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Cookies: HTTP State Management Mechanism
draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-13

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (httpbis WG)
Authors Steven Bingler , Mike West , John Wilander
Last updated 2023-11-15
Replaces draft-ietf-httpbis-cookie-prefixes, draft-thomson-http-omnomnom, draft-ietf-httpbis-cookie-same-site, draft-ietf-httpbis-cookie-alone
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draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-13
HTTP                                                     S. Bingler, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                              M. West, Ed.
Obsoletes: 6265 (if approved)                                 Google LLC
Intended status: Standards Track                        J. Wilander, Ed.
Expires: 18 May 2024                                          Apple, Inc
                                                        15 November 2023

                Cookies: HTTP State Management Mechanism
                    draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-13

Abstract

   This document defines the HTTP Cookie and Set-Cookie header fields.
   These header fields can be used by HTTP servers to store state
   (called cookies) at HTTP user agents, letting the servers maintain a
   stateful session over the mostly stateless HTTP protocol.  Although
   cookies have many historical infelicities that degrade their security
   and privacy, the Cookie and Set-Cookie header fields are widely used
   on the Internet.  This document obsoletes RFC 6265.

About This Document

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Status information for this document may be found at
   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis/.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the HTTP Working Group
   mailing list (mailto:ietf-http-wg@w3.org), which is archived at
   https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/ietf-http-wg/.  Working Group
   information can be found at https://httpwg.org/.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/labels/6265bis.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 18 May 2024.

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   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   Contributions published or made publicly available before November
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   than English.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.1.  Conformance Criteria  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.2.  Syntax Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.3.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.1.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.2.  Which Requirements to Implement . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.2.1.  Cookie Producing Implementations  . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.2.2.  Cookie Consuming Implementations  . . . . . . . . . .  10
   4.  Server Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.1.  Set-Cookie  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       4.1.1.  Syntax  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11

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       4.1.2.  Semantics (Non-Normative) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       4.1.3.  Cookie Name Prefixes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     4.2.  Cookie  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       4.2.1.  Syntax  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       4.2.2.  Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   5.  User Agent Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     5.1.  Subcomponent Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       5.1.1.  Dates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       5.1.2.  Canonicalized Host Names  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
       5.1.3.  Domain Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
       5.1.4.  Paths and Path-Match  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     5.2.  "Same-site" and "cross-site" Requests . . . . . . . . . .  23
       5.2.1.  Document-based requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
       5.2.2.  Worker-based requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     5.3.  Ignoring Set-Cookie Header Fields . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     5.4.  Cookie Name Prefixes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     5.5.  The Set-Cookie Header Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
       5.5.1.  The Expires Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
       5.5.2.  The Max-Age Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
       5.5.3.  The Domain Attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
       5.5.4.  The Path Attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
       5.5.5.  The Secure Attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  31
       5.5.6.  The HttpOnly Attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
       5.5.7.  The SameSite Attribute  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
     5.6.  Storage Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
     5.7.  Retrieval Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
       5.7.1.  The Cookie Header Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
       5.7.2.  Non-HTTP APIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40
       5.7.3.  Retrieval Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  41
   6.  Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
     6.1.  Limits  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42
     6.2.  Application Programming Interfaces  . . . . . . . . . . .  43
     6.3.  IDNA Dependency and Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  43
   7.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44
     7.1.  Third-Party Cookies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
     7.2.  Cookie Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45
     7.3.  User Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
     7.4.  Expiration Dates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
     8.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
     8.2.  Ambient Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47
     8.3.  Clear Text  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
     8.4.  Session Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48
     8.5.  Weak Confidentiality  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49
     8.6.  Weak Integrity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
     8.7.  Reliance on DNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
     8.8.  SameSite Cookies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
       8.8.1.  Defense in depth  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51

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       8.8.2.  Top-level Navigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
       8.8.3.  Mashups and Widgets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
       8.8.4.  Server-controlled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
       8.8.5.  Reload navigations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  52
       8.8.6.  Top-level requests with "unsafe" methods  . . . . . .  53
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
     9.1.  Cookie  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
     9.2.  Set-Cookie  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
     9.3.  Cookie Attribute Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  54
       9.3.1.  Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
       9.3.2.  Registration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  55
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57
   Appendix A.  Changes  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
     A.1.  draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-00  . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
     A.2.  draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-01  . . . . . . . . . . . .  59
     A.3.  draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-02  . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
     A.4.  draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-03  . . . . . . . . . . . .  60
     A.5.  draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-04  . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
     A.6.  draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-05  . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
     A.7.  draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-06  . . . . . . . . . . . .  61
     A.8.  draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-07  . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
     A.9.  draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-08  . . . . . . . . . . . .  62
     A.10. draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-09  . . . . . . . . . . . .  63
     A.11. draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-10  . . . . . . . . . . . .  63
     A.12. draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-11  . . . . . . . . . . . .  64
     A.13. draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-12  . . . . . . . . . . . .  65
   Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  65

1.  Introduction

   This document defines the HTTP Cookie and Set-Cookie header fields.
   Using the Set-Cookie header field, an HTTP server can pass name/value
   pairs and associated metadata (called cookies) to a user agent.  When
   the user agent makes subsequent requests to the server, the user
   agent uses the metadata and other information to determine whether to
   return the name/value pairs in the Cookie header field.

   Although simple on their surface, cookies have a number of
   complexities.  For example, the server indicates a scope for each
   cookie when sending it to the user agent.  The scope indicates the
   maximum amount of time in which the user agent should return the
   cookie, the servers to which the user agent should return the cookie,
   and the URI schemes for which the cookie is applicable.

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   For historical reasons, cookies contain a number of security and
   privacy infelicities.  For example, a server can indicate that a
   given cookie is intended for "secure" connections, but the Secure
   attribute does not provide integrity in the presence of an active
   network attacker.  Similarly, cookies for a given host are shared
   across all the ports on that host, even though the usual "same-origin
   policy" used by web browsers isolates content retrieved via different
   ports.

   There are two audiences for this specification: developers of cookie-
   generating servers and developers of cookie-consuming user agents.

   To maximize interoperability with user agents, servers SHOULD limit
   themselves to the well-behaved profile defined in Section 4 when
   generating cookies.

   User agents MUST implement the more liberal processing rules defined
   in Section 5, in order to maximize interoperability with existing
   servers that do not conform to the well-behaved profile defined in
   Section 4.

   This document specifies the syntax and semantics of these header
   fields as they are actually used on the Internet.  In particular,
   this document does not create new syntax or semantics beyond those in
   use today.  The recommendations for cookie generation provided in
   Section 4 represent a preferred subset of current server behavior,
   and even the more liberal cookie processing algorithm provided in
   Section 5 does not recommend all of the syntactic and semantic
   variations in use today.  Where some existing software differs from
   the recommended protocol in significant ways, the document contains a
   note explaining the difference.

   This document obsoletes [RFC6265].

2.  Conventions

2.1.  Conformance Criteria

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   Requirements phrased in the imperative as part of algorithms (such as
   "strip any leading space characters" or "return false and abort these
   steps") are to be interpreted with the meaning of the key word
   ("MUST", "SHOULD", "MAY", etc.) used in introducing the algorithm.

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   Conformance requirements phrased as algorithms or specific steps can
   be implemented in any manner, so long as the end result is
   equivalent.  In particular, the algorithms defined in this
   specification are intended to be easy to understand and are not
   intended to be performant.

2.2.  Syntax Notation

   This specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF)
   notation of [RFC5234].

   The following core rules are included by reference, as defined in
   [RFC5234], Appendix B.1: ALPHA (letters), CR (carriage return), CRLF
   (CR LF), CTLs (controls), DIGIT (decimal 0-9), DQUOTE (double quote),
   HEXDIG (hexadecimal 0-9/A-F/a-f), LF (line feed), NUL (null octet),
   OCTET (any 8-bit sequence of data except NUL), SP (space), HTAB
   (horizontal tab), CHAR (any [USASCII] character), VCHAR (any visible
   [USASCII] character), and WSP (whitespace).

   The OWS (optional whitespace) and BWS (bad whitespace) rules are
   defined in Section 5.6.3 of [HTTPSEM].

2.3.  Terminology

   The terms "user agent", "client", "server", "proxy", and "origin
   server" have the same meaning as in the HTTP/1.1 specification
   ([HTTPSEM], Section 3).

   The request-host is the name of the host, as known by the user agent,
   to which the user agent is sending an HTTP request or from which it
   is receiving an HTTP response (i.e., the name of the host to which it
   sent the corresponding HTTP request).

   The term request-uri refers to "target URI" as defined in Section 7.1
   of [HTTPSEM].

   Two sequences of octets are said to case-insensitively match each
   other if and only if they are equivalent under the i;ascii-casemap
   collation defined in [RFC4790].

   The term string means a sequence of non-NUL octets.

   The terms "active browsing context", "active document", "ancestor
   navigables", "container document", "content navigable", "dedicated
   worker", "Document", "inclusive ancestor navigables", "navigable",
   "opaque origin", "sandboxed origin browsing context flag", "shared
   worker", "the worker's Documents", "top-level traversable", and
   "WorkerGlobalScope" are defined in [HTML].

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   "Service Workers" are defined in the Service Workers specification
   [SERVICE-WORKERS].

   The term "origin", the mechanism of deriving an origin from a URI,
   and the "the same" matching algorithm for origins are defined in
   [RFC6454].

   "Safe" HTTP methods include GET, HEAD, OPTIONS, and TRACE, as defined
   in Section 9.2.1 of [HTTPSEM].

   A domain's "public suffix" is the portion of a domain that is
   controlled by a public registry, such as "com", "co.uk", and
   "pvt.k12.wy.us".  A domain's "registrable domain" is the domain's
   public suffix plus the label to its left.  That is, for
   https://www.site.example, the public suffix is example, and the
   registrable domain is site.example.  Whenever possible, user agents
   SHOULD use an up-to-date public suffix list, such as the one
   maintained by the Mozilla project at [PSL].

   The term "request", as well as a request's "client", "current url",
   "method", "target browsing context", and "url list", are defined in
   [FETCH].

   The term "non-HTTP APIs" refers to non-HTTP mechanisms used to set
   and retrieve cookies, such as a web browser API that exposes cookies
   to scripts.

   The term "top-level navigation" refers to a navigation of a top-level
   traversable.

3.  Overview

   This section outlines a way for an origin server to send state
   information to a user agent and for the user agent to return the
   state information to the origin server.

   To store state, the origin server includes a Set-Cookie header field
   in an HTTP response.  In subsequent requests, the user agent returns
   a Cookie request header field to the origin server.  The Cookie
   header field contains cookies the user agent received in previous
   Set-Cookie header fields.  The origin server is free to ignore the
   Cookie header field or use its contents for an application-defined
   purpose.

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   Origin servers MAY send a Set-Cookie response header field with any
   response.  An origin server can include multiple Set-Cookie header
   fields in a single response.  The presence of a Cookie or a Set-
   Cookie header field does not preclude HTTP caches from storing and
   reusing a response.

   Origin servers SHOULD NOT fold multiple Set-Cookie header fields into
   a single header field.  The usual mechanism for folding HTTP headers
   fields (i.e., as defined in Section 5.3 of [HTTPSEM]) might change
   the semantics of the Set-Cookie header field because the %x2C (",")
   character is used by Set-Cookie in a way that conflicts with such
   folding.

   User agents MAY ignore Set-Cookie header fields based on response
   status codes or the user agent's cookie policy (see Section 5.3).

3.1.  Examples

   Using the Set-Cookie header field, a server can send the user agent a
   short string in an HTTP response that the user agent will return in
   future HTTP requests that are within the scope of the cookie.  For
   example, the server can send the user agent a "session identifier"
   named SID with the value 31d4d96e407aad42.  The user agent then
   returns the session identifier in subsequent requests.

   == Server -> User Agent ==

   Set-Cookie: SID=31d4d96e407aad42

   == User Agent -> Server ==

   Cookie: SID=31d4d96e407aad42

   The server can alter the default scope of the cookie using the Path
   and Domain attributes.  For example, the server can instruct the user
   agent to return the cookie to every path and every subdomain of
   site.example.

   == Server -> User Agent ==

   Set-Cookie: SID=31d4d96e407aad42; Path=/; Domain=site.example

   == User Agent -> Server ==

   Cookie: SID=31d4d96e407aad42

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   As shown in the next example, the server can store multiple cookies
   at the user agent.  For example, the server can store a session
   identifier as well as the user's preferred language by returning two
   Set-Cookie header fields.  Notice that the server uses the Secure and
   HttpOnly attributes to provide additional security protections for
   the more sensitive session identifier (see Section 4.1.2).

   == Server -> User Agent ==

   Set-Cookie: SID=31d4d96e407aad42; Path=/; Secure; HttpOnly
   Set-Cookie: lang=en-US; Path=/; Domain=site.example

   == User Agent -> Server ==

   Cookie: SID=31d4d96e407aad42; lang=en-US

   Notice that the Cookie header field above contains two cookies, one
   named SID and one named lang.  If the server wishes the user agent to
   persist the cookie over multiple "sessions" (e.g., user agent
   restarts), the server can specify an expiration date in the Expires
   attribute.  Note that the user agent might delete the cookie before
   the expiration date if the user agent's cookie store exceeds its
   quota or if the user manually deletes the server's cookie.

