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S. Fluhrer  
D. McGrew  
P. Kampanakis  
Cisco Systems  
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Postquantum Preshared Keys for IKEv2  
draft-fluhrer-qr-ikev2-04

Abstract

The possibility of quantum computers pose a serious challenge to cryptography algorithms widely today. IKEv2 is one example of a cryptosystem that could be broken; someone storing VPN communications today could decrypt them at a later time when a quantum computer is available. It is anticipated that IKEv2 will be extended to support quantum secure key exchange algorithms; however that is not likely to happen in the near term. To address this problem before then, this document describes an extension of IKEv2 to allow it to be resistant to a Quantum Computer, by using preshared keys.

Status of This Memo

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## 1. Introduction

It is an open question whether or not it is feasible to build a quantum computer (and if so, when might one be implemented), but if it is, many of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols currently in use would be insecure. A quantum computer would be able to solve DH and ECDH problems, and this would imply that the security of existing IKEv2 systems would be compromised. IKEv1 when used with strong preshared keys is not vulnerable to quantum attacks, because those keys are one of the inputs to the key derivation function. If the preshared key has sufficient entropy and the PRF, encryption and authentication transforms are postquantum secure, then the resulting system is believed to be quantum resistant, that is, believed to be invulnerable to an attacker with a Quantum Computer.

This document describes a way to extend IKEv2 to have a similar property; assuming that the two end systems share a long secret key, then the resulting exchange is quantum resistant. By bringing postquantum security to IKEv2, this note removes the need to use an obsolete version of the Internet Key Exchange in order to achieve that security goal.

The general idea is that we add an additional secret that is shared between the initiator and the responder; this secret is in addition

to the authentication method that is already provided within IKEv2. We stir in this secret into the SK\_d value, which is used to generate the key material (KEYMAT) keys and the SKEYSEED for the child SAs; this secret provides quantum resistance to the IPsec SAs (and any child IKE SAs). We also stir in the secret into the SK\_pi, SK\_pr values; this allows both sides to detect a secret mismatch cleanly.

It was considered important to minimize the changes to IKEv2. The existing mechanisms to do authentication and key exchange remain in place (that is, we continue to do (EC)DH, and potentially a PKI authentication if configured). This does not replace the authentication checks that the protocol does; instead, it is done as a parallel check.

### 1.1. Changes

Changes in this draft from the previous versions

draft-03

- Modified how we stir the PPK into the IKEv2 secret state
- Modified how the use of PPKs is negotiated

draft-02

- Simplified the protocol by stirring in the preshared key into the child SAs; this avoids the problem of having the responder decide which preshared key to use (as it knows the initiator identity at that point); it does mean that someone with a Quantum Computer can recover the initial IKE negotiation.
- Removed positive endorsements of various algorithms. Retained warnings about algorithms known to be weak against a Quantum Computer

draft-01

- Added explicit guidance as to what IKE and IPsec algorithms are Quantum Resistant

draft-00

- We switched from using vendor ID's to transmit the additional data to notifications
- We added a mandatory cookie exchange to allow the server to communicate to the client before the initial exchange

- We added algorithm agility by having the server tell the client what algorithm to use in the cookie exchange
- We have the server specify the PPK Indicator Input, which allows the server to make a trade-off between the efficiency for the search of the clients PPK, and the anonymity of the client.
- We now use the negotiated PRF (rather than a fixed HMAC-SHA256) to transform the nonces during the KDF

## 1.2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

## 2. Assumptions

We assume that each IKE peer has a list of Postquantum Preshared Keys (PPK) along with their identifiers (PPK\_id), and any potential IKE initiator has a selection of which PPK to use with with any specific responder. In addition, the implementation has a configurable flag that determines whether this postquantum preshared key is mandatory. This PPK is independent of the preshared key (if any) that the IKEv2 protocol uses to perform authentication.

## 3. Exchanges

If the initiator is configured to use a postquantum preshared key with the responder (whether or not the use of the PPK is optional), then it will include a notify payload in the initial exchange as follows:

Initiator	Responder
HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni, N(PPK_SUPPORT)	--->

N(PPK\_SUPPORT) is a status notification payload with the type [TBA]; it has a protocol ID of 0, and no SPI and no notification data associated with it.

If the initiator needs to resend this initial message with a cookie (because the responder response included a cookie notification), then the resend would include the PPK\_SUPPORT notification if the original message did.

When the responder receives this initial exchange with the notify, then it MUST check if has a PPK configured. If it does, it MUST

reply with the IKE initial exchange including a notification in response.

```

Initiator                               Responder
-----
<--- HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ], N(PPK_SUPPORT)

```

If the responder does not have a PPK configured, then it continues with the IKE protocol as normal, not including the notify.

When the initiator receives this reply, it checks whether the responder included the PPK\_SUPPORT notify. If the responder did not, then the initiator MUST either proceed with the standard IKE negotiation (without using a PPK), or abort the exchange (for example, because the initiator has the PPK marked as mandatory). If the responder did include the PPK\_SUPPORT notify, then it selects a PPK, along with its identifier PPK\_id. Then, it computes this modification of the standard IKE key derivation:

```

SKEYSEED = prf(Ni | Nr, gir)
{SK_d' | SK_ai | SK_ar | SK_ei | SK_er | SK_pi' | SK_pr' }
              = prf+ (SKEYSEED, Ni | Nr | SPIi | SPIr )
SK_d = prf(PPK, SK_d')
SK_pi = prf(PPK, SK_pi')
SK_pr = prf(PPK, SK_pr')

```

That is, we use the standard IKE key derivation process except that the three subkeys SK\_d, SK\_pi, SK\_pr are run through the prf again, this time using the PPK as the key.

