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October 16, 2017

Multi-homing Deployment Considerations for Distributed-Denial-of-Service
Open Threat Signaling (DOTS)
draft-boucadair-dots-multihoming-02

Abstract

This document discusses multi-homing considerations for Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS). The goal is to provide a set of guidance for DOTS clients/gateways when multihomed.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

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1. Introduction

In many deployments, it may not be possible for a network to determine the cause for a distributed Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack [RFC4732], but instead just realize that some resources seem to be under attack. To fill that gap, the IETF is specifying an architecture, called DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture], in which a DOTS client can inform a DOTS server that the network is under a potential attack and that appropriate mitigation actions are required. Indeed, because the lack of a common method to coordinate a real-time response among involved actors and network domains inhibits the effectiveness of DDoS attack mitigation, DOTS protocol is meant to carry requests for DDoS attack mitigation, thereby reducing the impact of an attack and

leading to more efficient defensive actions.

[I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases] identifies a set of scenarios for DOTS; almost all these scenarios involve a CPE.

The basic high-level DOTS architecture is illustrated in Figure 1 ([I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]):




Figure 1: Basic DOTS Architecture

[I-D.ietf-dots-architecture] specifies that the DOTS client may be provided with a list of DOTS servers; each associated with one or more IP addresses. These addresses may or may not be of the same address family. The DOTS client establishes one or more DOTS signaling sessions by connecting to the provided DOTS server(s) addresses.

DOTS may be deployed within networks that are connected to one single upstream provider. It can also be enabled within networks that are multi-homed. The reader may refer to [RFC3582] for an overview of multi-homing goals and motivations. This document discusses DOTS multi-homing considerations. Specifically, the document aims to:

1. Complete the base DOTS architecture with multi-homing specifics. Those specifics need to be taking into account because:
 - * Send a DOTS mitigation request to an arbitrary DOTS server won't help mitigating a DDoS attack.
 - * Blindly forking all DOTS mitigation requests among all available DOTS servers is suboptimal.
 - * Sequentially contacting DOTS servers may increase the delay before a mitigation plan is enforced.
2. Identify DOTS deployment schemes in a multi-homing context, where DOTS service can be offered by all or a subset of upstream providers.

3. Sketch guidelines and recommendations for placing DOTS requests in multi-homed networks, e.g.,:

- * Select the appropriate DOTS server(s).
- * Identify cases where anycast is not recommended.

To that aim, this document adopts the following methodology:

- o Identify and extract viable deployment candidates from [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases].
- o Augment the description with multi-homing technicalities, e.g.,
 - * One vs. multiple upstream network providers
 - * One vs. multiple interconnect routers
 - * Provider-Independent (PI) vs. Provider-Aggregatable (PA)
- o Describe the recommended behavior of DOTS clients and gateways for each case.

Multi-homed DOTS agents are assumed to make use of the protocols defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] and [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel]; no specific extension is required to the base DOTS protocols for deploying DOTS in a multihomed context.

2. Terminology

This document makes use of the terms defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture] and [RFC4116].

IP refers to both IPv4 and IPv6.

3. Multi-Homing Scenarios

This section briefly describes some multi-homing scenarios that are relevant to DOTS. In the following sub-sections, only the connections of border routers are shown; internal network topologies are not elaborated hereafter.

3.1. Residential CPE

The scenario shown in Figure 2 is characterized as follows:

- o The home network is connected to the Internet using one single CPE (Customer Premises Equipment).

- o The CPE is connected to multiple provisioning domains (i.e. both fixed and mobile networks). Provisioning domain (PvD) is explained in [RFC7556].
- o Each of these provisioning domains assign IP addresses/prefixes to the CPE. These addresses/prefixes are said to be Provider-Aggregatable (PA).
- o The CPE is provided by each of these provisioning domains with additional configuration information such as a list of DNS servers, DNS suffixes associated with the network, default gateway address, and DOTS server's name [I-D.boucadair-dots-server-discovery].
- o Because of ingress filtering, packets forwarded by the CPE to a given provisioning domain must be send with a source IP address that was assigned by that network [RFC8043].




Figure 2: Typical Multi-homed Residential CPE

3.2. Multi-homed Enterprise: Single CPE, Multiple Upstream ISPs

The scenario shown in Figure 3 is characterized as follows:

- o The enterprise network is connected to the Internet using one single router.
- o That router is connected to multiple provisioning domains (i.e. managed by distinct administrative entities).

Unlike the previous scenario, two sub-cases can be considered for an enterprise network with regards to assigned addresses:

1. Provider Independent (PI) addresses: The enterprise is the owner of the IP addresses/prefixes; the same address/prefix is then used for communication placed using any of the provisioning domains.
2. PA addresses/prefixes: each of provisioning domains assigns IP addresses/prefixes to the enterprise network.




Figure 3: Multi-homed Enterprise Network (Single CPE connected to Multiple Networks)

3.3. Multi-homed Enterprise: Multiple CPEs, Multiple Upstream ISPs

This scenario is similar to the one in Section 3.2; the main difference is that dedicated routers are used to connect to each provisioning domain.




Figure 4: Multi-homed Enterprise Network (Multiple CPEs, Multiple ISPs)

3.4. Multi-homed Enterprise with the Same ISP

This scenario is a variant of Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 in which multi-homing is provided by the same ISP (i.e., same provisioning domain).

4. DOTS Deployment Considerations

Table 1 provides some sample (non-exhaustive) deployment schemes to illustrate how DOTS agents may be deployed for each of the scenarios introduced in Section 3.

Scenario	DOTS client	DOTS gateway
Residential CPE	CPE	N/A
Single CPE, Multiple provisioning domains	internal hosts or CPE	CPE
Multiple CPEs, Multiple provisioning domains	internal hosts or all CPEs (rtr1 and rtr2)	CPEs (rtr1 and rtr2)
Multi-homed enterprise, Single provisioning domain	internal hosts or all CPEs (rtr1 and rtr2)	CPEs (rtr1 and rtr2)

Table 1: Sample Deployment Cases

These deployment schemes are further discussed in the following sub-sections.

4.1. Residential CPE

Figure 5 depicts DOTS signaling sessions that are required to be established between a DOTS client (C) and DOTS servers (S1, S2) in the context of the scenario described in Section 3.1.

The DOTS client MUST resolve the DOTS server's name provided by a provisioning domain ([I-D.boucadair-dots-server-discovery]) using the DNS servers learned from the same provisioning domain. The DOTS client MUST use the source address selection algorithm defined in [RFC6724] to select the candidate source addresses to contact each of these DOTS servers. DOTS signaling sessions must be established and maintained with each of the DOTS servers because the mitigation scope of these servers is restricted. The DOTS client SHOULD use the

certificate provisioned by a provisioning domain to authenticate itself to the DOTS server provided by the same provisioning domain. When conveying a mitigation request to protect the attack target(s), the DOTS client among the DOTS servers available MUST select a DOTS server whose network has assigned the prefixes from which target prefixes and target IP addresses are derived. For example, mitigation request to protect target resources bound to a PA IP address/prefix cannot be honored by an provisioning domain other than the one that owns those addresses/prefixes. Consequently, Typically, if a CPE detects a DDoS attack on all its network attachments, it must contact both DOTS servers for mitigation. Nevertheless, if the DDoS attack is received from one single network, then only the DOTS server of that network must be contacted.

The DOTS client MUST be able to associate a DOTS server with each provisioning domain. For example, if the DOTS client is provisioned with S1 using DHCP when attaching to a first network and with S2 using Protocol Configuration Option (PCO) when attaching to a second network, the DOTS client must record the interface from which a DOTS server was provisioned. DOTS signaling session to a given DOTS server must be established using the interface from which the DOTS server was provisioned.




Figure 5: DOTS associations for a multihomed residential CPE

4.2. Multi-homed Enterprise: Single CPE, Multiple Upstream ISPs

Figure 6 illustrates a first set of DOTS associations that can be established with a DOTS gateway is enabled in the context of the scenario described in Section 3.2. This deployment is characterized as follows:

- o One of more DOTS clients are enabled in hosts located in the internal network.

- o A DOTS gateway is enabled to aggregate/relay the requests to upstream DOTS servers.

When PA addresses/prefixes are in used, the same considerations discussed in Section 4.1 are to be followed by the DOTS gateway to contact its DOTS server(s). The DOTS gateways can be reachable from DOTS client using a unicast or anycast address.

Nevertheless, when PI addresses/prefixes are assigned, the DOTS gateway MUST sent the same request to all its DOTS servers.




Figure 6: Multiple DOTS Clients, Single DOTS Gateway, Multiple DOTS Servers

An alternate deployment model is depicted in Figure 7. This deployment assumes that:

- o One of more DOTS clients are enabled in hosts located in the internal network. These DOTS client may use [I-D.boucadair-dots-server-discovery] to discover its DOTS server(s).
- o These DOTS clients communicate directly with upstream DOTS servers.

If PI addresses/prefixes are in use, the DOTS client can send the mitigation request for all its PI addresses/prefixes to any one of the DOTS servers. The use of anycast addresses is NOT RECOMMENDED.

If PA addresses/prefixes are used, the same considerations discussed in Section 4.1 are to be followed by the DOTS clients. Because DOTS clients are not located on the CPE and multiple addresses/prefixes may not be assigned to the DOTS client (IPv4 context, typically), some complications arise to steer the traffic to the appropriate DOTS

server using the appropriate source IP address. These complications discussed in [RFC4116] are not specific to DOTS .




Figure 7: Multiple DOTS Clients, Multiple DOTS Servers

Another deployment approach is to enable many DOTS clients; each of them responsible to handle communication with a specific DOTS server (see Figure 8). Each DOTS client is provided with policies (e.g., prefix filter) that will trigger DOTS communications with the DOTS servers. The CPE MUST select the appropriate source IP address when forwarding DOTS messages received from an internal DOTS client. If anycast addresses are used to reach DOTS servers, the CPE may not be able to select the appropriate provisioning domain to which the mitigation request should be forwarded. As a consequence, the request may not be forwarded to the appropriate DOTS server.




Figure 8: Single Homed DOTS Clients

4.3. Multi-homed Enterprise: Multiple CPEs, Multiple Upstream ISPs

The deployments depicted in Figure 7 and Figure 8 apply also for the scenario described in Section 3.3. One specific problem for this scenario is to select the appropriate exit router when contacting a given DOTS server.

An alternative deployment scheme is shown in Figure 9:

- o DOTS clients are enabled in hosts located in the internal network.
- o A DOTS gateway is enabled in each CPE (rtr1, rtr2).

- o Each of these DOTS gateways communicate with the DOTS server of the provisioning domain.

When PI addresses/prefixes are used, DOTS clients can contact any of the DOTS gateways to send a DOTS message. DOTS gateway will then relay the request to the DOTS server. Note that the use of anycast addresses is NOT RECOMMENDED to establish DOTS signaling sessions between DOTS client and DOTS gateways.

When PA addresses/prefixes are used, but no filter rules are provided to DOTS clients, these later MUST contact all DOTS gateways simultaneously to send a DOTS message. Upon receipt of a request by a DOTS gateway, it MUST check whether the request is to be forwarded upstream or be rejected.

When PA addresses/prefixes are used, but specific filter rules are provided to DOTS clients using some means that are out of scope, these later MUST select the appropriate DOTS gateway to be contacted. The use of anycast is NOT RECOMMENDED to reach DOTS gateways.




Figure 9: Multiple DOTS Clients, Multiple DOTS Gateways, Multiple DOTS Servers

4.4. Multi-homed Enterprise: Single ISP

The key difference of the scenario described in Section 3.4 compared to the other scenarios is that multi-homing is provided by the same ISP. Concretely, that ISP can decide to provision the enterprise network with:

1. The same DOTS server for all network attachments.
2. Distinct DOTS servers for each network attachment. These DOTS servers need to coordinate when a mitigation action is received from the enterprise network.

In both cases, DOTS agents enabled within the enterprise network may decide to select one or all network attachments to place DOTS mitigation requests.

5. Security Considerations

DOTS-related security considerations are discussed in Section 4 of [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture].

TBD: In Home networks, if EST is used then how will the DOTS gateway (EST client) be provisioned with credentials for initial enrolment (see Section 2.2 in RFC 7030).

6. IANA Considerations

This document does not require any action from IANA.

7. Acknowledgements

Thanks to Roland Dobbins and Nik Teague for sharing their comments on the mailing list.

Thanks to Kirill Kasavchenko for the comments.

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


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


Figure 2: Typical Multi-homed Residential CPE

4.2. Multi-homed Enterprise: Single CPE, Multiple Upstream ISPs

The scenario shown in Figure 3 is characterized as follows:

- o The enterprise network is connected to the Internet using one single router.
- o That router is connected to multiple provisioning domains (i.e. managed by distinct administrative entities).

Unlike the previous scenario, two sub-cases can be considered for an enterprise network with regards to assigned addresses:

1. Provider Independent (PI) addresses: The enterprise is the owner of the IP addresses/prefixes; the same address/prefix is then used for communication placed using any of the provisioning domains.
2. PA addresses/prefixes: each of provisioning domains assigns IP addresses/prefixes to the enterprise network.




Figure 3: Multi-homed Enterprise Network (Single CPE connected to Multiple Networks)

4.3. Multi-homed Enterprise: Multiple CPEs, Multiple Upstream ISPs

This scenario is similar to the one in Section 4.2; the main difference is that dedicated routers are used to connect to each provisioning domain.




Figure 4: Multi-homed Enterprise Network (Multiple CPEs, Multiple ISPs)

4.4. Multi-homed Enterprise with the Same ISP

This scenario is a variant of Section 4.2 and Section 4.3 in which multi-homing is provided by the same ISP (i.e., same provisioning domain).

5. DOTS Deployment Considerations

Table 1 provides some sample (non-exhaustive) deployment schemes to illustrate how DOTS agents may be deployed for each of the scenarios introduced in Section 4.

Scenario	DOTS client	DOTS gateway
Residential CPE	CPE	N/A
Single CPE, Multiple provisioning domains	internal hosts or CPE	CPE
Multiple CPEs, Multiple provisioning domains	internal hosts or all CPEs (rtr1 and rtr2)	CPEs (rtr1 and rtr2)
Multi-homed enterprise, Single provisioning domain	internal hosts or all CPEs (rtr1 and rtr2)	CPEs (rtr1 and rtr2)

Table 1: Sample Deployment Cases

These deployment schemes are further discussed in the following sub-sections.

5.1. Residential CPE

Figure 5 depicts DOTS signaling sessions that are required to be established between a DOTS client (C) and DOTS servers (S1, S2) in the context of the scenario described in Section 4.1.

The DOTS client MUST resolve the DOTS server's name provided by a provisioning domain ([I-D.boucadair-dots-server-discovery]) using the DNS servers learned from the same provisioning domain. The DOTS client MUST use the source address selection algorithm defined in [RFC6724] to select the candidate source addresses to contact each of these DOTS servers. DOTS signaling sessions must be established and maintained with each of the DOTS servers because the mitigation scope of these servers is restricted. The DOTS client SHOULD use the

certificate provisioned by a provisioning domain to authenticate itself to the DOTS server provided by the same provisioning domain. When conveying a mitigation request to protect the attack target(s), the DOTS client among the DOTS servers available MUST select a DOTS server whose network has assigned the prefixes from which target prefixes and target IP addresses are derived. For example, mitigation request to protect target resources bound to a PA IP address/prefix cannot be honored by an provisioning domain other than the one that owns those addresses/prefixes. Consequently, Typically, if a CPE detects a DDoS attack on all its network attachments, it must contact both DOTS servers for mitigation. Nevertheless, if the DDoS attack is received from one single network, then only the DOTS server of that network must be contacted.

The DOTS client MUST be able to associate a DOTS server with each provisioning domain. For example, if the DOTS client is provisioned with S1 using DHCP when attaching to a first network and with S2 using Protocol Configuration Option (PCO) when attaching to a second network, the DOTS client must record the interface from which a DOTS server was provisioned. DOTS signaling session to a given DOTS server must be established using the interface from which the DOTS server was provisioned.




Figure 5: DOTS associations for a multihomed residential CPE

5.2. Multi-homed Enterprise: Single CPE, Multiple Upstream ISPs

Figure 6 illustrates a first set of DOTS associations that can be established with a DOTS gateway is enabled in the context of the scenario described in Section 4.2. This deployment is characterized as follows:

- o One of more DOTS clients are enabled in hosts located in the internal network.

- o A DOTS gateway is enabled to aggregate/relay the requests to upstream DOTS servers.

When PA addresses/prefixes are in used, the same considerations discussed in Section 5.1 are to be followed by the DOTS gateway to contact its DOTS server(s). The DOTS gateways can be reachable from DOTS client using a unicast or anycast address.

Nevertheless, when PI addresses/prefixes are assigned, the DOTS gateway MUST sent the same request to all its DOTS servers.




Figure 6: Multiple DOTS Clients, Single DOTS Gateway, Multiple DOTS Servers

An alternate deployment model is depicted in Figure 7. This deployment assumes that:

- o One of more DOTS clients are enabled in hosts located in the internal network. These DOTS client may use [I-D.boucadair-dots-server-discovery] to discover its DOTS server(s).
- o These DOTS clients communicate directly with upstream DOTS servers.

If PI addresses/prefixes are in use, the DOTS client can send the mitigation request for all its PI addresses/prefixes to any one of the DOTS servers. The use of anycast addresses is NOT RECOMMENDED.

If PA addresses/prefixes are used, the same considerations discussed in Section 5.1 are to be followed by the DOTS clients. Because DOTS clients are not located on the CPE and multiple addresses/prefixes may not be assigned to the DOTS client (IPv4 context, typically), some complications arise to steer the traffic to the appropriate DOTS

server using the appropriate source IP address. These complications discussed in [RFC4116] are not specific to DOTS .




Figure 7: Multiple DOTS Clients, Multiple DOTS Servers

Another deployment approach is to enable many DOTS clients; each of them responsible to handle communication with a specific DOTS server (see Figure 8). Each DOTS client is provided with policies (e.g., prefix filter) that will trigger DOTS communications with the DOTS servers. The CPE MUST select the appropriate source IP address when forwarding DOTS messages received from an internal DOTS client. If anycast addresses are used to reach DOTS servers, the CPE may not be able to select the appropriate provisioning domain to which the mitigation request should be forwarded. As a consequence, the request may not be forwarded to the appropriate DOTS server.




Figure 8: Single Homed DOTS Clients

5.3. Multi-homed Enterprise: Multiple CPEs, Multiple Upstream ISPs

The deployments depicted in Figure 7 and Figure 8 apply also for the scenario described in Section 4.3. One specific problem for this scenario is to select the appropriate exit router when contacting a given DOTS server.

An alternative deployment scheme is shown in Figure 9:

- o DOTS clients are enabled in hosts located in the internal network.
- o A DOTS gateway is enabled in each CPE (rtr1, rtr2).

- o Each of these DOTS gateways communicate with the DOTS server of the provisioning domain.

When PI addresses/prefixes are used, DOTS clients can contact any of the DOTS gateways to send a DOTS message. DOTS gateway will then relay the request to the DOTS server. Note that the use of anycast addresses is NOT RECOMMENDED to establish DOTS signaling sessions between DOTS client and DOTS gateways.

When PA addresses/prefixes are used, but no filter rules are provided to DOTS clients, these later MUST contact all DOTS gateways simultaneously to send a DOTS message. Upon receipt of a request by a DOTS gateway, it MUST check whether the request is to be forwarded upstream or be rejected.

When PA addresses/prefixes are used, but specific filter rules are provided to DOTS clients using some means that are out of scope, these later MUST select the appropriate DOTS gateway to be contacted. The use of anycast is NOT RECOMMENDED to reach DOTS gateways.




Figure 9: Multiple DOTS Clients, Multiple DOTS Gateways, Multiple DOTS Servers

5.4. Multi-homed Enterprise: Single ISP

The key difference of the scenario described in Section 4.4 compared to the other scenarios is that multi-homing is provided by the same ISP. Concretely, that ISP can decide to provision the enterprise network with:

1. The same DOTS server for all network attachments.
2. Distinct DOTS servers for each network attachment. These DOTS servers need to coordinate when a mitigation action is received from the enterprise network.

In both cases, DOTS agents enabled within the enterprise network may decide to select one or all network attachments to place DOTS mitigation requests.

6. Security Considerations

DOTS-related security considerations are discussed in Section 4 of [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture].

TBD: In Home networks, if EST is used then how will the DOTS gateway (EST client) be provisioned with credentials for initial enrolment (see Section 2.2 in RFC 7030).

7. IANA Considerations

This document does not require any action from IANA.

8. Acknowledgements

Thanks to Roland Dobbins and Nik Teague for sharing their comments on the mailing list.

Thanks to Kirill Kasavchenko for the comments.

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Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Server
Discovery
draft-boucadair-dots-server-discovery-03

Abstract

It may not be possible for a network to determine the cause for an attack, but instead just realize that some resources seem to be under attack. To fill that gap, Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) allows a network to inform a DOTS server that it is under a potential attack so that appropriate mitigation actions are undertaken.

This document specifies mechanisms to configure nodes with DOTS servers.

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1. Introduction

In many deployments, it may not be possible for a network to determine the cause for a distributed Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack [RFC4732], but instead just realize that some resources seem to be under attack. To fill that gap, the IETF is specifying an architecture, called DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture], in which a DOTS client can inform a DOTS server that the network is under a potential attack and that appropriate mitigation actions are required. Indeed, because the lack of a common method to coordinate a real-time response among involved actors and network domains inhibits the effectiveness of DDoS attack mitigation, DOTS protocol is meant to carry requests for DDoS attack mitigation, thereby reducing the impact of an attack and leading to more efficient defensive actions. [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases] identifies a set of scenarios for DOTS.

The basic high-level DOTS architecture is illustrated in Figure 1 ([I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]):




Figure 1: Basic DOTS Architecture

[I-D.ietf-dots-architecture] specifies that the DOTS client may be provided with a list of DOTS servers; each associated with one or more IP addresses. These addresses may or may not be of the same address family. The DOTS client establishes one or more DOTS sessions by connecting to the provided DOTS server addresses. The logic for connecting to one or multiple IP addresses is out of scope of this document.

This document specifies methods for DOTS clients to discover their DOTS server(s). The rationale for specifying multiple discovery mechanisms is discussed in Section 4.

Considerations for the selection of DOTS server(s) by multi-homed DOTS clients is out of scope; the reader should refer to [I-D.boucadair-dots-multihoming] for more details.

Likewise, happy eyeballs considerations for DOTS are out of scope. The reader should refer to Section 4 of [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].

2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

3. Terminology

This document makes use of the following terms:

- o DDoS: A distributed Denial-of-Service attack, in which traffic originating from multiple sources are directed at a target on a network. DDoS attacks are intended to cause a negative impact on the availability of servers, services, applications, and/or other functionality of an attack target.
- o DHCP refers to both DHCPv4 [RFC2131] and DHCPv6 [RFC3315].
- o DHCP client denotes a node that initiates requests to obtain configuration parameters from one or more DHCP servers.
- o DHCP server refers to a node that responds to requests from DHCP clients.
- o DOTS client: A DOTS-aware software module responsible for requesting attack response coordination with other DOTS-aware elements.
- o DOTS server: A DOTS-aware software module handling and responding to messages from DOTS clients. The DOTS server should enable mitigation on behalf of the DOTS client, if requested, by communicating the DOTS client's request to the mitigator and returning selected mitigator feedback to the requesting DOTS client. A DOTS server may also be a mitigator.
- o DOTS gateway: A DOTS-aware software module that is logically equivalent to a DOTS client back-to-back with a DOTS server.

Furthermore, the reader should be familiar with other terms defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture] and [RFC3958].

4. Why Multiple Discovery Mechanisms?

It is tempting to specify one single discovery mechanism for DOTS. Nevertheless, the analysis of the various use cases sketched in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases] reveals that it is unlikely that one single discovery method can be suitable for all the sample deployments (Table 1). Concretely:

- o Some of the use cases may allow DOTS clients to have direct communications with upstream DOTS servers; that is no DOTS gateway is involved. Leveraging on existing features that do not require specific feature on the node embedding the DOTS client may ease DOTS deployment. Typically, the use of Straightforward-Naming Authority Pointer (S-NAPTR) lookups [RFC3958] allows the DOTS server administrators provision the preferred DOTS signal channel transport protocol between the DOTS client and the DOTS server and allows the DOTS client to discover this preference.
- o Resolving a DOTS server domain name offered by the upstream transit provider provisioned to a DOTS client into IP address(es) require the use of the appropriate DNS resolvers; otherwise, resolving those names will fail. The use of protocols such as DHCP does allow to associate provisioned DOTS server domain names with a list of DNS servers to be used for name resolution.
- o The upstream network provider is not the DDoS mitigation provider for some of these use cases. The use of anycast is not appropriate for this use case, in particular. It is safe to assume that for such deployments, the DOTS server(s) domain name is provided during the service subscription (i.e., manual/local configuration).
- o Multiple DOTS clients may be enabled within a network (e.g., enterprise network). Automatic means to discover DOTS servers in a deterministic manner are interesting from an operational standpoint.
- o Some of the use cases may involve a DOTS gateway that is responsible for forking requests received from DOTS clients to upstream DOTS servers or for selecting the appropriate DOTS server. Particularly, the use of anycast may simplify the operations within the enterprise network to discover a DOTS gateway, if the enterprise network is single-homed.
- o Many use cases discussed in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases] do involve a CPE device. Multiple CPEs, connected to distinct network providers may even be considered. It is intuitive to leverage on existing mechanisms such as discovery using service resolution or

DHCP or anycast to provision the CPE acting as a DOTS client with the DOTS server(s).

Use Case	Requires a CPE	The Network Provider is also the DDoS Mitigation Provider
End-customer with single or multiple upstream transit provider(s) offering DDoS mitigation services	Yes (Intelligent DDoS mitigation system (IDMS) acting as a DOTS client may be co-located on the CPE)	Yes
End-customer with an overlay DDoS mitigation managed security service provider (MSSP)	Yes (DDoS Detector acting as a DOTS client may be co-located on the CPE)	No
End-customer operating an application or service with an integrated DOTS client	Yes (CPE may act as a DOTS gateway)	Yes/No
End-customer operating a CPE network infrastructure device with an integrated DOTS client	Yes (CPE acts as a DOTS client)	Yes
Suppression of outbound DDoS traffic originating from a consumer broadband access network	Yes (CPE acts as a DOTS server)	Yes
DDoS Orchestration	No	N/A

Table 1: Summary of DOTS Use Cases

Consequently, this document describes the following mechanisms for discovery:

- o A resolution mechanism based on straightforward Naming Authority Pointer (S-NAPTR) resource records in the Domain Name System (DNS).
- o DNS Service Discovery.
- o Discovery using DHCP Options.
- o A mechanism based on anycast address for DOTS usage.

5. Discovery Procedure

A key point in the deployment of DOTS is the ability of network operators to be able to configure DOTS clients with the correct server information consistently. To accomplish this, operators will need a consistent set of ways in which DOTS clients can discover this information, and a consistent priority among these options. If some devices prefer manual configuration over DNS discovery, while others prefer DNS discovery over manual configuration, the result will be a process of "whack-a-mole", where the operator must find devices that are using the wrong DOTS server, determine how to ensure the devices are configured properly, and then reconfigure the device through the preferred method.

All DOTS clients MUST support at least one of the four mechanisms below to determine a DOTS server list. All DOTS clients SHOULD implement all four, or as many as are practical for any specific device, of these ways to discover DOTS servers, in order to facilitate the deployment of DOTS in large scale environments:

1. Explicit configuration:

- * Local/Manual configuration: A DOTS client, will learn the DOTS server(s) by means of local or manual DOTS configuration (i.e., DOTS servers configured at the system level). Configuration discovered from a DOTS client application is considered as local configuration. An implementation may give the user an opportunity (e.g., by means of configuration file options or menu items) to specify DOTS server(s) for each address family. These MAY be specified either as IP addresses or the DNS name of a DOTS server. When only DOTS server' IP addresses are configured, a reference identifier must also be configured for authentication purposes.
- * Automatic configuration (e.g., DHCP, an automation system): The DOTS client attempts to discover DOTS server(s) names and/or addresses from DHCP, as described in Section 9.

2. Service Resolution : The DOTS client attempts to discover DOTS server name(s) using service resolution, as specified in Section 7.
3. DNS SD: DNS Service Discovery. The DOTS client attempts to discover DOTS server name(s) using DNS service discovery, as specified in Section 8.
4. Anycast : Send DOTS request to establish a DOTS session with the assigned DOTS server anycast address for each combination of interface and address family.

Some of these mechanisms imply the use of DNS to resolve the IP address of the DOTS server, while others imply the IP address of the relevant DOTS server is obtained directly. Implementation options may vary on a per device basis, as some devices may not have DNS capabilities and/or proper configuration.

Clients will prefer information received from the discovery methods in the order listed.

On hosts with more than one interface or address family (IPv4/v6), the DOTS server discovery procedure has to be performed for each combination of interface and address family. A client MAY choose to perform the discovery procedure only for a desired interface/address combination if the client does not wish to discover a DOTS server for all combinations of interface and address family.

The above procedure MUST also be followed by a DOTS gateway.

6. Resolution

Once the DOTS client has retrieved client's DNS domain or discovered the DOTS server name that needs to be resolved, an S-NAPTR lookup with 'DOTS' application service and the desired protocol tag is made to obtain information necessary to connect to the authoritative DOTS server within the given domain.

This specification defines "DOTS" as an application service tag (Section 12.3.1) and "signal.udp" (Section 12.3.2), "signal.tcp" (Section 12.3.3), and "data.tcp" (Section 12.3.4) as application protocol tags.

In the example below, for domain 'example.net', the resolution algorithm will result in IP address(es), port, tag and protocol tuples as follows:

```
example.net.
IN NAPTR 100 10 "" DOTS:signal.udp "" signal.example.net.
IN NAPTR 200 10 "" DOTS:signal.tcp "" signal.example.net.
IN NAPTR 300 10 "" DOTS:data.tcp "" data.example.net.

signal.example.net.
IN NAPTR 100 10 S DOTS:signal.udp "" _dots._signal._udp.example.net.
IN NAPTR 200 10 S DOTS:signal.tcp "" _dots._signal._tcp.example.net.

data.example.net.
IN NAPTR 100 10 S DOTS:data.tcp "" _dots._data._tcp.example.net.

_dots._signal._udp.example.net.
IN SRV 0 0 5000 a.example.net.

_dots._signal._tcp.example.net.
IN SRV 0 0 5001 a.example.net.

_dots._data._tcp.example.net.
IN SRV 0 0 5002 a.example.net.

a.example.net.
IN AAAA 2001:db8::1
```

Order	Protocol	IP address	Port	Tag
1	UDP	2001:db8::1	5000	Signal
2	TCP	2001:db8::1	5001	Signal
3	TCP	2001:db8::1	5002	Data

If no DOTS-specific S-NAPTR records can be retrieved, the discovery procedure fails for this domain name (and the corresponding interface and IP protocol version). If more domain names are known, the discovery procedure MAY perform the corresponding S-NAPTR lookups immediately. However, before retrying a lookup that has failed, a DOTS client MUST wait a time period that is appropriate for the encountered error (e.g., NXDOMAIN, timeout, etc.).

7. Discovery using Service Resolution

This mechanism is performed in two steps:

1. A DNS domain name is retrieved for each combination of interface and address family.
2. Retrieved DNS domain names are then used for S-NAPTR lookups. Further DNS lookups may be necessary to determine DOTS server IP address(es).

7.1. Retrieving Domain Name

A DOTS client has to determine the domain in which it is located. The following section describes the means to obtain the domain name from DHCP. Other means of retrieving domain names may be used, which are outside the scope of this document, e.g., local configuration.

Implementations MAY allow the user to specify a default name that is used, if no specific name has been configured.

7.1.1. DHCP

DHCP can be used to determine the domain name related to an interface's point of network attachment. Network operators may provide the domain name to be used for service discovery within an access network using DHCP. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of [RFC5986] define DHCP IPv4 and IPv6 access network domain name options, `OPTION_V4_ACCESS_DOMAIN` and `OPTION_V6_ACCESS_DOMAIN` respectively, to identify a domain name that is suitable for service discovery within the access network.

For IPv4, the discovery procedure MUST request the access network domain name option in a Parameter Request List option, as described in [RFC2131]. [RFC2132] defines the DHCP IPv4 domain name option; while this option is less suitable, a client MAY request for it if the access network domain name defined in [RFC5986] is not available.

For IPv6, the discovery procedure MUST request for the access network domain name option in an Options Request Option (ORO) within an Information-request message, as described in [RFC3315].

If neither option can be retrieved the procedure fails for this interface. If a result can be retrieved it will be used as an input for S-NAPTR resolution discussed in Section 6.

8. DNS Service Discovery

DNS-based Service Discovery (DNS-SD) [RFC6763] and Multicast DNS (mDNS) [RFC6762] provide generic solutions for discovering services. DNS-SD/mDNS define a set of naming rules for certain DNS record types that they use for advertising and discovering services.

8.1. DNS-SD

Section 4.1 of [RFC6763] specifies that a service instance name in DNS-SD has the following structure:

```
<Instance> . <Service> . <Domain>
```

The <Domain> portion specifies the DNS sub-domain where the service instance is registered. It may be "local.", indicating the mDNS local domain, or it may be a conventional domain name such as "example.com.".

The <Service> portion of the DOTS service instance name MUST be "_dots._signal._udp" or "_dots._signal._tcp" or "_dots._data._tcp".

8.2. mDNS

A DOTS client can proactively discover DOTS servers being advertised in the site by multicasting a PTR query to one or all of the following:

- o "_dots._signal._udp.local."
- o "_dots._signal._tcp.local."
- o "_dots._data._tcp.local."

A DOTS server can send out gratuitous multicast DNS answer packets whenever it starts up, wakes from sleep, or detects a change in network configuration. DOTS clients receive these gratuitous packets and cache information contained in it.

9. DHCP Options for DOTS

As reported in Section 1.7.2 of [RFC6125]:

"few certification authorities issue server certificates based on IP addresses, but preliminary evidence indicates that such certificates are a very small percentage (less than 1%) of issued certificates".

In order to allow for PKIX-based authentication between a DOTS client and server while accommodating for the current best practices for issuing certificates, this document allows for configuring names to DOTS clients. These names can be used for two purposes: to retrieve the list of IP addresses of a DOTS server or to be presented as a reference identifier for authentication purposes.

Defining the option to include a list of IP addresses would avoid a dependency on an underlying name resolution, but that design requires to also supply a name for PKIX-based authentication purposes.

9.1. DHCPv6 DOTS Options

9.1.1. Format of DOTS Reference Identifier Option

The DHCPv6 DOTS option is used to configure a name of the DOTS server. The format of this option is shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2: DHCPv6 DOTS Reference Identifier option

The fields of the option shown in Figure 2 are as follows:

- o Option-code: OPTION_V6_DOTS_RI (TBA1, see Section 12.1)
- o Option-length: Length of the dots-server-name field in octets.
- o dots-server-name: A fully qualified domain name of the DOTS server. This field is formatted as specified in Section 8 of [RFC3315].

An example of the dots-server-name encoding is shown in Figure 3. This example conveys the FQDN "dots.example.com."




Figure 3: An example of the dots-server-name encoding

9.1.2. Format Format of DOTS Address Option

The DHCPv6 DOTS option can be used to configure a list of IPv6 addresses of a DOTS server. The format of this option is shown in Figure 4.




Figure 4: DHCPv6 DOTS Address option

The fields of the option shown in Figure 4 are as follows:

- o Option-code: OPTION_V6_DOTS_ADDRESS (TBA2, see Section 12.1)
- o Option-length: Length of the 'DOTS ipv6-address(es)' field in octets. MUST be a multiple of 16.
- o DOTS ipv6-address: Includes one or more IPv6 addresses [RFC4291] of the DOTS server to be used by the DOTS client.

Note, IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (Section 2.5.5.2 of [RFC4291]) are allowed to be included in this option.

To return more than one DOTS servers to the requesting DHCPv6 client, the DHCPv6 server returns multiple instances of OPTION_V6_DOTS.

9.1.3. DHCPv6 Client Behavior

DHCP clients MAY request options OPTION_V6_DOTS_RI and OPTION_V6_DOTS_ADDRESS, as defined in [RFC3315], Sections 17.1.1, 18.1.1, 18.1.3, 18.1.4, 18.1.5, and 22.7. As a convenience to the reader, it is mentioned here that the DHCP client includes the requested option codes in the Option Request Option.

If the DHCP client receives more than one instance of `OPTION_V6_DOTS_RI` (resp. `OPTION_V6_DOTS_ADDRESS`) option, it MUST use only the first instance of that option.

If the DHCP client receives both `OPTION_V6_DOTS_RI` and `OPTION_V6_DOTS_ADDRESS`, the content of `OPTION_V6_DOTS_RI` is used as reference identifier for authentication purposes (e.g., PKIX [RFC6125]), while the addresses included in `OPTION_V6_DOTS_ADDRESS` are used to reach the DOTS server. In other words, the name conveyed in `OPTION_V6_DOTS_RI` MUST NOT be passed to underlying resolution library in the presence of `OPTION_V6_DOTS_ADDRESS` in a response.


If the DHCP client receives `OPTION_V6_DOTS_RI` only, but `OPTION_V6_DOTS_RI` option contains more than one name, as distinguished by the presence of multiple root labels, the DHCP client MUST use only the first name. Once the name is validated (Section 8 of [RFC3315]), the name is passed to a name resolution library. Moreover, that name is also used as a reference identifier for authentication purposes.

If the DHCP client receives `OPTION_V6_DOTS_ADDRESS` only, the address(es) included in `OPTION_V6_DOTS_ADDRESS` is used to reach the DOTS server. In addition, these addresses can be used as identifiers for authentication.

9.2. DHCPv4 DOTS Options

9.2.1. Format of DOTS Reference Identifier Option

The DHCPv4 DOTS option is used to configure a name of the DOTS server. The format of this option is illustrated in Figure 5.



The values `s1`, `s2`, `s3`, etc. represent the domain name labels in the domain name encoding.

Figure 5: DHCPv4 DOTS Reference Identifier option

The fields of the option shown in Figure 5 are as follows:

- o Code: `OPTION_V4_DOTS_RI` (TBA3, see Section 12.2);
- o Length: Includes the length of the "DOTS server name" field in octets; the maximum length is 255 octets.

- o DOTS server name: The domain name of the DOTS server. This field is formatted as specified in Section 8 of [RFC3315].

9.2.2. Format of DOTS Address Option

The DHCPv4 DOTS option can be used to configure a list of IPv4 addresses of a DOTS server. The format of this option is illustrated in Figure 6.





Figure 6: DHCPv4 DOTS Address option

The fields of the option shown in Figure 6 are as follows:

- o Code: OPTION_V4_DOTS_ADDRESS (TBA4, see Section 12.2);
- o Length: Length of all included data in octets. The minimum length is 5.
- o List-Length: Length of the "List of DOTS IPv4 Addresses" field in octets; MUST be a multiple of 4.
- o List of DOTS IPv4 Addresses: Contains one or more IPv4 addresses of the DOTS server to be used by the DOTS client. The format of this field is shown in Figure 7.
- o OPTION_V4_DOTS can include multiple lists of DOTS IPv4 addresses; each list is treated separately as it corresponds to a given DOTS server.

When several lists of DOTS IPv4 addresses are to be included, "List-Length" and "DOTS IPv4 Addresses" fields are repeated.



This format assumes that an IPv4 address is encoded as a1.a2.a3.a4.

Figure 7: Format of the List of DOTS IPv4 Addresses

OPTION_V4_DOTS is a concatenation-requiring option. As such, the mechanism specified in [RFC3396] MUST be used if OPTION_V4_DOTS exceeds the maximum DHCPv4 option size of 255 octets.

9.2.3. DHCPv4 Client Behavior

To discover a DOTS server, the DHCPv4 client MUST include both OPTION_V4_DOTS_RI and OPTION_V4_DOTS_ADDRESS in a Parameter Request List Option [RFC2132].

If the DHCP client receives more than one instance of OPTION_V4_DOTS_RI (resp. OPTION_V4_DOTS_ADDRESS) option, it MUST use only the first instance of that option.

If the DHCP client receives both OPTION_V4_DOTS_RI and OPTION_V4_DOTS_ADDRESS, the content of OPTION_V4_DOTS_RI is used as reference identifier for authentication purposes, while the addresses included in OPTION_V4_DOTS_ADDRESS are used to reach the DOTS server. In other words, the name conveyed in OPTION_V4_DOTS_RI MUST NOT be passed to underlying resolution library in the presence of OPTION_V4_DOTS_ADDRESS in a response.

If the DHCP client receives OPTION_V4_DOTS_RI only, but OPTION_V4_DOTS_RI option contains more than one name, as distinguished by the presence of multiple root labels, the DHCP client MUST use only the first name. Once the name is validated (Section 8 of [RFC3315]), the name is passed to a name resolution library. Moreover, that name is also used as a reference identifier for authentication purposes.

If the DHCP client receives OPTION_V4_DOTS_ADDRESS only, the address(es) included in OPTION_V4_DOTS_ADDRESS is used to reach the DOTS server. In addition, these addresses can be used as identifiers for authentication.

10. Anycast

IP anycast can also be used for DOTS service discovery. A packet sent to an anycast address is delivered to the 'topologically nearest' network interface with the anycast address.

When a DOTS client requires DOTS services, it attempts to establish a signaling session with the assigned anycast address(es) defined in Sections 12.4 and 12.5. A DOTS server, that receives a DOTS request with an anycast address, SHOULD redirect the DOTS client to the appropriate DOTS unicast server(s) using the mechanism described in Section 5.5 of [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel], unless it is configured otherwise. Indeed, a DOTS server SHOULD be configurable to maintain all DOTS communications using anycast. DOTS redirect is not made mandatory because the use of anycast is not problematic for some deployment scenarios such as an enterprise network deploying one single DOTS gateway connected to one single network provider.

[I-D.boucadair-dots-multihoming] identifies a set of deployment schemes in which the use of anycast is not recommended.

11. Security Considerations

DOTS-related security considerations are discussed in Section 4 of [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture] is to be considered. DOTS agents must authenticate each other using (D)TLS before a DOTS session is considered valid.

If the DOTS client is explicitly configured with DOTS server(s) then the DOTS client can also be explicitly configured with credentials to authenticate the DOTS server.

The CPE device acting as a DOTS client MAY use Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI) discussed in [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] to automatically bootstrap using the vendor installed X.509 certificate, in combination with a domain registrar provided by the upstream transit provider and vendor's authorizing service. The CPE device authenticates to the upstream transit provider using the vendor installed X.509 certificate and the upstream transit provider validates the vendor installed certificate on the CPE device using the Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA) service. If authentication is successful then the CPE device can request and get a voucher from the MASA service via the domain registrar. The voucher is signed by the MASA service and includes the upstream transit provider's trust anchor certificate. The CPE device validates the signed voucher using the manufacturer installed trust anchor associated with the vendor's selected MASA service and stores the upstream transit

provider's trust anchor certificate. The CPE device then uses Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) [RFC7030] for certificate enrollment (Section 3.8 in [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]). The DOTS client on the CPE device can authenticate to the DOTS server using the certificate provisioned by the EST server and the DOTS client can validate the DOTS server certificate using the upstream transit provider's trust anchor certificate it had received in the voucher.

11.1. DHCP

The security considerations in [RFC2131] and [RFC3315] are to be considered.

11.2. Service Resolution

The primary attack against the methods described in Section 7 is one that would lead to impersonation of a DOTS server. An attacker could attempt to compromise the S-NAPTR resolution. The use of mutual authentication makes it difficult to redirect a DOTS client to an illegitimate DOTS server.

11.3. DNS Service Discovery

Since DNS-SD is just a specification for how to name and use records in the existing DNS system, it has no specific additional security requirements over and above those that already apply to DNS queries and DNS updates. For DNS queries, DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [RFC4033] SHOULD be used where the authenticity of information is important. For DNS updates, secure updates [RFC2136][RFC3007] SHOULD generally be used to control which clients have permission to update DNS records.

For mDNS, in addition to what has been described above, a principal security threat is a security threat inherent to IP multicast routing and any application that runs on it. A rogue system can advertise that it is a DOTS server. Discovery of such rogue systems as DOTS servers, in itself, is not a security threat if the DOTS client authenticates the discovered DOTS servers.

11.4. Anycast

Anycast-related security considerations are discussed in [RFC4786] and [RFC7094].

12. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to allocate the SRV service name of "_dots._signal" for DOTS signal channel over UDP or TCP, and the service name of "_dots._data" for DOTS data channel over TCP.

12.1. DHCPv6 Option

IANA is requested to assign the following new DHCPv6 Option Code in the registry maintained in <http://www.iana.org/assignments/dhcpv6-parameters/>:

Option Name	Value
OPTION_V6_DOTS_RI	TBA1
OPTION_V6_DOTS_ADDRESS	TBA2

12.2. DHCPv4 Option

IANA is requested to assign the following new DHCPv4 Option Code in the registry maintained in <http://www.iana.org/assignments/bootp-dhcp-parameters/>:

Option Name	Value	Data length	Meaning
OPTION_V4_DOTS_RI	TBA3	Variable; the maximum length is 255 octets.	Includes the name of the DOTS server.
OPTION_V4_DOTS_ADDRESS	TBA4	Variable; the minimum length is 5.	Includes one or multiple lists of DOTS IP addresses; each list is treated as a separate DOTS server.

12.3. Application Service & Application Protocol Tags

This document requests IANA to make the following allocations from the registry available at: <https://www.iana.org/assignments/s-naptr-parameters/s-naptr-parameters.xhtml>.

12.3.1. DOTS Application Service Tag Registration

- o Application Protocol Tag: DOTS
- o Intended Usage: See Section 6
- o Security Considerations: See Section 11

- o Contact Information: <one of the authors>

12.3.2. signal.udp Application Protocol Tag Registration

- o Application Protocol Tag: signal.udp
- o Intended Usage: See Section 6
- o Security Considerations: See Section 11
- o Contact Information: <one of the authors>

12.3.3. signal.tcp Application Protocol Tag Registration

- o Application Protocol Tag: signal.tcp
- o Intended Usage: See Section 6
- o Security Considerations: See Section 11
- o Contact Information: <one of the authors>

12.3.4. data.tcp Application Protocol Tag Registration

- o Application Protocol Tag: data.tcp
- o Intended Usage: See Section 6
- o Security Considerations: See Section 11
- o Contact Information: <one of the authors>

12.4. IPv4 Anycast

IANA has assigned a single IPv4 address from the 192.0.0.0/24 prefix and registered it in the "IANA IPv4 Special-Purpose Address Registry" [RFC6890].

Attribute	Value
Address Block Name	TBA Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Anycast
RFC	<this document>
Allocation Date	<date of approval of this document>
Termination Date	N/A
Source	True
Destination	True
Forwardable	True
Global	True
Reserved-by-Protocol	False

12.5. IPv6 Anycast

IANA has assigned a single IPv6 address from the 2001:0000::/23 prefix and registered it in the "IANA IPv6 Special-Purpose Address Registry" [RFC6890].

Attribute	Value
Address Block Name	TBA Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Anycast
RFC	<this document>
Allocation Date	<date of approval of this document>
Termination Date	N/A
Source	True
Destination	True
Forwardable	True
Global	True
Reserved-by-Protocol	False

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Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Server
Discovery
draft-boucadair-dots-server-discovery-05

Abstract

It may not be possible for a network to determine the cause for an attack, but instead just realize that some resources seem to be under attack. To fill that gap, Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) allows a network to inform a DOTS server that it is under a potential attack so that appropriate mitigation actions are undertaken.

This document specifies mechanisms to configure nodes with DOTS servers.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

In many deployments, it may not be possible for a network to determine the cause for a distributed Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack [RFC4732], but instead just realize that some resources seem to be under attack. To fill that gap, the IETF is specifying an architecture, called DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture], in which a DOTS client can inform a DOTS server that the network is under a potential attack and that appropriate mitigation actions are required. Indeed, because the lack of a common method to coordinate a real-time response among involved actors and network domains inhibits the effectiveness of DDoS attack mitigation, DOTS protocol is meant to carry requests for DDoS attack mitigation, thereby reducing the impact of an attack and leading to more efficient defensive actions. [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases] identifies a set of scenarios for DOTS.

The basic high-level DOTS architecture is illustrated in Figure 1 ([I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]):




Figure 1: Basic DOTS Architecture

[I-D.ietf-dots-architecture] specifies that the DOTS client may be provided with a list of DOTS servers; each associated with one or more IP addresses. These addresses may or may not be of the same address family. The DOTS client establishes one or more DOTS sessions by connecting to the provided DOTS server addresses. The logic for connecting to one or multiple IP addresses is out of scope of this document.

This document specifies methods for DOTS clients to discover their DOTS server(s). The rationale for specifying multiple discovery mechanisms is discussed in Section 4.

Considerations for the selection of DOTS server(s) by multi-homed DOTS clients is out of scope; the reader should refer to [I-D.boucadair-dots-multihoming] for more details.

Likewise, happy eyeballs considerations for DOTS are out of scope. The reader should refer to Section 4 of [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].

2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

3. Terminology

This document makes use of the following terms:

- o DDoS: A distributed Denial-of-Service attack, in which traffic originating from multiple sources are directed at a target on a network. DDoS attacks are intended to cause a negative impact on the availability of servers, services, applications, and/or other functionality of an attack target.
- o DHCP refers to both DHCPv4 [RFC2131] and DHCPv6 [RFC3315].
- o DHCP client denotes a node that initiates requests to obtain configuration parameters from one or more DHCP servers.
- o DHCP server refers to a node that responds to requests from DHCP clients.
- o DOTS client: A DOTS-aware software module responsible for requesting attack response coordination with other DOTS-aware elements.
- o DOTS server: A DOTS-aware software module handling and responding to messages from DOTS clients. The DOTS server should enable mitigation on behalf of the DOTS client, if requested, by communicating the DOTS client's request to the mitigator and returning selected mitigator feedback to the requesting DOTS client. A DOTS server may also be a mitigator.
- o DOTS gateway: A DOTS-aware software module that is logically equivalent to a DOTS client back-to-back with a DOTS server.

Furthermore, the reader should be familiar with other terms defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture] and [RFC3958].

4. Why Multiple Discovery Mechanisms?

It is tempting to specify one single discovery mechanism for DOTS. Nevertheless, the analysis of the various use cases sketched in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases] reveals that it is unlikely that one single discovery method can be suitable for all the sample deployments (Table 1). Concretely:

- o Some of the use cases may allow DOTS clients to have direct communications with upstream DOTS servers; that is no DOTS gateway is involved. Leveraging on existing features that do not require specific feature on the node embedding the DOTS client may ease DOTS deployment. Typically, the use of Straightforward-Naming Authority Pointer (S-NAPTR) lookups [RFC3958] allows the DOTS server administrators provision the preferred DOTS signal channel transport protocol between the DOTS client and the DOTS server and allows the DOTS client to discover this preference.
- o Resolving a DOTS server domain name offered by the upstream transit provider provisioned to a DOTS client into IP address(es) require the use of the appropriate DNS resolvers; otherwise, resolving those names will fail. The use of protocols such as DHCP does allow to associate provisioned DOTS server domain names with a list of DNS servers to be used for name resolution.
- o The upstream network provider is not the DDoS mitigation provider for some of these use cases. The use of anycast is not appropriate for this use case, in particular. It is safe to assume that for such deployments, the DOTS server(s) domain name is provided during the service subscription (i.e., manual/local configuration).
- o Multiple DOTS clients may be enabled within a network (e.g., enterprise network). Automatic means to discover DOTS servers in a deterministic manner are interesting from an operational standpoint.
- o Some of the use cases may involve a DOTS gateway that is responsible for forking requests received from DOTS clients to upstream DOTS servers or for selecting the appropriate DOTS server. Particularly, the use of anycast may simplify the operations within the enterprise network to discover a DOTS gateway, if the enterprise network is single-homed.
- o Many use cases discussed in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases] do involve a CPE device. Multiple CPEs, connected to distinct network providers may even be considered. It is intuitive to leverage on existing mechanisms such as discovery using service resolution or

DHCP or anycast to provision the CPE acting as a DOTS client with the DOTS server(s).

Use Case	Requires a CPE	The Network Provider is also the DDoS Mitigation Provider
End-customer with single or multiple upstream transit provider(s) offering DDoS mitigation services	Yes (Intelligent DDoS mitigation system (IDMS) acting as a DOTS client may be co-located on the CPE)	Yes
End-customer with an overlay DDoS mitigation managed security service provider (MSSP)	Yes (DDoS Detector acting as a DOTS client may be co-located on the CPE)	No
End-customer operating an application or service with an integrated DOTS client	Yes (CPE may act as a DOTS gateway)	Yes/No
End-customer operating a CPE network infrastructure device with an integrated DOTS client	Yes (CPE acts as a DOTS client)	Yes
Suppression of outbound DDoS traffic originating from a consumer broadband access network	Yes (CPE acts as a DOTS server)	Yes
DDoS Orchestration	No	N/A

Table 1: Summary of DOTS Use Cases

Consequently, this document describes the following mechanisms for discovery:

- o A resolution mechanism based on straightforward Naming Authority Pointer (S-NAPTR) resource records in the Domain Name System (DNS).
- o DNS Service Discovery.
- o Discovery using DHCP Options.
- o A mechanism based on anycast address for DOTS usage.

5. Discovery Procedure

A key point in the deployment of DOTS is the ability of network operators to be able to configure DOTS clients with the correct server information consistently. To accomplish this, operators will need a consistent set of ways in which DOTS clients can discover this information, and a consistent priority among these options. If some devices prefer manual configuration over DNS discovery, while others prefer DNS discovery over manual configuration, the result will be a process of "whack-a-mole", where the operator must find devices that are using the wrong DOTS server, determine how to ensure the devices are configured properly, and then reconfigure the device through the preferred method.

All DOTS clients MUST support at least one of the four mechanisms below to determine a DOTS server list. All DOTS clients SHOULD implement all four, or as many as are practical for any specific device, of these ways to discover DOTS servers, in order to facilitate the deployment of DOTS in large scale environments:

1. Explicit configuration:

- * Local/Manual configuration: A DOTS client, will learn the DOTS server(s) by means of local or manual DOTS configuration (i.e., DOTS servers configured at the system level). Configuration discovered from a DOTS client application is considered as local configuration. An implementation may give the user an opportunity (e.g., by means of configuration file options or menu items) to specify DOTS server(s) for each address family. These MAY be specified either as IP addresses or the DNS name of a DOTS server. When only DOTS server' IP addresses are configured, a reference identifier must also be configured for authentication purposes.
- * Automatic configuration (e.g., DHCP, an automation system): The DOTS client attempts to discover DOTS server(s) names and/or addresses from DHCP, as described in Section 9.

2. Service Resolution : The DOTS client attempts to discover DOTS server name(s) using service resolution, as specified in Section 7.
3. DNS SD: DNS Service Discovery. The DOTS client attempts to discover DOTS server name(s) using DNS service discovery, as specified in Section 8.
4. Anycast : Send DOTS request to establish a DOTS session with the assigned DOTS server anycast address for each combination of interface and address family.

Some of these mechanisms imply the use of DNS to resolve the IP address of the DOTS server, while others imply the IP address of the relevant DOTS server is obtained directly. Implementation options may vary on a per device basis, as some devices may not have DNS capabilities and/or proper configuration.

Clients will prefer information received from the discovery methods in the order listed.

On hosts with more than one interface or address family (IPv4/v6), the DOTS server discovery procedure has to be performed for each combination of interface and address family. A client MAY choose to perform the discovery procedure only for a desired interface/address combination if the client does not wish to discover a DOTS server for all combinations of interface and address family.

The above procedure MUST also be followed by a DOTS gateway.

6. Resolution

Once the DOTS client has retrieved client's DNS domain or discovered the DOTS server name that needs to be resolved, an S-NAPTR lookup with 'DOTS' application service and the desired protocol tag is made to obtain information necessary to connect to the authoritative DOTS server within the given domain.

This specification defines "DOTS" as an application service tag (Section 12.3.1) and "signal.udp" (Section 12.3.2), "signal.tcp" (Section 12.3.3), and "data.tcp" (Section 12.3.4) as application protocol tags.

In the example below, for domain 'example.net', the resolution algorithm will result in IP address(es), port, tag and protocol tuples as follows:

```
example.net.
IN NAPTR 100 10 "" DOTS:signal.udp "" signal.example.net.
IN NAPTR 200 10 "" DOTS:signal.tcp "" signal.example.net.
IN NAPTR 300 10 "" DOTS:data.tcp "" data.example.net.

signal.example.net.
IN NAPTR 100 10 S DOTS:signal.udp "" _dots._signal._udp.example.net.
IN NAPTR 200 10 S DOTS:signal.tcp "" _dots._signal._tcp.example.net.

data.example.net.
IN NAPTR 100 10 S DOTS:data.tcp "" _dots._data._tcp.example.net.

_dots._signal._udp.example.net.
IN SRV 0 0 5000 a.example.net.

_dots._signal._tcp.example.net.
IN SRV 0 0 5001 a.example.net.

_dots._data._tcp.example.net.
IN SRV 0 0 5002 a.example.net.

a.example.net.
IN AAAA 2001:db8::1
```

Order	Protocol	IP address	Port	Tag
1	UDP	2001:db8::1	5000	Signal
2	TCP	2001:db8::1	5001	Signal
3	TCP	2001:db8::1	5002	Data

If no DOTS-specific S-NAPTR records can be retrieved, the discovery procedure fails for this domain name (and the corresponding interface and IP protocol version). If more domain names are known, the discovery procedure MAY perform the corresponding S-NAPTR lookups immediately. However, before retrying a lookup that has failed, a DOTS client MUST wait a time period that is appropriate for the encountered error (e.g., NXDOMAIN, timeout, etc.).

7. Discovery using Service Resolution

This mechanism is performed in two steps:

1. A DNS domain name is retrieved for each combination of interface and address family.
2. Retrieved DNS domain names are then used for S-NAPTR lookups. Further DNS lookups may be necessary to determine DOTS server IP address(es).

7.1. Retrieving Domain Name

A DOTS client has to determine the domain in which it is located. The following section describes the means to obtain the domain name from DHCP. Other means of retrieving domain names may be used, which are outside the scope of this document, e.g., local configuration.

Implementations MAY allow the user to specify a default name that is used, if no specific name has been configured.

7.1.1. DHCP

DHCP can be used to determine the domain name related to an interface's point of network attachment. Network operators may provide the domain name to be used for service discovery within an access network using DHCP. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of [RFC5986] define DHCP IPv4 and IPv6 access network domain name options, `OPTION_V4_ACCESS_DOMAIN` and `OPTION_V6_ACCESS_DOMAIN` respectively, to identify a domain name that is suitable for service discovery within the access network.

For IPv4, the discovery procedure MUST request the access network domain name option in a Parameter Request List option, as described in [RFC2131]. [RFC2132] defines the DHCP IPv4 domain name option; while this option is less suitable, a client MAY request for it if the access network domain name defined in [RFC5986] is not available.

For IPv6, the discovery procedure MUST request for the access network domain name option in an Options Request Option (ORO) within an Information-request message, as described in [RFC3315].

If neither option can be retrieved the procedure fails for this interface. If a result can be retrieved it will be used as an input for S-NAPTR resolution discussed in Section 6.

8. DNS Service Discovery

DNS-based Service Discovery (DNS-SD) [RFC6763] and Multicast DNS (mDNS) [RFC6762] provide generic solutions for discovering services. DNS-SD/mDNS define a set of naming rules for certain DNS record types that they use for advertising and discovering services.

8.1. DNS-SD

Section 4.1 of [RFC6763] specifies that a service instance name in DNS-SD has the following structure:

```
<Instance> . <Service> . <Domain>
```

The <Domain> portion specifies the DNS sub-domain where the service instance is registered. It may be "local.", indicating the mDNS local domain, or it may be a conventional domain name such as "example.com."

The <Service> portion of the DOTS service instance name MUST be "_dots._signal._udp" or "_dots._signal._tcp" or "_dots._data._tcp".

8.2. mDNS

A DOTS client can proactively discover DOTS servers being advertised in the site by multicasting a PTR query to one or all of the following:

- o "_dots._signal._udp.local."
- o "_dots._signal._tcp.local."
- o "_dots._data._tcp.local."

A DOTS server can send out gratuitous multicast DNS answer packets whenever it starts up, wakes from sleep, or detects a change in network configuration. DOTS clients receive these gratuitous packets and cache information contained in it.

9. DHCP Options for DOTS

As reported in Section 1.7.2 of [RFC6125]:

"few certification authorities issue server certificates based on IP addresses, but preliminary evidence indicates that such certificates are a very small percentage (less than 1%) of issued certificates".

In order to allow for PKIX-based authentication between a DOTS client and server while accommodating for the current best practices for issuing certificates, this document allows for configuring names to DOTS clients. These names can be used for two purposes: to retrieve the list of IP addresses of a DOTS server or to be presented as a reference identifier for authentication purposes.

Defining the option to include a list of IP addresses would avoid a dependency on an underlying name resolution, but that design requires to also supply a name for PKIX-based authentication purposes.

9.1. DHCPv6 DOTS Options

9.1.1. Format of DOTS Reference Identifier Option

The DHCPv6 DOTS option is used to configure a name of the DOTS server. The format of this option is shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2: DHCPv6 DOTS Reference Identifier option

The fields of the option shown in Figure 2 are as follows:

- o Option-code: OPTION_V6_DOTS_RI (TBA1, see Section 12.1)
- o Option-length: Length of the dots-server-name field in octets.
- o dots-server-name: A fully qualified domain name of the DOTS server. This field is formatted as specified in Section 8 of [RFC3315].

An example of the dots-server-name encoding is shown in Figure 3. This example conveys the FQDN "dots.example.com."




Figure 3: An example of the dots-server-name encoding

9.1.2. Format Format of DOTS Address Option

The DHCPv6 DOTS option can be used to configure a list of IPv6 addresses of a DOTS server. The format of this option is shown in Figure 4.




Figure 4: DHCPv6 DOTS Address option

The fields of the option shown in Figure 4 are as follows:

- o Option-code: OPTION_V6_DOTS_ADDRESS (TBA2, see Section 12.1)
- o Option-length: Length of the 'DOTS ipv6-address(es)' field in octets. MUST be a multiple of 16.
- o DOTS ipv6-address: Includes one or more IPv6 addresses [RFC4291] of the DOTS server to be used by the DOTS client.

Note, IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (Section 2.5.5.2 of [RFC4291]) are allowed to be included in this option.

To return more than one DOTS servers to the requesting DHCPv6 client, the DHCPv6 server returns multiple instances of OPTION_V6_DOTS.

9.1.3. DHCPv6 Client Behavior

DHCP clients MAY request options OPTION_V6_DOTS_RI and OPTION_V6_DOTS_ADDRESS, as defined in [RFC3315], Sections 17.1.1, 18.1.1, 18.1.3, 18.1.4, 18.1.5, and 22.7. As a convenience to the reader, it is mentioned here that the DHCP client includes the requested option codes in the Option Request Option.

If the DHCP client receives more than one instance of `OPTION_V6_DOTS_RI` (resp. `OPTION_V6_DOTS_ADDRESS`) option, it MUST use only the first instance of that option.

If the DHCP client receives both `OPTION_V6_DOTS_RI` and `OPTION_V6_DOTS_ADDRESS`, the content of `OPTION_V6_DOTS_RI` is used as reference identifier for authentication purposes (e.g., PKIX [RFC6125]), while the addresses included in `OPTION_V6_DOTS_ADDRESS` are used to reach the DOTS server. In other words, the name conveyed in `OPTION_V6_DOTS_RI` MUST NOT be passed to underlying resolution library in the presence of `OPTION_V6_DOTS_ADDRESS` in a response.


If the DHCP client receives `OPTION_V6_DOTS_RI` only, but `OPTION_V6_DOTS_RI` option contains more than one name, as distinguished by the presence of multiple root labels, the DHCP client MUST use only the first name. Once the name is validated (Section 8 of [RFC3315]), the name is passed to a name resolution library. Moreover, that name is also used as a reference identifier for authentication purposes.

If the DHCP client receives `OPTION_V6_DOTS_ADDRESS` only, the address(es) included in `OPTION_V6_DOTS_ADDRESS` is used to reach the DOTS server. In addition, these addresses can be used as identifiers for authentication.

9.2. DHCPv4 DOTS Options

9.2.1. Format of DOTS Reference Identifier Option

The DHCPv4 DOTS option is used to configure a name of the DOTS server. The format of this option is illustrated in Figure 5.



The values `s1`, `s2`, `s3`, etc. represent the domain name labels in the domain name encoding.

Figure 5: DHCPv4 DOTS Reference Identifier option

The fields of the option shown in Figure 5 are as follows:

- o Code: `OPTION_V4_DOTS_RI` (TBA3, see Section 12.2);
- o Length: Includes the length of the "DOTS server name" field in octets; the maximum length is 255 octets.

- o DOTS server name: The domain name of the DOTS server. This field is formatted as specified in Section 8 of [RFC3315].

9.2.2. Format of DOTS Address Option

The DHCPv4 DOTS option can be used to configure a list of IPv4 addresses of a DOTS server. The format of this option is illustrated in Figure 6.





Figure 6: DHCPv4 DOTS Address option

The fields of the option shown in Figure 6 are as follows:

- o Code: OPTION_V4_DOTS_ADDRESS (TBA4, see Section 12.2);
- o Length: Length of all included data in octets. The minimum length is 5.
- o List-Length: Length of the "List of DOTS IPv4 Addresses" field in octets; MUST be a multiple of 4.
- o List of DOTS IPv4 Addresses: Contains one or more IPv4 addresses of the DOTS server to be used by the DOTS client. The format of this field is shown in Figure 7.
- o OPTION_V4_DOTS can include multiple lists of DOTS IPv4 addresses; each list is treated separately as it corresponds to a given DOTS server.

When several lists of DOTS IPv4 addresses are to be included, "List-Length" and "DOTS IPv4 Addresses" fields are repeated.



This format assumes that an IPv4 address is encoded as a1.a2.a3.a4.

Figure 7: Format of the List of DOTS IPv4 Addresses

OPTION_V4_DOTS is a concatenation-requiring option. As such, the mechanism specified in [RFC3396] MUST be used if OPTION_V4_DOTS exceeds the maximum DHCPv4 option size of 255 octets.

9.2.3. DHCPv4 Client Behavior

To discover a DOTS server, the DHCPv4 client MUST include both OPTION_V4_DOTS_RI and OPTION_V4_DOTS_ADDRESS in a Parameter Request List Option [RFC2132].

If the DHCP client receives more than one instance of OPTION_V4_DOTS_RI (resp. OPTION_V4_DOTS_ADDRESS) option, it MUST use only the first instance of that option.

If the DHCP client receives both OPTION_V4_DOTS_RI and OPTION_V4_DOTS_ADDRESS, the content of OPTION_V4_DOTS_RI is used as reference identifier for authentication purposes, while the addresses included in OPTION_V4_DOTS_ADDRESS are used to reach the DOTS server. In other words, the name conveyed in OPTION_V4_DOTS_RI MUST NOT be passed to underlying resolution library in the presence of OPTION_V4_DOTS_ADDRESS in a response.

If the DHCP client receives OPTION_V4_DOTS_RI only, but OPTION_V4_DOTS_RI option contains more than one name, as distinguished by the presence of multiple root labels, the DHCP client MUST use only the first name. Once the name is validated (Section 8 of [RFC3315]), the name is passed to a name resolution library. Moreover, that name is also used as a reference identifier for authentication purposes.

If the DHCP client receives OPTION_V4_DOTS_ADDRESS only, the address(es) included in OPTION_V4_DOTS_ADDRESS is used to reach the DOTS server. In addition, these addresses can be used as identifiers for authentication.

10. Anycast

IP anycast can also be used for DOTS service discovery. A packet sent to an anycast address is delivered to the 'topologically nearest' network interface with the anycast address.

When a DOTS client requires DOTS services, it attempts to establish a signaling session with the assigned anycast address(es) defined in Sections 12.4 and 12.5. A DOTS server, that receives a DOTS request with an anycast address, SHOULD redirect the DOTS client to the appropriate DOTS unicast server(s) using the mechanism described in Section 5.5 of [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel], unless it is configured otherwise. Indeed, a DOTS server SHOULD be configurable to maintain all DOTS communications using anycast. DOTS redirect is not made mandatory because the use of anycast is not problematic for some deployment scenarios such as an enterprise network deploying one single DOTS gateway connected to one single network provider.

[I-D.boucadair-dots-multihoming] identifies a set of deployment schemes in which the use of anycast is not recommended.

11. Security Considerations

DOTS-related security considerations are discussed in Section 4 of [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture] is to be considered. DOTS agents must authenticate each other using (D)TLS before a DOTS session is considered valid.

If the DOTS client is explicitly configured with DOTS server(s) then the DOTS client can also be explicitly configured with credentials to authenticate the DOTS server.

The CPE device acting as a DOTS client MAY use Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI) discussed in [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] to automatically bootstrap using the vendor installed X.509 certificate, in combination with a domain registrar provided by the upstream transit provider and vendor's authorizing service. The CPE device authenticates to the upstream transit provider using the vendor installed X.509 certificate and the upstream transit provider validates the vendor installed certificate on the CPE device using the Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA) service. If authentication is successful then the CPE device can request and get a voucher from the MASA service via the domain registrar. The voucher is signed by the MASA service and includes the upstream transit provider's trust anchor certificate. The CPE device validates the signed voucher using the manufacturer installed trust anchor associated with the vendor's selected MASA service and stores the upstream transit

provider's trust anchor certificate. The CPE device then uses Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) [RFC7030] for certificate enrollment (Section 3.8 in [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]). The DOTS client on the CPE device can authenticate to the DOTS server using the certificate provisioned by the EST server and the DOTS client can validate the DOTS server certificate using the upstream transit provider's trust anchor certificate it had received in the voucher.