   == Server -> User Agent ==

   Set-Cookie: lang=en-US; Expires=Wed, 09 Jun 2021 10:18:14 GMT

   == User Agent -> Server ==

   Cookie: SID=31d4d96e407aad42; lang=en-US

   Finally, to remove a cookie, the server returns a Set-Cookie header
   field with an expiration date in the past.  The server will be
   successful in removing the cookie only if the Path and the Domain
   attribute in the Set-Cookie header field match the values used when
   the cookie was created.

   == Server -> User Agent ==

   Set-Cookie: lang=; Expires=Sun, 06 Nov 1994 08:49:37 GMT

   == User Agent -> Server ==

   Cookie: SID=31d4d96e407aad42

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3.2.  Which Requirements to Implement

   The upcoming two sections, Section 4 and Section 5, discuss the set
   of requirements for two distinct types of implementations.  This
   section is meant to help guide implementers in determining which set
   of requirements best fits their goals.  Choosing the wrong set of
   requirements could result in a lack of compatibility with other
   cookie implementations.

   It's important to note that being compatible means different things
   depending on the implementer's goals.  These differences have built
   up over time due to both intentional and unintentional spec changes,
   spec interpretations, and historical implementation differences.

   This section roughly divides implementers of the cookie spec into two
   types, producers and consumers.  These are not official terms and are
   only used here to help readers develop an intuitive understanding of
   the use cases.

3.2.1.  Cookie Producing Implementations

   An implementer should choose Section 4 whenever cookies are created
   and will be sent to a user agent, such as a web browser.  These
   implementations are frequently referred to as Servers by the spec but
   that term includes anything which primarily produces cookies.  Some
   potential examples:

   *  Server applications hosting a website or API

   *  Programming languages or software frameworks that support cookies

   *  Integrated third-party web applications, such as a business
      management suite

   All these benefit from not only supporting as many user agents as
   possible but also supporting other servers.  This is useful if a
   cookie is produced by a software framework and is later sent back to
   a server application which needs to read it.  Section 4 advises best
   practices that help maximize this sense of compatibility.

   See Section 3.2.2.1 for more details on programming languages and
   software frameworks.

3.2.2.  Cookie Consuming Implementations

   An implementer should choose Section 5 whenever cookies are primarily
   received from another source.  These implementations are referred to
   as user agents.  Some examples:

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   *  Web browsers

   *  Tools that support stateful HTTP

   *  Programming languages or software frameworks that support cookies

   Because user agents don't know which servers a user will access, and
   whether or not that server is following best practices, users agents
   are advised to implement a more lenient set of requirements and to
   accept some things that servers are warned against producing.
   Section 5 advises best practices that help maximize this sense of
   compatibility.

   See Section 3.2.2.1 for more details on programming languages and
   software frameworks.

3.2.2.1.  Programming Languages & Software Frameworks

   A programming language or software framework with support for cookies
   could reasonably be used to create an application that acts as a
   cookie producer, cookie consumer, or both.  Because a developer may
   want to maximize their compatibility as either a producer or
   consumer, these languages or frameworks should strongly consider
   supporting both sets of requirements, Section 4 and Section 5, behind
   a compatibility mode toggle.  This toggle should default to
   Section 4's requirements.

   Doing so will reduce the chances that a developer's application can
   inadvertently create cookies that cannot be read by other servers.

4.  Server Requirements

   This section describes the syntax and semantics of a well-behaved
   profile of the Cookie and Set-Cookie header fields.

4.1.  Set-Cookie

   The Set-Cookie HTTP response header field is used to send cookies
   from the server to the user agent.

4.1.1.  Syntax

   Informally, the Set-Cookie response header field contains a cookie,
   which begins with a name-value-pair, followed by zero or more
   attribute-value pairs.  Servers SHOULD NOT send Set-Cookie header
   fields that fail to conform to the following grammar:

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   set-cookie        = set-cookie-string
   set-cookie-string = BWS cookie-pair *( BWS ";" OWS cookie-av )
   cookie-pair       = cookie-name BWS "=" BWS cookie-value
   cookie-name       = 1*cookie-octet
   cookie-value      = *cookie-octet / ( DQUOTE *cookie-octet DQUOTE )
   cookie-octet      = %x21 / %x23-2B / %x2D-3A / %x3C-5B / %x5D-7E
                         ; US-ASCII characters excluding CTLs,
                         ; whitespace DQUOTE, comma, semicolon,
                         ; and backslash

   cookie-av         = expires-av / max-age-av / domain-av /
                       path-av / secure-av / httponly-av /
                       samesite-av / extension-av
   expires-av        = "Expires" BWS "=" BWS sane-cookie-date
   sane-cookie-date  =
       <IMF-fixdate, defined in [HTTPSEM], Section 5.6.7>
   max-age-av        = "Max-Age" BWS "=" BWS non-zero-digit *DIGIT
   non-zero-digit    = %x31-39
                         ; digits 1 through 9
   domain-av         = "Domain" BWS "=" BWS domain-value
   domain-value      = <subdomain>
                         ; see details below
   path-av           = "Path" BWS "=" BWS path-value
   path-value        = *av-octet
   secure-av         = "Secure"
   httponly-av       = "HttpOnly"
   samesite-av       = "SameSite" BWS "=" BWS samesite-value
   samesite-value    = "Strict" / "Lax" / "None"
   extension-av      = *av-octet
   av-octet          = %x20-3A / %x3C-7E
                         ; any CHAR except CTLs or ";"

   Note that some of the grammatical terms above reference documents
   that use different grammatical notations than this document (which
   uses ABNF from [RFC5234]).

   Per the grammar above, servers SHOULD NOT produce nameless cookies
   (i.e.: an empty cookie-name) as such cookies may be unpredictably
   serialized by UAs when sent back to the server.

   The semantics of the cookie-value are not defined by this document.

   To maximize compatibility with user agents, servers that wish to
   store arbitrary data in a cookie-value SHOULD encode that data, for
   example, using Base64 [RFC4648].

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   Per the grammar above, the cookie-value MAY be wrapped in DQUOTE
   characters.  Note that in this case, the initial and trailing DQUOTE
   characters are not stripped.  They are part of the cookie-value, and
   will be included in Cookie header fields sent to the server.

   The domain-value is a subdomain as defined by [RFC1034], Section 3.5,
   and as enhanced by [RFC1123], Section 2.1.  Thus, domain-value is a
   string of [USASCII] characters, such as one obtained by applying the
   "ToASCII" operation defined in Section 4 of [RFC3490].

   The portions of the set-cookie-string produced by the cookie-av term
   are known as attributes.  To maximize compatibility with user agents,
   servers SHOULD NOT produce two attributes with the same name in the
   same set-cookie-string.  (See Section 5.6 for how user agents handle
   this case.)

   NOTE: The name of an attribute-value pair is not case sensitive.  So
   while they are presented here in CamelCase, such as "HttpOnly" or
   "SameSite", any case is accepted.  E.x.: "httponly", "Httponly",
   "hTTPoNLY", etc.

   Servers SHOULD NOT include more than one Set-Cookie header field in
   the same response with the same cookie-name.  (See Section 5.5 for
   how user agents handle this case.)

   If a server sends multiple responses containing Set-Cookie header
   fields concurrently to the user agent (e.g., when communicating with
   the user agent over multiple sockets), these responses create a "race
   condition" that can lead to unpredictable behavior.

   NOTE: Some existing user agents differ in their interpretation of
   two-digit years.  To avoid compatibility issues, servers SHOULD use
   the rfc1123-date format, which requires a four-digit year.

   NOTE: Some user agents store and process dates in cookies as 32-bit
   UNIX time_t values.  Implementation bugs in the libraries supporting
   time_t processing on some systems might cause such user agents to
   process dates after the year 2038 incorrectly.

4.1.2.  Semantics (Non-Normative)

   This section describes simplified semantics of the Set-Cookie header
   field.  These semantics are detailed enough to be useful for
   understanding the most common uses of cookies by servers.  The full
   semantics are described in Section 5.

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   When the user agent receives a Set-Cookie header field, the user
   agent stores the cookie together with its attributes.  Subsequently,
   when the user agent makes an HTTP request, the user agent includes
   the applicable, non-expired cookies in the Cookie header field.

   If the user agent receives a new cookie with the same cookie-name,
   domain-value, and path-value as a cookie that it has already stored,
   the existing cookie is evicted and replaced with the new cookie.
   Notice that servers can delete cookies by sending the user agent a
   new cookie with an Expires attribute with a value in the past.

   Unless the cookie's attributes indicate otherwise, the cookie is
   returned only to the origin server (and not, for example, to any
   subdomains), and it expires at the end of the current session (as
   defined by the user agent).  User agents ignore unrecognized cookie
   attributes (but not the entire cookie).

4.1.2.1.  The Expires Attribute

   The Expires attribute indicates the maximum lifetime of the cookie,
   represented as the date and time at which the cookie expires.  The
   user agent is not required to retain the cookie until the specified
   date has passed.  In fact, user agents often evict cookies due to
   memory pressure or privacy concerns.

   The user agent MUST limit the maximum value of the Expires attribute.
   The limit SHOULD NOT be greater than 400 days (34560000 seconds) in
   the future.  The RECOMMENDED limit is 400 days in the future, but the
   user agent MAY adjust the limit (see Section 7.2).  Expires
   attributes that are greater than the limit MUST be reduced to the
   limit.

4.1.2.2.  The Max-Age Attribute

   The Max-Age attribute indicates the maximum lifetime of the cookie,
   represented as the number of seconds until the cookie expires.  The
   user agent is not required to retain the cookie for the specified
   duration.  In fact, user agents often evict cookies due to memory
   pressure or privacy concerns.

   The user agent MUST limit the maximum value of the Max-Age attribute.
   The limit SHOULD NOT be greater than 400 days (34560000 seconds) in
   duration.  The RECOMMENDED limit is 400 days in duration, but the
   user agent MAY adjust the limit (see Section 7.2).  Max-Age
   attributes that are greater than the limit MUST be reduced to the
   limit.

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   NOTE: Some existing user agents do not support the Max-Age attribute.
   User agents that do not support the Max-Age attribute ignore the
   attribute.

   If a cookie has both the Max-Age and the Expires attribute, the Max-
   Age attribute has precedence and controls the expiration date of the
   cookie.  If a cookie has neither the Max-Age nor the Expires
   attribute, the user agent will retain the cookie until "the current
   session is over" (as defined by the user agent).

4.1.2.3.  The Domain Attribute

   The Domain attribute specifies those hosts to which the cookie will
   be sent.  For example, if the value of the Domain attribute is
   "site.example", the user agent will include the cookie in the Cookie
   header field when making HTTP requests to site.example,
   www.site.example, and www.corp.site.example.  (Note that a leading
   %x2E ("."), if present, is ignored even though that character is not
   permitted.)  If the server omits the Domain attribute, the user agent
   will return the cookie only to the origin server.

   WARNING: Some existing user agents treat an absent Domain attribute
   as if the Domain attribute were present and contained the current
   host name.  For example, if site.example returns a Set-Cookie header
   field without a Domain attribute, these user agents will erroneously
   send the cookie to www.site.example as well.

   The user agent will reject cookies unless the Domain attribute
   specifies a scope for the cookie that would include the origin
   server.  For example, the user agent will accept a cookie with a
   Domain attribute of "site.example" or of "foo.site.example" from
   foo.site.example, but the user agent will not accept a cookie with a
   Domain attribute of "bar.site.example" or of "baz.foo.site.example".

   NOTE: For security reasons, many user agents are configured to reject
   Domain attributes that correspond to "public suffixes".  For example,
   some user agents will reject Domain attributes of "com" or "co.uk".
   (See Section 5.6 for more information.)

4.1.2.4.  The Path Attribute

   The scope of each cookie is limited to a set of paths, controlled by
   the Path attribute.  If the server omits the Path attribute, the user
   agent will use the "directory" of the request-uri's path component as
   the default value.  (See Section 5.1.4 for more details.)

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   The user agent will include the cookie in an HTTP request only if the
   path portion of the request-uri matches (or is a subdirectory of) the
   cookie's Path attribute, where the %x2F ("/") character is
   interpreted as a directory separator.

   Although seemingly useful for isolating cookies between different
   paths within a given host, the Path attribute cannot be relied upon
   for security (see Section 8).

4.1.2.5.  The Secure Attribute

   The Secure attribute limits the scope of the cookie to "secure"
   channels (where "secure" is defined by the user agent).  When a
   cookie has the Secure attribute, the user agent will include the
   cookie in an HTTP request only if the request is transmitted over a
   secure channel (typically HTTP over Transport Layer Security (TLS)
   [RFC2818]).

4.1.2.6.  The HttpOnly Attribute

   The HttpOnly attribute limits the scope of the cookie to HTTP
   requests.  In particular, the attribute instructs the user agent to
   omit the cookie when providing access to cookies via non-HTTP APIs.

   Note that the HttpOnly attribute is independent of the Secure
   attribute: a cookie can have both the HttpOnly and the Secure
   attribute.

4.1.2.7.  The SameSite Attribute

   The "SameSite" attribute limits the scope of the cookie such that it
   will only be attached to requests if those requests are same-site, as
   defined by the algorithm in Section 5.2.  For example, requests for
   https://site.example/sekrit-image will attach same-site cookies if
   and only if initiated from a context whose "site for cookies" is an
   origin with a scheme and registered domain of "https" and
   "site.example" respectively.

