The OAuth 2.1 Authorization Framework
draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-10
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (oauth WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Dick Hardt , Aaron Parecki , Torsten Lodderstedt | ||
| Last updated | 2024-01-09 | ||
| Replaces | draft-parecki-oauth-v2-1 | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
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| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
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| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-10
OAuth Working Group D. Hardt
Internet-Draft Hellō
Intended status: Standards Track A. Parecki
Expires: 12 July 2024 Okta
T. Lodderstedt
yes.com
9 January 2024
The OAuth 2.1 Authorization Framework
draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-10
Abstract
The OAuth 2.1 authorization framework enables an application to
obtain limited access to a protected resource, either on behalf of a
resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction between the
resource owner and an authorization service, or by allowing the
application to obtain access on its own behalf. This specification
replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework
described in RFC 6749 and the Bearer Token Usage in RFC 6750.
Discussion Venues
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Discussion of this document takes place on the OAuth Working Group
mailing list (oauth@ietf.org), which is archived at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/oauth-wg/oauth-v2-1.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 12 July 2024.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1. Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2. Protocol Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3. Authorization Grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.1. Authorization Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.2. Refresh Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.3. Client Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4. Access Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4.1. Access Token Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.4.2. Bearer Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.4.3. Sender-Constrained Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.5. Communication security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.6. HTTP Redirections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.7. Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.8. Compatibility with OAuth 2.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.9. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2. Client Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1. Client Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2. Client Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3. Client Redirection Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.1. Registration Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3.2. Multiple Redirect URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.3. Preventing CSRF Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.4. Preventing Mix-Up Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.5. Invalid Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3.6. Endpoint Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4. Client Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4.1. Client Secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.4.2. Other Authentication Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.5. Unregistered Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
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3. Protocol Endpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.1. Authorization Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.2. Token Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2.1. Client Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2.2. Token Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.2.3. Token Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.2.4. Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4. Grant Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.1. Authorization Code Grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.1.1. Authorization Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.1.2. Authorization Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.1.3. Token Endpoint Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.2. Client Credentials Grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.2.1. Token Endpoint Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.3. Refresh Token Grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.3.1. Token Endpoint Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.3.2. Refresh Token Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.3.3. Refresh Token Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.4. Extension Grants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5. Resource Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.1. Bearer Token Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.1.1. Authorization Request Header Field . . . . . . . . . 46
5.1.2. Form-Encoded Content Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.2. Access Token Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.3. Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
5.3.1. The WWW-Authenticate Response Header Field . . . . . 48
5.3.2. Error Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
6. Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
6.1. Defining Access Token Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
6.1.1. Registered Access Token Types . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
6.1.2. Vendor-Specific Access Token Types . . . . . . . . . 51
6.2. Defining New Endpoint Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
6.3. Defining New Authorization Grant Types . . . . . . . . . 52
6.4. Defining New Authorization Endpoint Response Types . . . 52
6.5. Defining Additional Error Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
7.1. Access Token Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . 53
7.1.1. Security Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
7.1.2. Threat Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
7.1.3. Summary of Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
7.1.4. Access Token Privilege Restriction . . . . . . . . . 56
7.2. Client Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
7.3. Client Impersonation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
7.3.1. Impersonation of Native Apps . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
7.3.2. Access Token Privilege Restriction . . . . . . . . . 58
7.4. Client Impersonating Resource Owner . . . . . . . . . . . 58
7.5. Authorization Code Security Considerations . . . . . . . 59
7.5.1. Authorization Code Injection . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
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7.5.2. Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
7.5.3. Reuse of Authorization Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
7.5.4. HTTP 307 Redirect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
7.6. Ensuring Endpoint Authenticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
7.7. Credentials-Guessing Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
7.8. Phishing Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
7.9. Cross-Site Request Forgery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
7.10. Clickjacking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
7.11. Code Injection and Input Validation . . . . . . . . . . . 64
7.12. Open Redirection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
7.12.1. Client as Open Redirector . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
7.12.2. Authorization Server as Open Redirector . . . . . . 65
7.13. Authorization Server Mix-Up Mitigation . . . . . . . . . 66
7.13.1. Mix-Up Defense via Issuer Identification . . . . . . 67
7.13.2. Mix-Up Defense via Distinct Redirect URIs . . . . . 67
8. Native Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
8.1. Registration of Native App Clients . . . . . . . . . . . 69
8.1.1. Client Authentication of Native Apps . . . . . . . . 69
8.2. Using Inter-App URI Communication for OAuth in Native
Apps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
8.3. Initiating the Authorization Request from a Native App . 70
8.4. Receiving the Authorization Response in a Native App . . 71
8.4.1. Claimed "https" Scheme URI Redirection . . . . . . . 71
8.4.2. Loopback Interface Redirection . . . . . . . . . . . 71
8.4.3. Private-Use URI Scheme Redirection . . . . . . . . . 72
8.5. Security Considerations in Native Apps . . . . . . . . . 73
8.5.1. Embedded User Agents in Native Apps . . . . . . . . . 73
8.5.2. Fake External User-Agents in Native Apps . . . . . . 74
8.5.3. Malicious External User-Agents in Native Apps . . . . 75
8.5.4. Loopback Redirect Considerations in Native Apps . . . 75
9. Browser-Based Apps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
10. Differences from OAuth 2.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
10.1. Removal of the OAuth 2.0 Implicit grant . . . . . . . . 76
10.2. Redirect URI Parameter in Token Request . . . . . . . . 77
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Appendix A. Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) Syntax . . . . . . 83
A.1. "client_id" Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
A.2. "client_secret" Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
A.3. "response_type" Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
A.4. "scope" Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
A.5. "state" Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
A.6. "redirect_uri" Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
A.7. "error" Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
A.8. "error_description" Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
A.9. "error_uri" Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
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A.10. "grant_type" Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
A.11. "code" Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
A.12. "access_token" Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
A.13. "token_type" Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
A.14. "expires_in" Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
A.15. "refresh_token" Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
A.16. Endpoint Parameter Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
A.17. "code_verifier" Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
A.18. "code_challenge" Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Appendix B. Use of application/x-www-form-urlencoded Media
Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Appendix C. Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Appendix D. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Appendix E. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
1. Introduction
OAuth introduces an authorization layer to the client-server
authentication model by separating the role of the client from that
of the resource owner. In OAuth, the client requests access to
resources controlled by the resource owner and hosted by the resource
server. Instead of using the resource owner's credentials to access
protected resources, the client obtains an access token - a
credential representing a specific set of access attributes such as
scope and lifetime. Access tokens are issued to clients by an
authorization server with the approval of the resource owner. The
client uses the access token to access the protected resources hosted
by the resource server.
In the older, more limited client-server authentication model, the
client requests an access-restricted resource (protected resource) on
the server by authenticating to the server using the resource owner's
credentials. In order to provide applications access to restricted
resources, the resource owner shares their credentials with the
application. This creates several problems and limitations:
* Applications are required to store the resource owner's
credentials for future use, typically a password in clear-text.
* Servers are required to support password authentication, despite
the security weaknesses inherent in passwords.
* Applications gain overly broad access to the resource owner's
protected resources, leaving resource owners without any ability
to restrict duration or access to a limited subset of resources.
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* Resource owners often reuse passwords with other unrelated
services, despite best security practices. This password reuse
means a vulnerability or exposure in one service may have security
implications in completely unrelated services.
* Resource owners cannot revoke access to an individual application
without revoking access to all third parties, and must do so by
changing their password.
* Compromise of any application results in compromise of the end-
user's password and all of the data protected by that password.
With OAuth, an end-user (resource owner) can grant a printing service
(client) access to their protected photos stored at a photo- sharing
service (resource server), without sharing their username and
password with the printing service. Instead, they authenticate
directly with a server trusted by the photo-sharing service
(authorization server), which issues the printing service delegation-
specific credentials (access token).
This separation of concerns also provides the ability to use more
advanced user authentication methods such as multi-factor
authentication and even passwordless authentication, without any
modification to the applications. With all user authentication logic
handled by the authorization server, applications don't need to be
concerned with the specifics of implementing any particular
authentication mechanism. This provides the ability for the
authorization server to manage the user authentication policies and
even change them in the future without coordinating the changes with
applications.
The authorization layer can also simplify how a resource server
determines if a request is authorized. Traditionally, after
authenticating the client, each resource server would evaluate
policies to compute if the client is authorized on each API call. In
a distributed system, the policies need to be synchronized to all the
resource servers, or the resource server must call a central policy
server to process each request. In OAuth, evaluation of the policies
is performed only when a new access token is created by the
authorization server. If the authorized access is represented in the
access token, the resource server no longer needs to evaluate the
policies, and only needs to validate the access token. This
simplification applies when the application is acting on behalf of a
resource owner, or on behalf of itself.
OAuth is an authorization protocol, and is not an authentication
protocol. The access token represents the authorization granted to
the client. It is a common practice for the client to present the
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access token to a proprietary API which returns a user identifier for
the resource owner, and then using the result of the API as a proxy
for authenticating the user. This practice is not part of the OAuth
standard or security considerations, and may not have been considered
by the resource owner. Implementors should carefully consult the
documentation of the resource server before adopting this practice.
This specification is designed for use with HTTP ([RFC9110]). The
use of OAuth over any protocol other than HTTP is out of scope.
Since the publication of the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework
([RFC6749]) in October 2012, it has been updated by OAuth 2.0 for
Native Apps ([RFC8252]), OAuth Security Best Current Practice
([I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]), and OAuth 2.0 for Browser-Based
Apps ([I-D.ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps]). The OAuth 2.0
Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage ([RFC6750]) has also been
updated with ([I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]). This Standards
Track specification consolidates the information in all of these
documents and removes features that have been found to be insecure in
[I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics].
1.1. Roles
OAuth defines four roles:
"resource owner": An entity capable of granting access to a
protected resource. When the resource owner is a person, it is
referred to as an end-user. This is sometimes abbreviated as
"RO".
"resource server": The server hosting the protected resources,
capable of accepting and responding to protected resource requests
using access tokens. The resource server is often accessible via
an API. This is sometimes abbreviated as "RS".
"client": An application making protected resource requests on
behalf of the resource owner and with its authorization. The term
"client" does not imply any particular implementation
characteristics (e.g., whether the application executes on a
server, a desktop, or other devices).
"authorization server": The server issuing access tokens to the
client after successfully authenticating the resource owner and
obtaining authorization. This is sometimes abbreviated as "AS".
The interaction between the authorization server and resource server
is beyond the scope of this specification, however several extensions
have been defined to provide an option for interoperability between
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resource servers and authorization servers. The authorization server
may be the same server as the resource server or a separate entity.
A single authorization server may issue access tokens accepted by
multiple resource servers.
1.2. Protocol Flow
+--------+ +---------------+
| |--(1)- Authorization Request ->| Resource |
| | | Owner |
| |<-(2)-- Authorization Grant ---| |
| | +---------------+
| |
| | +---------------+
| |--(3)-- Authorization Grant -->| Authorization |
| Client | | Server |
| |<-(4)----- Access Token -------| |
| | +---------------+
| |
| | +---------------+
| |--(5)----- Access Token ------>| Resource |
| | | Server |
| |<-(6)--- Protected Resource ---| |
+--------+ +---------------+
Figure 1: Abstract Protocol Flow
The abstract OAuth 2.1 flow illustrated in Figure 1 describes the
interaction between the four roles and includes the following steps:
1. The client requests authorization from the resource owner. The
authorization request can be made directly to the resource owner
(as shown), or preferably indirectly via the authorization server
as an intermediary.
2. The client receives an authorization grant, which is a credential
representing the resource owner's authorization, expressed using
one of the authorization grant types defined in this
specification or using an extension grant type. The
authorization grant type depends on the method used by the client
to request authorization and the types supported by the
authorization server.
3. The client requests an access token by authenticating with the
authorization server and presenting the authorization grant.
4. The authorization server authenticates the client and validates
the authorization grant, and if valid, issues an access token.
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5. The client requests the protected resource from the resource
server and authenticates by presenting the access token.
6. The resource server validates the access token, and if valid,
serves the request.
The preferred method for the client to obtain an authorization grant
from the resource owner (depicted in steps (1) and (2)) is to use the
authorization server as an intermediary, which is illustrated in
Figure 3 in Section 4.1.
1.3. Authorization Grant
An authorization grant represents the resource owner's authorization
(to access its protected resources) used by the client to obtain an
access token. This specification defines three grant types --
authorization code, refresh token, and client credentials -- as well
as an extensibility mechanism for defining additional types.
1.3.1. Authorization Code
An authorization code is a temporary credential used to obtain an
access token. Instead of the client requesting authorization
directly from the resource owner, the client directs the resource
owner to an authorization server (via its user agent) which in turn
directs the resource owner back to the client with the authorization
code. The client can then exchange the authorization code for an
access token.
Before directing the resource owner back to the client with the
authorization code, the authorization server authenticates the
resource owner, and may request the resource owner's consent or
otherwise inform them of the client's request. Because the resource
owner only authenticates with the authorization server, the resource
owner's credentials are never shared with the client, and the client
does not need to have knowledge of any additional authentication
steps such as multi-factor authentication or delegated accounts.
The authorization code provides a few important security benefits,
such as the ability to authenticate the client, as well as the
transmission of the access token directly to the client without
passing it through the resource owner's user agent and potentially
exposing it to others, including the resource owner.
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1.3.2. Refresh Token
Refresh tokens are credentials used to obtain access tokens. Refresh
tokens may be issued to the client by the authorization server and
are used to obtain a new access token when the current access token
becomes invalid or expires, or to obtain additional access tokens
with identical or narrower scope (access tokens may have a shorter
lifetime and fewer privileges than authorized by the resource owner).
Issuing a refresh token is optional at the discretion of the
authorization server, and may be issued based on properties of the
client, properties of the request, policies within the authorization
server, or any other criteria. If the authorization server issues a
refresh token, it is included when issuing an access token (i.e.,
step (2) in Figure 2).
A refresh token is a string representing the authorization granted to
the client by the resource owner. The string is considered opaque to
the client. The refresh token may be an identifier used to retrieve
the authorization information or may encode this information into the
string itself. Unlike access tokens, refresh tokens are intended for
use only with authorization servers and are never sent to resource
servers.
+--------+ +---------------+
| |--(1)------- Authorization Grant --------->| |
| | | |
| |<-(2)----------- Access Token -------------| |
| | & Refresh Token | |
| | | |
| | +----------+ | |
| |--(3)---- Access Token ---->| | | |
| | | | | |
| |<-(4)- Protected Resource --| Resource | | Authorization |
| Client | | Server | | Server |
| |--(5)---- Access Token ---->| | | |
| | | | | |
| |<-(6)- Invalid Token Error -| | | |
| | +----------+ | |
| | | |
| |--(7)----------- Refresh Token ----------->| |
| | | |
| |<-(8)----------- Access Token -------------| |
+--------+ & Optional Refresh Token +---------------+
Figure 2: Refreshing an Expired Access Token
The flow illustrated in Figure 2 includes the following steps:
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1. The client requests an access token by authenticating with the
authorization server and presenting an authorization grant.
2. The authorization server authenticates the client and validates
the authorization grant, and if valid, issues an access token and
optionally a refresh token.
3. The client makes a protected resource request to the resource
server by presenting the access token.
4. The resource server validates the access token, and if valid,
serves the request.
5. Steps (3) and (4) repeat until the access token expires. If the
client knows the access token expired, it skips to step (7);
otherwise, it makes another protected resource request.
6. Since the access token is invalid, the resource server returns an
invalid token error.
7. The client requests a new access token by presenting the refresh
token and providing client authentication if it has been issued
credentials. The client authentication requirements are based on
the client type and on the authorization server policies.
8. The authorization server authenticates the client and validates
the refresh token, and if valid, issues a new access token (and,
optionally, a new refresh token).
1.3.3. Client Credentials
The client credentials or other forms of client authentication (e.g.
a private key used to sign a JWT, as described in [RFC7523]) can be
used as an authorization grant when the authorization scope is
limited to the protected resources under the control of the client,
or to protected resources previously arranged with the authorization
server. Client credentials are used when the client is requesting
access to protected resources based on an authorization previously
arranged with the authorization server.
1.4. Access Token
Access tokens are credentials used to access protected resources. An
access token is a string representing an authorization issued to the
client.
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The string is considered opaque to the client, even if it has a
structure. The client MUST NOT expect to be able to parse the access
token value. The authorization server is not required to use a
consistent access token encoding or format other than what is
expected by the resource server.
Access tokens represent specific scopes and durations of access,
granted by the resource owner, and enforced by the resource server
and authorization server.
Depending on the authorization server implementation, the token
string may be used by the resource server to retrieve the
authorization information, or the token may self-contain the
authorization information in a verifiable manner (i.e., a token
string consisting of a signed data payload). One example of a token
retrieval mechanism is Token Introspection [RFC7662], in which the RS
calls an endpoint on the AS to validate the token presented by the
client. One example of a structured token format is JWT Profile for
Access Tokens [RFC9068], a method of encoding and signing access
token data as a JSON Web Token [RFC7519].
Additional authentication credentials, which are beyond the scope of
this specification, may be required in order for the client to use an
access token. This is typically referred to as a sender-constrained
access token, such as DPoP [RFC9449] and Mutual TLS Certificate-Bound
Access Tokens [RFC8705].