11.1. DHCP

The security considerations in [RFC2131] and [RFC3315] are to be considered.

11.2. Service Resolution

The primary attack against the methods described in Section 7 is one that would lead to impersonation of a DOTS server. An attacker could attempt to compromise the S-NAPTR resolution. The use of mutual authentication makes it difficult to redirect a DOTS client to an illegitimate DOTS server.

11.3. DNS Service Discovery

Since DNS-SD is just a specification for how to name and use records in the existing DNS system, it has no specific additional security requirements over and above those that already apply to DNS queries and DNS updates. For DNS queries, DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [RFC4033] SHOULD be used where the authenticity of information is important. For DNS updates, secure updates [RFC2136][RFC3007] SHOULD generally be used to control which clients have permission to update DNS records.

For mDNS, in addition to what has been described above, a principal security threat is a security threat inherent to IP multicast routing and any application that runs on it. A rogue system can advertise that it is a DOTS server. Discovery of such rogue systems as DOTS servers, in itself, is not a security threat if the DOTS client authenticates the discovered DOTS servers.

11.4. Anycast

Anycast-related security considerations are discussed in [RFC4786] and [RFC7094].

12. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to allocate the SRV service name of "_dots._signal" for DOTS signal channel over UDP or TCP, and the service name of "_dots._data" for DOTS data channel over TCP.

12.1. DHCPv6 Option

IANA is requested to assign the following new DHCPv6 Option Code in the registry maintained in <http://www.iana.org/assignments/dhcpv6-parameters/>:

Option Name	Value
OPTION_V6_DOTS_RI	TBA1
OPTION_V6_DOTS_ADDRESS	TBA2

12.2. DHCPv4 Option

IANA is requested to assign the following new DHCPv4 Option Code in the registry maintained in <http://www.iana.org/assignments/bootp-dhcp-parameters/>:

Option Name	Value	Data length	Meaning
OPTION_V4_DOTS_RI	TBA3	Variable; the maximum length is 255 octets.	Includes the name of the DOTS server.
OPTION_V4_DOTS_ADDRESS	TBA4	Variable; the minimum length is 5.	Includes one or multiple lists of DOTS IP addresses; each list is treated as a separate DOTS server.

12.3. Application Service & Application Protocol Tags

This document requests IANA to make the following allocations from the registry available at: <https://www.iana.org/assignments/s-naptr-parameters/s-naptr-parameters.xhtml>.

12.3.1. DOTS Application Service Tag Registration

- o Application Protocol Tag: DOTS
- o Intended Usage: See Section 6
- o Security Considerations: See Section 11

- o Contact Information: <one of the authors>

12.3.2. signal.udp Application Protocol Tag Registration

- o Application Protocol Tag: signal.udp
- o Intended Usage: See Section 6
- o Security Considerations: See Section 11
- o Contact Information: <one of the authors>

12.3.3. signal.tcp Application Protocol Tag Registration

- o Application Protocol Tag: signal.tcp
- o Intended Usage: See Section 6
- o Security Considerations: See Section 11
- o Contact Information: <one of the authors>

12.3.4. data.tcp Application Protocol Tag Registration

- o Application Protocol Tag: data.tcp
- o Intended Usage: See Section 6
- o Security Considerations: See Section 11
- o Contact Information: <one of the authors>

12.4. IPv4 Anycast

IANA has assigned a single IPv4 address from the 192.0.0.0/24 prefix and registered it in the "IANA IPv4 Special-Purpose Address Registry" [RFC6890].

Attribute	Value
Address Block Name	TBA Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Anycast
RFC	<this document>
Allocation Date	<date of approval of this document>
Termination Date	N/A
Source	True
Destination	True
Forwardable	True
Global	True
Reserved-by-Protocol	False

12.5. IPv6 Anycast

IANA has assigned a single IPv6 address from the 2001:0000::/23 prefix and registered it in the "IANA IPv6 Special-Purpose Address Registry" [RFC6890].

Attribute	Value
Address Block Name	TBA Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Anycast
RFC	<this document>
Allocation Date	<date of approval of this document>
Termination Date	N/A
Source	True
Destination	True
Forwardable	True
Global	True
Reserved-by-Protocol	False

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Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Architecture
draft-ietf-dots-architecture-05

Abstract

This document describes an architecture for establishing and maintaining Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) within and between domains. The document does not specify protocols or protocol extensions, instead focusing on defining architectural relationships, components and concepts used in a DOTS deployment.

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1. Context and Motivation

Signaling the need for help defending against an active distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack requires a common understanding of mechanisms and roles among the parties coordinating defensive response. The signaling layer and supplementary messaging is the focus of DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS). DOTS defines a method of coordinating defensive measures among willing peers to mitigate attacks quickly and efficiently, enabling hybrid attack responses coordinated locally at or near the target of an active attack, or anywhere in-path between attack sources and target. Sample DOTS use cases are elaborated in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases].

This document describes an architecture used in establishing, maintaining or terminating a DOTS relationship within a domain or between domains.

1.1. Terminology

1.1.1. Key Words

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.1.2. Definition of Terms

This document uses the terms defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements].

1.2. Scope

In this architecture, DOTS clients and servers communicate using DOTS signaling. As a result of signals from a DOTS client, the DOTS server may modify the forwarding path of traffic destined for the attack target(s), for example by diverting traffic to a mitigator or pool of mitigators, where policy may be applied to distinguish and discard attack traffic. Any such policy is deployment-specific.

The DOTS architecture presented here is applicable across network administrative domains - for example, between an enterprise domain and the domain of a third-party attack mitigation service - as well as to a single administrative domain. DOTS is generally assumed to be most effective when aiding coordination of attack response between

two or more participating networks, but single domain scenarios are valuable in their own right, as when aggregating intra-domain DOTS client signals for inter-domain coordinated attack response.

This document does not address any administrative or business agreements that may be established between involved DOTS parties. Those considerations are out of scope. Regardless, this document assumes necessary authentication and authorization mechanisms are put in place so that only authorized clients can invoke the DOTS service.

A detailed set of DOTS requirements are discussed in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements], and the DOTS architecture is designed to follow those requirements. Only new behavioral requirements are described in this document.

1.3. Assumptions

This document makes the following assumptions:

- o All domains in which DOTS is deployed are assumed to offer the required connectivity between DOTS agents and any intermediary network elements, but the architecture imposes no additional limitations on the form of connectivity.
- o Congestion and resource exhaustion are intended outcomes of a DDoS attack [RFC4732]. Some operators may utilize non-impacted paths or networks for DOTS, but in general conditions should be assumed to be hostile and DOTS must be able to function in all circumstances, including when the signaling path is significantly impaired.
- o There is no universal DDoS attack scale threshold triggering a coordinated response across administrative domains. A network domain administrator, or service or application owner may arbitrarily set attack scale threshold triggers, or manually send requests for mitigation.
- o Mitigation requests may be sent to one or more upstream DOTS servers based on criteria determined by DOTS client administrators and the underlying network configuration. The number of DOTS servers with which a given DOTS client has established communications is determined by local policy and is deployment-specific. For example, a DOTS client of a multi-homed network may support built-in policies to establish DOTS relationships with DOTS servers located upstream of each interconnection link.
- o The mitigation capacity and/or capability of domains receiving requests for coordinated attack response is opaque to the domains

sending the request. The domain receiving the DOTS client signal may or may not have sufficient capacity or capability to filter any or all DDoS attack traffic directed at a target. In either case, the upstream DOTS server may redirect a request to another DOTS server. Redirection may be local to the redirecting DOTS server's domain, or may involve a third-party domain.

- o DOTS client and server signals, as well as messages sent through the data channel, are sent across any transit networks with the same probability of delivery as any other traffic between the DOTS client domain and the DOTS server domain. Any encapsulation required for successful delivery is left untouched by transit network elements. DOTS server and DOTS client cannot assume any preferential treatment of DOTS signals. Such preferential treatment may be available in some deployments (e.g., intra-domain scenarios), and the DOTS architecture does not preclude its use when available. However, DOTS itself does not address how that may be done.
- o The architecture allows for, but does not assume, the presence of Quality of Service (QoS) policy agreements between DOTS-enabled peer networks or local QoS prioritization aimed at ensuring delivery of DOTS messages between DOTS agents. QoS is an operational consideration only, not a functional part of the DOTS architecture.
- o The signal and data channels are loosely coupled, and may not terminate on the same DOTS server.

2. DOTS Architecture

The basic high-level DOTS architecture is illustrated in Figure 1:




Figure 1: Basic DOTS Architecture

A simple example instantiation of the DOTS architecture could be an enterprise as the attack target for a volumetric DDoS attack, and an upstream DDoS mitigation service as the mitigator. The enterprise

(attack target) is connected to the Internet via a link that is getting saturated, and the enterprise suspects it is under DDoS attack. The enterprise has a DOTS client, which obtains information about the DDoS attack, and signals the DOTS server for help in mitigating the attack. The DOTS server in turn invokes one or more mitigators, which are tasked with mitigating the actual DDoS attack, and hence aim to suppress the attack traffic while allowing valid traffic to reach the attack target.

The scope of the DOTS specifications is the interfaces between the DOTS client and DOTS server. The interfaces to the attack target and the mitigator are out of scope of DOTS. Similarly, the operation of both the attack target and the mitigator is out of scope of DOTS. Thus, DOTS neither specifies how an attack target decides it is under DDoS attack, nor does DOTS specify how a mitigator may actually mitigate such an attack. A DOTS client's request for mitigation is advisory in nature, and may not lead to any mitigation at all, depending on the DOTS server domain's capacity and willingness to mitigate on behalf of the DOTS client's domain.

The DOTS client may be provided with a list of DOTS servers, each associated with one or more IP addresses. These addresses may or may not be of the same address family. The DOTS client establishes one or more sessions by connecting to the provided DOTS server addresses.

As illustrated in Figure 2, there are two interfaces between a DOTS server and a DOTS client; a signal channel and (optionally) a data channel.




Figure 2: DOTS Interfaces

The primary purpose of the signal channel is for a DOTS client to ask a DOTS server for help in mitigating an attack, and for the DOTS server to inform the DOTS client about the status of such mitigation. The DOTS client does this by sending a client signal, which contains information about the attack target(s). The client signal may also include telemetry information about the attack, if the DOTS client has such information available. The DOTS server in turn sends a server signal to inform the DOTS client of whether it will honor the mitigation request. Assuming it will, the DOTS server initiates attack mitigation, and periodically informs the DOTS client about the status of the mitigation. Similarly, the DOTS client periodically

informs the DOTS server about the client's status, which at a minimum provides client (attack target) health information, but it should also include efficacy information about the attack mitigation as it is now seen by the client. At some point, the DOTS client may decide to terminate the server-side attack mitigation, which it indicates to the DOTS server over the signal channel. A mitigation may also be terminated if a DOTS client-specified mitigation lifetime is exceeded. Note that the signal channel may need to operate over a link that is experiencing a DDoS attack and hence is subject to severe packet loss and high latency.

While DOTS is able to request mitigation with just the signal channel, the addition of the DOTS data channel provides for additional and more efficient capabilities. The primary purpose of the data channel is to support DOTS related configuration and policy information exchange between the DOTS client and the DOTS server. Examples of such information include, but are not limited to:

- o Creating identifiers, such as names or aliases, for resources for which mitigation may be requested. Such identifiers may then be used in subsequent signal channel exchanges to refer more efficiently to the resources under attack, as seen in Figure 3, using JSON to serialize the data:

```
{
  "https1": [
    "192.0.2.1:443",
    "198.51.100.2:443",
  ],
  "proxies": [
    "203.0.113.3:3128",
    "[2001:db8:ac10::1]:3128"
  ],
  "api_urls": "https://apiserver.example.com/api/v1",
}
```

Figure 3: Protected resource identifiers

- o Black-list management, which enables a DOTS client to inform the DOTS server about sources to suppress.
- o White-list management, which enables a DOTS client to inform the DOTS server about sources from which traffic is always accepted.
- o Filter management, which enables a DOTS client to install or remove traffic filters dropping or rate-limiting unwanted traffic.
- o DOTS client provisioning.

Note that while it is possible to exchange the above information before, during or after a DDoS attack, DOTS requires reliable delivery of this information and does not provide any special means for ensuring timely delivery of it during an attack. In practice, this means that DOTS deployments should not rely on such information being exchanged during a DDoS attack.

2.1. DOTS Operations

DOTS does not prescribe any specific deployment models, however DOTS is designed with some specific requirements around the different DOTS agents and their relationships.

First of all, a DOTS agent belongs to a domain that has an identity which can be authenticated and authorized. DOTS agents communicate with each other over a mutually authenticated signal channel and (optionally) data channel. However, before they can do so, a service relationship needs to be established between them. The details and means by which this is done is outside the scope of DOTS, however an example would be for an enterprise A (DOTS client) to sign up for DDoS service from provider B (DOTS server). This would establish a (service) relationship between the two that enables enterprise A's DOTS client to establish a signal channel with provider B's DOTS server. A and B will authenticate each other, and B can verify that A is authorized for its service.

From an operational and design point of view, DOTS assumes that the above relationship is established prior to a request for DDoS attack mitigation. In particular, it is assumed that bi-directional communication is possible at this time between the DOTS client and DOTS server. Furthermore, it is assumed that additional service provisioning, configuration and information exchange can be performed by use of the data channel, if operationally required. It is not until this point that the mitigation service is available for use.

Once the mutually authenticated signal channel has been established, it will remain active. This is done to increase the likelihood that the DOTS client can signal the DOTS server for help when the attack target is being flooded, and similarly raise the probability that DOTS server signals reach the client regardless of inbound link congestion. This does not necessarily imply that the attack target and the DOTS client have to be co-located in the same administrative domain, but it is expected to be a common scenario.

DDoS mitigation with the help of an upstream mitigator may involve some form of traffic redirection whereby traffic destined for the attack target is steered towards the mitigator. Common mechanisms to achieve this redirection depend on BGP [RFC4271] and DNS [RFC1035].

The mitigator in turn inspects and scrubs the traffic, and forwards the resulting (hopefully non-attack) traffic to the attack target. Thus, when a DOTS server receives an attack mitigation request from a DOTS client, it can be viewed as a way of causing traffic redirection for the attack target indicated.

DOTS relies on mutual authentication and the pre-established service relationship between the DOTS client's domain and the DOTS server's domain to provide basic authorization. The DOTS server should enforce additional authorization mechanisms to restrict the mitigation scope a DOTS client can request, but such authorization mechanisms are deployment-specific.

Although co-location of DOTS server and mitigator within the same domain is expected to be a common deployment model, it is assumed that operators may require alternative models. Nothing in this document precludes such alternatives.

2.2. Components

2.2.1. DOTS Client

A DOTS client is a DOTS agent from which requests for help coordinating attack response originate. The requests may be in response to an active, ongoing attack against a target in the DOTS client's domain, but no active attack is required for a DOTS client to request help. Operators may wish to have upstream mitigators in the network path for an indefinite period, and are restricted only by business relationships when it comes to duration and scope of requested mitigation.

The DOTS client requests attack response coordination from a DOTS server over the signal channel, including in the request the DOTS client's desired mitigation scoping, as described in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]. The actual mitigation scope and countermeasures used in response to the attack are up to the DOTS server and mitigator operators, as the DOTS client may have a narrow perspective on the ongoing attack. As such, the DOTS client's request for mitigation should be considered advisory: guarantees of DOTS server availability or mitigation capacity constitute service level agreements and are out of scope for this document.

The DOTS client adjusts mitigation scope and provides available mitigation feedback (e.g. mitigation efficacy) at the direction of its local administrator. Such direction may involve manual or automated adjustments in response to updates from the DOTS server.

To provide a metric of signal health and distinguish an idle signal channel from a disconnected or defunct session, the DOTS client sends a heartbeat over the signal channel to maintain its half of the channel. The DOTS client similarly expects a heartbeat from the DOTS server, and may consider a session terminated in the extended absence of a DOTS server heartbeat.

2.2.2. DOTS Server

A DOTS server is a DOTS agent capable of receiving, processing and possibly acting on requests for help coordinating attack response from DOTS clients. The DOTS server authenticates and authorizes DOTS clients as described in Section 3.1, and maintains session state, tracking requests for mitigation, reporting on the status of active mitigations, and terminating sessions in the extended absence of a client heartbeat or when a session times out.

Assuming the preconditions discussed below exist, a DOTS client maintaining an active session with a DOTS server may reasonably expect some level of mitigation in response to a request for coordinated attack response.

The DOTS server enforces authorization of DOTS clients' signals for mitigation. The mechanism of enforcement is not in scope for this document, but is expected to restrict requested mitigation scope to addresses, prefixes, and/or services owned by the DOTS client's administrative domain, such that a DOTS client from one domain is not able to influence the network path to another domain. A DOTS server **MUST** reject requests for mitigation of resources not owned by the requesting DOTS client's administrative domain. A DOTS server **MAY** also refuse a DOTS client's mitigation request for arbitrary reasons, within any limits imposed by business or service level agreements between client and server domains. If a DOTS server refuses a DOTS client's request for mitigation, the DOTS server **SHOULD** include the refusal reason in the server signal sent to the client.

A DOTS server is in regular contact with one or more mitigators. If a DOTS server accepts a DOTS client's request for help, the DOTS server forwards a translated form of that request to the mitigator(s) responsible for scrubbing attack traffic. Note that the form of the translated request passed from the DOTS server to the mitigator is not in scope: it may be as simple as an alert to mitigator operators, or highly automated using vendor or open application programming interfaces supported by the mitigator. The DOTS server **MUST** report the actual scope of any mitigation enabled on behalf of a client.

The DOTS server **SHOULD** retrieve available metrics for any mitigations activated on behalf of a DOTS client, and **SHOULD** include them in

server signals sent to the DOTS client originating the request for mitigation.

To provide a metric of signal health and distinguish an idle signal channel from a disconnected or defunct channel, the DOTS server **MUST** send a heartbeat over the signal channel to maintain its half of the channel. The DOTS server similarly expects a heartbeat from the DOTS client, and **MAY** consider a session terminated in the extended absence of a DOTS client heartbeat.

2.2.3. DOTS Gateway

Traditional client/server relationships may be expanded by chaining DOTS sessions. This chaining is enabled through "logical concatenation" of a DOTS server and a DOTS client, resulting in an application analogous to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261] logical entity of a Back-to-Back User Agent (B2BUA) [RFC7092]. The term DOTS gateway is used here in the descriptions of selected scenarios involving this application.

A DOTS gateway may be deployed client-side, server-side or both. The gateway may terminate multiple discrete client connections and may aggregate these into a single or multiple DOTS sessions.

The DOTS gateway will appear as a server to its downstream agents and as a client to its upstream agents, a functional concatenation of the DOTS client and server roles, as depicted in Figure 4:




Figure 4: DOTS gateway

The DOTS gateway **MUST** perform full stack DOTS session termination and reorigination between its client and server side. The details of how this is achieved are implementation specific. The DOTS protocol does not include any special features related to DOTS gateways, and hence from a DOTS perspective, whenever a DOTS gateway is present, the DOTS session simply terminates/originates there.

2.3. DOTS Agent Relationships

So far, we have only considered a relatively simple scenario of a single DOTS client associated with a single DOTS server, however DOTS supports more advanced relationships.

A DOTS server may be associated with one or more DOTS clients, and those DOTS clients may belong to different domains. An example scenario is a mitigation provider serving multiple attack targets (Figure 5).




Figure 5: DOTS server with multiple clients

A DOTS client may be associated with one or more DOTS servers, and those DOTS servers may belong to different domains. This may be to ensure high availability or co-ordinate mitigation with more than one directly connected ISP. An example scenario is for an enterprise to have DDoS mitigation service from multiple providers, as shown in Figure 6.




Figure 6: Multi-Homed DOTS Client

Deploying a multi-homed client requires extra care and planning, as the DOTS servers with which the multi-homed client communicates may not be affiliated. Should the multi-homed client simultaneously request for mitigation from all servers with which it has established signal channels, the client may unintentionally inflict additional network disruption on the resources it intends to protect. In one of the worst cases, a multi-homed DOTS client could cause a permanent routing loop of traffic destined for the client's protected services, as the uncoordinated DOTS servers' mitigators all try to divert that traffic to their own scrubbing centers.

The DOTS protocol itself provides no fool-proof method to prevent such self-inflicted harms as a result of deploying multi-homed DOTS clients. If DOTS client implementations nevertheless include support for multi-homing, they are expected to be aware of the risks, and consequently to include measures aimed at reducing the likelihood of negative outcomes. Simple measures might include:

- o Requesting mitigation serially, ensuring only one mitigation request for a given address space is active at any given time;
- o Dividing the protected resources among the DOTS servers, such that no two mitigators will be attempting to divert and scrub the same traffic;
- o Restricting multi-homing to deployments in which all DOTS servers are coordinating management of a shared pool of mitigation resources.

2.3.1. Gatewayed Signaling

As discussed in Section 2.2.3, a DOTS gateway is a logical function chaining DOTS sessions through concatenation of a DOTS server and DOTS client.

An example scenario, as shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8, is for an enterprise to have deployed multiple DOTS capable devices which are able to signal intra-domain using TCP [RFC0793] on un-congested links to a DOTS gateway which may then transform these to a UDP [RFC0768] transport inter-domain where connection oriented transports may degrade; this applies to the signal channel only, as the data channel requires a connection-oriented transport. The relationship between the gateway and its upstream agents is opaque to the initial clients.




Figure 7: Client-Side Gateway with Aggregation




Figure 8: Client-Side Gateway without Aggregation

This may similarly be deployed in the inverse scenario where the gateway resides in the server-side domain and may be used to terminate and/or aggregate multiple clients to single transport as shown in figures Figure 9 and Figure 10.




Figure 9: Server-Side Gateway with Aggregation




Figure 10: Server-Side Gateway without Aggregation

This document anticipates scenarios involving multiple DOTS gateways. An example is a DOTS gateway at the network client's side, and another one at the server side. The first gateway can be located at a CPE to aggregate requests from multiple DOTS clients enabled in an enterprise network. The second DOTS gateway is deployed on the provider side. This scenario can be seen as a combination of the client-side and server-side scenarios.

3. Concepts

3.1. DOTS Sessions

In order for DOTS to be effective as a vehicle for DDoS mitigation requests, one or more DOTS clients must establish ongoing communication with one or more DOTS servers. While the preconditions for enabling DOTS in or among network domains may also involve business relationships, service level agreements, or other formal or informal understandings between network operators, such considerations are out of scope for this document.

A DOTS session is established to support bilateral exchange of data between an associated DOTS client and a DOTS server. In the DOTS architecture, data is exchanged between DOTS agents over signal and data channels. Regardless, a DOTS session is characterized by the presence of an established signal channel. A data channel may be established as well, however it is not a prerequisite. Conversely, a DOTS session cannot exist without an established signal channel: when an established signal channel is terminated for any reason, the DOTS session is also said to be terminated.

3.1.1. Preconditions

Prior to establishing a DOTS session between agents, the owners of the networks, domains, services or applications involved are assumed to have agreed upon the terms of the relationship involved. Such agreements are out of scope for this document, but must be in place for a functional DOTS architecture.

It is assumed that as part of any DOTS service agreement, the DOTS client is provided with all data and metadata required to establish communication with the DOTS server. Such data and metadata would include any cryptographic information necessary to meet the message confidentiality, integrity and authenticity requirement in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements], and might also include the pool of DOTS server addresses and ports the DOTS client should use for signal and data channel messaging.

3.1.2. Establishing the DOTS Session

With the required business agreements in place, the DOTS client initiates a signal session by contacting its DOTS server(s) over the signal channel and (possibly) the data channel. To allow for DOTS service flexibility, neither the order of contact nor the time interval between channel creations is specified. A DOTS client MAY establish signal channel first, and then data channel, or vice versa.

The methods by which a DOTS client receives the address and associated service details of the DOTS server are not prescribed by this document. For example, a DOTS client may be directly configured to use a specific DOTS server IP address and port, and directly provided with any data necessary to satisfy the Peer Mutual Authentication requirement in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements], such as symmetric or asymmetric keys, usernames and passwords, etc. All configuration and authentication information in this scenario is provided out-of-band by the domain operating the DOTS server.

At the other extreme, the architecture in this document allows for a form of DOTS client auto-provisioning. For example, the domain operating the DOTS server or servers might provide the client domain only with symmetric or asymmetric keys to authenticate the provisioned DOTS clients. Only the keys would then be directly configured on DOTS clients, but the remaining configuration required to provision the DOTS clients could be learned through mechanisms similar to DNS SRV [RFC2782] or DNS Service Discovery [RFC6763].

The DOTS client SHOULD successfully authenticate and exchange messages with the DOTS server over both signal and (if used) data channel as soon as possible to confirm that both channels are operational.

As described in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements], the DOTS client can configure preferred values for acceptable signal loss, mitigation lifetime, and heartbeat intervals when establishing the DOTS session. A DOTS session is not active until DOTS agents have agreed on the values for these DOTS session parameters, a process defined by the protocol.

Once the DOTS client begins receiving DOTS server signals, the DOTS session is active. At any time during the DOTS session, the DOTS client may use the data channel to manage aliases, manage black- and white-listed prefixes or addresses, leverage vendor-specific extensions, and so on. Note that unlike the signal channel, there is no requirement that the data channel remains operational in attack conditions (See Data Channel Requirements, [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]).

3.1.3. Maintaining the DOTS Session

DOTS clients and servers periodically send heartbeats to each other over the signal channel, per Operational Requirements discussed in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]. DOTS agent operators SHOULD configure the heartbeat interval such that the frequency does not lead to accidental denials of service due to the overwhelming number of heartbeats a DOTS agent must field.

Either DOTS agent may consider a DOTS session terminated in the extended absence of a heartbeat from its peer agent. The period of that absence will be established in the protocol definition.

3.2. Modes of Signaling

This section examines the modes of signaling between agents in a DOTS architecture.

3.2.1. Direct Signaling

A DOTS session may take the form of direct signaling between the DOTS clients and servers, as shown in Figure 11.




Figure 11: Direct Signaling

In a direct DOTS session, the DOTS client and server are communicating directly. Direct signaling may exist inter- or intra-domain. The DOTS session is abstracted from the underlying networks or network elements the signals traverse: in direct signaling, the DOTS client and server are logically adjacent.

3.2.2. Redirected Signaling

In certain circumstances, a DOTS server may want to redirect a DOTS client to an alternative DOTS server for a DOTS session. Such circumstances include but are not limited to:

- o Maximum number of DOTS sessions with clients has been reached;
- o Mitigation capacity exhaustion in the mitigator with which the specific DOTS server is communicating;
- o Mitigator outage or other downtime, such as scheduled maintenance;
- o Scheduled DOTS server maintenance;
- o Scheduled modifications to the network path between DOTS server and DOTS client.

A basic redirected DOTS session resembles the following, as shown in Figure 12.




Figure 12: Redirected Signaling

1. Previously established DOTS session 1 exists between a DOTS client and DOTS server A.
2. DOTS server A sends a server signal redirecting the client to DOTS server B.
3. If the DOTS client does not already have a separate DOTS session with the redirection target, the DOTS client initiates and establishes DOTS session 2 with DOTS server B.
4. Having redirected the DOTS client, DOTS server A ceases sending server signals. The DOTS client likewise stops sending client signals to DOTS server A. DOTS session 1 is terminated.

3.2.3. Recursive Signaling

DOTS is centered around improving the speed and efficiency of coordinated response to DDoS attacks. One scenario not yet discussed involves coordination among federated domains operating DOTS servers and mitigators.

In the course of normal DOTS operations, a DOTS client communicates the need for mitigation to a DOTS server, and that server initiates mitigation on a mitigator with which the server has an established service relationship. The operator of the mitigator may in turn monitor mitigation performance and capacity, as the attack being mitigated may grow in severity beyond the mitigating domain's capabilities.

The operator of the mitigator has limited options in the event a DOTS client-requested mitigation is being overwhelmed by the severity of the attack. Out-of-scope business or service level agreements may permit the mitigating domain to drop the mitigation and let attack traffic flow unchecked to the target, but this only encourages attack escalation. In the case where the mitigating domain is the upstream service provider for the attack target, this may mean the mitigating domain and its other services and users continue to suffer the incidental effects of the attack.

A recursive signaling model as shown in Figure 13 offers an alternative. In a variation of the use case "End-customer with a single upstream transit provider offering DDoS mitigation services" described in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases], a domain operating a DOTS server and mitigator also operates a DOTS client. This DOTS client has an established DOTS session with a DOTS server belonging to a separate administrative domain.

With these preconditions in place, the operator of the mitigator being overwhelmed or otherwise performing inadequately may request mitigation for the attack target from this separate DOTS-aware domain. Such a request recurses the originating mitigation request to the secondary DOTS server, in the hope of building a cumulative mitigation against the attack.




Figure 13: Recursive Signaling

In Figure 13, client Cc signals a request for mitigation across inter-domain DOTS session 1 to the DOTS server Sn belonging to the example.net domain. DOTS server Sn enables mitigation on mitigator Mn. DOTS server Sn is half of DOTS gateway Gn, being deployed logically back-to-back with DOTS client Cn, which has pre-existing inter-domain DOTS session 2 with the DOTS server So belonging to the example.org domain. At any point, DOTS server Sn MAY recurse an ongoing mitigation request through DOTS client Cn to DOTS server So, in the expectation that mitigator Mo will be activated to aid in the defense of the attack target.

Recursive signaling is opaque to the DOTS client. To maximize mitigation visibility to the DOTS client, however, the recursing domain SHOULD provide recursed mitigation feedback in signals reporting on mitigation status to the DOTS client. For example, the recursing domain's mitigator should incorporate into mitigation status messages available metrics such as dropped packet or byte counts from the recursed mitigation.

DOTS clients involved in recursive signaling must be able to withdraw requests for mitigation without warning or justification, per [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements].

Operators recursing mitigation requests MAY maintain the recursed mitigation for a brief, protocol-defined period in the event the DOTS client originating the mitigation withdraws its request for help, as per the discussion of managing mitigation toggling in the operational requirements ([I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]).

Deployment of recursive signaling may result in traffic redirection, examination and mitigation extending beyond the initial bilateral relationship between DOTS client and DOTS server. As such, client control over the network path of mitigated traffic may be reduced. DOTS client operators should be aware of any privacy concerns, and work with DOTS server operators employing recursive signaling to ensure shared sensitive material is suitably protected.

3.2.4. Anycast Signaling

The DOTS architecture does not assume the availability of anycast within a DOTS deployment, but neither does the architecture exclude it. Domains operating DOTS servers MAY deploy DOTS servers with an anycast Service Address as described in BCP 126 [RFC4786]. In such a deployment, DOTS clients connecting to the DOTS Service Address may be communicating with distinct DOTS servers, depending on the network configuration at the time the DOTS clients connect. Among other benefits, anycast signaling potentially offers the following:

- o Simplified DOTS client configuration, including service discovery through the methods described in [RFC7094]. In this scenario, the "instance discovery" message would be a DOTS client initiating a DOTS session to the DOTS server anycast Service Address, to which the DOTS server would reply with a redirection to the DOTS server unicast address the client should use for DOTS.
- o Region- or customer-specific deployments, in which the DOTS Service Addresses route to distinct DOTS servers depending on the client region or the customer network in which a DOTS client resides.
- o Operational resiliency, spreading DOTS signaling traffic across the DOTS server domain's networks, and thereby also reducing the potential attack surface, as described in BCP 126 [RFC4786].

3.2.4.1. Anycast Signaling Considerations

As long as network configuration remains stable, anycast DOTS signaling is to the individual DOTS client indistinct from direct signaling. However, the operational challenges inherent in anycast signaling are anything but negligible, and DOTS server operators must carefully weigh the risks against the benefits before deploying.

While the DOTS signal channel primarily operates over UDP per [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements], the signal channel also requires mutual authentication between DOTS agents, with associated security state on both ends.

Network instability is of particular concern with anycast signaling, as DOTS signal channels are expected to be long-lived, and potentially operating under congested network conditions caused by a volumetric DDoS attack.

For example, a network configuration altering the route to the DOTS server during active anycast signaling may cause the DOTS client to send messages to a DOTS server other than the one with which it initially established a signaling session. That second DOTS server may not have the security state of the existing session, forcing the DOTS client to initialize a new DOTS session. This challenge might in part be mitigated by use of pre-shared keys and session resumption [RFC5246][RFC6347], but keying material must be available to all DOTS servers sharing the anycast Service Address in that case.

While the DOTS client will try to establish a new DOTS session with the DOTS server now acting as the anycast DOTS Service Address, the link between DOTS client and server may be congested with attack traffic, making signal session establishment difficult. In such a scenario, anycast Service Address instability becomes a sort of signal session flapping, with obvious negative consequences for the DOTS deployment.

Anycast signaling deployments similarly must also take into account active mitigations. Active mitigations initiated through a DOTS session may involve diverting traffic to a scrubbing center. If the DOTS session flaps due to anycast changes as described above, mitigation may also flap as the DOTS servers sharing the anycast DOTS service address toggles mitigation on detecting DOTS session loss, depending on whether the client has configured mitigation on loss of signal.

3.3. Triggering Requests for Mitigation

[I-D.ietf-dots-requirements] places no limitation on the circumstances in which a DOTS client operator may request mitigation, nor does it demand justification for any mitigation request, thereby reserving operational control over DDoS defense for the domain requesting mitigation. This architecture likewise does not prescribe the network conditions and mechanisms triggering a mitigation request from a DOTS client.

However, considering selected possible mitigation triggers from an architectural perspective offers a model for alternative or unanticipated triggers for DOTS deployments. In all cases, what network conditions merit a mitigation request are at the discretion of the DOTS client operator.

The mitigation request itself is defined by DOTS, however the interfaces required to trigger the mitigation request in the following scenarios are implementation-specific.

3.3.1. Manual Mitigation Request

A DOTS client operator may manually prepare a request for mitigation, including scope and duration, and manually instruct the DOTS client to send the mitigation request to the DOTS server. In context, a manual request is a request directly issued by the operator without automated decision-making performed by a device interacting with the DOTS client. Modes of manual mitigation requests include an operator entering a command into a text interface, or directly interacting with a graphical interface to send the request.

An operator might do this, for example, in response to notice of an attack delivered by attack detection equipment or software, and the alerting detector lacks interfaces or is not configured to use available interfaces to translate the alert to a mitigation request automatically.

In a variation of the above scenario, the operator may have preconfigured on the DOTS client mitigation requests for various resources in the operator's domain. When notified of an attack, the DOTS client operator manually instructs the DOTS client to send the relevant preconfigured mitigation request for the resources under attack.

A further variant involves recursive signaling, as described in Section 3.2.3. The DOTS client in this case is the second half of a DOTS gateway (back-to-back DOTS server and client). As in the previous scenario, the scope and duration of the mitigation request are pre-existing, but in this case are derived from the mitigation request received from a downstream DOTS client by the DOTS server. Assuming the preconditions required by Section 3.2.3 are in place, the DOTS gateway operator may at any time manually request mitigation from an upstream DOTS server, sending a mitigation request derived from the downstream DOTS client's request.

The motivations for a DOTS client operator to request mitigation manually are not prescribed by this architecture, but are expected to include some of the following:

- o Notice of an attack delivered via e-mail or alternative messaging
- o Notice of an attack delivered via phone call
- o Notice of an attack delivered through the interface(s) of networking monitoring software deployed in the operator's domain
- o Manual monitoring of network behavior through network monitoring software

3.3.2. Automated Conditional Mitigation Request

Unlike manual mitigation requests, which depend entirely on the DOTS client operator's capacity to react with speed and accuracy to every detected or detectable attack, mitigation requests triggered by detected attack conditions reduce the operational burden on the DOTS client operator, and minimize the latency between attack detection and the start of mitigation.

Mitigation requests are triggered in this scenario by operator-specified network conditions. Attack detection is deployment-specific, and not constrained by this architecture. Similarly the specifics of a condition are left to the discretion of the operator, though common conditions meriting mitigation include the following:

- o Detected attack exceeding a rate in packets per second (pps).
- o Detected attack exceeding a rate in bytes per second (bps).
- o Detected resource exhaustion in an attack target.
- o Detected resource exhaustion in the local domain's mitigator.
- o Number of open connections to an attack target.
- o Number of attack sources in a given attack.
- o Number of active attacks against targets in the operator's domain.
- o Conditional detection developed through arbitrary statistical analysis or deep learning techniques.
- o Any combination of the above.

When automated conditional mitigation requests are enabled, violations of any of the above conditions, or any additional operator-defined conditions, will trigger a mitigation request from the DOTS client to the DOTS server. The interfaces between the

application detecting the condition violation and the DOTS client are implementation-specific.

3.3.3. Automated Mitigation on Loss of Signal

To maintain a DOTS session, the DOTS client and the DOTS server exchange regular but infrequent messages across the signal channel. In the absence of an attack, the probability of message loss in the signaling channel should be extremely low. Under attack conditions, however, some signal loss may be anticipated as attack traffic congests the link, depending on the attack type.

While [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements] specifies the DOTS protocol be robust when signaling under attack conditions, there are nevertheless scenarios in which the DOTS signal is lost in spite of protocol best efforts. To handle such scenarios, a DOTS operator may configure the DOTS session to trigger mitigation when the DOTS server ceases receiving DOTS client signals (or vice versa) beyond the miss count or period permitted by the protocol.

The impact of mitigating due to loss of signal in either direction must be considered carefully before enabling it. Signal loss is not caused by links congested with attack traffic alone, and as such mitigation requests triggered by signal channel degradation in either direction may incur unnecessary costs, in network performance and operational expense alike.

4. Security Considerations

This section describes identified security considerations for the DOTS architecture.

DOTS is at risk from three primary attack vectors: agent impersonation, traffic injection and signal blocking. These vectors may be exploited individually or in concert by an attacker to confuse, disable, take information from, or otherwise inhibit DOTS agents.

Any attacker with the ability to impersonate a legitimate DOTS client or server or, indeed, inject false messages into the stream may potentially trigger/withdraw traffic redirection, trigger/cancel mitigation activities or subvert black/whitelists. From an architectural standpoint, operators SHOULD ensure best current practices for secure communication are observed for data and signal channel confidentiality, integrity and authenticity. Care must be taken to ensure transmission is protected by appropriately secure means, reducing attack surface by exposing only the minimal required

services or interfaces. Similarly, received data at rest SHOULD be stored with a satisfactory degree of security.

As many mitigation systems employ diversion to scrub attack traffic, operators of DOTS agents SHOULD ensure DOTS sessions are resistant to Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks. An attacker with control of a DOTS client may negatively influence network traffic by requesting and withdrawing requests for mitigation for particular prefixes, leading to route or DNS flapping.

Any attack targeting the availability of DOTS servers may disrupt the ability of the system to receive and process DOTS signals resulting in failure to fulfill a mitigation request. DOTS agents SHOULD be given adequate protections, again in accordance with best current practices for network and host security.

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Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Architecture
draft-ietf-dots-architecture-18

Abstract

This document describes an architecture for establishing and maintaining Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) within and between domains. The document does not specify protocols or protocol extensions, instead focusing on defining architectural relationships, components and concepts used in a DOTS deployment.

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1. Context and Motivation

Signaling the need for help to defend against an active distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack requires a common understanding of mechanisms and roles among the parties coordinating defensive response. The signaling layer and supplementary messaging is the focus of DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS). DOTS defines a method of coordinating defensive measures among willing peers to mitigate attacks quickly and efficiently, enabling hybrid attack responses coordinated locally at or near the target of an active attack, or anywhere in-path between attack sources and target. Sample DOTS use cases are elaborated in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases].

This document describes an architecture used in establishing, maintaining or terminating a DOTS relationship within a domain or between domains.

1.1. Terminology

1.1.1. Key Words

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

1.1.2. Definition of Terms

This document uses the terms defined in [RFC8612].

1.2. Scope

In this architecture, DOTS clients and servers communicate using DOTS signal channel [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] and data channel [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel] protocols.

The DOTS architecture presented here is applicable across network administrative domains - for example, between an enterprise domain and the domain of a third-party attack mitigation service - as well as to a single administrative domain. DOTS is generally assumed to be most effective when aiding coordination of attack response between two or more participating networks, but single domain scenarios are valuable in their own right, as when aggregating intra-domain DOTS client signals for inter-domain coordinated attack response.

This document does not address any administrative or business agreements that may be established between involved DOTS parties. Those considerations are out of scope. Regardless, this document assumes necessary authentication and authorization mechanisms are put in place so that only authorized clients can invoke the DOTS service.

A detailed set of DOTS requirements are discussed in [RFC8612], and the DOTS architecture is designed to follow those requirements. Only new behavioral requirements are described in this document.

1.3. Assumptions

This document makes the following assumptions:

- o All domains in which DOTS is deployed are assumed to offer the required connectivity between DOTS agents and any intermediary network elements, but the architecture imposes no additional limitations on the form of connectivity.
- o Congestion and resource exhaustion are intended outcomes of a DDoS attack [RFC4732]. Some operators may utilize non-impacted paths or networks for DOTS, but in general conditions should be assumed to be hostile and DOTS must be able to function in all circumstances, including when the signaling path is significantly impaired. Congestion control requirements are discussed in Section 3 of [RFC8612]. DOTS signal channel defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] is designed to be extremely resilient under extremely hostile network conditions and provides continued contact between DOTS agents even as DDoS attack traffic saturates the link.
- o There is no universal DDoS attack scale threshold triggering a coordinated response across administrative domains. A network domain administrator, or service or application owner may arbitrarily set attack scale threshold triggers, or manually send requests for mitigation.
- o Mitigation requests may be sent to one or more upstream DOTS servers based on criteria determined by DOTS client administrators and the underlying network configuration. The number of DOTS servers with which a given DOTS client has established communications is determined by local policy and is deployment-specific. For example, a DOTS client of a multi-homed network may support built-in policies to establish DOTS relationships with DOTS servers located upstream of each interconnection link.
- o The mitigation capacity and/or capability of domains receiving requests for coordinated attack response is opaque to the domains

sending the request. The domain receiving the DOTS client signal may or may not have sufficient capacity or capability to filter any or all DDoS attack traffic directed at a target. In either case, the upstream DOTS server may redirect a request to another DOTS server. Redirection may be local to the redirecting DOTS server's domain, or may involve a third-party domain.

- o DOTS client and server signals, as well as messages sent through the data channel, are sent across any transit networks with the same probability of delivery as any other traffic between the DOTS client domain and the DOTS server domain. Any encapsulation required for successful delivery is left untouched by transit network elements. DOTS server and DOTS client cannot assume any preferential treatment of DOTS signals. Such preferential treatment may be available in some deployments (e.g., intra-domain scenarios), and the DOTS architecture does not preclude its use when available. However, DOTS itself does not address how that may be done.
- o The architecture allows for, but does not assume, the presence of Quality of Service (QoS) policy agreements between DOTS-enabled peer networks or local QoS prioritization aimed at ensuring delivery of DOTS messages between DOTS agents. QoS is an operational consideration only, not a functional part of the DOTS architecture.
- o The signal and data channels are loosely coupled, and might not terminate on the same DOTS server. How the DOTS servers synchronize the DOTS configuration is out of scope of this specification.

2. DOTS Architecture

The basic high-level DOTS architecture is illustrated in Figure 1:




Figure 1: Basic DOTS Architecture

A simple example instantiation of the DOTS architecture could be an enterprise as the attack target for a volumetric DDoS attack, and an upstream DDoS mitigation service as the mitigator. The service provided by the mitigator is called: DDoS mitigation service. The enterprise (attack target) is connected to the Internet via a link that is getting saturated, and the enterprise suspects it is under DDoS attack. The enterprise has a DOTS client, which obtains information about the DDoS attack, and signals the DOTS server for help in mitigating the attack. The DOTS server in turn invokes one or more mitigators, which are tasked with mitigating the actual DDoS attack, and hence aim to suppress the attack traffic while allowing valid traffic to reach the attack target.

The scope of the DOTS specifications is the interfaces between the DOTS client and DOTS server. The interfaces to the attack target and the mitigator are out of scope of DOTS. Similarly, the operation of both the attack target and the mitigator is out of scope of DOTS. Thus, DOTS specifies neither how an attack target decides it is under DDoS attack, nor does DOTS specify how a mitigator may actually mitigate such an attack. A DOTS client's request for mitigation is advisory in nature, and might not lead to any mitigation at all, depending on the DOTS server domain's capacity and willingness to mitigate on behalf of the DOTS client domain.

The DOTS client may be provided with a list of DOTS servers, each associated with one or more IP addresses. These addresses may or may not be of the same address family. The DOTS client establishes one or more sessions by connecting to the provided DOTS server addresses.

As illustrated in Figure 2, there are two interfaces between a DOTS server and a DOTS client; a signal channel and (optionally) a data channel.




Figure 2: DOTS Interfaces

The primary purpose of the signal channel is for a DOTS client to ask a DOTS server for help in mitigating an attack, and for the DOTS server to inform the DOTS client about the status of such mitigation. The DOTS client does this by sending a client signal, which contains information about the attack target(s). The client signal may also include telemetry information about the attack, if the DOTS client has such information available. The DOTS server in turn sends a

server signal to inform the DOTS client of whether it will honor the mitigation request. Assuming it will, the DOTS server initiates attack mitigation, and periodically informs the DOTS client about the status of the mitigation. Similarly, the DOTS client periodically informs the DOTS server about the client's status, which at a minimum provides client (attack target) health information, but it should also include efficacy information about the attack mitigation as it is now seen by the client. At some point, the DOTS client may decide to terminate the server-side attack mitigation, which it indicates to the DOTS server over the signal channel. A mitigation may also be terminated if a DOTS client-specified mitigation lifetime is exceeded. Note that the signal channel may need to operate over a link that is experiencing a DDoS attack and hence is subject to severe packet loss and high latency.

While DOTS is able to request mitigation with just the signal channel, the addition of the DOTS data channel provides for additional and more efficient capabilities. The primary purpose of the data channel is to support DOTS related configuration and policy information exchange between the DOTS client and the DOTS server. Examples of such information include, but are not limited to:

- o Creating identifiers, such as names or aliases, for resources for which mitigation may be requested. Such identifiers may then be used in subsequent signal channel exchanges to refer more efficiently to the resources under attack.
- o Drop-list management, which enables a DOTS client to inform the DOTS server about sources to suppress.
- o Accept-list management, which enables a DOTS client to inform the DOTS server about sources from which traffic is always accepted.
- o Filter management, which enables a DOTS client to install or remove traffic filters dropping or rate-limiting unwanted traffic.
- o DOTS client provisioning.

Note that while it is possible to exchange the above information before, during or after a DDoS attack, DOTS requires reliable delivery of this information and does not provide any special means for ensuring timely delivery of it during an attack. In practice, this means that DOTS deployments should rely on such information being exchanged only under normal traffic conditions.

2.1. DOTS Operations

DOTS does not prescribe any specific deployment models, however DOTS is designed with some specific requirements around the different DOTS agents and their relationships.

First of all, a DOTS agent belongs to a domain that has an identity which can be authenticated and authorized. DOTS agents communicate with each other over a mutually authenticated signal channel and (optionally) data channel. However, before they can do so, a service relationship needs to be established between them. The details and means by which this is done is outside the scope of DOTS, however an example would be for an enterprise A (DOTS client) to sign up for DDoS service from provider B (DOTS server). This would establish a (service) relationship between the two that enables enterprise A's DOTS client to establish a signal channel with provider B's DOTS server. A and B will authenticate each other, and B can verify that A is authorized for its service.

From an operational and design point of view, DOTS assumes that the above relationship is established prior to a request for DDoS attack mitigation. In particular, it is assumed that bi-directional communication is possible at this time between the DOTS client and DOTS server. Furthermore, it is assumed that additional service provisioning, configuration and information exchange can be performed by use of the data channel, if operationally required. It is not until this point that the mitigation service is available for use.

Once the mutually authenticated signal channel has been established, it will remain active. This is done to increase the likelihood that the DOTS client can signal the DOTS server for help when the attack target is being flooded, and similarly raise the probability that DOTS server signals reach the client regardless of inbound link congestion. This does not necessarily imply that the attack target and the DOTS client have to be co-located in the same administrative domain, but it is expected to be a common scenario.

DDoS mitigation with the help of an upstream mitigator may involve some form of traffic redirection whereby traffic destined for the attack target is steered towards the mitigator. Common mechanisms to achieve this redirection depend on BGP [RFC4271] and DNS [RFC1035]. The mitigator in turn inspects and scrubs the traffic, and forwards the resulting (hopefully non-attack) traffic to the attack target. Thus, when a DOTS server receives an attack mitigation request from a DOTS client, it can be viewed as a way of causing traffic redirection for the attack target indicated.

DOTS relies on mutual authentication and the pre-established service relationship between the DOTS client domain and the DOTS server domain to provide authorization. The DOTS server should enforce authorization mechanisms to restrict the mitigation scope a DOTS client can request, but such authorization mechanisms are deployment-specific.

Although co-location of DOTS server and mitigator within the same domain is expected to be a common deployment model, it is assumed that operators may require alternative models. Nothing in this document precludes such alternatives.

2.2. Components

2.2.1. DOTS Client

A DOTS client is a DOTS agent from which requests for help coordinating attack response originate. The requests may be in response to an active, ongoing attack against a target in the DOTS client domain, but no active attack is required for a DOTS client to request help. Operators may wish to have upstream mitigators in the network path for an indefinite period, and are restricted only by business relationships when it comes to duration and scope of requested mitigation.

The DOTS client requests attack response coordination from a DOTS server over the signal channel, including in the request the DOTS client's desired mitigation scoping, as described in [RFC8612] (SIG-008). The actual mitigation scope and countermeasures used in response to the attack are up to the DOTS server and mitigator operators, as the DOTS client may have a narrow perspective on the ongoing attack. As such, the DOTS client's request for mitigation should be considered advisory: guarantees of DOTS server availability or mitigation capacity constitute service level agreements and are out of scope for this document.

The DOTS client adjusts mitigation scope and provides available mitigation feedback (e.g., mitigation efficacy) at the direction of its local administrator. Such direction may involve manual or automated adjustments in response to updates from the DOTS server.

To provide a metric of signal health and distinguish an idle signal channel from a disconnected or defunct session, the DOTS client sends a heartbeat over the signal channel to maintain its half of the channel. The DOTS client similarly expects a heartbeat from the DOTS server, and may consider a session terminated in the extended absence of a DOTS server heartbeat.

2.2.2. DOTS Server

A DOTS server is a DOTS agent capable of receiving, processing and possibly acting on requests for help coordinating attack response from DOTS clients. The DOTS server authenticates and authorizes DOTS clients as described in Section 3.1, and maintains session state, tracking requests for mitigation, reporting on the status of active mitigations, and terminating sessions in the extended absence of a client heartbeat or when a session times out.

Assuming the preconditions discussed below exist, a DOTS client maintaining an active session with a DOTS server may reasonably expect some level of mitigation in response to a request for coordinated attack response.

For a given DOTS client (administrative) domain, the DOTS server needs to be able to determine whether a given resource is in that domain. For example, this could take the form of associating a set of IP addresses and/or prefixes per DOTS client domain. The DOTS server enforces authorization of signals for mitigation, filtering rules and aliases for resources from DOTS clients. The mechanism of enforcement is not in scope for this document, but is expected to restrict mitigation requests, filtering rules and aliases scope to addresses, prefixes, and/or services owned by the DOTS client domain, such that a DOTS client from one domain is not able to influence the network path to another domain. A DOTS server **MUST** reject mitigation requests, filtering rules and aliases for resources not owned by the requesting DOTS client's administrative domain. The exact mechanism for the DOTS servers to validate that the resources are within the scope of the DOTS client domain is deployment-specific. For example, if the DOTS client domain uses Provider-Aggregatable prefixes for its resources and leverages the DDoS mitigation service of the Internet Transit Provider (ITP), the ITP knows the prefixes assigned to the DOTS client domain because they are assigned by the ITP itself. However, if the DDoS Mitigation is offered by a third party DDoS mitigation service provider, it does not know the resources owned by the DOTS client domain. The DDoS mitigation service provider and the DOTS client domain can opt to use the identifier validation challenges discussed in [RFC8555] and [I-D.ietf-acme-ip] to identify whether the DOTS client domain actually controls the resources. The challenges for validating control of resources must be performed when no attack traffic is present and works only for "dns" and "ip" identifier types. Further, if the DOTS client lies about the resources owned by the DOTS client domain, the DDoS mitigation service provider can impose penalties for violating the service level agreement. A DOTS server **MAY** also refuse a DOTS client's mitigation request for arbitrary reasons, within any limits imposed by business or service level agreements between client and server domains. If a

DOTS server refuses a DOTS client's request for mitigation, the DOTS server MUST include the refusal reason in the server signal sent to the client.

A DOTS server is in regular contact with one or more mitigators. If a DOTS server accepts a DOTS client's request for help, the DOTS server forwards a translated form of that request to the mitigator(s) responsible for scrubbing attack traffic. Note that the form of the translated request passed from the DOTS server to the mitigator is not in scope: it may be as simple as an alert to mitigator operators, or highly automated using vendor or open application programming interfaces supported by the mitigator. The DOTS server MUST report the actual scope of any mitigation enabled on behalf of a client.

The DOTS server SHOULD retrieve available metrics for any mitigations activated on behalf of a DOTS client, and SHOULD include them in server signals sent to the DOTS client originating the request for mitigation.

To provide a metric of signal health and distinguish an idle signal channel from a disconnected or defunct channel, the DOTS server MUST send a heartbeat over the signal channel to maintain its half of the channel. The DOTS server similarly expects a heartbeat from the DOTS client, and MAY consider a session terminated in the extended absence of a DOTS client heartbeat.

2.2.3. DOTS Gateway

Traditional client/server relationships may be expanded by chaining DOTS sessions. This chaining is enabled through "logical concatenation" of a DOTS server and a DOTS client, resulting in an application analogous to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261] logical entity of a Back-to-Back User Agent (B2BUA) [RFC7092]. The term DOTS gateway is used here in the descriptions of selected scenarios involving this application.

A DOTS gateway may be deployed client-side, server-side or both. The gateway may terminate multiple discrete client connections and may aggregate these into a single or multiple DOTS sessions.

The DOTS gateway will appear as a server to its downstream agents and as a client to its upstream agents, a functional concatenation of the DOTS client and server roles, as depicted in Figure 3:




Figure 3: DOTS gateway

The DOTS gateway MUST perform full stack DOTS session termination and reorigination between its client and server side. The details of how this is achieved are implementation specific.

2.3. DOTS Agent Relationships

So far, we have only considered a relatively simple scenario of a single DOTS client associated with a single DOTS server, however DOTS supports more advanced relationships.

A DOTS server may be associated with one or more DOTS clients, and those DOTS clients may belong to different domains. An example scenario is a mitigation provider serving multiple attack targets (Figure 4).




Figure 4: DOTS server with multiple clients

A DOTS client may be associated with one or more DOTS servers, and those DOTS servers may belong to different domains. This may be to ensure high availability or co-ordinate mitigation with more than one directly connected ISP. An example scenario is for an enterprise to

have DDoS mitigation service from multiple providers, as shown in Figure 5.




Figure 5: Multi-Homed DOTS Client

Deploying a multi-homed client requires extra care and planning, as the DOTS servers with which the multi-homed client communicates might not be affiliated. Should the multi-homed client simultaneously request for mitigation from all servers with which it has established signal channels, the client may unintentionally inflict additional network disruption on the resources it intends to protect. In one of the worst cases, a multi-homed DOTS client could cause a permanent routing loop of traffic destined for the client's protected services, as the uncoordinated DOTS servers' mitigators all try to divert that traffic to their own scrubbing centers.

The DOTS protocol itself provides no fool-proof method to prevent such self-inflicted harms as a result deploying multi-homed DOTS clients. If DOTS client implementations nevertheless include support for multi-homing, they are expected to be aware of the risks, and consequently to include measures aimed at reducing the likelihood of negative outcomes. Simple measures might include:

- o Requesting mitigation serially, ensuring only one mitigation request for a given address space is active at any given time;
- o Dividing the protected resources among the DOTS servers, such that no two mitigators will be attempting to divert and scrub the same traffic;

- o Restricting multi-homing to deployments in which all DOTS servers are coordinating management of a shared pool of mitigation resources.

2.3.1. Gatewayed Signaling

As discussed in Section 2.2.3, a DOTS gateway is a logical function chaining DOTS sessions through concatenation of a DOTS server and DOTS client.

An example scenario, as shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7, is for an enterprise to have deployed multiple DOTS capable devices which are able to signal intra-domain using TCP [RFC0793] on un-congested links to a DOTS gateway which may then transform these to a UDP [RFC0768] transport inter-domain where connection oriented transports may degrade; this applies to the signal channel only, as the data channel requires a connection-oriented transport. The relationship between the gateway and its upstream agents is opaque to the initial clients.




Figure 6: Client-Side Gateway with Aggregation




Figure 7: Client-Side Gateway without Aggregation

This may similarly be deployed in the inverse scenario where the gateway resides in the server-side domain and may be used to terminate and/or aggregate multiple clients to single transport as shown in figures Figure 8 and Figure 9.




Figure 8: Server-Side Gateway with Aggregation




Figure 9: Server-Side Gateway without Aggregation

This document anticipates scenarios involving multiple DOTS gateways. An example is a DOTS gateway at the network client's side, and another one at the server side. The first gateway can be located at a Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) to aggregate requests from multiple DOTS clients enabled in an enterprise network. The second DOTS gateway is deployed on the provider side. This scenario can be seen as a combination of the client-side and server-side scenarios.

3. Concepts

3.1. DOTS Sessions

In order for DOTS to be effective as a vehicle for DDoS mitigation requests, one or more DOTS clients must establish ongoing communication with one or more DOTS servers. While the preconditions for enabling DOTS in or among network domains may also involve business relationships, service level agreements, or other formal or informal understandings between network operators, such considerations are out of scope for this document.

A DOTS session is established to support bilateral exchange of data between an associated DOTS client and a DOTS server. In the DOTS architecture, data is exchanged between DOTS agents over signal and data channels. As such, a DOTS session can be a DOTS signal channel session, a DOTS data channel session, or both. The DOTS server couples the DOTS signal and data channel sessions using the DOTS client identity. The DOTS session is further elaborated in the DOTS signal channel protocol defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] and the DOTS data channel protocol defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel].

A DOTS agent can maintain one or more DOTS sessions.

A DOTS signal channel session is associated with a single transport connection (TCP or UDP session) and an security association (a TLS or DTLS session). Similarly, a DOTS data channel session is associated with a single TCP connection and an TLS security association.

Mitigation requests created using DOTS signal channel are not bound to the DOTS signal channel session. Instead, mitigation requests are associated with a DOTS client and can be managed using different DOTS signal channel sessions.

3.1.1. Preconditions

Prior to establishing a DOTS session between agents, the owners of the networks, domains, services or applications involved are assumed to have agreed upon the terms of the relationship involved. Such agreements are out of scope for this document, but must be in place for a functional DOTS architecture.

It is assumed that as part of any DOTS service agreement, the DOTS client is provided with all data and metadata required to establish communication with the DOTS server. Such data and metadata would include any cryptographic information necessary to meet the message confidentiality, integrity and authenticity requirement (SEC-002) in [RFC8612], and might also include the pool of DOTS server addresses and ports the DOTS client should use for signal and data channel messaging.

3.1.2. Establishing the DOTS Session

With the required business agreements in place, the DOTS client initiates a DOTS session by contacting its DOTS server(s) over the signal channel and (possibly) the data channel. To allow for DOTS service flexibility, neither the order of contact nor the time interval between channel creations is specified. A DOTS client MAY establish signal channel first, and then data channel, or vice versa.

The methods by which a DOTS client receives the address and associated service details of the DOTS server are not prescribed by this document. For example, a DOTS client may be directly configured to use a specific DOTS server IP address and port, and directly provided with any data necessary to satisfy the Peer Mutual Authentication requirement (SEC-001) in [RFC8612], such as symmetric or asymmetric keys, usernames and passwords, etc. All configuration and authentication information in this scenario is provided out-of-band by the domain operating the DOTS server.

At the other extreme, the architecture in this document allows for a form of DOTS client auto-provisioning. For example, the domain

operating the DOTS server or servers might provide the client domain only with symmetric or asymmetric keys to authenticate the provisioned DOTS clients. Only the keys would then be directly configured on DOTS clients, but the remaining configuration required to provision the DOTS clients could be learned through mechanisms similar to DNS SRV [RFC2782] or DNS Service Discovery [RFC6763].

The DOTS client SHOULD successfully authenticate and exchange messages with the DOTS server over both signal and (if used) data channel as soon as possible to confirm that both channels are operational.

As described in [RFC8612] (DM-008), the DOTS client can configure preferred values for acceptable signal loss, mitigation lifetime, and heartbeat intervals when establishing the DOTS signal channel session. A DOTS signal channel session is not active until DOTS agents have agreed on the values for these DOTS session parameters, a process defined by the protocol.

Once the DOTS client begins receiving DOTS server signals, the DOTS session is active. At any time during the DOTS session, the DOTS client may use the data channel to manage aliases, manage drop- and accept-listed prefixes or addresses, leverage vendor-specific extensions, and so on. Note that unlike the signal channel, there is no requirement that the data channel remains operational in attack conditions (See Data Channel Requirements, Section 2.3 of [RFC8612]).

3.1.3. Maintaining the DOTS Session

DOTS clients and servers periodically send heartbeats to each other over the signal channel, discussed in [RFC8612] (SIG-004). DOTS agent operators SHOULD configure the heartbeat interval such that the frequency does not lead to accidental denials of service due to the overwhelming number of heartbeats a DOTS agent must field.

Either DOTS agent may consider a DOTS signal channel session terminated in the extended absence of a heartbeat from its peer agent. The period of that absence will be established in the protocol definition.

3.2. Modes of Signaling

This section examines the modes of signaling between agents in a DOTS architecture.

3.2.1. Direct Signaling

A DOTS session may take the form of direct signaling between the DOTS clients and servers, as shown in Figure 10.




Figure 10: Direct Signaling

In a direct DOTS session, the DOTS client and server are communicating directly. Direct signaling may exist inter- or intra-domain. The DOTS session is abstracted from the underlying networks or network elements the signals traverse: in direct signaling, the DOTS client and server are logically adjacent.

3.2.2. Redirected Signaling

In certain circumstances, a DOTS server may want to redirect a DOTS client to an alternative DOTS server for a DOTS signal channel session. Such circumstances include but are not limited to:

- o Maximum number of DOTS signal channel sessions with clients has been reached;
- o Mitigation capacity exhaustion in the mitigator with which the specific DOTS server is communicating;
- o Mitigator outage or other downtime, such as scheduled maintenance;
- o Scheduled DOTS server maintenance;
- o Scheduled modifications to the network path between DOTS server and DOTS client.

A basic redirected DOTS signal channel session resembles the following, as shown in Figure 11.




Figure 11: Redirected Signaling

1. Previously established DOTS signal channel session 1 exists between a DOTS client and DOTS server A.
2. DOTS server A sends a server signal redirecting the client to DOTS server B.
3. If the DOTS client does not already have a separate DOTS signal channel session with the redirection target, the DOTS client initiates and establishes DOTS signal channel session 2 with DOTS server B.
4. Having redirected the DOTS client, DOTS server A ceases sending server signals. The DOTS client likewise stops sending client signals to DOTS server A. DOTS signal channel session 1 is terminated.

3.2.3. Recursive Signaling

DOTS is centered around improving the speed and efficiency of coordinated response to DDoS attacks. One scenario not yet discussed involves coordination among federated domains operating DOTS servers and mitigators.

In the course of normal DOTS operations, a DOTS client communicates the need for mitigation to a DOTS server, and that server initiates mitigation on a mitigator with which the server has an established service relationship. The operator of the mitigator may in turn monitor mitigation performance and capacity, as the attack being

mitigated may grow in severity beyond the mitigating domain's capabilities.

The operator of the mitigator has limited options in the event a DOTS client-requested mitigation is being overwhelmed by the severity of the attack. Out-of-scope business or service level agreements may permit the mitigating domain to drop the mitigation and let attack traffic flow unchecked to the target, but this only encourages attack escalation. In the case where the mitigating domain is the upstream service provider for the attack target, this may mean the mitigating domain and its other services and users continue to suffer the incidental effects of the attack.

A recursive signaling model as shown in Figure 12 offers an alternative. In a variation of the use case "Upstream DDoS Mitigation by an Upstream Internet Transit Provider" described in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases], a domain operating a DOTS server and mitigator also operates a DOTS client. This DOTS client has an established DOTS session with a DOTS server belonging to a separate administrative domain.

With these preconditions in place, the operator of the mitigator being overwhelmed or otherwise performing inadequately may request mitigation for the attack target from this separate DOTS-aware domain. Such a request recurses the originating mitigation request to the secondary DOTS server, in the hope of building a cumulative mitigation against the attack.




Figure 12: Recursive Signaling

In Figure 12, client `Cc` signals a request for mitigation across inter-domain DOTS session 1 to the DOTS server `Sn` belonging to the `example.net` domain. DOTS server `Sn` enables mitigation on mitigator `Mn`. DOTS server `Sn` is half of DOTS gateway `Gn`, being deployed logically back-to-back with DOTS client `Cn`, which has pre-existing inter-domain DOTS session 2 with the DOTS server `So` belonging to the `example.org` domain. At any point, DOTS server `Sn` MAY recurse an on-going mitigation request through DOTS client `Cn` to DOTS server `So`, in the expectation that mitigator `Mo` will be activated to aid in the defense of the attack target.

Recursive signaling is opaque to the DOTS client. To maximize mitigation visibility to the DOTS client, however, the recursing domain SHOULD provide recursed mitigation feedback in signals reporting on mitigation status to the DOTS client. For example, the recursing domain's DOTS server should incorporate into mitigation status messages available metrics such as dropped packet or byte counts from the recursed domain's DOTS server.

DOTS clients involved in recursive signaling must be able to withdraw requests for mitigation without warning or justification, per SIG-006 in [RFC8612].

Operators recursing mitigation requests MAY maintain the recursed mitigation for a brief, protocol-defined period in the event the DOTS client originating the mitigation withdraws its request for help, as per the discussion of managing mitigation toggling in SIG-006 of [RFC8612].

Deployment of recursive signaling may result in traffic redirection, examination and mitigation extending beyond the initial bilateral relationship between DOTS client and DOTS server. As such, client control over the network path of mitigated traffic may be reduced. DOTS client operators should be aware of any privacy concerns, and work with DOTS server operators employing recursive signaling to ensure shared sensitive material is suitably protected. Typically there is a contractual Service Level Agreement (SLA) negotiated among the DOTS client domain, the recursed domain and the recursing domain to meet the privacy requirements of the DOTS client domain and authorization for the recursing domain to request mitigation for the resources controlled by the DOTS client domain.

3.2.4. Anycast Signaling

The DOTS architecture does not assume the availability of anycast within a DOTS deployment, but neither does the architecture exclude it. Domains operating DOTS servers MAY deploy DOTS servers with an anycast Service Address as described in BCP 126 [RFC4786]. In such a deployment, DOTS clients connecting to the DOTS Service Address may be communicating with distinct DOTS servers, depending on the network configuration at the time the DOTS clients connect. Among other benefits, anycast signaling potentially offers the following:

- o Simplified DOTS client configuration, including service discovery through the methods described in [RFC7094]. In this scenario, the "instance discovery" message would be a DOTS client initiating a DOTS session to the DOTS server anycast Service Address, to which the DOTS server would reply with a redirection to the DOTS server unicast address the client should use for DOTS.
- o Region- or customer-specific deployments, in which the DOTS Service Addresses route to distinct DOTS servers depending on the client region or the customer network in which a DOTS client resides.
- o Operational resiliency, spreading DOTS signaling traffic across the DOTS server domain's networks, and thereby also reducing the potential attack surface, as described in BCP 126 [RFC4786].

3.2.4.1. Anycast Signaling Considerations

As long as network configuration remains stable, anycast DOTS signaling is to the individual DOTS client indistinct from direct signaling. However, the operational challenges inherent in anycast signaling are anything but negligible, and DOTS server operators must carefully weigh the risks against the benefits before deploying.

While the DOTS signal channel primarily operates over UDP per SIG-001 in [RFC8612], the signal channel also requires mutual authentication between DOTS agents, with associated security state on both ends.

Network instability is of particular concern with anycast signaling, as DOTS signal channels are expected to be long-lived, and potentially operating under congested network conditions caused by a volumetric DDoS attack.

For example, a network configuration altering the route to the DOTS server during active anycast signaling may cause the DOTS client to send messages to a DOTS server other than the one with which it initially established a signaling session. That second DOTS server might not have the security state of the existing session, forcing the DOTS client to initialize a new DOTS session. This challenge might in part be mitigated by use of resumption via a PSK in TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] and DTLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] (session resumption in TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347]), but keying material must be available to all DOTS servers sharing the anycast Service Address in that case which has operational challenges of its own.

While the DOTS client will try to establish a new DOTS session with the DOTS server now acting as the anycast DOTS Service Address, the link between DOTS client and server may be congested with attack traffic, making signal session establishment difficult. In such a scenario, anycast Service Address instability becomes a sort of signal session flapping, with obvious negative consequences for the DOTS deployment.