   If the "SameSite" attribute's value is "Strict", the cookie will only
   be sent along with "same-site" requests.  If the value is "Lax", the
   cookie will be sent with same-site requests, and with "cross-site"
   top-level navigations, as described in Section 5.5.7.1.  If the value
   is "None", the cookie will be sent with same-site and cross-site
   requests.  If the "SameSite" attribute's value is something other
   than these three known keywords, the attribute's value will be
   subject to a default enforcement mode that is equivalent to "Lax".

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   The "SameSite" attribute affects cookie creation as well as delivery.
   Cookies which assert "SameSite=Lax" or "SameSite=Strict" cannot be
   set in responses to cross-site subresource requests, or cross-site
   nested navigations.  They can be set along with any top-level
   navigation, cross-site or otherwise.

4.1.3.  Cookie Name Prefixes

   Section 8.5 and Section 8.6 of this document spell out some of the
   drawbacks of cookies' historical implementation.  In particular, it
   is impossible for a server to have confidence that a given cookie was
   set with a particular set of attributes.  In order to provide such
   confidence in a backwards-compatible way, two common sets of
   requirements can be inferred from the first few characters of the
   cookie's name.

   The user agent requirements for the prefixes described below are
   detailed in Section 5.4.

   To maximize compatibility with user agents servers SHOULD use
   prefixes as described below.

4.1.3.1.  The "__Secure-" Prefix

   If a cookie's name begins with a case-sensitive match for the string
   __Secure-, then the cookie will have been set with a Secure
   attribute.

   For example, the following Set-Cookie header field would be rejected
   by a conformant user agent, as it does not have a Secure attribute.

   Set-Cookie: __Secure-SID=12345; Domain=site.example

   Whereas the following Set-Cookie header field would be accepted if
   set from a secure origin (e.g. "https://site.example/"), and rejected
   otherwise:

   Set-Cookie: __Secure-SID=12345; Domain=site.example; Secure

4.1.3.2.  The "__Host-" Prefix

   If a cookie's name begins with a case-sensitive match for the string
   __Host-, then the cookie will have been set with a Secure attribute,
   a Path attribute with a value of /, and no Domain attribute.

   This combination yields a cookie that hews as closely as a cookie can
   to treating the origin as a security boundary.  The lack of a Domain
   attribute ensures that the cookie's host-only-flag is true, locking

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   the cookie to a particular host, rather than allowing it to span
   subdomains.  Setting the Path to / means that the cookie is effective
   for the entire host, and won't be overridden for specific paths.  The
   Secure attribute ensures that the cookie is unaltered by non-secure
   origins, and won't span protocols.

   Ports are the only piece of the origin model that __Host- cookies
   continue to ignore.

   For example, the following cookies would always be rejected:

   Set-Cookie: __Host-SID=12345
   Set-Cookie: __Host-SID=12345; Secure
   Set-Cookie: __Host-SID=12345; Domain=site.example
   Set-Cookie: __Host-SID=12345; Domain=site.example; Path=/
   Set-Cookie: __Host-SID=12345; Secure; Domain=site.example; Path=/

   While the following would be accepted if set from a secure origin
   (e.g. "https://site.example/"), and rejected otherwise:

   Set-Cookie: __Host-SID=12345; Secure; Path=/

4.2.  Cookie

4.2.1.  Syntax

   The user agent sends stored cookies to the origin server in the
   Cookie header field.  If the server conforms to the requirements in
   Section 4.1 (and the user agent conforms to the requirements in
   Section 5), the user agent will send a Cookie header field that
   conforms to the following grammar:

   cookie        = cookie-string
   cookie-string = cookie-pair *( ";" SP cookie-pair )

4.2.2.  Semantics

   Each cookie-pair represents a cookie stored by the user agent.  The
   cookie-pair contains the cookie-name and cookie-value the user agent
   received in the Set-Cookie header field.

   Notice that the cookie attributes are not returned.  In particular,
   the server cannot determine from the Cookie field alone when a cookie
   will expire, for which hosts the cookie is valid, for which paths the
   cookie is valid, or whether the cookie was set with the Secure or
   HttpOnly attributes.

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   The semantics of individual cookies in the Cookie header field are
   not defined by this document.  Servers are expected to imbue these
   cookies with application-specific semantics.

   Although cookies are serialized linearly in the Cookie header field,
   servers SHOULD NOT rely upon the serialization order.  In particular,
   if the Cookie header field contains two cookies with the same name
   (e.g., that were set with different Path or Domain attributes),
   servers SHOULD NOT rely upon the order in which these cookies appear
   in the header field.

5.  User Agent Requirements

   This section specifies the Cookie and Set-Cookie header fields in
   sufficient detail that a user agent implementing these requirements
   precisely can interoperate with existing servers (even those that do
   not conform to the well-behaved profile described in Section 4).

   A user agent could enforce more restrictions than those specified
   herein (e.g., restrictions specified by its cookie policy, described
   in Section 7.2).  However, such additional restrictions may reduce
   the likelihood that a user agent will be able to interoperate with
   existing servers.

5.1.  Subcomponent Algorithms

   This section defines some algorithms used by user agents to process
   specific subcomponents of the Cookie and Set-Cookie header fields.

5.1.1.  Dates

   The user agent MUST use an algorithm equivalent to the following
   algorithm to parse a cookie-date.  Note that the various boolean
   flags defined as a part of the algorithm (i.e., found-time, found-
   day-of-month, found-month, found-year) are initially "not set".

   1.  Using the grammar below, divide the cookie-date into date-tokens.

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      cookie-date     = *delimiter date-token-list *delimiter
      date-token-list = date-token *( 1*delimiter date-token )
      date-token      = 1*non-delimiter

      delimiter       = %x09 / %x20-2F / %x3B-40 / %x5B-60 / %x7B-7E
      non-delimiter   = %x00-08 / %x0A-1F / DIGIT / ":" / ALPHA
                        / %x7F-FF
      non-digit       = %x00-2F / %x3A-FF

      day-of-month    = 1*2DIGIT [ non-digit *OCTET ]
      month           = ( "jan" / "feb" / "mar" / "apr" /
                          "may" / "jun" / "jul" / "aug" /
                          "sep" / "oct" / "nov" / "dec" ) *OCTET
      year            = 2*4DIGIT [ non-digit *OCTET ]
      time            = hms-time [ non-digit *OCTET ]
      hms-time        = time-field ":" time-field ":" time-field
      time-field      = 1*2DIGIT

   2.  Process each date-token sequentially in the order the date-tokens
       appear in the cookie-date:

       1.  If the found-time flag is not set and the token matches the
           time production, set the found-time flag and set the hour-
           value, minute-value, and second-value to the numbers denoted
           by the digits in the date-token, respectively.  Skip the
           remaining sub-steps and continue to the next date-token.

       2.  If the found-day-of-month flag is not set and the date-token
           matches the day-of-month production, set the found-day-of-
           month flag and set the day-of-month-value to the number
           denoted by the date-token.  Skip the remaining sub-steps and
           continue to the next date-token.

       3.  If the found-month flag is not set and the date-token matches
           the month production, set the found-month flag and set the
           month-value to the month denoted by the date-token.  Skip the
           remaining sub-steps and continue to the next date-token.

       4.  If the found-year flag is not set and the date-token matches
           the year production, set the found-year flag and set the
           year-value to the number denoted by the date-token.  Skip the
           remaining sub-steps and continue to the next date-token.

   3.  If the year-value is greater than or equal to 70 and less than or
       equal to 99, increment the year-value by 1900.

   4.  If the year-value is greater than or equal to 0 and less than or
       equal to 69, increment the year-value by 2000.

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       1.  NOTE: Some existing user agents interpret two-digit years
           differently.

   5.  Abort these steps and fail to parse the cookie-date if:

       *  at least one of the found-day-of-month, found-month, found-
          year, or found-time flags is not set,

       *  the day-of-month-value is less than 1 or greater than 31,

       *  the year-value is less than 1601,

       *  the hour-value is greater than 23,

       *  the minute-value is greater than 59, or

       *  the second-value is greater than 59.

       (Note that leap seconds cannot be represented in this syntax.)

   6.  Let the parsed-cookie-date be the date whose day-of-month, month,
       year, hour, minute, and second (in UTC) are the day-of-month-
       value, the month-value, the year-value, the hour-value, the
       minute-value, and the second-value, respectively.  If no such
       date exists, abort these steps and fail to parse the cookie-date.

   7.  Return the parsed-cookie-date as the result of this algorithm.

5.1.2.  Canonicalized Host Names

   A canonicalized host name is the string generated by the following
   algorithm:

   1.  Convert the host name to a sequence of individual domain name
       labels.

   2.  Convert each label that is not a Non-Reserved LDH (NR-LDH) label,
       to an A-label (see Section 2.3.2.1 of [RFC5890] for the former
       and latter), or to a "punycode label" (a label resulting from the
       "ToASCII" conversion in Section 4 of [RFC3490]), as appropriate
       (see Section 6.3 of this specification).

   3.  Concatenate the resulting labels, separated by a %x2E (".")
       character.

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5.1.3.  Domain Matching

   A string domain-matches a given domain string if at least one of the
   following conditions hold:

   *  The domain string and the string are identical.  (Note that both
      the domain string and the string will have been canonicalized to
      lower case at this point.)

   *  All of the following conditions hold:

      -  The domain string is a suffix of the string.

      -  The last character of the string that is not included in the
         domain string is a %x2E (".") character.

      -  The string is a host name (i.e., not an IP address).

5.1.4.  Paths and Path-Match

   The user agent MUST use an algorithm equivalent to the following
   algorithm to compute the default-path of a cookie:

   1.  Let uri-path be the path portion of the request-uri if such a
       portion exists (and empty otherwise).

   2.  If the uri-path is empty or if the first character of the uri-
       path is not a %x2F ("/") character, output %x2F ("/") and skip
       the remaining steps.

   3.  If the uri-path contains no more than one %x2F ("/") character,
       output %x2F ("/") and skip the remaining step.

   4.  Output the characters of the uri-path from the first character up
       to, but not including, the right-most %x2F ("/").

   A request-path path-matches a given cookie-path if at least one of
   the following conditions holds:

   *  The cookie-path and the request-path are identical.

      Note that this differs from the rules in [RFC3986] for equivalence
      of the path component, and hence two equivalent paths can have
      different cookies.

   *  The cookie-path is a prefix of the request-path, and the last
      character of the cookie-path is %x2F ("/").

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   *  The cookie-path is a prefix of the request-path, and the first
      character of the request-path that is not included in the cookie-
      path is a %x2F ("/") character.

5.2.  "Same-site" and "cross-site" Requests

   Two origins are same-site if they satisfy the "same site" criteria
   defined in [SAMESITE].  A request is "same-site" if the following
   criteria are true:

   1.  The request is not the result of a cross-site redirect.  That is,
       the origin of every url in the request's url list is same-site
       with the request's current url's origin.

   2.  The request is not the result of a reload navigation triggered
       through a user interface element (as defined by the user agent;
       e.g., a request triggered by the user clicking a refresh button
       on a toolbar).

   3.  The request's current url's origin is same-site with the
       request's client's "site for cookies" (which is an origin), or if
       the request has no client or the request's client is null.

   Requests which are the result of a reload navigation triggered
   through a user interface element are same-site if the reloaded
   document was originally navigated to via a same-site request.  A
   request that is not "same-site" is instead "cross-site".

   The request's client's "site for cookies" is calculated depending
   upon its client's type, as described in the following subsections:

5.2.1.  Document-based requests

   The URI displayed in a user agent's address bar is the only security
   context directly exposed to users, and therefore the only signal
   users can reasonably rely upon to determine whether or not they trust
   a particular website.  The origin of that URI represents the context
   in which a user most likely believes themselves to be interacting.
   We'll define this origin, the top-level traversable's active
   document's origin, as the "top-level origin".

   For a document displayed in a top-level traversable, we can stop
   here: the document's "site for cookies" is the top-level origin.

   For container documents, we need to audit the origins of each of a
   document's ancestor navigables' active documents in order to account
   for the "multiple-nested scenarios" described in Section 4 of
   [RFC7034].  A document's "site for cookies" is the top-level origin

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   if and only if the top-level origin is same-site with the document's
   origin, and with each of the document's ancestor documents' origins.
   Otherwise its "site for cookies" is an origin set to an opaque
   origin.

   Given a Document (document), the following algorithm returns its
   "site for cookies":

   1.  Let top-document be the active document in document's navigable's
       top-level traversable.

   2.  Let top-origin be the origin of top-document's URI if top-
       document's sandboxed origin browsing context flag is set, and
       top-document's origin otherwise.

   3.  Let documents be a list consisting of the active documents of
       document's inclusive ancestor navigables.

   4.  For each item in documents:

       1.  Let origin be the origin of item's URI if item's sandboxed
           origin browsing context flag is set, and item's origin
           otherwise.

       2.  If origin is not same-site with top-origin, return an origin
           set to an opaque origin.

   5.  Return top-origin.

   Note: This algorithm only applies when the entire chain of documents
   from top-document to document are all active.