The initiator then sends the initial encrypted message, including the PPK\_id value as follows:

```

Initiator                               Responder
-----
HDR, SK {IDi, [CERT,] [CERTREQ,]
        [IDr,] AUTH, SAi2,
        TSi, TSr, N(PPK_IDENTITY) (PPK_id)} --->

```

N(PPK\_IDENTITY) is a status notification payload with the type [TBA]; it has a protocol ID of 0, and no SPI and has a notification data that consists of the identifier PPK\_id.

When the responder receives this encrypted exchange, it first computes the values:

```

SKEYSEED = prf(Ni | Nr, g^ir)
{SK_d' | SK_ai | SK_ar | SK_ei | SK_er | SK_pi' | SK_pr' }
= prf+ (SKEYSEED, Ni | Nr | SPIi | SPIr )

```

It then uses the SK\_ei value to decrypt the message; and then finds the PPK\_id value attached to the notify. It then scans through the payload for the PPK\_id attached to the N(PPK\_IDENTITY); if it has no such PPK, it fails the negotiation. If it does have a PPK with that identity, it further computes:

```

SK_d = prf(PPK, SK_d')
SK_pi = prf(PPK, SK_pi')
SK_pr = prf(PPK, SK_pr')

```

And computes the exchange (validating the AUTH payload that the initiator included) as standard.

This table summarizes the above logic by the responder

Received PPK_SUPPORT	Have PPK	PPK Mandatory	Action
No	No	*	Standard IKE protocol
No	Yes	No	Standard IKE protocol
No	Yes	Yes	Abort negotiation
Yes	No	*	Standard IKE protocol
Yes	Yes	*	Include PPK_SUPPORT

When the initiator receives the response, then (if it is configured to use a PPK with the responder), then it checks for the presense of the notification. If it receives one, it marks the SA as using the configured PPK to generate SK\_d, SK\_pi, SK\_pr (as shown above); if it does not receive one, it MUST either abort the exchange (if the PPK was configured as mandatory), or it MUST continue without using the PPK (if the PPK was configured as optional).

If the initial exchange had PPK\_SUPPORT sent by both the initiator and the responder, and the initiator does not include a PPK\_NOTIFY notification, then the responder SHOULD fail the exchange.

With this protocol, the computed SK\_d is a function of the PPK, and assuming that the PPK has sufficient entropy (for example, at least 2\*\*256 possible values), then even if an attacker were able to recover the rest of the inputs to the prf function, it would be infeasible to use Grover's algorithm with a Quantum Computer to recover the SK\_d value. Similarly, every child SA key is a function of SK\_d, hence all the keys for all the child SAs are also quantum resistant (assuming that the PPK was high entropy and secret, and that all the subkeys are sufficiently long). However, this quantum

resistance does not extend to the initial SK<sub>ei</sub>, SK<sub>er</sub> keys; an implementation MAY rekey the initial IKE SA immediately after negotiating it; this would reduce the amount of data available to an attacker with a Quantum Computer.

#### 4. PPK ID format

This standard requires that both the initiator and the responder have a secret PPK value, with the responder selecting the PPK based on the PPK\_ID that the initiator sends. In this initial standard, both the initiator and the responder are configured with fixed PPK and PPK\_ID values, and do the look up based on that. It is anticipated that later standards will extend this technique to allow dynamically changing PPK values. To facilitate such an extension, we specify that the PPK\_ID that the initiator sends will have its first octet be the PPK ID Type value, which is encoded as follows:

PPK ID Type	Value
PPK_ID_OPAQUE	0
PPK_ID_FIXED	1
RESERVED TO IANA	2-127
Reserved for private use	128-255

For PPK\_ID\_OPAQUE, the format of the PPK ID (and the PPK itself) is not specified by this document; it is assumed to be mutually intelligible by both by initiator and the responder. This PPK ID type is intended for those implementations that choose not to disclose the type of PPK to active attackers.

For PPK\_ID\_FIXED, the format of the PPK ID and the PPK are fixed octet strings; the remaining bytes of the PPK\_ID are a configured value. We assume that there is a fixed mapping between PPK\_ID and PPK, which is configured locally to both the initiator and the responder. The responder can use to do a look up the passed PPK\_id value to determine the corresponding PPK value. Not all implementations are able to configure arbitrary octet strings; to improve the potential interoperability, it is recommended that, in the PPK\_ID\_FIXED case, both the PPK and the PPK\_ID strings be limited to the base64 character set, namely the 64 characters 0-9, A-Z, a-z, + and /.

The PPK ID type values 2-127 are reserved for IANA; values 128-255 are for private use among mutually consenting parties.

## 5. PPK Distribution

PPK\_id's of the type PPK\_ID\_FIXED (and the corresponding PPKs) are assumed to be configured within the IKE device in an out-of-band fashion. While the method of distribution is a local matter, one suggestion would be to reuse the format within [RFC6030], with the Key Id field being the PPK\_ID (without the 0x01 prefix for a PPK\_ID\_FIXED), and with the PPK being the secret, and the algorithm as PIN ("Algorithm=urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc:pin").

## 6. Upgrade procedure

This algorithm was designed so that someone can introduce PPKs into an existing IKE network without causing network disruption.