Anycast signaling deployments similarly must also take into account active mitigations. Active mitigations initiated through a DOTS session may involve diverting traffic to a scrubbing center. If the DOTS session flaps due to anycast changes as described above, mitigation may also flap as the DOTS servers sharing the anycast DOTS service address toggles mitigation on detecting DOTS session loss, depending on whether the client has configured mitigation on loss of signal (Section 3.3.3).

3.2.5. Signaling Considerations for Network Address Translation

Network address translators (NATs) are expected to be a common feature of DOTS deployments. The Middlebox Traversal Guidelines in [RFC8085] include general NAT considerations that are applicable to DOTS deployments when the signal channel is established over UDP.

Additional DOTS-specific considerations arise when NATs are part of the DOTS architecture. For example, DDoS attack detection behind a NAT will detect attacks against internal addresses. A DOTS client subsequently asked to request mitigation for the attacked scope of addresses cannot reasonably perform the task, due to the lack of externally routable addresses in the mitigation scope.

The following considerations do not cover all possible scenarios, but are meant rather to highlight anticipated common issues when signaling through NATs.

3.2.5.1. Direct Provisioning of Internal-to-External Address Mappings

Operators may circumvent the problem of translating internal addresses or prefixes to externally routable mitigation scopes by directly provisioning the mappings of external addresses to internal protected resources on the DOTS client. When the operator requests mitigation scoped for internal addresses, directly or through automated means, the DOTS client looks up the matching external addresses or prefixes, and issues a mitigation request scoped to that externally routable information.

When directly provisioning the address mappings, operators must ensure the mappings remain up to date, or risk losing the ability to request accurate mitigation scopes. To that aim, the DOTS client can rely on mechanisms such as [RFC8512] or [RFC7658] to retrieve static explicit mappings. This document does not prescribe the method by which mappings are maintained once they are provisioned on the DOTS client.

3.2.5.2. Resolving Public Mitigation Scope with Port Control Protocol (PCP)

Port Control Protocol (PCP) [RFC6887] may be used to retrieve the external addresses/prefixes and/or port numbers if the NAT function embeds a PCP server.

A DOTS client can use the information retrieved by means of PCP to feed the DOTS protocol(s) messages that will be sent to a DOTS server. These messages will convey the external addresses/prefixes as set by the NAT.

PCP also enables discovery and configuration of the lifetime of port mappings instantiated in intermediate NAT devices. Discovery of port mapping lifetimes can reduce the dependency on heartbeat messages to maintain mappings, and therefore reduce the load on DOTS servers and the network.

3.2.5.3. Resolving Public Mitigation Scope with Session Traversal Utilities (STUN)

An internal resource, e.g., a Web server, can discover its reflexive transport address through a STUN Binding request/response transaction, as described in [I-D.ietf-tram-stunbis]. After learning its reflexive transport address from the STUN server, the internal resource can export its reflexive transport address and internal transport address to the DOTS client, thereby enabling the DOTS client to request mitigation with the correct external scope, as depicted in Figure 13. The mechanism for providing the DOTS client with the reflexive transport address and internal transport address is unspecified in this document.

In order to prevent an attacker from modifying the STUN messages in transit, the STUN client and server must use the message-integrity mechanism discussed in Section 9 of [I-D.ietf-tram-stunbis] or use STUN over DTLS [RFC7350] or use STUN over TLS. If the STUN client is behind a NAT that performs Endpoint-Dependent Mapping [RFC5128], the internal service cannot provide the DOTS client with the reflexive transport address discovered using STUN. The behavior of a NAT between the STUN client and the STUN server could be discovered using the experimental techniques discussed in [RFC5780], but note that there is currently no standardized way for a STUN client to reliably determine if it is behind a NAT that performs Endpoint-Dependent Mapping.




Figure 13: Resolving mitigation scope with STUN

3.2.5.4. Resolving Requested Mitigation Scope with DNS

DOTS supports mitigation scoped to DNS names. As discussed in [RFC3235], using DNS names instead of IP addresses potentially avoids the address translation problem, as long as the same domain name is internally and externally resolvable. For example, a detected attack's internal target address can be mapped to a DNS name through a reverse lookup. The DNS name returned by the reverse lookup can then be provided to the DOTS client as the external scope for mitigation. For the reverse DNS lookup, DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) [RFC4033] must be used where the authenticity of response is critical.

3.3. Triggering Requests for Mitigation

[RFC8612] places no limitation on the circumstances in which a DOTS client operator may request mitigation, nor does it demand justification for any mitigation request, thereby reserving operational control over DDoS defense for the domain requesting mitigation. This architecture likewise does not prescribe the network conditions and mechanisms triggering a mitigation request from a DOTS client.

However, considering selected possible mitigation triggers from an architectural perspective offers a model for alternative or unanticipated triggers for DOTS deployments. In all cases, what network conditions merit a mitigation request are at the discretion of the DOTS client operator.

The mitigation request itself is defined by DOTS, however the interfaces required to trigger the mitigation request in the following scenarios are implementation-specific.

3.3.1. Manual Mitigation Request

A DOTS client operator may manually prepare a request for mitigation, including scope and duration, and manually instruct the DOTS client to send the mitigation request to the DOTS server. In context, a manual request is a request directly issued by the operator without automated decision-making performed by a device interacting with the DOTS client. Modes of manual mitigation requests include an operator entering a command into a text interface, or directly interacting with a graphical interface to send the request.

An operator might do this, for example, in response to notice of an attack delivered by attack detection equipment or software, and the alerting detector lacks interfaces or is not configured to use available interfaces to translate the alert to a mitigation request automatically.

In a variation of the above scenario, the operator may have preconfigured on the DOTS client mitigation requests for various resources in the operator's domain. When notified of an attack, the DOTS client operator manually instructs the DOTS client to send the relevant preconfigured mitigation request for the resources under attack.

A further variant involves recursive signaling, as described in Section 3.2.3. The DOTS client in this case is the second half of a DOTS gateway (back-to-back DOTS server and client). As in the previous scenario, the scope and duration of the mitigation request are pre-existing, but in this case are derived from the mitigation request received from a downstream DOTS client by the DOTS server. Assuming the preconditions required by Section 3.2.3 are in place, the DOTS gateway operator may at any time manually request mitigation from an upstream DOTS server, sending a mitigation request derived from the downstream DOTS client's request.

The motivations for a DOTS client operator to request mitigation manually are not prescribed by this architecture, but are expected to include some of the following:

- o Notice of an attack delivered via e-mail or alternative messaging
- o Notice of an attack delivered via phone call

- o Notice of an attack delivered through the interface(s) of networking monitoring software deployed in the operator's domain
- o Manual monitoring of network behavior through network monitoring software

3.3.2. Automated Conditional Mitigation Request

Unlike manual mitigation requests, which depend entirely on the DOTS client operator's capacity to react with speed and accuracy to every detected or detectable attack, mitigation requests triggered by detected attack conditions reduce the operational burden on the DOTS client operator, and minimize the latency between attack detection and the start of mitigation.

Mitigation requests are triggered in this scenario by operator-specified network conditions. Attack detection is deployment-specific, and not constrained by this architecture. Similarly the specifics of a condition are left to the discretion of the operator, though common conditions meriting mitigation include the following:

- o Detected attack exceeding a rate in packets per second (pps).
- o Detected attack exceeding a rate in bytes per second (bps).
- o Detected resource exhaustion in an attack target.
- o Detected resource exhaustion in the local domain's mitigator.
- o Number of open connections to an attack target.
- o Number of attack sources in a given attack.
- o Number of active attacks against targets in the operator's domain.
- o Conditional detection developed through arbitrary statistical analysis or deep learning techniques.
- o Any combination of the above.

When automated conditional mitigation requests are enabled, violations of any of the above conditions, or any additional operator-defined conditions, will trigger a mitigation request from the DOTS client to the DOTS server. The interfaces between the application detecting the condition violation and the DOTS client are implementation-specific.

3.3.3. Automated Mitigation on Loss of Signal

To maintain a DOTS signal channel session, the DOTS client and the DOTS server exchange regular but infrequent messages across the signal channel. In the absence of an attack, the probability of message loss in the signaling channel should be extremely low. Under attack conditions, however, some signal loss may be anticipated as attack traffic congests the link, depending on the attack type.

While [RFC8612] specifies the DOTS protocol be robust when signaling under attack conditions, there are nevertheless scenarios in which the DOTS signal is lost in spite of protocol best efforts. To handle such scenarios, a DOTS operator may request one or more mitigations which are triggered only when the DOTS server ceases receiving DOTS client heartbeats beyond the miss count or interval permitted by the protocol.

The impact of mitigating due to loss of signal in either direction must be considered carefully before enabling it. Attack traffic congesting links is not the only reason why signal could be lost, and as such mitigation requests triggered by signal channel degradation in either direction may incur unnecessary costs due to scrubbing traffic, adversely impact network performance and operational expense alike.

4. IANA Considerations

This document has no actions for IANA.

5. Security Considerations

This section describes identified security considerations for the DOTS architecture.

Security considerations and security requirements discussed in [RFC8612] need to be taken into account.

DOTS is at risk from three primary attack vectors: agent impersonation, traffic injection and signal blocking. These vectors may be exploited individually or in concert by an attacker to confuse, disable, take information from, or otherwise inhibit DOTS agents.

Any attacker with the ability to impersonate a legitimate DOTS client or server or, indeed, inject false messages into the stream may potentially trigger/withdraw traffic redirection, trigger/cancel mitigation activities or subvert drop-/accept-lists. From an architectural standpoint, operators MUST ensure conformance to the

security requirements defined in Section 2.4 of [RFC8612] to secure data in transit. Similarly, as the received data may contain network topology, telemetry, threat and mitigation information which could be considered sensitive in certain environment, it SHOULD be protected at rest per required local policy.

DOTS agents MUST perform mutual authentication to ensure authenticity of each other and DOTS servers MUST verify that the requesting DOTS client is authorized to request mitigation for specific target resources (see Section 2.2.2).

An MITM attacker can intercept and drop packets, preventing the DOTS peers from receiving some or all of the DOTS messages, automated mitigation on loss of signal can be used as a countermeasure but with risks discussed in Section 3.3.3.

An attacker with control of a DOTS client may negatively influence network traffic by requesting and withdrawing requests for mitigation for particular prefixes, leading to route or DNS flapping. DOTS operators should carefully monitor and audit DOTS clients to detect misbehavior and deter misuse.

Any attack targeting the availability of DOTS servers may disrupt the ability of the system to receive and process DOTS signals resulting in failure to fulfill a mitigation request. DOTS servers MUST be given adequate protections, in accordance with best current practices for network and host security.

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Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel
draft-ietf-dots-data-channel-07

Abstract

The document specifies a Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) data channel used for bulk exchange of data not easily or appropriately communicated through the DOTS signal channel under attack conditions. This is a companion document to the DOTS signal channel specification.

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1. Introduction

A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack is an attempt to make machines or network resources unavailable to their intended users. In most cases, sufficient scale can be achieved by compromising enough end-hosts and using those infected hosts to perpetrate and amplify the attack. The victim in this attack can be an application server, a client, a router, a firewall, or an entire network.

DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture] defines two channels: signal and data channels (Figure 1). The DOTS signal channel used to convey that a network is under a DDOS attack to an upstream DOTS server so that appropriate mitigation actions are undertaken on the suspect traffic is further elaborated in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]. The DOTS data channel is used for infrequent bulk data exchange between DOTS agents in the aim to significantly augment attack response coordination.




Figure 1: DOTS Channels

Section 2 of [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture] identifies that the DOTS data channel is used to perform the tasks listed below:

- o Filter management, which enables a DOTS client to request the installation or removal of traffic filters, dropping or rate-limiting unwanted traffic and permitting white-listed traffic. Sample use cases for populating black- or white-list filtering rules are detailed hereafter:
 - A. If a network resource (DOTS client) detects a potential DDoS attack from a set of IP addresses, the DOTS client informs its servicing router (DOTS gateway) of all suspect IP addresses that need to be blocked or black-listed for further investigation. The DOTS client could also specify a list of protocols and ports in the black-list rule. That DOTS gateway in-turn propagates the black-listed IP addresses to the DOTS server which will undertake appropriate action so that traffic from these IP addresses to the target network (specified by the DOTS client) is blocked.
 - B. A network has partner sites from which only legitimate traffic arrives and the network wants to ensure that the traffic from

these sites is not penalized during DDOS attacks. The DOTS client uses the DOTS data channel to convey the white-listed IP addresses or prefixes of the partner sites to its DOTS server. The DOTS server uses this information to white-list flows from such IP addresses or prefixes reaching the network.

- o Creating identifiers, such as names or aliases, for resources for which mitigation may be requested:
 - A. The DOTS client may submit to the DOTS server a collection of prefixes which it would like to refer to by alias when requesting mitigation. The server can respond to this request with either with a success or failure response (see requirement OP-006 in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements] and Section 2 in [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]).

2. Notational Conventions and Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

The reader should be familiar with the terms defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture].

The terminology for describing YANG data modules is defined in [RFC7950]. The meaning of the symbols in tree diagrams is defined in [I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams].

For simplicity, all of the examples in this document use `/restconf` as the discovered RESTCONF API root path. Many protocol header lines and message-body text within examples throughout the document are split into multiple lines for display purposes only. When a line ends with backslash (`'\'`) as the last character, the line is wrapped for display purposes. It is to be considered to be joined to the next line by deleting the backslash, the following line break, and the leading whitespace of the next line.

3. DOTS Data Channel

The DOTS data channel is intended to be used for bulk data exchanges between DOTS agents. Unlike the signal channel [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel], which must operate nominally even when confronted with signal degradation due to packets loss, the data channel is not expected to be constructed to deal with DDOS attack conditions.

As the primary function of the data channel is data exchange, a reliable transport is required in order for DOTS agents to detect data delivery success or failure. RESTCONF [RFC8040] over TLS [RFC5246] over TCP is used for DOTS data channel (Figure 2). RESTCONF uses HTTP methods to provide CRUD (create, read, update, delete) operations on a conceptual datastore containing YANG data, which is compatible with a server implementing NETCONF datastores.

The HTTP POST, PUT, PATCH, and DELETE methods are used to edit data resources represented by DOTS data channel YANG data models. These basic edit operations allow the DOTS data channel running configuration to be altered by a DOTS client.

DOTS data channel configuration data and state data can be retrieved with the GET method. HTTP status codes are used to report success or failure for RESTCONF operations.

The DOTS client will perform the root resource discovery procedure discussed in Section 3.1 of [RFC8040] to determine the root of the RESTCONF API. After discovering the RESTCONF API root, the DOTS client uses this value as the initial part of the path in the request URI, in any subsequent request to the DOTS server. The DOTS server may support retrieval of the YANG modules it supports (Section 3.7 in [RFC8040]), for example, a DOTS client may use RESTCONF to retrieve the company proprietary YANG modules supported by the DOTS server.

Note: This document uses RESTCONF, a protocol based on HTTP [RFC7230], for configuring data defined in YANG version 1 [RFC6020] or YANG version 1.1 [RFC7950], using the datastore concepts defined in the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF) [RFC6241]. RESTCONF combines the simplicity of the HTTP protocol with the predictability and automation potential of a schema-driven API. RESTCONF offers a simple subset of NETCONF functionality and provides a simplified interface using REST-like API which addresses the needs of the DOTS data channel and hence an optimal choice.




Figure 2: Abstract Layering of DOTS data channel over RESTCONF over TLS

JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [RFC7159] payload is used to propagate data channel specific payload messages that convey request parameters and response information such as errors. This specification uses the encoding rules defined in [RFC7951] for representing DOTS data channel configuration data defined using YANG (Section 3.1) as JSON text.

A DOTS client registers itself to its DOTS server(s) in order to set up DOTS data channel related configuration data and receive state data (i.e., non-configuration data) from the DOTS server(s).

A single DOTS data channel between DOTS agents can be used to exchange multiple requests and multiple responses. To reduce DOTS client and DOTS server workload, DOTS client SHOULD re-use the same TLS session. While the communication to the DOTS server is quiescent, the DOTS client MAY probe the server to ensure it has maintained cryptographic state. Such probes can also keep alive firewall and/or NAT bindings. A TLS heartbeat [RFC6520] verifies the DOTS server still has TLS state by returning a TLS message.

3.1. DOTS Data Channel YANG Module

3.1.1. Identifier Module Tree Structure

This document defines a YANG module for creating identifiers, such as names or aliases, for resources for which mitigation may be requested. Such identifiers may be used in subsequent DOTS signal channel exchanges to refer more efficiently to the resources under attack.

This document defines the YANG module "ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier", which has the following tree structure:

```

module: ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier
  +--rw identifier
    +--rw client-identifier*   binary
    +--rw alias* [alias-name]
      +--rw alias-name         string
      +--rw target-ip*         inet:ip-address
      +--rw target-prefix*     inet:ip-prefix
      +--rw target-port-range* [lower-port upper-port]
        | +--rw lower-port     inet:port-number
        | +--rw upper-port     inet:port-number
      +--rw target-protocol*   uint8
      +--rw fqdn*              inet:domain-name
      +--rw uri*               inet:uri

```

This structure is aligned with Section 5.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].

3.1.2. Identifier Model YANG Module

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier@2017-10-12.yang"

```

module ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier {
  yang-version 1.1;
  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier";

  prefix "alias";

  import ietf-inet-types {
    prefix "inet";
  }

  organization "IETF DOTS Working Group";

  contact
    "Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy <TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com>
    Mohamed Boucadair <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
    Kaname Nishizuka <kaname@nttv6.jp>
    Liang Xia <frank.xialiang@huawei.com>
    Prashanth Patil <praspati@cisco.com>
    Andrew Mortensen <amortensen@arbor.net>
    Nik Teague <nteague@verisign.com>";

  description
    "This module contains YANG definition for configuring
    identifiers for resources using DOTS data channel.

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```

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This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see the RFC itself for full legal notices.";

```
revision 2017-10-12 {
  description "Fix nits and align the module with the signal
              channel.";
  reference
    "-05";
}

revision 2017-08-03 {
  reference
    "https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dots-data-channel";
}

container identifier {
  description "Top level container for identifiers";

  leaf-list client-identifier {
    type binary;
    description "A client identifier conveyed by a DOTS gateway
                to a remote DOTS server.";

    reference
      "I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel";
  }

  list alias {
    key alias-name;
    description "List of identifiers";

    leaf alias-name {
      type string;
      description "alias name";
    }

    leaf-list target-ip {
      type inet:ip-address;
      description "IPv4 or IPv6 address identifying the target."
    }
  }
};
```



```
leaf-list target-prefix {
  type inet:ip-prefix;
  description "IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the target.";
}

list target-port-range {
  key "lower-port upper-port";
  description
    "Port range. When only lower-port is present,
    it represents a single port.";
  leaf lower-port {
    type inet:port-number;
    mandatory true;
    description "Lower port number.";
  }
  leaf upper-port {
    type inet:port-number;
    must ". >= ../lower-port" {
      error-message
        "The upper-port must be greater than or
        equal to lower-port";
    }
    description "Upper port number.";
  }
}

leaf-list target-protocol {
  type uint8;
  description "Identifies the target protocol number.";

  reference
    "https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/
    protocol-numbers.xhtml";
}

leaf-list fqdn {
  type inet:domain-name;
  description "FQDN";
}

leaf-list uri {
  type inet:uri;
  description "URI";
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
```

3.1.3. Filter Model YANG Module Tree Structure

This document augments the "ietf-access-control-list" Access Control List (ACL) YANG module [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model] for managing filtering rules. ACL is explained in Section 1 of [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model].

Examples of ACL management include, but not limited to,:

- o Black-list management, which enables a DOTS client to inform the DOTS server about sources from which traffic should be suppressed.
- o White-list management, which enables a DOTS client to inform the DOTS server about sources from which traffic should always be accepted.
- o Filter management, which enables a DOTS client to request the installation or removal of traffic filters, dropping or rate-limiting unwanted traffic and permitting white-listed traffic.

This document defines the YANG module "ietf-dots-access-control-list" to augment the "ietf-access-control-list" module to support filters based on the client identifier (client-identifier), to support rate-limit action (rate-limit), and to handle fragmented packets (fragments).

Filtering fragments adds an additional layer of protection against a DoS attack that uses only noninitial fragments. When there is only Layer 3 information in the ACL entry and the fragments keyword is present, for noninitial fragments matching the ACL entry, the deny or permit action associated with the ACL entry will be enforced and for initial or non-fragment matching the ACL entry, the next ACL entry will be processed. When there is both Layer 3 and Layer 4 information in the ACL entry and the fragments keyword is present, the ACL action is conservative for both permit and deny actions. The actions are conservative to not accidentally deny a fragmented portion of a flow because the fragments do not contain sufficient information to match all of the filter attributes. In the deny action case, instead of denying a non-initial fragment, the next ACL entry is processed. In the permit case, it is assumed that the Layer 4 information in the non-initial fragment, if available, matches the Layer 4 information in the ACL entry.

The "ietf-dots-access-control-list" module has the following structure:

```
module: ietf-dots-access-control-list
  augment /ietf-acl:access-lists:
    +--rw client-identifier*   binary
  augment /ietf-acl:access-lists/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces/ietf-acl:ace/ietf-acl:actions/ietf-acl:packet-handling:
    +--:(rate-limit)
      +--rw rate-limit?       decimal64
  augment /ietf-acl:access-lists/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces/ietf-acl:ace:
    +--rw fragments?         empty
```

3.1.4. Filter Model YANG Module

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-dots-access-control-list@2017-10-12.yang"

```
module ietf-dots-access-control-list {
  yang-version 1.1;

  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-access-control-list";
  prefix "dots-acl";

  import ietf-access-control-list {
    prefix "ietf-acl";
  }

  organization "IETF DOTS Working Group";

  contact
    "Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy <TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com>
    Mohamed Boucadair <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
    Kaname Nishizuka <kaname@nttv6.jp>
    Liang Xia <frank.xialiang@huawei.com>
    Prashanth Patil <praspati@cisco.com>
    Andrew Mortensen <amortensen@arbor.net>
    Nik Teague <nteague@verisign.com>";

  description
    "This module contains YANG definition for configuring
    filtering rules using DOTS data channel.

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    Relating to IETF Documents
    (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
```

This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see the RFC itself for full legal notices."

```
revision 2017-10-12 {
  description "Fix nits and align the module with the signal
              channel.";
  reference
    "-05";
}

revision 2017-06-12 {
  reference
    "https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dots-data-channel";
}

augment "/ietf-acl:access-lists" {

  description "client-identifier parameter.";

  leaf-list client-identifier {
    type binary;
    description "A client identifier conveyed by a DOTS gateway
                 to a remote DOTS server.";
  }
}

augment "/ietf-acl:access-lists/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces/"
  + "ietf-acl:ace/ietf-acl:actions" {

  description "rate-limit action";
  leaf rate-limit {
    type decimal64 {
      fraction-digits 2;
    }
    description "rate-limit action.";
  }
}

augment "/ietf-acl:access-lists/ietf-acl:acl/ietf-acl:aces/ietf-acl:ace" {

  description "Handle non-initial and initial fragments.";

  leaf fragments {
    type empty;
    description "Handle fragments.";
  }
}
}
```

<CODE ENDS>

3.2. Identifiers

3.2.1. Create Identifiers

A POST request is used to create identifiers, such as names or aliases, for resources for which a mitigation may be requested. Such identifiers may then be used in subsequent DOTS signal channel exchanges to refer more efficiently to the resources under attack (Figure 3).

```
POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Content-Format: "application/yang.api+json"
{
  "ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier:identifier": {
    "client-identifier": [
      "string"
    ],
    "alias": [
      {
        "alias-name": "string",
        "target-ip": [
          "string"
        ],
        "target-prefix": [
          "string"
        ],
        "target-port-range": [
          {
            "lower-port": integer,
            "upper-port": integer
          }
        ],
        "target-protocol": [
          integer
        ],
        "fqdn": [
          "string"
        ],
        "uri": [
          "string"
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

Figure 3: POST to create identifiers

The header parameters are described below:

client-identifer: This attribute has the same meaning, syntax and processing rules as the 'client-identifier' attribute defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]. This is an optional attribute.

alias-name: Name of the alias. This is a mandatory attribute.

target-ip: IP addresses are separated by commas. This is an optional attribute.

target-prefix: Prefixes are separated by commas. This is an optional attribute.

target-port-range: The port range, lower-port for lower port number and upper-port for upper port number. For TCP, UDP, SCTP, or DCCP: the range of ports (e.g., 80 to 8080). This is an optional attribute.

target-protocol: Values are taken from the IANA protocol registry [proto_numbers]. The value 0 has a special meaning for 'all protocols'. This is an optional attribute.

fqdn: Fully Qualified Domain Name, is the full name of a system, rather than just its hostname. For example, "venera" is a hostname, and "venera.isi.edu" is an FQDN. This is an optional attribute.

uri: Uniform Resource Identifier (URI). This is an optional attribute.

In the POST request at least one of the attributes 'target-ip' or 'target-prefix' or 'fqdn' or 'uri' MUST be present. DOTS agents can safely ignore Vendor-Specific parameters they don't understand.

Figure 4 shows a POST request to create alias called "https1" for HTTP(S) servers with IP addresses 2001:db8:6401::1 and 2001:db8:6401::2 listening on port 443.

```
POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com
Content-Format: "application/yang.api+json"
{
  "ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier:identifier": {
    "client-identifier": [
      "dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw",
      "iAYmCNPmrYoKoqzgFMiobw"
    ],
    "alias": [
      {
        "alias-name": "Server1",
        "target-protocol": [
          6
        ],
        "target-ip": [
          "2001:db8:6401::1",
          "2001:db8:6401::2"
        ],
        "target-port-range": [
          {
            "lower-port": 443
          }
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

Figure 4: POST to create identifiers

The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the POST request using HTTP response codes. HTTP 2xx codes are success, HTTP 4xx codes are some sort of invalid requests and 5xx codes are returned if the DOTS server has erred or it is incapable of accepting the alias. Response code 201 (Created) will be returned in the response if the DOTS server has accepted the alias. If the request is missing one or more mandatory attributes then 400 (Bad Request) will be returned in the response or if the request contains invalid or unknown parameters then 400 (Invalid query) will be returned in the response. The HTTP response will include the JSON body received in the request.

The DOTS client can use the PUT request (Section 4.5 in [RFC8040]) to create or modify the aliases in the DOTS server.

3.2.2. Delete Identifiers

A DELETE request is used to delete identifiers maintained by a DOTS server (Figure 5).

```
DELETE /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier:identifier\  
      /client-identifier=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw,iAYmCNPmrYoKoqzgFMiobw\  
      /alias-name=Server1 HTTP/1.1  
Host: {host}:{port}
```

Figure 5: DELETE identifier

In RESTCONF, URI-encoded path expressions are used. A RESTCONF data resource identifier is encoded from left to right, starting with the top-level data node, according to the 'api-path' rule defined in Section 3.5.3.1 of [RFC8040]. The data node in the above path expression is a YANG list node and MUST be encoded according to the rules defined in Section 3.5.1 of [RFC8040].

If the DOTS server does not find the alias name conveyed in the DELETE request in its configuration data, then it responds with a 404 (Not Found) error response code. The DOTS server successfully acknowledges a DOTS client's request to remove the identifier using 204 (No Content) in the response.

3.2.3. Retrieving Installed Identifiers

A GET request is used to retrieve the set of installed identifiers from a DOTS server (Section 3.3.1 in [RFC8040]). Figure 6 shows how to retrieve all the identifiers that were instantiated by the DOTS client. The content parameter and its permitted values are defined in Section 4.8.1 of [RFC8040].

```
GET /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier:identifier\  
   /client-identifier=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw,iAYmCNPmrYoKoqzgFMiobw?\  
   content=config HTTP/1.1  
Host: {host}:{port}  
Accept: application/yang-data+json
```

Figure 6: GET to retrieve all the installed identifiers

Figure 7 shows response for all identifiers on the DOTS server.

```
{
  "ietf-dots-data-channel-identifier:identifier": {
    "client-identifier": [
      "dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw",
      "iAYmCNPmrYoKoqzgFMiobw"
    ],
    "alias": [
      {
        "alias-name": "Server1",
        "traffic-protocol": [
          6
        ],
        "ip": [
          "2001:db8:6401::1",
          "2001:db8:6401::2"
        ],
        "port-range": [
          {
            "lower-port": 443
          }
        ]
      },
      {
        "alias-name": "Server2",
        "traffic-protocol": [
          6
        ],
        "ip": [
          "2001:db8:6401::10",
          "2001:db8:6401::20"
        ],
        "port-range": [
          {
            "lower-port": 80
          }
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

Figure 7: Response body

If the DOTS server does not find the alias name conveyed in the GET request in its configuration data, then it responds with a 404 (Not Found) error response code.

3.3. Filtering Rules

The DOTS server either receives the filtering rules directly from the DOTS client or via a DOTS gateway.

If the DOTS client signals the filtering rules via a DOTS gateway, then the DOTS gateway validates if the DOTS client is authorized to signal the filtering rules and if the client is authorized propagates the rules to the DOTS server. Likewise, the DOTS server validates if the DOTS gateway is authorized to signal the filtering rules. To create or purge filters, the DOTS client sends HTTP requests to its DOTS gateway. The DOTS gateway validates the rules in the requests and proxies the requests containing the filtering rules to a DOTS server. When the DOTS gateway receives the associated HTTP response from the DOTS server, it propagates the response back to the DOTS client.

The following APIs define means for a DOTS client to configure filtering rules on a DOTS server.

3.3.1. Install Filtering Rules

A POST request is used to push filtering rules to a DOTS server. Figure 8 shows a POST request example to block traffic from 192.0.2.0/24, destined to 198.51.100.0/24. The ACL JSON configuration for the filtering rule is generated using the ACL YANG data model defined in [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model] and the ACL configuration XML for the filtering rule is specified in Section 4.3 of [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model].

```

POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-access-control-list HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com
Content-Format: "application/yang.api+json"
{
  "ietf-dots-access-control-list:access-lists": {
    "client-identifier": [
      "dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw",
      "iAYmCNPmrYoKoqzgFMiobw"
    ],
    "acl": [
      {
        "acl-name": "sample-ipv4-acl",
        "acl-type": "ipv4-acl",
        "aces": {
          "ace": [
            {
              "rule-name": "rule1",
              "matches": {
                "ipv4-acl": {
                  "source-ipv4-network": "192.0.2.0/24",
                  "destination-ipv4-network": "198.51.100.0/24"
                }
              },
              "actions": {
                "deny": [null]
              }
            }
          ]
        }
      }
    ]
  }
}

```

Figure 8: POST to install filtering rules

The header parameters defined in [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model] are discussed below:

acl-name: The name of access-list. This is a mandatory attribute.

acl-type: Indicates the primary intended type of match criteria (e.g. IPv4, IPv6). This is a mandatory attribute.

protocol: Internet Protocol numbers. This is an optional attribute.

source-ipv4-network: The source IPv4 prefix. This is an optional attribute.

destination-ipv4-network: The destination IPv4 prefix. This is an optional attribute.

actions: "deny" or "permit" or "rate-limit". "permit" action is used to white-list traffic. "deny" action is used to black-list traffic. "rate-limit" action is used to rate-limit traffic, the allowed traffic rate is represented in bytes per second indicated in IEEE floating point format [IEEE.754.1985]. If actions attribute is not specified in the request then the default action is "deny". This is an optional attribute.

The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the POST request using HTTP response codes. HTTP 2xx codes are success, HTTP 4xx codes are some sort of invalid requests and 5xx codes are returned if the DOTS server has erred or it is incapable of configuring the filtering rules. Response code 201 (Created) will be returned in the response if the DOTS server has accepted the filtering rules. If the request is missing one or more mandatory attributes then 400 (Bad Request) will be returned in the response or if the request contains invalid or unknown parameters then 400 (Invalid query) will be returned in the response.

The DOTS client can use the PUT request to create or modify the filtering rules in the DOTS server.

3.3.2. Remove Filtering Rules

A DELETE request is used to delete filtering rules from a DOTS server (Figure 9).

```
DELETE /restconf/data/ietf-dots-access-control-list:access-lists\  
      /client-identifier=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw,iAYmCNPmrYoKoqzgFMiobw\  
      /acl-name=sample-ipv4-acl&acl-type=ipv4-acl HTTP/1.1  
Host: {host}:{port}
```

Figure 9: DELETE to remove the filtering rules

If the DOTS server does not find the access list name and access list type conveyed in the DELETE request in its configuration data, then it responds with a 404 (Not Found) error response code. The DOTS server successfully acknowledges a DOTS client's request to withdraw the filtering rules using 204 (No Content) response code, and removes the filtering rules as soon as possible.

3.3.3. Retrieving Installed Filtering Rules

The DOTS client periodically queries the DOTS server to check the counters for installed filtering rules. A GET request is used to retrieve filtering rules from a DOTS server. Figure 10 shows how to retrieve all the filtering rules programmed by the DOTS client and the number of matches for the installed filtering rules.

```
GET /restconf/data/ietf-dots-access-control-list:access-lists\
    /client-identifier=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw,iAYmCNPmrYoKoqzgFMiobw?\
    content=all HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Accept: application/yang-data+json
```

Figure 10: GET to retrieve the configuration data and state data for the filtering rules

If the DOTS server does not find the access list name and access list type conveyed in the GET request in its configuration data, then it responds with a 404 (Not Found) error response code.

4. IANA Considerations

This specification registers new parameters for the DOTS data channel and establishes registries for mappings to JSON attributes.

4.1. DOTS Data Channel JSON Attribute Mappings Registry

A new registry will be requested from IANA, entitled "DOTS data channel JSON attribute Mappings Registry". The registry is to be created as Expert Review Required.

4.2. Registration Template

JSON Attribute:
JSON attribute name.

Description:
Brief description of the attribute.

Change Controller:
For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG". For others, give the name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.

Specification Document(s):
Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter, preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of

the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be included but is not required.

4.3. Initial Registry Contents

- o JSON Attribute: "client-identifier"
- o Description: Client identifier.
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document

- o JSON Attribute: "alias-name"
- o Description: Name of alias.
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document

- o JSON Attribute: "traffic-protocol"
- o Description: Internet protocol numbers.
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document

- o JSON Attribute: "port-range"
- o Description: The port range, lower-port for lower port number and upper-port for upper port number. For TCP, UDP, SCTP, or DCCP: the range of ports (e.g., 80 to 8080).
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document

- o JSON Attribute: "lower-port"
- o Description: Lower port number for port range.
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document

- o JSON Attribute: "upper-port"
- o Description: Upper port number for port range.
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document

- o JSON Attribute: "ip"
- o Description: IP address.
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document

- o JSON Attribute: "prefix"
- o Description: IP prefix
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document

- o JSON Attribute: "fqdn"

- o Description: Fully Qualified Domain Name, is the full name of a system, rather than just its hostname. For example, "venera" is a hostname, and "venera.isi.edu" is an FQDN.
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document

- o JSON Attribute: "uri"
- o Description: Uniform Resource Identifier (URI).
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document

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6. Security Considerations

Authenticated encryption MUST be used for data confidentiality and message integrity. TLS based on client certificate MUST be used for mutual authentication. The interaction between the DOTS agents requires Transport Layer Security (TLS) with a cipher suite offering confidentiality protection and the guidance given in [RFC7525] MUST be followed to avoid attacks on TLS.

An attacker may be able to inject RST packets, bogus application segments, etc., regardless of whether TLS authentication is used. Because the application data is TLS protected, this will not result in the application receiving bogus data, but it will constitute a DoS on the connection. This attack can be countered by using TCP-AO [RFC5925]. If TCP-AO is used, then any bogus packets injected by an attacker will be rejected by the TCP-AO integrity check and therefore will never reach the TLS layer.

In order to prevent leaking internal information outside a client-domain, DOTS gateways located in the client-domain SHOULD NOT reveal the identity of internal DOTS clients (client-identifier) unless explicitly configured to do so.

Special care should be taken in order to ensure that the activation of the proposed mechanism won't have an impact on the stability of the network (including connectivity and services delivered over that network).

Involved functional elements in the cooperation system must establish exchange instructions and notification over a secure and authenticated channel. Adequate filters can be enforced to avoid that nodes outside a trusted domain can inject request such as deleting filtering rules. Nevertheless, attacks can be initiated from within the trusted domain if an entity has been corrupted. Adequate means to monitor trusted nodes should also be enabled.

7. Acknowledgements

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Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel
Specification
draft-ietf-dots-data-channel-31

Abstract

The document specifies a Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) data channel used for bulk exchange of data that cannot easily or appropriately be communicated through the DOTS signal channel under attack conditions.

This is a companion document to the DOTS signal channel specification.

Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)

Please update these statements within the document with the RFC number to be assigned to this document:

- o "This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX;"
- o "RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel Specification";
- o reference: RFC XXXX

Please update the "revision" date of the YANG module.

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1. Introduction

A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack is an attempt to make machines or network resources unavailable to their intended users. In most cases, sufficient scale can be achieved by compromising enough end-hosts and using those infected hosts to perpetrate and amplify the attack. The victim of such attack can be an application server, a router, a firewall, an entire network, etc.

As discussed in [RFC8612], the lack of a common method to coordinate a real-time response among involved actors and network domains inhibits the speed and effectiveness of DDoS attack mitigation. From that standpoint, DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) defines an architecture that allows a DOTS client to send requests to a DOTS server for DDoS attack mitigation [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]. The DOTS approach is thus meant to minimize the impact of DDoS attacks, thereby contributing to the enforcement of more efficient defensive if not proactive security strategies. To that aim, DOTS defines two channels: the signal and the data channels (Figure 1).




Figure 1: DOTS Channels

The DOTS signal channel is used to carry information about a device or a network (or a part thereof) that is under a DDoS attack. Such information is sent by a DOTS client to an upstream DOTS server so that appropriate mitigation actions are undertaken on traffic deemed suspicious. The DOTS signal channel is further elaborated in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].

As for the DOTS data channel, it is used for infrequent bulk data exchange between DOTS agents to significantly improve the coordination of all the parties involved in the response to the attack. Section 2 of [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture] mentions that the DOTS data channel is used to perform the following tasks:

- o Creating aliases for resources for which mitigation may be requested.

A DOTS client may submit to its DOTS server a collection of prefixes which it would like to refer to by an alias when requesting mitigation. The DOTS server can respond to this request with either a success or failure response (see Section 2 in [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]).

Refer to Section 6 for more details.

- o Policy management, which enables a DOTS client to request the installation or withdrawal of traffic filters, dropping or rate-limiting unwanted traffic, and permitting accept-listed traffic. A DOTS client is entitled to instruct filtering rules only on IP resources that belong to its domain.

Sample use cases for populating drop- or accept-list filtering rules are detailed hereafter:

- * If a network resource (DOTS client) is informed about a potential DDoS attack from a set of IP addresses, the DOTS client informs its servicing DOTS gateway of all suspect IP addresses that need to be drop-listed for further investigation. The DOTS client could also specify a list of protocols and port numbers in the drop-list rule.

The DOTS gateway then propagates the drop-listed IP addresses to a DOTS server which will undertake appropriate actions so that traffic originated by these IP addresses to the target network (specified by the DOTS client) is blocked.

- * A network, that has partner sites from which only legitimate traffic arrives, may want to ensure that the traffic from these sites is not subjected to DDoS attack mitigation. The DOTS client uses the DOTS data channel to convey the accept-listed IP prefixes of the partner sites to its DOTS server.

The DOTS server uses this information to accept-list flows originated by such IP prefixes and which reach the network.

Refer to Section 7 for more details.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

The reader should be familiar with the terms defined in [RFC8612].

The terminology for describing YANG modules is defined in [RFC7950]. The meaning of the symbols in the tree diagrams is defined in [RFC8340].

This document generalizes the notion of Access Control List (ACL) so that it is not device-specific [RFC8519]. As such, this document defines an ACL as an ordered set of rules that is used to filter traffic. Each rule is represented by an Access Control Entry (ACE). ACLs communicated via the DOTS data channel are not bound to a device interface.

For the sake of simplicity, all of the examples in this document use `"/restconf"` as the discovered RESTCONF API root path. Many protocol header lines and message-body text within examples throughout the document are split into multiple lines for display purposes only. When a line ends with backslash (`'\'`) as the last character, the line is wrapped for display purposes. It is to be considered to be joined to the next line by deleting the backslash, the following line break, and the leading whitespace of the next line.

3. DOTS Data Channel

3.1. Design Overview

Unlike the DOTS signal channel, which must remain operational even when confronted with signal degradation due to packets loss, the DOTS data channel is not expected to be fully operational at all times, especially when a DDoS attack is underway. The requirements for a DOTS data channel protocol are documented in [RFC8612].

This specification does not require an order of DOTS signal and data channel creations nor mandates a time interval between them. These considerations are implementation- and deployment-specific.

As the primary function of the data channel is data exchange, a reliable transport mode is required in order for DOTS agents to detect data delivery success or failure. This document uses RESTCONF

[RFC8040] over TLS over TCP as the DOTS data channel protocol. The abstract layering of DOTS data channel is shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Abstract Layering of DOTS Data Channel

The HTTP POST, PUT, PATCH, and DELETE methods are used to edit data resources represented by DOTS data channel YANG modules. These basic edit operations allow the DOTS data channel running configuration to be altered by a DOTS client. Rules for generating and processing RESTCONF methods are defined in Section 4 of [RFC8040].

DOTS data channel configuration information as well as state information can be retrieved with the GET method. An HTTP status-line is returned for each request to report success or failure for RESTCONF operations (Section 5.4 of [RFC8040]). The "error-tag" provides more information about encountered errors (Section 7 of [RFC8040]).

DOTS clients perform the root resource discovery procedure discussed in Section 3.1 of [RFC8040] to determine the root of the RESTCONF API. After discovering the RESTCONF API root, a DOTS client uses this value as the initial part of the path in the request URI in any subsequent request to the DOTS server. The DOTS server may support the retrieval of the YANG modules it supports (Section 3.7 in [RFC8040]). For example, a DOTS client may use RESTCONF to retrieve the vendor-specific YANG modules supported by its DOTS server.

JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [RFC8259] payloads are used to propagate the DOTS data-channel-specific payload messages that carry request parameters and response information, such as errors. This specification uses the encoding rules defined in [RFC7951] for representing DOTS data channel configuration data using YANG (Section 4) as JSON text.

A DOTS client registers itself to its DOTS server(s) in order to set up DOTS data channel-related configuration data and receive state

data (i.e., non-configuration data) from the DOTS server(s) (Section 5). Mutual authentication considerations are specified in Section 8 of [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]. The coupling of signal and data channels is discussed in Section 4.4.1 of [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].

A DOTS client can either maintain a persistent connection or periodic connections with its DOTS server(s). If the DOTS client needs to frequently update the drop-list or accept-list filtering rules or aliases, it maintains a persistent connection with the DOTS server. For example, CAPTCHA and cryptographic puzzles can be used by the mitigation service in the DOTS client domain to determine whether the IP address is used for legitimate purpose or not, and the DOTS client can frequently update the drop-list filtering rules. A persistent connection is also useful if the DOTS client subscribes to event notifications (Section 6.3 of [RFC8040]). Additional considerations related to RESTCONF connection management (including, configuring the connection type or the reconnect strategy) can be found in [I-D.ietf-netconf-restconf-client-server].

A single DOTS data channel between DOTS agents can be used to exchange multiple requests and multiple responses. To reduce DOTS client and DOTS server workload, DOTS clients SHOULD re-use the same TLS session. While the communication to the DOTS server is quiescent, the DOTS client MAY probe the server to ensure it has maintained cryptographic state. Such probes can also keep alive firewall and/or NAT bindings. A TLS heartbeat [RFC6520] verifies that the DOTS server still has TLS state by returning a TLS message.

A DOTS server may detect conflicting filtering requests from distinct DOTS clients which belong to the same domain. For example, a DOTS client could request to drop-list a prefix by specifying the source prefix, while another DOTS client could request to accept-list that same source prefix, but both having the same destination prefix. DOTS servers SHOULD support a configuration parameter to indicate the behavior to follow when a conflict is detected (e.g., reject all, reject the new request, notify an administrator for validation). Section 7.2 specifies a default behavior when no instruction is supplied to a DOTS server.

How a DOTS client synchronizes its configuration with the one maintained by its DOTS server(s) is implementation-specific. For example:

- o a DOTS client can systematically send a GET message before and/or after a configuration change request.

- o a DOTS client can re-establish the disconnected DOTS session after an attack is mitigated and sends a GET message before a configuration change request.

NAT considerations for the DOTS data channel are similar to those discussed in Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].

How filtering rules that are instantiated on a DOTS server are translated into network configurations actions is out of scope of this specification.

Some of the fields introduced in Section 4 are also discussed in Sections 5, 6, and 7. These sections are authoritative for these fields.

3.2. DOTS Server(s) Discovery

This document assumes that DOTS clients are provisioned with a way to know how to reach their DOTS server(s), which could occur by a variety of means (e.g., local configuration, or dynamic means such as DHCP [I-D.ietf-dots-server-discovery]). The specification of such means are out of scope of this document.

Likewise, it is out of scope of this document to specify the behavior to be followed by a DOTS client to send DOTS requests when multiple DOTS servers are provisioned (e.g., contact all DOTS servers, select one DOTS server among the list).

3.3. DOTS Gateways

When a server-domain DOTS gateway is involved in DOTS data channel exchanges, the same considerations for manipulating the 'cdid' (client domain identifier) parameter specified in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] MUST be followed by DOTS agents. As a reminder, 'cdid' is meant to assist the DOTS server to enforce some policies (e.g., limit the number of filtering rules per DOTS client or per DOTS client domain). A loop detect mechanism for DOTS gateways is specified in Section 3.4.

If a DOTS gateway is involved, the DOTS gateway verifies that the DOTS client is authorized to undertake a data channel action (e.g., instantiate filtering rules). If the DOTS client is authorized, it propagates the rules to the upstream DOTS server. Likewise, the DOTS server verifies that the DOTS gateway is authorized to relay data channel actions. For example, to create or purge filters, a DOTS client sends its request to its DOTS gateway. The DOTS gateway validates the rules in the request and proxies the requests containing the filtering rules to its DOTS server. When the DOTS

gateway receives the associated response from the DOTS server, it propagates the response back to the DOTS client.

3.4. Detect and Prevent Infinite Loops

In order to detect and prevent infinite loops, DOTS gateways MUST support the procedure defined in Section 5.7.1 of [RFC7230]. In particular, each intermediate DOTS gateway MUST check that none of its own information (e.g., server names, literal IP addresses) is present in the "Via" header field of a DOTS message it receives:

- o If it detects that its own information is present in the "Via" header field, the DOTS gateway MUST NOT forward the DOTS message. Messages that cannot be forwarded because of a loop SHOULD be logged with a "508 Loop Detected" status-line returned sent back to the DOTS peer. The structure of the reported error is depicted in Figure 3.

error-app-tag: loop-detected
error-tag: operation-failed
error-type: transport, application
error-info: <via-header> : A copy of the Via header field when the loop was detected.
Description: An infinite loop has been detected when forwarding a requests via a proxy.

Figure 3: Loop Detected Error

It is RECOMMENDED that DOTS clients and gateways support methods to alert administrators about loop errors so that appropriate actions are undertaken.

- o Otherwise, the DOTS agent MUST update or insert the "Via" header by appending its own information.

Unless configured otherwise, DOTS gateways at the boundaries of a DOTS client domain SHOULD remove the previous "Via" header field information after checking for a loop before forwarding. This behavior is required for topology hiding purposes but can also serve to minimize potential conflicts that may arise if overlapping information is used in distinct DOTS domains (e.g., private IPv4 addresses, non globally unique aliases).

3.5. Stale Entries

In order to avoid stale entries, a lifetime is associated with alias and filtering entries created by DOTS clients. Also, DOTS servers may track the inactivity timeout of DOTS clients to detect stale entries.

4. DOTS Data Channel YANG Module

4.1. Generic Tree Structure

The DOTS data channel YANG module (`ietf-dots-data-channel`) provides a method for DOTS clients to manage aliases for resources for which mitigation may be requested. Such aliases may be used in subsequent DOTS signal channel exchanges to refer more efficiently to the resources under attack.

Note that the full module's tree has been split across several figures to aid the exposition of the various sub-trees.

The tree structure for the DOTS alias is depicted in Figure 4.

```

module: ietf-dots-data-channel
  +--rw dots-data
    +--rw dots-client* [cuid]
      +--rw cuid          string
      +--rw cdid?         string
      +--rw aliases
        +--rw alias* [name]
          +--rw name          string
          +--rw target-prefix* inet:ip-prefix
          +--rw target-port-range* [lower-port]
            +--rw lower-port  inet:port-number
            +--rw upper-port? inet:port-number
          +--rw target-protocol* uint8
          +--rw target-fqdn*    inet:domain-name
          +--rw target-uri*     inet:uri
          +--ro pending-lifetime? int32
        +--rw acls
          ...
      +--ro capabilities
        ...
  
```

Figure 4: DOTS Alias Subtree

Also, the '`ietf-dots-data-channel`' module provides a method for DOTS clients to manage filtering rules. Examples of filtering management in a DOTS context include, but not limited to:

- o Drop-list management, which enables a DOTS client to inform a DOTS server about sources from which traffic should be discarded.
- o Accept-list management, which enables a DOTS client to inform a DOTS server about sources from which traffic should always be accepted.
- o Policy management, which enables a DOTS client to request the installation or withdrawal of traffic filters, dropping or rate-limiting unwanted traffic and permitting accept-listed traffic.

The tree structure for the DOTS filtering entries is depicted in Figure 5.

Investigations into the prospect of augmenting 'ietf-access-control-list' to meet DOTS requirements concluded that such a design approach did not support many of the DOTS requirements, e.g.,

- o Retrieve a filtering entry (or all entries) created by a DOTS client.
- o Delete a filtering entry that was instantiated by a DOTS client.

Accordingly, new DOTS filtering entries (i.e., Access Control List (ACL)) are defined that mimic the structure specified in [RFC8519]. Concretely, DOTS agents are assumed to manipulate an ordered list of ACLs; each ACL contains a separately ordered list of Access Control Entries (ACEs). Each ACE has a group of match and a group of action criteria.

Once all the ACE entries have been iterated through with no match, then all the following ACL's ACE entries are iterated through until the first match at which point the specified action is applied. If there is no match during 'idle' time (i.e., no mitigation is active), then there is no further action to be taken against the packet. If there is no match during active mitigation, then the packet will still be scrubbed by the DDoS mitigator.

```

module: ietf-dots-data-channel
  +--rw dots-data
    +--rw dots-client* [cuid]
      +--rw cuid          string
      +--rw cdid?         string
      +--rw aliases
      |   ...
      +--rw acls
        +--rw acl* [name]
          +--rw name          string
          +--rw type?         ietf-acl:acl-type
          +--rw activation-type? activation-type
          +--ro pending-lifetime? int32
          +--rw aces
            +--rw ace* [name]
              +--rw name          string
              +--rw matches
                +--rw (l3)?
                |   +--:(ipv4)
                |   |   ...
                |   +--:(ipv6)
                |   |   ...
                +--rw (l4)?
                |   +--:(tcp)
                |   |   ...
                |   +--:(udp)
                |   |   ...
                |   +--:(icmp)
                |   |   ...
                +--rw actions
                |   +--rw forwarding identityref
                |   +--rw rate-limit? decimal64
                +--ro statistics
                |   +--ro matched-packets? yang:counter64
                |   +--ro matched-octets?  yang:counter64
          +--ro capabilities
          |   ...

```

Figure 5: DOTS ACLs Subtree

Filtering rules instructed by a DOTS client assumes a default direction: the destination is the DOTS client domain.

DOTS forwarding actions can be 'accept' (i.e., accept matching traffic) or 'drop' (i.e., drop matching traffic without sending any ICMP error message). Accepted traffic can be subject to rate-limiting 'rate-limit'. Note that 'reject' action (i.e., drop matching traffic and send an ICMP error message to the source) is not

supported in 'ietf-dots-data-channel' because it is not appropriate in the context of DDoS mitigation. Generating ICMP messages to notify drops when mitigating a DDoS attack will exacerbate the DDoS attack. Furthermore, these ICMP messages will be used by an attacker as an explicit signal that the traffic is being blocked.

4.2. Filtering Fields

The 'ietf-dots-data-channel' module reuses the packet fields module 'ietf-packet-fields' [RFC8519] which defines matching on fields in the packet including IPv4, IPv6, and transport layer fields. The 'ietf-dots-data-channel' module can be augmented, for example, to support additional protocol-specific matching fields.

This specification defines a new IPv4/IPv6 matching field called 'fragment' to efficiently handle fragment-related filtering rules. Indeed, [RFC8519] does not support such capability for IPv6 but offers a partial support for IPv4 by means of 'flags'. Nevertheless, the use of 'flags' is problematic since it does not allow to define a bitmask. For example, setting other bits not covered by the 'flags' filtering clause in a packet will allow that packet to get through (because it won't match the ACE). Sample examples to illustrate how 'fragment' can be used are provided in Appendix A.

Figure 6 shows the IPv4 match subtree.

```

module: ietf-dots-data-channel
+--rw dots-data
+--rw dots-client* [cuid]
|
|   ...
+--rw acls
|   +--rw acl* [name]
|   |
|   |   ...
+--rw aces
|   +--rw ace* [name]
|   |
|   |   +--rw name                string
+--rw matches
|   +--rw (l3)?
|   |
|   |   +--:(ipv4)
|   |   |
|   |   |   +--rw ipv4
|   |   |   |
|   |   |   |   +--rw dscp?          inet:dscp
|   |   |   |   +--rw ecn?          uint8
|   |   |   |   +--rw length?       uint16
|   |   |   |   +--rw ttl?          uint8
|   |   |   |   +--rw protocol?     uint8
|   |   |   |   +--rw ihl?          uint8
|   |   |   |   +--rw flags?        bits
|   |   |   |   +--rw offset?       uint16
|   |   |   |   +--rw identification? uint16
|   |   |   +--rw (destination-network)?
|   |   |   |   +--:(destination-ipv4-network)
|   |   |   |   |   +--rw destination-ipv4-network?
|   |   |   |   |   |   inet:ipv4-prefix
|   |   |   +--rw (source-network)?
|   |   |   |   +--:(source-ipv4-network)
|   |   |   |   |   +--rw source-ipv4-network?
|   |   |   |   |   |   inet:ipv4-prefix
|   |   |   +--rw fragment
|   |   |   |   +--rw operator?      operator
|   |   |   |   +--rw type          fragment-type
|   |   +--:(ipv6)
|   |   |
|   |   |   ...
+--rw (l4)?
|   |
|   |   ...
+--rw actions
|   |
|   |   ...
+--ro statistics
|   |
|   |   ...
+--ro capabilities
|   |
|   |   ...

```

Figure 6: DOTS ACLs Subtree (IPv4 Match)

Figure 7 shows the IPv6 match subtree.

```

module: ietf-dots-data-channel
+--rw dots-data
  +--rw dots-client* [cuid]
    ...
    +--rw acls
      +--rw acl* [name]
        ...
        +--rw aces
          +--rw ace* [name]
            +--rw name                string
            +--rw matches
              +--rw (l3)?
                +--:(ipv4)
                |   ...
                +--:(ipv6)
                  +--rw ipv6
                    +--rw dscp?          inet:dscp
                    +--rw ecn?           uint8
                    +--rw length?        uint16
                    +--rw ttl?           uint8
                    +--rw protocol?      uint8
                    +--rw (destination-network)?
                      +--:(destination-ipv6-network)
                        +--rw destination-ipv6-network?
                          inet:ipv6-prefix
                    +--rw (source-network)?
                      +--:(source-ipv6-network)
                        +--rw source-ipv6-network?
                          inet:ipv6-prefix
                    +--rw flow-label?
                      inet:ipv6-flow-label
                    +--rw fragment
                      +--rw operator?    operator
                      +--rw type         fragment-type
              +--rw (l4)?
                ...
            +--rw actions
              ...
          +--ro statistics
            ...
        +--ro capabilities
          ...

```

Figure 7: DOTS ACLs Subtree (IPv6 Match)

Figure 8 shows the TCP match subtree. In addition to the fields defined in [RFC8519], this specification defines a new TCP matching

field, called 'flags-bitmask', to efficiently handle TCP flags filtering rules. Some examples are provided in Appendix B.

```

module: ietf-dots-data-channel
+--rw dots-data
  +--rw dots-client* [cuid]
    ...
  +--rw acls
    +--rw acl* [name]
      ...
    +--rw aces
      +--rw ace* [name]
        +--rw name string
        +--rw matches
          +--rw (l3)?
          | ...
          +--rw (l4)?
            +--:(tcp)
              +--rw tcp
                +--rw sequence-number? uint32
                +--rw acknowledgement-number? uint32
                +--rw data-offset? uint8
                +--rw reserved? uint8
                +--rw flags? bits
                +--rw window-size? uint16
                +--rw urgent-pointer? uint16
                +--rw options? binary
                +--rw flags-bitmask
                | +--rw operator? operator
                | +--rw bitmask uint16
                +--rw (source-port)?
                | +--:(source-port-range-or-operator)
                | | +--rw source-port-range-or-operator
                | | | +--rw (port-range-or-operator)?
                | | | | +--:(range)
                | | | | | +--rw lower-port
                | | | | | | inet:port-number
                | | | | | +--rw upper-port
                | | | | | | inet:port-number
                | | | | +--:(operator)
                | | | | | +--rw operator?
                | | | | | | operator
                | | | | +--rw port
                | | | | | inet:port-number
                +--rw (destination-port)?
                | +--:(destination-port-range-or-operator)
                | | +--rw destination-port-range-or-operator
                | | | +--rw (port-range-or-operator)?

```




Figure 8: DOTS ACLs Subtree (TCP Match)

Figure 9 shows the UDP and ICMP match subtrees. The same structure is used for both ICMP and ICMPv6. The indication whether an ACL is about ICMP or ICMPv6 is governed by the 'l3' match or the ACL type.

```

module: ietf-dots-data-channel
+--rw dots-data
+--rw dots-client* [cuid]
|
|   ...
+--rw acls
|   +--rw acl* [name]
|   |
|   |   ...
+--rw aces
|   +--rw ace* [name]
|   |   +--rw name                string
|   |   +--rw matches
|   |   |   +--rw (l3)?
|   |   |   |   ...
|   |   |   +--rw (l4)?
|   |   |   |   +--:(tcp)
|   |   |   |   |   ...
|   |   |   |   +--:(udp)
|   |   |   |   |   +--rw udp
|   |   |   |   |   |   +--rw length?                uint16
|   |   |   |   |   |   +--rw (source-port)?
|   |   |   |   |   |   |   +--:(source-port-range-or-operator)

```

```

|--rw source-port-range-or-operator
  |--rw (port-range-or-operator)?
    |--:(range)
      |--rw lower-port
      |   inet:port-number
      |--rw upper-port
      |   inet:port-number
    |--:(operator)
      |--rw operator?
      |   operator
      |--rw port
      |   inet:port-number
  |--rw (destination-port)?
    |--:(destination-port-range-or-operator)
      |--rw destination-port-range-or-operator
      |--rw (port-range-or-operator)?
        |--:(range)
          |--rw lower-port
          |   inet:port-number
          |--rw upper-port
          |   inet:port-number
        |--:(operator)
          |--rw operator?
          |   operator
          |--rw port
          |   inet:port-number
    |--:(icmp)
      |--rw icmp
      |--rw type?          uint8
      |--rw code?         uint8
      |--rw rest-of-header? binary
  |--rw actions
  |   ...
  |--ro statistics
  |   ...
  |--ro capabilities
  |   ...

```

Figure 9: DOTS ACLs Subtree (UDP and ICMP Match)

DOTS implementations MUST support the following matching criteria:

match based on the IP header (IPv4 and IPv6), match based on the transport header (TCP, UDP, and ICMP), and any combination thereof. The same matching fields are used for both ICMP and ICMPv6.

The following match fields MUST be supported by DOTS implementations (Table 1):

ACL Match	Mandatory Fields
-----	-----
ipv4	length, protocol, destination-ipv4-network, source-ipv4-network, and fragment
ipv6	length, protocol, destination-ipv6-network, source-ipv6-network, and fragment
tcp	flags-bitmask, source-port-range-or-operator, and destination-port-range-or-operator
udp	length, source-port-range-or-operator, and destination-port-range-or-operator
icmp	type and code

Table 1: Mandatory DOTS Channel Match Fields

Implementations MAY support other filtering match fields and actions. The 'ietf-dots-data-channel' provides a method for an implementation to expose its filtering capabilities. The tree structure of the 'capabilities' is shown in Figure 10. DOTS clients that support both 'fragment' and 'flags' (or 'flags-bitmask' and 'flags') matching fields MUST NOT set these fields in the same request.

```

module: ietf-dots-data-channel
  +--rw dots-data
    ...
    +--ro capabilities
      +--ro address-family*      enumeration
      +--ro forwarding-actions*  identityref
      +--ro rate-limit?          boolean
      +--ro transport-protocols* uint8
      +--ro ipv4
        +--ro dscp?              boolean
        +--ro ecn?               boolean
        +--ro length?            boolean
        +--ro ttl?               boolean
        +--ro protocol?          boolean
        +--ro ihl?               boolean
        +--ro flags?             boolean
        +--ro offset?            boolean
        +--ro identification?     boolean
        +--ro source-prefix?      boolean
        +--ro destination-prefix? boolean
        +--ro fragment?          boolean
      +--ro ipv6
        +--ro dscp?              boolean

```

```

|   +--ro ecn?                boolean
|   +--ro length?            boolean
|   +--ro hoplimit?          boolean
|   +--ro protocol?          boolean
|   +--ro destination-prefix? boolean
|   +--ro source-prefix?     boolean
|   +--ro flow-label?        boolean
|   +--ro fragment?          boolean
+--ro tcp
|   +--ro sequence-number?    boolean
|   +--ro acknowledgement-number? boolean
|   +--ro data-offset?        boolean
|   +--ro reserved?           boolean
|   +--ro flags?              boolean
|   +--ro window-size?        boolean
|   +--ro urgent-pointer?     boolean
|   +--ro options?            boolean
|   +--ro flags-bitmask?      boolean
|   +--ro source-port?        boolean
|   +--ro destination-port?   boolean
|   +--ro port-range?         boolean
+--ro udp
|   +--ro length?             boolean
|   +--ro source-port?        boolean
|   +--ro destination-port?   boolean
|   +--ro port-range?         boolean
+--ro icmp
|   +--ro type?               boolean
|   +--ro code?               boolean
|   +--ro rest-of-header?     boolean

```

Figure 10: Filtering Capabilities Subtree

4.3. YANG Module

This module uses the common YANG types defined in [RFC6991] and types defined in [RFC8519].

```

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-dots-data-channel@2019-05-09.yang"
module ietf-dots-data-channel {
  yang-version 1.1;
  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-data-channel";
  prefix data-channel;

  import ietf-inet-types {
    prefix inet;
    reference "Section 4 of RFC 6991";
  }
}

```



```
import ietf-access-control-list {
  prefix ietf-acl;
  reference
    "RFC 8519: YANG Data Model for Network Access
      Control Lists (ACLs)";
}
import ietf-packet-fields {
  prefix packet-fields;
  reference
    "RFC 8519: YANG Data Model for Network Access
      Control Lists (ACLs)";
}

organization
  "IETF DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Working Group";
contact
  "WG Web:  <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dots/>
  WG List:  <mailto:dots@ietf.org>

  Editor:   Mohamed Boucadair
            <mailto:mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>

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            <mailto:kaname@nttv6.jp>

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            <mailto:frank.xialiang@huawei.com>

  Author:   Prashanth Patil
            <mailto:praspati@cisco.com>

  Author:   Andrew Mortensen
            <mailto:amortensen@arbor.net>

  Author:   Nik Teague
            <mailto:nteague@verisign.com>";
description
  "This module contains YANG definition for configuring
  aliases for resources and filtering rules using DOTS
  data channel.

  Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
```

authors of the code. All rights reserved.

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This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see the RFC itself for full legal notices."

```
revision 2019-05-09 {
  description
    "Initial revision.";
  reference
    "RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
      Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel Specification";
}

typedef activation-type {
  type enumeration {
    enum "activate-when-mitigating" {
      value 1;
      description
        "The Access Control List (ACL) is installed only when
          a mitigation is active for the DOTS client.";
    }
    enum "immediate" {
      value 2;
      description
        "The ACL is immediately activated.";
    }
    enum "deactivate" {
      value 3;
      description
        "The ACL is maintained by the DOTS server, but it is
          deactivated.";
    }
  }
  description
    "Indicates the activation type of an ACL.";
}

typedef operator {
  type bits {
    bit not {
      position 0;
    }
  }
}
```

```
        description
            "If set, logical negation of operation.";
    }
    bit match {
        position 1;
        description
            "Match bit. This is a bitwise match operation
            defined as '(data & value) == value'.";
    }
    bit any {
        position 3;
        description
            "Any bit. This is a match on any of the bits in
            bitmask. It evaluates to 'true' if any of the bits
            in the value mask are set in the data,
            i.e., '(data & value) != 0'.";
    }
}
description
    "Specifies how to apply the defined bitmask.";
}

grouping tcp-flags {
    leaf operator {
        type operator;
        default "match";
        description
            "Specifies how to interpret the TCP flags.";
    }
    leaf bitmask {
        type uint16;
        mandatory true;
        description
            "The bitmask matches the last 4 bits of byte 12
            and byte 13 of the TCP header. For clarity, the 4 bits
            of byte 12 corresponding to the TCP data offset field
            are not included in any matching.";
    }
}
description
    "Operations on TCP flags.";
}

typedef fragment-type {
    type bits {
        bit df {
            position 0;
            description
                "Don't fragment bit for IPv4.
```

```
        Must be set to 0 when it appears in an IPv6 filter.";
    }
    bit isf {
        position 1;
        description
            "Is a fragment.";
    }
    bit ff {
        position 2;
        description
            "First fragment.";
    }
    bit lf {
        position 3;
        description
            "Last fragment.";
    }
}
description
    "Different fragment types to match against.";
}

grouping target {
    description
        "Specifies the targets of the mitigation request.";
    leaf-list target-prefix {
        type inet:ip-prefix;
        description
            "IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the target.";
    }
    list target-port-range {
        key "lower-port";
        description
            "Port range. When only lower-port is
            present, it represents a single port number.";
        leaf lower-port {
            type inet:port-number;
            mandatory true;
            description
                "Lower port number of the port range.";
        }
        leaf upper-port {
            type inet:port-number;
            must '. >= ../lower-port' {
                error-message
                    "The upper port number must be greater than
                    or equal to the lower-port number.";
            }
        }
    }
}
```

```
        description
            "Upper port number of the port range.";
    }
}
leaf-list target-protocol {
    type uint8;
    description
        "Identifies the target protocol number.

        Values are taken from the IANA protocol registry:
        https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/
        protocol-numbers.xhtml

        For example, 6 for TCP or 17 for UDP.";
}
leaf-list target-fqdn {
    type inet:domain-name;
    description
        "FQDN identifying the target.";
}
leaf-list target-uri {
    type inet:uri;
    description
        "URI identifying the target.";
}
}

grouping fragment-fields {
    leaf operator {
        type operator;
        default "match";
        description
            "Specifies how to interpret the fragment type.";
    }
    leaf type {
        type fragment-type;
        mandatory true;
        description
            "Indicates what fragment type to look for.";
    }
    description
        "Operations on fragment types.";
}

grouping aliases {
    description
        "Top level container for aliases.";
    list alias {
```

```
    key "name";
    description
        "List of aliases.";
    leaf name {
        type string;
        description
            "The name of the alias.";
    }
    uses target;
    leaf pending-lifetime {
        type int32;
        units "minutes";
        config false;
        description
            "Indicates the pending validity lifetime of the alias
            entry.";
    }
}

grouping ports {
    choice source-port {
        container source-port-range-or-operator {
            uses packet-fields:port-range-or-operator;
            description
                "Source port definition.";
        }
        description
            "Choice of specifying the source port or referring to
            a group of source port numbers.";
    }
    choice destination-port {
        container destination-port-range-or-operator {
            uses packet-fields:port-range-or-operator;
            description
                "Destination port definition.";
        }
        description
            "Choice of specifying a destination port or referring
            to a group of destination port numbers.";
    }
    description
        "Choice of specifying a source or destination port numbers.";
}

grouping access-lists {
    description
        "Specifies the ordered set of Access Control Lists.";
```

```
list acl {
  key "name";
  ordered-by user;
  description
    "An ACL is an ordered list of Access Control Entries (ACE).
    Each ACE has a list of match criteria and a list of actions.";
  leaf name {
    type string {
      length "1..64";
    }
    description
      "The name of the access list.";
    reference
      "RFC 8519: YANG Data Model for Network Access
      Control Lists (ACLs)";
  }
  leaf type {
    type ietf-acl:acl-type;
    description
      "Type of access control list. Indicates the primary intended
      type of match criteria (e.g., IPv4, IPv6) used in the list
      instance.";
    reference
      "RFC 8519: YANG Data Model for Network Access
      Control Lists (ACLs)";
  }
  leaf activation-type {
    type activation-type;
    default "activate-when-mitigating";
    description
      "Indicates the activation type of an ACL. An ACL can be
      deactivated, installed immediately, or installed when
      a mitigation is active.";
  }
  leaf pending-lifetime {
    type int32;
    units "minutes";
    config false;
    description
      "Indicates the pending validity lifetime of the ACL
      entry.";
  }
  container aces {
    description
      "The Access Control Entries container contains
      a list of ACEs.";
    list ace {
      key "name";
```

```
ordered-by user;
description
  "List of access list entries.";
leaf name {
  type string {
    length "1..64";
  }
  description
    "A unique name identifying this ACE.";
  reference
    "RFC 8519: YANG Data Model for Network Access
      Control Lists (ACLs)";
}
container matches {
  description
    "The rules in this set determine what fields will be
      matched upon before any action is taken on them.

      If no matches are defined in a particular container,
      then any packet will match that container.

      If no matches are specified at all in an ACE, then any
      packet will match the ACE.";
  reference
    "RFC 8519: YANG Data Model for Network Access
      Control Lists (ACLs)";
  choice l3 {
    container ipv4 {
      when "derived-from ../../../../type, "
        + "'ietf-acl:ipv4-acl-type'";
      uses packet-fields:acl-ip-header-fields;
      uses packet-fields:acl-ipv4-header-fields;
      container fragment {
        description
          "Indicates how to handle IPv4 fragments.";
        uses fragment-fields;
      }
      description
        "Rule set that matches IPv4 header.";
    }
    container ipv6 {
      when "derived-from ../../../../type, "
        + "'ietf-acl:ipv6-acl-type'";
      uses packet-fields:acl-ip-header-fields;
      uses packet-fields:acl-ipv6-header-fields;
      container fragment {
        description
          "Indicates how to handle IPv6 fragments.";
```



```
        uses fragment-fields;
    }
    description
        "Rule set that matches IPv6 header.";
    }
    description
        "Either IPv4 or IPv6.";
    }
    choice l4 {
        container tcp {
            uses packet-fields:acl-tcp-header-fields;
            container flags-bitmask {
                description
                    "Indicates how to handle TCP flags.";
                uses tcp-flags;
            }
            uses ports;
            description
                "Rule set that matches TCP header.";
        }
        container udp {
            uses packet-fields:acl-udp-header-fields;
            uses ports;
            description
                "Rule set that matches UDP header.";
        }
        container icmp {
            uses packet-fields:acl-icmp-header-fields;
            description
                "Rule set that matches ICMP/ICMPv6 header.";
        }
    }
    description
        "Can be TCP, UDP, or ICMP/ICMPv6";
    }
}
container actions {
    description
        "Definitions of action for this ACE.";
    leaf forwarding {
        type identityref {
            base ietf-acl:forwarding-action;
        }
        mandatory true;
        description
            "Specifies the forwarding action per ACE.";
        reference
            "RFC 8519: YANG Data Model for Network Access
            Control Lists (ACLs)";
    }
}
```

```
    }
    leaf rate-limit {
      when "../forwarding = 'ietf-acl:accept'" {
        description
          "Rate-limit is valid only when accept action is
          used.";
      }
      type decimal64 {
        fraction-digits 2;
      }
      units "bytes per second";
      description
        "Specifies how to rate-limit the traffic.";
    }
  }
  container statistics {
    config false;
    description
      "Aggregate statistics.";
    uses ietf-acl:acl-counters;
  }
}
}
}
}

container dots-data {
  description
    "Main container for DOTS data channel.";
  list dots-client {
    key "cuid";
    description
      "List of DOTS clients.";
    leaf cuid {
      type string;
      description
        "A unique identifier that is generated by a DOTS client
        to prevent request collisions.";
      reference
        "RFC YYYY: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
        Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification";
    }
    leaf cdid {
      type string;
      description
        "A client domain identifier conveyed by a
        server-domain DOTS gateway to a remote DOTS server.";
      reference

```

```
        "RFC YYYY: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
          Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification";
    }
    container aliases {
        description
            "Set of aliases that are bound to a DOTS client.";
        uses aliases;
    }
    container acls {
        description
            "Access lists that are bound to a DOTS client.";
        uses access-lists;
    }
}
container capabilities {
    config false;
    description
        "Match capabilities";
    leaf-list address-family {
        type enumeration {
            enum "ipv4" {
                description
                    "IPv4 is supported.";
            }
            enum "ipv6" {
                description
                    "IPv6 is supported.";
            }
        }
    }
    description
        "Indicates the IP address families supported by
        the DOTS server.";
}
leaf-list forwarding-actions {
    type identityref {
        base ietf-acl:forwarding-action;
    }
    description
        "Supported forwarding action(s).";
}
leaf rate-limit {
    type boolean;
    description
        "Support of rate-limit action.";
}
leaf-list transport-protocols {
    type uint8;
    description
```

"Upper-layer protocol associated with a filtering rule.