5.2.2.  Worker-based requests

   Worker-driven requests aren't as clear-cut as document-driven
   requests, as there isn't a clear link between a top-level traversable
   and a worker.  This is especially true for Service Workers
   [SERVICE-WORKERS], which may execute code in the background, without
   any document visible at all.

   Note: The descriptions below assume that workers must be same-origin
   with the documents that instantiate them.  If this invariant changes,
   we'll need to take the worker's script's URI into account when
   determining their status.

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5.2.2.1.  Dedicated and Shared Workers

   Dedicated workers are simple, as each dedicated worker is bound to
   one and only one document.  Requests generated from a dedicated
   worker (via importScripts, XMLHttpRequest, fetch(), etc) define their
   "site for cookies" as that document's "site for cookies".

   Shared workers may be bound to multiple documents at once.  As it is
   quite possible for those documents to have distinct "site for
   cookies" values, the worker's "site for cookies" will be an origin
   set to an opaque origin in cases where the values are not all same-
   site with the worker's origin, and the worker's origin in cases where
   the values agree.

   Given a WorkerGlobalScope (worker), the following algorithm returns
   its "site for cookies":

   1.  Let site be worker's origin.

   2.  For each document in worker's Documents:

       1.  Let document-site be document's "site for cookies" (as
           defined in Section 5.2.1).

       2.  If document-site is not same-site with site, return an origin
           set to an opaque origin.

   3.  Return site.

5.2.2.2.  Service Workers

   Service Workers are more complicated, as they act as a completely
   separate execution context with only tangential relationship to the
   Document which registered them.

   How user agents handle Service Workers may differ, but user agents
   SHOULD match the [SERVICE-WORKERS] specification.

5.3.  Ignoring Set-Cookie Header Fields

   User agents MAY ignore Set-Cookie header fields contained in
   responses with 100-level status codes or based on its cookie policy
   (see Section 7.2).

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   All other Set-Cookie header fields SHOULD be processed according to
   Section 5.5.  That is, Set-Cookie header fields contained in
   responses with non-100-level status codes (including those in
   responses with 400- and 500-level status codes) SHOULD be processed
   unless ignored according to the user agent's cookie policy.

5.4.  Cookie Name Prefixes

   User agents' requirements for cookie name prefixes differ slightly
   from servers' (Section 4.1.3) in that UAs MUST match the prefix
   string case-insensitively.

   The normative requirements for the prefixes are detailed in the
   storage model algorithm defined in Section 5.6.

   This is because some servers will process cookie case-insensitively,
   resulting in them unintentionally miscapitalizing and accepting
   miscapitalized prefixes.

   For example, if a server sends the following Set-Cookie header field

   Set-Cookie: __SECURE-SID=12345

   to a UA which checks prefixes case-sensitively it will accept this
   cookie and the server would incorrectly believe the cookie is subject
   the same guarantees as one spelled __Secure-.

   Additionally the server is vulnerable to an attacker that
   purposefully miscapitalizes a cookie in order to impersonate a
   prefixed cookie.  For example, a site already has a cookie __Secure-
   SID=12345 and by some means an attacker sends the following Set-
   Cookie header field for the site to a UA which checks prefixes case-
   sensitively.

   Set-Cookie: __SeCuRe-SID=evil

   The next time a user visits the site the UA will send both cookies:

   Cookie: __Secure-SID=12345; __SeCuRe-SID=evil

   The server, being case-insensitive, won't be able to tell the
   difference between the two cookies allowing the attacker to
   compromise the site.

   To prevent these issues, UAs MUST match cookie name prefixes case-
   insensitive.

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   Note: Cookies with different names are still considered separate by
   UAs.  So both __Secure-foo=bar and __secure-foo=baz can exist as
   distinct cookies simultaneously and both would have the requirements
   of the __Secure- prefix applied.

   The following are examples of Set-Cookie header fields that would be
   rejected by a conformant user agent.

   Set-Cookie: __Secure-SID=12345; Domain=site.example
   Set-Cookie: __secure-SID=12345; Domain=site.example
   Set-Cookie: __SECURE-SID=12345; Domain=site.example
   Set-Cookie: __Host-SID=12345
   Set-Cookie: __host-SID=12345; Secure
   Set-Cookie: __host-SID=12345; Domain=site.example
   Set-Cookie: __HOST-SID=12345; Domain=site.example; Path=/
   Set-Cookie: __Host-SID=12345; Secure; Domain=site.example; Path=/
   Set-Cookie: __host-SID=12345; Secure; Domain=site.example; Path=/
   Set-Cookie: __HOST-SID=12345; Secure; Domain=site.example; Path=/

   Whereas the following Set-Cookie header fields would be accepted if
   set from a secure origin.

   Set-Cookie: __Secure-SID=12345; Domain=site.example; Secure
   Set-Cookie: __secure-SID=12345; Domain=site.example; Secure
   Set-Cookie: __SECURE-SID=12345; Domain=site.example; Secure
   Set-Cookie: __Host-SID=12345; Secure; Path=/
   Set-Cookie: __host-SID=12345; Secure; Path=/
   Set-Cookie: __HOST-SID=12345; Secure; Path=/

5.5.  The Set-Cookie Header Field

   When a user agent receives a Set-Cookie header field in an HTTP
   response, the user agent MAY ignore the Set-Cookie header field in
   its entirety (see Section 5.3).

   If the user agent does not ignore the Set-Cookie header field in its
   entirety, the user agent MUST parse the field-value of the Set-Cookie
   header field as a set-cookie-string (defined below).

   NOTE: The algorithm below is more permissive than the grammar in
   Section 4.1.  For example, the algorithm strips leading and trailing
   whitespace from the cookie name and value (but maintains internal
   whitespace), whereas the grammar in Section 4.1 forbids whitespace in
   these positions.  In addition, the algorithm below accommodates some
   characters that are not cookie-octets according to the grammar in
   Section 4.1.  User agents use this algorithm so as to interoperate
   with servers that do not follow the recommendations in Section 4.

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   NOTE: As set-cookie-string may originate from a non-HTTP API, it is
   not guaranteed to be free of CTL characters, so this algorithm
   handles them explicitly.  Horizontal tab (%x09) is excluded from the
   CTL characters that lead to set-cookie-string rejection, as it is
   considered whitespace, which is handled separately.

   NOTE: The set-cookie-string may contain octet sequences that appear
   percent-encoded as per Section 2.1 of [RFC3986].  However, a user
   agent MUST NOT decode these sequences and instead parse the
   individual octets as specified in this algorithm.

   A user agent MUST use an algorithm equivalent to the following
   algorithm to parse a set-cookie-string:

   1.  If the set-cookie-string contains a %x00-08 / %x0A-1F / %x7F
       character (CTL characters excluding HTAB): Abort these steps and
       ignore the set-cookie-string entirely.

   2.  If the set-cookie-string contains a %x3B (";") character:

       1.  The name-value-pair string consists of the characters up to,
           but not including, the first %x3B (";"), and the unparsed-
           attributes consist of the remainder of the set-cookie-string
           (including the %x3B (";") in question).

       Otherwise:

       1.  The name-value-pair string consists of all the characters
           contained in the set-cookie-string, and the unparsed-
           attributes is the empty string.

   3.  If the name-value-pair string lacks a %x3D ("=") character, then
       the name string is empty, and the value string is the value of
       name-value-pair.

       Otherwise, the name string consists of the characters up to, but
       not including, the first %x3D ("=") character, and the (possibly
       empty) value string consists of the characters after the first
       %x3D ("=") character.

   4.  Remove any leading or trailing WSP characters from the name
       string and the value string.

   5.  If the sum of the lengths of the name string and the value string
       is more than 4096 octets, abort these steps and ignore the set-
       cookie-string entirely.

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   6.  The cookie-name is the name string, and the cookie-value is the
       value string.

   The user agent MUST use an algorithm equivalent to the following
   algorithm to parse the unparsed-attributes:

   1.  If the unparsed-attributes string is empty, skip the rest of
       these steps.

   2.  Discard the first character of the unparsed-attributes (which
       will be a %x3B (";") character).

   3.  If the remaining unparsed-attributes contains a %x3B (";")
       character:

       1.  Consume the characters of the unparsed-attributes up to, but
           not including, the first %x3B (";") character.

       Otherwise:

       1.  Consume the remainder of the unparsed-attributes.

       Let the cookie-av string be the characters consumed in this step.

   4.  If the cookie-av string contains a %x3D ("=") character:

       1.  The (possibly empty) attribute-name string consists of the
           characters up to, but not including, the first %x3D ("=")
           character, and the (possibly empty) attribute-value string
           consists of the characters after the first %x3D ("=")
           character.

       Otherwise:

       1.  The attribute-name string consists of the entire cookie-av
           string, and the attribute-value string is empty.

   5.  Remove any leading or trailing WSP characters from the attribute-
       name string and the attribute-value string.

   6.  If the attribute-value is longer than 1024 octets, ignore the
       cookie-av string and return to Step 1 of this algorithm.

   7.  Process the attribute-name and attribute-value according to the
       requirements in the following subsections.  (Notice that
       attributes with unrecognized attribute-names are ignored.)

   8.  Return to Step 1 of this algorithm.

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   When the user agent finishes parsing the set-cookie-string, the user
   agent is said to "receive a cookie" from the request-uri with name
   cookie-name, value cookie-value, and attributes cookie-attribute-
   list.  (See Section 5.6 for additional requirements triggered by
   receiving a cookie.)

5.5.1.  The Expires Attribute

   If the attribute-name case-insensitively matches the string
   "Expires", the user agent MUST process the cookie-av as follows.

   1.  Let the expiry-time be the result of parsing the attribute-value
       as cookie-date (see Section 5.1.1).

   2.  If the attribute-value failed to parse as a cookie date, ignore
       the cookie-av.

   3.  Let cookie-age-limit be the maximum age of the cookie (which
       SHOULD be 400 days in the future or sooner, see Section 4.1.2.1).

   4.  If the expiry-time is more than cookie-age-limit, the user agent
       MUST set the expiry time to cookie-age-limit in seconds.

   5.  If the expiry-time is earlier than the earliest date the user
       agent can represent, the user agent MAY replace the expiry-time
       with the earliest representable date.

   6.  Append an attribute to the cookie-attribute-list with an
       attribute-name of Expires and an attribute-value of expiry-time.

5.5.2.  The Max-Age Attribute

   If the attribute-name case-insensitively matches the string "Max-
   Age", the user agent MUST process the cookie-av as follows.

   1.  If the attribute-value is empty, ignore the cookie-av.

   2.  If the first character of the attribute-value is neither a DIGIT,
       nor a "-" character followed by a DIGIT, ignore the cookie-av.

   3.  If the remainder of attribute-value contains a non-DIGIT
       character, ignore the cookie-av.

   4.  Let delta-seconds be the attribute-value converted to a base 10
       integer.

   5.  Let cookie-age-limit be the maximum age of the cookie (which
       SHOULD be 400 days or less, see Section 4.1.2.2).

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   6.  Set delta-seconds to the smaller of its present value and cookie-
       age-limit.

   7.  If delta-seconds is less than or equal to zero (0), let expiry-
       time be the earliest representable date and time.  Otherwise, let
       the expiry-time be the current date and time plus delta-seconds
       seconds.

   8.  Append an attribute to the cookie-attribute-list with an
       attribute-name of Max-Age and an attribute-value of expiry-time.

5.5.3.  The Domain Attribute

   If the attribute-name case-insensitively matches the string "Domain",
   the user agent MUST process the cookie-av as follows.

   1.  Let cookie-domain be the attribute-value.

   2.  If cookie-domain starts with %x2E ("."), let cookie-domain be
       cookie-domain without its leading %x2E (".").

   3.  Convert the cookie-domain to lower case.

   4.  Append an attribute to the cookie-attribute-list with an
       attribute-name of Domain and an attribute-value of cookie-domain.

5.5.4.  The Path Attribute

   If the attribute-name case-insensitively matches the string "Path",
   the user agent MUST process the cookie-av as follows.

   1.  If the attribute-value is empty or if the first character of the
       attribute-value is not %x2F ("/"):

       1.  Let cookie-path be the default-path.

       Otherwise:

       1.  Let cookie-path be the attribute-value.

   2.  Append an attribute to the cookie-attribute-list with an
       attribute-name of Path and an attribute-value of cookie-path.

5.5.5.  The Secure Attribute

   If the attribute-name case-insensitively matches the string "Secure",
   the user agent MUST append an attribute to the cookie-attribute-list
   with an attribute-name of Secure and an empty attribute-value.

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5.5.6.  The HttpOnly Attribute

   If the attribute-name case-insensitively matches the string
   "HttpOnly", the user agent MUST append an attribute to the cookie-
   attribute-list with an attribute-name of HttpOnly and an empty
   attribute-value.

5.5.7.  The SameSite Attribute

   If the attribute-name case-insensitively matches the string
   "SameSite", the user agent MUST process the cookie-av as follows:

   1.  Let enforcement be "Default".

   2.  If cookie-av's attribute-value is a case-insensitive match for
       "None", set enforcement to "None".

   3.  If cookie-av's attribute-value is a case-insensitive match for
       "Strict", set enforcement to "Strict".

   4.  If cookie-av's attribute-value is a case-insensitive match for
       "Lax", set enforcement to "Lax".

   5.  Append an attribute to the cookie-attribute-list with an
       attribute-name of "SameSite" and an attribute-value of
       enforcement.