In the initial phase of the network upgrade, the network administrator would visit each IKE node, and configure:

- The set of PPKs (and corresponding PPK\_id's) that this node would need to know
- For each peer that this node would initiate to, which PPK that we would use
- That the use of PPK is currently optional

With this configuration, the node will continue to operate with nodes that have not yet been upgraded. This is due to the PPK\_SUPPORT notify; if the initiator has not been upgraded, it will not send the PPK\_SUPPORT notify (and so the responder will know that we will not use a PPK); if the responder has not been upgraded, it will not send the PPK\_SUPPORT notify (and so the initiator will know not to use a PPK). And, if both peers have been upgraded, they will both realize it, and in that case, the link will be quantum secure

As an optional second step, after all nodes have been upgraded, then the administrator may then go back through the nodes, and mark the use of PPK as mandatory. This will not affect the strength against a passive attacker; it would mean that an attacker with a Quantum Computer (which is sufficiently fast to be able to break the (EC)DH in real time would not be able to perform a downgrade attack).

## 7. Security Considerations

Quantum computers are able to perform Grover's algorithm; that effectively halves the size of a symmetric key. Because of this, the user SHOULD ensure that the postquantum preshared key used has at



least 256 bits of entropy, in order to provide a 128 bit security level.

Although this protocol preserves all the security properties of IKE against adversaries with conventional computers, this protocol allows an adversary with a Quantum Computer to decrypt all traffic encrypted with the initial IKE SA. In particular, it allows the adversary to recover the identities of both sides. If there is IKE traffic other than the identities that need to be protected against such an adversary, one suggestion would be to form an initial IKE SA (which is used to exchange identities), perhaps by using the protocol documented in RFC6023. Then, you would immediately create a child IKE SA (which is used to exchange everything else). Because the child IKE SA keys are a function of SK\_d, which is a function of the PPK (among other things), traffic protected by that SA is secure against Quantum capable adversaries.

In addition, the policy SHOULD be set to negotiate only quantum-resistant symmetric algorithms; while this RFC doesn't claim to give advise as to what algorithms are secure (as that may change based on future cryptographical results), here is a list of defined IKEv2 and IPsec algorithms that should NOT be used, as they are known not to be Quantum Resistant

Any IKE Encryption algorithm, PRF or Integrity algorithm with key size <256 bits

Any ESP Transform with key size <256 bits

PRF\_AES128\_XCBC and PRF\_AES128\_CBC; even though they are defined to be able to use an arbitrary key size, they convert it into a 128 bit key internally

## 8. References

### 8.1. Normative References

- [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, DOI 10.17487/RFC2104, February 1997, <<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2104>>.
- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>>.

- [RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T. Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October 2014, <<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>>.

## 8.2. Informational References

- [RFC6023] Nir, Y., Tschofenig, H., Deng, H., and R. Singh, "A Childless Initiation of the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) Security Association (SA)", RFC 6023, DOI 10.17487/RFC6023, October 2010, <<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6023>>.
- [RFC6030] Hoyer, P., Pei, M., and S. Machani, "Portable Symmetric Key Container (PSKC)", RFC 6030, DOI 10.17487/RFC6030, October 2010, <<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6030>>.
- [SPDP] McGrew, D., "A Secure Peer Discovery Protocol (SPDP)", 2001, <<http://www.mindspring.com/~dmcgrew/spdp.txt>>.

## Appendix A. Discussion and Rationale

The idea behind this is that while a Quantum Computer can easily reconstruct the shared secret of an (EC)DH exchange, they cannot as easily recover a secret from a symmetric exchange this makes the SK<sub>d</sub>, and hence the IPsec KEYMAT and any child SA's SKEYSEED, depend on both the symmetric PPK, and also the Diffie-Hellman exchange. If we assume that the attacker knows everything except the PPK during the key exchange, and there are  $2^n$  plausible PPK's, then a Quantum Computer (using Grover's algorithm) would take  $O(2^{n/2})$  time to recover the PPK. So, even if the (EC)DH can be trivially solved, the attacker still can't recover any key material (except for the SK<sub>ei</sub>, SK<sub>er</sub>, SK<sub>ai</sub>, SK<sub>ar</sub> values for the initial IKE exchange) unless they can find the PPK, and that's too difficult if the PPK has enough entropy (for example, 256 bits). Note that we do allow an attacker with a Quantum Computer to rederive the keying material for the initial IKE SA; this was a compromise to allow the responder to select the correct PPK quickly.

Another goal of this protocol is to minimize the number of changes within the IKEv2 protocol, and in particular, within the cryptography of IKEv2. By limiting our changes to notifications, and translating the nonces, it is hoped that this would be implementable, even on systems that perform much of the IKEv2 processing is in hardware.

A third goal was to be friendly to incremental deployment in operational networks, for which we might not want to have a global shared key, and also if we're rolling this out incrementally. This

is why we specifically try to allow the PPK to be dependent on the peer, and why we allow the PPK to be configured as optional.

A fourth goal was to avoid violating any of the security goals of IKEv2.