Values are taken from the IANA protocol registry:
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/protocol-numbers.xhtml>

For example, this field contains 1 for ICMP, 6 for TCP
17 for UDP, or 58 for ICMPv6.";

```
}
container ipv4 {
  description
    "Indicates IPv4 header fields that are supported to enforce
    ACLs.";
  leaf dscp {
    type boolean;
    description
      "Support of filtering based on Differentiated Services Code
      Point (DSCP).";
  }
  leaf ecn {
    type boolean;
    description
      "Support of filtering based on Explicit Congestion
      Notification (ECN).";
  }
  leaf length {
    type boolean;
    description
      "Support of filtering based on the Total Length.";
  }
  leaf ttl {
    type boolean;
    description
      "Support of filtering based on the Time to Live (TTL).";
  }
  leaf protocol {
    type boolean;
    description
      "Support of filtering based on protocol field.";
  }
  leaf ihl {
    type boolean;
    description
      "Support of filtering based on the Internet Header
      Length (IHL).";
  }
  leaf flags {
    type boolean;
```

```
        description
            "Support of filtering based on the 'flags'.";
    }
    leaf offset {
        type boolean;
        description
            "Support of filtering based on the 'offset'.";
    }
    leaf identification {
        type boolean;
        description
            "Support of filtering based on the 'identification'.";
    }
    leaf source-prefix {
        type boolean;
        description
            "Support of filtering based on the source prefix.";
    }
    leaf destination-prefix {
        type boolean;
        description
            "Support of filtering based on the destination prefix.";
    }
    leaf fragment {
        type boolean;
        description
            "Indicates the capability of a DOTS server to
            enforce filters on IPv4 fragments. That is, the match
            functionality based on the Layer 3 'fragment' clause
            is supported.";
    }
}
container ipv6 {
    description
        "Indicates IPv6 header fields that are supported to enforce
        ACLs.";
    leaf dscp {
        type boolean;
        description
            "Support of filtering based on DSCP.";
    }
    leaf ecn {
        type boolean;
        description
            "Support of filtering based on ECN.";
    }
    leaf length {
        type boolean;
```

```
        description
            "Support of filtering based on the Payload Length.";
    }
    leaf hoplimit {
        type boolean;
        description
            "Support of filtering based on the Hop Limit.";
    }
    leaf protocol {
        type boolean;
        description
            "Support of filtering based on the Next Header field.";
    }
    leaf destination-prefix {
        type boolean;
        description
            "Support of filtering based on the destination prefix.";
    }
    leaf source-prefix {
        type boolean;
        description
            "Support of filtering based on the source prefix.";
    }
    leaf flow-label {
        type boolean;
        description
            "Support of filtering based on the Flow label.";
    }
    leaf fragment {
        type boolean;
        description
            "Indicates the capability of a DOTS server to
            enforce filters on IPv6 fragments.";
    }
}
container tcp {
    description
        "Set of TCP fields that are supported by the DOTS server
        to enforce filters.";
    leaf sequence-number {
        type boolean;
        description
            "Support of filtering based on the TCP sequence number.";
    }
    leaf acknowledgement-number {
        type boolean;
        description
            "Support of filtering based on the TCP acknowledgement
```

```
        number.";
    }
    leaf data-offset {
        type boolean;
        description
            "Support of filtering based on the TCP data-offset.";
    }
    leaf reserved {
        type boolean;
        description
            "Support of filtering based on the TCP reserved field.";
    }
    leaf flags {
        type boolean;
        description
            "Support of filtering, as defined in RFC 8519, based
            on the TCP flags.";
    }
    leaf window-size {
        type boolean;
        description
            "Support of filtering based on the TCP window size.";
    }
    leaf urgent-pointer {
        type boolean;
        description
            "Support of filtering based on the TCP urgent pointer.";
    }
    leaf options {
        type boolean;
        description
            "Support of filtering based on the TCP options.";
    }
    leaf flags-bitmask {
        type boolean;
        description
            "Support of filtering based on the TCP flags bitmask.";
    }
    leaf source-port {
        type boolean;
        description
            "Support of filtering based on the source port number.";
    }
    leaf destination-port {
        type boolean;
        description
            "Support of filtering based on the destination port
            number.";
```

```
    }
    leaf port-range {
      type boolean;
      description
        "Support of filtering based on a port range.

        This includes filtering based on a source port range,
        destination port range, or both. All operators
        (i.e, less than or equal to, greater than or equal to,
        equal to, and not equal to) are supported.";
    }
  }
  container udp {
    description
      "Set of UDP fields that are supported by the DOTS server
      to enforce filters.";
    leaf length {
      type boolean;
      description
        "Support of filtering based on the UDP length.";
    }
    leaf source-port {
      type boolean;
      description
        "Support of filtering based on the source port number.";
    }
    leaf destination-port {
      type boolean;
      description
        "Support of filtering based on the destination port
        number.";
    }
    leaf port-range {
      type boolean;
      description
        "Support of filtering based on a port range.

        This includes filtering based on a source port range,
        destination port range, or both. All operators
        (i.e, less than or equal, greater than or equal, equal to,
        and not equal to) are supported.";
    }
  }
}
container icmp {
  description
    "Set of ICMP/ICMPv6 fields that are supported by the DOTS
    server to enforce filters.";
  leaf type {
```



```

        type boolean;
        description
            "Support of filtering based on the ICMP/ICMPv6 type.";
    }
    leaf code {
        type boolean;
        description
            "Support of filtering based on the ICMP/ICMPv6 code.";
    }
    leaf rest-of-header {
        type boolean;
        description
            "Support of filtering based on the ICMP four-bytes
            field / the ICMPv6 message body.";
    }
}
}
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>

```

5. Managing DOTS Clients

5.1. Registering DOTS Clients

In order to make use of DOTS data channel, a DOTS client MUST register to its DOTS server(s) by creating a DOTS client ('dots-client') resource. To that aim, DOTS clients SHOULD send a POST request (shown in Figure 11).

```

POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json

{
  "ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-client": [
    {
      "cuid": "string"
    }
  ]
}

```

Figure 11: POST to Register Schema

The 'cuid' (client unique identifier) parameter is described below:

cuid: A globally unique identifier that is meant to prevent collisions among DOTS clients. This attribute has the same

meaning, syntax, and processing rules as the 'cuid' attribute defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].

DOTS clients MUST use the same 'cuid' for both signal and data channels.

This is a mandatory attribute.

In deployments where server-domain DOTS gateways are enabled, identity information about the origin source client domain SHOULD be supplied to the DOTS server. That information is meant to assist the DOTS server to enforce some policies. These policies can be enforced per-client, per-client domain, or both. Figure 12 shows a schema example of a request relayed by a server-domain DOTS gateway.

```
POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json

{
  "ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-client": [
    {
      "cuid": "string",
      "cdid": "string"
    }
  ]
}
```

Figure 12: POST to Register Schema (via a Server-Domain DOTS Gateway)

A server-domain DOTS gateway SHOULD add the following attribute:

cdid: This attribute has the same meaning, syntax, and processing rules as the 'cdid' attribute defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].

In deployments where server-domain DOTS gateways are enabled, 'cdid' does not need to be inserted when relaying DOTS methods to manage aliases (Section 6) or filtering rules (Section 7). DOTS servers are responsible for maintaining the association between 'cdid' and 'cuid' for policy enforcement purposes.

This is an optional attribute.

A request example to create a 'dots-client' resource is depicted in Figure 13. This request is relayed by a server-domain DOTS gateway as hinted by the presence of the 'cdid' attribute.

```
POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json

{
  "ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-client": [
    {
      "cuid": "dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw",
      "cdid": "7eeaf349529eb55ed50113"
    }
  ]
}
```

Figure 13: POST to Register (DOTS gateway)

As a reminder, DOTS gateways may rewrite the 'cuid' used by peer DOTS clients (Section 4.4.1 of [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]).

DOTS servers can identify the DOTS client domain using the 'cdid' parameter or using the client's DNS name specified in the Subject Alternative Name extension's dNSName type in the client certificate [RFC6125].

DOTS servers MUST limit the number of 'dots-client' resources to be created by the same DOTS client to 1 per request. Requests with multiple 'dots-client' resources MUST be rejected by DOTS servers. To that aim, the DOTS server MUST rely on the same procedure to unambiguously identify a DOTS client as discussed in Section 4.4.1 of [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].

The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the POST request using status-line codes. Status codes in the range "2xx" codes are success, "4xx" codes are some sort of invalid requests and "5xx" codes are returned if the DOTS server has erred or is incapable of accepting the creation of the 'dots-client' resource. In particular,

- o "201 Created" status-line is returned in the response, if the DOTS server has accepted the request.
- o "400 Bad Request" status-line is returned by the DOTS server, if the request does not include a 'cuid' parameter. The error-tag "missing-attribute" is used in this case.
- o "409 Conflict" status-line is returned to the requesting DOTS client, if the data resource already exists. The error-tag "resource-denied" is used in this case.

Once a DOTS client registers itself to a DOTS server, it can create/delete/retrieve aliases (Section 6) and filtering rules (Section 7).

A DOTS client MAY use the PUT request (Section 4.5 in [RFC8040]) to register a DOTS client within the DOTS server. An example is shown in Figure 14.

```
PUT /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\
    /dots-client=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json

{
  "ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-client": [
    {
      "cuid": "dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
    }
  ]
}
```

Figure 14: PUT to Register

The DOTS gateway that inserted a 'cdid' in a PUT request MUST strip the 'cdid' parameter in the corresponding response before forwarding the response to the DOTS client.

5.2. Unregistering DOTS Clients

A DOTS client de-registers from its DOTS server(s) by deleting the 'cuid' resource(s). Resources bound to this DOTS client will be deleted by the DOTS server. An example of a de-register request is shown in Figure 15.

```
DELETE /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\
    /dots-client=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
```

Figure 15: De-register a DOTS Client

6. Managing DOTS Aliases

The following sub-sections define means for a DOTS client to create aliases (Section 6.1), retrieve one or a list of aliases (Section 6.2), and delete an alias (Section 6.3).

6.1. Create Aliases

A POST or PUT request is used by a DOTS client to create aliases, for resources for which a mitigation may be requested. Such aliases may be used in subsequent DOTS signal channel exchanges to refer more efficiently to the resources under attack.

DOTS clients within the same domain can create different aliases for the same resource.

The structure of POST requests used to create aliases is shown in Figure 16.

```
POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\
    /dots-client=cuid HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json

{
  "ietf-dots-data-channel:aliases": {
    "alias": [
      {
        "name": "string",
        "target-prefix": [
          "string"
        ],
        "target-port-range": [
          {
            "lower-port": integer,
            "upper-port": integer
          }
        ],
        "target-protocol": [
          integer
        ],
        "target-fqdn": [
          "string"
        ],
        "target-uri": [
          "string"
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

Figure 16: POST to Create Aliases (Request Schema)

The parameters are described below:

name: Name of the alias.

This is a mandatory attribute.

target-prefix: Prefixes are separated by commas. Prefixes are represented using Classless Inter-domain Routing (CIDR) notation [RFC4632]. As a reminder, the prefix length must be less than or equal to 32 (resp. 128) for IPv4 (resp. IPv6).

The prefix list MUST NOT include broadcast, loopback, or multicast addresses. These addresses are considered as invalid values. In addition, the DOTS server MUST validate that these prefixes are within the scope of the DOTS client domain. Other validation checks may be supported by DOTS servers.

This is an optional attribute.

target-port-range: A range of port numbers.

The port range is defined by two bounds, a lower port number (lower-port) and an upper port number (upper-port). The range is considered to include both the lower and upper bounds.

When only 'lower-port' is present, it represents a single port number.

For TCP, UDP, Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) [RFC4960], or Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP) [RFC4340], the range of port numbers can be, for example, 1024-65535.

This is an optional attribute.

target-protocol: A list of protocols. Values are taken from the IANA protocol registry [proto_numbers].

If 'target-protocol' is not specified, then the request applies to any protocol.

This is an optional attribute.

target-fqdn: A list of Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs) identifying resources under attack [RFC8499].

How a name is passed to an underlying name resolution library is implementation- and deployment-specific. Nevertheless, once the

name is resolved into one or multiple IP addresses, DOTS servers MUST apply the same validation checks as those for 'target-prefix'.

The use of FQDNs may be suboptimal because it does not guarantee that the DOTS server will resolve a name to the same IP addresses that the DOTS client does.

This is an optional attribute.

target-uri: A list of Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) [RFC3986].

The same validation checks used for 'target-fqdn' MUST be followed by DOTS servers to validate a target URI.

This is an optional attribute.

In POST or PUT requests, at least one of the 'target-prefix', 'target-fqdn', or 'target-uri' attributes MUST be present. DOTS agents can safely ignore Vendor-Specific parameters they don't understand.

If more than one 'target-*' scope types (e.g., 'target-prefix' and 'target-fqdn' or 'target-fqdn' and 'target-uri') are included in a POST or PUT request, the DOTS server binds all resulting IP addresses/prefixes to the same resource.

Figure 17 shows a POST request to create an alias called "https1" for HTTPS servers with IP addresses 2001:db8:6401::1 and 2001:db8:6401::2 listening on TCP port number 443.

```
POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\
/dots-client=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json

{
  "ietf-dots-data-channel:aliases": {
    "alias": [
      {
        "name": "https1",
        "target-protocol": [
          6
        ],
        "target-prefix": [
          "2001:db8:6401::1/128",
          "2001:db8:6401::2/128"
        ],
        "target-port-range": [
          {
            "lower-port": 443
          }
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

Figure 17: Example of a POST to Create an Alias

"201 Created" status-line MUST be returned in the response if the DOTS server has accepted the alias.

"409 Conflict" status-line MUST be returned to the requesting DOTS client, if the request is conflicting with an existing alias name. The error-tag "resource-denied" is used in this case.

If the request is missing a mandatory attribute or it contains an invalid or unknown parameter, "400 Bad Request" status-line MUST be returned by the DOTS server. The error-tag is set to "missing-attribute", "invalid-value", or "unknown-element" as a function of the encountered error.

If the request is received via a server-domain DOTS gateway, but the DOTS server does not maintain a 'cdid' for this 'cuid' while a 'cdid' is expected to be supplied, the DOTS server MUST reply with "403 Forbidden" status-line and the error-tag "access-denied". Upon receipt of this message, the DOTS client MUST register (Section 5).

A DOTS client uses the PUT request to modify the aliases in the DOTS server. In particular, a DOTS client MUST update its alias entries upon change of the prefix indicated in the 'target-prefix'.

A DOTS server MUST maintain an alias for at least 10080 minutes (1 week). If no refresh request is seen from the DOTS client, the DOTS server removes expired entries.

6.2. Retrieve Installed Aliases

A GET request is used to retrieve one or all installed aliases by a DOTS client from a DOTS server (Section 3.3.1 in [RFC8040]). If no 'name' is included in the request, this is an indication that the request is about retrieving all aliases instantiated by the DOTS client.

Figure 18 shows an example to retrieve all the aliases that were instantiated by the requesting DOTS client. The "content" query parameter and its permitted values are defined in Section 4.8.1 of [RFC8040].

```
GET /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\  
    /dots-client=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw\  
    /aliases?content=all HTTP/1.1  
Host: example.com  
Accept: application/yang-data+json
```

Figure 18: GET to Retrieve All Installed Aliases

Figure 19 shows an example of the response message body that includes all the aliases that are maintained by the DOTS server for the DOTS client identified by the 'cuid' parameter.

```
{
  "ietf-dots-data-channel:aliases": {
    "alias": [
      {
        "name": "Server1",
        "target-protocol": [
          6
        ],
        "target-prefix": [
          "2001:db8:6401::1/128",
          "2001:db8:6401::2/128"
        ],
        "target-port-range": [
          {
            "lower-port": 443
          }
        ],
        "pending-lifetime": 3596
      },
      {
        "name": "Server2",
        "target-protocol": [
          6
        ],
        "target-prefix": [
          "2001:db8:6401::10/128",
          "2001:db8:6401::20/128"
        ],
        "target-port-range": [
          {
            "lower-port": 80
          }
        ],
        "pending-lifetime": 9869
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

Figure 19: An Example of Response Body Listing All Installed Aliases

Figure 20 shows an example of a GET request to retrieve the alias "Server2" that was instantiated by the DOTS client.

```
GET /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\  
    /dots-client=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw\  
    /aliases/alias=Server2?content=all HTTP/1.1  
Host: example.com  
Accept: application/yang-data+json
```

Figure 20: GET to Retrieve an Alias

If an alias name ('name') is included in the request, but the DOTS server does not find that alias name for this DOTS client in its configuration data, it MUST respond with a "404 Not Found" status-line.

6.3. Delete Aliases

A DELETE request is used to delete an alias maintained by a DOTS server.

If the DOTS server does not find the alias name, conveyed in the DELETE request, in its configuration data for this DOTS client, it MUST respond with a "404 Not Found" status-line.

The DOTS server successfully acknowledges a DOTS client's request to remove the alias using "204 No Content" status-line in the response.

Figure 21 shows an example of a request to delete an alias.

```
DELETE /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\  
    /dots-client=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw\  
    /aliases/alias=Server1 HTTP/1.1  
Host: example.com
```

Figure 21: Delete an Alias

7. Managing DOTS Filtering Rules

The following sub-sections define means for a DOTS client to retrieve DOTS filtering capabilities (Section 7.1), create filtering rules (Section 7.2), retrieve active filtering rules (Section 7.3), and delete a filtering rule (Section 7.4).

7.1. Retrieve DOTS Filtering Capabilities

A DOTS client MAY send a GET request to retrieve the filtering capabilities supported by a DOTS server. Figure 22 shows an example of such request.

```
GET /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\  
  /capabilities HTTP/1.1  
Host: example.com  
Accept: application/yang-data+json
```

Figure 22: GET to Retrieve the Capabilities of a DOTS Server

A DOTS client which issued a GET request to retrieve the filtering capabilities supported by its DOTS server, SHOULD NOT request for filtering actions that are not supported by that DOTS server.

Figure 23 shows an example of a response body received from a DOTS server which supports:

- o IPv4, IPv6, TCP, UDP, ICMP, and ICMPv6 mandatory match criteria listed in Section 4.2.
- o 'accept', 'drop', and 'rate-limit' actions.

```
{
  "ietf-dots-data-channel:capabilities": {
    "address-family": ["ipv4", "ipv6"],
    "forwarding-actions": ["drop", "accept"],
    "rate-limit": true,
    "transport-protocols": [1, 6, 17, 58],
    "ipv4": {
      "length": true,
      "protocol": true,
      "destination-prefix": true,
      "source-prefix": true,
      "fragment": true
    },
    "ipv6": {
      "length": true,
      "protocol": true,
      "destination-prefix": true,
      "source-prefix": true,
      "fragment": true
    },
    "tcp": {
      "flags-bitmask": true,
      "source-port": true,
      "destination-port": true,
      "port-range": true
    },
    "udp": {
      "length": true,
      "source-port": true,
      "destination-port": true,
      "port-range": true
    },
    "icmp": {
      "type": true,
      "code": true
    }
  }
}
```

Figure 23: Reply to a GET Request with Filtering Capabilities
(Message Body)

7.2. Install Filtering Rules

A POST or PUT request is used by a DOTS client to communicate filtering rules to a DOTS server.

Figure 24 shows a POST request example to block traffic from 192.0.2.0/24 and destined to 198.51.100.0/24. Other examples are discussed in Appendix A.

```
POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\
/dots-client=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json

{
  "ietf-dots-data-channel:acls": {
    "acl": [
      {
        "name": "sample-ipv4-acl",
        "type": "ipv4-acl-type",
        "activation-type": "activate-when-mitigating",
        "aces": {
          "ace": [
            {
              "name": "rule1",
              "matches": {
                "ipv4": {
                  "destination-ipv4-network": "198.51.100.0/24",
                  "source-ipv4-network": "192.0.2.0/24"
                }
              },
              "actions": {
                "forwarding": "drop"
              }
            }
          ]
        }
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

Figure 24: POST to Install Filtering Rules

The meaning of these parameters is as follows:

name: The name of the access list.

This is a mandatory attribute.

type: Indicates the primary intended type of match criteria (e.g., IPv4, IPv6). It is set to 'ipv4-acl-type' in the example of Figure 24.

This is an optional attribute.

activation-type: Indicates whether an ACL has to be activated (immediately or during mitigation time) or instantiated without being activated (deactivated). Deactivated ACLs can be activated using a variety of means such as manual configuration on a DOTS server or using the DOTS data channel.

If this attribute is not provided, the DOTS server MUST use 'activate-when-mitigating' as default value.

When a mitigation is in progress, the DOTS server MUST only activate 'activate-when-mitigating' filters that are bound to the DOTS client that triggered the mitigation.

This is an optional attribute.

matches: Define criteria used to identify a flow on which to apply the rule. It can be "l3" (IPv4, IPv6) or "l4" (TCP, UDP, ..). The detailed match parameters are specified in Section 4.

In the example depicted in Figure 24, an IPv4 matching criteria is used.

This is an optional attribute.

destination-ipv4-network: The destination IPv4 prefix. DOTS servers MUST validate that these prefixes are within the scope of the DOTS client domain. Other validation checks may be supported by DOTS servers. If this attribute is not provided, the DOTS server enforces the ACL on any destination IP address that belong to the DOTS client domain.

This is a mandatory attribute in requests with an 'activation-type' set to 'immediate'.

source-ipv4-network: The source IPv4 prefix.

This is an optional attribute.

actions: Actions in the forwarding ACL category can be "drop" or "accept". The "accept" action is used to accept-list traffic. The "drop" action is used to drop-list traffic.

Accepted traffic may be subject to "rate-limit"; the allowed traffic rate is represented in bytes per second. This unit is the same as the one used for "traffic-rate" in [RFC5575].

This is a mandatory attribute.

The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the POST request using the status-line. Concretely, "201 Created" status-line MUST be returned in the response if the DOTS server has accepted the filtering rules. If the request is missing a mandatory attribute or contains an invalid or unknown parameter (e.g., a match field not supported by the DOTS server), "400 Bad Request" status-line MUST be returned by the DOTS server in the response. The error-tag is set to "missing-attribute", "invalid-value", or "unknown-element" as a function of the encountered error.

If the request is received via a server-domain DOTS gateway, but the DOTS server does not maintain a 'cdid' for this 'cuid' while a 'cdid' is expected to be supplied, the DOTS server MUST reply with "403 Forbidden" status-line and the error-tag "access-denied". Upon receipt of this message, the DOTS client MUST register (Figure 11).

If the request is conflicting with an existing filtering installed by another DOTS client of the domain, absent any local policy, the DOTS server returns "409 Conflict" status-line to the requesting DOTS client. The error-tag "resource-denied" is used in this case.

The "insert" query parameter (Section 4.8.5 of [RFC8040]) MAY be used to specify how an access control entry is inserted within an ACL and how an ACL is inserted within an ACL set.

The DOTS client uses the PUT request to modify its filtering rules maintained by the DOTS server. In particular, a DOTS client MUST update its filtering entries upon change of the destination-prefix. How such change is detected is out of scope.

A DOTS server MUST maintain a filtering rule for at least 10080 minutes (1 week). If no refresh request is seen from the DOTS client, the DOTS server removes expired entries. Typically, a refresh request is a PUT request which echoes the content of a response to a GET request with all of the read-only parameters stripped out (e.g., pending-lifetime).

7.3. Retrieve Installed Filtering Rules

A DOTS client periodically queries its DOTS server to check the counters for installed filtering rules. A GET request is used to retrieve filtering rules from a DOTS server. In order to indicate which type of data is requested in a GET request, the DOTS client sets adequately the "content" query parameter.

If the DOTS server does not find the access list name conveyed in the GET request in its configuration data for this DOTS client, it responds with a "404 Not Found" status-line.

In order to illustrate the intended behavior, consider the example depicted in Figure 25. In reference to this example, the DOTS client requests the creation of an immediate ACL called "test-acl-ipv6-udp".

```
PUT /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\  
  /dots-client=paL8p4Zqo4SLv64TLPXrxA/acls\  
  /acl=test-acl-ipv6-udp HTTP/1.1  
Host: example.com  
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json  
  
{  
  "ietf-dots-data-channel:acls": {  
    "acl": [  
      {  
        "name": "test-acl-ipv6-udp",  
        "type": "ipv6-acl-type",  
        "activation-type": "immediate",  
        "aces": {  
          "ace": [  
            {  
              "name": "my-test-ace",  
              "matches": {  
                "ipv6": {  
                  "destination-ipv6-network": "2001:db8:6401::2/127",  
                  "source-ipv6-network": "2001:db8:1234::/96",  
                  "protocol": 17,  
                  "flow-label": 10000  
                },  
                "udp": {  
                  "source-port": {  
                    "operator": "lte",  
                    "port": 80  
                  },  
                  "destination-port": {  
                    "operator": "neq",  
                    "port": 1010  
                  }  
                }  
              },  
              "actions": {  
                "forwarding": "accept"  
              }  
            }  
          ]  
        }  
      ]  
    }  
  }  
}
```

Figure 25: Example of a PUT Request to Create a Filtering

The peer DOTS server follows the procedure specified in Section 7.2 to process the request. We consider in the following that a positive response is sent back to the requesting DOTS client to confirm that the "test-acl-ipv6-udp" ACL is successfully installed by the DOTS server.

The DOTS client can issue a GET request to retrieve all its filtering rules and the number of matches for the installed filtering rules as illustrated in Figure 26. The "content" query parameter is set to 'all'. The message body of the response to this GET request is shown in Figure 27.

```
GET /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\  
    /dots-client=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw\  
    /acIs?content=all HTTP/1.1  
Host: example.com  
Accept: application/yang-data+json
```

Figure 26: Retrieve the Configuration Data and State Data for the Filtering Rules (GET Request)

```

{
  "ietf-dots-data-channel:acls": {
    "acl": [
      {
        "name": "test-acl-ipv6-udp",
        "type": "ipv6-acl-type",
        "activation-type": "immediate",
        "pending-lifetime": 9080,
        "aces": {
          "ace": [
            {
              "name": "my-test-ace",
              "matches": {
                "ipv6": {
                  "destination-ipv6-network": "2001:db8:6401::2/127",
                  "source-ipv6-network": "2001:db8:1234::/96",
                  "protocol": 17,
                  "flow-label": 10000
                },
                "udp": {
                  "source-port": {
                    "operator": "lte",
                    "port": 80
                  },
                  "destination-port": {
                    "operator": "neq",
                    "port": 1010
                  }
                }
              },
              "actions": {
                "forwarding": "accept"
              }
            }
          ]
        }
      }
    ]
  }
}

```

Figure 27: Retrieve the Configuration Data and State Data for the Filtering Rules (Response Message Body)

Also, a DOTS client can issue a GET request to retrieve only configuration data related to an ACL as shown in Figure 28. It does so by setting the "content" query parameter to 'config'.

```
GET /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\  
    /dots-client=paL8p4Zqo4SLv64TLPXrxA/acls\  
    /acl=test-acl-ipv6-udp?content=config HTTP/1.1  
Host: example.com  
Accept: application/yang-data+json
```

Figure 28: Retrieve the Configuration Data for a Filtering Rule (GET Request)

A response to this GET request is shown in Figure 29.

```

{
  "ietf-dots-data-channel:acls": {
    "acl": [
      {
        "name": "test-acl-ipv6-udp",
        "type": "ipv6-acl-type",
        "activation-type": "immediate",
        "aces": {
          "ace": [
            {
              "name": "my-test-ace",
              "matches": {
                "ipv6": {
                  "destination-ipv6-network": "2001:db8:6401::2/127",
                  "source-ipv6-network": "2001:db8:1234::/96",
                  "protocol": 17,
                  "flow-label": 10000
                },
                "udp": {
                  "source-port": {
                    "operator": "lte",
                    "port": 80
                  },
                  "destination-port": {
                    "operator": "neq",
                    "port": 1010
                  }
                }
              },
              "actions": {
                "forwarding": "accept"
              }
            }
          ]
        }
      }
    ]
  }
}

```

Figure 29: Retrieve the Configuration Data for a Filtering Rule
(Response Message Body)

A DOTS client can also issue a GET request with a "content" query parameter set to 'non-config' to exclusively retrieve non-configuration data bound to a given ACL as shown in Figure 30. A response to this GET request is shown in Figure 31.

```
GET /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\  
    /dots-client=paL8p4Zqo4SLv64TLPXrxA/acls\  
    /acl=test-acl-ipv6-udp?content=non-config HTTP/1.1  
Host: example.com  
Accept: application/yang-data+json
```

Figure 30: Retrieve the Non-Configuration Data for a Filtering Rule
(GET Request)

```
{  
  "ietf-dots-data-channel:acls": {  
    "acl": [  
      {  
        "name": "test-acl-ipv6-udp",  
        "pending-lifetime": 8000,  
        "aces": {  
          "ace": [  
            {  
              "name": "my-test-ace"  
            }  
          ]  
        }  
      }  
    ]  
  }  
}
```

Figure 31: Retrieve the Non-Configuration Data for a Filtering Rule
(Response Message Body)

7.4. Remove Filtering Rules

A DELETE request is used by a DOTS client to delete filtering rules from a DOTS server.

If the DOTS server does not find the access list name carried in the DELETE request in its configuration data for this DOTS client, it MUST respond with a "404 Not Found" status-line. The DOTS server successfully acknowledges a DOTS client's request to withdraw the filtering rules using "204 No Content" status-line, and removes the filtering rules accordingly.

Figure 32 shows an example of a request to remove the IPv4 ACL "sample-ipv4-acl" created in Section 7.2.

```
DELETE /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\  
/dots-client=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw/acls\  
/acl=sample-ipv4-acl HTTP/1.1  
Host: example.com
```

Figure 32: Remove a Filtering Rule (DELETE Request)

Figure 33 shows an example of a response received from the DOTS server to confirm the deletion of "sample-ipv4-acl".

```
HTTP/1.1 204 No Content  
Server: Apache  
Date: Fri, 27 Jul 2018 10:05:15 GMT  
Cache-Control: no-cache  
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json  
Content-Length: 0  
Connection: Keep-Alive
```

Figure 33: Remove a Filtering Rule (Response)

8. Operational Considerations

The following operational considerations should be taken into account:

- o DOTS servers MUST NOT enable both DOTS data channel and direct configuration, to avoid race conditions and inconsistent configurations arising from simultaneous updates from multiple sources.
- o DOTS agents SHOULD enable the DOTS data channel to configure aliases and ACLs, and only use direct configuration as a stop-gap mechanism to test DOTS signal channel with aliases and ACLs. Further, direct configuration SHOULD only be used when the on-path DOTS agents are within the same domain.
- o If a DOTS server has enabled direct configuration, it can reject the DOTS data channel connection using hard ICMP error [RFC1122] or RST (Reset) bit in the TCP header or reject the RESTCONF request using an error response containing a "503 Service Unavailable" status-line.

9. IANA Considerations

This document requests IANA to register the following URI in the "ns" subregistry within the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-data-channel
Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.

This document requests IANA to register the following YANG module in the "YANG Module Names" subregistry [RFC7950] within the "YANG Parameters" registry.

Name: ietf-dots-data-channel
Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-data-channel
Prefix: data-channel
Reference: RFC XXXX

This module is not maintained by IANA.

10. Security Considerations

RESTCONF security considerations are discussed in [RFC8040]. In particular, DOTS agents MUST follow the security recommendations in Sections 2 and 12 of [RFC8040]. Also, DOTS agents MUST support the mutual authentication TLS profile discussed in Sections 7.1 and 8 of [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].

Authenticated encryption MUST be used for data confidentiality and message integrity. The interaction between the DOTS agents requires Transport Layer Security (TLS) with a cipher suite offering confidentiality protection and the guidance given in [RFC7525] MUST be followed to avoid attacks on TLS.

The installation of drop- or accept-list rules using RESTCONF over TLS reveals the attacker IP addresses and legitimate IP addresses only to the DOTS server trusted by the DOTS client. The secure communication channel between DOTS agents provides privacy and prevents a network eavesdropper from directly gaining access to the drop- and accept-listed IP addresses.

An attacker may be able to inject RST packets, bogus application segments, etc., regardless of whether TLS authentication is used. Because the application data is TLS protected, this will not result in the application receiving bogus data, but it will constitute a DoS on the connection. This attack can be countered by using TCP-AO [RFC5925]. If TCP-AO is used, then any bogus packets injected by an attacker will be rejected by the TCP-AO integrity check and therefore will never reach the TLS layer.

In order to prevent leaking internal information outside a client-domain, client-side DOTS gateways SHOULD NOT reveal the identity of

internal DOTS clients (e.g., source IP address, client's hostname) unless explicitly configured to do so.

DOTS servers MUST verify that requesting DOTS clients are entitled to enforce filtering rules on a given IP prefix. That is, only filtering rules on IP resources that belong to the DOTS client domain can be authorized by a DOTS server. The exact mechanism for the DOTS servers to validate that the target prefixes are within the scope of the DOTS client domain is deployment-specific.

Rate-limiting DOTS requests, including those with new 'cuid' values, from the same DOTS client defends against DoS attacks that would result from varying the 'cuid' to exhaust DOTS server resources. Rate-limit policies SHOULD be enforced on DOTS gateways (if deployed) and DOTS servers.

Applying resources quota per DOTS client and/or per DOTS client domain (e.g., limit the number of aliases and filters to be installed by DOTS clients) prevents DOTS server resources to be aggressively used by some DOTS clients and ensures, therefore, DDoS mitigation usage fairness. Additionally, DOTS servers may limit the number of DOTS clients that can be enabled per domain.

When FQDNs are used as targets, the DOTS server MUST rely upon DNS privacy enabling protocols (e.g., DNS over TLS [RFC7858] or DoH [RFC8484]) to prevent eavesdroppers from possibly identifying the target resources protected by the DDoS mitigation service, and means to ensure the target FQDN resolution is authentic (e.g., DNSSEC [RFC4034]).

The presence of DOTS gateways may lead to infinite forwarding loops, which is undesirable. To prevent and detect such loops, a mechanism is defined in Section 3.4.

All data nodes defined in the YANG module which can be created, modified, and deleted (i.e., config true, which is the default) are considered sensitive. Write operations applied to these data nodes without proper protection can negatively affect network operations. This module reuses YANG structures from [RFC8519], and the security considerations for those nodes continue to apply for this usage. Appropriate security measures are recommended to prevent illegitimate users from invoking DOTS data channel primitives. Nevertheless, an attacker who can access a DOTS client is technically capable of launching various attacks, such as:

- o Setting an arbitrarily low rate-limit, which may prevent legitimate traffic from being forwarded (rate-limit).

- o Setting an arbitrarily high rate-limit, which may lead to the forwarding of illegitimate DDoS traffic (rate-limit).
- o Communicating invalid aliases to the server (alias), which will cause the failure of associating both data and signal channels.
- o Setting invalid ACL entries, which may prevent legitimate traffic from being forwarded. Likewise, invalid ACL entries may lead to forward DDoS traffic.

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Appendix A. Sample Examples: Filtering Fragments

This specification strongly recommends the use of "fragment" for handling fragments.

Figure 34 shows the content of the POST request to be issued by a DOTS client to its DOTS server to allow the traffic destined to 198.51.100.0/24 and UDP port number 53, but to drop all fragmented packets. The following ACEs are defined (in this order):

- o "drop-all-fragments" ACE: discards all fragments.
- o "allow-dns-packets" ACE: accepts DNS packets destined to 198.51.100.0/24.

```
POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\
/dots-client=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json
```



```

{
  "ietf-dots-data-channel:acls": {
    "acl": [
      {
        "name": "dns-fragments",
        "type": "ipv4-acl-type",
        "aces": {
          "ace": [
            {
              "name": "drop-all-fragments",
              "matches": {
                "ipv4": {
                  "fragment": {
                    "operator": "match",
                    "type": "isf"
                  }
                }
              },
              "actions": {
                "forwarding": "drop"
              }
            }
          ]
        },
        "ace": [
          {
            "name": "allow-dns-packets",
            "matches": {
              "ipv4": {
                "destination-ipv4-network": "198.51.100.0/24"
              },
              "udp": {
                "destination-port": {
                  "operator": "eq",
                  "port": 53
                }
              }
            },
            "actions": {
              "forwarding": "accept"
            }
          }
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
}

```

Figure 34: Filtering IPv4 Fragmented Packets

Figure 35 shows a POST request example issued by a DOTS client to its DOTS server to allow the traffic destined to 2001:db8::/32 and UDP port number 53, but to drop all fragmented packets. The following ACEs are defined (in this order):

- o "drop-all-fragments" ACE: discards all fragments (including atomic fragments). That is, IPv6 packets which include a Fragment header (44) are dropped.
- o "allow-dns-packets" ACE: accepts DNS packets destined to 2001:db8::/32.

```
POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\
    /dots-client=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json
```

```
{
  "ietf-dots-data-channel:acls": {
    "acl": [
      {
        "name": "dns-fragments",
        "type": "ipv6-acl-type",
        "aces": {
          "ace": [
            {
              "name": "drop-all-fragments",
              "matches": {
                "ipv6": {
                  "fragment": {
                    "operator": "match",
                    "type": "isf"
                  }
                }
              },
              "actions": {
                "forwarding": "drop"
              }
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      {
        "name": "allow-dns-packets",
        "matches": {
          "ipv6": {
            "destination-ipv6-network": "2001:db8::/32"
          }
        },
        "udp": {

```

```
        "destination-port": {
            "operator": "eq",
            "port": 53
        }
    },
    "actions": {
        "forwarding": "accept"
    }
}
]
```

Figure 35: Filtering IPv6 Fragmented Packets

Appendix B. Sample Examples: Filtering TCP Messages

This section provides sample examples to illustrate TCP-specific filtering based on the flag bits. These examples should not be interpreted as recommended filtering behaviors under specific DDoS attacks.

B.1. Discard TCP Null Attack

Figure 36 shows an example of a DOTS request sent by a DOTS client to install immediately a filter to discard incoming TCP messages having all flags unset. The bitmask can be set to 255 to check against the (CWR, ECE, URG, ACK, PSH, RST, SYN, FIN) flags.

```
PUT /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\  
  /dots-client=paL8p4Zqo4SLv64TLPXrxA/acls\  
  /acl=tcp-flags-example HTTP/1.1  
Host: example.com  
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json  
  
{  
  "ietf-dots-data-channel:acls": {  
    "acl": [{  
      "name": "tcp-flags-example",  
      "activation-type": "immediate",  
      "aces": {  
        "ace": [{  
          "name": "null-attack",  
          "matches": {  
            "tcp": {  
              "flags-bitmask": {  
                "operator": "not any",  
                "bitmask": 4095  
              }  
            }  
          },  
          "actions": {  
            "forwarding": "drop"  
          }  
        }  
      }  
    }  
  }  
}
```

Figure 36: Example of a DOTS Request to Deny TCP Null Attack Messages

B.2. Rate-Limit SYN Flooding

Figure 37 shows an ACL example to rate-limit incoming SYNs during a SYN-flood attack.

```
PUT /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\  
  /dots-client=paL8p4Zqo4SLv64TLPXrxA/acls\  
  /acl=tcp-flags-example HTTP/1.1  
Host: example.com  
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json  
  
{  
  "ietf-dots-data-channel:acls": {  
    "acl": [{  
      "name": "tcp-flags-example",  
      "activation-type": "activate-when-mitigating",  
      "aces": {  
        "ace": [{  
          "name": "rate-limit-syn",  
          "matches": {  
            "tcp": {  
              "flags-bitmask": {  
                "operator": "match",  
                "bitmask": 2  
              }  
            }  
          },  
          "actions": {  
            "forwarding": "accept",  
            "rate-limit": "20.00"  
          }  
        }  
      }  
    }  
  }  
}
```

Figure 37: Example of DOTS Request to Rate-Limit Incoming TCP SYNs

B.3. Rate-Limit ACK Flooding

Figure 38 shows an ACL example to rate-limit incoming ACKs during an ACK-flood attack.

```
PUT /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\  
  /dots-client=paL8p4Zqo4SLv64TLPXrxA/acls\  
  /acl=tcp-flags-example HTTP/1.1  
Host: example.com  
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json  
  
{  
  "ietf-dots-data-channel:acls": {  
    "acl": [{  
      "name": "tcp-flags-example",  
      "type": "ipv4-acl-type",  
      "activation-type": "activate-when-mitigating",  
      "aces": {  
        "ace": [{  
          "name": "rate-limit-ack",  
          "matches": {  
            "tcp": {  
              "flags-bitmask": {  
                "operator": "match",  
                "bitmask": 16  
              }  
            }  
          },  
          "actions": {  
            "forwarding": "accept",  
            "rate-limit": "20.00"  
          }  
        }  
      }  
    }  
  }  
}
```

Figure 38: Example of DOTS Request to Rate-Limit Incoming TCP ACKs

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Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling Requirements
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Abstract

This document defines the requirements for the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) protocols coordinating attack response against DDoS attacks.

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1. Introduction

1.1. Context and Motivation

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks continue to plague network operators around the globe, from Tier-1 service providers on down to enterprises and small businesses. Attack scale and frequency similarly have continued to increase, in part as a result of software vulnerabilities leading to reflection and amplification attacks. Once-staggering attack traffic volume is now the norm, and the impact of larger-scale attacks attract the attention of international press agencies.

The greater impact of contemporary DDoS attacks has led to increased focus on coordinated attack response. Many institutions and enterprises lack the resources or expertise to operate on-premises

attack mitigation solutions themselves, or simply find themselves constrained by local bandwidth limitations. To address such gaps, security service providers have begun to offer on-demand traffic scrubbing services, which aim to separate the DDoS traffic from legitimate traffic and forward only the latter. Today each such service offers a proprietary invocation interface for subscribers to request attack mitigation, tying subscribers to proprietary signaling implementations while also limiting the subset of network elements capable of participating in the attack mitigation. As a result of signaling interface incompatibility, attack responses may be fragmentary or otherwise incomplete, leaving key players in the attack path unable to assist in the defense.

The lack of a common method to coordinate a real-time response among involved actors and network domains inhibits the speed and effectiveness of DDoS attack mitigation. This document describes the required characteristics of protocols enabling requests for DDoS attack mitigation, reducing attack impact and leading to more efficient defensive strategies.

DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) communicates the need for defensive action in anticipation of or in response to an attack, but does not dictate the form any defensive action takes. DOTS supplements calls for help with pertinent details about the detected attack, allowing entities participating in DOTS to form ad hoc, adaptive alliances against DDoS attacks as described in the DOTS use cases [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases]. The requirements in this document are derived from those use cases and [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture].

1.2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

This document adopts the following terms:

DDoS: A distributed denial-of-service attack, in which traffic originating from multiple sources are directed at a target on a network. DDoS attacks are intended to cause a negative impact on the availability of servers, services, applications, and/or other functionality of an attack target. Denial-of-service considerations are discussed in detail in [RFC4732].

DDoS attack target: A network connected entity with a finite set of resources, such as network bandwidth, memory or CPU, that is the focus of a DDoS attack. Potential targets include (but not

limited to) network elements, network links, servers, and services.

DDoS attack telemetry: Collected measurements and behavioral characteristics defining the nature of a DDoS attack.

Countermeasure: An action or set of actions taken to recognize and filter out DDoS attack traffic while passing legitimate traffic to the attack target.

Mitigation: A set of countermeasures enforced against traffic destined for the target or targets of a detected or reported DDoS attack, where countermeasure enforcement is managed by an entity in the network path between attack sources and the attack target. Mitigation methodology is out of scope for this document.

Mitigator: An entity, typically a network element, capable of performing mitigation of a detected or reported DDoS attack. For the purposes of this document, this entity is a black box capable of mitigation, making no assumptions about availability or design of countermeasures, nor about the programmable interface(s) between this entity and other network elements. The mitigator and invoked DOTS server are assumed to belong to the same administrative entity.

DOTS client: A DOTS-aware software module responsible for requesting attack response coordination with other DOTS-aware elements.

DOTS server: A DOTS-aware software module handling and responding to messages from DOTS clients. The DOTS server enables mitigation on behalf of the DOTS client, if requested, by communicating the DOTS client's request to the mitigator and returning selected mitigator feedback to the requesting DOTS client. A DOTS server may also be colocated with a mitigator.

DOTS agent: Any DOTS-aware software module capable of participating in a DOTS signal or data channel. It can be a DOTS client, DOTS server, or, as a logical agent, a DOTS gateway.

DOTS gateway: A DOTS-aware software module resulting from the logical concatenation of a DOTS server and a DOTS client, analogous to a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261] Back-to-Back User Agent (B2BUA) [RFC7092]. Client-side DOTS gateways are DOTS gateways that are in the DOTS client's domain, while server-side DOTS gateways denote DOTS gateways that are in the DOTS server's domain. DOTS gateways are discussed in detail in [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture].

Signal channel: A bidirectional, mutually authenticated communication channel between two DOTS agents characterized by resilience even in conditions leading to severe packet loss, such as a volumetric DDoS attack causing network congestion.

DOTS signal: A concise authenticated status/control message transmitted between DOTS agents, used to indicate client's need for mitigation, as well as to convey the status of any requested mitigation.

Heartbeat: A message transmitted between DOTS agents over the signal channel, used as a keep-alive and to measure peer health.

Data channel: A secure communication layer between two DOTS agents used for infrequent bulk exchange of data not easily or appropriately communicated through the signal channel under attack conditions.

Filter: A specification of a matching network traffic flow or set of flows. The filter will typically have a policy associated with it, e.g., rate-limiting or discarding matching traffic.

Blacklist: A filter list of addresses, prefixes, and/or other identifiers indicating sources from which traffic should be blocked, regardless of traffic content.

Whitelist: A list of addresses, prefixes, and/or other identifiers indicating sources from which traffic should always be allowed, regardless of contradictory data gleaned in a detected attack.

Multi-homed DOTS client: A DOTS client exchanging messages with multiple DOTS servers, each in a separate administrative domain.

2. Requirements

This section describes the required features and characteristics of the DOTS protocol.

DOTS is an advisory protocol. An active DDoS attack against the entity controlling the DOTS client need not be present before establishing a communication channel between DOTS agents. Indeed, establishing a relationship with peer DOTS agents during normal network conditions provides the foundation for more rapid attack response against future attacks, as all interactions setting up DOTS, including any business or service level agreements, are already complete. Peer DOTS agents are provisioned to a DOTS client using a variety of manual or dynamic methods.

The DOTS protocol must at a minimum make it possible for a DOTS client to request a mitigator's aid mounting a defense, coordinated by a DOTS server, against a suspected attack, signaling within or between domains as requested by local operators. DOTS clients should similarly be able to withdraw aid requests. DOTS requires no justification from DOTS clients for requests for help, nor do DOTS clients need to justify withdrawing help requests: the decision is local to the DOTS clients' domain. Multi-homed DOTS clients must be able to select the appropriate DOTS server(s) to which a mitigation request is to be sent. Further multi-homing considerations are out of scope.

Regular feedback between DOTS clients and DOTS servers supplement the defensive alliance by maintaining a common understanding of the DOTS agents' health and activity. Bidirectional communication between DOTS clients and DOTS servers is therefore critical.

DOTS protocol implementations face competing operational goals when maintaining this bidirectional communication stream. On the one hand, the protocol must be resilient under extremely hostile network conditions, providing continued contact between DOTS agents even as attack traffic saturates the link. Such resiliency may be developed several ways, but characteristics such as small message size, asynchronous, redundant message delivery and minimal connection overhead (when possible given local network policy) will tend to contribute to the robustness demanded by a viable DOTS protocol. Operators of peer DOTS-enabled domains may enable quality- or class-of-service traffic tagging to increase the probability of successful DOTS signal delivery, but DOTS does not require such policies be in place. The DOTS solution indeed must be viable especially in their absence.

On the other hand, DOTS must include protections ensuring message confidentiality, integrity and authenticity to keep the protocol from becoming another vector for the very attacks it's meant to help fight off. DOTS clients must be able to authenticate DOTS servers, and vice versa, to avoid exposing new attack surfaces when deploying DOTS; specifically, to prevent DDoS mitigation in response to DOTS signaling from becoming a new form of attack. In order to provide this level of protection, DOTS agents must have a way to negotiate and agree upon the terms of protocol security. Attacks against the transport protocol should not offer a means of attack against the message confidentiality, integrity and authenticity.

The DOTS server and client must also have some common method of defining the scope of any mitigation performed by the mitigator, as well as making adjustments to other commonly configurable features,

such as listen port numbers, exchanging black- and white-lists, and so on.

Finally, DOTS should be sufficiently extensible to meet future needs in coordinated attack defense, although this consideration is necessarily superseded by the other operational requirements.

2.1. General Requirements

GEN-001 Extensibility: Protocols and data models developed as part of DOTS MUST be extensible in order to keep DOTS adaptable to operational and proprietary DDoS defenses. Future extensions MUST be backward compatible. DOTS protocols MUST use a version number system to distinguish protocol revisions. Implementations of older protocol versions SHOULD ignore information added to DOTS messages as part of newer protocol versions.

GEN-002 Resilience and Robustness: The signaling protocol MUST be designed to maximize the probability of signal delivery even under the severely constrained network conditions imposed by particular attack traffic. The protocol MUST be resilient, that is, continue operating despite message loss and out-of-order or redundant message delivery. In support of signaling protocol robustness, DOTS signals SHOULD be conveyed over a transport not susceptible to Head of Line Blocking.

GEN-003 Bidirectionality: To support peer health detection, to maintain an open signal channel, and to increase the probability of signal delivery during attack, the signal channel MUST be bidirectional, with client and server transmitting signals to each other at regular intervals, regardless of any client request for mitigation. Unidirectional messages MUST be supported within the bidirectional signal channel to allow for unsolicited message delivery, enabling asynchronous notifications between agents.

GEN-004 Bulk Data Exchange: Infrequent bulk data exchange between DOTS agents can also significantly augment attack response coordination, permitting such tasks as population of black- or white-listed source addresses; address or prefix group aliasing; exchange of incident reports; and other hinting or configuration supplementing attack response.

As the resilience requirements for the DOTS signal channel mandate small signal message size, a separate, secure data channel utilizing a reliable transport protocol MUST be used for bulk data exchange.

2.2. Signal Channel Requirements

SIG-001 Use of Common Transport Protocols: DOTS MUST operate over common widely deployed and standardized transport protocols. While connectionless transport such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) [RFC0768] SHOULD be used for the signal channel, the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [RFC0793] MAY be used if necessary due to network policy or middlebox capabilities or configurations.

SIG-002 Sub-MTU Message Size: To avoid message fragmentation and the consequently decreased probability of message delivery over a congested link, signaling protocol message size MUST be kept under signaling Path Maximum Transmission Unit (PMTU), including the byte overhead of any encapsulation, transport headers, and transport- or message-level security.

DOTS agents SHOULD attempt to learn the PMTU through mechanisms such as Path MTU Discovery [RFC1191] or Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery [RFC4821]. If the PMTU cannot be discovered, DOTS agents SHOULD assume a PMTU of 1280 bytes. If IPv4 support on legacy or otherwise unusual networks is a consideration and PMTU is unknown, DOTS implementations MAY rely on a PMTU of 576 bytes, as discussed in [RFC0791] and [RFC1122].

SIG-003 Channel Health Monitoring: DOTS agents MUST support exchange of heartbeat messages over the signal channel to monitor channel health. Peer DOTS agents SHOULD regularly send heartbeats to each other while a mitigation request is active. The heartbeat interval during active mitigation is not specified, but SHOULD be frequent enough to maintain any on-path NAT bindings during mitigation.

To support scenarios in which loss of heartbeat is used to trigger mitigation, and to keep the channel active, DOTS clients MAY solicit heartbeat exchanges after successful mutual authentication. When DOTS agents are exchanging heartbeats and no mitigation request is active, either agent MAY request changes to the heartbeat rate. For example, a DOTS server might want to delay or cease heartbeat exchanges when an active DOTS client has not requested mitigation, in order to control load.

Following mutual authentication, a signal channel MUST be considered active until a DOTS agent explicitly ends the session, or either DOTS agent fails to receive heartbeats from the other after a mutually agreed upon timeout period has elapsed. Because heartbeat loss is much more likely during volumetric attack, DOTS agents SHOULD avoid signal channel termination when mitigation is

active and heartbeats are not received by either DOTS agent for an extended period. In such circumstances, DOTS clients MAY attempt to reestablish the signal channel. DOTS servers SHOULD monitor the attack, using feedback from the mitigator and other available sources, and MAY use the absence of attack traffic and lack of client heartbeats as an indication the signal channel is defunct.

SIG-004 Channel Redirection: In order to increase DOTS operational flexibility and scalability, DOTS servers SHOULD be able to redirect DOTS clients to another DOTS server at any time. DOTS clients MUST NOT assume the redirection target DOTS server shares security state with the redirecting DOTS server. DOTS clients MAY attempt abbreviated security negotiation methods supported by the protocol, such as DTLS session resumption, but MUST be prepared to negotiate new security state with the redirection target DOTS server.

Due to the increased likelihood of packet loss caused by link congestion during an attack, DOTS servers SHOULD NOT redirect while mitigation is enabled during an active attack against a target in the DOTS client's domain.

SIG-005 Mitigation Requests and Status: Authorized DOTS clients MUST be able to request scoped mitigation from DOTS servers. DOTS servers MUST send mitigation request status in response to DOTS clients requests for mitigation, and SHOULD accept scoped mitigation requests from authorized DOTS clients. DOTS servers MAY reject authorized requests for mitigation, but MUST include a reason for the rejection in the status message sent to the client.

Due to the higher likelihood of packet loss during a DDoS attack, DOTS servers SHOULD regularly send mitigation status to authorized DOTS clients which have requested and been granted mitigation, regardless of client requests for mitigation status.

When DOTS client-requested mitigation is active, DOTS server status messages SHOULD include the following mitigation metrics:

- * Total number of packets blocked by the mitigation
- * Current number of packets per second blocked
- * Total number of bytes blocked
- * Current number of bytes per second blocked

DOTS clients MAY take these metrics into account when determining whether to ask the DOTS server to cease mitigation.

Once a DOTS client requests mitigation, the client MAY withdraw that request at any time, regardless of whether mitigation is currently active. The DOTS server MUST immediately acknowledge a DOTS client's request to stop mitigation.

To protect against route or DNS flapping caused by a client rapidly toggling mitigation, and to dampen the effect of oscillating attacks, DOTS servers MAY allow mitigation to continue for a limited period after acknowledging a DOTS client's withdrawal of a mitigation request. During this period, DOTS server status messages SHOULD indicate that mitigation is active but terminating.

The initial active-but-terminating period is implementation-specific, but SHOULD be sufficiently long to absorb latency incurred by route propagation. If the client requests mitigation again before the initial active-but-terminating period elapses, the DOTS server MAY exponentially increase the active-but-terminating period up to a maximum of 300 seconds (5 minutes). After the active-but-terminating period elapses, the DOTS server MUST treat the mitigation as terminated, as the DOTS client is no longer responsible for the mitigation. For example, if there is a financial relationship between the DOTS client and server domains, the DOTS client ceases incurring cost at this point.

SIG-006 Mitigation Lifetime: DOTS servers MUST support mitigation lifetimes, and MUST terminate a mitigation when the lifetime elapses. DOTS servers also MUST support renewal of mitigation lifetimes in mitigation requests from DOTS clients, allowing clients to extend mitigation as necessary for the duration of an attack.

DOTS servers MUST treat a mitigation terminated due to lifetime expiration exactly as if the DOTS client originating the mitigation had asked to end the mitigation, including the active-but-terminating period, as described above in SIG-005.

DOTS clients SHOULD include a mitigation lifetime in all mitigation requests. If a DOTS client does not include a mitigation lifetime in requests for help sent to the DOTS server, the DOTS server will use a reasonable default as defined by the protocol.

DOTS servers SHOULD support indefinite mitigation lifetimes, enabling architectures in which the mitigator is always in the traffic path to the resources for which the DOTS client is requesting protection. DOTS clients MUST be prepared to not be granted mitigations with indefinite lifetimes. DOTS servers MAY

refuse mitigations with indefinite lifetimes, for policy reasons. The reasons themselves are out of scope. If the DOTS server does not grant a mitigation request with an indefinite mitigation lifetime, it MUST set the lifetime to a value that is configured locally. That value MUST be returned in a reply to the requesting DOTS client.

SIG-007 Mitigation Scope: DOTS clients MUST indicate desired mitigation scope. The scope type will vary depending on the resources requiring mitigation. All DOTS agent implementations MUST support the following required scope types:

- * IPv4 addresses in dotted quad format
- * IPv4 prefixes in CIDR notation [RFC4632]
- * IPv6 addresses [RFC4291][RFC5952]
- * IPv6 prefixes [RFC4291][RFC5952]
- * Domain names [RFC1035]

The following mitigation scope types are OPTIONAL:

- * Uniform Resource Identifiers [RFC3986]

DOTS agents MUST support mitigation scope aliases, allowing DOTS clients and servers to refer to collections of protected resources by an opaque identifier created through the data channel, direct configuration, or other means. Domain name and URI mitigation scopes may be thought of as a form of scope alias, in which the addresses to which the domain name or URI resolve represent the full scope of the mitigation.

If there is additional information available narrowing the scope of any requested attack response, such as targeted port range, protocol, or service, DOTS clients SHOULD include that information in client signals. DOTS clients MAY also include additional attack details. Such supplemental information is OPTIONAL, and DOTS servers MAY ignore it when enabling countermeasures on the mitigator.

As an active attack evolves, clients MUST be able to adjust as necessary the scope of requested mitigation by refining the scope of resources requiring mitigation.

The DOTS client may obtain the mitigation scope through direct provisioning or through implementation-specific methods of

discovery. DOTS clients MUST support at least one mechanism to obtain mitigation scope.

SIG-008 Mitigation Efficacy: When a mitigation request by a DOTS client is active, DOTS clients SHOULD transmit a metric of perceived mitigation efficacy to the DOTS server. DOTS servers MAY use the efficacy metric to adjust countermeasures activated on a mitigator on behalf of a DOTS client.

SIG-009 Conflict Detection and Notification: Multiple DOTS clients controlled by a single administrative entity may send conflicting mitigation requests for pools of protected resources as a result of misconfiguration, operator error, or compromised DOTS clients. DOTS servers in the same administrative domain attempting to honor conflicting requests may flap network route or DNS information, degrading the networks attempting to participate in attack response with the DOTS clients. DOTS servers in a single administrative domain SHALL detect such conflicting requests, and SHALL notify the DOTS clients in conflict. The notification SHOULD indicate the nature and scope of the conflict, for example, the overlapping prefix range in a conflicting mitigation request.

SIG-010: Network Address Translator Traversal: DOTS clients may be deployed behind a Network Address Translator (NAT), and need to communicate with DOTS servers through the NAT. DOTS protocols MUST therefore be capable of traversing NATs.

If UDP is used as the transport for the DOTS signal channel, all considerations in "Middlebox Traversal Guidelines" in [RFC8085] apply to DOTS. Regardless of transport, DOTS protocols MUST follow established best common practices (BCPs) for NAT traversal.

2.3. Data Channel Requirements

The data channel is intended to be used for bulk data exchanges between DOTS agents. Unlike the signal channel, which must operate nominally even when confronted with signal degradation due to packet loss, the data channel is not expected to be constructed to deal with attack conditions. As the primary function of the data channel is data exchange, a reliable transport is required in order for DOTS agents to detect data delivery success or failure.

The data channel must be extensible. We anticipate the data channel will be used for such purposes as configuration or resource discovery. For example, a DOTS client may submit to the DOTS server a collection of prefixes it wants to refer to by alias when requesting mitigation, to which the server would respond with a success status and the new prefix group alias, or an error status and

message in the event the DOTS client's data channel request failed. The transactional nature of such data exchanges suggests a separate set of requirements for the data channel, while the potentially sensitive content sent between DOTS agents requires extra precautions to ensure data privacy and authenticity.

DATA-001 Reliable transport: Messages sent over the data channel MUST be delivered reliably, in order sent.

DATA-002 Data privacy and integrity: Transmissions over the data channel are likely to contain operationally or privacy-sensitive information or instructions from the remote DOTS agent. Theft or modification of data channel transmissions could lead to information leaks or malicious transactions on behalf of the sending agent (see Section 4 below). Consequently data sent over the data channel MUST be encrypted and authenticated using current industry best practices. DOTS servers MUST enable means to prevent leaking operationally or privacy-sensitive data. Although administrative entities participating in DOTS may detail what data may be revealed to third-party DOTS agents, such considerations are not in scope for this document.

DATA-003 Resource Configuration: To help meet the general and signal channel requirements in this document, DOTS server implementations MUST provide an interface to configure resource identifiers, as described in SIG-007. DOTS server implementations MAY expose additional configurability. Additional configurability is implementation-specific.

DATA-004 Black- and whitelist management: DOTS servers MUST provide methods for DOTS clients to manage black- and white-lists of traffic destined for resources belonging to a client.

For example, a DOTS client should be able to create a black- or whitelist entry; retrieve a list of current entries from either list; update the content of either list; and delete entries as necessary.

How the DOTS server authorizes DOTS client management of black- and white-list entries is implementation-specific.

2.4. Security requirements

DOTS must operate within a particularly strict security context, as an insufficiently protected signal or data channel may be subject to abuse, enabling or supplementing the very attacks DOTS purports to mitigate.

SEC-001 Peer Mutual Authentication: DOTS agents MUST authenticate each other before a DOTS signal or data channel is considered valid. The method of authentication is not specified, but should follow current industry best practices with respect to any cryptographic mechanisms to authenticate the remote peer.

SEC-002 Message Confidentiality, Integrity and Authenticity: DOTS protocols MUST take steps to protect the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of messages sent between client and server. While specific transport- and message-level security options are not specified, the protocols MUST follow current industry best practices for encryption and message authentication.

In order for DOTS protocols to remain secure despite advancements in cryptanalysis and traffic analysis, DOTS agents MUST be able to negotiate the terms and mechanisms of protocol security, subject to the interoperability and signal message size requirements above.

While the interfaces between downstream DOTS server and upstream DOTS client within a DOTS gateway are implementation-specific, those interfaces nevertheless MUST provide security equivalent to that of the signal channels bridged by gateways in the signaling path. For example, when a DOTS gateway consisting of a DOTS server and DOTS client is running on the same logical device, they must be within the same process security boundary.

SEC-003 Message Replay Protection: To prevent a passive attacker from capturing and replaying old messages, and thereby potentially disrupting or influencing the network policy of the receiving DOTS agent's domain, DOTS protocols MUST provide a method for replay detection and prevention.

Within the signal channel, messages MUST be uniquely identified such that replayed or duplicated messages may be detected and discarded. Unique mitigation requests MUST be processed at most once.

SEC-004 Authorization: DOTS servers MUST authorize all messages from DOTS clients which pertain to mitigation, configuration, filtering, or status.

DOTS servers MUST reject mitigation requests with scopes which the DOTS client is not authorized to manage.

Likewise, DOTS servers MUST refuse to allow creation, modification or deletion of scope aliases and black-/white-lists when the DOTS client is unauthorized.

The modes of authorization are implementation-specific.

2.5. Data Model Requirements

The value of DOTS is in standardizing a mechanism to permit elements, networks or domains under threat of DDoS attack to request aid mitigating the effects of any such attack. A well-structured DOTS data model is therefore critical to the development of a successful DOTS protocol.

DM-001: Structure: The data model structure for the DOTS protocol may be described by a single module, or be divided into related collections of hierarchical modules and sub-modules. If the data model structure is split across modules, those distinct modules MUST allow references to describe the overall data model's structural dependencies.

DM-002: Versioning: To ensure interoperability between DOTS protocol implementations, data models MUST be versioned. The version number of the initial data model SHALL be 1. Each published change to the initial published DOTS data model SHALL increment the data model version by 1.

How the protocol represents data model versions is not defined in this document.

DM-003: Mitigation Status Representation: The data model MUST provide the ability to represent a request for mitigation and the withdrawal of such a request. The data model MUST also support a representation of currently requested mitigation status, including failures and their causes.

DM-004: Mitigation Scope Representation: The data model MUST support representation of a requested mitigation's scope. As mitigation scope may be represented in several different ways, per SIG-007 above, the data model MUST be capable of flexible representation of mitigation scope.

DM-005: Mitigation Lifetime Representation: The data model MUST support representation of a mitigation request's lifetime, including mitigations with no specified end time.

DM-006: Mitigation Efficacy Representation: The data model MUST support representation of a DOTS client's understanding of the efficacy of a mitigation enabled through a mitigation request.

DM-007: Acceptable Signal Loss Representation: The data model MUST be able to represent the DOTS agent's preference for acceptable

signal loss when establishing a signal channel, as described in GEN-002.

DM-008: Heartbeat Interval Representation: The data model MUST be able to represent the DOTS agent's preferred heartbeat interval, which the client may include when establishing the signal channel, as described in SIG-003.

DM-009: Relationship to Transport: The DOTS data model MUST NOT depend on the specifics of any transport to represent fields in the model.

3. Congestion Control Considerations

3.1. Signal Channel

As part of a protocol expected to operate over links affected by DDoS attack traffic, the DOTS signal channel MUST NOT contribute significantly to link congestion. To meet the signal channel requirements above, DOTS signal channel implementations SHOULD support connectionless transports. However, some connectionless transports when deployed naively can be a source of network congestion, as discussed in [RFC5405]. Signal channel implementations using such connectionless transports, such as UDP, therefore MUST include a congestion control mechanism.

