Identifying Security Implications in a Link-Layer Tunnelling Mechanism for Unidirectional Links
draft-ietf-udlr-security-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(udlr WG)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Emmanuel Duros | ||
| Last updated | 2001-11-08 | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | WG Document | |
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Many operators may deploy network infrastructures that use unidirectional links such as broadcast satellite links or digital TV links (...), which are capable of carrying IP traffic. In order to transparently integrate these links in their infrastructure, they may use a link-layer tunnelling mechanism such as defined in [RFC3077]. The purpose of this document is to attempt to identify any potential security implications related to this mechanism in order to help operators set up adequate securing mechanisms.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)