#### Appendix B. Acknowledgement

We would like to thank Tero Kivine, Valery Smyslov, Paul Wouters and the rest of the ipsecme working group for their feedback and suggestions for the scheme

#### Authors' Addresses

Scott Fluhner  
Cisco Systems

Email: [sfluhner@cisco.com](mailto:sfluhner@cisco.com)

David McGrew  
Cisco Systems

Email: [mcgrew@cisco.com](mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com)

Panos Kampanakis  
Cisco Systems

Email: [pkampana@cisco.com](mailto:pkampana@cisco.com)

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Y. Nir  
Dell EMC  
October 26, 2017

Using Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA) in the Internet  
Key Exchange (IKEv2)  
draft-ietf-ipsecme-eddsa-04

Abstract

This document describes the use of the Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm in the IKEv2 protocol.

Status of This Memo

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## 1. Introduction

The Internet Key Exchange protocol [RFC7296] can use arbitrary signature algorithms as described in [RFC7427]. The latter RFC defines the SIGNATURE\_HASH\_ALGORITHMS notification where each side of the IKE negotiation lists its supported hash algorithms. This assumes that all signature schemes involve a hashing phase followed by a signature phase. This made sense because most signature algorithms either cannot sign messages bigger than their key or truncate messages bigger than their key.

EdDSA ([RFC8032]) defines signature methods that do not require pre-hashing of the message. Unlike other methods, these accept arbitrary-sized messages, so no pre-hashing is required. These methods are called Ed25519 and Ed448, which respectively use the Edwards 25519 and the Edwards 448 ("Goldilocks") curves. Although that document also defines pre-hashed versions of these algorithm, those versions are not recommended for protocols where the entire to-be-signed message is available at once. See section 8.5 or RFC 8032 for that recommendation.

EdDSA defines the binary format of the signatures that should be used in the "Signature Value" field of the Authentication Data Format in section 3. The CURDLE PKIX document ([I.D-curdle-pkix]) defines the object identifiers (OIDs) for these signature methods. For convenience, these OIDs are repeated in Appendix A.

In order to signal within IKE that no hashing needs to be done, we define a new value in the SIGNATURE\_HASH\_ALGORITHMS notification, one that indicates that no hashing is performed.

### 1.1. Conventions Used in This Document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

## 2. The "Identity" Hash Identifier

This document defines a new value called "Identity" (value is 5) in the hash algorithm registry for use in the SIGNATURE\_HASH\_ALGORITHMS notification. Inserting this new value into the notification indicates that the receiver supports at least one signature algorithm that accepts arbitrary-sized messages such as Ed25519 and Ed448.

Ed25519 and Ed448 are only defined with the Identity hash, and MUST NOT be sent to a receiver that has not indicated support for the "Identity" hash.

The pre-hashed versions of Ed25519 and Ed448 (Ed25519ph and Ed448ph respectively) MUST NOT be used in IKE.

## 3. Security Considerations

The new "Identity" value is needed only for signature algorithms that accept an arbitrary-sized input. It MUST NOT be used if none of the supported and configured algorithms have this property. On the other hand there is no good reason to pre-hash the inputs where the signature algorithm has that property. For this reason implementations MUST have the "Identity" value in the SIGNATURE\_HASH\_ALGORITHMS notification when EdDSA is supported and configured. Implementations SHOULD NOT have other hash algorithms in the notification if all supported and configured signature algorithms have this property.

## 4. IANA Considerations

IANA has assigned the value 5 for the algorithm with the name "Identity" in the "IKEv2 Hash Algorithms" registry with this draft as reference.

Upon publication of this document IANA is requested to update the entry with this document as reference.

## 5. Normative References

- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>>.
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- [RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032, DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>>.
- [I.D-curdle-pkix] Josefsson, S. and J. Schaad, "Algorithm Identifiers for Ed25519, Ed25519ph, Ed448, Ed448ph, X25519 and X448 for use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure", September 2017, <<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-06>>.

## Appendix A. ASN.1 Objects

The normative reference for the ASN.1 objects for Ed25519 and Ed448 is in [I.D-curdle-pkix]. They are repeated below for convenience.

## A.1. ASN.1 Object for Ed25519

id-Ed25519 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1.3.101.112 }

Parameters are absent. Length is 7 bytes.

Binary encoding: 3005 0603 2B65 70

## A.2. ASN.1 Object for Ed448

id-Ed448 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 1.3.101.113 }

Parameters are absent. Length is 7 bytes.

Binary encoding: 3005 0603 2B65 71

## Author's Address

Yoav Nir  
Dell EMC  
9 Andrei Sakharov St  
Haifa 3190500  
Israel

EMail: ynir.ietf@gmail.com



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S. Fluhrer  
D. McGrew  
P. Kampanakis  
Cisco Systems  
V. Smyslov  
ELVIS-PLUS  
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Postquantum Preshared Keys for IKEv2  
draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-08

Abstract

The possibility of Quantum Computers pose a serious challenge to cryptography algorithms deployed widely today. IKEv2 is one example of a cryptosystem that could be broken; someone storing VPN communications today could decrypt them at a later time when a Quantum Computer is available. It is anticipated that IKEv2 will be extended to support quantum secure key exchange algorithms; however that is not likely to happen in the near term. To address this problem before then, this document describes an extension of IKEv2 to allow it to be resistant to a Quantum Computer, by using preshared keys.

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## 1. Introduction

It is an open question whether or not it is feasible to build a Quantum Computer (and if so, when one might be implemented), but if it is, many of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols currently in use would be insecure. A Quantum Computer would be able to solve DH and ECDH problems in polynomial time [I-D.hoffman-c2pq], and this would imply that the security of existing IKEv2 [RFC7296] systems would be compromised. IKEv1 [RFC2409], when used with strong preshared keys, is not vulnerable to quantum attacks, because those keys are one of the inputs to the key derivation function. If the preshared key has sufficient entropy and the PRF, encryption and authentication transforms are postquantum secure, then the resulting system is believed to be quantum resistant, that is, invulnerable to an attacker with a Quantum Computer.