5.5.7.1.  "Strict" and "Lax" enforcement

   Same-site cookies in "Strict" enforcement mode will not be sent along
   with top-level navigations which are triggered from a cross-site
   document context.  As discussed in Section 8.8.2, this might or might
   not be compatible with existing session management systems.  In the
   interests of providing a drop-in mechanism that mitigates the risk of
   CSRF attacks, developers may set the SameSite attribute in a "Lax"
   enforcement mode that carves out an exception which sends same-site
   cookies along with cross-site requests if and only if they are top-
   level navigations which use a "safe" (in the [HTTPSEM] sense) HTTP
   method.  (Note that a request's method may be changed from POST to
   GET for some redirects (see Sections 15.4.2 and 15.4.3 of [HTTPSEM]);
   in these cases, a request's "safe"ness is determined based on the
   method of the current redirect hop.)

   Lax enforcement provides reasonable defense in depth against CSRF
   attacks that rely on unsafe HTTP methods (like POST), but does not
   offer a robust defense against CSRF as a general category of attack:

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   1.  Attackers can still pop up new windows or trigger top-level
       navigations in order to create a "same-site" request (as
       described in Section 5.2.1), which is only a speedbump along the
       road to exploitation.

   2.  Features like <link rel='prerender'> [prerendering] can be
       exploited to create "same-site" requests without the risk of user
       detection.

   When possible, developers should use a session management mechanism
   such as that described in Section 8.8.2 to mitigate the risk of CSRF
   more completely.

5.5.7.2.  "Lax-Allowing-Unsafe" enforcement

   As discussed in Section 8.8.6, compatibility concerns may necessitate
   the use of a "Lax-allowing-unsafe" enforcement mode that allows
   cookies to be sent with a cross-site HTTP request if and only if it
   is a top-level request, regardless of request method.  That is, the
   "Lax-allowing-unsafe" enforcement mode waives the requirement for the
   HTTP request's method to be "safe" in the SameSite enforcement step
   of the retrieval algorithm in Section 5.7.3.  (All cookies,
   regardless of SameSite enforcement mode, may be set for top-level
   navigations, regardless of HTTP request method, as specified in
   Section 5.6.)

   "Lax-allowing-unsafe" is not a distinct value of the SameSite
   attribute.  Rather, user agents MAY apply "Lax-allowing-unsafe"
   enforcement only to cookies that did not explicitly specify a
   SameSite attribute (i.e., those whose same-site-flag was set to
   "Default" by default).  To limit the scope of this compatibility
   mode, user agents which apply "Lax-allowing-unsafe" enforcement
   SHOULD restrict the enforcement to cookies which were created
   recently.  Deployment experience has shown a cookie age of 2 minutes
   or less to be a reasonable limit.

   If the user agent uses "Lax-allowing-unsafe" enforcement, it MUST
   apply the following modification to the retrieval algorithm defined
   in Section 5.7.3:

   Replace the condition in the penultimate bullet point of step 1 of
   the retrieval algorithm reading

    * The HTTP request associated with the retrieval uses a "safe"
      method.

   with

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    * At least one of the following is true:

      1.  The HTTP request associated with the retrieval uses a "safe"
          method.

      2.  The cookie's same-site-flag is "Default" and the amount of
          time elapsed since the cookie's creation-time is at most a
          duration of the user agent's choosing.

5.6.  Storage Model

   The user agent stores the following fields about each cookie: name,
   value, expiry-time, domain, path, creation-time, last-access-time,
   persistent-flag, host-only-flag, secure-only-flag, http-only-flag,
   and same-site-flag.

   When the user agent "receives a cookie" from a request-uri with name
   cookie-name, value cookie-value, and attributes cookie-attribute-
   list, the user agent MUST process the cookie as follows:

   1.   A user agent MAY ignore a received cookie in its entirety.  See
        Section 5.3.

   2.   If cookie-name is empty and cookie-value is empty, abort these
        steps and ignore the cookie entirely.

   3.   If the cookie-name or the cookie-value contains a %x00-08 /
        %x0A-1F / %x7F character (CTL characters excluding HTAB), abort
        these steps and ignore the cookie entirely.

   4.   If the sum of the lengths of cookie-name and cookie-value is
        more than 4096 octets, abort these steps and ignore the cookie
        entirely.

   5.   Create a new cookie with name cookie-name, value cookie-value.
        Set the creation-time and the last-access-time to the current
        date and time.

   6.   If the cookie-attribute-list contains an attribute with an
        attribute-name of "Max-Age":

        1.  Set the cookie's persistent-flag to true.

        2.  Set the cookie's expiry-time to attribute-value of the last
            attribute in the cookie-attribute-list with an attribute-
            name of "Max-Age".

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        Otherwise, if the cookie-attribute-list contains an attribute
        with an attribute-name of "Expires" (and does not contain an
        attribute with an attribute-name of "Max-Age"):

        1.  Set the cookie's persistent-flag to true.

        2.  Set the cookie's expiry-time to attribute-value of the last
            attribute in the cookie-attribute-list with an attribute-
            name of "Expires".

        Otherwise:

        1.  Set the cookie's persistent-flag to false.

        2.  Set the cookie's expiry-time to the latest representable
            date.

   7.   If the cookie-attribute-list contains an attribute with an
        attribute-name of "Domain":

        1.  Let the domain-attribute be the attribute-value of the last
            attribute in the cookie-attribute-list with both an
            attribute-name of "Domain" and an attribute-value whose
            length is no more than 1024 octets.  (Note that a leading
            %x2E ("."), if present, is ignored even though that
            character is not permitted.)

        Otherwise:

        1.  Let the domain-attribute be the empty string.

   8.   If the domain-attribute contains a character that is not in the
        range of [USASCII] characters, abort these steps and ignore the
        cookie entirely.

   9.   If the user agent is configured to reject "public suffixes" and
        the domain-attribute is a public suffix:

        1.  If the domain-attribute is identical to the canonicalized
            request-host:

            1.  Let the domain-attribute be the empty string.

            Otherwise:

            1.  Abort these steps and ignore the cookie entirely.

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        NOTE: This step prevents attacker.example from disrupting the
        integrity of site.example by setting a cookie with a Domain
        attribute of "example".

   10.  If the domain-attribute is non-empty:

        1.  If the canonicalized request-host does not domain-match the
            domain-attribute:

            1.  Abort these steps and ignore the cookie entirely.

            Otherwise:

            1.  Set the cookie's host-only-flag to false.

            2.  Set the cookie's domain to the domain-attribute.

        Otherwise:

        1.  Set the cookie's host-only-flag to true.

        2.  Set the cookie's domain to the canonicalized request-host.

   11.  If the cookie-attribute-list contains an attribute with an
        attribute-name of "Path", set the cookie's path to attribute-
        value of the last attribute in the cookie-attribute-list with
        both an attribute-name of "Path" and an attribute-value whose
        length is no more than 1024 octets.  Otherwise, set the cookie's
        path to the default-path of the request-uri.

   12.  If the cookie-attribute-list contains an attribute with an
        attribute-name of "Secure", set the cookie's secure-only-flag to
        true.  Otherwise, set the cookie's secure-only-flag to false.

   13.  If the scheme component of the request-uri does not denote a
        "secure" protocol (as defined by the user agent), and the
        cookie's secure-only-flag is true, then abort these steps and
        ignore the cookie entirely.

   14.  If the cookie-attribute-list contains an attribute with an
        attribute-name of "HttpOnly", set the cookie's http-only-flag to
        true.  Otherwise, set the cookie's http-only-flag to false.

   15.  If the cookie was received from a "non-HTTP" API and the
        cookie's http-only-flag is true, abort these steps and ignore
        the cookie entirely.

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   16.  If the cookie's secure-only-flag is false, and the scheme
        component of request-uri does not denote a "secure" protocol,
        then abort these steps and ignore the cookie entirely if the
        cookie store contains one or more cookies that meet all of the
        following criteria:

        1.  Their name matches the name of the newly-created cookie.

        2.  Their secure-only-flag is true.

        3.  Their domain domain-matches the domain of the newly-created
            cookie, or vice-versa.

        4.  The path of the newly-created cookie path-matches the path
            of the existing cookie.

        Note: The path comparison is not symmetric, ensuring only that a
        newly-created, non-secure cookie does not overlay an existing
        secure cookie, providing some mitigation against cookie-fixing
        attacks.  That is, given an existing secure cookie named 'a'
        with a path of '/login', a non-secure cookie named 'a' could be
        set for a path of '/' or '/foo', but not for a path of '/login'
        or '/login/en'.

   17.  If the cookie-attribute-list contains an attribute with an
        attribute-name of "SameSite", and an attribute-value of
        "Strict", "Lax", or "None", set the cookie's same-site-flag to
        the attribute-value of the last attribute in the cookie-
        attribute-list with an attribute-name of "SameSite".  Otherwise,
        set the cookie's same-site-flag to "Default".

   18.  If the cookie's same-site-flag is not "None":

        1.  If the cookie was received from a "non-HTTP" API, and the
            API was called from a navigable's active document whose
            "site for cookies" is not same-site with the top-level
            origin, then abort these steps and ignore the newly created
            cookie entirely.

        2.  If the cookie was received from a "same-site" request (as
            defined in Section 5.2), skip the remaining substeps and
            continue processing the cookie.

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        3.  If the cookie was received from a request which is
            navigating a top-level traversable [HTML] (e.g. if the
            request's "reserved client" is either null or an environment
            whose "target browsing context"'s navigable is a top-level
            traversable), skip the remaining substeps and continue
            processing the cookie.

            Note: Top-level navigations can create a cookie with any
            SameSite value, even if the new cookie wouldn't have been
            sent along with the request had it already existed prior to
            the navigation.

        4.  Abort these steps and ignore the newly created cookie
            entirely.

   19.  If the cookie's "same-site-flag" is "None", abort these steps
        and ignore the cookie entirely unless the cookie's secure-only-
        flag is true.

   20.  If the cookie-name begins with a case-insensitive match for the
        string "__Secure-", abort these steps and ignore the cookie
        entirely unless the cookie's secure-only-flag is true.

   21.  If the cookie-name begins with a case-insensitive match for the
        string "__Host-", abort these steps and ignore the cookie
        entirely unless the cookie meets all the following criteria:

        1.  The cookie's secure-only-flag is true.

        2.  The cookie's host-only-flag is true.

        3.  The cookie-attribute-list contains an attribute with an
            attribute-name of "Path", and the cookie's path is /.

   22.  If the cookie-name is empty and either of the following
        conditions are true, abort these steps and ignore the cookie:

        *  the cookie-value begins with a case-insensitive match for the
           string "__Secure-"

        *  the cookie-value begins with a case-insensitive match for the
           string "__Host-"

   23.  If the cookie store contains a cookie with the same name,
        domain, host-only-flag, and path as the newly-created cookie:

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        1.  Let old-cookie be the existing cookie with the same name,
            domain, host-only-flag, and path as the newly-created
            cookie.  (Notice that this algorithm maintains the invariant
            that there is at most one such cookie.)

        2.  If the newly-created cookie was received from a "non-HTTP"
            API and the old-cookie's http-only-flag is true, abort these
            steps and ignore the newly created cookie entirely.

        3.  Update the creation-time of the newly-created cookie to
            match the creation-time of the old-cookie.

        4.  Remove the old-cookie from the cookie store.

   24.  Insert the newly-created cookie into the cookie store.

   A cookie is "expired" if the cookie has an expiry date in the past.

   The user agent MUST evict all expired cookies from the cookie store
   if, at any time, an expired cookie exists in the cookie store.

   At any time, the user agent MAY "remove excess cookies" from the
   cookie store if the number of cookies sharing a domain field exceeds
   some implementation-defined upper bound (such as 50 cookies).

   At any time, the user agent MAY "remove excess cookies" from the
   cookie store if the cookie store exceeds some predetermined upper
   bound (such as 3000 cookies).

   When the user agent removes excess cookies from the cookie store, the
   user agent MUST evict cookies in the following priority order:

   1.  Expired cookies.

   2.  Cookies whose secure-only-flag is false, and which share a domain
       field with more than a predetermined number of other cookies.

   3.  Cookies that share a domain field with more than a predetermined
       number of other cookies.

   4.  All cookies.

   If two cookies have the same removal priority, the user agent MUST
   evict the cookie with the earliest last-access-time first.

   When "the current session is over" (as defined by the user agent),
   the user agent MUST remove from the cookie store all cookies with the
   persistent-flag set to false.

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5.7.  Retrieval Model

   This section defines how cookies are retrieved from a cookie store in
   the form of a cookie-string.  A "retrieval" is any event which
   requires generating a cookie-string.  For example, a retrieval may
   occur in order to build a Cookie header field for an HTTP request, or
   may be required in order to return a cookie-string from a call to a
   "non-HTTP" API that provides access to cookies.  A retrieval has an
   associated URI, same-site status, and type, which are defined below
   depending on the type of retrieval.

5.7.1.  The Cookie Header Field

   The user agent includes stored cookies in the Cookie HTTP request
   header field.

   When the user agent generates an HTTP request, the user agent MUST
   NOT attach more than one Cookie header field.

   A user agent MAY omit the Cookie header field in its entirety.  For
   example, the user agent might wish to block sending cookies during
   "third-party" requests from setting cookies (see Section 7.1).