Signal channel implementations using TCP may rely on built-in TCP congestion control support.

3.2. Data Channel

As specified in DATA-001, the data channel requires reliable, in-order message delivery. Data channel implementations using TCP may rely on the TCP implementation's built-in congestion control mechanisms.

4. Security Considerations

DOTS is at risk from three primary attacks:

- o DOTS agent impersonation
- o Traffic injection
- o Signaling blocking

The DOTS protocol MUST be designed for minimal data transfer to address the blocking risk. Impersonation and traffic injection

mitigation can be managed through current secure communications best practices. See Section 2.4 above for a detailed discussion.

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7. Change Log

7.1. 04 revision

2017-03-13

- o Establish required and optional mitigation scope types
- o Specify message size for DOTS signal channel
- o Recast mitigation lifetime as a DOTS server requirement
- o Clarify DOTS server's responsibilities after client request to end mitigation
- o Specify security state handling on redirection
- o Signal channel should use transport not susceptible to HOL blocking
- o Expanded list of DDoS types to include network links

7.2. 03 revision

2016-10-30

- o Extended SEC-003 to require secure interfaces within DOTS gateways.
- o Changed DATA-003 to Resource Configuration, delegating control of acceptable signal loss, heartbeat intervals, and mitigation lifetime to DOTS client.
- o Added data model requirements reflecting client control over the above.

7.3. 02 revision

7.4. 01 revision

2016-03-21

- o Reconciled terminology with -00 revision of [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases].
- o Terminology clarification based on working group feedback.
- o Moved security-related requirements to separate section.
- o Made resilience/robustness primary general requirement to align with charter.
- o Clarified support for unidirectional communication within the bidirectional signal channel.
- o Added proposed operational requirement to support session redirection.
- o Added proposed operational requirement to support conflict notification.
- o Added proposed operational requirement to support mitigation lifetime in mitigation requests.
- o Added proposed operational requirement to support mitigation efficacy reporting from DOTS clients.
- o Added proposed operational requirement to cache lookups of all kinds.

- o Added proposed operational requirement regarding NAT traversal.
- o Removed redundant mutual authentication requirement from data channel requirements.

7.5. 00 revision

2015-10-15

7.6. Initial revision

2015-09-24 Andrew Mortensen

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Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling Requirements
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Abstract

This document defines the requirements for the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) protocols enabling coordinated response to DDoS attacks.

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1. Introduction

1.1. Context and Motivation

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks afflict networks connected to the Internet, plaguing network operators at service providers and enterprises around the world. High-volume attacks saturating inbound links are now common, as attack scale and frequency continue to increase.

The prevalence and impact of these DDoS attacks has led to an increased focus on coordinated attack response. However, many enterprises lack the resources or expertise to operate on-premises attack mitigation solutions themselves, or are constrained by local bandwidth limitations. To address such gaps, service providers have begun to offer on-demand traffic scrubbing services, which are designed to separate the DDoS attack traffic from legitimate traffic and forward only the latter.

Today, these services offer proprietary interfaces for subscribers to request attack mitigation. Such proprietary interfaces tie a subscriber to a service and limit the abilities of network elements

that would otherwise be capable of participating in attack mitigation. As a result of signaling interface incompatibility, attack responses may be fragmented or otherwise incomplete, leaving operators in the attack path unable to assist in the defense.

A standardized method to coordinate a real-time response among involved operators will increase the speed and effectiveness of DDoS attack mitigation, and reduce the impact of these attacks. This document describes the required characteristics of protocols that enable attack response coordination and mitigation of DDoS attacks.

DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) communicates the need for defensive action in anticipation of or in response to an attack, but does not dictate the implementation of these actions. The DOTS use cases are discussed in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases] and the DOTS architecture is discussed in [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture].

1.2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174], when, and only when, they appear in all capitals. These capitalized words are used to signify the requirements for DOTS protocols design.

This document adopts the following terms:

DDoS: A distributed denial-of-service attack, in which traffic originating from multiple sources is directed at a target on a network. DDoS attacks are intended to cause a negative impact on the availability and/or other functionality of an attack target. Denial-of-service considerations are discussed in detail in [RFC4732].

DDoS attack target: A network connected entity that is the target of a DDoS attack. Potential targets include (but are not limited to) network elements, network links, servers, and services.

DDoS attack telemetry: Collected measurements and behavioral characteristics defining the nature of a DDoS attack.

Countermeasure: An action or set of actions focused on recognizing and filtering out specific types of DDoS attack traffic while passing legitimate traffic to the attack target. Distinct countermeasures can be layered to defend against attacks combining multiple DDoS attack types.

Mitigation: A set of countermeasures enforced against traffic destined for the target or targets of a detected or reported DDoS attack, where countermeasure enforcement is managed by an entity in the network path between attack sources and the attack target. Mitigation methodology is out of scope for this document.

Mitigator: An entity, typically a network element, capable of performing mitigation of a detected or reported DDoS attack. The means by which this entity performs these mitigations and how they are requested of it are out of scope for this document. The mitigator and DOTS server receiving a mitigation request are assumed to belong to the same administrative entity.

DOTS client: A DOTS-aware software module responsible for requesting attack response coordination with other DOTS-aware elements.

DOTS server: A DOTS-aware software module handling and responding to messages from DOTS clients. The DOTS server enables mitigation on behalf of the DOTS client, if requested, by communicating the DOTS client's request to the mitigator and returning selected mitigator feedback to the requesting DOTS client.

DOTS agent: Any DOTS-aware software module capable of participating in a DOTS signal or data channel. It can be a DOTS client, DOTS server, or, as a logical agent, a DOTS gateway.

DOTS gateway: A DOTS-aware software module resulting from the logical concatenation of the functionality of a DOTS server and a DOTS client into a single DOTS agent. This functionality is analogous to a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261] Back-to-Back User Agent (B2BUA) [RFC7092]. A DOTS gateway has a client-facing side, which behaves as a DOTS server for downstream clients, and a server-facing side, which performs the role of DOTS client for upstream DOTS servers. Client-domain DOTS gateways are DOTS gateways that are in the DOTS client's domain, while server-domain DOTS gateways denote DOTS gateways that are in the DOTS server's domain. A DOTS gateway may terminate multiple discrete DOTS client connections and may aggregate these into a single or multiple connections. DOTS gateways are described further in [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture].

Signal channel: A bidirectional, mutually authenticated communication channel between DOTS agents that is resilient even in conditions leading to severe packet loss, such as a volumetric DDoS attack causing network congestion.

DOTS signal: A status/control message transmitted over the authenticated signal channel between DOTS agents, used to indicate

the client's need for mitigation, or to convey the status of any requested mitigation.

Heartbeat: A message transmitted between DOTS agents over the signal channel, used as a keep-alive and to measure peer health.

Data channel: A bidirectional, mutually authenticated communication channel between two DOTS agents used for infrequent but reliable bulk exchange of data not easily or appropriately communicated through the signal channel. Reliable bulk data exchange may not function well or at all during attacks causing network congestion. The data channel is not expected to operate in such conditions.

Filter: A specification of a matching network traffic flow or set of flows. The filter will typically have a policy associated with it, e.g., rate-limiting or discarding matching traffic [RFC4949].

Drop-list: A list of filters indicating sources from which traffic should be blocked, regardless of traffic content.

Accept-list: A list of filters indicating sources from which traffic should always be allowed, regardless of contradictory data gleaned in a detected attack.

Multi-homed DOTS client: A DOTS client exchanging messages with multiple DOTS servers, each in a separate administrative domain.

2. Requirements

The expected layout and interactions amongst DOTS entities is described in the DOTS Architecture [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture].

The goal of the DOTS requirements specification is to specify the requirements for DOTS signal channel and data channel protocols that have different application and transport layer requirements. This section describes the required features and characteristics of the DOTS protocols.

The goal of DOTS protocols is to enable and manage mitigation on behalf of a network domain or resource which is or may become the focus of a DDoS attack. An active DDoS attack against the entity controlling the DOTS client need not be present before establishing a communication channel between DOTS agents. Indeed, establishing a relationship with peer DOTS agents during normal network conditions provides the foundation for more rapid attack response against future attacks, as all interactions setting up DOTS, including any business or service level agreements, are already complete. Reachability information of peer DOTS agents is provisioned to a DOTS client using

a variety of manual or dynamic methods. Once a relationship between DOTS agents is established, regular communication between DOTS clients and servers enables a common understanding of the DOTS agents' health and activity.

The DOTS protocol must at a minimum make it possible for a DOTS client to request aid mounting a defense against a suspected attack. This defense could be coordinated by a DOTS server and include signaling within or between domains as requested by local operators. DOTS clients should similarly be able to withdraw aid requests. DOTS requires no justification from DOTS clients for requests for help, nor do DOTS clients need to justify withdrawing help requests: the decision is local to the DOTS clients' domain. Multi-homed DOTS clients must be able to select the appropriate DOTS server(s) to which a mitigation request is to be sent. The method for selecting the appropriate DOTS server in a multi-homed environment is out of scope for this document.

DOTS protocol implementations face competing operational goals when maintaining this bidirectional communication stream. On the one hand, DOTS must include measures to ensure message confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and replay protection to keep the protocols from becoming additional vectors for the very attacks it is meant to help fight off. On the other hand, the protocol must be resilient under extremely hostile network conditions, providing continued contact between DOTS agents even as attack traffic saturates the link. Such resiliency may be developed several ways, but characteristics such as small message size, asynchronous, redundant message delivery and minimal connection overhead (when possible given local network policy) will tend to contribute to the robustness demanded by a viable DOTS protocol. Operators of peer DOTS-enabled domains may enable quality- or class-of-service traffic tagging to increase the probability of successful DOTS signal delivery, but DOTS does not require such policies be in place, and should be viable in their absence.

The DOTS server and client must also have some standardized method of defining the scope of any mitigation, as well as managing other mitigation-related configuration.

Finally, DOTS should be sufficiently extensible to meet future needs in coordinated attack defense, although this consideration is necessarily superseded by the other operational requirements.

2.1. General Requirements

GEN-001 Extensibility: Protocols and data models developed as part of DOTS MUST be extensible in order to keep DOTS adaptable to proprietary DDoS defenses. Future extensions MUST be backward compatible. Implementations of older protocol versions MUST ignore optional information added to DOTS messages as part of newer protocol versions. Implementations of older protocol versions MUST reject DOTS messages carrying mandatory information as part of newer protocol versions.

GEN-002 Resilience and Robustness: The signaling protocol MUST be designed to maximize the probability of signal delivery even under the severely constrained network conditions caused by attack traffic. Additional means to enhance the resilience of DOTS protocols, including when multiple DOTS servers are provisioned to the DOTS clients, SHOULD be considered. The protocol MUST be resilient, that is, continue operating despite message loss and out-of-order or redundant message delivery. In support of signaling protocol robustness, DOTS signals SHOULD be conveyed over transport and application protocols not susceptible to Head of Line Blocking. These requirements are at SHOULD strength to handle middle-boxes and firewall traversal.

GEN-003 Bulk Data Exchange: Infrequent bulk data exchange between DOTS agents can also significantly augment attack response coordination, permitting such tasks as population of drop- or accept-listed source addresses; address or prefix group aliasing; exchange of incident reports; and other hinting or configuration supplementing attack response.

As the resilience requirements for the DOTS signal channel mandate small signal message size, a separate, secure data channel utilizing a reliable transport protocol MUST be used for bulk data exchange. However, reliable bulk data exchange may not be possible during attacks causing network congestion.

GEN-004 Mitigation Hinting: DOTS clients may have access to attack details which can be used to inform mitigation techniques. Example attack details might include locally collected fingerprints for an on-going attack, or anticipated or active attack focal points based on other threat intelligence. DOTS clients MAY send mitigation hints derived from attack details to DOTS servers, in the full understanding that the DOTS server MAY ignore mitigation hints. Mitigation hints MUST be transmitted across the signal channel, as the data channel may not be functional during an attack. DOTS server handling of mitigation hints is implementation-specific.

GEN-005 Loop Handling: In certain scenarios, typically involving misconfiguration of DNS or routing policy, it may be possible for communication between DOTS agents to loop. Signal and data channel implementations should be prepared to detect and terminate such loops to prevent service disruption.

2.2. Signal Channel Requirements

SIG-001 Use of Common Transport Protocols: DOTS MUST operate over common widely deployed and standardized transport protocols. While connectionless transport such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) [RFC0768] SHOULD be used for the signal channel, the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [RFC0793] MAY be used if necessary due to network policy or middlebox capabilities or configurations.

SIG-002 Sub-MTU Message Size: To avoid message fragmentation and the consequently decreased probability of message delivery over a congested link, signaling protocol message size MUST be kept under signaling Path Maximum Transmission Unit (PMTU), including the byte overhead of any encapsulation, transport headers, and transport- or message-level security. If the total message size exceeds the path MTU, the DOTS agent MUST split the message into separate messages; for example, the list of mitigation scope types could be split into multiple lists and each list conveyed in a new message.

DOTS agents can attempt to learn PMTU using the procedures discussed in [I-D.ietf-intarea-frag-fragile]. If the PMTU cannot be discovered, DOTS agents MUST assume a PMTU of 1280 bytes, as IPv6 requires that every link in the Internet have an MTU of 1280 octets or greater as specified in [RFC8200]. If IPv4 support on legacy or otherwise unusual networks is a consideration and the PMTU is unknown, DOTS implementations MAY assume on a PMTU of 576 bytes for IPv4 datagrams, as every IPv4 host must be capable of receiving a packet whose length is equal to 576 bytes as discussed in [RFC0791] and [RFC1122].

SIG-003 Bidirectionality: To support peer health detection, to maintain an active signal channel, and to increase the probability of signal delivery during an attack, the signal channel MUST be bidirectional, with client and server transmitting signals to each other at regular intervals, regardless of any client request for mitigation. The bidirectional signal channel MUST support unidirectional messaging to enable notifications between DOTS agents.

SIG-004 Channel Health Monitoring: DOTS agents MUST support exchange of heartbeat messages over the signal channel to monitor channel health. These keepalives serve the purpose to maintain any on-path NAT or Firewall bindings to avoid cryptographic handshake for new mitigation requests. The heartbeat interval during active mitigation could be negotiable based on NAT/Firewall characteristics. Absent information about the NAT/Firewall characteristics, DOTS agent needs to ensure its on-path NAT or Firewall bindings do not expire, by using the keep-alive frequency discussed in Section 3.5 of [RFC8085].

To support scenarios in which loss of heartbeat is used to trigger mitigation, and to keep the channel active, DOTS servers MUST solicit heartbeat exchanges after successful mutual authentication. When DOTS agents are exchanging heartbeats and no mitigation request is active, either agent MAY request changes to the heartbeat rate. For example, a DOTS server might want to reduce heartbeat frequency or cease heartbeat exchanges when an active DOTS client has not requested mitigation, in order to control load.

Following mutual authentication, a signal channel MUST be considered active until a DOTS agent explicitly ends the session. When no attack traffic is present, the signal channel MUST be considered active until either DOTS agent fails to receive heartbeats from the other peer after a mutually agreed upon retransmission procedure has been exhausted. Peer DOTS agents MUST regularly send heartbeats to each other while a mitigation request is active. Because heartbeat loss is much more likely during volumetric attack, DOTS agents SHOULD avoid signal channel termination when mitigation is active and heartbeats are not received by either DOTS agent for an extended period. The exception circumstances to terminate the signal channel session during active mitigation are discussed below:

- * To handle possible DOTS server restart or crash, the DOTS clients MAY attempt to establish a new signal channel session, but MUST continue to send heartbeats on the current session so that the DOTS server knows the session is still alive. If the new session is successfully established, the DOTS client can terminate the current session.
- * DOTS servers are assumed to have the ability to monitor the attack, using feedback from the mitigator and other available sources, and MAY use the absence of attack traffic and lack of

client heartbeats as an indication the signal channel is defunct.

SIG-005 Channel Redirection: In order to increase DOTS operational flexibility and scalability, DOTS servers SHOULD be able to redirect DOTS clients to another DOTS server at any time. DOTS clients MUST NOT assume the redirection target DOTS server shares security state with the redirecting DOTS server. DOTS clients are free to attempt abbreviated security negotiation methods supported by the protocol, such as DTLS session resumption, but MUST be prepared to negotiate new security state with the redirection target DOTS server. The redirection DOTS server and redirecting DOTS server MUST belong to the same administrative domain.

Due to the increased likelihood of packet loss caused by link congestion during an attack, DOTS servers SHOULD NOT redirect while mitigation is enabled during an active attack against a target in the DOTS client's domain.

SIG-006 Mitigation Requests and Status: Authorized DOTS clients MUST be able to request scoped mitigation from DOTS servers. DOTS servers MUST send status to the DOTS clients about mitigation requests. If a DOTS server rejects an authorized request for mitigation, the DOTS server MUST include a reason for the rejection in the status message sent to the client.

DOTS servers MUST regularly send mitigation status updates to authorized DOTS clients which have requested and been granted mitigation. If unreliable transport is used for the signal channel protocol, due to the higher likelihood of packet loss during a DDoS attack, DOTS servers needs to send mitigation status multiple times at regular intervals following the the data transmission guidelines discussed in Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8085].

When DOTS client-requested mitigation is active, DOTS server status messages MUST include the following mitigation metrics:

- * Total number of packets blocked by the mitigation
- * Current number of packets per second blocked
- * Total number of bytes blocked
- * Current number of bytes per second blocked

DOTS clients MAY take these metrics into account when determining whether to ask the DOTS server to cease mitigation.

A DOTS client MAY withdraw a mitigation request at any time, regardless of whether mitigation is currently active. The DOTS server MUST immediately acknowledge a DOTS client's request to stop mitigation.

To protect against route or DNS flapping caused by a client rapidly toggling mitigation, and to dampen the effect of oscillating attacks, DOTS servers MAY allow mitigation to continue for a limited period after acknowledging a DOTS client's withdrawal of a mitigation request. During this period, DOTS server status messages SHOULD indicate that mitigation is active but terminating. DOTS clients MAY reverse the mitigation termination during this active-but-terminating period with a new mitigation request for the same scope. The DOTS server MUST treat this request as a mitigation lifetime extension (see SIG-007 below).

The initial active-but-terminating period is implementation- and deployment- specific, but SHOULD be sufficiently long to absorb latency incurred by route propagation. If a DOTS client refreshes the mitigation before the active-but-terminating period elapses, the DOTS server MAY increase the active-but-terminating period up to a maximum of 300 seconds (5 minutes). After the active-but-terminating period elapses, the DOTS server MUST treat the mitigation as terminated, as the DOTS client is no longer responsible for the mitigation.

SIG-007 Mitigation Lifetime: DOTS servers MUST support mitigations for a negotiated time interval, and MUST terminate a mitigation when the lifetime elapses. DOTS servers also MUST support renewal of mitigation lifetimes in mitigation requests from DOTS clients, allowing clients to extend mitigation as necessary for the duration of an attack.

DOTS servers MUST treat a mitigation terminated due to lifetime expiration exactly as if the DOTS client originating the mitigation had asked to end the mitigation, including the active-but-terminating period, as described above in SIG-005.

DOTS clients MUST include a mitigation lifetime in all mitigation requests.

DOTS servers SHOULD support indefinite mitigation lifetimes, enabling architectures in which the mitigator is always in the traffic path to the resources for which the DOTS client is requesting protection. DOTS clients MUST be prepared to not be granted mitigations with indefinite lifetimes. DOTS servers MAY refuse mitigations with indefinite lifetimes, for policy reasons.

The reasons themselves are out of scope. If the DOTS server does not grant a mitigation request with an indefinite mitigation lifetime, it MUST set the lifetime to a value that is configured locally. That value MUST be returned in a reply to the requesting DOTS client.

SIG-008 Mitigation Scope: DOTS clients MUST indicate desired mitigation scope. The scope type will vary depending on the resources requiring mitigation. All DOTS agent implementations MUST support the following required scope types:

- * IPv4 prefixes [RFC4632]
- * IPv6 prefixes [RFC4291][RFC5952]
- * Domain names [RFC1035]

The following mitigation scope types are OPTIONAL:

- * Uniform Resource Identifiers [RFC3986]

DOTS servers MUST be able to resolve domain names and (when supported) URIs. How name resolution is managed on the DOTS server is implementation-specific.

DOTS agents MUST support mitigation scope aliases, allowing DOTS clients and servers to refer to collections of protected resources by an opaque identifier created through the data channel, direct configuration, or other means. Domain name and URI mitigation scopes may be thought of as a form of scope alias, in which the addresses to which the domain name or URI resolve represent the full scope of the mitigation.

If there is additional information available narrowing the scope of any requested attack response, such as targeted port range, protocol, or service, DOTS clients SHOULD include that information in client mitigation requests. DOTS clients MAY also include additional attack details. DOTS servers MAY ignore such supplemental information when enabling countermeasures on the mitigator.

As an active attack evolves, DOTS clients MUST be able to adjust as necessary the scope of requested mitigation by refining the scope of resources requiring mitigation.

A DOTS client may obtain the mitigation scope through direct provisioning or through implementation-specific methods of

discovery. DOTS clients MUST support at least one mechanism to obtain mitigation scope.

SIG-009 Mitigation Efficacy: When a mitigation request is active, DOTS clients MUST be able to transmit a metric of perceived mitigation efficacy to the DOTS server. DOTS servers MAY use the efficacy metric to adjust countermeasures activated on a mitigator on behalf of a DOTS client.

SIG-010 Conflict Detection and Notification: Multiple DOTS clients controlled by a single administrative entity may send conflicting mitigation requests as a result of misconfiguration, operator error, or compromised DOTS clients. DOTS servers in the same administrative domain attempting to honor conflicting requests may flap network route or DNS information, degrading the networks attempting to participate in attack response with the DOTS clients. DOTS servers in a single administrative domain SHALL detect such conflicting requests, and SHALL notify the DOTS clients in conflict. The notification MUST indicate the nature and scope of the conflict, for example, the overlapping prefix range in a conflicting mitigation request.

SIG-011 Network Address Translator Traversal: DOTS clients may be deployed behind a Network Address Translator (NAT), and need to communicate with DOTS servers through the NAT. DOTS protocols MUST therefore be capable of traversing NATs.

If UDP is used as the transport for the DOTS signal channel, all considerations in "Middlebox Traversal Guidelines" in [RFC8085] apply to DOTS. Regardless of transport, DOTS protocols MUST follow established best common practices established in BCP 127 for NAT traversal [RFC4787] [RFC6888] [RFC7857].

2.3. Data Channel Requirements

The data channel is intended to be used for bulk data exchanges between DOTS agents. Unlike the signal channel, the data channel is not expected to be constructed to deal with attack conditions. As the primary function of the data channel is data exchange, a reliable transport is required in order for DOTS agents to detect data delivery success or failure.

The data channel provides a protocol for DOTS configuration, management. For example, a DOTS client may submit to a DOTS server a collection of prefixes it wants to refer to by alias when requesting mitigation, to which the server would respond with a success status and the new prefix group alias, or an error status and message in the event the DOTS client's data channel request failed.

DATA-001 Reliable transport: Messages sent over the data channel MUST be delivered reliably, in order sent.

DATA-003 Resource Configuration: To help meet the general and signal channel requirements in Section 2.1 and Section 2.2, DOTS server implementations MUST provide an interface to configure resource identifiers, as described in SIG-008. DOTS server implementations MAY expose additional configurability. Additional configurability is implementation-specific.

DATA-004 Policy management: DOTS servers MUST provide methods for DOTS clients to manage drop- and accept-lists of traffic destined for resources belonging to a client.

For example, a DOTS client should be able to create a drop- or accept-list entry, retrieve a list of current entries from either list, update the content of either list, and delete entries as necessary.

How a DOTS server authorizes DOTS client management of drop- and accept-list entries is implementation-specific.

2.4. Security Requirements

DOTS must operate within a particularly strict security context, as an insufficiently protected signal or data channel may be subject to abuse, enabling or supplementing the very attacks DOTS purports to mitigate.

SEC-001 Peer Mutual Authentication: DOTS agents MUST authenticate each other before a DOTS signal or data channel is considered valid. The method of authentication is not specified in this document, but should follow current IETF best practices [RFC7525] with respect to any cryptographic mechanisms to authenticate the remote peer.

SEC-002 Message Confidentiality, Integrity and Authenticity: DOTS protocols MUST take steps to protect the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of messages sent between client and server. While specific transport- and message-level security options are not specified, the protocols MUST follow current IETF best practices [RFC7525] for encryption and message authentication. Client-domain DOTS gateways are more trusted than DOTS clients, while server-domain DOTS gateways and DOTS servers share the same level of trust. A security mechanism at the transport layer TLS/DTLS is thus adequate to provide security between peer DOTS agents.

In order for DOTS protocols to remain secure despite advancements in cryptanalysis and traffic analysis, DOTS agents MUST support secure negotiation of the terms and mechanisms of protocol security, subject to the interoperability and signal message size requirements in Section 2.2.

While the interfaces between downstream DOTS server and upstream DOTS client within a DOTS gateway are implementation-specific, those interfaces nevertheless MUST provide security equivalent to that of the signal channels bridged by gateways in the signaling path. For example, when a DOTS gateway consisting of a DOTS server and DOTS client is running on the same logical device, the two DOTS agents could be implemented within the same process security boundary.

SEC-003 Data privacy and integrity: Transmissions over the DOTS protocols are likely to contain operationally or privacy-sensitive information or instructions from the remote DOTS agent. Theft, modification, or replay of message transmissions could lead to information leaks or malicious transactions on behalf of the sending agent (see Section 4 below). Consequently data sent over the DOTS protocols MUST be encrypted using secure transports TLS/DTLS. DOTS servers MUST enable means to prevent leaking operationally or privacy-sensitive data. Although administrative entities participating in DOTS may detail what data may be revealed to third-party DOTS agents, such considerations are not in scope for this document.

SEC-004 Message Replay Protection: To prevent a passive attacker from capturing and replaying old messages, and thereby potentially disrupting or influencing the network policy of the receiving DOTS agent's domain, DOTS protocols MUST provide a method for replay detection and prevention.

Within the signal channel, messages MUST be uniquely identified such that replayed or duplicated messages can be detected and discarded. Unique mitigation requests MUST be processed at most once.

SEC-005 Authorization: DOTS servers MUST authorize all messages from DOTS clients which pertain to mitigation, configuration, filtering, or status.

DOTS servers MUST reject mitigation requests with scopes which the DOTS client is not authorized to manage.

Likewise, DOTS servers MUST refuse to allow creation, modification or deletion of scope aliases and drop-/accept-lists when the DOTS client is unauthorized.

The modes of authorization are implementation-specific.

2.5. Data Model Requirements

A well-structured DOTS data model is critical to the development of successful DOTS protocols.

DM-001 Structure: The data model structure for the DOTS protocol MAY be described by a single module, or be divided into related collections of hierarchical modules and sub-modules. If the data model structure is split across modules, those distinct modules MUST allow references to describe the overall data model's structural dependencies.

DM-002 Versioning: To ensure interoperability between DOTS protocol implementations, data models MUST be versioned. How the protocols represent data model versions is not defined in this document.

DM-003 Mitigation Status Representation: The data model MUST provide the ability to represent a request for mitigation and the withdrawal of such a request. The data model MUST also support a representation of currently requested mitigation status, including failures and their causes.

DM-004 Mitigation Scope Representation: The data model MUST support representation of a requested mitigation's scope. As mitigation scope may be represented in several different ways, per SIG-008 above, the data model MUST include extensible representation of mitigation scope.

DM-005 Mitigation Lifetime Representation: The data model MUST support representation of a mitigation request's lifetime, including mitigations with no specified end time.

DM-006 Mitigation Efficacy Representation: The data model MUST support representation of a DOTS client's understanding of the efficacy of a mitigation enabled through a mitigation request.

DM-007 Acceptable Signal Loss Representation: The data model MUST be able to represent the DOTS agent's preference for acceptable signal loss when establishing a signal channel. Measurements of loss might include, but are not restricted to, number of consecutive missed heartbeat messages, retransmission count, or request timeouts.

DM-008 Heartbeat Interval Representation: The data model MUST be able to represent the DOTS agent's preferred heartbeat interval, which the client may include when establishing the signal channel, as described in SIG-003.

DM-009 Relationship to Transport: The DOTS data model MUST NOT make any assumptions about specific characteristics of any given transport into the data model, but instead, represent the fields in the model explicitly.

3. Congestion Control Considerations

3.1. Signal Channel

As part of a protocol expected to operate over links affected by DDoS attack traffic, the DOTS signal channel MUST NOT contribute significantly to link congestion. To meet the signal channel requirements above, DOTS signal channel implementations SHOULD support connectionless transports. However, some connectionless transports when deployed naively can be a source of network congestion, as discussed in [RFC8085]. Signal channel implementations using such connectionless transports, such as UDP, therefore MUST include a congestion control mechanism.

Signal channel implementations using a IETF standard congestion-controlled transport protocol (like TCP) may rely on built-in transport congestion control support.

3.2. Data Channel

As specified in DATA-001, the data channel requires reliable, in-order message delivery. Data channel implementations using a IETF standard congestion-controlled transport protocol may rely on the transport implementation's built-in congestion control mechanisms.

4. Security Considerations

This document informs future protocols under development, and so does not have security considerations of its own. However, operators should be aware of potential risks involved in deploying DOTS. DOTS agent impersonation and signal blocking are discussed here. Additional DOTS security considerations may be found in [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture] and DOTS protocol documents.

Impersonation of either a DOTS server or a DOTS client could have catastrophic impact on operations in either domain. If an attacker has the ability to impersonate a DOTS client, that attacker can affect policy on the network path to the DOTS client's domain, up to

and including instantiation of drop-lists blocking all inbound traffic to networks for which the DOTS client is authorized to request mitigation.

Similarly, an impersonated DOTS server may be able to act as a sort of malicious DOTS gateway, intercepting requests from the downstream DOTS client, and modifying them before transmission to the DOTS server to inflict the desired impact on traffic to or from the DOTS client's domain. Among other things, this malicious DOTS gateway might receive and discard mitigation requests from the DOTS client, ensuring no requested mitigation is ever applied.

To detect misuse, as detailed in Section 2.4, DOTS implementations require mutual authentication of DOTS agents in order to make agent impersonation more difficult. However, impersonation may still be possible as a result of credential theft, implementation flaws, or compromise of DOTS agents.

To detect compromised DOTS agents, DOTS operators should carefully monitor and audit DOTS agents to detect misbehavior and to deter misuse, while employing current secure network communications best practices to reduce attack surface.

Blocking communication between DOTS agents has the potential to disrupt the core function of DOTS, which is to request mitigation of active or expected DDoS attacks. The DOTS signal channel is expected to operate over congested inbound links, and, as described in Section 2.2, the signal channel protocol must be designed for minimal data transfer to reduce the incidence of signal loss.

5. IANA Considerations

This document does not require any IANA action.

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Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal
Channel
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Abstract

This document specifies the DOTS signal channel, a protocol for signaling the need for protection against Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks to a server capable of enabling network traffic mitigation on behalf of the requesting client. A companion document defines the DOTS data channel, a separate reliable communication layer for DOTS management and configuration.

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1. Introduction

A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack is an attempt to make machines or network resources unavailable to their intended users. In most cases, sufficient scale can be achieved by compromising enough end-hosts and using those infected hosts to perpetrate and amplify the attack. The victim in this attack can be an application server, a host, a router, a firewall, or an entire network.

In many cases, it may not be possible for network administrators to determine the causes of an attack, but instead just realize that certain resources seem to be under attack. This document defines a lightweight protocol permitting a DOTS client to request mitigation from one or more DOTS servers for protection against detected, suspected, or anticipated attacks. This protocol enables cooperation between DOTS agents to permit a highly-automated network defense that is robust, reliable and secure.

The document adheres to the DOTS architecture [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]. The requirements for DOTS signal channel protocol are obtained from [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]. This document satisfies all the use cases discussed in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases].

This is a companion document to the DOTS data channel specification [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel] that defines a configuration and bulk data exchange mechanism supporting the DOTS signal channel.

2. Notational Conventions and Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

(D)TLS: For brevity this term is used for statements that apply to both Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] and Datagram Transport Layer

Security [RFC6347]. Specific terms will be used for any statement that applies to either protocol alone.

The reader should be familiar with the terms defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture].

3. Solution Overview

Network applications have finite resources like CPU cycles, number of processes or threads they can create and use, maximum number of simultaneous connections it can handle, limited resources of the control plane, etc. When processing network traffic, such applications are supposed to use these resources to offer the intended task in the most efficient fashion. However, an attacker may be able to prevent an application from performing its intended task by causing the application to exhaust the finite supply of a specific resource.

TCP DDoS SYN-flood, for example, is a memory-exhaustion attack on the victim and ACK-flood is a CPU exhaustion attack on the victim ([RFC4987]). Attacks on the link are carried out by sending enough traffic such that the link becomes excessively congested, and legitimate traffic suffers high packet loss. Stateful firewalls can also be attacked by sending traffic that causes the firewall to hold excessive state. The firewall then runs out of memory, and can no longer instantiate the state required to pass legitimate flows. Other possible DDoS attacks are discussed in [RFC4732].

In each of the cases described above, the possible arrangements between the DOTS client and DOTS server to mitigate the attack are discussed in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases]. An example of network diagram showing a deployment of these elements is shown in Figure 1. Architectural relationships between involved DOTS agents is explained in [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]. In this example, the DOTS server is operating on the access network.




Figure 1: Sample DOTS Deployment (1)

The DOTS server can also be running on the Internet, as depicted in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Sample DOTS Deployment (2)

In typical deployments, the DOTS client belongs to a different administrative domain than the DOTS server. For example, the DOTS client is a firewall protecting services owned and operated by an domain, while the DOTS server is owned and operated by a different domain providing DDoS mitigation services. That domain providing DDoS mitigation service might, or might not, also provide Internet access service to the website operator.

The DOTS server may (not) be co-located with the DOTS mitigator. In typical deployments, the DOTS server belongs to the same administrative domain as the mitigator.

The DOTS client can communicate directly with the DOTS server or indirectly via a DOTS gateway.

This document focuses on the DOTS signal channel.

4. Happy Eyeballs for DOTS Signal Channel

DOTS signaling can happen with DTLS [RFC6347] over UDP and TLS [RFC5246] over TCP. A DOTS client can use DNS to determine the IP address(es) of a DOTS server or a DOTS client may be provided with the list of DOTS server IP addresses. The DOTS client MUST know a DOTS server's domain name; hard-coding the domain name of the DOTS server into software is NOT RECOMMENDED in case the domain name is not valid or needs to change for legal or other reasons. The DOTS client performs A and/or AAAA record lookup of the domain name and the result will be a list of IP addresses, each of which can be used to contact the DOTS server using UDP and TCP.

If an IPv4 path to reach a DOTS server is found, but the DOTS server's IPv6 path is not working, a dual-stack DOTS client can experience a significant connection delay compared to an IPv4-only DOTS client. The other problem is that if a middlebox between the DOTS client and DOTS server is configured to block UDP, the DOTS client will fail to establish a DTLS session with the DOTS server and will, then, have to fall back to TLS over TCP incurring significant connection delays. [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements] discusses that DOTS

client and server will have to support both connectionless and connection-oriented protocols.

To overcome these connection setup problems, the DOTS client can try connecting to the DOTS server using both IPv6 and IPv4, and try both DTLS over UDP and TLS over TCP in a fashion similar to the Happy Eyeballs mechanism [RFC6555]. These connection attempts are performed by the DOTS client when it initializes, and the client uses that information for its subsequent alert to the DOTS server. In order of preference (most preferred first), it is UDP over IPv6, UDP over IPv4, TCP over IPv6, and finally TCP over IPv4, which adheres to address preference order [RFC6724] and the DOTS preference that UDP be used over TCP (to avoid TCP's head of line blocking).




Figure 3: Happy Eyeballs

In reference to Figure 3, the DOTS client sends two TCP SYNs and two DTLS ClientHello messages at the same time over IPv6 and IPv4. In this example, it is assumed that the IPv6 path is broken and UDP is dropped by a middlebox but has little impact to the DOTS client because there is no long delay before using IPv4 and TCP. The DOTS client repeats the mechanism to discover if DOTS signaling with DTLS over UDP becomes available from the DOTS server, so the DOTS client can migrate the DOTS signal channel from TCP to UDP, but such probing SHOULD NOT be done more frequently than every 24 hours and MUST NOT be done more frequently than every 5 minutes.

5. DOTS Signal Channel

5.1. Overview

The DOTS signal channel is built on top of the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252], a lightweight protocol originally designed for constrained devices and networks. CoAP's expectation of packet loss, support for asynchronous non-confirmable messaging, congestion control, small message overhead limiting the need for fragmentation, use of minimal resources, and support for (D)TLS make it a good foundation on which to build the DOTS signaling mechanism.

The DOTS signal channel is layered on existing standards (Figure 4).

By default, DOTS signal channel MUST run over port number TBD as defined in Section 10.1, for both UDP and TCP, unless the DOTS server has mutual agreement with its DOTS clients to use a port other than TBD for DOTS signal channel, or DOTS clients supports means to dynamically discover the ports used by their DOTS servers. In order to use a distinct port number (vs. TBD), DOTS clients and servers should support a configurable parameter to supply the port number to use.




Figure 4: Abstract Layering of DOTS signal channel over CoAP over (D)TLS

The signal channel is initiated by the DOTS client. Once the signal channel is established, the DOTS agents periodically send heartbeats to keep the channel active. At any time, the DOTS client may send a mitigation request message to the DOTS server over the active channel. While mitigation is active, due to the higher likelihood of packet loss during a DDoS attack, the DOTS server periodically sends status messages to the client, including basic mitigation feedback details. Mitigation remains active until the DOTS client explicitly terminates mitigation, or the mitigation lifetime expires.

Messages exchanged between DOTS client and server are serialized using Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC7049], CBOR is a binary encoding designed for small code and message size. CBOR encoded payloads are used to convey signal channel specific payload messages that convey request parameters and response information such as errors. This specification uses the encoding rules defined in [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor] for representing mitigation scope and DOTS signal channel session configuration data defined using YANG (Section 5.2) as CBOR data.

DOTS agents MUST support GET, PUT, and DELETE CoAP methods. The payload included in CoAP responses with 2.xx and 3.xx Response Codes MUST be of content type "application/cbor" (Section 5.5.1 of [RFC7252]). CoAP responses with 4.xx and 5.xx error Response Codes MUST include a diagnostic payload (Section 5.5.2 of [RFC7252]). The Diagnostic Payload may contain additional information to aid troubleshooting.

5.2. DOTS Signal YANG Module

This document defines a YANG [RFC6020] module for mitigation scope and DOTS signal channel session configuration data.

5.2.1. Mitigation Request YANG Module Tree Structure

This document defines the YANG module "ietf-dots-signal", which has the following tree structure:

```
module: ietf-dots-signal
  +--rw mitigation-scope
    +--rw client-identifier*   binary
    +--rw scope* [mitigation-id]
      +--rw mitigation-id      int32
      +--rw target-ip*         inet:ip-address
      +--rw target-prefix*     inet:ip-prefix
      +--rw target-port-range* [lower-port upper-port]
        |   +--rw lower-port   inet:port-number
        |   +--rw upper-port   inet:port-number
      +--rw target-protocol*   uint8
      +--rw fqdn*              inet:domain-name
      +--rw uri*               inet:uri
      +--rw alias-name*        string
      +--rw lifetime?          int32
```

5.2.2. Mitigation Request YANG Module

```
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-dots-signal@2017-10-04.yang"

module ietf-dots-signal {
  yang-version 1.1;
  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-signal";
  prefix "signal";

  import ietf-inet-types {
    prefix "inet";
  }

  organization "IETF DOTS Working Group";

  contact
    "Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy <TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com>
    Mohamed Boucadair <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
    Prashanth Patil <praspati@cisco.com>
    Andrew Mortensen <amortensen@arbor.net>
    Nik Teague <nteague@verisign.com>";

  description
    "This module contains YANG definition for DOTS
    signal sent by the DOTS client to the DOTS server.

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    authors of the code. All rights reserved.

    Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
    without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
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    set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
    Relating to IETF Documents
    (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

    This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
    the RFC itself for full legal notices.";

  revision 2017-10-04 {
    description
      "Add units and fix some nits.";
    reference
      "-05";
  }

  revision 2017-08-03 {
    reference
```

```
"https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-reddy-dots-signal-channel";
}

container mitigation-scope {
  description
    "Top level container for a mitigation request.";

  leaf-list client-identifier {
    type binary;
    description
      "A client identifier conveyed by a DOTS gateway
       to a remote DOTS server.";
  }

  list scope {
    key mitigation-id;
    description "Identifier for the mitigation request.";

    leaf mitigation-id {
      type int32;
      description "Mitigation request identifier.";
    }
    leaf-list target-ip {
      type inet:ip-address;
      description
        "IPv4 or IPv6 address identifying the target.";
    }

    leaf-list target-prefix {
      type inet:ip-prefix;
      description
        "IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the target.";
    }

    list target-port-range {
      key "lower-port upper-port";

      description "Port range. When only lower-port is present,
                   it represents a single port.";

      leaf lower-port {
        type inet:port-number;
        mandatory true;
        description "Lower port number.";
      }

      leaf upper-port {
        type inet:port-number;
```

```
        must ". >= ../lower-port" {
            error-message
                "The upper port number must be greater than or
                equal to lower port number.";
        }
        description "Upper port number.";
    }

    leaf-list target-protocol {
        type uint8;
        description "Identifies the target protocol number.";
    }

    leaf-list fqdn {
        type inet:domain-name;
        description "FQDN";
    }

    leaf-list uri {
        type inet:uri;
        description "URI";
    }

    leaf-list alias-name {
        type string;
        description "alias name";
    }

    leaf lifetime {
        type int32;
        units "seconds";
        default 3600;

        description
            "Indicates the lifetime of the mitigation request.";
    }
}

}
<CODE ENDS>
```

5.2.3. Session Configuration YANG Module Tree Structure

This document defines the YANG module "ietf-dots-signal-config", which has the following structure:

```
module: ietf-dots-signal-config
  +--rw signal-config
    +--rw session-id?          int32
    +--rw heartbeat-interval?  int16
    +--rw missing-hb-allowed?  int16
    +--rw max-retransmit?      int16
    +--rw ack-timeout?         int16
    +--rw ack-random-factor?   decimal64
    +--rw trigger-mitigation?  boolean
```

5.2.4. Session Configuration YANG Module

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-dots-signal-config@2017-10-04.yang"

```
module ietf-dots-signal-config {
  yang-version 1.1;
  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-signal-config";
  prefix "config";

  organization "IETF DOTS Working Group";

  contact
    "Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy <TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com>
    Mohamed Boucadair <mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
    Prashanth Patil <praspati@cisco.com>
    Andrew Mortensen <amortensen@arbor.net>
    Nik Teague <nteague@verisign.com>";

  description
    "This module contains YANG definition for DOTS
    signal channel session configuration.

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    authors of the code. All rights reserved.

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    (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

    This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
    the RFC itself for full legal notices.";

  revision 2017-10-04 {
    description
      "Add units/defaults and fix some nits.";
```

```
    reference
      "-05";
  }

  revision 2016-11-28 {
    reference
      "https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-reddy-dots-signal-channel";
  }

  container signal-config {
    description "Top level container for DOTS signal channel session
      configuration.";

    leaf session-id {
      type int32;
      description "An identifier for the DOTS signal channel
        session configuration data.";
    }

    leaf heartbeat-interval {
      type int16;
      units "seconds";
      default 30;

      description
        "DOTS agents regularly send heartbeats to each other
        after mutual authentication in order to keep
        the DOTS signal channel open.";
    }

    leaf missing-hb-allowed {
      type int16;
      default 5;

      description
        "Maximum number of missing heartbeats allowed.";
    }

    leaf max-retransmit {
      type int16;
      default 3;

      description
        "Maximum number of retransmissions of a
        Confirmable message.";
    }

    leaf ack-timeout {
```

```
        type int16;
        units "seconds";
        default 2;

        description
            "Initial retransmission timeout value.";
    }

    leaf ack-random-factor {
        type decimal64 {
            fraction-digits 2;
        }

        default 1.5;

        description
            "Random factor used to influence the timing of
            retransmissions";
    }
    leaf trigger-mitigation {
        type boolean;
        default true;

        description
            "If false, then mitigation is triggered
            only when the DOTS server channel session is lost";
    }
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
```

5.3. CoAP URIs

The DOTS server MUST support the use of the path-prefix of `"/.well-known/"` as defined in [RFC5785] and the registered name of `"dots"`. Each DOTS operation is indicated by a path-suffix that indicates the intended operation.

Operation	Operation path	Details
Mitigation	/v1/mitigate	Section 5.4
Session configuration	/v1/config	Section 5.5

Figure 5: Operations and their corresponding URIs:

5.4. Mitigation Request

The following methods are used to request or withdraw mitigation requests:

PUT: DOTS clients use the PUT method to request mitigation (Section 5.4.1). During active mitigation, DOTS clients may use PUT requests to convey mitigation efficacy updates to the DOTS server (Section 5.4.4).

DELETE: DOTS clients use the DELETE method to withdraw a request for mitigation from the DOTS server (Section 5.4.2).

GET: DOTS clients may use the GET method to subscribe to DOTS server status messages, or to retrieve the list of existing mitigations (Section 5.4.3).

Mitigation request and response messages are marked as Non-confirmable messages. DOTS agents SHOULD follow the data transmission guidelines discussed in Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8085] and control transmission behavior by not sending on average more than one UDP datagram per RTT to the peer DOTS agent.

Requests marked by the DOTS client as Non-confirmable messages are sent at regular intervals until a response is received from the DOTS server and if the DOTS client cannot maintain a RTT estimate then it SHOULD NOT send more than one Non-confirmable request every 3 seconds, and SHOULD use an even less aggressive rate when possible (case 2 in Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8085]).

5.4.1. Requesting mitigation

When a DOTS client requires mitigation for any reason, the DOTS client uses CoAP PUT method to send a mitigation request to the DOTS server (Figure 6, illustrated in JSON diagnostic notation). The DOTS server can enable mitigation on behalf of the DOTS client by

communicating the DOTS client's request to the mitigator and relaying selected mitigator feedback to the requesting DOTS client.

```
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Content-Type: "application/cbor"
{
  "mitigation-scope": {
    "client-identifier": [
      "string"
    ],
    "scope": [
      {
        "mitigation-id": integer,
        "target-ip": [
          "string"
        ],
        "target-prefix": [
          "string"
        ],
        "target-port-range": [
          {
            "lower-port": integer,
            "upper-port": integer
          }
        ],
        "target-protocol": [
          integer
        ],
        "fqdn": [
          "string"
        ],
        "uri": [
          "string"
        ],
        "alias-name": [
          "string"
        ],
        "lifetime": integer
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

Figure 6: PUT to convey DOTS signals

The parameters are described below.

client-identifier: The client identifier MAY be conveyed by the DOTS gateway to propagate the DOTS client identity from the gateway's client-side to the gateway's server-side, and from the gateway's server-side to the DOTS server. This allows the final DOTS server to accept mitigation requests with scopes which the DOTS client is authorized to manage.

The 'client-identifier' value MUST be assigned by the DOTS gateway in a manner that ensures that there is no probability that the same value will be assigned to a different DOTS client. The DOTS gateway MUST obscure potentially sensitive DOTS client identity information. The client-identifier attribute SHOULD NOT to be generated and included by the DOTS client.

This is an optional attribute.

mitigation-id: Identifier for the mitigation request represented using an integer. This identifier MUST be unique for each mitigation request bound to the DOTS client, i.e., the mitigation-id parameter value in the mitigation request needs to be unique relative to the mitigation-id parameter values of active mitigation requests conveyed from the DOTS client to the DOTS server. This identifier MUST be generated by the DOTS client. This document does not make any assumption about how this identifier is generated. This is a mandatory attribute.

target-ip: A list of IP addresses under attack. This is an optional attribute.

target-prefix: A list of prefixes under attack. Prefixes are represented using CIDR notation [RFC4632]. This is an optional attribute.

target-port-range: A list of ports under attack. The port range, lower-port for lower port number and upper-port for upper port number. When only lower-port is present, it represents a single port. For TCP, UDP, Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) [RFC4960], or Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP) [RFC4340]: the range of ports (e.g., 1024-65535). This is an optional attribute.

target-protocol: A list of protocols under attack. Values are taken from the IANA protocol registry [proto_numbers]. The value 0 has a special meaning for 'all protocols'. This is an optional attribute.

fqdn: A list of Fully Qualified Domain Names. Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) is the full name of a system, rather than just

its hostname. For example, "venera" is a hostname, and "venera.isi.edu" is an FQDN. This is an optional attribute.

uri: A list of Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI). This is an optional attribute.

alias-name: A list of aliases. Aliases can be created using the DOTS data channel (Section 3.1.1 of [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel]) or direct configuration, or other means and then used in subsequent signal channel exchanges to refer more efficiently to the resources under attack. This is an optional attribute.

lifetime: Lifetime of the mitigation request in seconds. The default lifetime of a mitigation request is 3600 seconds (60 minutes) -- this value was chosen to be long enough so that refreshing is not typically a burden on the DOTS client, while expiring the request where the client has unexpectedly quit in a timely manner.

A lifetime of negative one (-1) indicates indefinite lifetime for the mitigation request.

DOTS clients SHOULD include this parameter in their mitigation requests. If no lifetime is supplied by a DOTS client, the DOTS server uses the default lifetime value (3600 seconds). Upon the expiry of this lifetime, and if the request is not refreshed, the mitigation request is removed. The request can be refreshed by sending the same request again. The server MAY refuse indefinite lifetime, for policy reasons; the granted lifetime value is returned in the response. DOTS clients MUST be prepared to not be granted mitigations with indefinite lifetimes. The server MUST always indicate the actual lifetime in the response and the remaining lifetime in status messages sent to the client. This is a mandatory parameter for responses.

The CBOR key values for the parameters are defined in Section 6. Section 10 defines how the CBOR key values can be allocated to standards bodies and vendors.

FQDN and URI mitigation scopes may be thought of as a form of scope alias, in which the addresses to which the domain name or URI resolve represent the full scope of the mitigation.

In the PUT request at least one of the attributes 'target-ip' or 'target-prefix' or 'fqdn' or 'uri' or 'alias-name' MUST be present. DOTS agents can safely ignore Vendor-Specific parameters they don't understand.

The relative order of two mitigation requests from a DOTS client is determined by comparing their respective 'mitigation-id' values. If two mitigation requests have overlapping mitigation scopes, the mitigation request with higher numeric 'mitigation-id' value will override the mitigation request with a lower numeric 'mitigation-id' value. Two mitigation-ids are overlapping if there is a common IP address, IP prefix, FQDN, URI, or alias-name. The overlapped lower numeric 'mitigation-id' MUST be automatically deleted and no longer available at the DOTS server.

The Uri-Path option carries a major and minor version nomenclature to manage versioning and DOTS signal channel in this specification uses v1 major version.

If the DOTS client is using the certificate provisioned by the Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) server [RFC6234] in the DOTS gateway-domain to authenticate itself to the DOTS gateway, then the 'client-identifier' value can be the output of a cryptographic hash algorithm whose input is the DER-encoded ASN.1 representation of the Subject Public Key Info (SPKI) of an X.509 certificate. In this version of the specification, the cryptographic hash algorithm used is SHA-256 [RFC6234]. The output of the cryptographic hash algorithm is truncated to 16 bytes; truncation is done by stripping off the final 16 bytes. The truncated output is base64url encoded. If the 'client-identifier' value is already present in the mitigation request received from the DOTS client, the DOTS gateway MAY compute the 'client-identifier' value, as discussed above, and add the computed 'client-identifier' value to the end of the 'client-identifier' list. The DOTS server MUST NOT use the 'client-identifier' for the DOTS client authentication process.

In both DOTS signal and data channel sessions, the DOTS client MUST authenticate itself to the DOTS server (Section 9). The DOTS server may use the algorithm in Section 7 of [RFC7589] to derive the DOTS client identity or username from the client certificate. The DOTS client identity allows the DOTS server to accept mitigation requests with scopes which the DOTS client is authorized to manage. The DOTS server couples the DOTS signal and data channel sessions using the DOTS client identity and the 'client-identifier' parameter value, so the DOTS server can validate whether the aliases conveyed in the mitigation request were indeed created by the same DOTS client using the DOTS data channel session. If the aliases were not created by the DOTS client, the DOTS server returns 4.00 (Bad Request) in the response.

The DOTS server couples the DOTS signal channel sessions using the DOTS client identity and the 'client-identifier' parameter value, and the DOTS server uses 'mitigation-id' parameter value to detect

duplicate mitigation requests. If the mitigation request contains both alias-name and other parameters identifying the target resources (such as, 'target-ip', 'target-prefix', 'target-port-range', 'fqdn', or 'uri'), then the DOTS server appends the parameter values in 'alias-name' with the corresponding parameter values in 'target-ip', 'target-prefix', 'target-port-range', 'fqdn', or 'uri'.

Figure 7 shows a PUT request example to signal that ports 80, 8080, and 443 on the servers 2001:db8:6401::1 and 2001:db8:6401::2 are being attacked (illustrated in JSON diagnostic notation).

```
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Host: "www.example.com"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "v1"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Content-Format: "application/cbor"
{
  "mitigation-scope": {
    "client-identifier": [
      "dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
    ],
    "scope": [
      {
        "mitigation-id": 12332,
        "target-ip": [
          "2001:db8:6401::1",
          "2001:db8:6401::2"
        ],
        "target-port-range": [
          {
            "lower-port": 80
          },
          {
            "lower-port": 443
          },
          {
            "lower-port": 8080
          }
        ],
        "target-protocol": [
          6
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

The CBOR encoding format is shown below:

```

A1                                     # map(1)
  01                                 # unsigned(1)
  A2                                 # map(2)
    18 20                           # unsigned(32)
    81                               # array(1)
    76                               # text(22)
      647A3670486A6141446B614654626A72304A47427077 # "dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
    02                               # unsigned(2)
    81                               # array(1)
      A4                             # map(4)
        03                           # unsigned(3)
        19 302C                       # unsigned(12332)
        04                           # unsigned(4)
        82                             # array(2)
          70                           # text(16)
            323030313A6462383A363430313A3A31 # "2001:db8:6401::1"
          70                           # text(16)
            323030313A6462383A363430313A3A32 # "2001:db8:6401::2"
        05                           # unsigned(5)
        83                             # array(3)
          A1                           # map(1)
            06                         # unsigned(6)
            18 50                       # unsigned(80)
          A1                           # map(1)
            06                         # unsigned(6)
            19 01BB                     # unsigned(443)
          A1                           # map(1)
            06                         # unsigned(6)
            19 1F90                     # unsigned(8080)
        08                           # unsigned(8)
        81                             # array(1)
          06                           # unsigned(6)

```

Figure 7: PUT for DOTS signal

The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the PUT request using CoAP response codes. CoAP 2.xx codes are success. CoAP 4.xx codes are some sort of invalid requests. Figure 8 shows a PUT response for CoAP 2.xx response codes.


```
{
  "mitigation-scope": {
    "client-identifier": [
      "string"
    ],
    "scope": [
      {
        "mitigation-id": integer,
        "lifetime": integer
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

Figure 8: 2.xx response body

COAP 5.xx codes are returned if the DOTS server has erred or is currently unavailable to provide mitigation in response to the mitigation request from the DOTS client.

If the DOTS server does not find the 'mitigation-id' parameter value conveyed in the PUT request in its configuration data, then the server MAY accept the mitigation request by sending back a 2.01 (Created) response to the DOTS client; the DOTS server will consequently try to mitigate the attack.

If the DOTS server finds the 'mitigation-id' parameter value conveyed in the PUT request in its configuration data, then the server MAY update the mitigation request, and a 2.04 (Changed) response is returned to indicate a successful update of the mitigation request.

If the request is missing one or more mandatory attributes, then 4.00 (Bad Request) will be returned in the response or if the request contains invalid or unknown parameters then 4.02 (Invalid query) is returned in the response.

For a mitigation request to continue beyond the initial negotiated lifetime, the DOTS client need to refresh the current mitigation request by sending a new PUT request. The PUT request MUST use the same 'mitigation-id' value, and MUST repeat all the other parameters as sent in the original mitigation request apart from a possible change to the lifetime parameter value.

A DOTS gateway MUST update the 'client-identifier' list in the response to remove the 'client-identifier' value it had added in the corresponding request before forwarding the response to the DOTS client.

5.4.2. Withdraw a DOTS Signal

A DELETE request is used to withdraw a DOTS signal from a DOTS server (Figure 9).

```
Header: DELETE (Code=0.04)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Content-Format: "application/cbor"
{
  "mitigation-scope": {
    "client-identifier": [
      "string"
    ],
    "scope": [
      {
        "mitigation-id": integer
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

Figure 9: Withdraw DOTS signal

The DOTS server immediately acknowledges a DOTS client's request to withdraw the DOTS signal using 2.02 (Deleted) response code with no response payload. A 2.02 (Deleted) Response Code is returned even if the 'mitigation-id' parameter value conveyed in the DELETE request does not exist in its configuration data before the request.

If the DOTS server finds the 'mitigation-id' parameter value conveyed in the DELETE request in its configuration data, then to protect against route or DNS flapping caused by a client rapidly toggling mitigation, and to dampen the effect of oscillating attacks, DOTS servers MAY allow mitigation to continue for a limited period after acknowledging a DOTS client's withdrawal of a mitigation request. During this period, the DOTS server status messages SHOULD indicate that mitigation is active but terminating. The initial active-but-terminating period SHOULD be sufficiently long to absorb latency incurred by route propagation. The active-but-terminating period SHOULD be set by default to 120 seconds. If the client requests mitigation again before the initial active-but-terminating period elapses, the DOTS server MAY exponentially increase the active-but-terminating period up to a maximum of 300 seconds (5 minutes). After the active-but-terminating period elapses, the DOTS server MUST treat

the mitigation as terminated, as the DOTS client is no longer responsible for the mitigation. For example, if there is a financial relationship between the DOTS client and server domains, the DOTS client ceases incurring cost at this point.

5.4.3. Retrieving a DOTS Signal

A GET request is used to retrieve information (including status) of a DOTS signal from a DOTS server (Figure 10). If the DOTS server does not find the 'mitigation-id' parameter value conveyed in the GET request in its configuration data, then it responds with a 4.04 (Not Found) error response code. The 'c' (content) parameter and its permitted values defined in [I-D.ietf-core-comi] can be used to retrieve non-configuration data (attack mitigation status) or configuration data or both. The DOTS server SHOULD support this optional filtering capability but can safely ignore it if not supported.

The examples below assume the default of "c=a".

- 1) To retrieve all DOTS signals signaled by the DOTS client.

```
Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Observe : 0
{
  "mitigation-scope": {
    "client-identifier": [
      "string"
    ]
  }
}
```

- 2) To retrieve a specific DOTS signal signaled by the DOTS client.
The configuration data in the response will be formatted in the same order it was processed at the DOTS server.

```
Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Observe : 0
Content-Format: "application/cbor"
{
  "mitigation-scope": {
    "client-identifier": [
      "string"
    ],
    "scope": [
      {
        "mitigation-id": integer
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

Figure 10: GET to retrieve the rules

Figure 11 shows a response example of all the active mitigation requests associated with the DOTS client on the DOTS server and the mitigation status of each mitigation request.

```
{
  "mitigation-scope": {
    "scope": [
      {
        "mitigation-id": 12332,
        "mitigation-start": 1507818434.00,
        "target-protocol": [
          17
        ],
        "lifetime":1800,
        "status":2,
        "bytes-dropped": 134334555,
        "bps-dropped": 43344,
        "pkts-dropped": 333334444,
        "pps-dropped": 432432
      },
      {
        "mitigation-id": 12333,
        "mitigation-start": 1507818393.00,
        "target-protocol": [
          6
        ],
        "lifetime":1800,
        "status":3
        "bytes-dropped": 0,
        "bps-dropped": 0,
        "pkts-dropped": 0,
        "pps-dropped": 0
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

Figure 11: Response body

The mitigation status parameters are described below.

lifetime: The remaining lifetime of the mitigation request in seconds.

mitigation-start: Mitigation start time is represented in seconds relative to 1970-01-01T00:00Z in UTC time (Section 2.4.1 of [RFC7049]). The encoding is modified so that the leading tag 1 (epoch-based date/time) MUST be omitted.

bytes-dropped: The total dropped byte count for the mitigation request since the attack mitigation is triggered. The count wraps

around when it reaches the maximum value of unsigned integer.
This is an optional attribute.

bps-dropped: The average dropped bytes per second for the mitigation request since the attack mitigation is triggered. This SHOULD be a five-minute average. This is an optional attribute.

pkts-dropped: The total dropped packet count for the mitigation request since the attack mitigation is triggered. This is an optional attribute.

pps-dropped: The average dropped packets per second for the mitigation request since the attack mitigation is triggered. This SHOULD be a five-minute average. This is an optional attribute.

status: Status of attack mitigation. The 'status' parameter is a mandatory attribute.

The various possible values of 'status' parameter are explained below:

Parameter value	Description
1	Attack mitigation is in progress (e.g., changing the network path to re-route the inbound traffic to DOTS mitigator).
2	Attack is successfully mitigated (e.g., traffic is redirected to a DDOS mitigator and attack traffic is dropped).
3	Attack has stopped and the DOTS client can withdraw the mitigation request.
4	Attack has exceeded the mitigation provider capability.
5	DOTS client has withdrawn the mitigation request and the mitigation is active but terminating.

The observe option defined in [RFC7641] extends the CoAP core protocol with a mechanism for a CoAP client to "observe" a resource on a CoAP server: the client retrieves a representation of the resource and requests this representation be updated by the server as long as the client is interested in the resource. A DOTS client

conveys the observe option set to 0 in the GET request to receive unsolicited notifications of attack mitigation status from the DOTS server. Unidirectional notifications within the bidirectional signal channel allows unsolicited message delivery, enabling asynchronous notifications between the agents. Due to the higher likelihood of packet loss during a DDoS attack, DOTS server periodically sends attack mitigation status to the DOTS client and also notifies the DOTS client whenever the status of the attack mitigation changes. If the DOTS server cannot maintain a RTT estimate then it SHOULD NOT send more than one unsolicited notification every 3 seconds, and SHOULD use an even less aggressive rate when possible (case 2 in Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8085]). A DOTS client that is no longer interested in receiving notifications from the DOTS server can simply "forget" the observation. When the DOTS server then sends the next notification, the DOTS client will not recognize the token in the message and thus will return a Reset message. This causes the DOTS server to remove the associated entry. Alternatively, the DOTS client can explicitly deregister by issuing a GET request that has the Token field set to the token of the observation to be cancelled and includes an Observe Option with the value set to 1 (deregister).




Figure 12: Notifications of attack mitigation status

5.4.3.1. Mitigation Status

The DOTS client can send the GET request at frequent intervals without the Observe option to retrieve the configuration data of the mitigation request and non-configuration data (i.e., the attack status). The frequency of polling the DOTS server to get the mitigation status should follow the transmission guidelines given in Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8085]. If the DOTS server has been able to mitigate the attack and the attack has stopped, the DOTS server indicates as such in the status, and the DOTS client recalls the mitigation request by issuing a DELETE for the mitigation-id.

A DOTS client should react to the status of the attack from the DOTS server and not the fact that it has recognized, using its own means, that the attack has been mitigated. This ensures that the DOTS client does not recall a mitigation request in a premature fashion because it is possible that the DOTS client does not sense the DDOS attack on its resources but the DOTS server could be actively mitigating the attack and the attack is not completely averted.

5.4.4. Efficacy Update from DOTS Client

While DDoS mitigation is active, due to the likelihood of packet loss, a DOTS client MAY periodically transmit DOTS mitigation efficacy updates to the relevant DOTS server. A PUT request (Figure 13) is used to convey the mitigation efficacy update to the DOTS server.

The PUT request MUST include all the parameters used in the PUT request to convey the DOTS signal (Section 5.4.1) unchanged apart from the lifetime parameter value. If this is not the case, the DOTS server MUST reject the request with a 4.02 error response code.

The If-Match Option (Section 5.10.8.1 of [RFC7252]) with an empty value is used to make the PUT request conditional on the current existence of the mitigation request. If UDP is used as transport, CoAP requests may arrive out-of-order. For example, the DOTS client may send a PUT request to convey an efficacy update to the DOTS server followed by a DELETE request to withdraw the mitigation request, but the DELETE request arrives at the DOTS server before the PUT request. To handle out-of-order delivery of requests, if an If-Match option is present in the PUT request and the 'mitigation-id' in the request matches a mitigation request from that DOTS client, then the request is processed. If no match is found, the PUT request is silently ignored.


```
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Content-Format: "application/cbor"
{
  "mitigation-scope": {
    "client-identifier": [
      "string"
    ],
    "scope": [
      {
        "mitigation-id": integer,
        "target-ip": [
          "string"
        ],
        "target-port-range": [
          {
            "lower-port": integer,
            "upper-port": integer
          }
        ],
        "target-protocol": [
          integer
        ],
        "fqdn": [
          "string"
        ],
        "uri": [
          "string"
        ],
        "alias-name": [
          "string"
        ],
        "lifetime": integer,
        "attack-status": integer
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

Figure 13: Efficacy Update

The 'attack-status' parameter is a mandatory attribute when doing a efficacy update. The various possible values contained in the 'attack-status' parameter are described below:

Parameter value	Description
1	DOTS client determines that it is still under attack.
2	DOTS client determines that the attack is successfully mitigated (e.g., attack traffic is not seen).

The DOTS server indicates the result of processing a PUT request using CoAP response codes. The response code 2.04 (Changed) is returned if the DOTS server has accepted the mitigation efficacy update. The error response code 5.03 (Service Unavailable) is returned if the DOTS server has erred or is incapable of performing the mitigation.

5.5. DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration

The DOTS client can negotiate, configure, and retrieve the DOTS signal channel session behavior. The DOTS signal channel can be used, for example, to configure the following:

- a. Heartbeat interval: DOTS agents regularly send heartbeats (CoAP Ping/Pong) to each other after mutual authentication in order to keep the DOTS signal channel open, heartbeat messages are exchanged between the DOTS agents every heartbeat-interval seconds to detect the current status of the DOTS signal channel session.
- b. Missing heartbeats allowed: This variable indicates the maximum number of consecutive heartbeat messages for which a DOTS agent did not receive a response before concluding that the session is disconnected or defunct.
- c. Acceptable signal loss ratio: Maximum retransmissions, retransmission timeout value and other message transmission parameters for the DOTS signal channel.

Reliability is provided to requests and responses by marking them as Confirmable (CON) messages. DOTS signal channel session configuration requests and responses are marked as Confirmable (CON) messages. As explained in Section 2.1 of [RFC7252], a Confirmable message is retransmitted using a default timeout and exponential back-off between retransmissions, until the DOTS server sends an Acknowledgement message (ACK) with the same Message ID conveyed from the DOTS client. Message transmission parameters are defined in

Section 4.8 of [RFC7252]. Reliability is provided to the responses by marking them as Confirmable (CON) messages. The DOTS server can either piggyback the response in the acknowledgement message or if the DOTS server is not able to respond immediately to a request carried in a Confirmable message, it simply responds with an Empty Acknowledgement message so that the DOTS client can stop retransmitting the request. Empty Acknowledgement message is explained in Section 2.2 of [RFC7252]. When the response is ready, the server sends it in a new Confirmable message which then in turn needs to be acknowledged by the DOTS client (see Sections 5.2.1 and Sections 5.2.2 of [RFC7252]). Requests and responses exchanged between DOTS agents during peacetime are marked as Confirmable messages.

Implementation Note: A DOTS client that receives a response in a CON message may want to clean up the message state right after sending the ACK. If that ACK is lost and the DOTS server retransmits the CON, the DOTS client may no longer have any state to which to correlate this response, making the retransmission an unexpected message; the DOTS client will send a Reset message so it does not receive any more retransmissions. This behavior is normal and not an indication of an error (see Section 5.3.2 of [RFC7252] for more details).

5.5.1. Discover Configuration Parameters

A GET request is used to obtain acceptable and current configuration parameters on the DOTS server for DOTS signal channel session configuration. Figure 14 shows how to obtain acceptable configuration parameters for the server.

```
Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "config"
```

Figure 14: GET to retrieve configuration

The DOTS server in the 2.05 (Content) response conveys the current, minimum and maximum attribute values acceptable by the DOTS server.

```
Content-Format: "application/cbor"
{
  "heartbeat-interval": {
    "CurrentValue": integer,
    "MinValue": integer,
    "MaxValue" : integer,
  },
  "missing-hb-allowed": {
    "CurrentValue": integer,
    "MinValue": integer,
    "MaxValue" : integer,
  },
  "max-retransmit": {
    "CurrentValue": integer,
    "MinValue": integer,
    "MaxValue" : integer,
  },
  "ack-timeout": {
    "CurrentValue": integer,
    "MinValue": integer,
    "MaxValue" : integer,
  },
  "ack-random-factor": {
    "CurrentValue": number,
    "MinValue": number,
    "MaxValue" : number,
  },
  "trigger-mitigation": {
    "CurrentValue": boolean,
  }
}
```

Figure 15: GET response body

Figure 16 shows an example of acceptable and current configuration parameters on the DOTS server for DOTS signal channel session configuration.