This document describes a way to extend IKEv2 to have a similar property; assuming that the two end systems share a long secret key, then the resulting exchange is quantum resistant. By bringing postquantum security to IKEv2, this note removes the need to use an obsolete version of the Internet Key Exchange in order to achieve that security goal.

The general idea is that we add an additional secret that is shared between the initiator and the responder; this secret is in addition to the authentication method that is already provided within IKEv2. We stir this secret into the SK\_d value, which is used to generate the key material (KEYMAT) and the SKEYSEED for the child SAs; this secret provides quantum resistance to the IPsec SAs (and any child IKE SAs). We also stir the secret into the SK\_pi, SK\_pr values; this allows both sides to detect a secret mismatch cleanly.

It was considered important to minimize the changes to IKEv2. The existing mechanisms to do authentication and key exchange remain in place (that is, we continue to do (EC)DH, and potentially PKI authentication if configured). This document does not replace the authentication checks that the protocol does; instead, it is done as a parallel check.

### 1.1. Changes

RFC EDITOR PLEASE DELETE THIS SECTION.

Changes in this draft in each version iterations.

draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-05

- o Addressed comments received during WGLC.

draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-04

- o Using Group PPK is clarified based on comment from Quynh Dang.

draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-03

- o Editorial changes and minor text nit fixes.
- o Integrated Tommy P. text suggestions.

draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-02

- o Added note that the PPK is stirred in the initial IKE SA setup only.

- o Added note about the initiator ignoring any content in the PPK\_IDENTITY notification from the responder.
- o fixed Tero's suggestions from 2/6/1028
- o Added IANA assigned message types where necessary.
- o fixed minor text nits

draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-01

- o Nits and minor fixes.
- o prf is replaced with prf+ for the SK<sub>d</sub> and SK<sub>pi/r</sub> calculations.
- o Clarified using PPK in case of EAP authentication.
- o PPK\_SUPPORT notification is changed to USE\_PPK to better reflect its purpose.

draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-00

- o Migrated from draft-fluhrer-qr-ikev2-05 to draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-00 that is a WG item.

draft-fluhrer-qr-ikev2-05

- o Nits and editorial fixes.
- o Made PPK\_ID format and PPK Distributions subsection of the PPK section. Also added an Operational Considerations section.
- o Added comment about Child SA rekey in the Security Considerations section.
- o Added NO\_PPK\_AUTH to solve the cases where a PPK\_ID is not configured for a responder.
- o Various text changes and clarifications.
- o Expanded Security Considerations section to describe some security concerns and how they should be addressed.

draft-fluhrer-qr-ikev2-03

- o Modified how we stir the PPK into the IKEv2 secret state.
- o Modified how the use of PPKs is negotiated.

draft-fluhrer-qr-ikev2-02

- o Simplified the protocol by stirring in the preshared key into the child SAs; this avoids the problem of having the responder decide which preshared key to use (as it knows the initiator identity at that point); it does mean that someone with a Quantum Computer can recover the initial IKE negotiation.
- o Removed positive endorsements of various algorithms. Retained warnings about algorithms known to be weak against a Quantum Computer.

draft-fluhrer-qr-ikev2-01

- o Added explicit guidance as to what IKE and IPsec algorithms are quantum resistant.

draft-fluhrer-qr-ikev2-00

- o We switched from using vendor ID's to transmit the additional data to notifications.
- o We added a mandatory cookie exchange to allow the server to communicate to the client before the initial exchange.
- o We added algorithm agility by having the server tell the client what algorithm to use in the cookie exchange.
- o We have the server specify the PPK Indicator Input, which allows the server to make a trade-off between the efficiency for the search of the clients PPK, and the anonymity of the client.
- o We now use the negotiated PRF (rather than a fixed HMAC-SHA256) to transform the nonces during the KDF.

## 1.2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

## 2. Assumptions

We assume that each IKE peer has a list of Postquantum Preshared Keys (PPK) along with their identifiers (PPK\_ID), and any potential IKE initiator has a selection of which PPK to use with any specific responder. In addition, implementations have a configurable flag

that determines whether this postquantum preshared key is mandatory. This PPK is independent of the preshared key (if any) that the IKEv2 protocol uses to perform authentication. The PPK specific configuration that is assumed on each peer consists of the following tuple:

Peer, PPK, PPK\_ID, mandatory\_or\_not

### 3. Exchanges

If the initiator is configured to use a postquantum preshared key with the responder (whether or not the use of the PPK is mandatory), then he will include a notification USE\_PPK in the IKE\_SA\_INIT request message as follows:

```

Initiator                               Responder
-----
HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni, N(USE_PPK)  ---->

```

N(USE\_PPK) is a status notification payload with the type 16435; it has a protocol ID of 0, no SPI and no notification data associated with it.

If the initiator needs to resend this initial message with a cookie (because the responder response included a COOKIE notification), then the resend would include the USE\_PPK notification if the original message did.