The access token provides an abstraction layer, replacing different
authorization constructs (e.g., username and password) with a single
token understood by the resource server. This abstraction enables
issuing access tokens more restrictive than the authorization grant
used to obtain them, as well as removing the resource server's need
to understand a wide range of authentication methods.
Access tokens can have different formats, structures, and methods of
utilization (e.g., cryptographic properties) based on the resource
server security requirements. Access token attributes and the
methods used to access protected resources may be extended beyond
what is described in this specification.
Access tokens (as well as any confidential access token attributes)
MUST be kept confidential in transit and storage, and only shared
among the authorization server, the resource servers the access token
is valid for, and the client to which the access token is issued.
The authorization server MUST ensure that access tokens cannot be
generated, modified, or guessed to produce valid access tokens by
unauthorized parties.
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1.4.1. Access Token Scope
Access tokens are intended to be issued to clients with less
privileges than the user granting the access has. This is known as a
limited "scope" access token. The authorization server and resource
server can use this scope mechanism to limit what types of resources
or level of access a particular client can have. For example, a
client may only need "read" access to a user's resources, but doesn't
need to update resources, so the client can request the read-only
scope defined by the authorization server, and obtain an access token
that cannot be used to update resources. This requires coordination
between the authorization server and resource server. The
authorization server provides the client the ability to request
specific scopes, and associates those scopes with the access token
issued to the client. The resource server is then responsible for
enforcing scopes when presented with a limited-scope access token.
To request a limited-scope access token, the client uses the scope
request parameter at the authorization or token endpoints, depending
on the grant type used. In turn, the authorization server uses the
scope response parameter to inform the client of the scope of the
access token issued.
The value of the scope parameter is expressed as a list of space-
delimited, case-sensitive strings. The strings are defined by the
authorization server. If the value contains multiple space-delimited
strings, their order does not matter, and each string adds an
additional access range to the requested scope.
scope = scope-token *( SP scope-token )
scope-token = 1*( %x21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E )
The authorization server MAY fully or partially ignore the scope
requested by the client, based on the authorization server policy or
the resource owner's instructions. If the issued access token scope
is different from the one requested by the client, the authorization
server MUST include the scope response parameter in the token
response (Section 3.2.3) to inform the client of the actual scope
granted.
If the client omits the scope parameter when requesting
authorization, the authorization server MUST either process the
request using a pre-defined default value or fail the request
indicating an invalid scope. The authorization server SHOULD
document its scope requirements and default value (if defined).
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1.4.2. Bearer Tokens
A Bearer Token is a security token with the property that any party
in possession of the token (a "bearer") can use the token in any way
that any other party in possession of it can. Using a Bearer Token
does not require a bearer to prove possession of cryptographic key
material (proof-of-possession).
Bearer Tokens may be enhanced with proof-of-possession specifications
such as DPoP [RFC9449] and mTLS [RFC8705] to provide proof-of-
possession characteristics.
To protect against access token disclosure, the communication
interaction between the client and the resource server MUST utilize
confidentiality and integrity protection as described in Section 1.5.
There is no requirement on the particular structure or format of a
bearer token. If a bearer token is a reference to authorization
information, such references MUST be infeasible for an attacker to
guess, such as using a sufficiently long cryptographically random
string. If a bearer token uses an encoding mechanism to contain the
authorization information in the token itself, the access token MUST
use integrity protection sufficient to prevent the token from being
modified. One example of an encoding and signing mechanism for
access tokens is described in JSON Web Token Profile for Access
Tokens [RFC9068].
1.4.3. Sender-Constrained Access Tokens
A sender-constrained access token binds the use of an access token to
a specific sender. This sender is obliged to demonstrate knowledge
of a certain secret as prerequisite for the acceptance of that access
token at the recipient (e.g., a resource server).
Authorization and resource servers SHOULD use mechanisms for sender-
constraining access tokens, such as OAuth Demonstration of Proof of
Possession (DPoP) [RFC9449] or Mutual TLS for OAuth 2.0 [RFC8705].
See [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] Section 4.10.1, to prevent
misuse of stolen and leaked access tokens.
It is RECOMMENDED to use end-to-end TLS between the client and the
resource server. If TLS traffic needs to be terminated at an
intermediary, refer to Section 4.13 of
[I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] for further security advice.
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1.5. Communication security
Implementations MUST use a mechanism to provide communication
authentication, integrity and confidentiality such as Transport-Layer
Security [RFC8446], to protect the exchange of clear-text credentials
and tokens either in the content or in header fields from
eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery (eg. see Section 2.4.1,
Section 7.5.1, Section 3.2, and Section 1.4.2).
OAuth URLs MUST use the https scheme except for loopback interface
redirect URIs, which MAY use the http scheme. When using https, TLS
certificates MUST be checked according to [RFC9110]. At the time of
this writing, TLS version 1.3 [RFC8446] is the most recent version.
Implementations MAY also support additional transport-layer security
mechanisms that meet their security requirements.
The identification of the TLS versions and algorithms is outside the
scope of this specification. Refer to [BCP195] for up to date
recommendations on transport layer security, and to the relevant
specifications for certificate validation and other security
considerations.
1.6. HTTP Redirections
This specification makes extensive use of HTTP redirections, in which
the client or the authorization server directs the resource owner's
user agent to another destination. While the examples in this
specification show the use of the HTTP 302 status code, any other
method available via the user agent to accomplish this redirection,
with the exception of HTTP 307, is allowed and is considered to be an
implementation detail. See Section 7.5.4 for details.
1.7. Interoperability
OAuth 2.1 provides a rich authorization framework with well-defined
security properties.
This specification leaves a few required components partially or
fully undefined (e.g., client registration, authorization server
capabilities, endpoint discovery). Some of these behaviors are
defined in optional extensions which implementations can choose to
use, such as:
* [RFC8414]: Authorization Server Metadata, defining an endpoint
clients can use to look up the information needed to interact with
a particular OAuth server
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* [RFC7591]: Dynamic Client Registration, providing a mechanism for
programmatically registering clients with an authorization server
* [RFC7592]: Dynamic Client Management, providing a mechanism for
updating dynamically registered client information
* [RFC7662]: Token Introspection, defining a mechanism for resource
servers to obtain information about access tokens
Please refer to Appendix C for a list of current known extensions at
the time of this publication.
1.8. Compatibility with OAuth 2.0
OAuth 2.1 is compatible with OAuth 2.0 with the extensions and
restrictions from known best current practices applied.
Specifically, features not specified in OAuth 2.0 core, such as PKCE,
are required in OAuth 2.1. Additionally, some features available in
OAuth 2.0, such as the Implicit or Resource Owner Credentials grant
types, are not specified in OAuth 2.1. Furthermore, some behaviors
allowed in OAuth 2.0 are restricted in OAuth 2.1, such as the strict
string matching of redirect URIs required by OAuth 2.1.
See Section 10 for more details on the differences from OAuth 2.0.
1.9. Notational Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF)
notation of [RFC5234]. Additionally, the rule URI-reference is
included from "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax"
[RFC3986].
Certain security-related terms are to be understood in the sense
defined in [RFC4949]. These terms include, but are not limited to,
"attack", "authentication", "authorization", "certificate",
"confidentiality", "credential", "encryption", "identity", "sign",
"signature", "trust", "validate", and "verify".
The term "content" is to be interpreted as described in Section 6.4
of [RFC9110].
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The term "user agent" is to be interpreted as described in
Section 3.5 of [RFC9110].
Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values
are case sensitive.
2. Client Registration
Before initiating the protocol, the client must establish its
registration with the authorization server. The means through which
the client registers with the authorization server are beyond the
scope of this specification but typically involve the client
developer manually registering the client at the authorization
server's website after creating an account and agreeing to the
service's Terms of Service, or by using Dynamic Client Registration
([RFC7591]).
Client registration does not require a direct interaction between the
client and the authorization server. When supported by the
authorization server, registration can rely on other means for
establishing trust and obtaining the required client properties
(e.g., redirect URI, client type). For example, registration can be
accomplished using a self-issued or third-party-issued assertion, or
by the authorization server performing client discovery using a
trusted channel.
When registering a client, the client developer SHALL:
* specify the client type as described in Section 2.1,
* provide client details needed by the grant type in use, such as
redirect URIs as described in Section 2.3, and
* include any other information required by the authorization server
(e.g., application name, website, description, logo image, the
acceptance of legal terms).
Dynamic Client Registration ([RFC7591]) defines a common general data
model for clients that may be used even with manual client
registration.
2.1. Client Types
OAuth 2.1 defines two client types based on their ability to
authenticate securely with the authorization server.
"confidential": Clients that have credentials with the AS are
designated as "confidential clients"
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"public": Clients without credentials are called "public clients"
Any clients with credentials MUST take precautions to prevent leakage
and abuse of their credentials.
Client authentication allows an Authorization Server to ensure it is
interacting with a certain client (identified by its client_id) in an
OAuth flow. The Authorization Server might make policy decisions
about things such as whether to prompt the user for consent on every
authorization or only the first based on the confidence that the
Authorization Server is actually communicating with the legitimate
client.
Whether and how an Authorization Server validates the identity of a
client or the party providing/operating this client is out of scope
of this specification. Authorization servers SHOULD consider the
level of confidence in a client's identity when deciding whether they
allow a client access to more sensitive resources and operations such
as the Client Credentials grant type and how often to prompt the user
for consent.
A single client_id SHOULD NOT be treated as more than one type of
client.
This specification has been designed around the following client
profiles:
"web application": A web application is a client running on a web
server. Resource owners access the client via an HTML user
interface rendered in a user agent on the device used by the
resource owner. The client credentials as well as any access
tokens issued to the client are stored on the web server and are
not exposed to or accessible by the resource owner.
"browser-based application": A browser-based application is a client
in which the client code is downloaded from a web server and
executes within a user agent (e.g., web browser) on the device
used by the resource owner. Protocol data and credentials are
easily accessible (and often visible) to the resource owner. If
such applications wish to use client credentials, it is
recommended to utilize the backend for frontend pattern. Since
such applications reside within the user agent, they can make
seamless use of the user agent capabilities when requesting
authorization.
"native application": A native application is a client installed and
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executed on the device used by the resource owner. Protocol data
and credentials are accessible to the resource owner. It is
assumed that any client authentication credentials included in the
application can be extracted. Dynamically issued access tokens
and refresh tokens can receive an acceptable level of protection.
On some platforms, these credentials are protected from other
applications residing on the same device. If such applications
wish to use client credentials, it is recommended to utilize the
backend for frontend pattern, or issue the credentials at runtime
using Dynamic Client Registration ([RFC7591]).
2.2. Client Identifier
Every client is identified in the context of an authorization server
by a client identifier -- a unique string representing the
registration information provided by the client. While the
Authorization Server typically issues the client identifier itself,
it may also serve clients whose client identifier was created by a
party other than the Authorization Server. The client identifier is
not a secret; it is exposed to the resource owner and MUST NOT be
used alone for client authentication. The client identifier is
unique in the context of an authorization server.
The client identifier is an opaque string whose size is left
undefined by this specification. The client should avoid making
assumptions about the identifier size. The authorization server
SHOULD document the size of any identifier it issues.
If the authorization server supports clients with client identifiers
issued by parties other than the authorization server, the
authorization server SHOULD take precautions to avoid clients
impersonating resource owners as described in Section 7.4.
2.3. Client Redirection Endpoint
The client redirection endpoint (also referred to as "redirect
endpoint") is the URI of the client that the authorization server
redirects the user agent back to after completing its interaction
with the resource owner.
The authorization server redirects the user agent to one of the
client's redirection endpoints previously established with the
authorization server during the client registration process.
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The redirect URI MUST be an absolute URI as defined by [RFC3986]
Section 4.3. The redirect URI MAY include an "application/x-www-
form-urlencoded" formatted query component ([WHATWG.URL]), which MUST
be retained when adding additional query parameters. The redirect
URI MUST NOT include a fragment component.
2.3.1. Registration Requirements
Authorization servers MUST require clients to register their complete
redirect URI (including the path component). Authorization servers
MUST reject authorization requests that specify a redirect URI that
doesn't exactly match one that was registered, with an exception for
loopback redirects, where an exact match is required except for the
port URI component, see Section 4.1.1 for details.
The authorization server MAY allow the client to register multiple
redirect URIs.
Registration may happen out of band, such as a manual step of
configuring the client information at the authorization server, or
may happen at runtime, such as in the initial POST in Pushed
Authorization Requests [RFC9126].
For private-use URI scheme-based redirect URIs, authorization servers
SHOULD enforce the requirement in Section 8.4.3 that clients use
schemes that are reverse domain name based. At a minimum, any
private-use URI scheme that doesn't contain a period character (.)
SHOULD be rejected.
In addition to the collision-resistant properties, this can help to
prove ownership in the event of a dispute where two apps claim the
same private-use URI scheme (where one app is acting maliciously).
For example, if two apps claimed com.example.app, the owner of
example.com could petition the app store operator to remove the
counterfeit app. Such a petition is harder to prove if a generic URI
scheme was used.
Clients MUST NOT expose URLs that forward the user's browser to
arbitrary URIs obtained from a query parameter ("open redirector"),
as described in Section 7.12. Open redirectors can enable
exfiltration of authorization codes and access tokens.
The client MAY use the state request parameter to achieve per-request
customization if needed rather than varying the redirect URI per
request.
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Without requiring registration of redirect URIs, attackers can use
the authorization endpoint as an open redirector as described in
Section 7.12.
2.3.2. Multiple Redirect URIs
If multiple redirect URIs have been registered to a client, the
client MUST include a redirect URI with the authorization request
using the redirect_uri request parameter (Section 4.1.1). If only a
single redirect URI has been registered to a client, the redirect_uri
request parameter is optional.
2.3.3. Preventing CSRF Attacks
Clients MUST prevent Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks. In
this context, CSRF refers to requests to the redirection endpoint
that do not originate at the authorization server, but a malicious
third party (see Section 4.4.1.8. of [RFC6819] for details). Clients
that have ensured that the authorization server supports the
code_challenge parameter MAY rely on the CSRF protection provided by
that mechanism. In OpenID Connect flows, validating the nonce
parameter provides CSRF protection. Otherwise, one-time use CSRF
tokens carried in the state parameter that are securely bound to the
user agent MUST be used for CSRF protection (see Section 7.9).
2.3.4. Preventing Mix-Up Attacks
When an OAuth client can only interact with one authorization server,
a mix-up defense is not required. In scenarios where an OAuth client
interacts with two or more authorization servers, however, clients
MUST prevent mix-up attacks. In order to prevent mix-up attacks,
clients MUST only process redirect responses of the issuer they sent
the respective request to and from the same user agent this
authorization request was initiated with.
See Section 7.13 for a detailed description of two different defenses
against mix-up attacks.
2.3.5. Invalid Endpoint
If an authorization request fails validation due to a missing,
invalid, or mismatching redirect URI, the authorization server SHOULD
inform the resource owner of the error and MUST NOT automatically
redirect the user agent to the invalid redirect URI.
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2.3.6. Endpoint Content
The redirection request to the client's endpoint typically results in
an HTML document response, processed by the user agent. If the HTML
response is served directly as the result of the redirection request,
any script included in the HTML document will execute with full
access to the redirect URI and the artifacts (e.g. authorization
code) it contains. Additionally, the request URL containing the
authorization code may be sent in the HTTP Referer header to any
embedded images, stylesheets and other elements loaded in the page.
The client SHOULD NOT include any third-party scripts (e.g., third-
party analytics, social plug-ins, ad networks) in the redirect URI
endpoint response. Instead, it SHOULD extract the artifacts from the
URI and redirect the user agent again to another endpoint without
exposing the artifacts (in the URI or elsewhere). If third-party
scripts are included, the client MUST ensure that its own scripts
(used to extract and remove the credentials from the URI) will
execute first.
2.4. Client Authentication
The authorization server MUST only rely on client authentication if
the process of issuance/registration and distribution of the
underlying credentials ensures their confidentiality.
If the client is confidential, the authorization server MAY accept
any form of client authentication meeting its security requirements
(e.g., password, public/private key pair).
It is RECOMMENDED to use asymmetric (public-key based) methods for
client authentication such as mTLS [RFC8705] or using signed JWTs
("Private Key JWT") in accordance with [RFC7521] and [RFC7523] (in
[OpenID] defined as the client authentication method
private_key_jwt). When such methods for client authentication are
used, authorization servers do not need to store sensitive symmetric
keys, making these methods more robust against a number of attacks.
When client authentication is not possible, the authorization server
SHOULD employ other means to validate the client's identity -- for
example, by requiring the registration of the client redirect URI or
enlisting the resource owner to confirm identity. A valid redirect
URI is not sufficient to verify the client's identity when asking for
resource owner authorization but can be used to prevent delivering
credentials to a counterfeit client after obtaining resource owner
authorization.
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The client MUST NOT use more than one authentication method in each
request to prevent a conflict of which authentication mechanism is
authoritative for the request.
The authorization server MUST consider the security implications of
interacting with unauthenticated clients and take measures to limit
the potential exposure of tokens issued to such clients, (e.g.,
limiting the lifetime of refresh tokens).
The privileges an authorization server associates with a certain
client identity MUST depend on the assessment of the overall process
for client identification and client credential lifecycle management.
See Section 7.2 for additional details.