   If the user agent does attach a Cookie header field to an HTTP
   request, the user agent MUST compute the cookie-string following the
   algorithm defined in Section 5.7.3, where the retrieval's URI is the
   request-uri, the retrieval's same-site status is computed for the
   HTTP request as defined in Section 5.2, and the retrieval's type is
   "HTTP".

5.7.2.  Non-HTTP APIs

   The user agent MAY implement "non-HTTP" APIs that can be used to
   access stored cookies.

   A user agent MAY return an empty cookie-string in certain contexts,
   such as when a retrieval occurs within a third-party context (see
   Section 7.1).

   If a user agent does return cookies for a given call to a "non-HTTP"
   API with an associated Document, then the user agent MUST compute the
   cookie-string following the algorithm defined in Section 5.7.3, where
   the retrieval's URI is defined by the caller (see
   [DOM-DOCUMENT-COOKIE]), the retrieval's same-site status is "same-
   site" if the Document's "site for cookies" is same-site with the top-
   level origin as defined in Section 5.2.1 (otherwise it is "cross-
   site"), and the retrieval's type is "non-HTTP".

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5.7.3.  Retrieval Algorithm

   Given a cookie store and a retrieval, the following algorithm returns
   a cookie-string from a given cookie store.

   1.  Let cookie-list be the set of cookies from the cookie store that
       meets all of the following requirements:

       *  Either:

          -  The cookie's host-only-flag is true and the canonicalized
             host of the retrieval's URI is identical to the cookie's
             domain.

          Or:

          -  The cookie's host-only-flag is false and the canonicalized
             host of the retrieval's URI domain-matches the cookie's
             domain.

          NOTE: (For user agents configured to reject "public suffixes")
          It's possible that the public suffix list was changed since a
          cookie was created.  If this change results in a cookie's
          domain becoming a public suffix then that cookie is considered
          invalid as it would have been rejected during creation (See
          Section 5.6 step 9).  User agents should be careful to avoid
          retrieving these invalid cookies even if they domain-match the
          host of the retrieval's URI.

       *  The retrieval's URI's path path-matches the cookie's path.

       *  If the cookie's secure-only-flag is true, then the retrieval's
          URI's scheme must denote a "secure" protocol (as defined by
          the user agent).

          NOTE: The notion of a "secure" protocol is not defined by this
          document.  Typically, user agents consider a protocol secure
          if the protocol makes use of transport-layer security, such as
          SSL or TLS.  For example, most user agents consider "https" to
          be a scheme that denotes a secure protocol.

       *  If the cookie's http-only-flag is true, then exclude the
          cookie if the retrieval's type is "non-HTTP".

       *  If the cookie's same-site-flag is not "None" and the
          retrieval's same-site status is "cross-site", then exclude the
          cookie unless all of the following conditions are met:

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          -  The retrieval's type is "HTTP".

          -  The same-site-flag is "Lax" or "Default".

          -  The HTTP request associated with the retrieval uses a
             "safe" method.

          -  The target browsing context of the HTTP request associated
             with the retrieval is the active browsing context or a top-
             level traversable.

   2.  The user agent SHOULD sort the cookie-list in the following
       order:

       *  Cookies with longer paths are listed before cookies with
          shorter paths.

       *  Among cookies that have equal-length path fields, cookies with
          earlier creation-times are listed before cookies with later
          creation-times.

       NOTE: Not all user agents sort the cookie-list in this order, but
       this order reflects common practice when this document was
       written, and, historically, there have been servers that
       (erroneously) depended on this order.

   3.  Update the last-access-time of each cookie in the cookie-list to
       the current date and time.

   4.  Serialize the cookie-list into a cookie-string by processing each
       cookie in the cookie-list in order:

       1.  If the cookies' name is not empty, output the cookie's name
           followed by the %x3D ("=") character.

       2.  If the cookies' value is not empty, output the cookie's
           value.

       3.  If there is an unprocessed cookie in the cookie-list, output
           the characters %x3B and %x20 ("; ").

6.  Implementation Considerations

6.1.  Limits

   Practical user agent implementations have limits on the number and
   size of cookies that they can store.  General-use user agents SHOULD
   provide each of the following minimum capabilities:

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   *  At least 50 cookies per domain.

   *  At least 3000 cookies total.

   User agents MAY limit the maximum number of cookies they store, and
   may evict any cookie at any time (whether at the request of the user
   or due to implementation limitations).

   Note that a limit on the maximum number of cookies also limits the
   total size of the stored cookies, due to the length limits which MUST
   be enforced in Section 5.5.

   Servers SHOULD use as few and as small cookies as possible to avoid
   reaching these implementation limits and to minimize network
   bandwidth due to the Cookie header field being included in every
   request.

   Servers SHOULD gracefully degrade if the user agent fails to return
   one or more cookies in the Cookie header field because the user agent
   might evict any cookie at any time.

6.2.  Application Programming Interfaces

   One reason the Cookie and Set-Cookie header fields use such esoteric
   syntax is that many platforms (both in servers and user agents)
   provide a string-based application programming interface (API) to
   cookies, requiring application-layer programmers to generate and
   parse the syntax used by the Cookie and Set-Cookie header fields,
   which many programmers have done incorrectly, resulting in
   interoperability problems.

   Instead of providing string-based APIs to cookies, platforms would be
   well-served by providing more semantic APIs.  It is beyond the scope
   of this document to recommend specific API designs, but there are
   clear benefits to accepting an abstract "Date" object instead of a
   serialized date string.

6.3.  IDNA Dependency and Migration

   IDNA2008 [RFC5890] supersedes IDNA2003 [RFC3490].  However, there are
   differences between the two specifications, and thus there can be
   differences in processing (e.g., converting) domain name labels that
   have been registered under one from those registered under the other.
   There will be a transition period of some time during which
   IDNA2003-based domain name labels will exist in the wild.  User
   agents SHOULD implement IDNA2008 [RFC5890] and MAY implement [UTS46]
   or [RFC5895] in order to facilitate their IDNA transition.  If a user
   agent does not implement IDNA2008, the user agent MUST implement

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   IDNA2003 [RFC3490].

7.  Privacy Considerations

   Cookies' primary privacy risk is their ability to correlate user
   activity.  This can happen on a single site, but is most problematic
   when activity is tracked across different, seemingly unconnected Web
   sites to build a user profile.

   Over time, this capability (warned against explicitly in [RFC2109]
   and all of its successors) has become widely used for varied reasons
   including:

   *  authenticating users across sites,

   *  assembling information on users,

   *  protecting against fraud and other forms of undesirable traffic,

   *  targeting advertisements at specific users or at users with
      specified attributes,

   *  measuring how often ads are shown to users, and

   *  recognizing when an ad resulted in a change in user behavior.

   While not every use of cookies is necessarily problematic for
   privacy, their potential for abuse has become a widespread concern in
   the Internet community and broader society.  In response to these
   concerns, user agents have actively constrained cookie functionality
   in various ways (as allowed and encouraged by previous
   specifications), while avoiding disruption to features they judge
   desirable for the health of the Web.

   It is too early to declare consensus on which specific mechanism(s)
   should be used to mitigate cookies' privacy impact; user agents'
   ongoing changes to how they are handled are best characterised as
   experiments that can provide input into that eventual consensus.

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   Instead, this document describes limited, general mitigations against
   the privacy risks associated with cookies that enjoy wide deployment
   at the time of writing.  It is expected that implementations will
   continue to experiment and impose stricter, more well-defined
   limitations on cookies over time.  Future versions of this document
   might codify those mechanisms based upon deployment experience.  If
   functions that currently rely on cookies can be supported by
   separate, targeted mechanisms, they might be documented in separate
   specifications and stricter limitations on cookies might become
   feasible.

   Note that cookies are not the only mechanism that can be used to
   track users across sites, so while these mitigations are necessary to
   improve Web privacy, they are not sufficient on their own.

7.1.  Third-Party Cookies

   A "third-party" or cross-site cookie is one that is associated with
   embedded content (such as scripts, images, stylesheets, frames) that
   is obtained from a different server than the one that hosts the
   primary resource (usually, the Web page that the user is viewing).
   Third-party cookies are often used to correlate users' activity on
   different sites.

   Because of their inherent privacy issues, most user agents now limit
   third-party cookies in a variety of ways.  Some completely block
   third-party cookies by refusing to process third-party Set-Cookie
   header fields and refusing to send third-party Cookie header fields.
   Some partition cookies based upon the first-party context, so that
   different cookies are sent depending on the site being browsed.  Some
   block cookies based upon user agent cookie policy and/or user
   controls.

   While this document does not endorse or require a specific approach,
   it is RECOMMENDED that user agents adopt a policy for third-party
   cookies that is as restrictive as compatibility constraints permit.
   Consequently, resources cannot rely upon third-party cookies being
   treated consistently by user agents for the foreseeable future.

7.2.  Cookie Policy

   User agents MAY enforce a cookie policy consisting of restrictions on
   how cookies may be used or ignored (see Section 5.3).

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   A cookie policy may govern which domains or parties, as in first and
   third parties (see Section 7.1), for which the user agent will allow
   cookie access.  The policy can also define limits on cookie size,
   cookie expiry (see Section 4.1.2.1 and Section 4.1.2.2), and the
   number of cookies per domain or in total.

   The recomended cookie expiry upper limit is 400 days.  User agents
   may set a lower limit to enforce shorter data retention timelines, or
   set the limit higher to support longer retention when appropriate
   (e.g., server-to-server communication over HTTPS).

   The goal of a restrictive cookie policy is often to improve security
   or privacy.  User agents often allow users to change the cookie
   policy (see Section 7.3).

7.3.  User Controls

   User agents SHOULD provide users with a mechanism for managing the
   cookies stored in the cookie store.  For example, a user agent might
   let users delete all cookies received during a specified time period
   or all the cookies related to a particular domain.  In addition, many
   user agents include a user interface element that lets users examine
   the cookies stored in their cookie store.

   User agents SHOULD provide users with a mechanism for disabling
   cookies.  When cookies are disabled, the user agent MUST NOT include
   a Cookie header field in outbound HTTP requests and the user agent
   MUST NOT process Set-Cookie header fields in inbound HTTP responses.

   User agents MAY offer a way to change the cookie policy (see
   Section 7.2).

   User agents MAY provide users the option of preventing persistent
   storage of cookies across sessions.  When configured thusly, user
   agents MUST treat all received cookies as if the persistent-flag were
   set to false.  Some popular user agents expose this functionality via
   "private browsing" mode [Aggarwal2010].

7.4.  Expiration Dates

   Although servers can set the expiration date for cookies to the
   distant future, most user agents do not actually retain cookies for
   multiple decades.  Rather than choosing gratuitously long expiration
   periods, servers SHOULD promote user privacy by selecting reasonable
   cookie expiration periods based on the purpose of the cookie.  For
   example, a typical session identifier might reasonably be set to
   expire in two weeks.

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8.  Security Considerations

8.1.  Overview

   Cookies have a number of security pitfalls.  This section overviews a
   few of the more salient issues.

   In particular, cookies encourage developers to rely on ambient
   authority for authentication, often becoming vulnerable to attacks
   such as cross-site request forgery [CSRF].  Also, when storing
   session identifiers in cookies, developers often create session
   fixation vulnerabilities.

   Transport-layer encryption, such as that employed in HTTPS, is
   insufficient to prevent a network attacker from obtaining or altering
   a victim's cookies because the cookie protocol itself has various
   vulnerabilities (see "Weak Confidentiality" and "Weak Integrity",
   below).  In addition, by default, cookies do not provide
   confidentiality or integrity from network attackers, even when used
   in conjunction with HTTPS.

8.2.  Ambient Authority

   A server that uses cookies to authenticate users can suffer security
   vulnerabilities because some user agents let remote parties issue
   HTTP requests from the user agent (e.g., via HTTP redirects or HTML
   forms).  When issuing those requests, user agents attach cookies even
   if the remote party does not know the contents of the cookies,
   potentially letting the remote party exercise authority at an unwary
   server.

   Although this security concern goes by a number of names (e.g.,
   cross-site request forgery, confused deputy), the issue stems from
   cookies being a form of ambient authority.  Cookies encourage server
   operators to separate designation (in the form of URLs) from
   authorization (in the form of cookies).  Consequently, the user agent
   might supply the authorization for a resource designated by the
   attacker, possibly causing the server or its clients to undertake
   actions designated by the attacker as though they were authorized by
   the user.

   Instead of using cookies for authorization, server operators might
   wish to consider entangling designation and authorization by treating
   URLs as capabilities.  Instead of storing secrets in cookies, this
   approach stores secrets in URLs, requiring the remote entity to
   supply the secret itself.  Although this approach is not a panacea,
   judicious application of these principles can lead to more robust
   security.

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8.3.  Clear Text

   Unless sent over a secure channel (such as TLS), the information in
   the Cookie and Set-Cookie header fields is transmitted in the clear.

   1.  All sensitive information conveyed in these header fields is
       exposed to an eavesdropper.

   2.  A malicious intermediary could alter the header fields as they
       travel in either direction, with unpredictable results.