If the responder does not support this specification or does not have any PPK configured, then she ignores the received notification and continues with the IKEv2 protocol as normal. Otherwise the responder checks if she has a PPK configured, and if she does, then the responder replies with the IKE\_SA\_INIT message including a USE\_PPK notification in the response:

```

Initiator                               Responder
-----
<--- HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ,] N(USE_PPK)

```

When the initiator receives this reply, he checks whether the responder included the USE\_PPK notification. If the responder did not and the flag mandatory\_or\_not indicates that using PPKs is mandatory for communication with this responder, then the initiator MUST abort the exchange. This situation may happen in case of misconfiguration, when the initiator believes he has a mandatory to use PPK for the responder, while the responder either doesn't support PPKs at all or doesn't have any PPK configured for the initiator.

See Section 6 for discussion of the possible impacts of this situation.

If the responder did not include the USE\_PPK notification and using a PPK for this particular responder is optional, then the initiator continues with the IKEv2 protocol as normal, without using PPKs.

If the responder did include the USE\_PPK notification, then the initiator selects a PPK, along with its identifier PPK\_ID. Then, she computes this modification of the standard IKEv2 key derivation:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{SKEYSEED} &= \text{prf}(\text{Ni} \mid \text{Nr}, \text{g}^{\text{ir}}) \\ &\{\text{SK}_{\text{d}'} \mid \text{SK}_{\text{ai}} \mid \text{SK}_{\text{ar}} \mid \text{SK}_{\text{ei}} \mid \text{SK}_{\text{er}} \mid \text{SK}_{\text{pi}'} \mid \text{SK}_{\text{pr}'} \} \\ &= \text{prf+}(\text{SKEYSEED}, \text{Ni} \mid \text{Nr} \mid \text{SPIi} \mid \text{SPIr} \} \\ \\ \text{SK}_{\text{d}} &= \text{prf+}(\text{PPK}, \text{SK}_{\text{d}'}) \\ \text{SK}_{\text{pi}} &= \text{prf+}(\text{PPK}, \text{SK}_{\text{pi}'}) \\ \text{SK}_{\text{pr}} &= \text{prf+}(\text{PPK}, \text{SK}_{\text{pr}'}) \end{aligned}$$

That is, we use the standard IKEv2 key derivation process except that the three subkeys SK<sub>d</sub>, SK<sub>pi</sub>, SK<sub>pr</sub> are run through the prf+ again, this time using the PPK as the key. Using prf+ construction ensures that it is always possible to get the resulting keys of the same size as the initial ones, even if the underlying PRF has output size different from its key size. Note, that at the time this document was written, all PRFs defined for use in IKEv2 [IKEV2-IANA-PRFS] had output size equal to the (preferred) key size. For such PRFs only the first iteration of prf+ is needed:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{SK}_{\text{d}} &= \text{prf}(\text{PPK}, \text{SK}_{\text{d}'} \mid 0\text{x01}) \\ \text{SK}_{\text{pi}} &= \text{prf}(\text{PPK}, \text{SK}_{\text{pi}'} \mid 0\text{x01}) \\ \text{SK}_{\text{pr}} &= \text{prf}(\text{PPK}, \text{SK}_{\text{pr}'} \mid 0\text{x01}) \end{aligned}$$

Note that the PPK is used in SK<sub>d</sub>, SK<sub>pi</sub> and SK<sub>pr</sub> calculation only during the initial IKE SA setup. It MUST NOT be used when these subkeys are calculated as result of IKE SA rekey, resumption or other similar operation.

The initiator then sends the IKE\_AUTH request message, including the PPK\_ID value as follows:

Initiator	Responder
-----	
HDR, SK {IDi, [CERT,] [CERTREQ,] [IDr,] AUTH, SAi2, TSi, TSr, N(PPK_IDENTITY, PPK_ID), [N(NO_PPK_AUTH)]}	---->

PPK\_IDENTITY is a status notification with the type 16436; it has a protocol ID of 0, no SPI and a notification data that consists of the identifier PPK\_ID.

A situation may happen when the responder has some PPKs, but doesn't have a PPK with the PPK\_ID received from the initiator. In this case the responder cannot continue with PPK (in particular, she cannot authenticate the initiator), but she could be able to continue with normal IKEv2 protocol if the initiator provided its authentication data computed as in normal IKEv2, without using PPKs. For this purpose, if using PPKs for communication with this responder is optional for the initiator, then the initiator MAY include a notification NO\_PPK\_AUTH in the above message.

NO\_PPK\_AUTH is a status notification with the type 16437; it has a protocol ID of 0 and no SPI. The Notification Data field contains the initiator's authentication data computed using SK\_pi', which has been computed without using PPKs. This is the same data that would normally be placed in the Authentication Data field of an AUTH payload. Since the Auth Method field is not present in the notification, the authentication method used for computing the authentication data MUST be the same as method indicated in the AUTH payload. Note that if the initiator decides to include the NO\_PPK\_AUTH notification, the initiator needs to perform authentication data computation twice, which may consume computation power (e.g. if digital signatures are involved).

When the responder receives this encrypted exchange, she first computes the values:

```
SKEYSEED = prf(Ni | Nr, g^ir)
{SK_d' | SK_ai | SK_ar | SK_ei | SK_er | SK_pi' | SK_pr' }
= prf+ (SKEYSEED, Ni | Nr | SPIi | SPIr )
```

She then uses the SK\_ei/SK\_ai values to decrypt/check the message and then scans through the payloads for the PPK\_ID attached to the PPK\_IDENTITY notification. If no PPK\_IDENTITY notification is found and the peers successfully exchanged USE\_PPK notifications in the IKE\_SA\_INIT exchange, then the responder MUST send back AUTHENTICATION\_FAILED notification and then fail the negotiation.