2.4.1. Client Secret
Clients in possession of a client secret, sometimes known as a client
password, MAY use the HTTP Basic authentication scheme as defined in
Section 11 of [RFC9110] to authenticate with the authorization
server. The client identifier is encoded using the application/x-
www-form-urlencoded encoding algorithm per Appendix B, and the
encoded value is used as the username; the client secret is encoded
using the same algorithm and used as the password. The authorization
server MUST support the HTTP Basic authentication scheme for
authenticating clients that were issued a client secret.
For example (with extra line breaks for display purposes only):
Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0Mzo3RmpmcDBaQnIxS3REUmJuZlZkbUl3
In addition to that, the authorization server MAY support including
the client credentials in the request content using the following
parameters:
"client_id": REQUIRED. The client identifier issued to the client
during the registration process described by Section 2.2.
"client_secret": REQUIRED. The client secret.
Including the client credentials in the request content using the two
parameters is NOT RECOMMENDED and SHOULD be limited to clients unable
to directly utilize the HTTP Basic authentication scheme (or other
password-based HTTP authentication schemes). The parameters can only
be transmitted in the request content and MUST NOT be included in the
request URI.
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For example, a request to refresh an access token (Section 4.3) using
the content parameters (with extra line breaks for display purposes
only):
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
grant_type=refresh_token&refresh_token=tGzv3JOkF0XG5Qx2TlKWIA
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&client_secret=7Fjfp0ZBr1KtDRbnfVdmIw
Since this client authentication method involves a password, the
authorization server MUST protect any endpoint utilizing it against
brute force attacks.
2.4.2. Other Authentication Methods
The authorization server MAY support any suitable authentication
scheme matching its security requirements. When using other
authentication methods, the authorization server MUST define a
mapping between the client identifier (registration record) and
authentication scheme.
Some additional authentication methods such as mTLS [RFC8705] and
Private Key JWT [RFC7523] are defined in the "OAuth Token Endpoint
Authentication Methods (https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-
parameters/oauth-parameters.xhtml#token-endpoint-auth-method)"
registry, and may be useful as generic client authentication methods
beyond the specific use of protecting the token endpoint.
2.5. Unregistered Clients
This specification does not require that clients be registered with
the authorization server. However, the use of unregistered clients
is beyond the scope of this specification and requires additional
security analysis and review of its interoperability impact.
3. Protocol Endpoints
The authorization process utilizes two authorization server endpoints
(HTTP resources):
* Authorization endpoint - used by the client to obtain
authorization from the resource owner via user agent redirection.
* Token endpoint - used by the client to exchange an authorization
grant for an access token, typically with client authentication.
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As well as one client endpoint:
* Redirection endpoint - used by the authorization server to return
responses containing authorization credentials to the client via
the resource owner user agent.
Not every authorization grant type utilizes both endpoints.
Extension grant types MAY define additional endpoints as needed.
3.1. Authorization Endpoint
The authorization endpoint is used to interact with the resource
owner and obtain an authorization grant. The authorization server
MUST first authenticate the resource owner. The way in which the
authorization server authenticates the resource owner (e.g., username
and password login, passkey, federated login, or by using an
established session) is beyond the scope of this specification.
The means through which the client obtains the URL of the
authorization endpoint are beyond the scope of this specification,
but the URL is typically provided in the service documentation, or in
the authorization server's metadata document ([RFC8414]).
The authorization endpoint URL MUST NOT include a fragment component,
and MAY include an "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" formatted
query component [WHATWG.URL], which MUST be retained when adding
additional query parameters.
The authorization server MUST support the use of the HTTP GET method
Section 9.3.1 of [RFC9110] for the authorization endpoint and MAY
support the POST method (Section 9.3.3 of [RFC9110]) as well.
The authorization server MUST ignore unrecognized request parameters
sent to the authorization endpoint.
Request and response parameters defined by this specification MUST
NOT be included more than once. Parameters sent without a value MUST
be treated as if they were omitted from the request.
An authorization server that redirects a request potentially
containing user credentials MUST avoid forwarding these user
credentials accidentally (see Section 7.5.4 for details).
Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (also known as CORS) [WHATWG.CORS] MUST
NOT be supported at the Authorization Endpoint as the client does not
access this endpoint directly, instead the client redirects the user
agent to it.
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3.2. Token Endpoint
The token endpoint is used by the client to obtain an access token
using a grant such as those described in Section 4 and Section 4.3.
The means through which the client obtains the URL of the token
endpoint are beyond the scope of this specification, but the URL is
typically provided in the service documentation and configured during
development of the client, or provided in the authorization server's
metadata document ([RFC8414]) and fetched programmatically at
runtime.
The token endpoint URL MUST NOT include a fragment component, and MAY
include an application/x-www-form-urlencoded formatted query
component ([WHATWG.URL]).
The client MUST use the HTTP POST method when making requests to the
token endpoint.
The authorization server MUST ignore unrecognized request parameters
sent to the token endpoint.
Parameters sent without a value MUST be treated as if they were
omitted from the request. Request and response parameters defined by
this specification MUST NOT be included more than once.
Authorization servers that wish to support browser-based applications
(applications running exclusively in client-side JavaScript without
access to a supporting backend server) will need to ensure the token
endpoint supports the necessary CORS ([WHATWG.CORS]) headers to allow
the responses to be visible to the application. If the authorization
server provides additional endpoints to the application, such as
metadata URLs, dynamic client registration, revocation,
introspection, discovery or user info endpoints, these endpoints may
also be accessed by the browser-based application, and will also need
to have the CORS headers defined to allow access. See
[I-D.ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps] for further details.
3.2.1. Client Authentication
Confidential clients MUST authenticate with the authorization server
as described in Section 2.4 when making requests to the token
endpoint.
Client authentication is used for:
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* Enforcing the binding of refresh tokens and authorization codes to
the client they were issued to. Client authentication adds an
additional layer of security when an authorization code is
transmitted to the redirection endpoint over an insecure channel.
* Recovering from a compromised client by disabling the client or
changing its credentials, thus preventing an attacker from abusing
stolen refresh tokens. Changing a single set of client
credentials is significantly faster than revoking an entire set of
refresh tokens.
* Implementing authentication management best practices, which
require periodic credential rotation. Rotation of an entire set
of refresh tokens can be challenging, while rotation of a single
set of client credentials is significantly easier.
3.2.2. Token Request
The client makes a request to the token endpoint by sending the
following parameters using the application/x-www-form-urlencoded
format per Appendix B with a character encoding of UTF-8 in the HTTP
request content:
"client_id": REQUIRED, if the client is not authenticating with the
authorization server as described in Section 3.2.1.
"grant_type": REQUIRED. Identifier of the grant type the client
uses with the particular token request. This specification
defines the values authorization_code, refresh_token, and
client_credentials. The grant type determines the further
parameters required or supported by the token request. The
details of those grant types are defined below.
Confidential clients MUST authenticate with the authorization server
as described in Section 3.2.1.
For example, the client makes the following HTTP request (with extra
line breaks for display purposes only):
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
grant_type=authorization_code&code=SplxlOBeZQQYbYS6WxSbIA
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb
&code_verifier=3641a2d12d66101249cdf7a79c000c1f8c05d2aafcf14bf146497bed
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The authorization server MUST:
* require client authentication for confidential clients (or clients
with other authentication requirements),
* authenticate the client if client authentication is included
Further grant type specific processing rules apply and are specified
with the respective grant type.
3.2.3. Token Response
If the access token request is valid and authorized, the
authorization server issues an access token and optional refresh
token.
If the request client authentication failed or is invalid, the
authorization server returns an error response as described in
Section 3.2.4.
The authorization server issues an access token and optional refresh
token by creating an HTTP response content using the application/json
media type as defined by [RFC8259] with the following parameters and
an HTTP 200 (OK) status code:
"access_token": REQUIRED. The access token issued by the
authorization server.
"token_type": REQUIRED. The type of the access token issued as
described in Section 1.4. Value is case insensitive.
"expires_in": RECOMMENDED. The lifetime in seconds of the access
token. For example, the value 3600 denotes that the access token
will expire in one hour from the time the response was generated.
If omitted, the authorization server SHOULD provide the expiration
time via other means or document the default value.
"scope": RECOMMENDED, if identical to the scope requested by the
client; otherwise, REQUIRED. The scope of the access token as
described by Section 1.4.1.
"refresh_token": OPTIONAL. The refresh token, which can be used to
obtain new access tokens based on the grant passed in the
corresponding token request.
Authorization servers SHOULD determine, based on a risk assessment
and their own policies, whether to issue refresh tokens to a certain
client. If the authorization server decides not to issue refresh
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tokens, the client MAY obtain new access tokens by starting the OAuth
flow over, for example initiating a new authorization code request.
In such a case, the authorization server may utilize cookies and
persistent grants to optimize the user experience.
If refresh tokens are issued, those refresh tokens MUST be bound to
the scope and resource servers as consented by the resource owner.
This is to prevent privilege escalation by the legitimate client and
reduce the impact of refresh token leakage.
The parameters are serialized into a JavaScript Object Notation
(JSON) structure by adding each parameter at the highest structure
level. Parameter names and string values are included as JSON
strings. Numerical values are included as JSON numbers. The order
of parameters does not matter and can vary.
The authorization server MUST include the HTTP Cache-Control response
header field (see Section 5.2 of [RFC9111]) with a value of no-store
in any response containing tokens, credentials, or other sensitive
information.
For example:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
"access_token":"2YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA",
"token_type":"Bearer",
"expires_in":3600,
"refresh_token":"tGzv3JOkF0XG5Qx2TlKWIA",
"example_parameter":"example_value"
}
The client MUST ignore unrecognized value names in the response. The
sizes of tokens and other values received from the authorization
server are left undefined. The client should avoid making
assumptions about value sizes. The authorization server SHOULD
document the size of any value it issues.
3.2.4. Error Response
The authorization server responds with an HTTP 400 (Bad Request)
status code (unless specified otherwise) and includes the following
parameters with the response:
"error": REQUIRED. A single ASCII [USASCII] error code from the
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following:
"invalid_request": The request is missing a required parameter,
includes an unsupported parameter value (other than grant
type), repeats a parameter, includes multiple credentials,
utilizes more than one mechanism for authenticating the client,
contains a code_verifier although no code_challenge was sent in
the authorization request, or is otherwise malformed.
"invalid_client": Client authentication failed (e.g., unknown
client, no client authentication included, or unsupported
authentication method). The authorization server MAY return an
HTTP 401 (Unauthorized) status code to indicate which HTTP
authentication schemes are supported. If the client attempted
to authenticate via the Authorization request header field, the
authorization server MUST respond with an HTTP 401
(Unauthorized) status code and include the WWW-Authenticate
response header field matching the authentication scheme used
by the client.
"invalid_grant": The provided authorization grant (e.g.,
authorization code, resource owner credentials) or refresh
token is invalid, expired, revoked, does not match the redirect
URI used in the authorization request, or was issued to another
client.
"unauthorized_client": The authenticated client is not authorized
to use this authorization grant type.
"unsupported_grant_type": The authorization grant type is not
supported by the authorization server.
"invalid_scope": The requested scope is invalid, unknown,
malformed, or exceeds the scope granted by the resource owner.
Values for the error parameter MUST NOT include characters outside
the set %x20-21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E.
"error_description": OPTIONAL. Human-readable ASCII [USASCII] text
providing additional information, used to assist the client
developer in understanding the error that occurred. Values for
the error_description parameter MUST NOT include characters
outside the set %x20-21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E.
"error_uri": OPTIONAL. A URI identifying a human-readable web page
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with information about the error, used to provide the client
developer with additional information about the error. Values for
the error_uri parameter MUST conform to the URI-reference syntax
and thus MUST NOT include characters outside the set %x21 /
%x23-5B / %x5D-7E.
The parameters are included in the content of the HTTP response using
the application/json media type as defined by [RFC7159]. The
parameters are serialized into a JSON structure by adding each
parameter at the highest structure level. Parameter names and string
values are included as JSON strings. Numerical values are included
as JSON numbers. The order of parameters does not matter and can
vary.
For example:
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
"error":"invalid_request"
}
4. Grant Types
To request an access token, the client obtains authorization from the
resource owner. This specification defines the following
authorization grant types:
* authorization code
* client credentials, and
* refresh token
It also provides an extension mechanism for defining additional grant
types.
4.1. Authorization Code Grant
The authorization code grant type is used to obtain both access
tokens and refresh tokens.
The grant type uses the additional authorization endpoint to let the
authorization server interact with the resource owner in order to get
consent for resource access.
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Since this is a redirect-based flow, the client must be capable of
initiating the flow with the resource owner's user agent (typically a
web browser) and capable of being redirected back to from the
authorization server.
+----------+
| Resource |
| Owner |
+----------+
^
|
|
+-----|----+ Client Identifier +---------------+
| .---+---------(1)-- & Redirect URI ------->| |
| | | | | |
| | '---------(2)-- User authenticates --->| |
| | User- | | Authorization |
| | Agent | | Server |
| | | | |
| | .--------(3)-- Authorization Code ---<| |
+-|----|---+ +---------------+
| | ^ v
| | | |
^ v | |
+---------+ | |
| |>---(4)-- Authorization Code ---------' |
| Client | & Redirect URI |
| | |
| |<---(5)----- Access Token -------------------'
+---------+ (w/ Optional Refresh Token)
Figure 3: Authorization Code Flow
The flow illustrated in Figure 3 includes the following steps:
(1) The client initiates the flow by directing the resource owner's
user agent to the authorization endpoint. The client includes its
client identifier, code challenge (derived from a generated code
verifier), optional requested scope, optional local state, and a
redirect URI to which the authorization server will send the user
agent back once access is granted (or denied).
(2) The authorization server authenticates the resource owner (via
the user agent) and establishes whether the resource owner grants or
denies the client's access request.
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(3) Assuming the resource owner grants access, the authorization
server redirects the user agent back to the client using the redirect
URI provided earlier (in the request or during client registration).
The redirect URI includes an authorization code and any local state
provided by the client earlier.
(4) The client requests an access token from the authorization
server's token endpoint by including the authorization code received
in the previous step, and including its code verifier. When making
the request, the client authenticates with the authorization server
if it can. The client includes the redirect URI used to obtain the
authorization code for verification.
(5) The authorization server authenticates the client when possible,
validates the authorization code, validates the code verifier, and
ensures that the redirect URI received matches the URI used to
redirect the client in step (3). If valid, the authorization server
responds back with an access token and, optionally, a refresh token.
4.1.1. Authorization Request
To begin the authorization request, the client builds the
authorization request URI by adding parameters to the authorization
server's authorization endpoint URI. The client will eventually
redirect the user agent to this URI to initiate the request.
Clients use a unique secret per authorization request to protect
against authorization code injection and CSRF attacks. The client
first generates this secret, which it can use at the time of
redeeming the authorization code to prove that the client using the
authorization code is the same client that requested it.
The client constructs the request URI by adding the following
parameters to the query component of the authorization endpoint URI
using the application/x-www-form-urlencoded format, per Appendix B:
"response_type": REQUIRED. The authorization endpoint supports
different sets of request and response pameters. The client
determines the type of flow by using a certain response_type
value. This specification defines the value code, which must be
used to signal that the client wants to use the authorization code
flow.
Extension response types MAY contain a space-delimited (%x20) list of
values, where the order of values does not matter (e.g., response
type a b is the same as b a). The meaning of such composite response
types is defined by their respective specifications.
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Some extension response types are defined by ([OpenID]).
If an authorization request is missing the response_type parameter,
or if the response type is not understood, the authorization server
MUST return an error response as described in Section 4.1.2.1.
"client_id": REQUIRED. The client identifier as described in
Section 2.2.
"code_challenge": REQUIRED or RECOMMENDED (see Section 7.5.1). Code
challenge.
"code_challenge_method": OPTIONAL, defaults to plain if not present
in the request. Code verifier transformation method is S256 or
plain.
"redirect_uri": OPTIONAL if only one redirect URI is registered for
this client. REQUIRED if multiple redirict URIs are registered
for this client. See Section 2.3.2.
"scope": OPTIONAL. The scope of the access request as described by
Section 1.4.1.
"state": OPTIONAL. An opaque value used by the client to maintain
state between the request and callback. The authorization server
includes this value when redirecting the user agent back to the
client.
The code_verifier is a unique high-entropy cryptographically random
string generated for each authorization request, using the unreserved
characters [A-Z] / [a-z] / [0-9] / "-" / "." / "_" / "~", with a
minimum length of 43 characters and a maximum length of 128
characters.
The client stores the code_verifier temporarily, and calculates the
code_challenge which it uses in the authorization request.
ABNF for code_verifier is as follows.
code-verifier = 43*128unreserved
unreserved = ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "." / "_" / "~"
ALPHA = %x41-5A / %x61-7A
DIGIT = %x30-39
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Clients SHOULD use code challenge methods that do not expose the
code_verifier in the authorization request. Otherwise, attackers
that can read the authorization request (cf. Attacker A4 in
[I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]) can break the security provided by
this mechanism. Currently, S256 is the only such method.
NOTE: The code verifier SHOULD have enough entropy to make it
impractical to guess the value. It is RECOMMENDED that the output of
a suitable random number generator be used to create a 32-octet
sequence. The octet sequence is then base64url-encoded to produce a
43-octet URL-safe string to use as the code verifier.