```
Content-Format: "application/cbor"
{
  "heartbeat-interval": {
    "CurrentValue": 30,
    "MinValue": 15,
    "MaxValue" : 240,
  },
  "missing-hb-allowed": {
    "CurrentValue": 5,
    "MinValue": 3,
    "MaxValue" : 9,
  },
  "max-retransmit": {
    "CurrentValue": 3,
    "MinValue": 2,
    "MaxValue" : 15,
  },
  "ack-timeout": {
    "CurrentValue": 2,
    "MinValue": 1,
    "MaxValue" : 30,
  },
  "ack-random-factor": {
    "CurrentValue": 1.5,
    "MinValue": 1.1,
    "MaxValue" : 4.0,
  },
  "trigger-mitigation": {
    "CurrentValue": true,
  }
}
```

Figure 16: configuration response body

5.5.2. Convey DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration

A PUT request is used to convey the configuration parameters for the signaling channel (e.g., heartbeat interval, maximum retransmissions). Message transmission parameters for CoAP are defined in Section 4.8 of [RFC7252]. The RECOMMENDED values of transmission parameter values are `ack_timeout` (2 seconds), `max-retransmit` (3), `ack-random-factor` (1.5). In addition to those parameters, the RECOMMENDED specific DOTS transmission parameter values are `heartbeat-interval` (30 seconds) and `missing-hb-allowed` (5).

Note: `heartbeat-interval` should be tweaked to also assist DOTS messages for NAT traversal (SIG-010 of

[I-D.ietf-dots-requirements])). According to [RFC8085], keepalive messages must not be sent more frequently than once every 15 seconds and should use longer intervals when possible. Furthermore, [RFC4787] recommends NATs to use a state timeout of 2 minutes or longer, but experience shows that sending packets every 15 to 30 seconds is necessary to prevent the majority of middleboxes from losing state for UDP flows. From that standpoint, this specification recommends a minimum heartbeat-interval of 15 seconds and a maximum heartbeat-interval of 240 seconds. The recommended value of 30 seconds is selected to anticipate the expiry of NAT state.

A heartbeat-interval of 30 second may be seen as too chatty in some deployments. For such deployments, DOTS agents may negotiate longer heartbeat-interval values to avoid overloading the network with too frequent keepalives.

When a confirmable "CoAP ping" is sent, and if there is no response, the "CoAP ping" will get retransmitted max-retransmit number of times by the CoAP layer using an initial timeout set to a random duration between `ack_timeout` and `(ack_timeout*ack-random-factor)` and exponential back-off between retransmissions. By choosing the recommended transmission parameters, the "CoAP ping" will timeout after 45 seconds. If the DOTS agent does not receive any response from the peer DOTS agent for `missing-hb-allowed` number of consecutive "CoAP ping" confirmable messages, then it concludes that the DOTS signal channel session is disconnected. A DOTS client MUST NOT transmit a "CoAP ping" while waiting for the previous "CoAP ping" response from the same DOTS server.

If the DOTS agent wishes to change the default values of message transmission parameters, then it should follow the guidance given in Section 4.8.1 of [RFC7252]. The DOTS agents MUST use the negotiated values for message transmission parameters and default values for non-negotiated message transmission parameters.

The signaling channel session configuration is applicable to a single DOTS signal channel session between the DOTS agents.

```
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "config"
Content-Format: "application/cbor"
{
  "signal-config": {
    "session-id": integer,
    "heartbeat-interval": integer,
    "missing-hb-allowed": integer,
    "max-retransmit": integer,
    "ack-timeout": integer,
    "ack-random-factor": number
    "trigger-mitigation": boolean
  }
}
```

Figure 17: PUT to convey the DOTS signal channel session configuration data.

The parameters are described below:

session-id: Identifier for the DOTS signal channel session configuration data represented as an integer. This identifier MUST be generated by the DOTS client. This document does not make any assumption about how this identifier is generated. This is a mandatory attribute.

heartbeat-interval: Time interval in seconds between two consecutive heartbeat messages. This is an optional attribute.

missing-hb-allowed: Maximum number of consecutive heartbeat messages for which the DOTS agent did not receive a response before concluding that the session is disconnected. This is an optional attribute.

max-retransmit: Maximum number of retransmissions for a message (referred to as MAX_RETRANSMIT parameter in CoAP). This is an optional attribute.

ack-timeout: Timeout value in seconds used to calculate the initial retransmission timeout value (referred to as ACK_TIMEOUT parameter in CoAP). This is an optional attribute.

ack-random-factor: Random factor used to influence the timing of retransmissions (referred to as `ACK_RANDOM_FACTOR` parameter in CoAP). This is an optional attribute.

trigger-mitigation: If the parameter value is set to `'false'`, then DDoS mitigation is triggered only when the DOTS signal channel session is lost. Automated mitigation on loss of signal is discussed in Section 3.3.3 of [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]. If the DOTS client ceases to respond to heartbeat messages, then the DOTS server can detect that the DOTS session is lost. The default value of the parameter is `'true'`. This is an optional attribute.

In the PUT request at least one of the attributes `heartbeat-interval`, `missing-hb-allowed`, `max-retransmit`, `ack-timeout`, `ack-random-factor`, and `trigger-mitigation` MUST be present. The PUT request with higher numeric `session-id` value over-rides the DOTS signal channel session configuration data installed by a PUT request with a lower numeric `session-id` value.

Figure 18 shows a PUT request example to convey the configuration parameters for the DOTS signal channel.

```
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Host: "www.example.com"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "v1"
Uri-Path: "config"
Content-Format: "application/cbor"
{
  "signal-config": {
    "session-id": 1234534333242,
    "heartbeat-interval": 91,
    "missing-hb-allowed": 3,
    "max-retransmit": 7,
    "ack-timeout": 5,
    "ack-random-factor": 1.5,
    "trigger-mitigation": false
  }
}
```

Figure 18: PUT to convey the configuration parameters

The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the PUT request using CoAP response codes:

- o If the DOTS server finds the `'session-id'` parameter value conveyed in the PUT request in its configuration data and if the DOTS

server has accepted the updated configuration parameters, then 2.04 (Changed) code is returned in the response.

- o If the DOTS server does not find the 'session-id' parameter value conveyed in the PUT request in its configuration data and if the DOTS server has accepted the configuration parameters, then a response code 2.01 (Created) is returned in the response.
- o If the request is missing one or more mandatory attributes, then 4.00 (Bad Request) is returned in the response.
- o If the request contains one or more invalid or unknown parameters, then 4.02 (Invalid query) code is returned in the response.
- o Response code 4.22 (Unprocessable Entity) is returned in the response, if any of the heartbeat-interval, missing-hb-allowed, max-retransmit, target-protocol, ack-timeout, and ack-random-factor attribute values are not acceptable to the DOTS server. Upon receipt of the 4.22 error response code, the DOTS client should request the maximum and minimum attribute values acceptable to the DOTS server (Section 5.5.1). The DOTS client may re-try and send the PUT request with updated attribute values acceptable to the DOTS server.

5.5.3. Delete DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration

A DELETE request is used to delete the installed DOTS signal channel session configuration data (Figure 19).

```
Header: DELETE (Code=0.04)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "config"
Content-Format: "application/cbor"
```

Figure 19: DELETE configuration

The DOTS server resets the DOTS signal channel session configuration back to the default values and acknowledges a DOTS client's request to remove the DOTS signal channel session configuration using 2.02 (Deleted) response code.

5.6. Redirected Signaling

Redirected Signaling is discussed in detail in Section 3.2.2 of [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]. If the DOTS server wants to redirect the DOTS client to an alternative DOTS server for a signaling session then the response code 3.00 (alternate server) will be returned in the response to the client. The DOTS server can return the error response code 3.00 in response to a PUT request from the DOTS client or convey the error response code 3.00 in a unidirectional notification response from the DOTS server.

The DOTS server in the error response conveys the alternate DOTS server FQDN, and the alternate DOTS server IP addresses and time to live values in the CBOR body.

```
{
  "alt-server": "string",
  "alt-server-record": [
    {
      "addr": "string",
      "ttl" : integer,
    }
  ]
}
```

Figure 20: Error response body

The parameters are described below:

alt-server: FQDN of an alternate DOTS server.

addr: IP address of an alternate DOTS server.

ttl: Time to live (TTL) represented as an integer number of seconds.

Figure 21 shows a 3.00 response example to convey the DOTS alternate server `www.example-alt.com`, its IP addresses `2001:db8:6401::1` and `2001:db8:6401::2`, and TTL values 3600 and 1800.

```
{
  "alt-server": "www.example-alt.com",
  "alt-server-record": [
    {
      "ttl" : 3600,
      "addr": "2001:db8:6401::1"
    },
    {
      "ttl" : 1800,
      "addr": "2001:db8:6401::2"
    }
  ]
}
```

Figure 21: Example of error response body

When the DOTS client receives 3.00 response, it considers the current request as having failed, but SHOULD try the request with the alternate DOTS server. During a DDOS attack, the DNS server may be subjected to DDOS attack, alternate DOTS server IP addresses conveyed in the 3.00 response help the DOTS client to skip DNS lookup of the alternate DOTS server and can try to establish UDP or TCP session with the alternate DOTS server IP addresses. The DOTS client SHOULD implement DNS64 function to handle the scenario where IPv6-only DOTS client communicates with IPv4-only alternate DOTS server.

5.7. Heartbeat Mechanism

To provide a metric of signal health and distinguish an 'idle' signal channel from a 'disconnected' or 'defunct' session, the DOTS agent sends a heartbeat over the signal channel to maintain its half of the channel. The DOTS agent similarly expects a heartbeat from its peer DOTS agent, and may consider a session terminated in the extended absence of a peer agent heartbeat.

While the communication between the DOTS agents is quiescent, the DOTS client will probe the DOTS server to ensure it has maintained cryptographic state and vice versa. Such probes can also keep alive firewall and/or NAT bindings. This probing reduces the frequency of establishing a new handshake when a DOTS signal needs to be conveyed to the DOTS server.

In case of a volumetric DDoS attack saturating the incoming link to the DOTS client, all traffic from the DOTS server to the DOTS client will likely be dropped, although the DOTS server receives heartbeat requests and DOTS messages from the DOTS client. In this scenario,

the DOTS agents MUST behave differently to handle message transmission and DOTS session liveliness during link saturation:

- o The DOTS client MUST NOT consider the DOTS session terminated even after maximum "missing-hb-allowed" threshold is reached. The DOTS client SHOULD continue to use the current DOTS session, and send heartbeat requests over the current DOTS session, so the DOTS server knows the DOTS client has not disconnected the DOTS session. After the maximum "missing-hb-allowed" threshold is reached, the DOTS client SHOULD try (D)TLS session resumption. The DOTS client SHOULD send mitigation requests over the current DOTS session, and in parallel, try (D)TLS session resumption or 0-RTT mode in DTLS 1.3 to piggyback the mitigation request in the ClientHello message. Once the link is no longer saturated, if traffic from the DOTS server reaches the DOTS client over the current DOTS session, the DOTS client can stop (D)TLS session resumption or if (D)TLS session resumption is successful then disconnect the current DOTS session.
- o If the DOTS server does not receive any traffic from the peer DOTS client, then the DOTS server sends heartbeat requests to the DOTS client and after maximum "missing-hb-allowed" threshold is reached, the DOTS server concludes the session is disconnected.

In DOTS over UDP, heartbeat messages may be exchanged between the DOTS agents using the "COAP ping" mechanism defined in Section 4.2 of [RFC7252]. Concretely, the DOTS agent sends an Empty Confirmable message and the peer DOTS agent will respond by sending a Reset message.

In DOTS over TCP, heartbeat messages can be exchanged between the DOTS agents using the Ping and Pong messages specified in Section 4.4 of [I-D.ietf-core-coap-tcp-tls]. That is, the DOTS agent sends a Ping message and the peer DOTS agent would respond by sending a single Pong message.

6. Mapping parameters to CBOR

All parameters in the payload in the DOTS signal channel MUST be mapped to CBOR types as follows and are given an integer key to save space. The recipient of the payload MAY reject the information if it is not suitably mapped.

Parameter name	CBOR key	CBOR major type of value
mitigation-scope	1	5 (map)
scope	2	5 (map)
mitigation-id	3	0 (unsigned)
target-ip	4	4 (array)
target-port-range	5	4
lower-port	6	0
upper-port	7	0
target-protocol	8	4
fqdn	9	4
uri	10	4
alias-name	11	4
lifetime	12	0
attack-status	13	0
signal-config	14	5
heartbeat-interval	15	0
max-retransmit	16	0
ack-timeout	17	0
ack-random-factor	18	7
MinValue	19	0
MaxValue	20	0
status	21	0
bytes-dropped	22	0
bps-dropped	23	0
pkts-dropped	24	0
pps-dropped	25	0
session-id	26	0
trigger-mitigation	27	7 (simple types)
missing-hb-allowed	28	0
CurrentValue	29	0
mitigation-start	30	7 (floating-point)
target-prefix	31	4 (array)
client-identifier	32	2 (byte string)
alt-server	33	2
alt-server-record	34	4
addr	35	2
ttl	36	0

Figure 22: CBOR mappings used in DOTS signal channel message

7. (D)TLS Protocol Profile and Performance considerations

This section defines the (D)TLS protocol profile of DOTS signal channel over (D)TLS and DOTS data channel over TLS.

There are known attacks on (D)TLS, such as machine-in-the-middle and protocol downgrade. These are general attacks on (D)TLS and not specific to DOTS over (D)TLS; please refer to the (D)TLS RFCs for discussion of these security issues. DOTS agents MUST adhere to the (D)TLS implementation recommendations and security considerations of [RFC7525] except with respect to (D)TLS version. Since encryption of DOTS using (D)TLS is virtually a green-field deployment DOTS agents MUST implement only (D)TLS 1.2 or later.

Implementations compliant with this profile MUST implement all of the following items:

- o DOTS agents MUST support DTLS record replay detection (Section 3.3 of [RFC6347]) to protect against replay attacks.
- o DOTS client can use (D)TLS session resumption without server-side state [RFC5077] to resume session and convey the DOTS signal.
- o Raw public keys [RFC7250] which reduce the size of the ServerHello, and can be used by servers that cannot obtain certificates (e.g., DOTS gateways on private networks).

Implementations compliant with this profile SHOULD implement all of the following items to reduce the delay required to deliver a DOTS signal:

- o TLS False Start [RFC7918] which reduces round-trips by allowing the TLS second flight of messages (ChangeCipherSpec) to also contain the DOTS signal.
- o Cached Information Extension [RFC7924] which avoids transmitting the server's certificate and certificate chain if the client has cached that information from a previous TLS handshake.
- o TCP Fast Open [RFC7413] can reduce the number of round-trips to convey DOTS signal.

7.1. MTU and Fragmentation Issues

To avoid DOTS signal message fragmentation and the consequently decreased probability of message delivery, DOTS agents MUST ensure that the DTLS record MUST fit within a single datagram. If the Path MTU is not known to the DOTS server, an IP MTU of 1280 bytes SHOULD be assumed. The length of the URL MUST NOT exceed 256 bytes. If UDP is used to convey the DOTS signal messages then the DOTS client must consider the amount of record expansion expected by the DTLS processing when calculating the size of CoAP message that fits within the path MTU. Path MTU MUST be greater than or equal to [CoAP

message size + DTLS overhead of 13 octets + authentication overhead of the negotiated DTLS cipher suite + block padding (Section 4.1.1.1 of [RFC6347]). If the request size exceeds the Path MTU then the DOTS client MUST split the DOTS signal into separate messages, for example the list of addresses in the 'target-ip' parameter could be split into multiple lists and each list conveyed in a new PUT request.

Implementation Note: DOTS choice of message size parameters works well with IPv6 and with most of today's IPv4 paths. However, with IPv4, it is harder to absolutely ensure that there is no IP fragmentation. If IPv4 support on unusual networks is a consideration and path MTU is unknown, implementations may want to limit themselves to more conservative IPv4 datagram sizes such as 576 bytes, as per [RFC0791] IP packets up to 576 bytes should never need to be fragmented, thus sending a maximum of 500 bytes of DOTS signal over a UDP datagram will generally avoid IP fragmentation.

8. (D)TLS 1.3 considerations

TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] provides critical latency improvements for connection establishment over TLS 1.2. The DTLS 1.3 protocol [I-D.rescorla-tls-dtls13] is based on the TLS 1.3 protocol and provides equivalent security guarantees. (D)TLS 1.3 provides two basic handshake modes of interest to DOTS signal channel:

- o Absent packet loss, a full handshake in which the DOTS client is able to send the DOTS signal message after one round trip and the DOTS server immediately after receiving the first DOTS signal message from the client.
- o 0-RTT mode in which the DOTS client can authenticate itself and send DOTS signal message on its first flight, thus reducing handshake latency. 0-RTT only works if the DOTS client has previously communicated with that DOTS server, which is very likely with the DOTS signal channel. The DOTS client SHOULD establish a (D)TLS session with the DOTS server during peacetime and share a PSK. During DDOS attack, the DOTS client can use the (D)TLS session to convey the DOTS signal message and if there is no response from the server after multiple re-tries then the DOTS client can resume the (D)TLS session in 0-RTT mode using PSK. A simplified TLS 1.3 handshake with 0-RTT DOTS signal message exchange is shown in Figure 23.




Figure 23: TLS 1.3 handshake with 0-RTT

9. Mutual Authentication of DOTS Agents & Authorization of DOTS Clients

(D)TLS based on client certificate can be used for mutual authentication between DOTS agents. If a DOTS gateway is involved, DOTS clients and DOTS gateway MUST perform mutual authentication; only authorized DOTS clients are allowed to send DOTS signals to a DOTS gateway. DOTS gateway and DOTS server MUST perform mutual authentication; DOTS server only allows DOTS signals from authorized DOTS gateway, creating a two-link chain of transitive authentication between the DOTS client and the DOTS server.




Figure 24: Example of Authentication and Authorization of DOTS Agents

In the example depicted in Figure 24, the DOTS gateway and DOTS clients within the 'example.com' domain mutually authenticate with each other. After the DOTS gateway validates the identity of a DOTS client, it communicates with the AAA server in the 'example.com' domain to determine if the DOTS client is authorized to request DDOS mitigation. If the DOTS client is not authorized, a 4.01 (Unauthorized) is returned in the response to the DOTS client. In this example, the DOTS gateway only allows the application server and DDOS detector to request DDOS mitigation, but does not permit the user of type 'guest' to request DDOS mitigation.

Also, DOTS gateway and DOTS server located in different domains MUST perform mutual authentication (e.g., using certificates). A DOTS server will only allow a DOTS gateway with a certificate for a particular domain to request mitigation for that domain. In reference to Figure 24, the DOTS server only allows the DOTS gateway to request mitigation for 'example.com' domain and not for other domains.

10. IANA Considerations

This specification registers a default port, new URI suffix in the Well-Known URIs registry, new CoAP response code, new parameters for DOTS signal channel and establishes registries for mappings to CBOR.

10.1. DOTS Signal Channel UDP and TCP Port Number

IANA has assigned the port number TBD to the DOTS signal channel protocol, for both UDP and TCP.

10.2. Well-Known 'dots' URI

This memo registers the 'dots' well-known URI in the Well-Known URIs registry as defined by [RFC5785].

URI suffix: dots

Change controller: IETF

Specification document(s): This RFC

Related information: None

10.3. CoAP Response Code

The following entry is added to the "CoAP Response Codes" sub-registry:

Code	Description	Reference
3.00	Alternate server	[RFCXXXX]

Figure 25: CoAP Response Code

[Note to RFC Editor: Please replace XXXX with the RFC number of this specification.]

10.4. DOTS signal channel CBOR Mappings Registry

A new registry will be requested from IANA, entitled "DOTS signal channel CBOR Mappings Registry". The registry is to be created as Expert Review Required.

10.4.1. Registration Template

Parameter name:

Parameter names (e.g., "target_ip") in the DOTS signal channel.

CBOR Key Value:

Key value for the parameter. The key value MUST be an integer in the range of 1 to 65536. The key values in the range of 32768 to 65536 are assigned for Vendor-Specific parameters.

CBOR Major Type:

CBOR Major type and optional tag for the claim.

Change Controller:

For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG". For others, give the name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.

Specification Document(s):

Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter, preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be included but is not required.

10.4.2. Initial Registry Contents

- o Parameter Name: "mitigation-scope"
- o CBOR Key Value: 1
- o CBOR Major Type: 5
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document

- o Parameter Name: "scope"
- o CBOR Key Value: 2
- o CBOR Major Type: 5
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document

- o Parameter Name: "mitigation-id"
- o CBOR Key Value: 3
- o CBOR Major Type: 0
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document

- o Parameter Name: target-ip
- o CBOR Key Value: 4
- o CBOR Major Type: 4
- o Change Controller: IESG

- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name: target-port-range
- o CBOR Key Value: 5
- o CBOR Major Type: 4
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name: "lower-port"
- o CBOR Key Value: 6
- o CBOR Major Type: 0
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name: "upper-port"
- o CBOR Key Value: 7
- o CBOR Major Type: 0
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name: target-protocol
- o CBOR Key Value: 8
- o CBOR Major Type: 4
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name: "fqdn"
- o CBOR Key Value: 9
- o CBOR Major Type: 4
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name: "uri"
- o CBOR Key Value: 10
- o CBOR Major Type: 4
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name: alias-name
- o CBOR Key Value: 11
- o CBOR Major Type: 4
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name: "lifetime"
- o CBOR Key Value: 12
- o CBOR Major Type: 0
- o Change Controller: IESG

- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name: attack-status
- o CBOR Key Value: 13
- o CBOR Major Type: 0
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name: signal-config
- o CBOR Key Value: 14
- o CBOR Major Type: 5
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name: heartbeat-interval
- o CBOR Key Value: 15
- o CBOR Major Type: 0
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name: max-retransmit
- o CBOR Key Value: 16
- o CBOR Major Type: 0
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name: ack-timeout
- o CBOR Key Value: 17
- o CBOR Major Type: 0
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name: ack-random-factor
- o CBOR Key Value: 18
- o CBOR Major Type: 7
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name: MinValue
- o CBOR Key Value: 19
- o CBOR Major Type: 0
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name: MaxValue
- o CBOR Key Value: 20
- o CBOR Major Type: 0
- o Change Controller: IESG

- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name: status
- o CBOR Key Value: 21
- o CBOR Major Type: 0
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name: bytes-dropped
- o CBOR Key Value: 22
- o CBOR Major Type: 0
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name: bps-dropped
- o CBOR Key Value: 23
- o CBOR Major Type: 0
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name: pkts-dropped
- o CBOR Key Value: 24
- o CBOR Major Type: 0
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name: pps-dropped
- o CBOR Key Value: 25
- o CBOR Major Type: 0
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name: session-id
- o CBOR Key Value: 26
- o CBOR Major Type: 0
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name: trigger-mitigation
- o CBOR Key Value: 27
- o CBOR Major Type: 7
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name: missing-hb-allowed
- o CBOR Key Value: 28
- o CBOR Major Type: 0
- o Change Controller: IESG

- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name: CurrentValue
- o CBOR Key Value: 29
- o CBOR Major Type: 0
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name:mitigation-start
- o CBOR Key Value: 30
- o CBOR Major Type: 7
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name:target-prefix
- o CBOR Key Value: 31
- o CBOR Major Type: 4
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name:client-identifier
- o CBOR Key Value: 32
- o CBOR Major Type: 2
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name:alt-server
- o CBOR Key Value: 33
- o CBOR Major Type: 2
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name:alt-server-record
- o CBOR Key Value: 34
- o CBOR Major Type: 4
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name:addr
- o CBOR Key Value: 35
- o CBOR Major Type: 2
- o Change Controller: IESG
- o Specification Document(s): this document
- o Parameter Name:ttl
- o CBOR Key Value: 36
- o CBOR Major Type: 0
- o Change Controller: IESG

- o Specification Document(s): this document

11. Implementation Status

[Note to RFC Editor: Please remove this section and reference to [RFC7942] prior to publication.]

This section records the status of known implementations of the protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942]. The description of implementations in this section is intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may exist.

According to [RFC7942], "this will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature. It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as they see fit".

11.1. nttdots

Organization: NTT Communication is developing a DOTS client and DOTS server software based on DOTS signal channel specified in this draft. It will be open-sourced.

Description: Early implementation of DOTS protocol. It is aimed to implement a full DOTS protocol spec in accordance with maturing of DOTS protocol itself.

Implementation: <https://github.com/nttdots/go-dots>

Level of maturity: It is a early implementation of DOTS protocol. Messaging between DOTS clients and DOTS servers has been tested. Level of maturity will increase in accordance with maturing of DOTS protocol itself.

Coverage: Capability of DOTS client: sending DOTS messages to the DOTS server in CoAP over DTLS as dots-signal. Capability of DOTS server: receiving dots-signal, validating received dots-signal, starting mitigation by handing over the dots-signal to DDOS mitigator.

Licensing: It will be open-sourced with BSD 3-clause license.

Implementation experience: It is implemented in Go-lang. Core specification of signaling is mature to be implemented, however, finding good libraries (like DTLS, CoAP) is rather difficult.

Contact: Kaname Nishizuka <kaname@nttv6.jp>

12. Security Considerations

Authenticated encryption MUST be used for data confidentiality and message integrity. (D)TLS based on client certificate MUST be used for mutual authentication. The interaction between the DOTS agents requires Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) with a cipher suite offering confidentiality protection and the guidance given in [RFC7525] MUST be followed to avoid attacks on (D)TLS.

A single DOTS signal channel between DOTS agents can be used to exchange multiple DOTS signal messages. To reduce DOTS client and DOTS server workload, DOTS client SHOULD re-use the (D)TLS session.

If TCP is used between DOTS agents, an attacker may be able to inject RST packets, bogus application segments, etc., regardless of whether TLS authentication is used. Because the application data is TLS protected, this will not result in the application receiving bogus data, but it will constitute a DoS on the connection. This attack can be countered by using TCP-AO [RFC5925]. If TCP-AO is used, then any bogus packets injected by an attacker will be rejected by the TCP-AO integrity check and therefore will never reach the TLS layer.

In order to prevent leaking internal information outside a client-domain, DOTS gateways located in the client-domain SHOULD NOT reveal the identity of internal DOTS clients (client-identifier) unless explicitly configured to do so.

Special care should be taken in order to ensure that the activation of the proposed mechanism won't have an impact on the stability of the network (including connectivity and services delivered over that network).

Involved functional elements in the cooperation system must establish exchange instructions and notification over a secure and authenticated channel. Adequate filters can be enforced to avoid that nodes outside a trusted domain can inject request such as deleting filtering rules. Nevertheless, attacks can be initiated from within the trusted domain if an entity has been corrupted. Adequate means to monitor trusted nodes should also be enabled.

13. Contributors

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Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal
Channel Specification
draft-ietf-dots-signal-channel-41

Abstract

This document specifies the DOTS signal channel, a protocol for signaling the need for protection against Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks to a server capable of enabling network traffic mitigation on behalf of the requesting client.

A companion document defines the DOTS data channel, a separate reliable communication layer for DOTS management and configuration purposes.

Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)

Please update these statements within the document with the RFC number to be assigned to this document:

- o "This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX;"
- o "RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification";
- o "| [RFCXXXX] |"
- o reference: RFC XXXX

Please update this statement with the RFC number to be assigned to the following documents:

- o "RFC YYYY: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel Specification (used to be I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel)"

Please update TBD/TBD1/TBD2 statements with the assignments made by IANA to DOTS Signal Channel Protocol.

Also, please update the "revision" date of the YANG modules.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack is a distributed attempt to make machines or network resources unavailable to their intended users. In most cases, sufficient scale for an effective attack can be achieved by compromising enough end-hosts and using those infected hosts to perpetrate and amplify the attack. The victim in this attack can be an application server, a host, a router, a firewall, or an entire network.

Network applications have finite resources like CPU cycles, the number of processes or threads they can create and use, the maximum number of simultaneous connections they can handle, the limited resources of the control plane, etc. When processing network traffic, such applications are supposed to use these resources to provide the intended functionality in the most efficient manner. However, a DDoS attacker may be able to prevent an application from performing its intended task by making the application exhaust its finite resources.

A TCP DDoS SYN-flood [RFC4987], for example, is a memory-exhausting attack while an ACK-flood is a CPU-exhausting attack. Attacks on the link are carried out by sending enough traffic so that the link becomes congested, thereby likely causing packet loss for legitimate traffic. Stateful firewalls can also be attacked by sending traffic that causes the firewall to maintain an excessive number of states that may jeopardize the firewall's operation overall, besides likely performance impacts. The firewall then runs out of memory, and can no longer instantiate the states required to process legitimate flows. Other possible DDoS attacks are discussed in [RFC4732].

In many cases, it may not be possible for network administrators to determine the cause(s) of an attack. They may instead just realize that certain resources seem to be under attack. This document defines a lightweight protocol that allows a DOTS client to request mitigation from one or more DOTS servers for protection against detected, suspected, or anticipated attacks. This protocol enables cooperation between DOTS agents to permit a highly-automated network defense that is robust, reliable, and secure. Note that "secure" means the support of the features defined in Section 2.4 of [RFC8612].

An example of a network diagram that illustrates a deployment of DOTS agents is shown in Figure 1. In this example, a DOTS server is operating on the access network. A DOTS client is located on the LAN (Local Area Network), while a DOTS gateway is embedded in the CPE (Customer Premises Equipment).




Figure 1: Sample DOTS Deployment (1)

DOTS servers can also be reachable over the Internet, as depicted in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Sample DOTS Deployment (2)

In typical deployments, the DOTS client belongs to a different administrative domain than the DOTS server. For example, the DOTS client is embedded in a firewall protecting services owned and operated by a customer, while the DOTS server is owned and operated by a different administrative entity (service provider, typically) providing DDoS mitigation services. The latter might or might not provide connectivity services to the network hosting the DOTS client.

The DOTS server may (not) be co-located with the DOTS mitigator. In typical deployments, the DOTS server belongs to the same administrative domain as the mitigator. The DOTS client can communicate directly with a DOTS server or indirectly via a DOTS gateway.

The document adheres to the DOTS architecture [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]. The requirements for DOTS signal channel protocol are documented in [RFC8612]. This document satisfies all the use cases discussed in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases].

This document focuses on the DOTS signal channel. This is a companion document of the DOTS data channel specification [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel] that defines a configuration and a bulk data exchange mechanism supporting the DOTS signal channel.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

(D)TLS is used for statements that apply to both Transport Layer Security [RFC5246][RFC8446] and Datagram Transport Layer Security [RFC6347]. Specific terms are used for any statement that applies to either protocol alone.

The reader should be familiar with the terms defined in [RFC8612].

The meaning of the symbols in YANG tree diagrams is defined in [RFC8340].

3. Design Overview

The DOTS signal channel is built on top of the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252], a lightweight protocol originally designed for constrained devices and networks. The many features of CoAP (expectation of packet loss, support for asynchronous Non-confirmable messaging, congestion control, small message overhead limiting the need for fragmentation, use of minimal resources, and support for (D)TLS) makes it a good candidate to build the DOTS signaling mechanism from.

DOTS clients and servers behave as CoAP endpoints. By default, a DOTS client (or server) behaves as a CoAP client (or server). Nevertheless, a DOTS client (or server) behaves as a CoAP server (or client) for specific operations such as DOTS heartbeat operations (Section 4.7).

The DOTS signal channel is layered on existing standards (Figure 3).




Figure 3: Abstract Layering of DOTS Signal Channel over CoAP over (D)TLS

In some cases, a DOTS client and server may have mutual agreement to use a specific port number, such as by explicit configuration or dynamic discovery [I-D.ietf-dots-server-discovery]. Absent such mutual agreement, the DOTS signal channel **MUST** run over port number TBD as defined in Section 9.1, for both UDP and TCP. In order to use a distinct port number (as opposed to TBD), DOTS clients and servers **SHOULD** support a configurable parameter to supply the port number to use.

Note: The rationale for not using the default port number 5684 ((D)TLS CoAP) is to avoid the discovery of services and resources discussed in [RFC7252] and allow for differentiated behaviors in environments where both a DOTS gateway and an IoT gateway (e.g., Figure 3 of [RFC7452]) are co-located.

Particularly, the use of a default port number is meant to simplify DOTS deployment in scenarios where no explicit IP address configuration is required. For example, the use of the default router as DOTS server aims to ease DOTS deployment within LANs (in which, CPEs embed a DOTS gateway as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2) without requiring a sophisticated discovery method and configuration tasks within the LAN. It is also possible to use anycast addresses for DOTS servers to simplify DOTS client configuration, including service discovery. In such anycast-based scenario, a DOTS client initiating a DOTS session to the DOTS server anycast address may, for example, be (1) redirected to the DOTS server unicast address to be used by the DOTS client following the procedure discussed in Section 4.6 or (2) relayed to a unicast DOTS server.

The signal channel uses the "coaps" URI scheme defined in Section 6 of [RFC7252] and the "coaps+tcp" URI scheme defined in Section 8.2 of [RFC8323] to identify DOTS server resources accessible using CoAP

over UDP secured with DTLS and CoAP over TCP secured with TLS, respectively.

The DOTS signal channel can be established between two DOTS agents prior or during an attack. The DOTS signal channel is initiated by the DOTS client. The DOTS client can then negotiate, configure, and retrieve the DOTS signal channel session behavior with its DOTS peer (Section 4.5). Once the signal channel is established, the DOTS agents may periodically send heartbeats to keep the channel active (Section 4.7). At any time, the DOTS client may send a mitigation request message (Section 4.4) to a DOTS server over the active signal channel. While mitigation is active (because of the higher likelihood of packet loss during a DDoS attack), the DOTS server periodically sends status messages to the client, including basic mitigation feedback details. Mitigation remains active until the DOTS client explicitly terminates mitigation, or the mitigation lifetime expires. Also, the DOTS server may rely on the signal channel session loss to trigger mitigation for pre-configured mitigation requests (if any).

DOTS signaling can happen with DTLS over UDP and TLS over TCP. Likewise, DOTS requests may be sent using IPv4 or IPv6 transfer capabilities. A Happy Eyeballs procedure for DOTS signal channel is specified in Section 4.3.

A DOTS client is entitled to access only to resources it creates. In particular, a DOTS client can not retrieve data related to mitigation requests created by other DOTS clients of the same DOTS client domain.

Messages exchanged between DOTS agents are serialized using Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC7049], a binary encoding scheme designed for small code and message size. CBOR-encoded payloads are used to carry signal channel-specific payload messages which convey request parameters and response information such as errors. In order to allow reusing data models across protocols, [RFC7951] specifies the JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) encoding of YANG-modeled data. A similar effort for CBOR is defined in [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor].

DOTS agents determine that a CBOR data structure is a DOTS signal channel object from the application context, such as from the port number assigned to the DOTS signal channel. The other method DOTS agents use to indicate that a CBOR data structure is a DOTS signal channel object is the use of the "application/dots+cbor" content type (Section 9.3).

This document specifies a YANG module for representing DOTS mitigation scopes, DOTS signal channel session configuration data, and DOTS redirected signaling (Section 5). All parameters in the payload of the DOTS signal channel are mapped to CBOR types as specified in Table 4 (Section 6).

In order to prevent fragmentation, DOTS agents must follow the recommendations documented in Section 4.6 of [RFC7252]. Refer to Section 7.3 for more details.

DOTS agents MUST support GET, PUT, and DELETE CoAP methods. The payload included in CoAP responses with 2.xx Response Codes MUST be of content type "application/dots+cbor". CoAP responses with 4.xx and 5.xx error Response Codes MUST include a diagnostic payload (Section 5.5.2 of [RFC7252]). The Diagnostic Payload may contain additional information to aid troubleshooting.

In deployments where multiple DOTS clients are enabled in a network (owned and operated by the same entity), the DOTS server may detect conflicting mitigation requests from these clients. This document does not aim to specify a comprehensive list of conditions under which a DOTS server will characterize two mitigation requests from distinct DOTS clients as conflicting, nor recommend a DOTS server behavior for processing conflicting mitigation requests. Those considerations are implementation- and deployment-specific. Nevertheless, the document specifies the mechanisms to notify DOTS clients when conflicts occur, including the conflict cause (Section 4.4).

In deployments where one or more translators (e.g., Traditional NAT [RFC3022], CGN [RFC6888], NAT64 [RFC6146], NPTv6 [RFC6296]) are enabled between the client's network and the DOTS server, DOTS signal channel messages forwarded to a DOTS server MUST NOT include internal IP addresses/prefixes and/or port numbers; external addresses/prefixes and/or port numbers as assigned by the translator MUST be used instead. This document does not make any recommendation about possible translator discovery mechanisms. The following are some (non-exhaustive) deployment examples that may be considered:

- o Port Control Protocol (PCP) [RFC6887] or Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) [RFC5389] may be used to retrieve the external addresses/prefixes and/or port numbers. Information retrieved by means of PCP or STUN will be used to feed the DOTS signal channel messages that will be sent to a DOTS server.
- o A DOTS gateway may be co-located with the translator. The DOTS gateway will need to update the DOTS messages, based upon the local translator's binding table.

4. DOTS Signal Channel: Messages & Behaviors

4.1. DOTS Server(s) Discovery

This document assumes that DOTS clients are provisioned with the reachability information of their DOTS server(s) using any of a variety of means (e.g., local configuration, or dynamic means such as DHCP [I-D.ietf-dots-server-discovery]). The description of such means is out of scope of this document.

Likewise, it is out of scope of this document to specify the behavior to be followed by a DOTS client to send DOTS requests when multiple DOTS servers are provisioned (e.g., contact all DOTS servers, select one DOTS server among the list). Such behavior is specified in other documents (e.g., [I-D.ietf-dots-multihoming]).

4.2. CoAP URIs

The DOTS server MUST support the use of the path-prefix of `"/.well-known/"` as defined in [RFC8615] and the registered name of `"dots"`. Each DOTS operation is indicated by a path-suffix that indicates the intended operation. The operation path (Table 1) is appended to the path-prefix to form the URI used with a CoAP request to perform the desired DOTS operation.

Operation	Operation Path	Details
Mitigation	/mitigate	Section 4.4
Session configuration	/config	Section 4.5
Heartbeat	/hb	Section 4.7

Table 1: Operations and their Corresponding URIs

4.3. Happy Eyeballs for DOTS Signal Channel

[RFC8612] mentions that DOTS agents will have to support both connectionless and connection-oriented protocols. As such, the DOTS signal channel is designed to operate with DTLS over UDP and TLS over TCP. Further, a DOTS client may acquire a list of IPv4 and IPv6 addresses (Section 4.1), each of which can be used to contact the DOTS server using UDP and TCP. If no list of IPv4 and IPv6 addresses to contact the DOTS server is configured (or discovered), the DOTS client adds the IPv4/IPv6 addresses of its default router to the candidate list to contact the DOTS server.

The following specifies the procedure to follow to select the address family and the transport protocol for sending DOTS signal channel messages.

Such procedure is needed to avoid experiencing long connection delays. For example, if an IPv4 path to reach a DOTS server is functional, but the DOTS server's IPv6 path is non-functional, a dual-stack DOTS client may experience a significant connection delay compared to an IPv4-only DOTS client, in the same network conditions. The other problem is that if a middlebox between the DOTS client and DOTS server is configured to block UDP traffic, the DOTS client will fail to establish a DTLS association with the DOTS server and, as a consequence, will have to fall back to TLS over TCP, thereby incurring significant connection delays.


To overcome these connection setup problems, the DOTS client attempts to connect to its DOTS server(s) using both IPv6 and IPv4, and tries both DTLS over UDP and TLS over TCP following a DOTS Happy Eyeballs approach. To some extent, this approach is similar to the Happy Eyeballs mechanism defined in [RFC8305]. The connection attempts are performed by the DOTS client when it initializes, or in general when it has to select an address family and transport to contact its DOTS server. The results of the Happy Eyeballs procedure are used by the DOTS client for sending its subsequent messages to the DOTS server. The difference in behavior with respect to the Happy Eyeballs mechanism [RFC8305] are listed below:

- o The order of preference of the DOTS signal channel address family and transport protocol (most preferred first) is: UDP over IPv6, UDP over IPv4, TCP over IPv6, and finally TCP over IPv4. This order adheres to the address preference order specified in [RFC6724] and the DOTS signal channel preference which privileges the use of UDP over TCP (to avoid TCP's head of line blocking).
- o The DOTS client after successfully establishing a connection MUST cache information regarding the outcome of each connection attempt for a specific time period, and it uses that information to avoid thrashing the network with subsequent attempts. The cached information is flushed when its age exceeds a specific time period on the order of few minutes (e.g., 10 min). Typically, if the DOTS client has to re-establish the connection with the same DOTS server within few seconds after the Happy Eyeballs mechanism is completed, caching avoids trashing the network especially in the presence of DDoS attack traffic.
- o If DOTS signal channel session is established with TLS (but DTLS failed), the DOTS client periodically repeats the mechanism to discover whether DOTS signal channel messages with DTLS over UDP

becomes available from the DOTS server, so the DOTS client can migrate the DOTS signal channel from TCP to UDP. Such probing SHOULD NOT be done more frequently than every 24 hours and MUST NOT be done more frequently than every 5 minutes.

When connection attempts are made during an attack, the DOTS client SHOULD use a "Connection Attempt Delay" [RFC8305] set to 100 ms.

In reference to Figure 4, the DOTS client proceeds with the connection attempts following the rules in [RFC8305]. In this example, it is assumed that the IPv6 path is broken and UDP traffic is dropped by a middlebox but has little impact to the DOTS client because there is no long delay before using IPv4 and TCP.



Note:

- * Retransmission messages are not shown.
- * $T1-T0=T2-T1=T3-T2=$ Connection Attempt Delay.

Figure 4: DOTS Happy Eyeballs (Sample Flow)

A single DOTS signal channel between DOTS agents can be used to exchange multiple DOTS signal messages. To reduce DOTS client and DOTS server workload, DOTS clients SHOULD re-use the (D)TLS session.

4.4. DOTS Mitigation Methods

The following methods are used by a DOTS client to request, withdraw, or retrieve the status of mitigation requests:

PUT: DOTS clients use the PUT method to request mitigation from a DOTS server (Section 4.4.1). During active mitigation, DOTS clients may use PUT requests to carry mitigation efficacy updates to the DOTS server (Section 4.4.3).

GET: DOTS clients may use the GET method to subscribe to DOTS server status messages, or to retrieve the list of its mitigations maintained by a DOTS server (Section 4.4.2).

DELETE: DOTS clients use the DELETE method to withdraw a request for mitigation from a DOTS server (Section 4.4.4).

Mitigation request and response messages are marked as Non-confirmable messages (Section 2.2 of [RFC7252]).

DOTS agents MUST NOT send more than one UDP datagram per round-trip time (RTT) to the peer DOTS agent on average following the data transmission guidelines discussed in Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8085].

Requests marked by the DOTS client as Non-confirmable messages are sent at regular intervals until a response is received from the DOTS server. If the DOTS client cannot maintain an RTT estimate, it MUST NOT send more than one Non-confirmable request every 3 seconds, and SHOULD use an even less aggressive rate whenever possible (case 2 in Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8085]). Mitigation requests MUST NOT be delayed because of checks on probing rate (Section 4.7 of [RFC7252]).

JSON encoding of YANG modelled data [RFC7951] is used to illustrate the various methods defined in the following sub-sections. Also, the examples use the Labels defined in Sections 9.6.2, 9.6.3, 9.6.4, and 9.6.5.

4.4.1. Request Mitigation

When a DOTS client requires mitigation for some reason, the DOTS client uses the CoAP PUT method to send a mitigation request to its DOTS server(s) (Figures 5 and 6).

If a DOTS client is entitled to solicit the DOTS service, the DOTS server enables mitigation on behalf of the DOTS client by communicating the DOTS client's request to a mitigator (which may be co-located with the DOTS server) and relaying the feedback of the thus-selected mitigator to the requesting DOTS client.

```
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "mid=123"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"

{
  ...
}
```

Figure 5: PUT to Convey DOTS Mitigation Requests

The order of the Uri-Path options is important as it defines the CoAP resource. In particular, 'mid' MUST follow 'cuid'.

The additional Uri-Path parameters to those defined in Section 4.2 are as follows:

cuid: Stands for Client Unique Identifier. A globally unique identifier that is meant to prevent collisions among DOTS clients, especially those from the same domain. It MUST be generated by DOTS clients.

For the reasons discussed in Appendix A, implementations SHOULD set 'cuid' using the following procedure: first, the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)-encoded Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) representation of the Subject Public Key Info (SPKI) of the DOTS client X.509 certificate [RFC5280], the DOTS client raw public key [RFC7250], the "Pre-Shared Key (PSK) identity" used by the DOTS client in the TLS 1.2 ClientKeyExchange message, or the "identity" used by the DOTS client in the "pre_shared_key" TLS 1.3 extension is input to the SHA-256 [RFC6234] cryptographic hash. Then, the output of the cryptographic hash algorithm is truncated to 16 bytes; truncation is done by stripping off the final 16 bytes. The truncated output is base64url encoded (Section 5 of [RFC4648]) with the trailing "=" removed from the encoding, and the resulting value used as the 'cuid'.

The 'cuid' is intended to be stable when communicating with a given DOTS server, i.e., the 'cuid' used by a DOTS client SHOULD NOT change over time. Distinct 'cuid' values MAY be used by a single DOTS client per DOTS server.

If a DOTS client has to change its 'cuid' for some reason, it MUST NOT do so when mitigations are still active for the old

'cuid'. The 'cuid' SHOULD be 22 characters to avoid DOTS signal message fragmentation over UDP. Furthermore, if that DOTS client created aliases and filtering entries at the DOTS server by means of the DOTS data channel, it MUST delete all the entries bound to the old 'cuid' and re-install them using the new 'cuid'.

DOTS servers MUST return 4.09 (Conflict) error code to a DOTS peer to notify that the 'cuid' is already in-use by another DOTS client. Upon receipt of that error code, a new 'cuid' MUST be generated by the DOTS peer (e.g., using [RFC4122]).

Client-domain DOTS gateways MUST handle 'cuid' collision directly and it is RECOMMENDED that 'cuid' collision is handled directly by server-domain DOTS gateways.

DOTS gateways MAY rewrite the 'cuid' used by peer DOTS clients. Triggers for such rewriting are out of scope.

This is a mandatory Uri-Path parameter.

mid: Identifier for the mitigation request represented with an integer. This identifier MUST be unique for each mitigation request bound to the DOTS client, i.e., the 'mid' parameter value in the mitigation request needs to be unique (per 'cuid' and DOTS server) relative to the 'mid' parameter values of active mitigation requests conveyed from the DOTS client to the DOTS server.

In order to handle out-of-order delivery of mitigation requests, 'mid' values MUST increase monotonically.

If the 'mid' value has reached $3/4$ of $(2^{32} - 1)$ (i.e., 3221225471) and no attack is detected, the DOTS client MUST reset 'mid' to 0 to handle 'mid' rollover. If the DOTS client maintains mitigation requests with pre-configured scopes, it MUST re-create them with the 'mid' restarting at 0.

This identifier MUST be generated by the DOTS client.

This is a mandatory Uri-Path parameter.

'cuid' and 'mid' MUST NOT appear in the PUT request message body (Figure 6). The schema in Figure 6 uses the types defined in Section 6. Note that this figure (and other similar figures depicting a schema) are non-normative sketches of the structure of the message.

```

{
  "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
    "scope": [
      {
        "target-prefix": [
          "string"
        ],
        "target-port-range": [
          {
            "lower-port": number,
            "upper-port": number
          }
        ],
        "target-protocol": [
          number
        ],
        "target-fqdn": [
          "string"
        ],
        "target-uri": [
          "string"
        ],
        "alias-name": [
          "string"
        ],
        "lifetime": number,
        "trigger-mitigation": true|false
      }
    ]
  }
}

```

Figure 6: PUT to Convey DOTS Mitigation Requests (Message Body Schema)

The parameters in the CBOR body (Figure 6) of the PUT request are described below:

target-prefix: A list of prefixes identifying resources under attack. Prefixes are represented using Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) notation [RFC4632]. As a reminder, the prefix length must be less than or equal to 32 (or 128) for IPv4 (or IPv6).

The prefix list **MUST NOT** include broadcast, loopback, or multicast addresses. These addresses are considered as invalid values. In addition, the DOTS server **MUST** validate that target prefixes are

within the scope of the DOTS client domain. Other validation checks may be supported by DOTS servers.

This is an optional attribute.

target-port-range: A list of port numbers bound to resources under attack.

A port range is defined by two bounds, a lower port number (lower-port) and an upper port number (upper-port). When only 'lower-port' is present, it represents a single port number.

For TCP, UDP, Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) [RFC4960], or Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP) [RFC4340], a range of ports can be, for example, 0-1023, 1024-65535, or 1024-49151.

This is an optional attribute.

target-protocol: A list of protocols involved in an attack. Values are taken from the IANA protocol registry [proto_numbers].

If 'target-protocol' is not specified, then the request applies to any protocol.

This is an optional attribute.

target-fqdn: A list of Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs) identifying resources under attack [RFC8499].

How a name is passed to an underlying name resolution library is implementation- and deployment-specific. Nevertheless, once the name is resolved into one or multiple IP addresses, DOTS servers MUST apply the same validation checks as those for 'target-prefix'.

The use of FQDNs may be suboptimal because:

- * It induces both an extra load and increased delays on the DOTS server to handle and manage DNS resolution requests.
- * It does not guarantee that the DOTS server will resolve a name to the same IP addresses that the DOTS client does.

This is an optional attribute.

target-uri: A list of Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) [RFC3986] identifying resources under attack.

The same validation checks used for 'target-fqdn' MUST be followed by DOTS servers to validate a target URI.

This is an optional attribute.

alias-name: A list of aliases of resources for which the mitigation is requested. Aliases can be created using the DOTS data channel (Section 6.1 of [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel]), direct configuration, or other means.

An alias is used in subsequent signal channel exchanges to refer more efficiently to the resources under attack.

This is an optional attribute.

lifetime: Lifetime of the mitigation request in seconds. The RECOMMENDED lifetime of a mitigation request is 3600 seconds -- this value was chosen to be long enough so that refreshing is not typically a burden on the DOTS client, while still making the request expire in a timely manner when the client has unexpectedly quit. DOTS clients MUST include this parameter in their mitigation requests. Upon the expiry of this lifetime, and if the request is not refreshed, the mitigation request is removed. The request can be refreshed by sending the same request again.

A lifetime of '0' in a mitigation request is an invalid value.

A lifetime of negative one (-1) indicates indefinite lifetime for the mitigation request. The DOTS server MAY refuse indefinite lifetime, for policy reasons; the granted lifetime value is returned in the response. DOTS clients MUST be prepared to not be granted mitigations with indefinite lifetimes.

The DOTS server MUST always indicate the actual lifetime in the response and the remaining lifetime in status messages sent to the DOTS client.

This is a mandatory attribute.

trigger-mitigation: If the parameter value is set to 'false', DDoS mitigation will not be triggered for the mitigation request unless the DOTS signal channel session is lost.

If the DOTS client ceases to respond to heartbeat messages, the DOTS server can detect that the DOTS signal channel session is lost. More details are discussed in Section 4.7.

The default value of the parameter is 'true' (that is, the mitigation starts immediately). If 'trigger-mitigation' is not present in a request, this is equivalent to receiving a request with 'trigger-mitigation' set to 'true'.

This is an optional attribute.

In deployments where server-domain DOTS gateways are enabled, identity information about the origin source client domain ('cdid') SHOULD be propagated to the DOTS server. That information is meant to assist the DOTS server to enforce some policies such as grouping DOTS clients that belong to the same DOTS domain, limiting the number of DOTS requests, and identifying the mitigation scope. These policies can be enforced per-client, per-client domain, or both. Also, the identity information may be used for auditing and debugging purposes.

Figure 7 shows an example of a request relayed by a server-domain DOTS gateway.

```
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "cdid=7eeaf349529eb55ed50113"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "mid=123"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"

{
  ...
}
```

Figure 7: PUT for DOTS Mitigation Request as Relayed by a DOTS Gateway

A server-domain DOTS gateway SHOULD add the following Uri-Path parameter:

cdid: Stands for Client Domain Identifier. The 'cdid' is conveyed by a server-domain DOTS gateway to propagate the source domain identity from the gateway's client-facing-side to the gateway's server-facing-side, and from the gateway's server-facing-side to the DOTS server. 'cdid' may be used by the final DOTS server for policy enforcement purposes (e.g., enforce a quota on filtering rules). These policies are deployment-specific.

Server-domain DOTS gateways SHOULD support a configuration option to instruct whether 'cdid' parameter is to be inserted.

In order to accommodate deployments that require enforcing per-client policies, per-client domain policies, or a combination thereof, server-domain DOTS gateways instructed to insert the 'cdid' parameter MUST supply the SPKI hash of the DOTS client X.509 certificate, the DOTS client raw public key, or the hash of the "PSK identity" in the 'cdid', following the same rules for generating the hash conveyed in 'cuid', which is then used by the ultimate DOTS server to determine the corresponding client's domain. The 'cdid' generated by a server-domain gateway is likely to be the same as the 'cuid' except if the DOTS message was relayed by a client-domain DOTS gateway or the 'cuid' was generated from a rogue DOTS client.

If a DOTS client is provisioned, for example, with distinct certificates as a function of the peer server-domain DOTS gateway, distinct 'cdid' values may be supplied by a server-domain DOTS gateway. The ultimate DOTS server MUST treat those 'cdid' values as equivalent.

The 'cdid' attribute MUST NOT be generated and included by DOTS clients.

DOTS servers MUST ignore 'cdid' attributes that are directly supplied by source DOTS clients or client-domain DOTS gateways. This implies that first server-domain DOTS gateways MUST strip 'cdid' attributes supplied by DOTS clients. DOTS servers SHOULD support a configuration parameter to identify DOTS gateways that are trusted to supply 'cdid' attributes.

Only single-valued 'cdid' are defined in this document. That is, only the first on-path server-domain DOTS gateway can insert a 'cdid' value. This specification does not allow multiple server-domain DOTS gateways, whenever involved in the path, to insert a 'cdid' value for each server-domain gateway.

This is an optional Uri-Path. When present, 'cdid' MUST be positioned before 'cuid'.

A DOTS gateway SHOULD add the CoAP Hop-Limit Option [I-D.ietf-core-hop-limit].

Because of the complexity to handle partial failure cases, this specification does not allow for including multiple mitigation requests in the same PUT request. Concretely, a DOTS client MUST NOT

include multiple entries in the 'scope' array of the same PUT request.

FQDN and URI mitigation scopes may be thought of as a form of scope alias, in which the addresses associated with the domain name or URI (as resolved by the DOTS server) represent the scope of the mitigation. Particularly, the IP addresses to which the host subcomponent of authority component of an URI resolves represent the 'target-prefix', the URI scheme represents the 'target-protocol', the port subcomponent of authority component of an URI represents the 'target-port-range'. If the optional port information is not present in the authority component, the default port defined for the URI scheme represents the 'target-port'.

In the PUT request at least one of the attributes 'target-prefix', 'target-fqdn', 'target-uri', or 'alias-name' MUST be present.

Attributes and Uri-Path parameters with empty values MUST NOT be present in a request and render the entire request invalid.

Figure 8 shows a PUT request example to signal that TCP port numbers 80, 8080, and 443 used by 2001:db8:6401::1 and 2001:db8:6401::2 servers are under attack. The presence of 'cdid' indicates that a server-domain DOTS gateway has modified the initial PUT request sent by the DOTS client. Note that 'cdid' MUST NOT appear in the PUT request message body.

```
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "cdid=7eeaf349529eb55ed50113"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "mid=123"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"

{
  "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
    "scope": [
      {
        "target-prefix": [
          "2001:db8:6401::1/128",
          "2001:db8:6401::2/128"
        ],
        "target-port-range": [
          {
            "lower-port": 80
          },
          {
            "lower-port": 443
          },
          {
            "lower-port": 8080
          }
        ],
        "target-protocol": [
          6
        ],
        "lifetime": 3600
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

Figure 8: PUT for DOTS Mitigation Request (An Example)

The corresponding CBOR encoding format for the payload is shown in Figure 9.

```

A1          # map(1)
  01        # unsigned(1)
    A1      # map(1)
      02    # unsigned(2)
        81  # array(1)
          A3 # map(3)
            06 # unsigned(6)
              82 # array(2)
                74 # text(20)
                  323030313A6462383A363430313A3A312F313238
                    74 # text(20)
                      323030313A6462383A363430313A3A322F313238
                        07 # unsigned(7)
                          83 # array(3)
                            A1 # map(1)
                              08 # unsigned(8)
                                18 50 # unsigned(80)
                                  A1 # map(1)
                                    08 # unsigned(8)
                                      19 01BB # unsigned(443)
                                        A1 # map(1)
                                          08 # unsigned(8)
                                            19 1F90 # unsigned(8080)
                                              0A # unsigned(10)
                                                81 # array(1)
                                                  06 # unsigned(6)
                                                    0E # unsigned(14)
                                                      19 0E10 # unsigned(3600)

```

Figure 9: PUT for DOTS Mitigation Request (CBOR)

In both DOTS signal and data channel sessions, the DOTS client MUST authenticate itself to the DOTS server (Section 8). The DOTS server MAY use the algorithm presented in Section 7 of [RFC7589] to derive the DOTS client identity or username from the client certificate. The DOTS client identity allows the DOTS server to accept mitigation requests with scopes that the DOTS client is authorized to manage.

The DOTS server couples the DOTS signal and data channel sessions using the DOTS client identity and optionally the 'cdid' parameter value, so the DOTS server can validate whether the aliases conveyed in the mitigation request were indeed created by the same DOTS client using the DOTS data channel session. If the aliases were not created by the DOTS client, the DOTS server MUST return 4.00 (Bad Request) in the response.

The DOTS server couples the DOTS signal channel sessions using the DOTS client identity and optionally the 'cdid' parameter value, and

the DOTS server uses 'mid' and 'cuid' Uri-Path parameter values to detect duplicate mitigation requests. If the mitigation request contains the 'alias-name' and other parameters identifying the target resources (such as 'target-prefix', 'target-port-range', 'target-fqdn', or 'target-uri'), the DOTS server appends the parameter values in 'alias-name' with the corresponding parameter values in 'target-prefix', 'target-port-range', 'target-fqdn', or 'target-uri'.

The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the PUT request using CoAP response codes. CoAP 2.xx codes are success. CoAP 4.xx codes are some sort of invalid requests (client errors). CoAP 5.xx codes are returned if the DOTS server is in an error state or is currently unavailable to provide mitigation in response to the mitigation request from the DOTS client.

Figure 10 shows an example response to a PUT request that is successfully processed by a DOTS server (i.e., CoAP 2.xx response codes). This version of the specification forbids 'cuid' and 'cdid' (if used) to be returned in a response message body.

```
{
  "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
    "scope": [
      {
        "mid": 123,
        "lifetime": 3600
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

Figure 10: 2.xx Response Body

If the request is missing a mandatory attribute, does not include 'cuid' or 'mid' Uri-Path options, includes multiple 'scope' parameters, or contains invalid or unknown parameters, the DOTS server MUST reply with 4.00 (Bad Request). DOTS agents can safely ignore comprehension-optional parameters they don't understand (Section 9.6.1.1).

A DOTS server that receives a mitigation request with a lifetime set to '0' MUST reply with a 4.00 (Bad Request).

If the DOTS server does not find the 'mid' parameter value conveyed in the PUT request in its configuration data, it MAY accept the mitigation request by sending back a 2.01 (Created) response to the DOTS client; the DOTS server will consequently try to mitigate the attack. A DOTS server could reject mitigation requests when it is

near capacity or needs to rate-limit a particular client, for example.

The relative order of two mitigation requests, having the same 'trigger-mitigation' type, from a DOTS client is determined by comparing their respective 'mid' values. If two mitigation requests with the same 'trigger-mitigation' type have overlapping mitigation scopes, the mitigation request with the highest numeric 'mid' value will override the other mitigation request. Two mitigation requests from a DOTS client have overlapping scopes if there is a common IP address, IP prefix, FQDN, URI, or alias-name. To avoid maintaining a long list of overlapping mitigation requests (i.e., requests with the same 'trigger-mitigation' type and overlapping scopes) from a DOTS client and avoid error-prone provisioning of mitigation requests from a DOTS client, the overlapped lower numeric 'mid' MUST be automatically deleted and no longer available at the DOTS server. For example, if the DOTS server receives a mitigation request which overlaps with an existing mitigation with a higher numeric 'mid', the DOTS server rejects the request by returning 4.09 (Conflict) to the DOTS client. The response includes enough information for a DOTS client to recognize the source of the conflict as described below in the 'conflict-information' subtree with only the relevant nodes listed:

conflict-information: Indicates that a mitigation request is conflicting with another mitigation request. This optional attribute has the following structure:

conflict-cause: Indicates the cause of the conflict. The following values are defined:

- 1: Overlapping targets. 'conflict-scope' provides more details about the conflicting target clauses.

conflict-scope: Characterizes the exact conflict scope. It may include a list of IP addresses, a list of prefixes, a list of port numbers, a list of target protocols, a list of FQDNs, a list of URIs, a list of alias-names, or a 'mid'.

If the DOTS server receives a mitigation request which overlaps with an active mitigation request, but both having distinct 'trigger-mitigation' types, the DOTS server SHOULD deactivate (absent explicit policy/configuration otherwise) the mitigation request with 'trigger-mitigation' set to false. Particularly, if the mitigation request with 'trigger-mitigation' set to false is active, the DOTS server withdraws the mitigation request (i.e., status code is set to '7' as defined in Table 2) and transitions the status of the mitigation request to '8'.

Upon DOTS signal channel session loss with a peer DOTS client, the DOTS server SHOULD withdraw (absent explicit policy/configuration otherwise) any active mitigation requests overlapping with mitigation requests having 'trigger-mitigation' set to false from that DOTS client, as the loss of the session implicitly activates these preconfigured mitigation requests and they take precedence. Note that active-but-terminating period is not observed for mitigations withdrawn at the initiative of the DOTS server.

DOTS clients may adopt various strategies for setting the scopes of immediate and pre-configured mitigation requests to avoid potential conflicts. For example, a DOTS client may tweak pre-configured scopes so that the scope of any overlapping immediate mitigation request will be a subset of the pre-configured scopes. Also, if an immediate mitigation request overlaps with any of the pre-configured scopes, the DOTS client sets the scope of the overlapping immediate mitigation request to be a subset of the pre-configured scopes, so as to get a broad mitigation when the DOTS signal channel collapses and maximize the chance of recovery.

If the request is conflicting with an existing mitigation request from a different DOTS client, the DOTS server may return 2.01 (Created) or 4.09 (Conflict) to the requesting DOTS client. If the DOTS server decides to maintain the new mitigation request, the DOTS server returns 2.01 (Created) to the requesting DOTS client. If the DOTS server decides to reject the new mitigation request, the DOTS server returns 4.09 (Conflict) to the requesting DOTS client. For both 2.01 (Created) and 4.09 (Conflict) responses, the response includes enough information for a DOTS client to recognize the source of the conflict as described below:

conflict-information: Indicates that a mitigation request is conflicting with another mitigation request(s) from other DOTS client(s). This optional attribute has the following structure:

conflict-status: Indicates the status of a conflicting mitigation request. The following values are defined:

- 1: DOTS server has detected conflicting mitigation requests from different DOTS clients. This mitigation request is currently inactive until the conflicts are resolved. Another mitigation request is active.
- 2: DOTS server has detected conflicting mitigation requests from different DOTS clients. This mitigation request is currently active.

- 3: DOTS server has detected conflicting mitigation requests from different DOTS clients. All conflicting mitigation requests are inactive.

conflict-cause: Indicates the cause of the conflict. The following values are defined:

- 1: Overlapping targets. 'conflict-scope' provides more details about the conflicting target clauses.
- 2: Conflicts with an existing accept-list. This code is returned when the DDoS mitigation detects source addresses/prefixes in the accept-listed ACLs are attacking the target.
- 3: CUID Collision. This code is returned when a DOTS client uses a 'cuid' that is already used by another DOTS client. This code is an indication that the request has been rejected and a new request with a new 'cuid' is to be re-sent by the DOTS client (see the example shown in Figure 11). Note that 'conflict-status', 'conflict-scope', and 'retry-timer' MUST NOT be returned in the error response.

conflict-scope: Characterizes the exact conflict scope. It may include a list of IP addresses, a list of prefixes, a list of port numbers, a list of target protocols, a list of FQDNs, a list of URIs, a list of alias-names, or references to conflicting ACLs (by an 'acl-name', typically [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel]).

retry-timer: Indicates, in seconds, the time after which the DOTS client may re-issue the same request. The DOTS server returns 'retry-timer' only to DOTS client(s) for which a mitigation request is deactivated. Any retransmission of the same mitigation request before the expiry of this timer is likely to be rejected by the DOTS server for the same reasons.

The retry-timer SHOULD be equal to the lifetime of the active mitigation request resulting in the deactivation of the conflicting mitigation request.

If the DOTS server decides to maintain a state for the deactivated mitigation request, the DOTS server updates the lifetime of the deactivated mitigation request to 'retry-timer + 45 seconds' (that is, this mitigation request remains deactivated for the entire duration of 'retry-timer + 45 seconds') so that the DOTS client can refresh the deactivated

mitigation request after 'retry-timer' seconds, but before the expiry of the lifetime, and check if the conflict is resolved.

```
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "cuid=7eeaf349529eb55ed50113"
Uri-Path: "mid=12"
```

(1) Request with a conflicting 'cuid'

```
{
  "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
    "scope": [
      {
        "conflict-information": {
          "conflict-cause": "cuid-collision"
        }
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

(2) Message body of the 4.09 (Conflict) response from the DOTS server

```
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "cuid=f30d281ce6b64fc5a0b91e"
Uri-Path: "mid=12"
```

(3) Request with a new 'cuid'

Figure 11: Example of Generating a New 'cuid'

As an active attack evolves, DOTS clients can adjust the scope of requested mitigation as necessary, by refining the scope of resources requiring mitigation. This can be achieved by sending a PUT request with a new 'mid' value that will override the existing one with overlapping mitigation scopes.

For a mitigation request to continue beyond the initial negotiated lifetime, the DOTS client has to refresh the current mitigation request by sending a new PUT request. This PUT request MUST use the same 'mid' value, and MUST repeat all the other parameters as sent in

the original mitigation request apart from a possible change to the lifetime parameter value. In such case, the DOTS server MAY update the mitigation request, and a 2.04 (Changed) response is returned to indicate a successful update of the mitigation request. If this is not the case, the DOTS server MUST reject the request with a 4.00 (Bad Request).

4.4.2. Retrieve Information Related to a Mitigation

A GET request is used by a DOTS client to retrieve information (including status) of DOTS mitigations from a DOTS server.

'cuid' is a mandatory Uri-Path parameter for GET requests.

Uri-Path parameters with empty values MUST NOT be present in a request.

The same considerations for manipulating 'cdid' parameter by server-domain DOTS gateways specified in Section 4.4.1 MUST be followed for GET requests.

The 'c' Uri-Query option is used to control selection of configuration and non-configuration data nodes. Concretely, the 'c' (content) parameter and its permitted values defined in the following table [I-D.ietf-core-comi] can be used to retrieve non-configuration data (attack mitigation status), configuration data, or both. The DOTS server MAY support this optional filtering capability. It can safely ignore it if not supported. If the DOTS client supports the optional filtering capability, it SHOULD use "c=n" query (to get back only the dynamically changing data) or "c=c" query (to get back the static configuration values) when the DDoS attack is active to limit the size of the response.

Value	Description
c	Return only configuration descendant data nodes
n	Return only non-configuration descendant data nodes
a	Return all descendant data nodes

The DOTS client can use Block-wise transfer [RFC7959] to get the list of all its mitigations maintained by a DOTS server, it can send Block2 Option in a GET request with NUM = 0 to aid in limiting the size of the response. If the representation of all the active mitigation requests associated with the DOTS client does not fit within a single datagram, the DOTS server MUST use the Block2 Option with NUM = 0 in the GET response. The Size2 Option may be conveyed

in the response to indicate the total size of the resource representation. The DOTS client retrieves the rest of the representation by sending additional GET requests with Block2 Options containing NUM values greater than zero. The DOTS client MUST adhere to the block size preferences indicated by the DOTS server in the response. If the DOTS server uses the Block2 Option in the GET response and the response is for a dynamically changing resource (e.g., "c=n" or "c=a" query), the DOTS server MUST include the ETag Option in the response. The DOTS client MUST include the same ETag value in subsequent GET requests to retrieve the rest of the representation.

The following examples illustrate how a DOTS client retrieves active mitigation requests from a DOTS server. In particular:

- o Figure 12 shows the example of a GET request to retrieve all DOTS mitigation requests signaled by a DOTS client.
- o Figure 13 shows the example of a GET request to retrieve a specific DOTS mitigation request signaled by a DOTS client. The configuration data to be reported in the response is formatted in the same order as was processed by the DOTS server in the original mitigation request.

These two examples assume the default of "c=a"; that is, the DOTS client asks for all data to be reported by the DOTS server.

```
Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Observe: 0
```

Figure 12: GET to Retrieve all DOTS Mitigation Requests

```
Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "mid=12332"
Observe: 0
```

Figure 13: GET to Retrieve a Specific DOTS Mitigation Request

If the DOTS server does not find the 'mid' Uri-Path value conveyed in the GET request in its configuration data for the requesting DOTS

client, it MUST respond with a 4.04 (Not Found) error response code. Likewise, the same error MUST be returned as a response to a request to retrieve all mitigation records (i.e., 'mid' Uri-Path is not defined) of a given DOTS client if the DOTS server does not find any mitigation record for that DOTS client. As a reminder, a DOTS client is identified by its identity (e.g., client certificate, 'cuid') and optionally the 'cdid'.