If the PPK\_IDENTITY notification contains PPK\_ID that is not known to the responder or is not configured for use for the identity from IDi payload, then the responder checks whether using PPKs for this initiator is mandatory and whether the initiator included NO\_PPK\_AUTH notification in the message. If using PPKs is mandatory or no NO\_PPK\_AUTH notification found, then the responder MUST send back AUTHENTICATION\_FAILED notification and then fail the



negotiation. Otherwise (when PPK is optional and the initiator included NO\_PPK\_AUTH notification) the responder MAY continue regular IKEv2 protocol, except that she uses the data from the NO\_PPK\_AUTH notification as the authentication data (which usually resides in the AUTH payload), for the purpose of the initiator authentication. Note, that Authentication Method is still indicated in the AUTH payload.

This table summarizes the above logic for the responder:

Received USE_PPK	Received NO_PPK_AUTH	Configured with PPK	PPK is Mandatory	Action
No	*	No	*	Standard IKEv2 protocol
No	*	Yes	No	Standard IKEv2 protocol
No	*	Yes	Yes	Abort negotiation
Yes	No	No	*	Abort negotiation
Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Abort negotiation
Yes	Yes	No	No	Standard IKEv2 protocol
Yes	*	Yes	*	Use PPK

If PPK is in use, then the responder extracts the corresponding PPK and computes the following values:

```
SK_d = prf+ (PPK, SK_d')
SK_pi = prf+ (PPK, SK_pi')
SK_pr = prf+ (PPK, SK_pr')
```

The responder then continues with the IKE\_AUTH exchange (validating the AUTH payload that the initiator included) as usual and sends back a response, which includes the PPK\_IDENTITY notification with no data to indicate that the PPK is used in the exchange:

Initiator	Responder
	<-- HDR, SK {IDr, [CERT,] AUTH, SAr2, TSi, TSr, N(PPK_IDENTITY)}

When the initiator receives the response, then he checks for the presence of the PPK\_IDENTITY notification. If he receives one, he marks the SA as using the configured PPK to generate SK\_d, SK\_pi, SK\_pr (as shown above); the content of the received PPK\_IDENTITY (if any) MUST be ignored. If the initiator does not receive the PPK\_IDENTITY, he MUST either fail the IKE SA negotiation sending the AUTHENTICATION\_FAILED notification in the Informational exchange (if the PPK was configured as mandatory), or continue without using the

PPK (if the PPK was not configured as mandatory and the initiator included the NO\_PPK\_AUTH notification in the request).

If EAP is used in the IKE\_AUTH exchange, then the initiator doesn't include AUTH payload in the first request message, however the responder sends back AUTH payload in the first reply. The peers then exchange AUTH payloads after EAP is successfully completed. As a result, the responder sends AUTH payload twice - in the first IKE\_AUTH reply message and in the last one, while the initiator sends AUTH payload only in the last IKE\_AUTH request. See more details about EAP authentication in IKEv2 in Section 2.16 of [RFC7296].

The general rule for using PPK in the IKE\_AUTH exchange, which covers EAP authentication case too, is that the initiator includes PPK\_IDENTITY (and optionally NO\_PPK\_AUTH) notification in the request message containing AUTH payload. Therefore, in case of EAP the responder always computes the AUTH payload in the first IKE\_AUTH reply message without using PPK (by means of SK\_pr'), since PPK\_ID is not yet known to the responder. Once the IKE\_AUTH request message containing PPK\_IDENTITY notification is received, the responder follows rules described above for non-EAP authentication case.

Initiator	Responder
HDR, SK {IDi, [CERTREQ, [IDr,] Sai2, TSi, TSr} -->	<-- HDR, SK {IDr, [CERT,] AUTH, EAP}
HDR, SK {EAP} -->	<-- HDR, SK {EAP (success)}
HDR, SK {AUTH, N(PPK_IDENTITY, PPK_ID) [, N(NO_PPK_AUTH)]} -->	<-- HDR, SK {AUTH, SAR2, TSi, TSr [, N(PPK_IDENTITY)]}

Note, that the IKE\_SA\_INIT exchange in case of PPK is as described above (including exchange of the USE\_PPK notifications), regardless whether EAP is employed in the IKE\_AUTH or not.

#### 4. Upgrade procedure

This algorithm was designed so that someone can introduce PPKs into an existing IKE network without causing network disruption.

In the initial phase of the network upgrade, the network administrator would visit each IKE node, and configure:

- o The set of PPKs (and corresponding PPK\_IDs) that this node would need to know.
- o For each peer that this node would initiate to, which PPK will be used.
- o That the use of PPK is currently not mandatory.

With this configuration, the node will continue to operate with nodes that have not yet been upgraded. This is due to the USE\_PPK notify and the NO\_PPK\_AUTH notify; if the initiator has not been upgraded, he will not send the USE\_PPK notify (and so the responder will know that we will not use a PPK). If the responder has not been upgraded, she will not send the USE\_PPK notify (and so the initiator will know to not use a PPK). If both peers have been upgraded, but the responder isn't yet configured with the PPK for the initiator, then the responder could do standard IKEv2 protocol if the initiator sent NO\_PPK\_AUTH notification. If both the responder and initiator have been upgraded and properly configured, they will both realize it, and in that case, the link will be quantum secure.