The client then creates a code_challenge derived from the code
verifier by using one of the following transformations on the code
verifier:
S256
code_challenge = BASE64URL-ENCODE(SHA256(ASCII(code_verifier)))
plain
code_challenge = code_verifier
If the client is capable of using S256, it MUST use S256, as S256 is
Mandatory To Implement (MTI) on the server. Clients are permitted to
use plain only if they cannot support S256 for some technical reason,
for example constrained environments that do not have a hashing
function available, and know via out-of-band configuration or via
Authorization Server Metadata ([RFC8414]) that the server supports
plain.
ABNF for code_challenge is as follows.
code-challenge = 43*128unreserved
unreserved = ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "." / "_" / "~"
ALPHA = %x41-5A / %x61-7A
DIGIT = %x30-39
The properties code_challenge and code_verifier are adopted from the
OAuth 2.0 extension known as "Proof-Key for Code Exchange", or PKCE
([RFC7636]) where this technique was originally developed.
Authorization servers MUST support the code_challenge and
code_verifier parameters.
Clients MUST use code_challenge and code_verifier and authorization
servers MUST enforce their use except under the conditions described
in Section 7.5.1. In this case, using and enforcing code_challenge
and code_verifier as described in the following is still RECOMMENDED.
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The state and scope parameters SHOULD NOT include sensitive client or
resource owner information in plain text, as they can be transmitted
over insecure channels or stored insecurely.
The client directs the resource owner to the constructed URI using an
HTTP redirection, or by other means available to it via the user
agent.
For example, the client directs the user agent to make the following
HTTP request (with extra line breaks for display purposes only):
GET /authorize?response_type=code&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&state=xyz
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb
&code_challenge=6fdkQaPm51l13DSukcAH3Mdx7_ntecHYd1vi3n0hMZY
&code_challenge_method=S256 HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
The authorization server validates the request to ensure that all
required parameters are present and valid.
In particular, the authorization server MUST validate the
redirect_uri in the request if present, ensuring that it matches one
of the registered redirect URIs previously established during client
registration (Section 2). When comparing the two URIs the
authorization server MUST ensure that the two URIs are equal, see
[RFC3986], Section 6.2.1, Simple String Comparison, for details.
If the request is valid, the authorization server authenticates the
resource owner and obtains an authorization decision (by asking the
resource owner or by establishing approval via other means).
When a decision is established, the authorization server directs the
user agent to the provided client redirect URI using an HTTP
redirection response, or by other means available to it via the user
agent.
4.1.2. Authorization Response
If the resource owner grants the access request, the authorization
server issues an authorization code and delivers it to the client by
adding the following parameters to the query component of the
redirect URI using the application/x-www-form-urlencoded format, per
Appendix B:
"code": REQUIRED. The authorization code is generated by the
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authorization server and opaque to the client. The authorization
code MUST expire shortly after it is issued to mitigate the risk
of leaks. A maximum authorization code lifetime of 10 minutes is
RECOMMENDED. The authorization code is bound to the client
identifier, code challenge and redirect URI.
"state": REQUIRED if the state parameter was present in the client
authorization request. The exact value received from the client.
"iss": OPTIONAL. The identifier of the authorization server which
the client can use to prevent mix-up attacks, if the client
interacts with more than one authorization server. See
Section 7.13 and [RFC9207] for additional details on when this
parameter is necessary, and how the client can use it to prevent
mix-up attacks.
For example, the authorization server redirects the user agent by
sending the following HTTP response:
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://client.example.com/cb?code=SplxlOBeZQQYbYS6WxSbIA
&state=xyz&iss=https%3A%2F%2Fauthorization-server.example.com
The client MUST ignore unrecognized response parameters. The
authorization code string size is left undefined by this
specification. The client should avoid making assumptions about code
value sizes. The authorization server SHOULD document the size of
any value it issues.
The authorization server MUST associate the code_challenge and
code_challenge_method values with the issued authorization code so
the code challenge can be verified later.
The exact method that the server uses to associate the code_challenge
with the issued code is out of scope for this specification. The
code challenge could be stored on the server and associated with the
code there. The code_challenge and code_challenge_method values may
be stored in encrypted form in the code itself, but the server MUST
NOT include the code_challenge value in a response parameter in a
form that entities other than the AS can extract.
Clients MUST prevent injection (replay) of authorization codes into
the authorization response by attackers. Using code_challenge and
code_verifier prevents injection of authorization codes since the
authorization server will reject a token request with a mismatched
code_verifier. See Section 7.5.1 for more details.
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4.1.2.1. Error Response
If the request fails due to a missing, invalid, or mismatching
redirect URI, or if the client identifier is missing or invalid, the
authorization server SHOULD inform the resource owner of the error
and MUST NOT automatically redirect the user agent to the invalid
redirect URI.
An AS MUST reject requests without a code_challenge from public
clients, and MUST reject such requests from other clients unless
there is reasonable assurance that the client mitigates authorization
code injection in other ways. See Section 7.5.1 for details.
If the server does not support the requested code_challenge_method
transformation, the authorization endpoint MUST return the
authorization error response with error value set to invalid_request.
The error_description or the response of error_uri SHOULD explain the
nature of error, e.g., transform algorithm not supported.
If the resource owner denies the access request or if the request
fails for reasons other than a missing or invalid redirect URI, the
authorization server informs the client by adding the following
parameters to the query component of the redirect URI using the
application/x-www-form-urlencoded format, per Appendix B:
"error": REQUIRED. A single ASCII [USASCII] error code from the
following:
"invalid_request": The request is missing a required parameter,
includes an invalid parameter value, includes a parameter more
than once, or is otherwise malformed.
"unauthorized_client": The client is not authorized to request an
authorization code using this method.
"access_denied": The resource owner or authorization server
denied the request.
"unsupported_response_type": The authorization server does not
support obtaining an authorization code using this method.
"invalid_scope": The requested scope is invalid, unknown, or
malformed.
"server_error": The authorization server encountered an
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unexpected condition that prevented it from fulfilling the
request. (This error code is needed because a 500 Internal
Server Error HTTP status code cannot be returned to the client
via an HTTP redirect.)
"temporarily_unavailable": The authorization server is currently
unable to handle the request due to a temporary overloading or
maintenance of the server. (This error code is needed because
a 503 Service Unavailable HTTP status code cannot be returned
to the client via an HTTP redirect.)
Values for the error parameter MUST NOT include characters outside
the set %x20-21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E.
"error_description": OPTIONAL. Human-readable ASCII [USASCII] text
providing additional information, used to assist the client
developer in understanding the error that occurred. Values for
the error_description parameter MUST NOT include characters
outside the set %x20-21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E.
"error_uri": OPTIONAL. A URI identifying a human-readable web page
with information about the error, used to provide the client
developer with additional information about the error. Values for
the error_uri parameter MUST conform to the URI-reference syntax
and thus MUST NOT include characters outside the set %x21 /
%x23-5B / %x5D-7E.
"state": REQUIRED if a state parameter was present in the client
authorization request. The exact value received from the client.
"iss": OPTIONAL. The identifier of the authorization server. See
Section 4.1.2 above for details.
For example, the authorization server redirects the user agent by
sending the following HTTP response:
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://client.example.com/cb?error=access_denied
&state=xyz&iss=https%3A%2F%2Fauthorization-server.example.com
4.1.3. Token Endpoint Extension
The authorization grant type is identified at the token endpoint with
the grant_type value of authorization_code.
If this value is set, the following additional token request
parameters beyond Section 3.2.2 are required:
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"code": REQUIRED. The authorization code received from the
authorization server.
"code_verifier": REQUIRED, if the code_challenge parameter was
included in the authorization request. MUST NOT be used
otherwise. The original code verifier string.
The authorization server MUST return an access token only once for a
given authorization code.
If a second valid token request is made with the same authorization
code as a previously successful token request, the authorization
server MUST deny the request and SHOULD revoke (when possible) all
access tokens and refresh tokens previously issued based on that
authorization code. See Section 7.5.3 for further details.
For example, the client makes the following HTTP request (with extra
line breaks for display purposes only):
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
grant_type=authorization_code
&code=SplxlOBeZQQYbYS6WxSbIA
&code_verifier=3641a2d12d66101249cdf7a79c000c1f8c05d2aafcf14bf146497bed
In addition to the processing rules in Section 3.2.2, the
authorization server MUST:
* ensure that the authorization code was issued to the authenticated
confidential client, or if the client is public, ensure that the
code was issued to client_id in the request,
* verify that the authorization code is valid,
* verify that the code_verifier parameter is present if and only if
a code_challenge parameter was present in the authorization
request,
* if a code_verifier is present, verify the code_verifier by
calculating the code challenge from the received code_verifier and
comparing it with the previously associated code_challenge, after
first transforming it according to the code_challenge_method
method specified by the client, and
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* If there was no code_challenge in the authorization request
associated with the authorization code in the token request, the
authorization server MUST reject the token request.
See Section 10.2 for details on backwards compatibility with OAuth
2.0 clients regarding the redirect_uri parameter in the token
request.
4.2. Client Credentials Grant
The client can request an access token using only its client
credentials (or other supported means of authentication) when the
client is requesting access to the protected resources under its
control, or those of another resource owner that have been previously
arranged with the authorization server (the method of which is beyond
the scope of this specification).
The client credentials grant type MUST only be used by confidential
clients.
+---------+ +---------------+
| | | |
| |>--(1)- Client Authentication --->| Authorization |
| Client | | Server |
| |<--(2)---- Access Token ---------<| |
| | | |
+---------+ +---------------+
Figure 4: Client Credentials Grant
The use of the client credentials grant illustrated in Figure 4
includes the following steps:
(1) The client authenticates with the authorization server and
requests an access token from the token endpoint.
(2) The authorization server authenticates the client, and if valid,
issues an access token.
4.2.1. Token Endpoint Extension
The authorization grant type is identified at the token endpoint with
the grant_type value of client_credentials.
If this value is set, the following additional token request
parameters beyond Section 3.2.2 are supported:
"scope": OPTIONAL. The scope of the access request as described by
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Section 1.4.1.
For example, the client makes the following HTTP request using
transport-layer security (with extra line breaks for display purposes
only):
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
grant_type=client_credentials
The authorization server MUST authenticate the client.
4.3. Refresh Token Grant
The refresh token is a credential issued by the authorization server
to a client, which can be used to obtain new (fresh) access tokens
based on an existing grant. The client uses this option either
because the previous access token has expired or the client
previously obtained an access token with a scope more narrow than
approved by the respective grant and later requires an access token
with a different scope under the same grant.
Refresh tokens MUST be kept confidential in transit and storage, and
shared only among the authorization server and the client to whom the
refresh tokens were issued. The authorization server MUST maintain
the binding between a refresh token and the client to whom it was
issued.
The authorization server MUST verify the binding between the refresh
token and client identity whenever the client identity can be
authenticated. When client authentication is not possible, the
authorization server SHOULD issue sender-constrained refresh tokens
or use refresh token rotation as described in Section 4.3.1.
The authorization server MUST ensure that refresh tokens cannot be
generated, modified, or guessed to produce valid refresh tokens by
unauthorized parties.
4.3.1. Token Endpoint Extension
The authorization grant type is identified at the token endpoint with
the grant_type value of refresh_token.
If this value is set, the following additional parameters beyond
Section 3.2.2 are required/supported:
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"refresh_token": REQUIRED. The refresh token issued to the client.
"scope": OPTIONAL. The scope of the access request as described by
Section 1.4.1. The requested scope MUST NOT include any scope not
originally granted by the resource owner, and if omitted is
treated as equal to the scope originally granted by the resource
owner.
Because refresh tokens are typically long-lasting credentials used to
request additional access tokens, the refresh token is bound to the
client to which it was issued. Confidential clients MUST
authenticate with the authorization server as described in
Section 3.2.1.
For example, the client makes the following HTTP request using
transport-layer security (with extra line breaks for display purposes
only):
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
grant_type=refresh_token&refresh_token=tGzv3JOkF0XG5Qx2TlKWIA
In addition to the processing rules in Section 3.2.2, the
authorization server MUST:
* if client authentication is included in the request, ensure that
the refresh token was issued to the authenticated client, OR if a
client_id is included in the request, ensure the refresh token was
issued to the matching client
* validate that the grant corresponding to this refresh token is
still active
* validate the refresh token
Authorization servers MUST utilize one of these methods to detect
refresh token replay by malicious actors for public clients:
* _Sender-constrained refresh tokens:_ the authorization server
cryptographically binds the refresh token to a certain client
instance, e.g. by utilizing DPoP [RFC9449] or mTLS [RFC8705].
* _Refresh token rotation:_ the authorization server issues a new
refresh token with every access token refresh response. The
previous refresh token is invalidated but information about the
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relationship is retained by the authorization server. If a
refresh token is compromised and subsequently used by both the
attacker and the legitimate client, one of them will present an
invalidated refresh token, which will inform the authorization
server of the breach. The authorization server cannot determine
which party submitted the invalid refresh token, but it will
revoke the active refresh token as well as the access
authorization grant associated with it. This stops the attack at
the cost of forcing the legitimate client to obtain a fresh
authorization grant.
Implementation note: the grant to which a refresh token belongs may
be encoded into the refresh token itself. This can enable an
authorization server to efficiently determine the grant to which a
refresh token belongs, and by extension, all refresh tokens that need
to be revoked. Authorization servers MUST ensure the integrity of
the refresh token value in this case, for example, using signatures.
4.3.2. Refresh Token Response
If valid and authorized, the authorization server issues an access
token as described in Section 3.2.3.
The authorization server MAY issue a new refresh token, in which case
the client MUST discard the old refresh token and replace it with the
new refresh token.
4.3.3. Refresh Token Recommendations
The authorization server MAY revoke the old refresh token after
issuing a new refresh token to the client. If a new refresh token is
issued, the refresh token scope MUST be identical to that of the
refresh token included by the client in the request.
Authorization servers MAY revoke refresh tokens automatically in case
of a security event, such as:
* password change
* logout at the authorization server
Refresh tokens SHOULD expire if the client has been inactive for some
time, i.e., the refresh token has not been used to obtain new access
tokens for some time. The expiration time is at the discretion of
the authorization server. It might be a global value or determined
based on the client policy or the grant associated with the refresh
token (and its sensitivity).
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4.4. Extension Grants
The client uses an extension grant type by specifying the grant type
using an absolute URI (defined by the authorization server) as the
value of the grant_type parameter of the token endpoint, and by
adding any additional parameters necessary.
For example, to request an access token using the Device
Authorization Grant as defined by [RFC8628] after the user has
authorized the client on a separate device, the client makes the
following HTTP request (with extra line breaks for display purposes
only):
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Adevice_code
&device_code=GmRhmhcxhwEzkoEqiMEg_DnyEysNkuNhszIySk9eS
&client_id=C409020731
If the access token request is valid and authorized, the
authorization server issues an access token and optional refresh
token as described in Section 3.2.3. If the request failed client
authentication or is invalid, the authorization server returns an
error response as described in Section 3.2.4.
5. Resource Requests
The client accesses protected resources by presenting an access token
to the resource server. The resource server MUST validate the access
token and ensure that it has not expired and that its scope covers
the requested resource. The methods used by the resource server to
validate the access token are beyond the scope of this specification,
but generally involve an interaction or coordination between the
resource server and the authorization server. For example, when the
resource server and authorization server are colocated or are part of
the same system, they may share a database or other storage; when the
two components are operated independently, they may use Token
Introspection [RFC7662] or a structured access token format such as a
JWT [RFC9068].
5.1. Bearer Token Requests
This section defines two methods of sending Bearer tokens in resource
requests to resource servers. Clients MUST use one of the two
methods defined below, and MUST NOT use more than one method to
transmit the token in each request.
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In particular, clients MUST NOT send the access token in a URI query
parameter, and resource servers MUST ignore access tokens in a URI
query parameter.
5.1.1. Authorization Request Header Field
When sending the access token in the Authorization request header
field defined by HTTP/1.1 [RFC7235], the client uses the Bearer
scheme to transmit the access token.
For example:
GET /resource HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Bearer mF_9.B5f-4.1JqM
The syntax of the Authorization header field for this scheme follows
the usage of the Basic scheme defined in Section 2 of [RFC2617].
Note that, as with Basic, it does not conform to the generic syntax
defined in Section 1.2 of [RFC2617] but is compatible with the
general authentication framework in HTTP 1.1 Authentication
[RFC7235], although it does not follow the preferred practice
outlined therein in order to reflect existing deployments. The
syntax for Bearer credentials is as follows:
token68 = 1*( ALPHA / DIGIT /
"-" / "." / "_" / "~" / "+" / "/" ) *"="
credentials = "Bearer" 1*SP token68
Clients SHOULD make authenticated requests with a bearer token using
the Authorization request header field with the Bearer HTTP
authorization scheme. Resource servers MUST support this method.
5.1.2. Form-Encoded Content Parameter
When sending the access token in the HTTP request content, the client
adds the access token to the request content using the access_token
parameter. The client MUST NOT use this method unless all of the
following conditions are met:
* The HTTP request includes the Content-Type header field set to
application/x-www-form-urlencoded.