Figure 14 shows a response example of all active mitigation requests associated with the DOTS client as maintained by the DOTS server. The response indicates the mitigation status of each mitigation request.

```

{
  "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
    "scope": [
      {
        "mid": 12332,
        "mitigation-start": "1507818434",
        "target-prefix": [
          "2001:db8:6401::1/128",
          "2001:db8:6401::2/128"
        ],
        "target-protocol": [
          17
        ],
        "lifetime": 1756,
        "status": "attack-successfully-mitigated",
        "bytes-dropped": "134334555",
        "bps-dropped": "43344",
        "pkts-dropped": "333334444",
        "pps-dropped": "432432"
      },
      {
        "mid": 12333,
        "mitigation-start": "1507818393",
        "target-prefix": [
          "2001:db8:6401::1/128",
          "2001:db8:6401::2/128"
        ],
        "target-protocol": [
          6
        ],
        "lifetime": 1755,
        "status": "attack-stopped",
        "bytes-dropped": "0",
        "bps-dropped": "0",
        "pkts-dropped": "0",
        "pps-dropped": "0"
      }
    ]
  }
}

```

Figure 14: Response Body to a GET Request

The mitigation status parameters are described below:

mitigation-start: Mitigation start time is expressed in seconds relative to 1970-01-01T00:00Z in UTC time (Section 2.4.1 of

[RFC7049]). The CBOR encoding is modified so that the leading tag 1 (epoch-based date/time) MUST be omitted.

This is a mandatory attribute when an attack mitigation is active. Particularly, 'mitigation-start' is not returned for a mitigation with 'status' code set to 8.

lifetime: The remaining lifetime of the mitigation request, in seconds.

This is a mandatory attribute.

status: Status of attack mitigation. The various possible values of 'status' parameter are explained in Table 2.

This is a mandatory attribute.

bytes-dropped: The total dropped byte count for the mitigation request since the attack mitigation is triggered. The count wraps around when it reaches the maximum value of unsigned integer64.

This is an optional attribute.

bps-dropped: The average number of dropped bytes per second for the mitigation request since the attack mitigation is triggered. This average SHOULD be over five-minute intervals (that is, measuring bytes into five-minute buckets and then averaging these buckets over the time since the mitigation was triggered).

This is an optional attribute.

pkts-dropped: The total number of dropped packet count for the mitigation request since the attack mitigation is triggered. The count wraps around when it reaches the maximum value of unsigned integer64.

This is an optional attribute.

pps-dropped: The average number of dropped packets per second for the mitigation request since the attack mitigation is triggered. This average SHOULD be over five-minute intervals (that is, measuring packets into five-minute buckets and then averaging these buckets over the time since the mitigation was triggered).

This is an optional attribute.

Parameter Value	Description
1	Attack mitigation setup is in progress (e.g., changing the network path to redirect the inbound traffic to a DOTS mitigator).
2	Attack is being successfully mitigated (e.g., traffic is redirected to a DDoS mitigator and attack traffic is dropped).
3	Attack has stopped and the DOTS client can withdraw the mitigation request. This status code will be transmitted for immediate mitigation requests till the mitigation is withdrawn or the lifetime expires. For mitigation requests with pre-configured scopes (i.e., 'trigger-mitigation' set to 'false'), this status code will be transmitted 4 times and then transition to "8".
4	Attack has exceeded the mitigation provider capability.
5	DOTS client has withdrawn the mitigation request and the mitigation is active but terminating.
6	Attack mitigation is now terminated.
7	Attack mitigation is withdrawn (by the DOTS server). If a mitigation request with 'trigger-mitigation' set to false is withdrawn because it overlaps with an immediate mitigation request, this status code will be transmitted 4 times and then transition to "8" for the mitigation request with pre-configured scopes.
8	Attack mitigation will be triggered for the mitigation request only when the DOTS signal channel session is lost.

Table 2: Values of 'status' Parameter

4.4.2.1. DOTS Servers Sending Mitigation Status

The Observe Option defined in [RFC7641] extends the CoAP core protocol with a mechanism for a CoAP client to "observe" a resource on a CoAP server: The client retrieves a representation of the

resource and requests this representation be updated by the server as long as the client is interested in the resource. DOTS implementations MUST use the Observe Option for both 'mitigate' and 'config' (Section 4.2).

A DOTS client conveys the Observe Option set to '0' in the GET request to receive asynchronous notifications of attack mitigation status from the DOTS server.

Unidirectional mitigation notifications within the bidirectional signal channel enables asynchronous notifications between the agents. [RFC7641] indicates that (1) a notification can be sent in a Confirmable or a Non-confirmable message, and (2) the message type used is typically application-dependent and may be determined by the server for each notification individually. For DOTS server application, the message type MUST always be set to Non-confirmable even if the underlying COAP library elects a notification to be sent in a Confirmable message. This overrides the behavior defined in Section 4.5 of [RFC7641] to send a Confirmable message instead of a Non-confirmable message at least every 24 hour for the following reasons: First, the DOTS signal channel uses a heartbeat mechanism to determine if the DOTS client is alive. Second, Confirmable messages are not suitable during an attack.

Due to the higher likelihood of packet loss during a DDoS attack, the DOTS server periodically sends attack mitigation status to the DOTS client and also notifies the DOTS client whenever the status of the attack mitigation changes. If the DOTS server cannot maintain an RTT estimate, it MUST NOT send more than one asynchronous notification every 3 seconds, and SHOULD use an even less aggressive rate whenever possible (case 2 in Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8085]).

When conflicting requests are detected, the DOTS server enforces the corresponding policy (e.g., accept all requests, reject all requests, accept only one request but reject all the others, ...). It is assumed that this policy is supplied by the DOTS server administrator or it is a default behavior of the DOTS server implementation. Then, the DOTS server sends notification message(s) to the DOTS client(s) at the origin of the conflict (refer to the conflict parameters defined in Section 4.4.1). A conflict notification message includes information about the conflict cause, scope, and the status of the mitigation request(s). For example,

- o A notification message with 'status' code set to '7 (Attack mitigation is withdrawn)' and 'conflict-status' set to '1' is sent to a DOTS client to indicate that an active mitigation request is deactivated because a conflict is detected.

- o A notification message with 'status' code set to '1 (Attack mitigation is in progress)' and 'conflict-status' set to '2' is sent to a DOTS client to indicate that this mitigation request is in progress, but a conflict is detected.

Upon receipt of a conflict notification message indicating that a mitigation request is deactivated because of a conflict, a DOTS client MUST NOT resend the same mitigation request before the expiry of 'retry-timer'. It is also recommended that DOTS clients support means to alert administrators about mitigation conflicts.

A DOTS client that is no longer interested in receiving notifications from the DOTS server can simply "forget" the observation. When the DOTS server sends the next notification, the DOTS client will not recognize the token in the message and thus will return a Reset message. This causes the DOTS server to remove the associated entry. Alternatively, the DOTS client can explicitly deregister itself by issuing a GET request that has the Token field set to the token of the observation to be cancelled and includes an Observe Option with the value set to '1' (deregister). The latter is more deterministic and thus is RECOMMENDED.

Figure 15 shows an example of a DOTS client requesting a DOTS server to send notifications related to a mitigation request. Note that for mitigations with pre-configured scopes (i.e., 'trigger-mitigation' set to 'false'), the state will need to transition from 3 (attack-stopped) to 8 (attack-mitigation-signal-loss).




Figure 15: Notifications of Attack Mitigation Status

4.4.2.2. DOTS Clients Polling for Mitigation Status

The DOTS client can send the GET request at frequent intervals without the Observe Option to retrieve the configuration data of the mitigation request and non-configuration data (i.e., the attack status). DOTS clients MAY be configured with a policy indicating the frequency of polling DOTS servers to get the mitigation status. This frequency MUST NOT be more than one UDP datagram per RTT as discussed in Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8085].

If the DOTS server has been able to mitigate the attack and the attack has stopped, the DOTS server indicates as such in the status. In such case, the DOTS client recalls the mitigation request by issuing a DELETE request for this mitigation request (Section 4.4.4).

A DOTS client SHOULD react to the status of the attack as per the information sent by the DOTS server rather than performing its own

detection that the attack has been mitigated. This ensures that the DOTS client does not recall a mitigation request prematurely because it is possible that the DOTS client does not sense the DDoS attack on its resources, but the DOTS server could be actively mitigating the attack because the attack is not completely averted.

4.4.3. Efficacy Update from DOTS Clients

While DDoS mitigation is in progress, due to the likelihood of packet loss, a DOTS client MAY periodically transmit DOTS mitigation efficacy updates to the relevant DOTS server. A PUT request is used to convey the mitigation efficacy update to the DOTS server. This PUT request is treated as a refresh of the current mitigation.

The PUT request used for efficacy update MUST include all the parameters used in the PUT request to carry the DOTS mitigation request (Section 4.4.1) unchanged apart from the 'lifetime' parameter value. If this is not the case, the DOTS server MUST reject the request with a 4.00 (Bad Request).

The If-Match Option (Section 5.10.8.1 of [RFC7252]) with an empty value is used to make the PUT request conditional on the current existence of the mitigation request. If UDP is used as transport, CoAP requests may arrive out-of-order. For example, the DOTS client may send a PUT request to convey an efficacy update to the DOTS server followed by a DELETE request to withdraw the mitigation request, but the DELETE request arrives at the DOTS server before the PUT request. To handle out-of-order delivery of requests, if an If-Match Option is present in the PUT request and the 'mid' in the request matches a mitigation request from that DOTS client, the request is processed by the DOTS server. If no match is found, the PUT request is silently ignored by the DOTS server.

An example of an efficacy update message, which includes an If-Match Option with an empty value, is depicted in Figure 16.

```

Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "mid=123"
If-Match:
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"

{
  "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
    "scope": [
      {
        "target-prefix": [
          "2001:db8:6401::1/128",
          "2001:db8:6401::2/128"
        ],
        "target-port-range": [
          {
            "lower-port": 80
          },
          {
            "lower-port": 443
          },
          {
            "lower-port": 8080
          }
        ],
        "target-protocol": [
          6
        ],
        "attack-status": "under-attack"
      }
    ]
  }
}

```

Figure 16: An Example of Efficacy Update

The 'attack-status' parameter is a mandatory attribute when performing an efficacy update. The various possible values contained in the 'attack-status' parameter are described in Table 3.

Parameter value	Description
1	The DOTS client determines that it is still under attack.
2	The DOTS client determines that the attack is successfully mitigated (e.g., attack traffic is not seen).

Table 3: Values of 'attack-status' Parameter

The DOTS server indicates the result of processing a PUT request using CoAP response codes. The response code 2.04 (Changed) is returned if the DOTS server has accepted the mitigation efficacy update. The error response code 5.03 (Service Unavailable) is returned if the DOTS server has erred or is incapable of performing the mitigation. As specified in [RFC7252], 5.03 uses Max-Age option to indicate the number of seconds after which to retry.

4.4.4. Withdraw a Mitigation

DELETE requests are used to withdraw DOTS mitigation requests from DOTS servers (Figure 17).

'cuid' and 'mid' are mandatory Uri-Path parameters for DELETE requests.

The same considerations for manipulating 'cdid' parameter by DOTS gateways, as specified in Section 4.4.1, MUST be followed for DELETE requests. Uri-Path parameters with empty values MUST NOT be present in a request.

```
Header: DELETE (Code=0.04)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "mid=123"
```

Figure 17: Withdraw a DOTS Mitigation

If the DELETE request does not include 'cuid' and 'mid' parameters, the DOTS server MUST reply with a 4.00 (Bad Request).

Once the request is validated, the DOTS server immediately acknowledges a DOTS client's request to withdraw the DOTS signal using 2.02 (Deleted) response code with no response payload. A 2.02 (Deleted) Response Code is returned even if the 'mid' parameter value conveyed in the DELETE request does not exist in its configuration data before the request.

If the DOTS server finds the 'mid' parameter value conveyed in the DELETE request in its configuration data for the DOTS client, then to protect against route or DNS flapping caused by a DOTS client rapidly removing a mitigation, and to dampen the effect of oscillating attacks, the DOTS server MAY allow mitigation to continue for a limited period after acknowledging a DOTS client's withdrawal of a mitigation request. During this period, the DOTS server status messages SHOULD indicate that mitigation is active but terminating (Section 4.4.2).

The initial active-but-terminating period SHOULD be sufficiently long to absorb latency incurred by route propagation. The active-but-terminating period SHOULD be set by default to 120 seconds. If the client requests mitigation again before the initial active-but-terminating period elapses, the DOTS server MAY exponentially increase (the base of the exponent is 2) the active-but-terminating period up to a maximum of 300 seconds (5 minutes).

Once the active-but-terminating period elapses, the DOTS server MUST treat the mitigation as terminated, as the DOTS client is no longer responsible for the mitigation.

If a mitigation is triggered due to a signal channel loss, the DOTS server relies upon normal triggers to stop that mitigation (typically, receipt of a valid DELETE request, expiry of the mitigation lifetime, or scrubbing the traffic to the attack target). In particular, the DOTS server MUST NOT consider the signal channel recovery as a trigger to stop the mitigation.

4.5. DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration

A DOTS client can negotiate, configure, and retrieve the DOTS signal channel session behavior with its DOTS peers. The DOTS signal channel can be used, for example, to configure the following:

- a. Heartbeat interval (heartbeat-interval): DOTS agents regularly send heartbeats to each other after mutual authentication is successfully completed in order to keep the DOTS signal channel open. Heartbeat messages are exchanged between DOTS agents every 'heartbeat-interval' seconds to detect the current status of the DOTS signal channel session.

- b. Missing heartbeats allowed (missing-hb-allowed): This variable indicates the maximum number of consecutive heartbeat messages for which a DOTS agent did not receive a response before concluding that the session is disconnected or defunct.
- c. Acceptable probing rate (probing-rate): This parameter indicates the average data rate that must not be exceeded by a DOTS agent in sending to a peer DOTS agent that does not respond.
- d. Acceptable signal loss ratio: Maximum retransmissions, retransmission timeout value, and other message transmission parameters for Confirmable messages over the DOTS signal channel.

When the DOTS signal channel is established over a reliable transport (e.g., TCP), there is no need for the reliability mechanisms provided by CoAP over UDP since the underlying TCP connection provides retransmissions and deduplication [RFC8323]. As a reminder, CoAP over reliable transports does not support Confirmable or Non-confirmable message types. As such, the transmission-related parameters (missing-hb-allowed and acceptable signal loss ratio) are negotiated only for DOTS over unreliable transports.

The same or distinct configuration sets may be used during times when a mitigation is active ('mitigating-config') and when no mitigation is active ('idle-config'). This is particularly useful for DOTS servers that might want to reduce heartbeat frequency or cease heartbeat exchanges when an active DOTS client has not requested mitigation. If distinct configurations are used, DOTS agents MUST follow the appropriate configuration set as a function of the mitigation activity (e.g., if no mitigation request is active (also referred to as 'idle' time), 'idle-config'-related values must be followed). Additionally, DOTS agents MUST automatically switch to the other configuration upon a change in the mitigation activity (e.g., if an attack mitigation is launched after an 'idle' time, the DOTS agent switches from 'idle-config' to 'mitigating-config'-related values).

CoAP Requests and responses are indicated for reliable delivery by marking them as Confirmable messages. DOTS signal channel session configuration requests and responses are marked as Confirmable messages. As explained in Section 2.1 of [RFC7252], a Confirmable message is retransmitted using a default timeout and exponential back-off between retransmissions, until the DOTS server sends an Acknowledgement message (ACK) with the same Message ID conveyed from the DOTS client.

Message transmission parameters are defined in Section 4.8 of [RFC7252]. The DOTS server can either piggyback the response in the

acknowledgement message or, if the DOTS server cannot respond immediately to a request carried in a Confirmable message, it simply responds with an Empty Acknowledgement message so that the DOTS client can stop retransmitting the request. Empty Acknowledgement messages are explained in Section 2.2 of [RFC7252]. When the response is ready, the server sends it in a new Confirmable message which in turn needs to be acknowledged by the DOTS client (see Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 of [RFC7252]). Requests and responses exchanged between DOTS agents during 'idle' time, except heartbeat messages, are marked as Confirmable messages.

Implementation Note: A DOTS client that receives a response in a Confirmable message may want to clean up the message state right after sending the ACK. If that ACK is lost and the DOTS server retransmits the Confirmable message, the DOTS client may no longer have any state that would help it correlate this response: from the DOTS client's standpoint, the retransmission message is unexpected. The DOTS client will send a Reset message so it does not receive any more retransmissions. This behavior is normal and not an indication of an error (see Section 5.3.2 of [RFC7252] for more details).

4.5.1. Discover Configuration Parameters

A GET request is used to obtain acceptable (e.g., minimum and maximum values) and current configuration parameters on the DOTS server for DOTS signal channel session configuration. This procedure occurs between a DOTS client and its immediate peer DOTS server. As such, this GET request MUST NOT be relayed by a DOTS gateway.

Figure 18 shows how to obtain configuration parameters that the DOTS server will find acceptable.

```
Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "config"
```

Figure 18: GET to Retrieve Configuration

The DOTS server in the 2.05 (Content) response conveys the current, minimum, and maximum attribute values acceptable by the DOTS server (Figure 19).

```
{
  "ietf-dots-signal-channel:signal-config": {
    "mitigating-config": {
      "heartbeat-interval": {
```

```
        "max-value": number,
        "min-value": number,
        "current-value": number
    },
    "missing-hb-allowed": {
        "max-value": number,
        "min-value": number,
        "current-value": number
    },
    "probing-rate": {
        "max-value": number,
        "min-value": number,
        "current-value": number
    },
    "max-retransmit": {
        "max-value": number,
        "min-value": number,
        "current-value": number
    },
    "ack-timeout": {
        "max-value-decimal": "string",
        "min-value-decimal": "string",
        "current-value-decimal": "string"
    },
    "ack-random-factor": {
        "max-value-decimal": "string",
        "min-value-decimal": "string",
        "current-value-decimal": "string"
    }
},
"idle-config": {
    "heartbeat-interval": {
        "max-value": number,
        "min-value": number,
        "current-value": number
    },
    "missing-hb-allowed": {
        "max-value": number,
        "min-value": number,
        "current-value": number
    },
    "probing-rate": {
        "max-value": number,
        "min-value": number,
        "current-value": number
    },
    "max-retransmit": {
        "max-value": number,
```

```
        "min-value": number,  
        "current-value": number  
    },  
    "ack-timeout": {  
        "max-value-decimal": "string",  
        "min-value-decimal": "string",  
        "current-value-decimal": "string"  
    },  
    "ack-random-factor": {  
        "max-value-decimal": "string",  
        "min-value-decimal": "string",  
        "current-value-decimal": "string"  
    }  
}  
}
```

Figure 19: GET Configuration Response Body Schema

The parameters in Figure 19 are described below:

mitigating-config: Set of configuration parameters to use when a mitigation is active. The following parameters may be included:

heartbeat-interval: Time interval in seconds between two consecutive heartbeat messages.

'0' is used to disable the heartbeat mechanism.

This is an optional attribute.

missing-hb-allowed: Maximum number of consecutive heartbeat messages for which the DOTS agent did not receive a response before concluding that the session is disconnected.

This is an optional attribute.

probing-rate: The average data rate that must not be exceeded by a DOTS agent in sending to a peer DOTS agent that does not respond (referred to as PROBING_RATE parameter in CoAP).

This is an optional attribute.

max-retransmit: Maximum number of retransmissions for a message (referred to as MAX_RETRANSMIT parameter in CoAP).

This is an optional attribute.

ack-timeout: Timeout value in seconds used to calculate the initial retransmission timeout value (referred to as ACK_TIMEOUT parameter in CoAP).

This is an optional attribute.

ack-random-factor: Random factor used to influence the timing of retransmissions (referred to as ACK_RANDOM_FACTOR parameter in CoAP).

This is an optional attribute.

idle-config: Set of configuration parameters to use when no mitigation is active. This attribute has the same structure as 'mitigating-config'.

Figure 20 shows an example of acceptable and current configuration parameters on a DOTS server for DOTS signal channel session configuration. The same acceptable configuration is used during mitigation and idle times.

```
{
  "ietf-dots-signal-channel:signal-config": {
    "mitigating-config": {
      "heartbeat-interval": {
        "max-value": 240,
        "min-value": 15,
        "current-value": 30
      },
      "missing-hb-allowed": {
        "max-value": 20,
        "min-value": 3,
        "current-value": 15
      },
      "probing-rate": {
        "max-value": 20,
        "min-value": 5,
        "current-value": 15
      },
      "max-retransmit": {
        "max-value": 15,
        "min-value": 2,
        "current-value": 3
      },
      "ack-timeout": {
        "max-value-decimal": "30.00",
        "min-value-decimal": "1.00",
        "current-value-decimal": "2.00"
      }
    }
  }
}
```

```
    },
    "ack-random-factor": {
      "max-value-decimal": "4.00",
      "min-value-decimal": "1.10",
      "current-value-decimal": "1.50"
    }
  },
  "idle-config": {
    "heartbeat-interval": {
      "max-value": 240,
      "min-value": 15,
      "current-value": 30
    },
    "missing-hb-allowed": {
      "max-value": 20,
      "min-value": 3,
      "current-value": 15
    },
    "probing-rate": {
      "max-value": 20,
      "min-value": 5,
      "current-value": 15
    },
    "max-retransmit": {
      "max-value": 15,
      "min-value": 2,
      "current-value": 3
    },
    "ack-timeout": {
      "max-value-decimal": "30.00",
      "min-value-decimal": "1.00",
      "current-value-decimal": "2.00"
    },
    "ack-random-factor": {
      "max-value-decimal": "4.00",
      "min-value-decimal": "1.10",
      "current-value-decimal": "1.50"
    }
  }
}
```

Figure 20: Example of a Configuration Response Body

4.5.2. Convey DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration

A PUT request (Figures 21 and 22) is used to convey the configuration parameters for the signal channel (e.g., heartbeat interval, maximum retransmissions). Message transmission parameters for CoAP are defined in Section 4.8 of [RFC7252]. The RECOMMENDED values of transmission parameter values are ack-timeout (2 seconds), max-retransmit (3), and ack-random-factor (1.5). In addition to those parameters, the RECOMMENDED specific DOTS transmission parameter values are 'heartbeat-interval' (30 seconds) and 'missing-hb-allowed' (15).

Note: heartbeat-interval should be tweaked to also assist DOTS messages for NAT traversal (SIG-011 of [RFC8612]). According to [RFC8085], heartbeat messages must not be sent more frequently than once every 15 seconds and should use longer intervals when possible. Furthermore, [RFC4787] recommends NATs to use a state timeout of 2 minutes or longer, but experience shows that sending packets every 15 to 30 seconds is necessary to prevent the majority of middleboxes from losing state for UDP flows. From that standpoint, the RECOMMENDED minimum heartbeat-interval is 15 seconds and the RECOMMENDED maximum heartbeat-interval is 240 seconds. The recommended value of 30 seconds is selected to anticipate the expiry of NAT state.

A heartbeat-interval of 30 seconds may be considered as too chatty in some deployments. For such deployments, DOTS agents may negotiate longer heartbeat-interval values to prevent any network overload with too frequent heartbeats.

Different heartbeat intervals can be defined for 'mitigating-config' and 'idle-config' to reduce being too chatty during idle times. If there is an on-path translator between the DOTS client (standalone or part of a DOTS gateway) and the DOTS server, the 'mitigating-config' heartbeat-interval has to be smaller than the translator session timeout. It is recommended that the 'idle-config' heartbeat-interval is also smaller than the translator session timeout to prevent translator traversal issues, or disabled entirely. Means to discover the lifetime assigned by a translator are out of scope.

Given that the size of the heartbeat request can not exceed (heartbeat-interval * probing-rate) bytes, probing-rate should be set appropriately to avoid slowing down heartbeat exchanges. For example, probing-rate may be set to $2 * (\text{"size of encrypted DOTS heartbeat request"} / \text{heartbeat-interval})$ or $(\text{"size of encrypted DOTS heartbeat request"} + \text{"average size of an encrypted mitigation request"}) / \text{heartbeat-interval}$. Absent any explicit configuration

or inability to dynamically adjust probing-rate values (Section 4.8.1 of [RFC7252]), DOTS agents use 5 bytes/second as a default probing-rate value.

If the DOTS agent wishes to change the default values of message transmission parameters, it SHOULD follow the guidance given in Section 4.8.1 of [RFC7252]. The DOTS agents MUST use the negotiated values for message transmission parameters and default values for non-negotiated message transmission parameters.

The signal channel session configuration is applicable to a single DOTS signal channel session between DOTS agents, so the 'cuid' Uri-Path MUST NOT be used.

```
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "config"
Uri-Path: "sid=123"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"
```

```
{
  ...
}
```

Figure 21: PUT to Convey the DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration Data

The additional Uri-Path parameter to those defined in Table 1 is as follows:

sid: Session Identifier is an identifier for the DOTS signal channel session configuration data represented as an integer. This identifier MUST be generated by DOTS clients. 'sid' values MUST increase monotonically (when a new PUT is generated by a DOTS client to convey the configuration parameters for the signal channel).

This is a mandatory attribute.


```
{
  "ietf-dots-signal-channel:signal-config": {
    "mitigating-config": {
      "heartbeat-interval": {
        "current-value": number
      },
      "missing-hb-allowed": {
        "current-value": number
      },
      "probing-rate": {
        "current-value": number
      },
      "max-retransmit": {
        "current-value": number
      },
      "ack-timeout": {
        "current-value-decimal": "string"
      },
      "ack-random-factor": {
        "current-value-decimal": "string"
      }
    },
    "idle-config": {
      "heartbeat-interval": {
        "current-value": number
      },
      "missing-hb-allowed": {
        "current-value": number
      },
      "probing-rate": {
        "current-value": number
      },
      "max-retransmit": {
        "current-value": number
      },
      "ack-timeout": {
        "current-value-decimal": "string"
      },
      "ack-random-factor": {
        "current-value-decimal": "string"
      }
    }
  }
}
```

Figure 22: PUT to Convey the DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration Data (Message Body Schema)

The meaning of the parameters in the CBOR body (Figure 22) is defined in Section 4.5.1.

At least one of the attributes 'heartbeat-interval', 'missing-hb-allowed', 'probing-rate', 'max-retransmit', 'ack-timeout', and 'ack-random-factor' MUST be present in the PUT request. Note that 'heartbeat-interval', 'missing-hb-allowed', 'probing-rate', 'max-retransmit', 'ack-timeout', and 'ack-random-factor', if present, do not need to be provided for both 'mitigating-config', and 'idle-config' in a PUT request.

The PUT request with a higher numeric 'sid' value overrides the DOTS signal channel session configuration data installed by a PUT request with a lower numeric 'sid' value. To avoid maintaining a long list of 'sid' requests from a DOTS client, the lower numeric 'sid' MUST be automatically deleted and no longer available at the DOTS server.

Figure 23 shows a PUT request example to convey the configuration parameters for the DOTS signal channel. In this example, the heartbeat mechanism is disabled when no mitigation is active, while the heartbeat interval is set to '30' when a mitigation is active.

```
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "config"
Uri-Path: "sid=123"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"

{
  "ietf-dots-signal-channel:signal-config": {
    "mitigating-config": {
      "heartbeat-interval": {
        "current-value": 30
      },
      "missing-hb-allowed": {
        "current-value": 15
      },
      "probing-rate": {
        "current-value": 15
      },
      "max-retransmit": {
        "current-value": 3
      },
      "ack-timeout": {
        "current-value-decimal": "2.00"
      },
      "ack-random-factor": {
        "current-value-decimal": "1.50"
      }
    },
    "idle-config": {
      "heartbeat-interval": {
        "current-value": 0
      },
      "max-retransmit": {
        "current-value": 3
      },
      "ack-timeout": {
        "current-value-decimal": "2.00"
      },
      "ack-random-factor": {
        "current-value-decimal": "1.50"
      }
    }
  }
}
```

Figure 23: PUT to Convey the Configuration Parameters

The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the PUT request using CoAP response codes:

- o If the request is missing a mandatory attribute, does not include a 'sid' Uri-Path, or contains one or more invalid or unknown parameters, 4.00 (Bad Request) MUST be returned in the response.
- o If the DOTS server does not find the 'sid' parameter value conveyed in the PUT request in its configuration data and if the DOTS server has accepted the configuration parameters, then a response code 2.01 (Created) MUST be returned in the response.
- o If the DOTS server finds the 'sid' parameter value conveyed in the PUT request in its configuration data and if the DOTS server has accepted the updated configuration parameters, 2.04 (Changed) MUST be returned in the response.
- o If any of the 'heartbeat-interval', 'missing-hb-allowed', 'probing-rate', 'max-retransmit', 'target-protocol', 'ack-timeout', and 'ack-random-factor' attribute values are not acceptable to the DOTS server, 4.22 (Unprocessable Entity) MUST be returned in the response. Upon receipt of this error code, the DOTS client SHOULD retrieve the maximum and minimum attribute values acceptable to the DOTS server (Section 4.5.1).

The DOTS client may re-try and send the PUT request with updated attribute values acceptable to the DOTS server.

A DOTS client may issue a GET message with 'sid' Uri-Path parameter to retrieve the negotiated configuration. The response does not need to include 'sid' in its message body.

4.5.3. Configuration Freshness and Notifications

Max-Age Option (Section 5.10.5 of [RFC7252]) SHOULD be returned by a DOTS server to associate a validity time with a configuration it sends. This feature allows the update of the configuration data if a change occurs at the DOTS server side. For example, the new configuration may instruct a DOTS client to cease heartbeats or reduce heartbeat frequency.

It is NOT RECOMMENDED to return a Max-Age Option set to 0.

Returning a Max-Age Option set to $2^{32}-1$ is equivalent to associating an infinite lifetime with the configuration.

If a non-zero value of Max-Age Option is received by a DOTS client, it MUST issue a GET request with 'sid' Uri-Path parameter to retrieve

the current and acceptable configuration before the expiry of the value enclosed in the Max-Age option. This request is considered by the client and the server as a means to refresh the configuration parameters for the signal channel. When a DDoS attack is active, refresh requests MUST NOT be sent by DOTS clients and the DOTS server MUST NOT terminate the (D)TLS session after the expiry of the value returned in Max-Age Option.

If Max-Age Option is not returned in a response, the DOTS client initiates GET requests to refresh the configuration parameters each 60 seconds (Section 5.10.5 of [RFC7252]). To prevent such overload, it is RECOMMENDED that DOTS servers return a Max-Age Option in GET responses. Considerations related to which value to use and how such value is set, are implementation- and deployment-specific.

If an Observe Option set to 0 is included in the configuration request, the DOTS server sends notifications of any configuration change (Section 4.2 of [RFC7641]).

If a DOTS server detects that a misbehaving DOTS client does not contact the DOTS server after the expiry of Max-Age and retrieve the signal channel configuration data, it MAY terminate the (D)TLS session. A (D)TLS session is terminated by the receipt of an authenticated message that closes the connection (e.g., a fatal alert (Section 6 of [RFC8446])).

4.5.4. Delete DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration

A DELETE request is used to delete the installed DOTS signal channel session configuration data (Figure 24).

```
Header: DELETE (Code=0.04)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "config"
Uri-Path: "sid=123"
```

Figure 24: Delete Configuration

The DOTS server resets the DOTS signal channel session configuration back to the default values and acknowledges a DOTS client's request to remove the DOTS signal channel session configuration using 2.02 (Deleted) response code.

Upon bootstrapping or reboot, a DOTS client MAY send a DELETE request to set the configuration parameters to default values. Such a request does not include any 'sid'.

4.6. Redirected Signaling

Redirected DOTS signaling is discussed in detail in Section 3.2.2 of [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture].

If a DOTS server wants to redirect a DOTS client to an alternative DOTS server for a signal session, then the response code 5.03 (Service Unavailable) will be returned in the response to the DOTS client.

The DOTS server can return the error response code 5.03 in response to a request from the DOTS client or convey the error response code 5.03 in a unidirectional notification response from the DOTS server.

The DOTS server in the error response conveys the alternate DOTS server's FQDN, and the alternate DOTS server's IP address(es) values in the CBOR body (Figure 25).

```
{
  "ietf-dots-signal-channel:redirected-signal": {
    "alt-server": "string",
    "alt-server-record": [
      "string"
    ]
  }
}
```

Figure 25: Redirected Server Error Response Body Schema

The parameters are described below:

alt-server: FQDN of an alternate DOTS server.

This is a mandatory attribute.

alt-server-record: A list of IP addresses of an alternate DOTS server.

This is an optional attribute.

The DOTS server returns the Time to live (TTL) of the alternate DOTS server in a Max-Age Option. That is, the time interval that the alternate DOTS server may be cached for use by a DOTS client. A Max-Age Option set to $2^{32}-1$ is equivalent to receiving an infinite TTL. This value means that the alternate DOTS server is to be used until the alternate DOTS server redirects the traffic with another 5.03 response which encloses an alternate server.

A Max-Age Option set to '0' may be returned for redirecting mitigation requests. Such value means that the redirection applies only for the mitigation request in progress. Returning short TTL in a Max-Age Option may adversely impact DOTS clients on slow links. Returning short values should be avoided under such conditions.

If the alternate DOTS server TTL has expired, the DOTS client MUST use the DOTS server(s), that was provisioned using means discussed in Section 4.1. This fall back mechanism is triggered immediately upon expiry of the TTL, except when a DDoS attack is active.

Requests issued by misbehaving DOTS clients which do not honor the TTL conveyed in the Max-Age Option or react to explicit re-direct messages can be rejected by DOTS servers.

Figure 26 shows a 5.03 response example to convey the DOTS alternate server 'alt-server.example' together with its IP addresses 2001:db8:6401::1 and 2001:db8:6401::2.

```
{
  "ietf-dots-signal-channel:redirected-signal": {
    "alt-server": "alt-server.example",
    "alt-server-record": [
      "2001:db8:6401::1",
      "2001:db8:6401::2"
    ]
  }
}
```

Figure 26: Example of Redirected Server Error Response Body

When the DOTS client receives 5.03 response with an alternate server included, it considers the current request as failed, but SHOULD try re-sending the request to the alternate DOTS server. During a DDoS attack, the DNS server may be the target of another DDoS attack, alternate DOTS server's IP addresses conveyed in the 5.03 response help the DOTS client skip DNS lookup of the alternate DOTS server, at the cost of trusting the first DOTS server to provide accurate information. The DOTS client can then try to establish a UDP or a TCP session with the alternate DOTS server. The DOTS client MAY implement a method to construct IPv4-embedded IPv6 addresses [RFC6052]; this is required to handle the scenario where an IPv6-only DOTS client communicates with an IPv4-only alternate DOTS server.

If the DOTS client has been redirected to a DOTS server to which it has already communicated with within the last five (5) minutes, it MUST ignore the redirection and try to contact other DOTS servers listed in the local configuration or discovered using dynamic means such as DHCP or SRV procedures [I-D.ietf-dots-server-discovery]. It

is RECOMMENDED that DOTS clients support means to alert administrators about redirect loops.

4.7. Heartbeat Mechanism

To provide an indication of signal health and distinguish an 'idle' signal channel from a 'disconnected' or 'defunct' session, the DOTS agent sends a heartbeat over the signal channel to maintain its half of the channel (also, aligned with the "consents" recommendation in Section 6 of [RFC8085]). The DOTS agent similarly expects a heartbeat from its peer DOTS agent, and may consider a session terminated in the prolonged absence of a peer agent heartbeat. Concretely, while the communication between the DOTS agents is otherwise quiescent, the DOTS client will probe the DOTS server to ensure it has maintained cryptographic state and vice versa. Such probes can also keep firewalls and/or stateful translators bindings alive. This probing reduces the frequency of establishing a new handshake when a DOTS signal needs to be conveyed to the DOTS server.

Implementation Note: Given that CoAP roles can be multiplexed over the same session as discussed in [RFC7252] and already supported by CoAP implementations, both the DOTS client and server can send DOTS heartbeat requests.

The DOTS Heartbeat mechanism uses non-confirmable PUT requests (Figure 27) with an expected 2.04 (Changed) Response Code (Figure 28). This procedure occurs between a DOTS agent and its immediate peer DOTS agent. As such, this PUT request MUST NOT be relayed by a DOTS gateway. The PUT request used for DOTS heartbeat MUST NOT have a 'cuid', 'cdid,' or 'mid' Uri-Path.

```
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "hb"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"

{
  "ietf-dots-signal-channel:heartbeat": {
    "peer-hb-status": true
  }
}
```

Figure 27: PUT to Check Peer DOTS Agent is Responding

The mandatory 'peer-hb-status' attribute is set to 'true' (or 'false') to indicates that a DOTS agent is (or not) receiving heartbeat messages from its peer in the last (2 * heartbeat-interval)

period. Such information can be used by a peer DOTS agent to detect or confirm connectivity issues and react accordingly. For example, if a DOTS client receives 2.04 response for its heartbeat messages but no server-initiated heartbeat messages, the DOTS client sets 'peer-hb-status' to 'false'. The DOTS server will need then to try another strategy for sending the heartbeats (e.g., adjust the heartbeat interval or send a server-initiated heartbeat immediately after receiving a client-initiated heartbeat message).

Header: (Code=2.04)

Figure 28: Response to a DOTS Heartbeat Request

DOTS servers MAY trigger their heartbeat requests immediately after receiving heartbeat probes from peer DOTS clients. As a reminder, it is the responsibility of DOTS clients to ensure that on-path translators/firewalls are maintaining a binding so that the same external IP address and/or port number is retained for the DOTS signal channel session.

Under normal traffic conditions (i.e., no attack is ongoing), if a DOTS agent does not receive any response from the peer DOTS agent for 'missing-hb-allowed' number of consecutive heartbeat messages, it concludes that the DOTS signal channel session is disconnected. The DOTS client MUST then try to re-establish the DOTS signal channel session, preferably by resuming the (D)TLS session.

Note: If a new DOTS signal channel session cannot be established, the DOTS client SHOULD NOT retry to establish the DOTS signal channel session more frequently than every 300 seconds (5 minutes) and MUST NOT retry more frequently than every 60 seconds (1 minute). It is recommended that DOTS clients support means to alert administrators about the failure to establish a (D)TLS session.

In case of a massive DDoS attack that saturates the incoming link(s) to the DOTS client, all traffic from the DOTS server to the DOTS client will likely be dropped, although the DOTS server receives heartbeat requests in addition to DOTS messages sent by the DOTS client. In this scenario, DOTS clients MUST behave differently to handle message transmission and DOTS signal channel session liveness during link saturation:

The DOTS client MUST NOT consider the DOTS signal channel session terminated even after a maximum 'missing-hb-allowed' threshold is reached. The DOTS client SHOULD keep on using the current DOTS signal channel session to send heartbeat requests over it, so that

the DOTS server knows the DOTS client has not disconnected the DOTS signal channel session.

After the maximum 'missing-hb-allowed' threshold is reached, the DOTS client SHOULD try to establish a new DOTS signal channel session. The DOTS client SHOULD send mitigation requests over the current DOTS signal channel session and, in parallel, send the mitigation requests over the new DOTS signal channel session. This may be handled, for example, by resumption of the (D)TLS session or using 0-RTT mode in DTLS 1.3 to piggyback the mitigation request in the ClientHello message.

As soon as the link is no longer saturated, if traffic from the DOTS server reaches the DOTS client over the current DOTS signal channel session, the DOTS client can stop the new DOTS signal channel session attempt or if a new DOTS signal channel session is successful then disconnect the current DOTS signal channel session.

If the DOTS server receives traffic from the peer DOTS client (e.g., peer DOTS client initiated heartbeats) but maximum 'missing-hb-allowed' threshold is reached, the DOTS server MUST NOT consider the DOTS signal channel session disconnected. The DOTS server MUST keep on using the current DOTS signal channel session so that the DOTS client can send mitigation requests over the current DOTS signal channel session. In this case, the DOTS server can identify the DOTS client is under attack and the inbound link to the DOTS client (domain) is saturated. Furthermore, if the DOTS server does not receive a mitigation request from the DOTS client, it implies the DOTS client has not detected the attack or, if an attack mitigation is in progress, it implies the applied DDoS mitigation actions are not yet effective to handle the DDoS attack volume.

If the DOTS server does not receive any traffic from the peer DOTS client during the time span required to exhaust the maximum 'missing-hb-allowed' threshold, the DOTS server concludes the session is disconnected. The DOTS server can then trigger pre-configured mitigation requests for this DOTS client (if any).

In DOTS over TCP, the sender of a DOTS heartbeat message has to allow up to 'heartbeat-interval' seconds when waiting for a heartbeat reply. When a failure is detected by a DOTS client, it proceeds with the session recovery following the same approach as the one used for unreliable transports.

5. DOTS Signal Channel YANG Modules

This document defines a YANG [RFC7950] module for DOTS mitigation scope, DOTS signal channel session configuration data, DOTS redirection signaling, and DOTS heartbeats.

This YANG module (ietf-dots-signal-channel) defines the DOTS client interaction with the DOTS server as seen by the DOTS client. A DOTS server is allowed to update the non-configurable 'ro' entities in the responses. This YANG module is not intended to be used via NETCONF/RESTCONF for DOTS server management purposes; such module is out of the scope of this document. It serves only to provide a data model and encoding, but not a management data model.

A companion YANG module is defined to include a collection of types defined by IANA: "iana-dots-signal-channel" (Section 5.2).

5.1. Tree Structure

This document defines the YANG module "ietf-dots-signal-channel" (Section 5.3), which has the following tree structure. A DOTS signal message can be a mitigation, a configuration, a redirect, or a heartbeat message.

```

module: ietf-dots-signal-channel
  +--rw dots-signal
    +--rw (message-type)?
      +--:(mitigation-scope)
        +--rw scope* [cuid mid]
          +--rw cdid? string
          +--rw cuid string
          +--rw mid uint32
          +--rw target-prefix* inet:ip-prefix
          +--rw target-port-range* [lower-port]
            +--rw lower-port inet:port-number
            +--rw upper-port? inet:port-number
          +--rw target-protocol* uint8
          +--rw target-fqdn* inet:domain-name
          +--rw target-uri* inet:uri
          +--rw alias-name* string
          +--rw lifetime? int32
          +--rw trigger-mitigation? boolean
          +--ro mitigation-start? uint64
          +--ro status? iana-signal:status
          +--ro conflict-information
            +--ro conflict-status? iana-signal:conflict-status
            +--ro conflict-cause? iana-signal:conflict-cause
            +--ro retry-timer? uint32

```

```

+--ro conflict-scope
+--ro target-prefix*      inet:ip-prefix
+--ro target-port-range*  [lower-port]
|   +--ro lower-port      inet:port-number
|   +--ro upper-port?     inet:port-number
+--ro target-protocol*    uint8
+--ro target-fqdn*        inet:domain-name
+--ro target-uri*         inet:uri
+--ro alias-name*         string
+--ro acl-list* [acl-name]
|   +--ro acl-name
|   |   -> /ietf-data:dots-data/dots-client/acls/
|   |   acl/name
|   +--ro acl-type?
|   |   -> /ietf-data:dots-data/dots-client/acls/
|   |   acl/type
|   +--ro mid?            -> ../../../../mid
+--ro bytes-dropped?      yang:zero-based-counter64
+--ro bps-dropped?        yang:gauge64
+--ro pkts-dropped?       yang:zero-based-counter64
+--ro pps-dropped?        yang:gauge64
+--rw attack-status?      iana-signal:attack-status
+--:(signal-config)
+--rw sid                  uint32
+--rw mitigating-config
|   +--rw heartbeat-interval
|   |   +--ro max-value?    uint16
|   |   +--ro min-value?    uint16
|   |   +--rw current-value? uint16
|   +--rw missing-hb-allowed
|   |   +--ro max-value?    uint16
|   |   +--ro min-value?    uint16
|   |   +--rw current-value? uint16
|   +--rw probing-rate
|   |   +--ro max-value?    uint16
|   |   +--ro min-value?    uint16
|   |   +--rw current-value? uint16
|   +--rw max-retransmit
|   |   +--ro max-value?    uint16
|   |   +--ro min-value?    uint16
|   |   +--rw current-value? uint16
|   +--rw ack-timeout
|   |   +--ro max-value-decimal? decimal64
|   |   +--ro min-value-decimal? decimal64
|   |   +--rw current-value-decimal? decimal64
|   +--rw ack-random-factor
|   |   +--ro max-value-decimal? decimal64
|   |   +--ro min-value-decimal? decimal64

```

```

|      +---rw current-value-decimal?    decimal64
+---rw idle-config
|   +---rw heartbeat-interval
|   |   +---ro max-value?                uint16
|   |   +---ro min-value?                uint16
|   |   +---rw current-value?            uint16
|   +---rw missing-hb-allowed
|   |   +---ro max-value?                uint16
|   |   +---ro min-value?                uint16
|   |   +---rw current-value?            uint16
|   +---rw probing-rate
|   |   +---ro max-value?                uint16
|   |   +---ro min-value?                uint16
|   |   +---rw current-value?            uint16
|   +---rw max-retransmit
|   |   +---ro max-value?                uint16
|   |   +---ro min-value?                uint16
|   |   +---rw current-value?            uint16
|   +---rw ack-timeout
|   |   +---ro max-value-decimal?        decimal64
|   |   +---ro min-value-decimal?        decimal64
|   |   +---rw current-value-decimal?    decimal64
|   +---rw ack-random-factor
|   |   +---ro max-value-decimal?        decimal64
|   |   +---ro min-value-decimal?        decimal64
|   |   +---rw current-value-decimal?    decimal64
+---:(redirected-signal)
|   +---ro alt-server                    string
|   +---ro alt-server-record*            inet:ip-address
+---:(heartbeat)
|   +---rw peer-hb-status                boolean

```

5.2. IANA DOTS Signal Channel YANG Module

```

<CODE BEGINS> file "iana-dots-signal-channel@2019-01-17.yang"
module iana-dots-signal-channel {
  yang-version 1.1;
  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:iana-dots-signal-channel";
  prefix iana-signal;

  organization
    "IANA";
  contact
    "Internet Assigned Numbers Authority

    Postal: ICANN
    12025 Waterfront Drive, Suite 300
    Los Angeles, CA 90094-2536

```

```
    United States of America
    Tel:      +1 310 301 5800
    <mailto:iana@iana.org>;
description
  "This module contains a collection of YANG data types defined
  by IANA and used for DOTS signal channel protocol.

  Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
  authors of the code.  All rights reserved.

  Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
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  set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
  Relating to IETF Documents
  (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

  This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
  the RFC itself for full legal notices."

revision 2019-01-17 {
  description
    "Initial revision.";
  reference
    "RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
    Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification";
}

typedef status {
  type enumeration {
    enum attack-mitigation-in-progress {
      value 1;
      description
        "Attack mitigation setup is in progress (e.g., changing
        the network path to re-route the inbound traffic
        to DOTS mitigator).";
    }
    enum attack-successfully-mitigated {
      value 2;
      description
        "Attack is being successfully mitigated (e.g., traffic
        is redirected to a DDoS mitigator and attack
        traffic is dropped or blackholed).";
    }
    enum attack-stopped {
      value 3;
      description
        "Attack has stopped and the DOTS client can
```

```
        withdraw the mitigation request.";
    }
    enum attack-exceeded-capability {
        value 4;
        description
            "Attack has exceeded the mitigation provider
            capability.";
    }
    enum dots-client-withdrawn-mitigation {
        value 5;
        description
            "DOTS client has withdrawn the mitigation
            request and the mitigation is active but
            terminating.";
    }
    enum attack-mitigation-terminated {
        value 6;
        description
            "Attack mitigation is now terminated.";
    }
    enum attack-mitigation-withdrawn {
        value 7;
        description
            "Attack mitigation is withdrawn.";
    }
    enum attack-mitigation-signal-loss {
        value 8;
        description
            "Attack mitigation will be triggered
            for the mitigation request only when
            the DOTS signal channel session is lost.";
    }
}
description
    "Enumeration for status reported by the DOTS server.";
}

typedef conflict-status {
    type enumeration {
        enum request-inactive-other-active {
            value 1;
            description
                "DOTS Server has detected conflicting mitigation
                requests from different DOTS clients.
                This mitigation request is currently inactive
                until the conflicts are resolved. Another
                mitigation request is active.";
        }
    }
}
```

```
enum request-active {
    value 2;
    description
        "DOTS Server has detected conflicting mitigation
        requests from different DOTS clients.
        This mitigation request is currently active.";
}
enum all-requests-inactive {
    value 3;
    description
        "DOTS Server has detected conflicting mitigation
        requests from different DOTS clients. All
        conflicting mitigation requests are inactive.";
}
}
description
    "Enumeration for conflict status.";
}

typedef conflict-cause {
    type enumeration {
        enum overlapping-targets {
            value 1;
            description
                "Overlapping targets. conflict-scope provides
                more details about the exact conflict.";
        }
        enum conflict-with-acceptlist {
            value 2;
            description
                "Conflicts with an existing accept-list.

                This code is returned when the DDoS mitigation
                detects that some of the source addresses/prefixes
                listed in the accept-list ACLs are actually
                attacking the target.";
        }
        enum cuid-collision {
            value 3;
            description
                "Conflicts with the cuid used by another
                DOTS client.";
        }
    }
}
description
    "Enumeration for conflict causes.";
}
```



```
typedef attack-status {
  type enumeration {
    enum under-attack {
      value 1;
      description
        "The DOTS client determines that it is still under
        attack.";
    }
    enum attack-successfully-mitigated {
      value 2;
      description
        "The DOTS client determines that the attack is
        successfully mitigated.";
    }
  }
  description
    "Enumeration for attack status codes.";
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
```

5.3. IETF DOTS Signal Channel YANG Module

This module uses the common YANG types defined in [RFC6991] and types defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel].

```
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-dots-signal-channel@2019-11-13.yang"
module ietf-dots-signal-channel {
  yang-version 1.1;
  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-signal-channel";
  prefix signal;

  import ietf-inet-types {
    prefix inet;
    reference "Section 4 of RFC 6991";
  }
  import ietf-yang-types {
    prefix yang;
    reference "Section 3 of RFC 6991";
  }
  import ietf-dots-data-channel {
    prefix ietf-data;
    reference
      "RFC YYYY: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling
      (DOTS) Data Channel Specification";
  }
  import iana-dots-signal-channel {
    prefix iana-signal;
  }
```

```
}

organization
  "IETF DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Working Group";
contact
  "WG Web:  <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dots/>
   WG List: <mailto:dots@ietf.org>

   Editor:  Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy
            <mailto:TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com>

   Editor:  Mohamed Boucadair
            <mailto:mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>

   Author:  Prashanth Patil
            <mailto:praspati@cisco.com>

   Author:  Andrew Mortensen
            <mailto:amortensen@arbor.net>

   Author:  Nik Teague
            <mailto:nteague@verisign.com>";
description
  "This module contains YANG definition for the signaling
   messages exchanged between a DOTS client and a DOTS server.

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
   authors of the code.  All rights reserved.

   Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
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   Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

   This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
   the RFC itself for full legal notices.";

revision 2019-11-13 {
  description
    "Initial revision.";
  reference
    "RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
     Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification";
}

/*
```

```
* Groupings
*/

grouping mitigation-scope {
  description
    "Specifies the scope of the mitigation request.";
  list scope {
    key "cuid mid";
    description
      "The scope of the request.";
    leaf cdid {
      type string;
      description
        "The cdid should be included by a server-domain
        DOTS gateway to propagate the client domain
        identification information from the
        gateway's client-facing-side to the gateway's
        server-facing-side, and from the gateway's
        server-facing-side to the DOTS server.

        It may be used by the final DOTS server
        for policy enforcement purposes.";
    }
    leaf cuid {
      type string;
      description
        "A unique identifier that is
        generated by a DOTS client to prevent
        request collisions. It is expected that the
        cuid will remain consistent throughout the
        lifetime of the DOTS client.";
    }
    leaf mid {
      type uint32;
      description
        "Mitigation request identifier.

        This identifier must be unique for each mitigation
        request bound to the DOTS client.";
    }
  }
  uses ietf-data:target;
  leaf-list alias-name {
    type string;
    description
      "An alias name that points to a resource.";
  }
  leaf lifetime {
    type int32;
```

```
    units "seconds";
    default "3600";
    description
        "Indicates the lifetime of the mitigation request.

        A lifetime of '0' in a mitigation request is an
        invalid value.

        A lifetime of negative one (-1) indicates indefinite
        lifetime for the mitigation request.";
}
leaf trigger-mitigation {
    type boolean;
    default "true";
    description
        "If set to 'false', DDoS mitigation will not be
        triggered unless the DOTS signal channel
        session is lost.";
}
leaf mitigation-start {
    type uint64;
    config false;
    description
        "Mitigation start time is represented in seconds
        relative to 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z in UTC time.";
}
leaf status {
    type iana-signal:status;
    config false;
    description
        "Indicates the status of a mitigation request.
        It must be included in responses only.";
}
container conflict-information {
    config false;
    description
        "Indicates that a conflict is detected.
        Must only be used for responses.";
    leaf conflict-status {
        type iana-signal:conflict-status;
        description
            "Indicates the conflict status.";
    }
    leaf conflict-cause {
        type iana-signal:conflict-cause;
        description
            "Indicates the cause of the conflict.";
    }
}
```

```
leaf retry-timer {
  type uint32;
  units "seconds";
  description
    "The DOTS client must not re-send the
     same request that has a conflict before the expiry of
     this timer.";
}
container conflict-scope {
  description
    "Provides more information about the conflict scope.";
  uses ietf-data:target {
    when "../conflict-cause = 'overlapping-targets'";
  }
  leaf-list alias-name {
    when "../../conflict-cause = 'overlapping-targets'";
    type string;
    description
      "Conflicting alias-name.";
  }
  list acl-list {
    when "../../conflict-cause = 'conflict-with-acceptlist'";
    key "acl-name";
    description
      "List of conflicting ACLs as defined in the DOTS data
       channel. These ACLs are uniquely defined by
       cuid and acl-name.";
    leaf acl-name {
      type leafref {
        path "/ietf-data:dots-data/ietf-data:dots-client/"
          + "ietf-data:acls/ietf-data:acl/ietf-data:name";
      }
      description
        "Reference to the conflicting ACL name bound to
         a DOTS client.";
    }
    leaf acl-type {
      type leafref {
        path "/ietf-data:dots-data/ietf-data:dots-client/"
          + "ietf-data:acls/ietf-data:acl/ietf-data:type";
      }
      description
        "Reference to the conflicting ACL type bound to
         a DOTS client.";
    }
  }
  leaf mid {
    when "../../conflict-cause = 'overlapping-targets'";
```

```
        type leafref {
            path "../.../mid";
        }
        description
            "Reference to the conflicting 'mid' bound to
             the same DOTS client.";
    }
}
}
leaf bytes-dropped {
    type yang:zero-based-counter64;
    units "bytes";
    config false;
    description
        "The total dropped byte count for the mitigation
         request since the attack mitigation is triggered.
         The count wraps around when it reaches the maximum value
         of counter64 for dropped bytes.";
}
leaf bps-dropped {
    type yang:gauge64;
    config false;
    description
        "The average number of dropped bits per second for
         the mitigation request since the attack
         mitigation is triggered. This should be over
         five-minute intervals (that is, measuring bytes
         into five-minute buckets and then averaging these
         buckets over the time since the mitigation was
         triggered).";
}
leaf pkts-dropped {
    type yang:zero-based-counter64;
    config false;
    description
        "The total number of dropped packet count for the
         mitigation request since the attack mitigation is
         triggered. The count wraps around when it reaches
         the maximum value of counter64 for dropped packets.";
}
leaf pps-dropped {
    type yang:gauge64;
    config false;
    description
        "The average number of dropped packets per second
         for the mitigation request since the attack
         mitigation is triggered. This should be over
         five-minute intervals (that is, measuring packets
```

```
        into five-minute buckets and then averaging these
        buckets over the time since the mitigation was
        triggered).";
    }
    leaf attack-status {
        type iana-signal:attack-status;
        description
            "Indicates the status of an attack as seen by the
            DOTS client.";
    }
}
}

grouping config-parameters {
    description
        "Subset of DOTS signal channel session configuration.";
    container heartbeat-interval {
        description
            "DOTS agents regularly send heartbeats to each other
            after mutual authentication is successfully
            completed in order to keep the DOTS signal channel
            open.";
        leaf max-value {
            type uint16;
            units "seconds";
            config false;
            description
                "Maximum acceptable heartbeat-interval value.";
        }
        leaf min-value {
            type uint16;
            units "seconds";
            config false;
            description
                "Minimum acceptable heartbeat-interval value.";
        }
        leaf current-value {
            type uint16;
            units "seconds";
            default "30";
            description
                "Current heartbeat-interval value.

                '0' means that heartbeat mechanism is deactivated.";
        }
    }
    container missing-hb-allowed {
        description
```

```
        "Maximum number of missing heartbeats allowed.";
    leaf max-value {
        type uint16;
        config false;
        description
            "Maximum acceptable missing-hb-allowed value.";
    }
    leaf min-value {
        type uint16;
        config false;
        description
            "Minimum acceptable missing-hb-allowed value.";
    }
    leaf current-value {
        type uint16;
        default "15";
        description
            "Current missing-hb-allowed value.";
    }
}
container probing-rate {
    description
        "The limit for sending non-confirmable messages with
        no response.";
    leaf max-value {
        type uint16;
        units "byte/second";
        config false;
        description
            "Maximum acceptable probing-rate value.";
    }
    leaf min-value {
        type uint16;
        units "byte/second";
        config false;
        description
            "Minimum acceptable probing-rate value.";
    }
    leaf current-value {
        type uint16;
        units "byte/second";
        default "5";
        description
            "Current probing-rate value.";
    }
}
container max-retransmit {
    description
```



```
        "Maximum number of retransmissions of a Confirmable
        message.";
    leaf max-value {
        type uint16;
        config false;
        description
            "Maximum acceptable max-retransmit value.";
    }
    leaf min-value {
        type uint16;
        config false;
        description
            "Minimum acceptable max-retransmit value.";
    }
    leaf current-value {
        type uint16;
        default "3";
        description
            "Current max-retransmit value.";
    }
}
container ack-timeout {
    description
        "Initial retransmission timeout value.";
    leaf max-value-decimal {
        type decimal64 {
            fraction-digits 2;
        }
        units "seconds";
        config false;
        description
            "Maximum ack-timeout value.";
    }
    leaf min-value-decimal {
        type decimal64 {
            fraction-digits 2;
        }
        units "seconds";
        config false;
        description
            "Minimum ack-timeout value.";
    }
    leaf current-value-decimal {
        type decimal64 {
            fraction-digits 2;
        }
        units "seconds";
        default "2";
    }
}
```

```
        description
            "Current ack-timeout value.";
    }
}
container ack-random-factor {
    description
        "Random factor used to influence the timing of
        retransmissions.";
    leaf max-value-decimal {
        type decimal64 {
            fraction-digits 2;
        }
        config false;
        description
            "Maximum acceptable ack-random-factor value.";
    }
    leaf min-value-decimal {
        type decimal64 {
            fraction-digits 2;
        }
        config false;
        description
            "Minimum acceptable ack-random-factor value.";
    }
    leaf current-value-decimal {
        type decimal64 {
            fraction-digits 2;
        }
        default "1.5";
        description
            "Current ack-random-factor value.";
    }
}
}

grouping signal-config {
    description
        "DOTS signal channel session configuration.";
    leaf sid {
        type uint32;
        mandatory true;
        description
            "An identifier for the DOTS signal channel
            session configuration data.";
    }
    container mitigating-config {
        description
            "Configuration parameters to use when a mitigation
```

```
        is active.";
        uses config-parameters;
    }
    container idle-config {
        description
            "Configuration parameters to use when no mitigation
            is active.";
        uses config-parameters;
    }
}

grouping redirected-signal {
    description
        "Grouping for the redirected signaling.";
    leaf alt-server {
        type string;
        config false;
        mandatory true;
        description
            "FQDN of an alternate server.";
    }
    leaf-list alt-server-record {
        type inet:ip-address;
        config false;
        description
            "List of records for the alternate server.";
    }
}

/*
 * Main Container for DOTS Signal Channel
 */

container dots-signal {
    description
        "Main container for DOTS signal message.

        A DOTS signal message can be a mitigation, a configuration,
        or a redirected signal message.";
    choice message-type {
        description
            "Can be a mitigation, a configuration, or a redirect
            message.";
        case mitigation-scope {
            description
                "Mitigation scope of a mitigation message.";
            uses mitigation-scope;
        }
    }
}
```

```
    case signal-config {
      description
        "Configuration message.";
      uses signal-config;
    }
    case redirected-signal {
      description
        "Redirected signaling.";
      uses redirected-signal;
    }
    case heartbeat {
      description
        "DOTS heartbeats.";
      leaf peer-hb-status {
        type boolean;
        mandatory true;
        description
          "Indicates whether a DOTS agent receives heartbeats
           from its peer. The value is set to 'true' if the
           DOTS agent is receiving heartbeat messages
           from its peer.";
      }
    }
  }
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
```

6. YANG/JSON Mapping Parameters to CBOR

All parameters in the payload of the DOTS signal channel MUST be mapped to CBOR types as shown in Table 4 and are assigned an integer key to save space.

- o Note: Implementers must check that the mapping output provided by their YANG-to-CBOR encoding schemes is aligned with the content of Table 4. For example, some CBOR and JSON types for enumerations and the 64-bit quantities can differ depending on the encoder used.

The CBOR key values are divided into two types: comprehension-required and comprehension-optional. DOTS agents can safely ignore comprehension-optional values they don't understand, but cannot successfully process a request if it contains comprehension-required values that are not understood. The 4.00 response SHOULD include a diagnostic payload describing the unknown comprehension-required CBOR key values. The initial set of CBOR key values defined in this specification are of type comprehension-required.

Parameter Name	YANG Type	CBOR Key	CBOR Major Type & Information	JSON Type
ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope	container	1	5 map	Object
scope	list	2	4 array	Array
cdid	string	3	3 text string	String
cuid	string	4	3 text string	String
mid	uint32	5	0 unsigned	Number
target-prefix	leaf-list	6	4 array	Array
	inet:			
	ip-prefix		3 text string	String
target-port-range	list	7	4 array	Array
lower-port	inet:			
	port-number	8	0 unsigned	Number
upper-port	inet:			
	port-number	9	0 unsigned	Number
target-protocol	leaf-list	10	4 array	Array
	uint8		0 unsigned	Number
target-fqdn	leaf-list	11	4 array	Array
	inet:			
	domain-name		3 text string	String
target-uri	leaf-list	12	4 array	Array
	inet:uri		3 text string	String
alias-name	leaf-list	13	4 array	Array
	string		3 text string	String
lifetime	int32	14	0 unsigned	Number
			1 negative	Number
mitigation-start	uint64	15	0 unsigned	String
status	enumeration	16	0 unsigned	String
conflict-information	container	17	5 map	Object
conflict-status	enumeration	18	0 unsigned	String
conflict-cause	enumeration	19	0 unsigned	String
retry-timer	uint32	20	0 unsigned	Number
conflict-scope	container	21	5 map	Object
acl-list	list	22	4 array	Array
acl-name	leafref	23	3 text string	String
acl-type	leafref	24	3 text string	String
bytes-dropped	yang:zero-based-counter64			
		25	0 unsigned	String
bps-dropped	yang:gauge64	26	0 unsigned	String
pkts-dropped	yang:zero-based-counter64			
		27	0 unsigned	String
pps-dropped	yang:gauge64	28	0 unsigned	String

attack-status	enumeration	29	0 unsigned	String
ietf-dots-signal-channel:signal-config	container	30	5 map	Object
sid	uint32	31	0 unsigned	Number
mitigating-config	container	32	5 map	Object
heartbeat-interval	container	33	5 map	Object
max-value	uint16	34	0 unsigned	Number
min-value	uint16	35	0 unsigned	Number
current-value	uint16	36	0 unsigned	Number
missing-hb-allowed	container	37	5 map	Object
max-retransmit	container	38	5 map	Object
ack-timeout	container	39	5 map	Object
ack-random-factor	container	40	5 map	Object
max-value-decimal	decimal64	41	6 tag 4	String
			[-2, integer]	
min-value-decimal	decimal64	42	6 tag 4	String
			[-2, integer]	
current-value-decimal	decimal64	43	6 tag 4	String
			[-2, integer]	
idle-config	container	44	5 map	Object
trigger-mitigation	boolean	45	7 bits 20	False
			7 bits 21	True
ietf-dots-signal-channel:redirected-signal	container	46	5 map	Object
alt-server	string	47	3 text string	String
alt-server-record	leaf-list	48	4 array	Array
	inet:			
	ip-address		3 text string	String
ietf-dots-signal-channel:heartbeat	container	49	5 map	Object
probing-rate	container	50	5 map	Object
peer-hb-status	boolean	51	7 bits 20	False
			7 bits 21	True

Table 4: CBOR Key Values Used in DOTS Signal Channel Messages & Their Mappings to JSON and YANG

7. (D)TLS Protocol Profile and Performance Considerations

7.1. (D)TLS Protocol Profile

This section defines the (D)TLS protocol profile of DOTS signal channel over (D)TLS and DOTS data channel over TLS.

There are known attacks on (D)TLS, such as man-in-the-middle and protocol downgrade attacks. These are general attacks on (D)TLS and, as such, they are not specific to DOTS over (D)TLS; refer to the

(D)TLS RFCs for discussion of these security issues. DOTS agents MUST adhere to the (D)TLS implementation recommendations and security considerations of [RFC7525] except with respect to (D)TLS version. Since DOTS signal channel encryption relying upon (D)TLS is virtually a green-field deployment, DOTS agents MUST implement only (D)TLS 1.2 or later.

When a DOTS client is configured with a domain name of the DOTS server, and connects to its configured DOTS server, the server may present it with a PKIX certificate. In order to ensure proper authentication, a DOTS client MUST verify the entire certification path per [RFC5280]. Additionally, the DOTS client MUST use [RFC6125] validation techniques to compare the domain name with the certificate provided. Certification authorities that issue DOTS server certificates SHOULD support the DNS-ID and SRV-ID identifier types. DOTS server SHOULD prefer the use of DNS-ID and SRV-ID over CN-ID identifier types in certificate requests (as described in Section 2.3 of [RFC6125]) and the wildcard character '*' SHOULD NOT be included in the presented identifier. DOTS doesn't use URI-IDs for server identity verification.

A key challenge to deploying DOTS is the provisioning of DOTS clients, including the distribution of keying material to DOTS clients to enable the required mutual authentication of DOTS agents. Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) [RFC7030] defines a method of certificate enrollment by which domains operating DOTS servers may provide DOTS clients with all the necessary cryptographic keying material, including a private key and a certificate to authenticate themselves. One deployment option is DOTS clients behave as EST clients for certificate enrollment from an EST server provisioned by the mitigation provider. This document does not specify which EST or other mechanism the DOTS client uses to achieve initial enrollment.

The Server Name Indication (SNI) extension [RFC6066] defines a mechanism for a client to tell a (D)TLS server the name of the server it wants to contact. This is a useful extension for hosting environments where multiple virtual servers are reachable over a single IP address. The DOTS client may or may not know if it is interacting with a DOTS server in a virtual server hosting environment, so the DOTS client SHOULD include the DOTS server FQDN in the SNI extension.

Implementations compliant with this profile MUST implement all of the following items:

- o DTLS record replay detection (Section 3.3 of [RFC6347]) or an equivalent mechanism to protect against replay attacks.

- o DTLS session resumption without server-side state to resume session and convey the DOTS signal.
- o At least one of raw public keys [RFC7250] or PSK handshake [RFC4279] with (EC)DHE key exchange which reduces the size of the ServerHello, and can be used by DOTS agents that cannot obtain certificates.

Implementations compliant with this profile SHOULD implement all of the following items to reduce the delay required to deliver a DOTS signal channel message:

- o TLS False Start [RFC7918] which reduces round-trips by allowing the TLS client's second flight of messages (ChangeCipherSpec) to also contain the DOTS signal. TLS False Start is formally defined for use with TLS, but the same technique is applicable to DTLS as well.
- o Cached Information Extension [RFC7924] which avoids transmitting the server's certificate and certificate chain if the client has cached that information from a previous TLS handshake.

Compared to UDP, DOTS signal channel over TCP requires an additional round-trip time (RTT) of latency to establish a TCP connection. DOTS implementations are encouraged to implement TCP Fast Open [RFC7413] to eliminate that RTT.

7.2. (D)TLS 1.3 Considerations

TLS 1.3 provides critical latency improvements for connection establishment over TLS 1.2. The DTLS 1.3 protocol [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] is based upon the TLS 1.3 protocol and provides equivalent security guarantees. (D)TLS 1.3 provides two basic handshake modes the DOTS signal channel can take advantage of:

- o A full handshake mode in which a DOTS client can send a DOTS mitigation request message after one round trip and the DOTS server immediately responds with a DOTS mitigation response. This assumes no packet loss is experienced.
- o 0-RTT mode in which the DOTS client can authenticate itself and send DOTS mitigation request messages in the first message, thus reducing handshake latency. 0-RTT only works if the DOTS client has previously communicated with that DOTS server, which is very likely with the DOTS signal channel.

The DOTS client has to establish a (D)TLS session with the DOTS server during 'idle' time and share a PSK.


During a DDoS attack, the DOTS client can use the (D)TLS session to convey the DOTS mitigation request message and, if there is no response from the server after multiple retries, the DOTS client can resume the (D)TLS session in 0-RTT mode using PSK.

