origin Authorization (ROA). One recommendation is to avoid using the maxLength attribute in ROAs except in some specific cases. The recommendations complement and extend those in RFC 7115. This document also discusses the creation of ROAs for facilitating the use of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) mitigation services. Considerations related to ROAs and RPKI-based Route Origin Validation (RPKI-ROV) in the context of destination-based Remotely Triggered Discard Route (RTDR) (elsewhere referred to as "Remotely Triggered Black Hole") filtering are also highlighted.}, }