* The content follows the encoding requirements of the application/
x-www-form-urlencoded content-type as defined by the URL Living
Standard [WHATWG.URL].
* The HTTP request content is single-part.
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* The content to be encoded in the request MUST consist entirely of
ASCII [USASCII] characters.
* The HTTP request method is one for which the content has defined
semantics. In particular, this means that the GET method MUST NOT
be used.
The content MAY include other request-specific parameters, in which
case the access_token parameter MUST be properly separated from the
request-specific parameters using & character(s) (ASCII code 38).
For example, the client makes the following HTTP request using
transport-layer security:
POST /resource HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
access_token=mF_9.B5f-4.1JqM
The application/x-www-form-urlencoded method SHOULD NOT be used
except in application contexts where participating clients do not
have access to the Authorization request header field. Resource
servers MAY support this method.
5.2. Access Token Validation
After receiving the access token, the resource server MUST check that
the access token is not yet expired, is authorized to access the
requested resource, was issued with the appropriate scope, and meets
other policy requirements of the resource server to access the
protected resource.
Access tokens generally fall into two categories: reference tokens or
self-encoded tokens. Reference tokens can be validated by querying
the authorization server or looking up the token in a token database,
whereas self-encoded tokens contain the authorization information in
an encrypted and/or signed string which can be extracted by the
resource server.
A standardized method to query the authorization server to check the
validity of an access token is defined in Token Introspection
([RFC7662]).
A standardized method of encoding information in a token string is
defined in JWT Profile for Access Tokens ([RFC9068]).
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See Section 7.1 for additional considerations around creating and
validating access tokens.
5.3. Error Response
If a resource access request fails, the resource server SHOULD inform
the client of the error. The details of the error response is
determined by the particular token type, such as the description of
Bearer tokens in Section 5.3.2.
5.3.1. The WWW-Authenticate Response Header Field
If the protected resource request does not include authentication
credentials or does not contain an access token that enables access
to the protected resource, the resource server MUST include the HTTP
WWW-Authenticate response header field; it MAY include it in response
to other conditions as well. The WWW-Authenticate header field uses
the framework defined by HTTP/1.1 [RFC7235].
All challenges for this token type MUST use the auth-scheme value
Bearer. This scheme MUST be followed by one or more auth-param
values. The auth-param attributes used or defined by this
specification for this token type are as follows. Other auth-param
attributes MAY be used as well.
"realm": A realm attribute MAY be included to indicate the scope of
protection in the manner described in HTTP/1.1 [RFC7235]. The
realm attribute MUST NOT appear more than once.
"scope": The scope attribute is defined in Section 1.4.1. The scope
attribute is a space-delimited list of case-sensitive scope values
indicating the required scope of the access token for accessing
the requested resource. scope values are implementation defined;
there is no centralized registry for them; allowed values are
defined by the authorization server. The order of scope values is
not significant. In some cases, the scope value will be used when
requesting a new access token with sufficient scope of access to
utilize the protected resource. Use of the scope attribute is
OPTIONAL. The scope attribute MUST NOT appear more than once.
The scope value is intended for programmatic use and is not meant
to be displayed to end-users.
Two example scope values follow; these are taken from the OpenID
Connect [OpenID.Messages] and the Open Authentication Technology
Committee (OATC) Online Multimedia Authorization Protocol [OMAP]
OAuth 2.0 use cases, respectively:
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scope="openid profile email"
scope="urn:example:channel=HBO&urn:example:rating=G,PG-13"
"error": If the protected resource request included an access token
and failed authentication, the resource server SHOULD include the
error attribute to provide the client with the reason why the
access request was declined. The parameter value is described in
Section 5.3.2.
"error_description": The resource server MAY include the
error_description attribute to provide developers a human-readable
explanation that is not meant to be displayed to end-users.
"error_uri": The resource server MAY include the error_uri attribute
with an absolute URI identifying a human-readable web page
explaining the error.
The error, error_description, and error_uri attributes MUST NOT
appear more than once.
Values for the scope attribute (specified in Appendix A.4) MUST NOT
include characters outside the set %x21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E for
representing scope values and %x20 for delimiters between scope
values. Values for the error and error_description attributes
(specified in Appendix A.7 and Appendix A.8) MUST NOT include
characters outside the set %x20-21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E. Values for
the error_uri attribute (specified in Appendix A.9 of) MUST conform
to the URI-reference syntax and thus MUST NOT include characters
outside the set %x21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E.
5.3.2. Error Codes
When a request fails, the resource server responds using the
appropriate HTTP status code (typically, 400, 401, 403, or 405) and
includes one of the following error codes in the response:
"invalid_request": The request is missing a required parameter,
includes an unsupported parameter or parameter value, repeats the
same parameter, uses more than one method for including an access
token, or is otherwise malformed. The resource server SHOULD
respond with the HTTP 400 (Bad Request) status code.
"invalid_token": The access token provided is expired, revoked,
malformed, or invalid for other reasons. The resource SHOULD
respond with the HTTP 401 (Unauthorized) status code. The client
MAY request a new access token and retry the protected resource
request.
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"insufficient_scope": The request requires higher privileges
(scopes) than provided by the scopes granted to the client and
represented by the access token. The resource server SHOULD
respond with the HTTP 403 (Forbidden) status code and MAY include
the scope attribute with the scope necessary to access the
protected resource.
Extensions may define additional error codes or specify additional
circumstances in which the above error codes are retured.
If the request lacks any authentication information (e.g., the client
was unaware that authentication is necessary or attempted using an
unsupported authentication method), the resource server SHOULD NOT
include an error code or other error information.
For example:
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm="example"
And in response to a protected resource request with an
authentication attempt using an expired access token:
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm="example",
error="invalid_token",
error_description="The access token expired"
6. Extensibility
6.1. Defining Access Token Types
Access token types can be defined in one of two ways: registered in
the Access Token Types registry (following the procedures in
Section 11.1 of [RFC6749]), or by using a unique absolute URI as its
name.
6.1.1. Registered Access Token Types
[RFC6750] establishes a common registry in Section 11.4 of [RFC6749]
for error values to be shared among OAuth token authentication
schemes.
New authentication schemes designed primarily for OAuth token
authentication SHOULD define a mechanism for providing an error
status code to the client, in which the error values allowed are
registered in the error registry established by this specification.
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Such schemes MAY limit the set of valid error codes to a subset of
the registered values. If the error code is returned using a named
parameter, the parameter name SHOULD be error.
Other schemes capable of being used for OAuth token authentication,
but not primarily designed for that purpose, MAY bind their error
values to the registry in the same manner.
New authentication schemes MAY choose to also specify the use of the
error_description and error_uri parameters to return error
information in a manner parallel to their usage in this
specification.
Type names MUST conform to the type-name ABNF. If the type
definition includes a new HTTP authentication scheme, the type name
SHOULD be identical to the HTTP authentication scheme name (as
defined by [RFC2617]). The token type example is reserved for use in
examples.
type-name = 1*name-char
name-char = "-" / "." / "_" / DIGIT / ALPHA
6.1.2. Vendor-Specific Access Token Types
Types utilizing a URI name SHOULD be limited to vendor-specific
implementations that are not commonly applicable, and are specific to
the implementation details of the resource server where they are
used.
All other types MUST be registered.
6.2. Defining New Endpoint Parameters
New request or response parameters for use with the authorization
endpoint or the token endpoint are defined and registered in the
OAuth Parameters registry following the procedure in Section 11.2 of
[RFC6749].
Parameter names MUST conform to the param-name ABNF, and parameter
values syntax MUST be well-defined (e.g., using ABNF, or a reference
to the syntax of an existing parameter).
param-name = 1*name-char
name-char = "-" / "." / "_" / DIGIT / ALPHA
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Unregistered vendor-specific parameter extensions that are not
commonly applicable and that are specific to the implementation
details of the authorization server where they are used SHOULD
utilize a vendor-specific prefix that is not likely to conflict with
other registered values (e.g., begin with 'companyname_').
6.3. Defining New Authorization Grant Types
New authorization grant types can be defined by assigning them a
unique absolute URI for use with the grant_type parameter. If the
extension grant type requires additional token endpoint parameters,
they MUST be registered in the OAuth Parameters registry as described
by Section 11.2 of [RFC6749].
6.4. Defining New Authorization Endpoint Response Types
New response types for use with the authorization endpoint are
defined and registered in the Authorization Endpoint Response Types
registry following the procedure in Section 11.3 of [RFC6749].
Response type names MUST conform to the response-type ABNF.
response-type = response-name *( SP response-name )
response-name = 1*response-char
response-char = "_" / DIGIT / ALPHA
If a response type contains one or more space characters (%x20), it
is compared as a space-delimited list of values in which the order of
values does not matter. Only one order of values can be registered,
which covers all other arrangements of the same set of values.
For example, an extension can define and register the code
other_token response type. Once registered, the same combination
cannot be registered as other_token code, but both values can be used
to denote the same response type.
6.5. Defining Additional Error Codes
In cases where protocol extensions (i.e., access token types,
extension parameters, or extension grant types) require additional
error codes to be used with the authorization code grant error
response (Section 4.1.2.1), the token error response (Section 3.2.4),
or the resource access error response (Section 5.3), such error codes
MAY be defined.
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Extension error codes MUST be registered (following the procedures in
Section 11.4 of [RFC6749]) if the extension they are used in
conjunction with is a registered access token type, a registered
endpoint parameter, or an extension grant type. Error codes used
with unregistered extensions MAY be registered.
Error codes MUST conform to the error ABNF and SHOULD be prefixed by
an identifying name when possible. For example, an error identifying
an invalid value set to the extension parameter example SHOULD be
named example_invalid.
error = 1*error-char
error-char = %x20-21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E
7. Security Considerations
As a flexible and extensible framework, OAuth's security
considerations depend on many factors. The following sections
provide implementers with security guidelines focused on the three
client profiles described in Section 2.1: web application, browser-
based application, and native application.
A comprehensive OAuth security model and analysis, as well as
background for the protocol design, is provided by [RFC6819] and
[I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics].
7.1. Access Token Security Considerations
7.1.1. Security Threats
The following list presents several common threats against protocols
utilizing some form of tokens. This list of threats is based on NIST
Special Publication 800-63 [NIST800-63].
7.1.1.1. Access token manufacture/modification
An attacker may generate a bogus access token or modify the token
contents (such as the authentication or attribute statements) of an
existing token, causing the resource server to grant inappropriate
access to the client. For example, an attacker may modify the token
to extend the validity period; a malicious client may modify the
assertion to gain access to information that they should not be able
to view.
7.1.1.2. Access token disclosure
Access tokens may contain authentication and attribute statements
that include sensitive information.
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7.1.1.3. Access token redirect
An attacker uses an access token generated for consumption by one
resource server to gain access to a different resource server that
mistakenly believes the token to be for it.
7.1.1.4. Access token replay
An attacker attempts to use an access token that has already been
used with that resource server in the past.
7.1.2. Threat Mitigation
A large range of threats can be mitigated by protecting the contents
of the access token by using a digital signature.
Alternatively, a bearer token can contain a reference to
authorization information, rather than encoding the information
directly. Using a reference may require an extra interaction between
a resource server and authorization server to resolve the reference
to the authorization information. The mechanics of such an
interaction are not defined by this specification, but one such
mechanism is defined in Token Introspection [RFC7662].
This document does not specify the encoding or the contents of the
access token; hence, detailed recommendations about the means of
guaranteeing access token integrity protection are outside the scope
of this specification. One example of an encoding and signing
mechanism for access tokens is described in JSON Web Token Profile
for Access Tokens [RFC9068].
To deal with access token redirects, it is important for the
authorization server to include the identity of the intended
recipients (the audience), typically a single resource server (or a
list of resource servers), in the token. Restricting the use of the
token to a specific scope is also RECOMMENDED.
If cookies are transmitted without TLS protection, any information
contained in them is at risk of disclosure. Therefore, Bearer tokens
MUST NOT be stored in cookies that can be sent in the clear, as any
information in them is at risk of disclosure. See "HTTP State
Management Mechanism" [RFC6265] for security considerations about
cookies.
In some deployments, including those utilizing load balancers, the
TLS connection to the resource server terminates prior to the actual
server that provides the resource. This could leave the token
unprotected between the front-end server where the TLS connection
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terminates and the back-end server that provides the resource. In
such deployments, sufficient measures MUST be employed to ensure
confidentiality of the access token between the front-end and back-
end servers; encryption of the token is one such possible measure.
7.1.3. Summary of Recommendations
7.1.3.1. Safeguard bearer tokens
Client implementations MUST ensure that bearer tokens are not leaked
to unintended parties, as they will be able to use them to gain
access to protected resources. This is the primary security
consideration when using bearer tokens and underlies all the more
specific recommendations that follow.
7.1.3.2. Validate TLS certificate chains
The client MUST validate the TLS certificate chain when making
requests to protected resources. Failing to do so may enable DNS
hijacking attacks to steal the token and gain unintended access.
7.1.3.3. Always use TLS (https)
Clients MUST always use TLS (https) or equivalent transport security
when making requests with bearer tokens. Failing to do so exposes
the token to numerous attacks that could give attackers unintended
access.
7.1.3.4. Don't store bearer tokens in HTTP cookies
Implementations MUST NOT store bearer tokens within cookies that can
be sent in the clear (which is the default transmission mode for
cookies). Implementations that do store bearer tokens in cookies
MUST take precautions against cross-site request forgery.
7.1.3.5. Issue short-lived bearer tokens
Authorization servers SHOULD issue short-lived bearer tokens,
particularly when issuing tokens to clients that run within a web
browser or other environments where information leakage may occur.
Using short-lived bearer tokens can reduce the impact of them being
leaked.
7.1.3.6. Issue scoped bearer tokens
Authorization servers SHOULD issue bearer tokens that contain an
audience restriction, scoping their use to the intended relying party
or set of relying parties.
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7.1.3.7. Don't pass bearer tokens in page URLs
Bearer tokens MUST NOT be passed in page URLs (for example, as query
string parameters). Instead, bearer tokens SHOULD be passed in HTTP
message headers or message bodies for which confidentiality measures
are taken. Browsers, web servers, and other software may not
adequately secure URLs in the browser history, web server logs, and
other data structures. If bearer tokens are passed in page URLs,
attackers might be able to steal them from the history data, logs, or
other unsecured locations.
7.1.4. Access Token Privilege Restriction
The privileges associated with an access token SHOULD be restricted
to the minimum required for the particular application or use case.
This prevents clients from exceeding the privileges authorized by the
resource owner. It also prevents users from exceeding their
privileges authorized by the respective security policy. Privilege
restrictions also help to reduce the impact of access token leakage.
In particular, access tokens SHOULD be restricted to certain resource
servers (audience restriction), preferably to a single resource
server. To put this into effect, the authorization server associates
the access token with certain resource servers and every resource
server is obliged to verify, for every request, whether the access
token sent with that request was meant to be used for that particular
resource server. If not, the resource server MUST refuse to serve
the respective request. Clients and authorization servers MAY
utilize the parameters scope or resource as specified in this
document and [RFC8707], respectively, to determine the resource
server they want to access.
Additionally, access tokens SHOULD be restricted to certain resources
and actions on resource servers or resources. To put this into
effect, the authorization server associates the access token with the
respective resource and actions and every resource server is obliged
to verify, for every request, whether the access token sent with that
request was meant to be used for that particular action on the
particular resource. If not, the resource server must refuse to
serve the respective request. Clients and authorization servers MAY
utilize the parameter scope and authorization_details as specified in
[RFC9396] to determine those resources and/or actions.
7.2. Client Authentication
Depending on the overall process of client registration and
credential lifecycle management, this may affect the confidence an
authorization server has in a particular client.
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For example, authentication of a dynamically registered client does
not prove the identity of the client, it only ensures that repeated
requests to the authorization server were made from the same client
instance. Such clients may be limited in terms of which scopes they
are allowed to request, or may have other limitations such as shorter
token lifetimes.
In contrast, if there is a registered application whose developer's
identity was verified, who signed a contract and is issued a client
secret that is only used in a secure backend service, the
authorization server might allow this client to request more
sensitive scopes or to be issued longer-lasting tokens.
7.3. Client Impersonation
If a confidential client has its credentials stolen, a malicious
client can impersonate the client and obtain access to protected
resources.
The authorization server SHOULD enforce explicit resource owner
authentication and provide the resource owner with information about
the client and the requested authorization scope and lifetime. It is
up to the resource owner to review the information in the context of
the current client and to authorize or deny the request.
The authorization server SHOULD NOT process repeated authorization
requests automatically (without active resource owner interaction)
without authenticating the client or relying on other measures to
ensure that the repeated request comes from the original client and
not an impersonator.
7.3.1. Impersonation of Native Apps
As stated above, the authorization server SHOULD NOT process
authorization requests automatically without user consent or
interaction, except when the identity of the client can be assured.
This includes the case where the user has previously approved an
authorization request for a given client ID -- unless the identity of
the client can be proven, the request SHOULD be processed as if no
previous request had been approved.
Measures such as claimed https scheme redirects MAY be accepted by
authorization servers as identity proof. Some operating systems may
offer alternative platform-specific identity features that MAY be
accepted, as appropriate.