DOTS servers that support (D)TLS 1.3 MAY allow DOTS clients to send early data (0-RTT). DOTS clients MUST NOT send "CoAP Ping" as early data; such messages MUST be rejected by DOTS servers. Section 8 of [RFC8446] discusses some mechanisms to implement to limit the impact of replay attacks on 0-RTT data. If the DOTS server accepts 0-RTT, it MUST implement one of these mechanisms to prevent replay at the TLS layer. A DOTS server can reject 0-RTT by sending a TLS HelloRetryRequest.

The DOTS signal channel messages sent as early data by the DOTS client are idempotent requests. As a reminder, the Message ID (Section 3 of [RFC7252]) is changed each time a new CoAP request is sent, and the Token (Section 5.3.1 of [RFC7252]) is randomized in each CoAP request. The DOTS server(s) MUST use the Message ID and the Token in the DOTS signal channel message to detect replay of early data at the application layer, and accept 0-RTT data at most once from the same DOTS client. This anti-replay defense requires sharing the Message ID and the Token in the 0-RTT data between DOTS servers in the DOTS server domain. DOTS servers do not rely on transport coordinates to identify DOTS peers. As specified in Section 4.4.1, DOTS servers couple the DOTS signal channel sessions using the DOTS client identity and optionally the 'cdid' parameter value. Furthermore, 'mid' value is monotonically increased by the DOTS client for each mitigation request, attackers replaying mitigation requests with lower numeric 'mid' values and overlapping scopes with mitigation requests having higher numeric 'mid' values will be rejected systematically by the DOTS server. Likewise, 'sid' value is monotonically increased by the DOTS client for each configuration request (Section 4.5.2), attackers replaying configuration requests with lower numeric 'sid' values will be rejected by the DOTS server if it maintains a higher numeric 'sid' value for this DOTS client.

Owing to the aforementioned protections, all DOTS signal channel requests are safe to transmit in TLS 1.3 as early data. Refer to [I-D.boucadair-dots-earlydata] for more details.

A simplified TLS 1.3 handshake with 0-RTT DOTS mitigation request message exchange is shown in Figure 29.



Note that:

- () Indicates messages protected 0-RTT keys
- { } Indicates messages protected using handshake keys
- [] Indicates messages protected using 1-RTT keys

Figure 29: A Simplified TLS 1.3 Handshake with 0-RTT

7.3. DTLS MTU and Fragmentation

To avoid DOTS signal message fragmentation and the subsequent decreased probability of message delivery, DOTS agents MUST ensure that the DTLS record fit within a single datagram. As a reminder, DTLS handles fragmentation and reassembly only for handshake messages and not for the application data (Section 4.1.1 of [RFC6347]). If the PMTU cannot be discovered, DOTS agents MUST assume a PMTU of 1280 bytes, as IPv6 requires that every link in the Internet have an MTU of 1280 octets or greater as specified in [RFC8200]. If IPv4 support on legacy or otherwise unusual networks is a consideration and the PMTU is unknown, DOTS implementations MAY assume on a PMTU of 576 bytes for IPv4 datagrams, as every IPv4 host must be capable of receiving a packet whose length is equal to 576 bytes as discussed in [RFC0791] and [RFC1122].

The DOTS client must consider the amount of record expansion expected by the DTLS processing when calculating the size of CoAP message that fits within the path MTU. Path MTU MUST be greater than or equal to [CoAP message size + DTLS 1.2 overhead of 13 octets + authentication overhead of the negotiated DTLS cipher suite + block padding] (Section 4.1.1.1 of [RFC6347]). If the total request size exceeds the path MTU then the DOTS client MUST split the DOTS signal into separate messages; for example, the list of addresses in the 'target-prefix' parameter could be split into multiple lists and each list conveyed in a new PUT request.

Implementation Note: DOTS choice of message size parameters works well with IPv6 and with most of today's IPv4 paths. However, with IPv4, it is harder to safely make sure that there is no IP fragmentation. If the IPv4 path MTU is unknown, implementations may want to limit themselves to more conservative IPv4 datagram sizes such as 576 bytes, as per [RFC0791].

8. Mutual Authentication of DOTS Agents & Authorization of DOTS Clients

(D)TLS based upon client certificate can be used for mutual authentication between DOTS agents. If, for example, a DOTS gateway is involved, DOTS clients and DOTS gateways must perform mutual authentication; only authorized DOTS clients are allowed to send DOTS signals to a DOTS gateway. The DOTS gateway and the DOTS server must perform mutual authentication; a DOTS server only allows DOTS signal channel messages from an authorized DOTS gateway, thereby creating a two-link chain of transitive authentication between the DOTS client and the DOTS server.

The DOTS server should support certificate-based client authentication. The DOTS client should respond to the DOTS server's TLS CertificateRequest message with the PKIX certificate held by the DOTS client. DOTS client certificate validation must be performed as per [RFC5280] and the DOTS client certificate must conform to the [RFC5280] certificate profile. If a DOTS client does not support TLS client certificate authentication, it must support pre-shared key based or raw public key based client authentication.




Figure 30: Example of Authentication and Authorization of DOTS Agents

In the example depicted in Figure 30, the DOTS gateway and DOTS clients within the 'example.com' domain mutually authenticate. After the DOTS gateway validates the identity of a DOTS client, it communicates with the AAA server in the 'example.com' domain to determine if the DOTS client is authorized to request DDoS mitigation. If the DOTS client is not authorized, a 4.01 (Unauthorized) is returned in the response to the DOTS client. In this example, the DOTS gateway only allows the application server and DDoS attack detector to request DDoS mitigation, but does not permit the user of type 'guest' to request DDoS mitigation.

Also, DOTS gateways and servers located in different domains must perform mutual authentication (e.g., using certificates). A DOTS server will only allow a DOTS gateway with a certificate for a particular domain to request mitigation for that domain. In reference to Figure 30, the DOTS server only allows the DOTS gateway to request mitigation for 'example.com' domain and not for other domains.

9. IANA Considerations

9.1. DOTS Signal Channel UDP and TCP Port Number

IANA is requested to assign the port number TBD to the DOTS signal channel protocol for both UDP and TCP from the "Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry" available at <https://www.iana.org/assignments/service-names-port-numbers/service-names-port-numbers.xhtml>.

The assignment of port number 4646 is strongly suggested, as 4646 is the ASCII decimal value for ".." (DOTS).

9.2. Well-Known 'dots' URI

This document requests IANA to register the 'dots' well-known URI (Table 5) in the Well-Known URIs registry (<https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris/well-known-uris.xhtml>) as defined by [RFC8615]:

URI suffix	Change controller	Specification document(s)	Related information
dots	IETF	[RFCXXXX]	None

Table 5: 'dots' well-known URI

9.3. Media Type Registration

This document requests IANA to register the "application/dots+cbor" media type in the "Media Types" registry [IANA.MediaTypes] in the manner described in [RFC6838], which can be used to indicate that the content is a DOTS signal channel object:

- o Type name: application
- o Subtype name: dots+cbor
- o Required parameters: N/A
- o Optional parameters: N/A
- o Encoding considerations: binary
- o Security considerations: See the Security Considerations section of [RFCXXXX]
- o Interoperability considerations: N/A
- o Published specification: [RFCXXXX]
- o Applications that use this media type: DOTS agents sending DOTS messages over CoAP over (D)TLS.
- o Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

- o Additional information:
 - Magic number(s): N/A
 - File extension(s): N/A
 - Macintosh file type code(s): N/A
- o Person & email address to contact for further information:
IESG, iesg@ietf.org
- o Intended usage: COMMON
- o Restrictions on usage: none
- o Author: See Authors' Addresses section.
- o Change controller: IESG
- o Provisional registration? No

9.4. CoAP Content-Formats Registration

This document requests IANA to register the CoAP Content-Format ID for the "application/dots+cbor" media type in the "CoAP Content-Formats" registry [IANA.CoAP.Content-Formats] (0-255 range):

- o Media Type: application/dots+cbor
- o Encoding: -
- o Id: TBD1
- o Reference: [RFCXXXX]

9.5. CBOR Tag Registration

This section defines the DOTS CBOR tag as another means for applications to declare that a CBOR data structure is a DOTS signal channel object. Its use is optional and is intended for use in cases in which this information would not otherwise be known. DOTS CBOR tag is not required for DOTS signal channel protocol version specified in this document. If present, the DOTS tag MUST prefix a DOTS signal channel object.

This document requests IANA to register the DOTS signal channel CBOR tag in the "CBOR Tags" registry [IANA.CBOR.Tags] using the 24-255 range:

- o CBOR Tag: TBD2 (please assign the same value as the Content-Format)
- o Data Item: DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) signal channel object
- o Semantics: DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) signal channel object, as defined in [RFCXXXX]
- o Description of Semantics: [RFCXXXX]

9.6. DOTS Signal Channel Protocol Registry

The document requests IANA to create a new registry, entitled "DOTS Signal Channel Registry". The following sections define sub-registries.

9.6.1. DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Key Values Sub-Registry

The document requests IANA to create a new sub-registry, entitled "DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Key Values".

The structure of this sub-registry is provided in Section 9.6.1.1. Section 9.6.1.2 provides how the registry is initially populated with the values in Table 4.

9.6.1.1. Registration Template

Parameter name:

Parameter name as used in the DOTS signal channel.

CBOR Key Value:

Key value for the parameter. The key value MUST be an integer in the 1-65535 range. The key values of the comprehension-required range (0x0001 - 0x3FFF) and of the comprehension-optional range (0x8000 - 0xBFFF) are assigned by IETF Review (Section 4.8 of [RFC8126]). The key values of the comprehension-optional range (0x4000 - 0x7FFF) are assigned by Specification Required (Section 4.6 of [RFC8126]) and of the comprehension-optional range (0xC000 - 0xFFFF) are reserved for Private Use (Section 4.1 of [RFC8126]).

Registration requests for the 0x4000 - 0x7FFF range are evaluated after a three-week review period on the dots-signal-reg-review@ietf.org mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts. However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication, the Designated Experts may approve registration once they are satisfied that such a specification will be published. New registration requests should be sent in the form of an email to the review mailing list; the request should use an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to register CBOR Key Value for DOTS: example"). IANA will only accept new registrations from the Designated Experts, and will check that review was requested on the mailing list in accordance with these procedures.

Within the review period, the Designated Experts will either approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the review list and IANA. Denials should include an

explanation and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful. Registration requests that are undetermined for a period longer than 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention (using the `iesg@ietf.org` mailing list) for resolution.

Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Experts includes determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing functionality, whether it is likely to be of general applicability or whether it is useful only for a single use case, and whether the registration description is clear. IANA must only accept registry updates to the 0x4000 - 0x7FFF range from the Designated Experts and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing list. It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed. In cases where a registration decision could be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other Experts.

CBOR Major Type:

CBOR Major type and optional tag for the parameter.

Change Controller:

For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG". For others, give the name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., email address) may also be included.

Specification Document(s):

Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter, preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be included but is not required.

9.6.1.2. Initial Sub-Registry Content

Parameter Name	CBOR Key Value	CBOR Major Type	Change Controller	Specification Document (s)
ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope	1	5	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
scope	2	4	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
cdid	3	3	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
cuid	4	3	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
mid	5	0	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
target-prefix	6	4	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
target-port-range	7	4	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
lower-port	8	0	IESG	[RFCXXXX]

upper-port	9	0	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
target-protocol	10	4	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
target-fqdn	11	4	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
target-uri	12	4	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
alias-name	13	4	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
lifetime	14	0/1	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
mitigation-start	15	0	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
status	16	0	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
conflict-information	17	5	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
conflict-status	18	0	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
conflict-cause	19	0	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
retry-timer	20	0	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
conflict-scope	21	5	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
acl-list	22	4	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
acl-name	23	3	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
acl-type	24	3	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
bytes-dropped	25	0	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
bps-dropped	26	0	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
pkts-dropped	27	0	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
pps-dropped	28	0	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
attack-status	29	0	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
ietf-dots-signal-channel:signal-config	30	5	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
sid	31	0	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
mitigating-config	32	5	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
heartbeat-interval	33	5	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
min-value	34	0	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
max-value	35	0	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
current-value	36	0	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
missing-hb-allowed	37	5	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
max-retransmit	38	5	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
ack-timeout	39	5	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
ack-random-factor	40	5	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
min-value-decimal	41	6tag4	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
max-value-decimal	42	6tag4	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
current-value-decimal	43	6tag4	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
idle-config	44	5	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
trigger-mitigation	45	7	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
ietf-dots-signal-channel:redirection-signal	46	5	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
alt-server	47	3	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
alt-server-record	48	4	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
ietf-dots-signal-channel:heartbeat	49	5	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
probing-rate	50	5	IESG	[RFCXXXX]
peer-hb-status	51	7	IESG	[RFCXXXX]

Table 6: Initial DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Key Values Registry

9.6.2. Status Codes Sub-Registry

The document requests IANA to create a new sub-registry, entitled "DOTS Signal Channel Status Codes". Codes in this registry are used as valid values of 'status' parameter.

The registry is initially populated with the following values:

Cod e	Label	Description	Reference
1	attack-mitigation-in-progress	Attack mitigation setup is in progress (e.g., changing the network path to redirect the inbound traffic to a DOTS mitigator).	[RFCXXXX]
2	attack-successfully-mitigated	Attack is being successfully mitigated (e.g., traffic is redirected to a DDoS mitigator and attack traffic is dropped).	[RFCXXXX]
3	attack-stopped	Attack has stopped and the DOTS client can withdraw the mitigation request.	[RFCXXXX]
4	attack-exceeded-capability	Attack has exceeded the mitigation	[RFCXXXX]

5	dots-client-withdrawn-mitigation	provider capability. DOTS client has withdrawn the mitigation request and the mitigation is active but terminating.	[RFCXXXX]
6	attack-mitigation-terminated	Attack mitigation is now terminated.	[RFCXXXX]
7	attack-mitigation-withdrawn	Attack mitigation is withdrawn.	[RFCXXXX]
8	attack-mitigation-signal-loss	Attack mitigation will be triggered for the mitigation request only when the DOTS signal channel session is lost.	[RFCXXXX]

New codes can be assigned via Standards Action [RFC8126].

9.6.3. Conflict Status Codes Sub-Registry

The document requests IANA to create a new sub-registry, entitled "DOTS Signal Channel Conflict Status Codes". Codes in this registry are used as valid values of 'conflict-status' parameter.

The registry is initially populated with the following values:

Code	Label	Description	Reference
1	request-inactive-other-active	DOTS server has detected conflicting mitigation requests from different DOTS clients. This mitigation request is currently inactive until the conflicts are resolved. Another mitigation request is active.	[RFCXXXX]
2	request-active	DOTS server has detected conflicting mitigation requests from different DOTS clients. This mitigation request is currently active.	[RFCXXXX]
3	all-requests-inactive	DOTS server has detected conflicting mitigation requests from different DOTS clients. All conflicting mitigation requests are inactive.	[RFCXXXX]

New codes can be assigned via Standards Action [RFC8126].

9.6.4. Conflict Cause Codes Sub-Registry

The document requests IANA to create a new sub-registry, entitled "DOTS Signal Channel Conflict Cause Codes". Codes in this registry are used as valid values of 'conflict-cause' parameter.

The registry is initially populated with the following values:

Code	Label	Description	Reference
1	overlapping-targets	Overlapping targets.	[RFCXXXX]
2	conflict-with-acceptlist	Conflicts with an existing accept-list. This code is returned when the DDoS mitigation detects source addresses/prefixes in the accept-listed ACLs are attacking the target.	[RFCXXXX]
3	cuid-collision	CUID Collision. This code is returned when a DOTS client uses a 'cuid' that is already used by another DOTS client.	[RFCXXXX]

New codes can be assigned via Standards Action [RFC8126].

9.6.5. Attack Status Codes Sub-Registry

The document requests IANA to create a new sub-registry, entitled "DOTS Signal Channel Attack Status Codes". Codes in this registry are used as valid values of 'attack-status' parameter.

The registry is initially populated with the following values:

Code	Label	Description	Reference
1	under-attack	The DOTS client determines that it is still under attack.	[RFCXXXX]
2	attack-successfully-mitigated	The DOTS client determines that the attack is successfully mitigated.	[RFCXXXX]

New codes can be assigned via Standards Action [RFC8126].

9.7. DOTS Signal Channel YANG Modules

This document requests IANA to register the following URIs in the "ns" subregistry within the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-signal-channel
 Registrant Contact: The IESG.
 XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:iana-dots-signal-channel
 Registrant Contact: IANA.
 XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.

This document requests IANA to register the following YANG modules in the "YANG Module Names" subregistry [RFC7950] within the "YANG Parameters" registry.

Name: ietf-dots-signal-channel
 Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-signal-channel
 Maintained by IANA: N
 Prefix: signal
 Reference: RFC XXXX

Name: iana-dots-signal-channel
 Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:iana-dots-signal-channel
 Maintained by IANA: Y
 Prefix: iana-signal
 Reference: RFC XXXX

This document defines the initial version of the IANA-maintained iana-dots-signal-channel YANG module. IANA is requested to add this note:

Status, conflict status, conflict cause, and attack status values must not be directly added to the iana-dots-signal-channel YANG module. They must instead be respectively added to the "DOTS Status Codes", "DOTS Conflict Status Codes", "DOTS Conflict Cause Codes", and "DOTS Attack Status Codes" registries.

When a 'status', 'conflict-status', 'conflict-cause', or 'attack-status' value is respectively added to the "DOTS Status Codes", "DOTS Conflict Status Codes", "DOTS Conflict Cause Codes", or "DOTS Attack Status Codes" registry, a new "enum" statement must be added to the iana-dots-signal-channel YANG module. The following "enum" statement, and substatements thereof, should be defined:

"enum": Replicates the label from the registry.

"value": Contains the IANA-assigned value corresponding to the 'status', 'conflict-status', 'conflict-cause', or 'attack-status'.

"description": Replicates the description from the registry.

"reference": Replicates the reference from the registry and adds the title of the document.

When the iana-dots-signal-channel YANG module is updated, a new "revision" statement must be added in front of the existing revision statements.

IANA is requested to add this note to "DOTS Status Codes", "DOTS Conflict Status Codes", "DOTS Conflict Cause Codes", and "DOTS Attack Status Codes" registries:

When this registry is modified, the YANG module iana-dots-signal-channel must be updated as defined in [RFCXXXX].

10. Security Considerations

High-level DOTS security considerations are documented in [RFC8612] and [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture].

Authenticated encryption MUST be used for data confidentiality and message integrity. The interaction between the DOTS agents requires Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) or Transport Layer Security (TLS) with a cipher suite offering confidentiality protection, and

the guidance given in [RFC7525] MUST be followed to avoid attacks on (D)TLS. The (D)TLS protocol profile used for the DOTS signal channel is specified in Section 7.

If TCP is used between DOTS agents, an attacker may be able to inject RST packets, bogus application segments, etc., regardless of whether TLS authentication is used. Because the application data is TLS protected, this will not result in the application receiving bogus data, but it will constitute a DoS on the connection. This attack can be countered by using TCP-AO [RFC5925]. Although not widely adopted, if TCP-AO is used, then any bogus packets injected by an attacker will be rejected by the TCP-AO integrity check and therefore will never reach the TLS layer.

An attack vector that can be achieved if the 'cuid' is guessable is a misbehaving DOTS client from within the client's domain which uses the 'cuid' of another DOTS client of the domain to delete or alter active mitigations. For this attack vector to happen, the misbehaving client needs to pass the security validation checks by the DOTS server, and eventually the checks of a client-domain DOTS gateway.

A similar attack can be achieved by a compromised DOTS client which can sniff the TLS 1.2 handshake, use the client certificate to identify the 'cuid' used by another DOTS client. This attack is not possible if algorithms such as version 4 Universally Unique Identifiers (UUIDs) in Section 4.4 of [RFC4122] are used to generate the 'cuid' because such UUIDs are not a deterministic function of the client certificate. Likewise, this attack is not possible with TLS 1.3 because most of the TLS handshake is encrypted and the client certificate is not visible to eavesdroppers.

A compromised DOTS client can collude with a DDoS attacker to send mitigation request for a target resource, gets the mitigation efficacy from the DOTS server, and conveys the mitigation efficacy to the DDoS attacker to possibly change the DDoS attack strategy. Obviously, signaling an attack by the compromised DOTS client to the DOTS server will trigger attack mitigation. This attack can be prevented by monitoring and auditing DOTS clients to detect misbehavior and to deter misuse, and by only authorizing the DOTS client to request mitigation for specific target resources (e.g., an application server is authorized to request mitigation for its IP addresses but a DDoS mitigator can request mitigation for any target resource in the network). Furthermore, DOTS clients are typically co-located on network security services (e.g., firewall) and a compromised security service potentially can do a lot more damage to the network.

Rate-limiting DOTS requests, including those with new 'cuid' values, from the same DOTS client defends against DoS attacks that would result in varying the 'cuid' to exhaust DOTS server resources. Rate-limit policies SHOULD be enforced on DOTS gateways (if deployed) and DOTS servers.

In order to prevent leaking internal information outside a client-domain, DOTS gateways located in the client-domain SHOULD NOT reveal the identification information that pertains to internal DOTS clients (e.g., source IP address, client's hostname) unless explicitly configured to do so.

DOTS servers MUST verify that requesting DOTS clients are entitled to trigger actions on a given IP prefix. That is, only actions on IP resources that belong to the DOTS client's domain MUST be authorized by a DOTS server. The exact mechanism for the DOTS servers to validate that the target prefixes are within the scope of the DOTS client domain is deployment-specific.

The presence of DOTS gateways may lead to infinite forwarding loops, which is undesirable. To prevent and detect such loops, this document uses the Hop-Limit Option.

When FQDNs are used as targets, the DOTS server MUST rely upon DNS privacy enabling protocols (e.g., DNS over TLS [RFC7858] or DoH [RFC8484]) to prevent eavesdroppers from possibly identifying the target resources protected by the DDoS mitigation service, and means to ensure the target FQDN resolution is authentic (e.g., DNSSEC [RFC4034]).

CoAP-specific security considerations are discussed in Section 11 of [RFC7252], while CBOR-related security considerations are discussed in Section 8 of [RFC7049].

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Appendix A. CUID Generation

The document recommends the use of SPKI to generate the 'cuid'. This design choice is motivated by the following reasons:

- o SPKI is globally unique.
- o It is deterministic.
- o It allows to avoid extra cycles that may be induced by 'cuid' collision.
- o DOTS clients do not need to store the 'cuid' in a persistent storage.
- o It allows to detect compromised DOTS clients that do not adhere to the 'cuid' generation algorithm.

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Abstract

The DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) effort is intended to provide a protocol that facilitates interoperability between multivendor solutions/services. This document presents use cases to evaluate the interactions expected between the DOTS components as well as DOTS messaging exchanges. The purpose of describing use cases is to identify the interacting DOTS components, how they collaborate and what are the types of information to be exchanged.

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1. Introduction

Currently, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack mitigation solutions are largely based upon siloed, proprietary communications schemes which result in vendor lock-in. As a side-effect, this makes the configuration, provisioning, operation, and activation of these solutions a highly manual and often time-consuming process. Additionally, coordination of multiple DDoS mitigation solutions simultaneously engaged in defending the same organization (resources) against DDoS attacks is fraught with both technical and process-related hurdles. This greatly increase operational complexity and often results in suboptimal DDoS attack mitigation efficacy.

The DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) effort is intended to specify a protocol that facilitates interoperability between multivendor DDoS mitigation solutions and ensures more automation in term of mitigation requests and attack characterization patterns. As DDoS solutions are broadly heterogeneous among different vendors, the primary goal for DOTS is to provide a high level interaction with these DDoS solutions such as initiating or terminating DDoS mitigation assistance.

It should be noted that DOTS is not in and of itself intended to perform orchestration functions duplicative of the functionality being developed by the [I2NSF] WG; rather, DOTS is intended to allow devices, services, and applications to request DDoS attack mitigation assistance and receive mitigation status updates.

These use cases are expected to provide inputs for the design of the DOTS protocol(s).

2. Terminology and Acronyms

This document makes use of the terms defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements].

In addition, this document introduces the following terms:

Inter-domain: a DOTS communications relationship between distinct organizations with separate spans of administrative control. Typical inter-domain DOTS communication relationships would be between a DDoS mitigation service provider and an end-customer who requires DDoS mitigation assistance; between multiple DDoS mitigation service providers coordinating mutual defense of a mutual end-customer; or between DDoS mitigation service providers which are requesting additional DDoS mitigation assistance in for attacks which exceed their inherent DDoS mitigation capacities and/or capabilities.

Intra-domain: a DOTS communications relationship between various (network) elements that are owned and operated by the same administrative entity. A typical intra-domain DOTS communications relationship would be between DOTS agents [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements] within the same organization.

2.1. Requirements Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

3. Use Cases Scenarios

This section provides a high-level description of scenarios addressed by DOTS. In both sub-sections, the scenarios are provided in order to illustrate the use of DOTS in typical DDoS attack scenarios. They are not definitive, and other use cases are expected to emerge with widespread DOTS deployment.

All scenarios present a coordination between the targeted organization, the DDoS attack telemetry and the mitigator. The coordination and communication between these entities depends, for example, on the characteristic or functionality of the entity itself, the reliability of the information provided by DDoS attack telemetry, and the business relationship between the DDoS target domain and the mitigator.

More explicitly, in some cases, the DDoS attack telemetry may simply activate a DDoS mitigation, whereas in other cases, it may collaborate by providing some information about an attack. In some cases, the DDoS mitigation may be orchestrated, which includes selecting a specific appliance as well as starting/ending a mitigation.

3.1. Inter-domain Use Cases

Inter-domain DOTS deployment scenarios span two or more distinct spans of administrative control. A typical inter-domain DOTS deployment may consist of an endpoint network such as an Internet-connected enterprise requesting DDoS mitigation assistance from one or more upstream transit providers offering DDoS mitigation services, or from a topologically-distant MSSP offering cloud-based overlay DDoS mitigation services. DOTS may also be used to facilitate coordination of DDoS mitigation activities between mitigation providers.

Coordination between organizations making use of DOTS in such scenarios is necessary. Along with DOTS-specific tasks such as DOTS peering and validating the exchange of DOTS messaging between the relevant organizations, externalities relating to routing advertisements, authoritative DNS records (for DNS-based diversion), network access policies for DOTS nodes, service-level agreements (SLAs), and DDoS mitigation provisioning are required.

3.1.1. End-customer with a single upstream transit provider offering DDoS mitigation services

In this scenario, an enterprise network with self-hosted Internet-facing properties such as Web servers, authoritative DNS servers, and VoIP PBXes has an intelligent DDoS mitigation system (IDMS) deployed to protect those servers and applications from DDoS attacks. In addition to their on-premise DDoS defense capability, they have contracted with their Internet transit provider for DDoS mitigation services which threaten to overwhelm their transit link bandwidth.

The IDMS is configured such that if the incoming Internet traffic volume exceeds 50% of the provisioned upstream Internet transit link capacity, the IDMS will request DDoS mitigation assistance from the upstream transit provider.

The requests to trigger, manage, and finalize a DDoS mitigation between the enterprise IDMS and the transit provider is performed using DOTS. The enterprise IDMS implements a DOTS client while the transit provider implements a DOTS server which is integrated with their DDoS mitigation orchestration system.

When the IDMS detects an inbound DDoS attack targeting the enterprise servers and applications, it immediately begins mitigating the attack.

During the course of the attack, the inbound traffic volume exceeds the 50% threshold; the IDMS DOTS client signals the DOTS server on

the upstream transit provider network to initiate DDoS mitigation. The DOTS server signals the DOTS client that it can service this request, and mitigation is initiated on the transit provider network.

Over the course of the attack, the DOTS server on the transit provider network periodically signals the DOTS client on the enterprise IDMS in order to provide mitigation status information, statistics related to DDoS attack traffic mitigation, and related information. Once the DDoS attack has ended, the DOTS server signals the enterprise IDMS DOTS client that the attack has subsided.

The enterprise IDMS then requests that DDoS mitigation services on the upstream transit provider network be terminated. The DOTS server on the transit provider network receives this request, communicates with the transit provider orchestration system controlling its DDoS mitigation system to terminate attack mitigation, and once the mitigation has ended, confirms the end of upstream DDoS mitigation service to the enterprise IDMS DOTS client.

Note that communications between the enterprise DOTS client and the upstream transit provider DOTS server may take place in-band within the main Internet transit link between the enterprise and the transit provider; out-of-band via a separate, dedicated wireline network link utilized solely for DOTS signaling; or out-of-band via some other form of network connectivity such as a third-party wireless 4G network link.

(a) A DDoS attack is initiated against online properties of an organization which has deployed DOTS-client-capable DDoS mitigators.

(b) CPE or PE DDoS mitigators detect, classify, and begin mitigating the DDoS attack.

(c) CPE or PE DDoS mitigators determine that their capacity and/or capability to mitigate the DDoS attack is insufficient, and utilize their DOTS client functionality to send a DOTS mitigation service initiation request to one or more DOTS servers residing on one or more upstream transit networks, peer networks, or overlay MSSP networks. This DOTS mitigation service initiation request may be automatically initiated by the CPE or PE DDoS mitigators, or may be manually triggered by personnel of the requesting organization in response to an alert from the mitigators (the mechanism by which this process takes place is beyond the scope of this document).

(d) The DOTS servers which receive the DOTS mitigation service initiation requests determine that they have been configured to honor requests from the requesting CPE or PE mitigators, and initiate situationally-appropriate DDoS mitigation service on their respective

networks (the mechanism by which this process takes place is beyond the scope of this document).

(e) The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS service status message to the requesting CPE or PE mitigators indicating that upstream DDoS mitigation service has been initiated.

(f) While DDoS mitigation services are active, the DOTS servers regularly transmit DOTS mitigation status updates to the requesting CPE or PE mitigators.

(g) While DDoS mitigation services are active, the CPE or PE mitigators may optionally regularly transmit DOTS mitigation efficacy updates to the relevant DOTS servers.

(h) When the upstream DDoS mitigators determine that the DDoS attack has ceased, they indicate this change in status to their respective DOTS servers (the mechanism by which this process takes place is beyond the scope of this document).

(i) The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to the CPE or PE mitigators indicating that the DDoS attack has ceased.

(j) The CPE or PE DDoS mitigators transmit a DOTS mitigation service termination request to the DOTS servers. This DOTS mitigation service termination request may be automatically initiated by the CPE or PE DDoS mitigators, or may be manually triggered by personnel of the requesting organization in response to an alert from the mitigators or a management system which monitors them (the mechanism by which this process takes place is beyond the scope of this document).

(k) The DOTS servers terminate DDoS mitigation service on their respective networks (the mechanism by which this process takes place is beyond the scope of this document).

(l) The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS mitigation status update to the CPE or PE mitigators indicating that DDoS mitigation services have been terminated.

(m) The CPE or PE DDoS mitigators transmit a DOTS mitigation termination status acknowledgement to the DOTS servers.

3.1.2. End-customer with multiple upstream transit providers offering DDoS mitigation services

This scenario shares many characteristics with the above, but with the key difference that the enterprise in question is multi-homed, i.e., has two or more upstream transit providers, and that they all provide DDoS mitigation services.

In most cases, the communications model for a multi-homed model would be the same as in the single-homed model, merely duplicated in parallel. However, if two or more of the upstream transit providers have entered into a mutual DDoS mitigation agreement and have established DOTS peering between the participants, DDoS mitigation status messages may be exchanged between the DOTS servers of the participants in order to provide a more complete picture of the DDoS attack scope, and allow for either automated or operator-assisted programmatic cooperative DDoS mitigation activities on the part of the transit providers.

The DOTS communications between the upstream transit providers will consist of mitigation start, mitigation status, and mitigation termination messages.

3.1.3. End-customer with multiple upstream transit providers, but only a single upstream transit provider offering DDoS mitigation services

This scenario is similar to the multi-homed scenario referenced above; however, only one of the upstream transit providers in question offers DDoS mitigation services. In this situation, the enterprise would cease advertising the relevant network prefixes via the transit providers which do not provide DDoS mitigation services - or, in the case where the enterprise does not control its own routing, request that the upstream transit providers which do not offer DDoS mitigation services stop advertising the relevant network prefixes on their behalf.

Once it has been determined that the DDoS attack has ceased, the enterprise once again announces the relevant routes to the upstream transit providers which do not offer DDoS mitigation services, or requests that they resume announcing the relevant routes on behalf of the enterprise.

Note that falling back to a single transit provider has the effect of reducing available inbound transit bandwidth during a DDoS attack. Without proper planning and sufficient provisioning of both the link capacity and DDoS mitigation capacity of the sole transit provider offering DDoS mitigation services, this reduction of available

bandwidth could lead to network link congestion caused by legitimate inbound network traffic. Therefore, careful planning and provisioning of both upstream transit bandwidth as well as DDoS mitigation capacity is required in scenarios of this nature.

The withdrawal and announcement of routing prefixes described in this use-case falls outside the scope of DOTS, although they could conceivably be triggered as a result of provider-specific orchestration triggered by the receipt of specific DOTS messages from the enterprise in question.

The DOTS communications model for this scenario will be identical to that described in Section 3.1.1.

3.1.4. End-customer with an overlay DDoS mitigation managed security service provider (MSSP)

This use case details an enterprise that has a local DDoS detection and classification capability and may or may not have an on-premise mitigation capability. The enterprise is contracted with an overlay DDoS mitigation MSSP, topologically distant from the enterprise network (i.e., not a direct upstream transit provider), which can redirect (divert) traffic away from the enterprise, provide DDoS mitigation services, and then forward (re-inject) legitimate traffic to the enterprise on an on-demand basis. In this scenario, diversion of Internet traffic destined for the enterprise network into the overlay DDoS mitigation MSSP network is typically accomplished via eBGP announcements of the relevant enterprise network CIDR blocks, or via authoritative DNS subdomain-based mechanisms (other mechanisms are not precluded, these are merely the most common ones in use today).

The enterprise determines thresholds at which a request for mitigation is triggered indicating to the MSSP that inbound network traffic should be diverted into the MSSP network and that DDoS mitigation should be initiated. The enterprise may also elect to manually request diversion and mitigation via the MSSP network as desired.

The communications required to initiate, manage, and terminate active DDoS mitigation by the MSSP is performed using DOTS. The enterprise DDoS detection/classification system implements a DOTS client, while the MSSP implements a DOTS server integrated with its DDoS mitigation orchestration system. One or more out-of-band methods for initiating a mitigation request, such as a Web portal, a smartphone app, or voice support hotline, may also be made available by the MSSP.

When an attack is detected, an automated or manual DOTS mitigation request is generated by the enterprise and sent to the MSSP. The enterprise DOTS mitigation request is processed by the MSSP DOTS server, which validates the origin of the request and passes it to the MSSP DDoS mitigation orchestration system, which then initiates active DDoS mitigation. This action will usually involve the diversion of all network traffic destined for the targeted enterprise into the MSSP DDoS mitigation network, where it will be subjected to further scrutiny, with DDoS attack traffic filtered by the MSSP. Successful mitigation of the DDoS attack will not only result in preserving the availability of services and applications resident on the enterprise network, but will also prevent DDoS attack traffic from ingressing the networks of the enterprise upstream transit providers/peers.

The MSSP should signal via DOTS to the enterprise that a mitigation request has been received and acted upon, and should also include an update of the mitigation status. The MSSP may respond periodically with additional updates on the mitigation status in order to enable the enterprise to make an informed decision on whether to maintain or terminate the mitigation. An alternative approach would be for the DOTS client mitigation request to include a time to live (TTL) for the mitigation, which may also be extended by the client should the attack still be ongoing as the TTL reaches expiration.

A variation of this use case may be that the enterprise is providing a DDoS monitoring and analysis service to customers whose networks may be protected by any one of a number of third-party providers. The enterprise in question may integrate with these third-party providers using DOTS and signal accordingly when a customer is attacked – the MSSP may then manage the life-cycle of the attack mitigation on behalf of the enterprise.

The DOTS communication model used in these scenarios will be identical to those described in Section 3.1.1 or Section 3.1.2.

3.1.5. End-customer operating an application or service with an integrated DOTS client

In this scenario, a Web server has a built-in mechanism to detect and classify DDoS attacks, which also incorporates a DOTS client. When an attack is detected, the self-defense mechanism is activated, and local DDoS mitigation is initiated.

The DOTS client built into the Web server has been configured to request DDoS mitigation services from an upstream transit provider or overlay MSSP once specific attack traffic thresholds have been reached, or certain network traffic conditions prevail. Once the

specified conditions have been met, the DOTS communications dialogue and subsequent DDoS mitigation initiation and termination actions described above take place.

The DOTS communication model used in these scenarios will be identical to those described in Section 3.1.1, Section 3.1.2 or Section 3.1.4, with the exception that the DOTS client will be the application or service in question.

3.1.6. End-customer operating a CPE network infrastructure device with an integrated DOTS client

Similar to the above use-case featuring applications or services with built-in DDoS attack detection/classification and DOTS client capabilities, in this scenario, an end-customer network infrastructure CPE device such as a router, layer-3 switch, firewall, or load-balance incorporates both the functionality required to detect and classify incoming DDoS attacks as well as DOTS client functionality.

The subsequent DOTS communications dialogue and resultant DDoS mitigation initiation and termination activities take place as described in Section 3.1.1, Section 3.1.2 or Section 3.1.4.

3.1.7. End-customer with an out-of-band smartphone application featuring DOTS client capabilities

This scenario would typically apply in a small office/home office (SOHO) setting, where the end-customer does not have CPE equipment or software capable of detecting/classifying/mitigating DDoS attack, yet still has a requirement for on-demand DDoS mitigation services. A smartphone application containing a DOTS client would be provided by the upstream transit mitigation provider or overlay DDoS MSSP to the SOHO end-customer; this application would allow a manual 'panic-button' to request the initiation and termination of DDoS mitigation services.

The DOTS communications dialogue and resultant DDoS mitigation initiation/status reporting/termination actions would then take place as in as described in in Section 3.1.1, Section 3.1.2 or Section 3.1.4, with the end-customer DOTS client application serving to display received status information while DDoS mitigation activities are taking place.

3.1.8. MSSP as an end-customer requesting overflow DDoS mitigation assistance from other MSSPs

This is a more complex use-case involving multiple DDoS MSSPs, whether transit operators, overlay MSSPs, or both. In this scenario, an MSSP has entered into a pre-arranged DDoS mitigation assistance agreement with one or more other DDoS MSSPs in order to ensure that sufficient DDoS mitigation capacity and/or capabilities may be activated in the event that a given DDoS attack threatens to overwhelm the ability of a given DDoS MSSP to mitigate the attack on its own.

BGP-based diversion (including relevant Letters of Authorization, or LoAs), DNS-based diversion (including relevant LoAs), traffic re-injection mechanisms such as Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) tunnels, provisioning of DDoS orchestration systems, et. al., must be arranged in advance between the DDoS MSSPs which are parties to the agreement. They should also be tested on a regular basis.

When a DDoS MSSP which is party to the agreement is nearing its capacity or ability to mitigate a given DDoS attack traffic, the DOTS client integrated with the MSSP DDoS mitigation orchestration system signals partner MSSPs to initiate network traffic diversion and DDoS mitigation activities. Ongoing attack and mitigation status messages may be passed between the DDoS MSSPs, and between the requesting MSSP and the ultimate end-customer of the attack.

The DOTS dialogues and resultant DDoS mitigation-related activities in this scenario progress as described in the other use-cases detailed above. Once the requesting DDoS MSSP is confident that the DDoS attack has either ceased or has fallen to levels of traffic/complexity which they can handle on their own, the requesting DDoS MSSP DOTS client sends mitigation termination requests to the participating overflow DDoS MSSPs.

3.2. Intra-domain Use Cases

While many of the DOTS-specific elements of inter-domain DOTS deployment scenarios apply to intra-domain scenarios, it is expected that many externalities such as coordination of and authorization for routing advertisements and authoritative DNS updates may be automated to a higher degree than is practicable in inter-domain scenarios, given that the scope of required activities and authorizations are confined to a single organization. In theory, provisioning and change-control related both to DOTS itself as well as relevant externalities may require less administrative overhead and less implementation lead-times.

The scope of potential DDoS mitigation actions may also be broader in intra-organizational scenarios, as presumably an organization will have a higher degree of autonomy with regards to both technically and administratively feasible activities.

3.2.1. Suppression of outbound DDoS traffic originating from a consumer broadband access network

While most DDoS defenses concentrate on inbound DDoS attacks ingressing from direct peering links or upstream transit providers, the DDoS attack traffic in question originates from one or more Internet-connected networks. In some cases, compromised devices residing on the local networks of broadband access customers are used to directly generate this DDoS attack traffic; in others, misconfigured devices residing on said local customer networks are exploited by attackers to launch reflection/amplification DDoS attacks. In either scenario, the outbound DDoS traffic emanating from these devices can be just as disruptive as an inbound DDoS attack, and can cause disruption for substantial proportions of the broadband access network operator's customer base.

Some broadband access network operators provide CPE devices (DSL modems/routers, cablemodems, FTTH routers, etc.) to their end-customers. Others allow end-customers to provide their own CPE devices. Many will either provide CPE devices or allow end-customers to supply their own.

Broadband access network operators typically have mechanisms to detect and classify both inbound and outbound DDoS attacks, utilizing flow telemetry exported from their peering/transit and customer aggregation routers. In the event of an outbound DDoS attack, they may make use of internally-developed systems which leverage their subscriber-management systems to de-provision end-customers who are sourcing outbound DDoS traffic; in some cases, they may have implemented quarantine systems to block all outbound traffic sourced from the offending end-customers. In either case, the perceived disruption of the end-customer's Internet access often prompts a help-desk call, which erodes the margins of the broadband access provider and can cause end-customer dissatisfaction.

Increasingly, CPE devices themselves are targeted by attackers who exploit security flaws in these devices in order to compromise them and subsume them into botnets, and then leverage them to launch outbound DDoS attacks. In all of the described scenarios, the end-customers are unaware that their computers and/or CPE devices have been compromised and are being used to launch outbound DDoS attacks - however, they may notice a degradation of their Internet connectivity as a result of outbound bandwidth consumption or other disruption.

By deploying DOTS-enabled telemetry systems and CPE devices (and possibly requiring DOTS functionality in customer-provided CPE devices), broadband access providers can utilize a standards-based mechanism to suppress outbound DDoS attack traffic while optionally allowing legitimate end-customer traffic to proceed unmolested.

In order to achieve this capability, the telemetry analysis system utilized by the broadband access provider must have DOTS client functionality, and the end-customer CPE devices must have DOTS server functionality. When the telemetry analysis system detects and classifies an outbound DDoS attack sourced from one or more end-customer networks/devices, the DOTS client of the telemetry analysis system sends a DOTS request to the DOTS server implemented on the CPE devices, requesting local mitigation assistance in suppressing either the identified outbound DDoS traffic, or all outbound traffic sourced from the end-customer networks/devices. The DOTS server residing within the CPE device(s) would then perform predefined actions such as implementing on-board access-control lists (ACLs) to suppress the outbound traffic in question and prevent it from leaving the local end-customer network(s).

Broadband access network operators may choose to implement a quarantine of all or selected network traffic originating from end-customer networks/devices which are sourcing outbound DDoS traffic, redirecting traffic from interactive applications such as Web browsers to an internal portal which informs the end-customer of the quarantine action, and providing instructions for self-remediation and/or helpdesk contact information.

Quarantine systems for broadband access networks are typically custom-developed and -maintained, and are generally deployed only by a relatively small number of broadband access providers with considerable internal software development and support capabilities. By requiring the manufacturers of operator-supplied CPE devices to implement DOTS server functionality, and requiring customer-provided CPE devices to feature DOTS server functionality, broadband access network operators who previously could not afford the development expense of creating custom quarantine systems to integrate DOTS-enabled network telemetry systems to act as DOTS clients and perform effective quarantine of end-customer networks and devices until such time as they have been remediated.

The DOTS communications model in this scenario resembles that described in Section 3.1.1, except that all the DOTS communications take place within the same span of administrative control and the same network.

3.2.2. Home Network DDoS Detection Collaboration for ISP network management

Home networks run with (limited) bandwidth as well as limited routing resources, while they are expected to provide services reachable from the outside [RFC7368]. This makes such networks some easy targets to DDoS attacks via their WAN interface. As these DDoS attacks are easy to perform, they may remain undetected by the upstream ISP. When the CPE is congested, the customer is likely to call the ISP hotline. In order to improve the quality of experience of the connectivity as well as to automate the request for DDoS mitigation, ISPs are likely to consider a standard mean for CPEs to automatically inform a dedicated service mitigation platform when they are under a suspected DDoS.

Note also that this section only considers DDoS attacks CPE or services in the home network are encountering. This differs from DDoS attacks the CPE or any device within the home network may take part of – such as botnets. In the later attacks, the home network generates traffic under the control of a botmaster. Such attacks may only be detected once the attacks have been characterized. It would be tempting to consider a feature in the DOTS protocol to allow a DOTS server to inform a CPE that some suspect traffic is being sent by the CPE so that appropriate actions are undertaken by the CPE/user. Nevertheless, this feature would require some interaction with the CPE administrator. Such scenario is outside the scope of this document.

In this use case, ISPs are willing to prevent their customer undergoing DDoS attacks in order to enhance the quality of experience of their customers, to avoid unnecessary costly call on hot lines as well as to optimize the bandwidth of their network. A key challenge for the ISP is to detect DDoS attacks. In fact, DDoS detection is not only fine grained but is also expected to be different for each home network or small businesses networks (SOHO), and the ISP is unlikely to have sufficient resource to inspect the traffic of all its customers.

In order to address these challenges, ISPs are delegating the DDoS detection to CPE of home network or SOHO. Outsourcing the detection on the CPE provides the following advantages to the ISP: 1) Avoid the ISP to dedicate a huge amount of resource for deep packet inspection over a large amount of traffic with a specific security policies associated to each home network. It is expected that such traffic only constitutes a small fraction of the total traffic the ISP is responsible for. 2) DDoS detection is deployed in a scalable way. 3) Provide more deterministic DDoS attack detection. For example, what could be suspected to be an UDP flood by the ISP may be consented by

the terminating point hosted in the home network or SOHO. In fact, without specific home network security policies, the ISP is likely to detect DDoS attack over regular traffic or to miss DDoS attacks targeting a specific home network or CPE. In the first case, this would result in the ISP spending unnecessary resources and in the second case this would directly impact the quality of experience of the customer.

Note that in this scenario slightly differs from the "Enterprise with an upstream transit provider DDoS mitigation Service" scenario described in Section 3.1.1. In this scenario, the detection DDoS is motivated by the ISP in order to operate appropriately its network.

For that purpose, it requires some collaboration with the home network. In Section 3.1.1, the target network requests a mitigation service from the upstream transit provider in order to operate its services.

Even though the motivations differ, there are still significant advantages for the home network to collaborate. On the home network or SOHO perspective such collaboration provides the following advantages: 1) If it removes the flows contributing to a DDoS attacks, then it enhances the quality of experience of the users of the targeted services or the entire home network. 2) If mitigation is being handled by the ISP rather than the home network, then it reduces the management of DDoS attacks by the network administrator which involves detection as well as mitigation as well as the provisioning of extra resources. 3) If the DDoS detection is based on information specific to the home network, such as for example the description of the services, the hosts capacities or the network topology, then performing the DDoS detection by the home network instead of the ISP avoids the home network to leak private information to the ISP. In that sense, it better preserves the home network or SOHO privacy while enabling a better detection. However, the request for mitigation may still leak some informations. ISPs must not retrieve sensitive data without the consent of the user. This is usually captured in administrative contracts that are out of scope of this document.

When the CPE suspects an attack, it notifies automatically or the ISP. The contact address of the DDoS Mitigation service of the ISP may be hard coded or may be configured manually or automatically (e.g., eventually the DHCP server may provide the DDoS mitigation service via specific DHCP options).

The communication to trigger a DDoS mitigation between the home network and the ISP is performed using DOTS. The home network CPE implements a DOTS client while the ISP implements a DOTS server.

The DOTS client on the CPE monitors the status of CPE's resource and WAN link bandwidth usage. If something unusual happens based on preconfigured throughput, traffic pattern, explicit action from the user, or some heuristics methods, the DOTS client sends a DOTS mitigation request to the ISP DOTS server. Typically, a default configuration with no additional information associated to the DOTS mitigation request is expected. The ISP derives traffic to mitigate from the CPE IP address.

In some cases, the DOTS mitigation request contains options such as some IP addresses or prefixes that belongs to a whitelist or a blacklist. In this case, the white and black lists are not associated to some analysis performed by the CPE - as the CPE is clearly not expected to analyze such attacks. Instead these are part of some configuration parameters. For example, in the case of small business, one may indicate specific legitimate IP addresses such as those used for VPNs, or third party services the company is likely to set a session. Similarly, the CPE may provide the IP addresses targeting the assets to be protected inside the network. Note that the IP address is the IP address used to reach the asset from the internet, and as such is expected to be globally routable. Such options may include the IP address as well as a service description. Similarly to the previous blacklist and whitelist, such information are likely not derived from a traffic analysis performed by the CPE, but instead are more related to configuration parameters.

Upon receiving the DOTS mitigation request, the DOTS server acknowledges its reception and confirms DDoS mitigation starts or not. Such feedback is mostly to avoid retransmission of the request.

Note that the ISP is connected to multiple CPEs and as such the CPE can potentially perform DDoS attack to the DOTS server. ISP may use gateways to absorb the traffic. These gateways, will typically aggregate a smaller number of CPEs and retransmit to the destination DOTS Server a selected information. Note that such gateways may somehow act as a DOTS relay, which is implemented with a DOTS Server and a DOTS Client. Note also that the case of a large DDoS attack targeting simultaneously multiple CPEs is expected to be detected and mitigated by the upstream architecture, eventually without DOTS alerts sent by each single CPE.

ISP may activate mitigation for the traffic associated to the CPE sending the alert or instead to the traffic associated to all CPE. Such decisions are not part of DOTS, but instead depend on the policies of the ISP.

It is unlikely the CPE will follow the status of the mitigation. The ISP is only expected to inform the CPE the mitigation has been stopped.

Upon receipt of such notification the CPE may, for example, re-activate the monitoring jobs and thus is likely to provide some further DOTS alert.

3.2.3. DDoS Orchestration

In this use case, one or multiple DDoS telemetry systems or monitoring devices such as a flow telemetry collector monitor a network -- typically an ISP network. Upon detection of a DDoS attack, these telemetry systems alert an orchestrator in charge of coordinating the various DDoS mitigation systems within the domain. The telemetry systems may be configured to provide necessary and useful pieces of information, such as a preliminary analysis of the observation to the orchestrator.

The orchestrator analyses the various information it receives from specialized equipment, and elaborates one or multiple DDoS mitigation strategies. In some case, a manual confirmation may also be required to choose a proposed strategy or to initiate a DDoS mitigation. The DDoS mitigation may consist of multiple steps such as configuring the network, various hardware, or updating already instantiated DDoS mitigation functions. In some cases, some specific virtual DDoS mitigation functions must be instantiated and properly ordered. Eventually, the coordination of the mitigation may involve external DDoS resources such as a transit provider (Section 3.1.1) or an MSSP (Section 3.1.4).

The communications used to trigger a DDoS mitigation between the telemetry and monitoring systems and the orchestrator is performed using DOTS. The telemetry systems implements a DOTS client while the orchestrator implements a DOTS server.

The communication between a network administrator and the orchestrator is also performed using DOTS. The network administrator via its web interfaces implements a DOTS client, while the Orchestrator implements a DOTS server.

The communication between the Orchestrator and the DDoS mitigation systems is performed using DOTS. The Orchestrator implements a DOTS client while the DDoS mitigation systems implement a DOTS server.

The configuration aspects of each DDoS mitigation system, as well as the instantiations of DDoS mitigation functions or network

configuration is not part of DOTS. Similarly, the discovery of available DDoS mitigation functions is not part of DOTS.




Figure 1: DDoS Orchestration

The telemetry systems monitor various traffic network and perform their measurement tasks. They are configured so that when an event or some measurements reach a predefined level to report a DOTS mitigation request to the Orchestrator. The DOTS mitigation request may be associated with some element such as specific reporting.

Upon receipt of the DOTS mitigation request from the telemetry system, the Orchestrator responds with an acknowledgement, to avoid retransmission of the request for mitigation. The status of the DDoS mitigation indicates the Orchestrator is in an analysing phase. The Orchestrator begins collecting various information from various telemetry systems in order to correlate the measurements and provide an analysis of the event. Eventually, the Orchestrator may ask additional information to the telemetry system, however, the collection of these information is performed outside DOTS.

The orchestrator may be configured to start a DDoS mitigation upon approval from a network administrator. The analysis from the orchestrator is reported to the network administrator via a web

interface. If the network administrator decides to start the mitigation, she orders through her web interface a DOTS client to send a request for DDoS mitigation. This request is expected to be associated with a context that identifies the DDoS mitigation selected.

Upon receiving the DOTS request for DDoS mitigation from the network administrator, the orchestrator orchestrates the DDoS mitigation according to the specified strategy. Its status indicates the DDoS mitigation is starting while not effective.

Orchestration of the DDoS mitigation systems works similarly as described in Section 3.1.1 and Section 3.1.4. The Orchestrator indicates with its status whether the DDoS Mitigation is effective.

When the DDoS mitigation is finished on the DDoS mitigation systems, the orchestrator indicates to the Telemetry systems as well as to the network administrator the DDoS mitigation is finished.

4. Security Considerations

DOTS is at risk from three primary attacks: DOTS agent impersonation, traffic injection, and signaling blocking. Associated security requirements and additional ones are defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements].

Impersonation and traffic injection mitigation can be managed through current secure communications best practices. DOTS is not subject to anything new in this area. One consideration could be to minimize the security technologies in use at any one time. The more needed, the greater the risk of failures coming from assumptions on one technology providing protection that it does not in the presence of another technology.

5. IANA Considerations

No IANA considerations exist for this document at this time.

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Use cases for DDoS Open Threat Signaling
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Abstract

The DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) effort is intended to provide protocols to facilitate interoperability across disparate DDoS mitigation solutions. This document presents sample use cases which describe the interactions expected between the DOTS components as well as DOTS messaging exchanges. These use cases are meant to identify the interacting DOTS components, how they collaborate, and what are the typical information to be exchanged.

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1. Introduction

At the time of writing, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack mitigation solutions are largely based upon siloed, proprietary communications schemes with vendor lock-in as a side-effect. This can result in the configuration, provisioning, operation, and activation of these solutions being a highly manual and often time-consuming process. Additionally, coordinating multiple DDoS mitigation solutions simultaneously is fraught with both technical and process-related hurdles. This greatly increases operational complexity which, in turn, can degrade the efficacy of mitigations that are generally highly dependent on a timely reaction by the system.

The DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) effort is intended to specify protocols that facilitate interoperability between diverse DDoS

mitigation solutions and ensure greater integration in term of attack detection, mitigation requests, and attack characterization patterns.

As DDoS solutions are broadly heterogeneous among vendors, the primary goal of DOTS is to provide high-level interaction amongst differing DDoS solutions, such as detecting DDoS attacks, initiating/terminating DDoS mitigation assistance, or requesting the status of a DDoS mitigation.

This document provides sample use cases that provided input for the requirements [RFC8612] and design of the DOTS protocols [RFC8782][RFC8783]. The use cases are not exhaustive and future use cases are expected to emerge as DOTS is adopted and evolves.

2. Terminology and Acronyms

This document makes use of the same terminology and definitions as [RFC8612]. In addition it uses the terms defined below:

- o DDoS Mitigation System (DMS): A system that performs DDoS mitigation. The DDoS Mitigation System may be composed of a cluster of hardware and/or software resources, but could also involve an orchestrator that may take decisions such as outsourcing some or all of the mitigation to another DDoS Mitigation System.
- o DDoS Mitigation: The action performed by the DDoS Mitigation System.
- o DDoS Mitigation Service: designates a service provided to a customer to mitigate DDoS attacks. Each service subscription usually involve Service Level Agreement (SLA) that has to be met. It is the responsibility of the DDoS Service provider to instantiate the DDoS Mitigation System to meet these SLAs.
- o DDoS Mitigation Service Provider: designates the administrative entity providing the DDoS Mitigation Service.
- o Internet Transit Provider (ITP): designates the entity that delivers the traffic to a customer network. It can be an Internet Service Provider (ISP), or an upstream entity delivering the traffic to the ISP.

3. Use Cases

3.1. Upstream DDoS Mitigation by an Upstream Internet Transit Provider

This use case describes how an enterprise or a residential customer network may take advantage of a pre-existing relation with its ITP in order to mitigate a DDoS attack targeting its network.

For clarity of discussion, the targeted network is indicated as an enterprise network, but the same scenario applies to any downstream network, including residential and cloud hosting networks.


As the ITP provides connectivity to the enterprise network, it is already on the path of the inbound and outbound traffic of the enterprise network and well aware of the networking parameters associated to the enterprise network WAN connectivity. This eases both the configuration and the instantiation of a DDoS Mitigation Service.

This section considers two kinds of DDoS Mitigation Service between an enterprise network and an ITP:

- o The upstream ITP may instantiate a DDoS Mitigation System (DMS) upon receiving a request from the enterprise network. This typically corresponds to the case when the enterprise network is under attack.
- o On the other hand, the ITP may identify an enterprise network as the source of an attack and send a mitigation request to the enterprise DMS to mitigate this at the source.

The two scenarios, though different, have similar interactions between the DOTS client and server. For the sake of simplicity, only the first scenario will be detailed in this section. Nevertheless, the second scenario is also in scope for DOTS.

In the first scenario, as depicted in Figure 1, an enterprise network with self-hosted Internet-facing properties such as Web servers, authoritative DNS servers, and VoIP servers has a DMS deployed to protect those servers and applications from DDoS attacks. In addition to on-premise DDoS defense capability, the enterprise has contracted with its ITP for DDoS Mitigation Services when attacks threaten to overwhelm the bandwidth of their WAN link(s).



* C is for DOTS client functionality

* S is for DOTS server functionality

Figure 1: Upstream Internet Transit Provider DDoS Mitigation

The enterprise DMS is configured such that if the incoming Internet traffic volume exceeds 50% of the provisioned upstream Internet WAN link capacity, the DMS will request DDoS mitigation assistance from the upstream transit provider. More sophisticated detection means may be considered as well.

The requests to trigger, manage, and finalize a DDoS Mitigation between the enterprise DMS and the ITP is performed using DOTS. The enterprise DMS implements a DOTS client while the ITP implements a DOTS server which is integrated with their DMS in this example.

When the enterprise DMS locally detects an inbound DDoS attack targeting its resources (e.g., servers, hosts, or applications), it immediately begins a DDoS Mitigation.

During the course of the attack, the inbound traffic volume to the enterprise network exceeds the 50% threshold and the enterprise DMS escalates the DDoS mitigation. The enterprise DMS DOTS client signals to the DOTS server on the upstream ITP to initiate DDoS Mitigation. The DOTS server replies to the DOTS client that it can

serve this request, and mitigation is initiated on the ITP network by the ITP DMS.

Over the course of the attack, the DOTS server of the ITP periodically informs the DOTS client on the mitigation status, statistics related to DDoS attack traffic mitigation, and related information. Once the DDoS attack has ended, or decreased to a certain level that the enterprise DMS might handle by itself, the DOTS server signals the enterprise DMS DOTS client that the attack has subsided.

The DOTS client on the enterprise DMS then requests the ITP to terminate the DDoS Mitigation. The DOTS server on the ITP receives this request and once the mitigation has ended, confirms the end of upstream DDoS Mitigation to the enterprise DMS DOTS client.

The following is an overview of the DOTS communication model for this use-case:

1. A DDoS attack is initiated against resources of a network organization (here, the enterprise) which has deployed a DOTS-capable DMS - typically a DOTS client.
2. The enterprise DMS detects, classifies, and begins the DDoS Mitigation.
3. The enterprise DMS determines that its capacity and/or capability to mitigate the DDoS attack is insufficient, and sends via its DOTS client a DOTS DDoS Mitigation request to one or more DOTS servers residing on the upstream ITP.
4. The DOTS server which receives the DOTS Mitigation request determines that it has been configured to honor requests from the requesting DOTS client, and honors the request by orchestrating its own DMS.
5. While the DDoS Mitigation is active, the DOTS server regularly transmits DOTS DDoS Mitigation status updates to the DOTS client.
6. Informed by the DOTS server status update that the attack has ended or subsided, the DOTS client transmits a DOTS DDoS Mitigation termination request to the DOTS server.
7. The DOTS server terminates DDoS Mitigation, and sends the notification to the DOTS client.

Note that communications between the enterprise DOTS client and the upstream ITP DOTS server may take place in-band within the main

Internet WAN link between the enterprise and the ITP; out-of-band via a separate, dedicated wireline network link utilized solely for DOTS signaling; or out-of-band via some other form of network connectivity such as a third-party wireless 4G network connectivity.


Note also that a DOTS client that sends a DOTS Mitigation request may be also triggered by a network admin that manually confirms the request to the upstream ITP, in which case the request may be sent from an application such as a web browser or a dedicated mobile application.

Note also that when the enterprise is multihomed and connected to multiple upstream ITPs, each ITP is only able to provide a DDoS Mitigation Service for the traffic it transits. As a result, the enterprise network may be required to coordinate the various DDoS Mitigation Services associated to each link. More multi-homing considerations are discussed in [I-D.ietf-dots-multihoming].

3.2. DDoS Mitigation by a Third Party DDoS Mitigation Service Provider

This use case differs from the previous use case described in Section 3.1 in that the DDoS Mitigation Service is not provided by an upstream ITP. In other words, as represented in Figure 2, the traffic is not forwarded through the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider by default. In order to steer the traffic to the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider, some network configuration changes are required. As such, this use case is likely to apply to large enterprises or large data centers, but as for the other use cases is not exclusively limited to them.

Another typical scenario for this use case is for there to be a relationship between DDoS Mitigation Service Providers, forming an overlay of DMS. When a DDoS Mitigation Service Provider mitigating a DDoS attack reaches its resources capacity, it may chose to delegate the DDoS Mitigation to another DDoS Mitigation Service Provider.



* C is for DOTS client functionality

* S is for DOTS server functionality

Figure 2: DDoS Mitigation between an Enterprise Network and Third Party DDoS Mitigation Service Provider

In this scenario, an enterprise network has entered into a pre-arranged DDoS mitigation assistance agreement with one or more third-party DDoS Mitigation Service Providers in order to ensure that sufficient DDoS mitigation capacity and/or capabilities may be activated in the event that a given DDoS attack threatens to overwhelm the ability of the enterprise's or any other given DMS to mitigate the attack on its own.

The pre-arrangement typically includes agreement on the mechanisms used to redirect the traffic to the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider, as well as the mechanism to re-inject the traffic back to the Enterprise Network. Redirection to the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider typically involves BGP prefix announcement or DNS redirection, while re-injection of the scrubbed traffic to the enterprise network may be performed via tunneling mechanisms (e.g., GRE). The exact mechanisms used for traffic steering are out of scope of DOTS, but will need to be pre-arranged, while in some contexts such changes could be detected and considered as an attack.

In some cases the communication between the enterprise DOTS client and the DOTS server of the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider may go through the ITP carrying the DDoS attack, which would affect the communication. On the other hand, the communication between the DOTS client and DOTS server may take a path that is not undergoing a DDoS attack.




Figure 3: Redirection to a DDoS Mitigation Service Provider

When the enterprise network is under attack or at least is reaching its capacity or ability to mitigate a given DDoS attack, the DOTS client sends a DOTS request to the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider to initiate network traffic diversion – as represented in Figure 3 – and DDoS mitigation activities. Ongoing attack and mitigation status messages may be passed between the enterprise network and the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider using DOTS. If the DDoS attack has stopped or the severity of the attack has subsided, the DOTS client can request the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider to terminate the DDoS Mitigation.

3.3. DDoS Orchestration

In this use case, one or more DDoS telemetry systems or monitoring devices monitor a network - typically an ISP network, an enterprise network, or a data center. Upon detection of a DDoS attack, these DDoS telemetry systems alert an orchestrator in charge of coordinating the various DMS's within the domain. The DDoS telemetry systems may be configured to provide required information, such as a preliminary analysis of the observation, to the orchestrator.

The orchestrator analyses the various sets of information it receives from DDoS telemetry systems, and initiates one or more DDoS mitigation strategies. For example, the orchestrator could select the DDoS mitigation system in the enterprise network or one provided by the ITP.

DDoS Mitigation System selection and DDoS Mitigation techniques may depend on the type of the DDoS attack. In some case, a manual confirmation or selection may also be required to choose a proposed strategy to initiate a DDoS Mitigation. The DDoS Mitigation may consist of multiple steps such as configuring the network, or of updating already instantiated DDoS mitigation functions. Eventually, the coordination of the mitigation may involve external DDoS mitigation resources such as a transit provider or a Third Party DDoS Mitigation Service Provider.

The communication used to trigger a DDoS Mitigation between the DDoS telemetry and monitoring systems and the orchestrator is performed using DOTS. The DDoS telemetry system implements a DOTS client while the orchestrator implements a DOTS server.

The communication between a network administrator and the orchestrator is also performed using DOTS. The network administrator uses, for example, a web interface which interacts with a DOTS client, while the orchestrator implements a DOTS server.

The communication between the orchestrator and the DDoS Mitigation Systems is performed using DOTS. The orchestrator implements a DOTS client while the DDoS Mitigation Systems implement a DOTS server.

The configuration aspects of each DDoS Mitigation System, as well as the instantiations of DDoS mitigation functions or network configuration is not part of DOTS. Similarly, the discovery of available DDoS mitigation functions is not part of DOTS; and as such is out of scope.




Figure 4: DDoS Orchestration

The DDoS telemetry systems monitor various aspects of the network traffic and perform some measurement tasks.

These systems are configured so that when an event or some measurement indicators reach a predefined level their associated DOTS client sends a DOTS mitigation request to the orchestrator DOTS server. The DOTS mitigation request may be associated with some optional mitigation hints to let the orchestrator know what has triggered the request. In particular, it is possible for something that locally to one telemetry system looks like an attack is not actually an attack when seen from the broader scope (e.g., of the orchestrator)

Upon receipt of the DOTS mitigation request from the DDoS telemetry system, the orchestrator DOTS server responds with an acknowledgment, to avoid retransmission of the request for mitigation. The orchestrator may begin collecting additional fine-grained and specific information from various DDoS telemetry systems in order to correlate the measurements and provide an analysis of the event. Eventually, the orchestrator may ask for additional information from the DDoS telemetry system; however, the collection of this information is out of scope of DOTS.

The orchestrator may be configured to start a DDoS Mitigation upon approval from a network administrator. The analysis from the orchestrator is reported to the network administrator via, for example, a web interface. If the network administrator decides to start the mitigation, the network administrator triggers the DDoS mitigation request using, for example, a web interface of a DOTS client communicating to the orchestrator DOTS server. This request is expected to be associated with a context that provides sufficient information to the orchestrator DOTS server to infer, elaborate and coordinate the appropriate DDoS Mitigation.

Upon receiving a request to mitigate a DDoS attack aimed at a target, the orchestrator may evaluate the volume of the attack as well as the value that the target represents. The orchestrator may select the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider based on the attack severity. It may also coordinate the DDoS Mitigation performed by the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider with some other tasks such as, for example, moving the target to another network so new sessions will not be impacted. The orchestrator requests a DDoS Mitigation by the selected DDoS mitigation systems via its DOTS client, as described in Section 3.1.

The orchestrator DOTS client is notified that the DDoS Mitigation is effective by the selected DDoS mitigation systems. The orchestrator DOTS server returns this information back to the network administrator.

Similarly, when the DDoS attack has stopped, the orchestrator DOTS client is notified and the orchestrator's DOTS server indicates to the DDoS telemetry systems as well as to the network administrator the end of the DDoS Mitigation.

In addition to the above DDoS Orchestration, the selected DDoS mitigation system can return back a mitigation request to the orchestrator as an offloading. For example, when the DDoS attack becomes severe and the DDoS mitigation system's utilization rate reaches its maximum capacity, the DDoS mitigation system can send mitigation requests with additional hints such as its blocked traffic information to the orchestrator. Then the orchestrator can take further actions such as requesting forwarding nodes such as routers to filter the traffic. In this case, the DDoS mitigation system implements a DOTS client while the orchestrator implements a DOTS server. Similar to other DOTS use cases, the offloading scenario assumes that some validation checks are followed by the DMS, the orchestrator, or both (e.g., avoid exhausting the resources of the forwarding nodes or inadvertent disruption of legitimate services). These validation checks are part of the mitigation, and are therefore out of the scope of the document.

4. Security Considerations

The document does not describe any protocol, though there are still a few high-level security considerations to discuss.

DOTS is at risk from three primary attacks: DOTS agent impersonation, traffic injection, and signaling blocking.

Impersonation and traffic injection mitigation can be mitigated through current secure communications best practices including mutual authentication. Preconfigured mitigation steps to take on the loss of keepalive traffic can partially mitigate signal blocking, but in general it is impossible to comprehensively defend against an attacker that can selectively block any or all traffic. Alternate communication paths that are (hopefully) not subject to blocking by the attacker in question is another potential mitigation.

Additional details of DOTS security requirements can be found in [RFC8612].

Service disruption may be experienced if inadequate mitigation actions are applied. These considerations are out of the scope of DOTS.

5. IANA Considerations

No IANA considerations exist for this document.

6. Acknowledgments

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