   3.  A malicious client could alter the Cookie header fields before
       transmission, with unpredictable results.

   Servers SHOULD encrypt and sign the contents of cookies (using
   whatever format the server desires) when transmitting them to the
   user agent (even when sending the cookies over a secure channel).
   However, encrypting and signing cookie contents does not prevent an
   attacker from transplanting a cookie from one user agent to another
   or from replaying the cookie at a later time.

   In addition to encrypting and signing the contents of every cookie,
   servers that require a higher level of security SHOULD use the Cookie
   and Set-Cookie header fields only over a secure channel.  When using
   cookies over a secure channel, servers SHOULD set the Secure
   attribute (see Section 4.1.2.5) for every cookie.  If a server does
   not set the Secure attribute, the protection provided by the secure
   channel will be largely moot.

   For example, consider a webmail server that stores a session
   identifier in a cookie and is typically accessed over HTTPS.  If the
   server does not set the Secure attribute on its cookies, an active
   network attacker can intercept any outbound HTTP request from the
   user agent and redirect that request to the webmail server over HTTP.
   Even if the webmail server is not listening for HTTP connections, the
   user agent will still include cookies in the request.  The active
   network attacker can intercept these cookies, replay them against the
   server, and learn the contents of the user's email.  If, instead, the
   server had set the Secure attribute on its cookies, the user agent
   would not have included the cookies in the clear-text request.

8.4.  Session Identifiers

   Instead of storing session information directly in a cookie (where it
   might be exposed to or replayed by an attacker), servers commonly
   store a nonce (or "session identifier") in a cookie.  When the server
   receives an HTTP request with a nonce, the server can look up state
   information associated with the cookie using the nonce as a key.

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   Using session identifier cookies limits the damage an attacker can
   cause if the attacker learns the contents of a cookie because the
   nonce is useful only for interacting with the server (unlike non-
   nonce cookie content, which might itself be sensitive).  Furthermore,
   using a single nonce prevents an attacker from "splicing" together
   cookie content from two interactions with the server, which could
   cause the server to behave unexpectedly.

   Using session identifiers is not without risk.  For example, the
   server SHOULD take care to avoid "session fixation" vulnerabilities.
   A session fixation attack proceeds in three steps.  First, the
   attacker transplants a session identifier from his or her user agent
   to the victim's user agent.  Second, the victim uses that session
   identifier to interact with the server, possibly imbuing the session
   identifier with the user's credentials or confidential information.
   Third, the attacker uses the session identifier to interact with
   server directly, possibly obtaining the user's authority or
   confidential information.

8.5.  Weak Confidentiality

   Cookies do not provide isolation by port.  If a cookie is readable by
   a service running on one port, the cookie is also readable by a
   service running on another port of the same server.  If a cookie is
   writable by a service on one port, the cookie is also writable by a
   service running on another port of the same server.  For this reason,
   servers SHOULD NOT both run mutually distrusting services on
   different ports of the same host and use cookies to store security-
   sensitive information.

   Cookies do not provide isolation by scheme.  Although most commonly
   used with the http and https schemes, the cookies for a given host
   might also be available to other schemes, such as ftp and gopher.
   Although this lack of isolation by scheme is most apparent in non-
   HTTP APIs that permit access to cookies (e.g., HTML's document.cookie
   API), the lack of isolation by scheme is actually present in
   requirements for processing cookies themselves (e.g., consider
   retrieving a URI with the gopher scheme via HTTP).

   Cookies do not always provide isolation by path.  Although the
   network-level protocol does not send cookies stored for one path to
   another, some user agents expose cookies via non-HTTP APIs, such as
   HTML's document.cookie API.  Because some of these user agents (e.g.,
   web browsers) do not isolate resources received from different paths,
   a resource retrieved from one path might be able to access cookies
   stored for another path.

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8.6.  Weak Integrity

   Cookies do not provide integrity guarantees for sibling domains (and
   their subdomains).  For example, consider foo.site.example and
   bar.site.example.  The foo.site.example server can set a cookie with
   a Domain attribute of "site.example" (possibly overwriting an
   existing "site.example" cookie set by bar.site.example), and the user
   agent will include that cookie in HTTP requests to bar.site.example.
   In the worst case, bar.site.example will be unable to distinguish
   this cookie from a cookie it set itself.  The foo.site.example server
   might be able to leverage this ability to mount an attack against
   bar.site.example.

   Even though the Set-Cookie header field supports the Path attribute,
   the Path attribute does not provide any integrity protection because
   the user agent will accept an arbitrary Path attribute in a Set-
   Cookie header field.  For example, an HTTP response to a request for
   http://site.example/foo/bar can set a cookie with a Path attribute of
   "/qux".  Consequently, servers SHOULD NOT both run mutually
   distrusting services on different paths of the same host and use
   cookies to store security-sensitive information.

   An active network attacker can also inject cookies into the Cookie
   header field sent to https://site.example/ by impersonating a
   response from http://site.example/ and injecting a Set-Cookie header
   field.  The HTTPS server at site.example will be unable to
   distinguish these cookies from cookies that it set itself in an HTTPS
   response.  An active network attacker might be able to leverage this
   ability to mount an attack against site.example even if site.example
   uses HTTPS exclusively.

   Servers can partially mitigate these attacks by encrypting and
   signing the contents of their cookies, or by naming the cookie with
   the __Secure- prefix.  However, using cryptography does not mitigate
   the issue completely because an attacker can replay a cookie he or
   she received from the authentic site.example server in the user's
   session, with unpredictable results.

   Finally, an attacker might be able to force the user agent to delete
   cookies by storing a large number of cookies.  Once the user agent
   reaches its storage limit, the user agent will be forced to evict
   some cookies.  Servers SHOULD NOT rely upon user agents retaining
   cookies.

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8.7.  Reliance on DNS

   Cookies rely upon the Domain Name System (DNS) for security.  If the
   DNS is partially or fully compromised, the cookie protocol might fail
   to provide the security properties required by applications.

8.8.  SameSite Cookies

8.8.1.  Defense in depth

   "SameSite" cookies offer a robust defense against CSRF attack when
   deployed in strict mode, and when supported by the client.  It is,
   however, prudent to ensure that this designation is not the extent of
   a site's defense against CSRF, as same-site navigations and
   submissions can certainly be executed in conjunction with other
   attack vectors such as cross-site scripting.

   Developers are strongly encouraged to deploy the usual server-side
   defenses (CSRF tokens, ensuring that "safe" HTTP methods are
   idempotent, etc) to mitigate the risk more fully.

   Additionally, client-side techniques such as those described in
   [app-isolation] may also prove effective against CSRF, and are
   certainly worth exploring in combination with "SameSite" cookies.

8.8.2.  Top-level Navigations

   Setting the SameSite attribute in "strict" mode provides robust
   defense in depth against CSRF attacks, but has the potential to
   confuse users unless sites' developers carefully ensure that their
   cookie-based session management systems deal reasonably well with
   top-level navigations.

   Consider the scenario in which a user reads their email at MegaCorp
   Inc's webmail provider https://site.example/. They might expect that
   clicking on an emailed link to https://projects.example/secret/
   project would show them the secret project that they're authorized to
   see, but if https://projects.example has marked their session cookies
   as SameSite=Strict, then this cross-site navigation won't send them
   along with the request. https://projects.example will render a 404
   error to avoid leaking secret information, and the user will be quite
   confused.

   Developers can avoid this confusion by adopting a session management
   system that relies on not one, but two cookies: one conceptually
   granting "read" access, another granting "write" access.  The latter
   could be marked as SameSite=Strict, and its absence would prompt a
   reauthentication step before executing any non-idempotent action.

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   The former could be marked as SameSite=Lax, in order to allow users
   access to data via top-level navigation, or SameSite=None, to permit
   access in all contexts (including cross-site embedded contexts).

8.8.3.  Mashups and Widgets

   The Lax and Strict values for the SameSite attribute are
   inappropriate for some important use-cases.  In particular, note that
   content intended for embedding in cross-site contexts (social
   networking widgets or commenting services, for instance) will not
   have access to same-site cookies.  Cookies which are required in
   these situations should be marked with SameSite=None to allow access
   in cross-site contexts.

   Likewise, some forms of Single-Sign-On might require cookie-based
   authentication in a cross-site context; these mechanisms will not
   function as intended with same-site cookies and will also require
   SameSite=None.

8.8.4.  Server-controlled

   SameSite cookies in and of themselves don't do anything to address
   the general privacy concerns outlined in Section 7.1 of [RFC6265].
   The "SameSite" attribute is set by the server, and serves to mitigate
   the risk of certain kinds of attacks that the server is worried
   about.  The user is not involved in this decision.  Moreover, a
   number of side-channels exist which could allow a server to link
   distinct requests even in the absence of cookies (for example,
   connection and/or socket pooling between same-site and cross-site
   requests).

8.8.5.  Reload navigations

   Requests issued for reloads triggered through user interface elements
   (such as a refresh button on a toolbar) are same-site only if the
   reloaded document was originally navigated to via a same-site
   request.  This differs from the handling of other reload navigations,
   which are always same-site if top-level, since the source navigable's
   active document is precisely the document being reloaded.

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   This special handling of reloads triggered through a user interface
   element avoids sending SameSite cookies on user-initiated reloads if
   they were withheld on the original navigation (i.e., if the initial
   navigation were cross-site).  If the reload navigation were instead
   considered same-site, and sent all the initially withheld SameSite
   cookies, the security benefits of withholding the cookies in the
   first place would be nullified.  This is especially important given
   that the absence of SameSite cookies withheld on a cross-site
   navigation request may lead to visible site breakage, prompting the
   user to trigger a reload.

   For example, suppose the user clicks on a link from
   https://attacker.example/ to https://victim.example/. This is a
   cross-site request, so SameSite=Strict cookies are withheld.  Suppose
   this causes https://victim.example/ to appear broken, because the
   site only displays its sensitive content if a particular SameSite
   cookie is present in the request.  The user, frustrated by the
   unexpectedly broken site, presses refresh on their browser's toolbar.
   To now consider the reload request same-site and send the initially
   withheld SameSite cookie would defeat the purpose of withholding it
   in the first place, as the reload navigation triggered through the
   user interface may replay the original (potentially malicious)
   request.  Thus, the reload request should be considered cross-site,
   like the request that initially navigated to the page.

8.8.6.  Top-level requests with "unsafe" methods

   The "Lax" enforcement mode described in Section 5.5.7.1 allows a
   cookie to be sent with a cross-site HTTP request if and only if it is
   a top-level navigation with a "safe" HTTP method.  Implementation
   experience shows that this is difficult to apply as the default
   behavior, as some sites may rely on cookies not explicitly specifying
   a SameSite attribute being included on top-level cross-site requests
   with "unsafe" HTTP methods (as was the case prior to the introduction
   of the SameSite attribute).

   For example, a login flow may involve a cross-site top-level POST
   request to an endpoint which expects a cookie with login information.
   For such a cookie, "Lax" enforcement is not appropriate, as it would
   cause the cookie to be excluded due to the unsafe HTTP request
   method.  On the other hand, "None" enforcement would allow the cookie
   to be sent with all cross-site requests, which may not be desirable
   due to the cookie's sensitive contents.

   The "Lax-allowing-unsafe" enforcement mode described in
   Section 5.5.7.2 retains some of the protections of "Lax" enforcement
   (as compared to "None") while still allowing cookies to be sent
   cross-site with unsafe top-level requests.

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   As a more permissive variant of "Lax" mode, "Lax-allowing-unsafe"
   mode necessarily provides fewer protections against CSRF.
   Ultimately, the provision of such an enforcement mode should be seen
   as a temporary, transitional measure to ease adoption of "Lax"
   enforcement by default.

9.  IANA Considerations

9.1.  Cookie

   The permanent message header field registry (see [RFC3864]) needs to
   be updated with the following registration:

   Header field name:  Cookie

   Applicable protocol:  http

   Status:  standard

   Author/Change controller:  IETF

   Specification document:  this specification (Section 5.7.1)

9.2.  Set-Cookie

   The permanent message header field registry (see [RFC3864]) needs to
   be updated with the following registration:

   Header field name:  Set-Cookie

   Applicable protocol:  http

   Status:  standard

   Author/Change controller:  IETF

   Specification document:  this specification (Section 5.5)

9.3.  Cookie Attribute Registry

   IANA is requested to create the "Cookie Attribute Registry", defining
   the name space of attribute used to control cookies' behavior.  The
   registry should be maintained at https://www.iana.org/assignments/
   cookie-attribute-names (https://www.iana.org/assignments/cookie-
   attribute-names).

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9.3.1.  Procedure

   Each registered attribute name is associated with a description, and
   a reference detailing how the attribute is to be processed and
   stored.

   New registrations happen on a "RFC Required" basis (see Section 4.7
   of [RFC8126]).  The attribute to be registered MUST match the
   extension-av syntax defined in Section 4.1.1.  Note that attribute
   names are generally defined in CamelCase, but technically accepted
   case-insensitively.