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7.3.2. Access Token Privilege Restriction
The client SHOULD request access tokens with the minimal scope
necessary. The authorization server SHOULD take the client identity
into account when choosing how to honor the requested scope and MAY
issue an access token with fewer scopes than requested.
The privileges associated with an access token SHOULD be restricted
to the minimum required for the particular application or use case.
This prevents clients from exceeding the privileges authorized by the
resource owner. It also prevents users from exceeding their
privileges authorized by the respective security policy. Privilege
restrictions also help to reduce the impact of access token leakage.
In particular, access tokens SHOULD be restricted to certain resource
servers (audience restriction), preferably to a single resource
server. To put this into effect, the authorization server associates
the access token with certain resource servers and every resource
server is obliged to verify, for every request, whether the access
token sent with that request was meant to be used for that particular
resource server. If not, the resource server MUST refuse to serve
the respective request. Clients and authorization servers MAY
utilize the parameters scope or resource as specified in [RFC8707],
respectively, to determine the resource server they want to access.
7.4. Client Impersonating Resource Owner
Resource servers may make access control decisions based on the
identity of a resource owner for which an access token was issued, or
based on the identity of a client in the client credentials grant.
If both options are possible, depending on the details of the
implementation, a client's identity may be mistaken for the identity
of a resource owner. For example, if a client is able to choose its
own client_id during registration with the authorization server, a
malicious client may set it to a value identifying an end-user (e.g.,
a sub value if OpenID Connect is used). If the resource server
cannot properly distinguish between access tokens issued to clients
and access tokens issued to end-users, the client may then be able to
access resource of the end-user.
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If the authorization server has a common namespace for client IDs and
user identifiers, causing the resource server to be unable to
distinguish an access token authorized by a resource owner from an
access token authorized by a client itself, authorization servers
SHOULD NOT allow clients to influence their client_id or any other
Claim if that can cause confusion with a genuine resource owner.
Where this cannot be avoided, authorization servers MUST provide
other means for the resource server to distinguish between the two
types of access tokens.
7.5. Authorization Code Security Considerations
7.5.1. Authorization Code Injection
Authorization code injection is an attack where the client receives
an authorization code from the attacker in its redirect URI instead
of the authorization code from the legitimate authorization server.
Without protections in place, there is no mechanism by which the
client can know that the attack has taken place. Authorization code
injection can lead to both the attacker obtaining access to a
victim's account, as well as a victim accidentally gaining access to
the attacker's account.
7.5.2. Countermeasures
To prevent injection of authorization codes into the client, using
code_challenge and code_verifier is REQUIRED for clients, and
authorization servers MUST enforce their use, unless both of the
following criteria are met:
* The client is a confidential client.
* In the specific deployment and the specific request, there is
reasonable assurance by the authorization server that the client
implements the OpenID Connect nonce mechanism properly.
In this case, using and enforcing code_challenge and code_verifier is
still RECOMMENDED.
The code_challenge or OpenID Connect nonce value MUST be transaction-
specific and securely bound to the client and the user agent in which
the transaction was started. If a transaction leads to an error,
fresh values for code_challenge or nonce MUST be chosen.
Relying on the client to validate the OpenID Connect nonce parameter
means the authorization server has no way to confirm that the client
has actually protected itself against authorization code injection
attacks. If an attacker is able to inject an authorization code into
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a client, the client would still exchange the injected authorization
code and obtain tokens, and would only later reject the ID token
after validating the nonce and seeing that it doesn't match. In
contrast, the authorization server enforcing the code_challenge and
code_verifier parameters provides a higher security outcome, since
the authorization server is able to recognize the authorization code
injection attack pre-emtpively and avoid issuing any tokens in the
first place.
Historic note: Although PKCE [RFC7636] (where the code_challenge and
code_verifier parameters were created) was originally designed as a
mechanism to protect native apps from authorization code exfiltration
attacks, all kinds of OAuth clients, including web applications and
other confidential clients, are susceptible to authorziation code
injection attacks, which are solved by the code_challenge and
code_verifier mechanism.
7.5.3. Reuse of Authorization Codes
Several types of attacks are possible if authorization codes are able
to be used more than once.
As described in Section 4.1.3, the authorization server must reject a
token request and revoke any issued tokens when receiving a second
valid request with an authorization code that has already been used
to issue an access token. If an attacker is able to exfiltrate an
authorization code and use it before the legitimate client, the
attacker will obtain the access token and the legitimate client will
not. Revoking any issued tokens means the attacker's tokens will
then be revoked, stopping the attack from proceeding any further.
However, the authorization server should only revoke issued tokens if
the request containing the authorization code is also valid,
including any other parameters such as the code_verifier and client
authentication. The authorization server SHOULD NOT revoke any
issued tokens when receiving a replayed authorization code that
contains invalid parameters. If it were to do so, this would create
a denial of service opportunity for an attacker who is able to obtain
an authorization code but unable to obtain the client authentication
or code_verifier by sending an invalid authorization code request
before the legitimate client and thereby revoking the legitimate
client's tokens once it makes the valid request.
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7.5.4. HTTP 307 Redirect
An authorization server which redirects a request that potentially
contains user credentials MUST NOT use the 307 status code
(Section 15.4.8 of [RFC9110]) for redirection. If an HTTP
redirection (and not, for example, JavaScript) is used for such a
request, AS SHOULD use the status code 303 ("See Other").
At the authorization endpoint, a typical protocol flow is that the AS
prompts the user to enter their credentials in a form that is then
submitted (using the POST method) back to the authorization server.
The AS checks the credentials and, if successful, redirects the user
agent to the client's redirect URI.
If the status code 307 were used for redirection, the user agent
would send the user credentials via a POST request to the client.
This discloses the sensitive credentials to the client. If the
relying party is malicious, it can use the credentials to impersonate
the user at the AS.
The behavior might be unexpected for developers, but is defined in
Section 15.4.8 of [RFC9110]. This status code does not require the
user agent to rewrite the POST request to a GET request and thereby
drop the form data in the POST request content.
In HTTP [RFC9110], only the status code 303 unambigiously enforces
rewriting the HTTP POST request to an HTTP GET request. For all
other status codes, including the popular 302, user agents can opt
not to rewrite POST to GET requests and therefore reveal the user
credentials to the client. (In practice, however, most user agents
will only show this behaviour for 307 redirects.)
7.6. Ensuring Endpoint Authenticity
The risk related to man-in-the-middle attacks is mitigated by the
mandatory use of channel security mechanisms such as [RFC8446] for
communicating with the Authorization and Token Endpoints. See
Section 1.5 for further details.
7.7. Credentials-Guessing Attacks
The authorization server MUST prevent attackers from guessing access
tokens, authorization codes, refresh tokens, resource owner
passwords, and client credentials.
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The probability of an attacker guessing generated tokens (and other
credentials not intended for handling by end-users) MUST be less than
or equal to 2^(-128) and SHOULD be less than or equal to 2^(-160).
The authorization server MUST utilize other means to protect
credentials intended for end-user usage.
7.8. Phishing Attacks
Wide deployment of this and similar protocols may cause end-users to
become inured to the practice of being redirected to websites where
they are asked to enter their passwords. If end-users are not
careful to verify the authenticity of these websites before entering
their credentials, it will be possible for attackers to exploit this
practice to steal resource owners' passwords.
Service providers should attempt to educate end-users about the risks
phishing attacks pose and should provide mechanisms that make it easy
for end-users to confirm the authenticity of their sites. Client
developers should consider the security implications of how they
interact with the user agent (e.g., external, embedded), and the
ability of the end-user to verify the authenticity of the
authorization server.
See Section 1.5 for further details on mitigating the risk of
phishing attacks.
7.9. Cross-Site Request Forgery
An attacker might attempt to inject a request to the redirect URI of
the legitimate client on the victim's device, e.g., to cause the
client to access resources under the attacker's control. This is a
variant of an attack known as Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF).
The traditional countermeasure is that clients pass a random value,
also known as a CSRF Token, in the state parameter that links the
request to the redirect URI to the user agent session as described.
This countermeasure is described in detail in [RFC6819],
Section 5.3.5. The same protection is provided by the code_verifier
parameter or the OpenID Connect nonce value.
When using code_verifier instead of state or nonce for CSRF
protection, it is important to note that:
* Clients MUST ensure that the AS supports the code_challenge_method
intended to be used by the client. If an authorization server
does not support the requested method, state or nonce MUST be used
for CSRF protection instead.
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* If state is used for carrying application state, and integrity of
its contents is a concern, clients MUST protect state against
tampering and swapping. This can be achieved by binding the
contents of state to the browser session and/or signed/encrypted
state values [I-D.bradley-oauth-jwt-encoded-state].
AS therefore MUST provide a way to detect their supported code
challenge methods either via AS metadata according to [RFC8414] or
provide a deployment-specific way to ensure or determine support.
7.10. Clickjacking
As described in Section 4.4.1.9 of [RFC6819], the authorization
request is susceptible to clickjacking attacks, also called user
interface redressing. In such an attack, an attacker embeds the
authorization endpoint user interface in an innocuous context. A
user believing to interact with that context, for example, clicking
on buttons, inadvertently interacts with the authorization endpoint
user interface instead. The opposite can be achieved as well: A user
believing to interact with the authorization endpoint might
inadvertently type a password into an attacker-provided input field
overlaid over the original user interface. Clickjacking attacks can
be designed such that users can hardly notice the attack, for example
using almost invisible iframes overlaid on top of other elements.
An attacker can use this vector to obtain the user's authentication
credentials, change the scope of access granted to the client, and
potentially access the user's resources.
Authorization servers MUST prevent clickjacking attacks. Multiple
countermeasures are described in [RFC6819], including the use of the
X-Frame-Options HTTP response header field and frame-busting
JavaScript. In addition to those, authorization servers SHOULD also
use Content Security Policy (CSP) level 2 [CSP-2] or greater.
To be effective, CSP must be used on the authorization endpoint and,
if applicable, other endpoints used to authenticate the user and
authorize the client (e.g., the device authorization endpoint, login
pages, error pages, etc.). This prevents framing by unauthorized
origins in user agents that support CSP. The client MAY permit being
framed by some other origin than the one used in its redirection
endpoint. For this reason, authorization servers SHOULD allow
administrators to configure allowed origins for particular clients
and/or for clients to register these dynamically.
Using CSP allows authorization servers to specify multiple origins in
a single response header field and to constrain these using flexible
patterns (see [CSP-2] for details). Level 2 of this standard
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provides a robust mechanism for protecting against clickjacking by
using policies that restrict the origin of frames (using frame-
ancestors) together with those that restrict the sources of scripts
allowed to execute on an HTML page (by using script-src). A non-
normative example of such a policy is shown in the following listing:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors https://ext.example.org:8000
Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self'
X-Frame-Options: ALLOW-FROM https://ext.example.org:8000
...
Because some user agents do not support [CSP-2], this technique
SHOULD be combined with others, including those described in
[RFC6819], unless such legacy user agents are explicitly unsupported
by the authorization server. Even in such cases, additional
countermeasures SHOULD still be employed.
7.11. Code Injection and Input Validation
A code injection attack occurs when an input or otherwise external
variable is used by an application unsanitized and causes
modification to the application logic. This may allow an attacker to
gain access to the application device or its data, cause denial of
service, or introduce a wide range of malicious side-effects.
The authorization server and client MUST sanitize (and validate when
possible) any value received -- in particular, the value of the state
and redirect_uri parameters.
7.12. Open Redirection
An open redirector is an endpoint that forwards a user's browser to
an arbitrary URI obtained from a query parameter. Such endpoints are
sometimes implemented, for example, to show a message before a user
is then redirected to an external website, or to redirect users back
to a URL they were intending to visit before being interrupted, e.g.,
by a login prompt.
The following attacks can occur when an AS or client has an open
redirector.
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7.12.1. Client as Open Redirector
Clients MUST NOT expose open redirectors. Attackers may use open
redirectors to produce URLs pointing to the client and utilize them
to exfiltrate authorization codes, as described in Section 4.1.1 of
[I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]. Another abuse case is to produce
URLs that appear to point to the client. This might trick users into
trusting the URL and follow it in their browser. This can be abused
for phishing.
In order to prevent open redirection, clients should only redirect if
the target URLs are whitelisted or if the origin and integrity of a
request can be authenticated. Countermeasures against open
redirection are described by OWASP [owasp_redir].
7.12.2. Authorization Server as Open Redirector
Just as with clients, attackers could try to utilize a user's trust
in the authorization server (and its URL in particular) for
performing phishing attacks. OAuth authorization servers regularly
redirect users to other web sites (the clients), but must do so in a
safe way.
Section 4.1.2.1 already prevents open redirects by stating that the
AS MUST NOT automatically redirect the user agent in case of an
invalid combination of client_id and redirect_uri.
However, an attacker could also utilize a correctly registered
redirect URI to perform phishing attacks. The attacker could, for
example, register a client via dynamic client registration [RFC7591]
and execute one of the following attacks:
1. Intentionally send an erroneous authorization request, e.g., by
using an invalid scope value, thus instructing the AS to redirect
the user-agent to its phishing site.
2. Intentionally send a valid authorization request with client_id
and redirect_uri controlled by the attacker. After the user
authenticates, the AS prompts the user to provide consent to the
request. If the user notices an issue with the request and
declines the request, the AS still redirects the user agent to
the phishing site. In this case, the user agent will be
redirected to the phishing site regardless of the action taken by
the user.
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3. Intentionally send a valid silent authentication request
(prompt=none) with client_id and redirect_uri controlled by the
attacker. In this case, the AS will automatically redirect the
user agent to the phishing site.
The AS MUST take precautions to prevent these threats. The AS MUST
always authenticate the user first and, with the exception of the
silent authentication use case, prompt the user for credentials when
needed, before redirecting the user. Based on its risk assessment,
the AS needs to decide whether it can trust the redirect URI or not.
It could take into account URI analytics done internally or through
some external service to evaluate the credibility and trustworthiness
content behind the URI, and the source of the redirect URI and other
client data.
The AS SHOULD only automatically redirect the user agent if it trusts
the redirect URI. If the URI is not trusted, the AS MAY inform the
user and rely on the user to make the correct decision.
7.13. Authorization Server Mix-Up Mitigation
Mix-up is an attack on scenarios where an OAuth client interacts with
two or more authorization servers and at least one authorization
server is under the control of the attacker. This can be the case,
for example, if the attacker uses dynamic registration to register
the client at his own authorization server or if an authorization
server becomes compromised.
When an OAuth client can only interact with one authorization server,
a mix-up defense is not required. In scenarios where an OAuth client
interacts with two or more authorization servers, however, clients
MUST prevent mix-up attacks. Two different methods are discussed in
the following.
For both defenses, clients MUST store, for each authorization
request, the issuer they sent the authorization request to, bind this
information to the user agent, and check that the authorization
response was received from the correct issuer. Clients MUST ensure
that the subsequent access token request, if applicable, is sent to
the same issuer. The issuer serves, via the associated metadata, as
an abstract identifier for the combination of the authorization
endpoint and token endpoint that are to be used in the flow. If an
issuer identifier is not available, for example, if neither OAuth
metadata [RFC8414] nor OpenID Connect Discovery [OpenID.Discovery]
are used, a different unique identifier for this tuple or the tuple
itself can be used instead. For brevity of presentation, such a
deployment-specific identifier will be subsumed under the issuer (or
issuer identifier) in the following.
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Note: Just storing the authorization server URL is not sufficient to
identify mix-up attacks. An attacker might declare an uncompromised
AS's authorization endpoint URL as "their" AS URL, but declare a
token endpoint under their own control.
See Section 4.4 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] for a detailed
description of several types of mix-up attacks.
7.13.1. Mix-Up Defense via Issuer Identification
This defense requires that the authorization server sends his issuer
identifier in the authorization response to the client. When
receiving the authorization response, the client MUST compare the
received issuer identifier to the stored issuer identifier. If there
is a mismatch, the client MUST abort the interaction.
There are different ways this issuer identifier can be transported to
the client:
* The issuer information can be transported, for example, via an
optional response parameter iss (see Section 4.1.2).
* When OpenID Connect is used and an ID Token is returned in the
authorization response, the client can evaluate the iss claim in
the ID Token.
In both cases, the iss value MUST be evaluated according to
[RFC9207].
While this defense may require using an additional parameter to
transport the issuer information, it is a robust and relatively
simple defense against mix-up.
7.13.2. Mix-Up Defense via Distinct Redirect URIs
For this defense, clients MUST use a distinct redirect URI for each
issuer they interact with.
Clients MUST check that the authorization response was received from
the correct issuer by comparing the distinct redirect URI for the
issuer to the URI where the authorization response was received on.
If there is a mismatch, the client MUST abort the flow.
While this defense builds upon existing OAuth functionality, it
cannot be used in scenarios where clients only register once for the
use of many different issuers (as in some open banking schemes) and
due to the tight integration with the client registration, it is
harder to deploy automatically.
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Furthermore, an attacker might be able to circumvent the protection
offered by this defense by registering a new client with the "honest"
AS using the redirect URI that the client assigned to the attacker's
AS. The attacker could then run the attack as described above,
replacing the client ID with the client ID of his newly created
client.
This defense SHOULD therefore only be used if other options are not
available.
