The Use of maxLength in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
RFC 9319 part of BCP 185

Received changes through RFC Editor sync (created alias RFC 9319, changed title to 'The Use of maxLength in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)', changed abstract to 'This document recommends ways to reduce the forged-origin hijack attack surface by prudently limiting the set of IP prefixes that are included in a Route Origin Authorization (ROA).  One recommendation is to avoid using the maxLength attribute in ROAs except in some specific cases.  The recommendations complement and extend those in RFC 7115.  This document also discusses the creation of ROAs for facilitating the use of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) mitigation services.  Considerations related to ROAs and RPKI-based Route Origin Validation (RPKI-ROV) in the context of destination-based Remotely Triggered Discard Route (RTDR) (elsewhere referred to as "Remotely Triggered Black Hole") filtering are also highlighted.', changed pages to 13, changed standardization level to Best Current Practice, changed state to RFC, added RFC published event at 2022-10-21, changed IESG state to RFC Published)