Sender Authentication and the Surreptitious Forwarding Attack in CMS and S/MIME
draft-ietf-smime-sender-auth-00
Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(smime WG)
Expired & archived
|
|
---|---|---|---|
Author | Donald T. Davis | ||
Last updated | 2001-10-01 | ||
RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
Document shepherd | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
By default, a CMS signed-and-encrypted document or message authenticates only the document's originator, and not the person who encrypted the document. This subtle limitation exposes CMS and S/MIME signed-and-encrypted data to 'surreptitious forwarding.' Secure-messaging standards have treated surreptitious forwarding as an insoluble problem of user carelessness, and have long accepted the risk of this attack. This document discusses easy cryptographic remedies for this attack, suitable for incorporation into the CMS and S/MIME specifications. This document is an abridgement of [U2001].
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)