8. Native Applications
Native applications are clients installed and executed on the device
used by the resource owner (i.e., desktop application, native mobile
application). Native applications require special consideration
related to security, platform capabilities, and overall end-user
experience.
The authorization endpoint requires interaction between the client
and the resource owner's user agent. The best current practice is to
perform the OAuth authorization request in an external user agent
(typically the browser) rather than an embedded user agent (such as
one implemented with web-views).
The native application can capture the response from the
authorization server using a redirect URI with a scheme registered
with the operating system to invoke the client as the handler, manual
copy-and-paste of the credentials, running a local web server,
installing a user agent extension, or by providing a redirect URI
identifying a server-hosted resource under the client's control,
which in turn makes the response available to the native application.
Previously, it was common for native apps to use embedded user agents
(commonly implemented with web-views) for OAuth authorization
requests. That approach has many drawbacks, including the host app
being able to copy user credentials and cookies as well as the user
needing to authenticate from scratch in each app. See Section 8.5.1
for a deeper analysis of the drawbacks of using embedded user agents
for OAuth.
Native app authorization requests that use the system browser are
more secure and can take advantage of the user's authentication state
on the device. Being able to use the existing authentication session
in the browser enables single sign-on, as users don't need to
authenticate to the authorization server each time they use a new app
(unless required by the authorization server policy).
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Supporting authorization flows between a native app and the browser
is possible without changing the OAuth protocol itself, as the OAuth
authorization request and response are already defined in terms of
URIs. This encompasses URIs that can be used for inter-app
communication. Some OAuth server implementations that assume all
clients are confidential web clients will need to add an
understanding of public native app clients and the types of redirect
URIs they use to support this best practice.
8.1. Registration of Native App Clients
Except when using a mechanism like Dynamic Client Registration
[RFC7591] to provision per-instance secrets, native apps are
classified as public clients, as defined in Section 2.1; they MUST be
registered with the authorization server as such. Authorization
servers MUST record the client type in the client registration
details in order to identify and process requests accordingly.
8.1.1. Client Authentication of Native Apps
Secrets that are statically included as part of an app distributed to
multiple users should not be treated as confidential secrets, as one
user may inspect their copy and learn the shared secret. For this
reason, it is NOT RECOMMENDED for authorization servers to require
client authentication of public native apps clients using a shared
secret, as this serves little value beyond client identification
which is already provided by the client_id request parameter.
Authorization servers that still require a statically included shared
secret for native app clients MUST treat the client as a public
client (as defined in Section 2.1), and not accept the secret as
proof of the client's identity. Without additional measures, such
clients are subject to client impersonation (see Section 7.3.1).
8.2. Using Inter-App URI Communication for OAuth in Native Apps
Just as URIs are used for OAuth on the web to initiate the
authorization request and return the authorization response to the
requesting website, URIs can be used by native apps to initiate the
authorization request in the device's browser and return the response
to the requesting native app.
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By adopting the same methods used on the web for OAuth, benefits seen
in the web context like the usability of a single sign-on session and
the security of a separate authentication context are likewise gained
in the native app context. Reusing the same approach also reduces
the implementation complexity and increases interoperability by
relying on standards-based web flows that are not specific to a
particular platform.
Native apps MUST use an external user agent to perform OAuth
authorization requests. This is achieved by opening the
authorization request in the browser (detailed in Section 8.3) and
using a redirect URI that will return the authorization response back
to the native app (defined in Section 8.4).
8.3. Initiating the Authorization Request from a Native App
Native apps needing user authorization create an authorization
request URI with the authorization code grant type per Section 4.1
using a redirect URI capable of being received by the native app.
The function of the redirect URI for a native app authorization
request is similar to that of a web-based authorization request.
Rather than returning the authorization response to the OAuth
client's server, the redirect URI used by a native app returns the
response to the app. Several options for a redirect URI that will
return the authorization response to the native app in different
platforms are documented in Section 8.4. Any redirect URI that
allows the app to receive the URI and inspect its parameters is
viable.
After constructing the authorization request URI, the app uses
platform-specific APIs to open the URI in an external user agent.
Typically, the external user agent used is the default browser, that
is, the application configured for handling http and https scheme
URIs on the system; however, different browser selection criteria and
other categories of external user agents MAY be used.
This best practice focuses on the browser as the RECOMMENDED external
user agent for native apps. An external user agent designed
specifically for user authorization and capable of processing
authorization requests and responses like a browser MAY also be used.
Other external user agents, such as a native app provided by the
authorization server may meet the criteria set out in this best
practice, including using the same redirect URI properties, but their
use is out of scope for this specification.
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Some platforms support a browser feature known as "in-app browser
tabs", where an app can present a tab of the browser within the app
context without switching apps, but still retain key benefits of the
browser such as a shared authentication state and security context.
On platforms where they are supported, it is RECOMMENDED, for
usability reasons, that apps use in-app browser tabs for the
authorization request.
8.4. Receiving the Authorization Response in a Native App
There are several redirect URI options available to native apps for
receiving the authorization response from the browser, the
availability and user experience of which varies by platform.
8.4.1. Claimed "https" Scheme URI Redirection
Some operating systems allow apps to claim https URIs (see
Section 4.2.2 of [RFC9110]) in the domains they control. When the
browser encounters a claimed URI, instead of the page being loaded in
the browser, the native app is launched with the URI supplied as a
launch parameter.
Such URIs can be used as redirect URIs by native apps. They are
indistinguishable to the authorization server from a regular web-
based client redirect URI. An example is:
https://app.example.com/oauth2redirect/example-provider
As the redirect URI alone is not enough to distinguish public native
app clients from confidential web clients, it is REQUIRED in
Section 8.1 that the client type be recorded during client
registration to enable the server to determine the client type and
act accordingly.
App-claimed https scheme redirect URIs have some advantages compared
to other native app redirect options in that the identity of the
destination app is guaranteed to the authorization server by the
operating system. For this reason, native apps SHOULD use them over
the other options where possible.
8.4.2. Loopback Interface Redirection
Native apps that are able to open a port on the loopback network
interface without needing special permissions (typically, those on
desktop operating systems) can use the loopback interface to receive
the OAuth redirect.
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Loopback redirect URIs use the http scheme and are constructed with
the loopback IP literal and whatever port the client is listening on.
That is, http://127.0.0.1:{port}/{path} for IPv4, and
http://[::1]:{port}/{path} for IPv6. An example redirect using the
IPv4 loopback interface with a randomly assigned port:
http://127.0.0.1:51004/oauth2redirect/example-provider
An example redirect using the IPv6 loopback interface with a randomly
assigned port:
http://[::1]:61023/oauth2redirect/example-provider
While redirect URIs using the name localhost (i.e.,
http://localhost:{port}/{path}) function similarly to loopback IP
redirects, the use of localhost is NOT RECOMMENDED. Specifying a
redirect URI with the loopback IP literal rather than localhost
avoids inadvertently listening on network interfaces other than the
loopback interface. It is also less susceptible to client-side
firewalls and misconfigured host name resolution on the user's
device.
The authorization server MUST allow any port to be specified at the
time of the request for loopback IP redirect URIs, to accommodate
clients that obtain an available ephemeral port from the operating
system at the time of the request.
Clients SHOULD NOT assume that the device supports a particular
version of the Internet Protocol. It is RECOMMENDED that clients
attempt to bind to the loopback interface using both IPv4 and IPv6
and use whichever is available.
8.4.3. Private-Use URI Scheme Redirection
Many mobile and desktop computing platforms support inter-app
communication via URIs by allowing apps to register private-use URI
schemes (sometimes colloquially referred to as "custom URL schemes")
like com.example.app. When the browser or another app attempts to
load a URI with a private-use URI scheme, the app that registered it
is launched to handle the request.
Many environments that support private-use URI schemes do not provide
a mechanism to claim a scheme and prevent other parties from using
another application's scheme. As such, clients using private-use URI
schemes are vulnerable to potential attacks on their redirect URIs,
so this option should only be used if the previously mentioned more
secure options are not available.
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To perform an authorization request with a private-use URI scheme
redirect, the native app launches the browser with a standard
authorization request, but one where the redirect URI utilizes a
private-use URI scheme it registered with the operating system.
When choosing a URI scheme to associate with the app, apps MUST use a
URI scheme based on a domain name under their control, expressed in
reverse order, as recommended by Section 3.8 of [RFC7595] for
private-use URI schemes.
For example, an app that controls the domain name app.example.com can
use com.example.app as their scheme. Some authorization servers
assign client identifiers based on domain names, for example,
client1234.usercontent.example.net, which can also be used as the
domain name for the scheme when reversed in the same manner. A
scheme such as myapp, however, would not meet this requirement, as it
is not based on a domain name.
When there are multiple apps by the same publisher, care must be
taken so that each scheme is unique within that group. On platforms
that use app identifiers based on reverse-order domain names, those
identifiers can be reused as the private-use URI scheme for the OAuth
redirect to help avoid this problem.
Following the requirements of Section 3.2 of [RFC3986], as there is
no naming authority for private-use URI scheme redirects, only a
single slash (/) appears after the scheme component. A complete
example of a redirect URI utilizing a private-use URI scheme is:
com.example.app:/oauth2redirect/example-provider
When the authorization server completes the request, it redirects to
the client's redirect URI as it would normally. As the redirect URI
uses a private-use URI scheme, it results in the operating system
launching the native app, passing in the URI as a launch parameter.
Then, the native app uses normal processing for the authorization
response.
8.5. Security Considerations in Native Apps
8.5.1. Embedded User Agents in Native Apps
Embedded user agents are a technically possible method for
authorizing native apps. These embedded user agents are unsafe for
use by third parties to the authorization server by definition, as
the app that hosts the embedded user agent can access the user's full
authentication credentials, not just the OAuth authorization grant
that was intended for the app.
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In typical web-view-based implementations of embedded user agents,
the host application can record every keystroke entered in the login
form to capture usernames and passwords, automatically submit forms
to bypass user consent, and copy session cookies and use them to
perform authenticated actions as the user.
Even when used by trusted apps belonging to the same party as the
authorization server, embedded user agents violate the principle of
least privilege by having access to more powerful credentials than
they need, potentially increasing the attack surface.
Encouraging users to enter credentials in an embedded user agent
without the usual address bar and visible certificate validation
features that browsers have makes it impossible for the user to know
if they are signing in to the legitimate site; even when they are, it
trains them that it's OK to enter credentials without validating the
site first.
Aside from the security concerns, embedded user agents do not share
the authentication state with other apps or the browser, requiring
the user to log in for every authorization request, which is often
considered an inferior user experience.
8.5.2. Fake External User-Agents in Native Apps
The native app that is initiating the authorization request has a
large degree of control over the user interface and can potentially
present a fake external user agent, that is, an embedded user agent
made to appear as an external user agent.
When all good actors are using external user agents, the advantage is
that it is possible for security experts to detect bad actors, as
anyone faking an external user agent is provably bad. On the other
hand, if good and bad actors alike are using embedded user agents,
bad actors don't need to fake anything, making them harder to detect.
Once a malicious app is detected, it may be possible to use this
knowledge to blacklist the app's signature in malware scanning
software, take removal action (in the case of apps distributed by app
stores) and other steps to reduce the impact and spread of the
malicious app.
Authorization servers can also directly protect against fake external
user agents by requiring an authentication factor only available to
true external user agents.
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Users who are particularly concerned about their security when using
in-app browser tabs may also take the additional step of opening the
request in the full browser from the in-app browser tab and complete
the authorization there, as most implementations of the in-app
browser tab pattern offer such functionality.
8.5.3. Malicious External User-Agents in Native Apps
If a malicious app is able to configure itself as the default handler
for https scheme URIs in the operating system, it will be able to
intercept authorization requests that use the default browser and
abuse this position of trust for malicious ends such as phishing the
user.
This attack is not confined to OAuth; a malicious app configured in
this way would present a general and ongoing risk to the user beyond
OAuth usage by native apps. Many operating systems mitigate this
issue by requiring an explicit user action to change the default
handler for http and https scheme URIs.
8.5.4. Loopback Redirect Considerations in Native Apps
Loopback interface redirect URIs MAY use the http scheme (i.e.,
without TLS). This is acceptable for loopback interface redirect
URIs as the HTTP request never leaves the device.
Clients should open the network port only when starting the
authorization request and close it once the response is returned.
Clients should listen on the loopback network interface only, in
order to avoid interference by other network actors.
Clients should use loopback IP literals rather than the string
localhost as described in Section 8.4.2.
9. Browser-Based Apps
Browser-based apps are are clients that run in a web browser,
typically written in JavaScript, also known as "single-page apps".
These types of apps have particular security considerations similar
to native apps.
TODO: Bring in the normative text of the browser-based apps BCP when
it is finalized.
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10. Differences from OAuth 2.0
This draft consolidates the functionality in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749],
OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps ([RFC8252]), Proof Key for Code Exchange
([RFC7636]), OAuth 2.0 for Browser-Based Apps
([I-D.ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps]), OAuth Security Best Current
Practice ([I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]), and Bearer Token Usage
([RFC6750]).
Where a later draft updates or obsoletes functionality found in the
original [RFC6749], that functionality in this draft is updated with
the normative changes described in a later draft, or removed
entirely.
A non-normative list of changes from OAuth 2.0 is listed below:
* The authorization code grant is extended with the functionality
from PKCE ([RFC7636]) such that the default method of using the
authorization code grant according to this specification requires
the addition of the PKCE parameters
* Redirect URIs must be compared using exact string matching as per
Section 4.1.3 of [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
* The Implicit grant (response_type=token) is omitted from this
specification as per Section 2.1.2 of
[I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
* The Resource Owner Password Credentials grant is omitted from this
specification as per Section 2.4 of
[I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
* Bearer token usage omits the use of bearer tokens in the query
string of URIs as per Section 4.3.2 of
[I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
* Refresh tokens for public clients must either be sender-
constrained or one-time use as per Section 4.13.2 of
[I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
* The token endpoint request containing an authorization code no
longer contains the redirect_uri parameter
10.1. Removal of the OAuth 2.0 Implicit grant
The OAuth 2.0 Implicit grant is omitted from OAuth 2.1 as it was
deprecated in [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics].
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The intent of removing the Implicit grant is to no longer issue
access tokens in the authorization response, as such tokens are
vulnerable to leakage and injection, and are unable to be sender-
constrained to a client. This behavior was indicated by clients
using the response_type=token parameter. This value for the
response_type parameter is no longer defined in OAuth 2.1.
Removal of response_type=token does not have an effect on other
extension response types returning other artifacts from the
authorization endpoint, for example, response_type=id_token defined
by [OpenID].
10.2. Redirect URI Parameter in Token Request
In OAuth 2.0, the request to the token endpoint in the authorization
code flow (section 4.1.3 of [RFC6749]) contains an optional
redirect_uri parameter. The parameter was intended to prevent an
authorization code injection attack, and was required if the
redirect_uri parameter was sent in the original authorization
request. The authorization request only required the redirect_uri
parameter if multiple redirect URIs were registered to the specific
client. However, in practice, many authorization server
implementations required the redirect_uri parameter in the
authorization request even if only one was registered, leading the
redirect_uri parameter to be required at the token endpoint as well.
In OAuth 2.1, authorization code injection is prevented by the
code_challenge and code_verifier parameters, making the inclusion of
the redirect_uri parameter serve no purpose in the token request. As
such, it has been removed.
For backwards compatibility of an authorization server wishing to
support both OAuth 2.0 and OAuth 2.1 clients, the authorization
server MUST allow clients to send the redirect_uri parameter in the
token request (Section 4.1.3), and MUST enforce the parameter as
described in [RFC6749]. The authorization server can use the
client_id in the request to determine whether to enforce this
behavior for the specific client that it knows will be using the
older OAuth 2.0 behavior.
A client following only the OAuth 2.1 recommendations will not send
the redirect_uri in the token request, and therefore will not be
compatible with an authorization server that expects the parameter in
the token request.
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11. IANA Considerations
This document does not require any IANA actions.
All referenced registries are defined by [RFC6749] and related
documents that this work is based upon. No changes to those
registries are required by this specification.
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[BCP195] Saint-Andre, P., "Recommendations for Secure Use of
Transport Layer Security (TLS)", 2015.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
Lodderstedt, T., Bradley, J., Labunets, A., and D. Fett,
"OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-security-
topics-24, 23 October 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-
security-topics-24>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,
Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
RFC 2617, DOI 10.17487/RFC2617, June 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2617>.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
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[RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
[RFC7235] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7235, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7235>.
[RFC7521] Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., Jones, M., and Y. Goland,
"Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication
and Authorization Grants", RFC 7521, DOI 10.17487/RFC7521,
May 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7521>.
[RFC7523] Jones, M., Campbell, B., and C. Mortimore, "JSON Web Token
(JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and
Authorization Grants", RFC 7523, DOI 10.17487/RFC7523, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7523>.
[RFC7595] Thaler, D., Ed., Hansen, T., and T. Hardie, "Guidelines
and Registration Procedures for URI Schemes", BCP 35,
RFC 7595, DOI 10.17487/RFC7595, June 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7595>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8252] Denniss, W. and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps",
BCP 212, RFC 8252, DOI 10.17487/RFC8252, October 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8252>.
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[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC9110] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9110>.
[RFC9111] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "HTTP Caching", STD 98, RFC 9111,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9111, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9111>.