9.3.2.  Registration

   The "Cookie Attribute Registry" should be created with the
   registrations below:

              +==========+==================================+
              |     Name | Reference                        |
              +==========+==================================+
              |   Domain | Section 4.1.2.3 of this document |
              +----------+----------------------------------+
              |  Expires | Section 4.1.2.1 of this document |
              +----------+----------------------------------+
              | HttpOnly | Section 4.1.2.6 of this document |
              +----------+----------------------------------+
              |  Max-Age | Section 4.1.2.2 of this document |
              +----------+----------------------------------+
              |     Path | Section 4.1.2.4 of this document |
              +----------+----------------------------------+
              | SameSite | Section 4.1.2.7 of this document |
              +----------+----------------------------------+
              |   Secure | Section 4.1.2.5 of this document |
              +----------+----------------------------------+

                                  Table 1

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [DOM-DOCUMENT-COOKIE]
              WHATWG, "HTML - Living Standard", 18 May 2021,
              <https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#dom-document-cookie>.

   [FETCH]    van Kesteren, A., "Fetch", n.d.,
              <https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/>.

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   [HTML]     Hickson, I., Pieters, S., van Kesteren, A., Jägenstedt,
              P., and D. Denicola, "HTML", n.d.,
              <https://html.spec.whatwg.org/>.

   [HTTPSEM]  Fielding, R. T., Nottingham, M., and J. Reschke, "HTTP
              Semantics", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              httpbis-semantics-19, 12 September 2021,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-
              semantics-19>.

   [RFC1034]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
              STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1034>.

   [RFC1123]  Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
              Application and Support", STD 3, RFC 1123,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1123, October 1989,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1123>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3490]  Costello, A., "Internationalizing Domain Names in
              Applications (IDNA)", RFC 3490, March 2003,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3490>.  See Section 6.3
              for an explanation why the normative reference to an
              obsoleted specification is needed.

   [RFC4790]  Newman, C., Duerst, M., and A. Gulbrandsen, "Internet
              Application Protocol Collation Registry", RFC 4790,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4790, March 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4790>.

   [RFC5234]  Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
              Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5234>.

   [RFC5890]  Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for
              Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework",
              RFC 5890, DOI 10.17487/RFC5890, August 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5890>.

   [RFC6454]  Barth, A., "The Web Origin Concept", RFC 6454,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6454, December 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6454>.

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   [RFC8126]  Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
              Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
              RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8126>.

   [SAMESITE] WHATWG, "HTML - Living Standard", 26 January 2021,
              <https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#same-site>.

   [SERVICE-WORKERS]
              Russell, A., Song, J., and J. Archibald, "Service
              Workers", n.d., <http://www.w3.org/TR/service-workers/>.

   [USASCII]  American National Standards Institute, "Coded Character
              Set -- 7-bit American Standard Code for Information
              Interchange", ANSI X3.4, 1986.

10.2.  Informative References

   [Aggarwal2010]
              Aggarwal, G., Burzstein, E., Jackson, C., and D. Boneh,
              "An Analysis of Private Browsing Modes in Modern
              Browsers", 2010,
              <http://www.usenix.org/events/sec10/tech/full_papers/
              Aggarwal.pdf>.

   [app-isolation]
              Chen, E., Bau, J., Reis, C., Barth, A., and C. Jackson,
              "App Isolation - Get the Security of Multiple Browsers
              with Just One", 2011,
              <http://www.collinjackson.com/research/papers/
              appisolation.pdf>.

   [CSRF]     Barth, A., Jackson, C., and J. Mitchell, "Robust Defenses
              for Cross-Site Request Forgery",
              DOI 10.1145/1455770.1455782, ISBN 978-1-59593-810-7,
              ACM CCS '08: Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on
              Computer and communications security (pages 75-88),
              October 2008,
              <http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1455770.1455782>.

   [I-D.ietf-httpbis-cookie-alone]
              West, M., "Deprecate modification of 'secure' cookies from
              non-secure origins", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-ietf-httpbis-cookie-alone-01, 5 September 2016,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-
              cookie-alone-01>.

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   [I-D.ietf-httpbis-cookie-prefixes]
              West, M., "Cookie Prefixes", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-ietf-httpbis-cookie-prefixes-00, 23 February
              2016, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
              httpbis-cookie-prefixes-00>.

   [I-D.ietf-httpbis-cookie-same-site]
              West, M. and M. Goodwin, "Same-Site Cookies", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-httpbis-cookie-same-
              site-00, 20 June 2016,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-httpbis-
              cookie-same-site-00>.

   [prerendering]
              Bentzel, C., "Chrome Prerendering", n.d.,
              <https://www.chromium.org/developers/design-documents/
              prerender>.

   [PSL]      "Public Suffix List", n.d.,
              <https://publicsuffix.org/list/>.

   [RFC2109]  Kristol, D. and L. Montulli, "HTTP State Management
              Mechanism", RFC 2109, DOI 10.17487/RFC2109, February 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2109>.

   [RFC2818]  Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2818>.

   [RFC3864]  Klyne, G., Nottingham, M., and J. Mogul, "Registration
              Procedures for Message Header Fields", BCP 90, RFC 3864,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3864, September 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3864>.

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986>.

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4648>.

   [RFC5895]  Resnick, P. and P. Hoffman, "Mapping Characters for
              Internationalized Domain Names in Applications (IDNA)
              2008", RFC 5895, DOI 10.17487/RFC5895, September 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5895>.

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   [RFC6265]  Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6265, April 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6265>.

   [RFC7034]  Ross, D. and T. Gondrom, "HTTP Header Field X-Frame-
              Options", RFC 7034, DOI 10.17487/RFC7034, October 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7034>.

   [UTS46]    Davis, M. and M. Suignard, "Unicode IDNA Compatibility
              Processing", UNICODE Unicode Technical Standards # 46,
              June 2016, <http://unicode.org/reports/tr46/>.

Appendix A.  Changes

A.1.  draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-00

   *  Port [RFC6265] to Markdown.  No (intentional) normative changes.

A.2.  draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-01

   *  Fixes to formatting caused by mistakes in the initial port to
      Markdown:

      -  https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/243
         (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/243)

      -  https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/246
         (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/246)

   *  Addresses errata 3444 by updating the path-value and extension-av
      grammar, errata 4148 by updating the day-of-month, year, and time
      grammar, and errata 3663 by adding the requested note.
      https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=6265
      (https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=6265)

   *  Dropped Cookie2 and Set-Cookie2 from the IANA Considerations
      section: https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/247
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/247)

   *  Merged the recommendations from [I-D.ietf-httpbis-cookie-alone],
      removing the ability for a non-secure origin to set cookies with a
      'secure' flag, and to overwrite cookies whose 'secure' flag is
      true.

   *  Merged the recommendations from
      [I-D.ietf-httpbis-cookie-prefixes], adding __Secure- and __Host-
      cookie name prefix processing instructions.

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A.3.  draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-02

   *  Merged the recommendations from
      [I-D.ietf-httpbis-cookie-same-site], adding support for the
      SameSite attribute.

   *  Closed a number of editorial bugs:

      -  Clarified address bar behavior for SameSite cookies:
         https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/201
         (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/201)

      -  Added the word "Cookies" to the document's name:
         https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/204
         (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/204)

      -  Clarified that the __Host- prefix requires an explicit Path
         attribute: https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/222
         (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/222)

      -  Expanded the options for dealing with third-party cookies to
         include a brief mention of partitioning based on first-party:
         https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/248
         (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/248)

      -  Noted that double-quotes in cookie values are part of the
         value, and are not stripped: https://github.com/httpwg/http-
         extensions/issues/295 (https://github.com/httpwg/http-
         extensions/issues/295)

      -  Fixed the "site for cookies" algorithm to return something that
         makes sense: https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/
         issues/302 (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/
         issues/302)

A.4.  draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-03

   *  Clarified handling of invalid SameSite values:
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/389
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/389)

   *  Reflect widespread implementation practice of including a cookie's
      host-only-flag when calculating its uniqueness:
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/199
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/199)

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   *  Introduced an explicit "None" value for the SameSite attribute:
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/788
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/788)

A.5.  draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-04

   *  Allow SameSite cookies to be set for all top-level navigations.
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/594
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/594)

   *  Treat Set-Cookie: token as creating the cookie ("", "token"):
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/159
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/159)

   *  Reject cookies with neither name nor value (e.g.  Set-Cookie: =
      and Set-Cookie:: https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/
      issues/159 (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/159)

   *  Clarified behavior of multiple SameSite attributes in a cookie
      string: https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/901
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/901)

A.6.  draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-05

   *  Typos and editorial fixes: https://github.com/httpwg/http-
      extensions/pull/1035 (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/
      pull/1035), https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1038
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1038),
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1040
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1040),
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1047
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1047).

A.7.  draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-06

   *  Editorial fixes: https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/
      issues/1059 (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/
      issues/1059), https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/
      issues/1158 (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/
      issues/1158).

   *  Created a registry for cookie attribute names:
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1060
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1060).

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   *  Tweaks to ABNF for cookie-pair and the Cookie header production:
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/1074
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/1074),
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/1119
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/1119).

   *  Fixed serialization for nameless/valueless cookies:
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1143
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1143).

   *  Converted a normative reference to Mozilla's Public Suffix List
      [PSL] into an informative reference: https://github.com/httpwg/
      http-extensions/issues/1159 (https://github.com/httpwg/http-
      extensions/issues/1159).

A.8.  draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-07

   *  Moved instruction to ignore cookies with empty cookie-name and
      cookie-value from Section 5.5 to Section 5.6 to ensure that they
      apply to cookies created without parsing a cookie string:
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/1234
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/issues/1234).

   *  Add a default enforcement value to the same-site-flag, equivalent
      to "SameSite=Lax": https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/
      pull/1325 (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1325).

   *  Require a Secure attribute for "SameSite=None":
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1323
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1323).

   *  Consider scheme when running the same-site algorithm:
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1324
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1324).

A.9.  draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-08

   *  Define "same-site" for reload navigation requests, e.g. those
      triggered via user interface elements: https://github.com/httpwg/
      http-extensions/pull/1384 (https://github.com/httpwg/http-
      extensions/pull/1384)

   *  Consider redirects when defining same-site:
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1348
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1348)

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   *  Align on using HTML terminology for origins:
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1416
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1416)

   *  Modify cookie parsing and creation algorithms in Section 5.5 and
      Section 5.6 to explicitly handle control characters:
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1420
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1420)

   *  Refactor cookie retrieval algorithm to support non-HTTP APIs:
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1428
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1428)

   *  Define "Lax-allowing-unsafe" SameSite enforcement mode:
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1435
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1435)

   *  Consistently use "header field" (vs 'header"):
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1527
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1527)

A.10.  draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-09

   *  Update cookie size requirements: https://github.com/httpwg/http-
      extensions/pull/1563 (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/
      pull/1563)

   *  Reject cookies with control characters: https://github.com/httpwg/
      http-extensions/pull/1576 (https://github.com/httpwg/http-
      extensions/pull/1576)

   *  No longer treat horizontal tab as a control character:
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1589
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1589)

   *  Specify empty domain attribute handling:
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1709
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1709)

A.11.  draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-10

   *  Standardize Max-Age/Expires upper bound:
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1732
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1732),
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1980
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1980).

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   *  Expand on privacy considerations and third-party cookies:
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1878
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1878)

   *  Specify that no decoding of Set-Cookie line should occur:
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1902
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1902)

   *  Require ASCII for domain attributes: https://github.com/httpwg/
      http-extensions/pull/1969 (https://github.com/httpwg/http-
      extensions/pull/1969)

   *  Typos, formatting and editorial fixes: https://github.com/httpwg/
      http-extensions/pull/1789 (https://github.com/httpwg/http-
      extensions/pull/1789), https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/
      pull/1858 (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1858),
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/2069
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/2069).

A.12.  draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-11

   *  Remove note to ignore Domain attribute with trailing dot:
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/2087
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/2087),
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/2092
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/2092).

   *  Remove an inadvertant change to cookie-octet:
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/2090
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/2090)

   *  Remove note regarding cookie serialization:
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/2165
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/2165)

   *  Add case insensitivity note to Set-Cookie Syntax:
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/2167
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/2167)

   *  Add note not to send invalid cookies due to public suffix list
      changes: https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/2215
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/2215)

   *  Add warning to not send nameless cookies:
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/2220
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/2220)

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   *  Add note regarding Service Worker's computation of "site for
      cookies": https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/2217
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/2217)

   *  Compare cookie name prefixes case-insensitively:
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/2236
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/2236)

   *  Update editors and the acknowledgements https://github.com/httpwg/
      http-extensions/pull/2244 (https://github.com/httpwg/http-
      extensions/pull/2244)

   *  Prevent nameless cookies with prefixed values
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/2251
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/2251)

A.13.  draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-12

   *  Advise the reader which section to implement
      https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/2478
      (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/2478)

   *  Define top-level navigation https://github.com/httpwg/http-
      extensions/pull/2481 (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/
      pull/2481)

   *  Use navigables concept https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/
      pull/2478 (https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/2478)

Acknowledgements

   RFC 6265 was written by Adam Barth.  This document is an update of
   RFC 6265, adding features and aligning the specification with the
   reality of today’s deployments.  Here, we’re standing upon the
   shoulders of a giant since the majority of the text is still Adam’s.

   Thank you to both Lily Chen and Steven Englehardt, editors emeritus,
   for their significant contributions improving this draft.

Authors' Addresses

   Steven Bingler (editor)
   Google LLC
   Email: bingler@google.com

   Mike West (editor)
   Google LLC

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   Email: mkwst@google.com
   URI:   https://mikewest.org/

   John Wilander (editor)
   Apple, Inc
   Email: wilander@apple.com

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