[RFC9207] Meyer zu Selhausen, K. and D. Fett, "OAuth 2.0
Authorization Server Issuer Identification", RFC 9207,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9207, March 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9207>.
[USASCII] Institute, A. N. S., "Coded Character Set -- 7-bit
American Standard Code for Information Interchange, ANSI
X3.4", 1986.
[W3C.REC-xml-20081126]
Bray, T., Paoli, J., Sperberg-McQueen, C. M., Maler, E.,
and F. Yergeau, "Extensible Markup Language", November
2008,
<https://www.w3.org/TR/REC-xml/REC-xml-20081126.xml>.
[WHATWG.CORS]
WHATWG, "Fetch Standard: CORS protocol", June 2023,
<https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/#http-cors-protocol>.
[WHATWG.URL]
WHATWG, "URL", May 2022, <https://url.spec.whatwg.org/>.
12.2. Informative References
[CSP-2] "Content Security Policy Level 2", December 2016,
<https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2>.
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[I-D.bradley-oauth-jwt-encoded-state]
Bradley, J., Lodderstedt, T., and H. Zandbelt, "Encoding
claims in the OAuth 2 state parameter using a JWT", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-bradley-oauth-jwt-
encoded-state-09, 4 November 2018,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-bradley-
oauth-jwt-encoded-state-09>.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps]
Parecki, A., Waite, D., and P. De Ryck, "OAuth 2.0 for
Browser-Based Apps", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps-15, 23 October 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-
browser-based-apps-15>.
[NIST800-63]
Burr, W., Dodson, D., Newton, E., Perlner, R., Polk, T.,
Gupta, S., and E. Nabbus, "NIST Special Publication
800-63-1, INFORMATION SECURITY", December 2011,
<http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/>.
[OMAP] Huff, J., Schlacht, D., Nadalin, A., Simmons, J.,
Rosenberg, P., Madsen, P., Ace, T., Rickelton-Abdi, C.,
and B. Boyer, "Online Multimedia Authorization Protocol:
An Industry Standard for Authorized Access to Internet
Multimedia Resources", August 2012,
<https://www.svta.org/product/online-multimedia-
authorization-protocol/>.
[OpenID] Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", November 2014,
<https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
[OpenID.Discovery]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and E. Jay, "OpenID
Connect Discovery 1.0 incorporating errata set 1",
November 2014, <https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-
discovery-1_0.html>.
[OpenID.Messages]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B.,
Mortimore, C., and E. Jay, "OpenID Connect Messages 1.0",
June 2012, <http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-
messages-1_0.html>.
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[owasp_redir]
"OWASP Cheat Sheet Series - Unvalidated Redirects and
Forwards", 2020,
<https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/
Unvalidated_Redirects_and_Forwards_Cheat_Sheet.html>.
[RFC6265] Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6265, April 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6265>.
[RFC6819] Lodderstedt, T., Ed., McGloin, M., and P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0
Threat Model and Security Considerations", RFC 6819,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6819, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6819>.
[RFC7009] Lodderstedt, T., Ed., Dronia, S., and M. Scurtescu, "OAuth
2.0 Token Revocation", RFC 7009, DOI 10.17487/RFC7009,
August 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7009>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7591] Richer, J., Ed., Jones, M., Bradley, J., Machulak, M., and
P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol",
RFC 7591, DOI 10.17487/RFC7591, July 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7591>.
[RFC7592] Richer, J., Ed., Jones, M., Bradley, J., and M. Machulak,
"OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Management
Protocol", RFC 7592, DOI 10.17487/RFC7592, July 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7592>.
[RFC7636] Sakimura, N., Ed., Bradley, J., and N. Agarwal, "Proof Key
for Code Exchange by OAuth Public Clients", RFC 7636,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7636, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7636>.
[RFC7662] Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection",
RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, October 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7662>.
[RFC8414] Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0
Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, June 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8414>.
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[RFC8628] Denniss, W., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and H. Tschofenig,
"OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant", RFC 8628,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8628, August 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8628>.
[RFC8705] Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Sakimura, N., and T.
Lodderstedt, "OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication
and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens", RFC 8705,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8705, February 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8705>.
[RFC8707] Campbell, B., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Resource
Indicators for OAuth 2.0", RFC 8707, DOI 10.17487/RFC8707,
February 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8707>.
[RFC9068] Bertocci, V., "JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0
Access Tokens", RFC 9068, DOI 10.17487/RFC9068, October
2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9068>.
[RFC9126] Lodderstedt, T., Campbell, B., Sakimura, N., Tonge, D.,
and F. Skokan, "OAuth 2.0 Pushed Authorization Requests",
RFC 9126, DOI 10.17487/RFC9126, September 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9126>.
[RFC9396] Lodderstedt, T., Richer, J., and B. Campbell, "OAuth 2.0
Rich Authorization Requests", RFC 9396,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9396, May 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9396>.
[RFC9449] Fett, D., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Lodderstedt, T.,
Jones, M., and D. Waite, "OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of
Possession (DPoP)", RFC 9449, DOI 10.17487/RFC9449,
September 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9449>.
[W3C.REC-html401-19991224]
Hors, A. L., Ed., Raggett, D., Ed., and I. Jacobs, Ed.,
"HTML 4.01 Specification", W3C REC REC-html401-19991224,
W3C REC-html401-19991224, 24 December 1999,
<https://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-html401-19991224/>.
Appendix A. Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) Syntax
This section provides Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) syntax
descriptions for the elements defined in this specification using the
notation of [RFC5234]. The ABNF below is defined in terms of Unicode
code points [W3C.REC-xml-20081126]; these characters are typically
encoded in UTF-8. Elements are presented in the order first defined.
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Some of the definitions that follow use the "URI-reference"
definition from [RFC3986].
Some of the definitions that follow use these common definitions:
VSCHAR = %x20-7E
NQCHAR = %x21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E
NQSCHAR = %x20-21 / %x23-5B / %x5D-7E
A.1. "client_id" Syntax
The client_id element is defined in Section 2.4.1:
client-id = *VSCHAR
A.2. "client_secret" Syntax
The client_secret element is defined in Section 2.4.1:
client-secret = *VSCHAR
A.3. "response_type" Syntax
The response_type element is defined in Section 4.1.1 and
Section 6.4:
response-type = response-name *( SP response-name )
response-name = 1*response-char
response-char = "_" / DIGIT / ALPHA
A.4. "scope" Syntax
The scope element is defined in Section 1.4.1:
scope = scope-token *( SP scope-token )
scope-token = 1*NQCHAR
A.5. "state" Syntax
The state element is defined in Section 4.1.1, Section 4.1.2, and
Section 4.1.2.1:
state = 1*VSCHAR
A.6. "redirect_uri" Syntax
The redirect_uri element is defined in Section 4.1.1, and
Section 4.1.3:
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redirect-uri = URI-reference
A.7. "error" Syntax
The error element is defined in Sections Section 4.1.2.1,
Section 3.2.4, 7.2, and 8.5:
error = 1*NQSCHAR
A.8. "error_description" Syntax
The error_description element is defined in Sections Section 4.1.2.1,
Section 3.2.4, and Section 5.3:
error-description = 1*NQSCHAR
A.9. "error_uri" Syntax
The error_uri element is defined in Sections Section 4.1.2.1,
Section 3.2.4, and 7.2:
error-uri = URI-reference
A.10. "grant_type" Syntax
The grant_type element is defined in Section Section 3.2.2:
grant-type = grant-name / URI-reference
grant-name = 1*name-char
name-char = "-" / "." / "_" / DIGIT / ALPHA
A.11. "code" Syntax
The code element is defined in Section 4.1.3:
code = 1*VSCHAR
A.12. "access_token" Syntax
The access_token element is defined in Section 3.2.3:
access-token = 1*VSCHAR
A.13. "token_type" Syntax
The token_type element is defined in Section 3.2.3, and Section 6.1:
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token-type = type-name / URI-reference
type-name = 1*name-char
name-char = "-" / "." / "_" / DIGIT / ALPHA
A.14. "expires_in" Syntax
The expires_in element is defined in Section 3.2.3:
expires-in = 1*DIGIT
A.15. "refresh_token" Syntax
The refresh_token element is defined in Section 3.2.3 and
Section 4.3:
refresh-token = 1*VSCHAR
A.16. Endpoint Parameter Syntax
The syntax for new endpoint parameters is defined in Section 6.2:
param-name = 1*name-char
name-char = "-" / "." / "_" / DIGIT / ALPHA
A.17. "code_verifier" Syntax
ABNF for code_verifier is as follows.
code-verifier = 43*128unreserved
unreserved = ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "." / "_" / "~"
ALPHA = %x41-5A / %x61-7A
DIGIT = %x30-39
A.18. "code_challenge" Syntax
ABNF for code_challenge is as follows.
code-challenge = 43*128unreserved
unreserved = ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "." / "_" / "~"
ALPHA = %x41-5A / %x61-7A
DIGIT = %x30-39
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Appendix B. Use of application/x-www-form-urlencoded Media Type
At the time of publication of [RFC6749], the application/x-www-form-
urlencoded media type was defined in Section 17.13.4 of
[W3C.REC-html401-19991224] but not registered in the IANA MIME Media
Types registry (http://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types
(http://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types)). Furthermore, that
definition is incomplete, as it does not consider non-US-ASCII
characters.
To address this shortcoming when generating contents using this media
type, names and values MUST be encoded using the UTF-8 character
encoding scheme [RFC3629] first; the resulting octet sequence then
needs to be further encoded using the escaping rules defined in
[W3C.REC-html401-19991224].
When parsing data from a content using this media type, the names and
values resulting from reversing the name/value encoding consequently
need to be treated as octet sequences, to be decoded using the UTF-8
character encoding scheme.
For example, the value consisting of the six Unicode code points (1)
U+0020 (SPACE), (2) U+0025 (PERCENT SIGN), (3) U+0026 (AMPERSAND),
(4) U+002B (PLUS SIGN), (5) U+00A3 (POUND SIGN), and (6) U+20AC (EURO
SIGN) would be encoded into the octet sequence below (using
hexadecimal notation):
20 25 26 2B C2 A3 E2 82 AC
and then represented in the content as:
+%25%26%2B%C2%A3%E2%82%AC
GitHub discussion: https://github.com/oauth-wg/oauth-v2-1/issues/128
(https://github.com/oauth-wg/oauth-v2-1/issues/128)
Appendix C. Extensions
Below is a list of well-established extensions at the time of
publication:
* [RFC9068]: JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0 Access
Tokens
- This specification defines a profile for issuing OAuth access
tokens in JSON Web Token (JWT) format.
* [RFC8628]: OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant
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- The Device Authorization Grant (formerly known as the Device
Flow) is an extension that enables devices with no browser or
limited input capability to obtain an access token. This is
commonly used by smart TV apps, or devices like hardware video
encoders that can stream video to a streaming video service.
* [RFC8414]: Authorization Server Metadata
- Authorization Server Metadata (also known as OAuth Discovery)
defines an endpoint clients can use to look up the information
needed to interact with a particular OAuth server, such as the
location of the authorization and token endpoints and the
supported grant types.
* [RFC8707]: Resource Indicators
- Provides a way for the client to explicitly signal to the
authorization server where it intends to use the access token
it is requesting.
* [RFC7591]: Dynamic Client Registration
- Dynamic Client Registration provides a mechanism for
programmatically registering clients with an authorization
server.
* [RFC9449]: Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP)
- DPoP describes a mechanism of binding tokens to the clients
they were issued to, and providing proof of that binding in an
HTTP header when making requests.
* [RFC8705]: Mutual TLS
- Mutual TLS describes a mechanism of binding tokens to the
clients they were issued to, as well as a client authentication
mechanism, via TLS certificate authentication.
* [RFC7662]: Token Introspection
- The Token Introspection extension defines a mechanism for
resource servers to obtain information about access tokens.
* [RFC7009]: Token Revocation
- The Token Revocation extension defines a mechanism for clients
to indicate to the authorization server that an access token is
no longer needed.
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* [RFC9126]: Pushed Authorization Requests
- The Pushed Authorization Requests extension describes a
technique of initiating an OAuth flow from the back channel,
providing better security and more flexibility for building
complex authorization requests.
* [RFC9207]: Authorization Server Issuer Identification
- The iss parameter in the authorization response indicates the
identity of the authorization server to prevent mix-up attacks
in the client.
* [RFC9396]: Rich Authorization Requests
- Rich Authorization Requests specifies a new parameter
authorization_details that is used to carry fine-grained
authorization data in the OAuth authorization request.
Appendix D. Acknowledgements
This specification is the work of the OAuth Working Group, and its
starting point was based on the contents of the following
specifications: OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework (RFC 6749), OAuth
2.0 for Native Apps (RFC 8252), OAuth Security Best Current Practice,
and OAuth 2.0 for Browser-Based Apps. The editors would like to
thank everyone involved in the creation of those specifications upon
which this is built.
The editors would also like to thank the following individuals for
their ideas, feedback, corrections, and wording that helped shape
this version of the specification: Vittorio Bertocci, Michael Jones,
Justin Richer, Daniel Fett, Brian Campbell, Joseph Heenan, Roberto
Polli, Andrii Deinega, Falko, Michael Peck, Bob Hamburg, Deng Chao,
and Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen.
Discussions around this specification have also occurred at the OAuth
Security Workshop in 2021 and 2022. The authors thank the organizers
of the workshop (Guido Schmitz, Steinar Noem, and Daniel Fett) for
hosting an event that's conducive to collaboration and community
input.
Appendix E. Document History
[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]
-10
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* Clarify that the client id is an opaque string
* Extensions may define additional error codes on a resource request
* Improved formatting for error field definitions
* Moved and expanded "scope" definition to introduction section
* Split access token section into structure and request
* Renamed b64token to token68 for consistency with RFC7235
* Restored content from old appendix B about application/x-www-form-
urlencoded
* Clarified that clients must not parse access tokens
* Expanded text around when redirect_uri parameter is required in
the authorization request
* Changed "permissions" to "privileges" in refresh token section for
consistency
* Consolidated authorization code flow security considerations
* Clarified authorization code reuse - an authorization code can
only obtain an access token once
-09
* AS MUST NOT support CORS requests at authorization endpoint
* more detail on asymmetric client authentication
* sync CSRF description from security BCP
* update and move sender-constrained access tokens section
* sync client impersonating resource owner with security BCP
* add reference to authorization request from redirect URI
registration section
* sync refresh rotation section from security BCP
* sync redirect URI matching text from security BCP
* updated references to RAR (RFC9396)
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* clarifications on URIs
* removed redirect_uri from the token request
* expanded security considerations around code_verifier
* revised introduction section
-08
* Updated acknowledgments
* Swap "by a trusted party" with "by an outside party" in client ID
definition
* Replaced "verify the identity of the resource owner" with
"authenticate"
* Clarified refresh token rotation to match RFC6819
* Added appendix to hold application/x-www-form-urlencoded examples
* Fixed references to entries in appendix
* Incorporated new "Phishing via AS" section from Security BCP
* Rephrase description of the motivation for client authentication
* Moved "scope" parameter in token request into specific grant types
to match OAuth 2.0
* Updated Clickjacking and Open Redirection description from the
latest version of the Security BCP
* Moved normative requirements out of authorization code security
considerations section
* Security considerations clarifications, and removed a duplicate
section
-07
* Removed "third party" from abstract
* Added MFA and passwordless as additional motiviations in
introduction
* Mention PAR as one way redirect URI registration can happen
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* Added a reference to requiring CORS headers on the token endpoint
* Updated reference to OMAP extension
* Fixed numbering in sequence diagram
-06
* Removed "credentialed client" term
* Simplified definition of "confidential" and "public" clients
* Incorporated the iss response parameter referencing RFC9207
* Added section on access token validation by the RS
* Removed requirement for authorization servers to support all 3
redirect methods for native apps
* Fixes for some references
* Updates HTTP references to RFC 9110
* Clarifies "authorization grant" term
* Clarifies client credential grant usage
* Clean up authorization code diagram
* Updated reference for application/x-www-form-urlencoded and
removed outdated note about it not being in the IANA registry
-05
* Added a section about the removal of the implicit flow
* Moved many normative requirements from security considerations
into the appropriate inline sections
* Reorganized and consolidated TLS language
* Require TLS on redirect URIs except for localhost/custom URL
scheme
* Updated refresh token guidance to match security BCP
-04
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* Added explicit mention of not sending access tokens in URI query
strings
* Clarifications on definition of client types
* Consolidated text around loopback vs localhost
* Editorial clarifications throughout the document
-03
* refactoring to collect all the grant types under the same top-
level header in section 4
* Better split normative and security consideration text into the
appropriate places, both moving text that was really security
considerations out of the main part of the document, as well as
pulling normative requirements from the security considerations
sections into the appropriate part of the main document
* Incorporated many of the published errata on RFC6749
* Updated references to various RFCs
* Editorial clarifications throughout the document
-02
-01
-00
* initial revision
Authors' Addresses
Dick Hardt
Hellō
Email: dick.hardt@gmail.com
Aaron Parecki
Okta
Email: aaron@parecki.com
URI: https://aaronparecki.com
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Torsten Lodderstedt
yes.com
Email: torsten@lodderstedt.net
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