As an optional second step, after all nodes have been upgraded, then the administrator should then go back through the nodes, and mark the use of PPK as mandatory. This will not affect the strength against a passive attacker; it would mean that an attacker with a Quantum Computer (which is sufficiently fast to be able to break the (EC)DH in real time) would not be able to perform a downgrade attack.

## 5. PPK

### 5.1. PPK\_ID format

This standard requires that both the initiator and the responder have a secret PPK value, with the responder selecting the PPK based on the PPK\_ID that the initiator sends. In this standard, both the initiator and the responder are configured with fixed PPK and PPK\_ID values, and do the look up based on PPK\_ID value. It is anticipated that later standards will extend this technique to allow dynamically changing PPK values. To facilitate such an extension, we specify that the PPK\_ID the initiator sends will have its first octet be the PPK\_ID Type value. This document defines two values for PPK\_ID Type:

- o PPK\_ID\_OPAQUE (1) - for this type the format of the PPK\_ID (and the PPK itself) is not specified by this document; it is assumed to be mutually intelligible by both by initiator and the responder. This PPK\_ID type is intended for those implementations that choose not to disclose the type of PPK to active attackers.

- o PPK\_ID\_FIXED (2) - in this case the format of the PPK\_ID and the PPK are fixed octet strings; the remaining bytes of the PPK\_ID are a configured value. We assume that there is a fixed mapping between PPK\_ID and PPK, which is configured locally to both the initiator and the responder. The responder can use to do a look up the passed PPK\_ID value to determine the corresponding PPK value. Not all implementations are able to configure arbitrary octet strings; to improve the potential interoperability, it is recommended that, in the PPK\_ID\_FIXED case, both the PPK and the PPK\_ID strings be limited to the base64 character set, namely the 64 characters 0-9, A-Z, a-z, + and /.

The PPK\_ID type value 0 is reserved; values 3-127 are reserved for IANA; values 128-255 are for private use among mutually consenting parties.

## 5.2. Operational Considerations

The need to maintain several independent sets of security credentials can significantly complicate a security administrator's job, and can potentially slow down widespread adoption of this specification. It is anticipated, that administrators will try to simplify their job by decreasing the number of credentials they need to maintain. This section describes some of the considerations for PPK management.

### 5.2.1. PPK Distribution

PPK\_IDs of the type PPK\_ID\_FIXED (and the corresponding PPKs) are assumed to be configured within the IKE device in an out-of-band fashion. While the method of distribution is a local matter and out of scope of this document or IKEv2, [RFC6030] describes a format for symmetric key exchange. That format could be reused with the Key Id field being the PPK\_ID (without the PPK\_ID Type octet for a PPK\_ID\_FIXED), the PPK being the secret, and algorithm ("Algorithm=urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc:pin") as the PIN.

### 5.2.2. Group PPK

This document doesn't explicitly require that PPK is unique for each pair of peers. If it is the case, then this solution provides full peer authentication, but it also means that each host must have as many independent PPKs as the peers it is going to communicate with. As the number of peers grows the PPKs will not scale.

It is possible to use a single PPK for a group of users. Since each peer uses classical public key cryptography in addition to PPK for key exchange and authentication, members of the group can neither impersonate each other nor read other's traffic, unless they use

Quantum Computers to break public key operations. However group members can record other members' traffic and decrypt it later, when they get access to a Quantum Computer.

In addition, the fact that the PPK is known to a (potentially large) group of users makes it more susceptible to theft. When an attacker equipped with a Quantum Computer got access to a group PPK, all communications inside the group are revealed.

For these reasons using group PPK is NOT RECOMMENDED.

### 5.2.3. PPK-only Authentication

If Quantum Computers become a reality, classical public key cryptography will provide little security, so administrators may find it attractive not to use it at all for authentication. This will reduce the number of credentials they need to maintain to PPKs only. Combining group PPK and PPK-only authentication is NOT RECOMMENDED, since in this case any member of the group can impersonate any other member even without help of Quantum Computers.

PPK-only authentication can be achieved in IKEv2 if NULL Authentication method [RFC7619] is employed. Without PPK the NULL Authentication method provides no authentication of the peers, however since a PPK is stirred into the SK\_pi and the SK\_pr, the peers become authenticated if a PPK is in use. Using PPKs MUST be mandatory for the peers if they advertise support for PPK in IKE\_SA\_INIT and use NULL Authentication. Additionally, since the peers are authenticated via PPK, the ID Type in the IDi/IDr payloads SHOULD NOT be ID\_NULL, despite using the NULL Authentication method.

## 6. Security Considerations

Quantum computers are able to perform Grover's algorithm; that effectively halves the size of a symmetric key. Because of this, the user SHOULD ensure that the postquantum preshared key used has at least 256 bits of entropy, in order to provide 128-bit security level.

With this protocol, the computed SK\_d is a function of the PPK. Assuming that the PPK has sufficient entropy (for example, at least  $2^{256}$  possible values), then even if an attacker was able to recover the rest of the inputs to the PRF function, it would be infeasible to use Grover's algorithm with a Quantum Computer to recover the SK\_d value. Similarly, all keys that are a function of SK\_d, which include all Child SAs keys and all keys for subsequent IKE SAs (created when the initial IKE SA is rekeyed), are also quantum

resistant (assuming that the PPK was of high enough entropy, and that all the subkeys are sufficiently long).

An attacker with a Quantum Computer that can decrypt the initial IKE SA has access to all the information exchanged over it, such as identities of the peers, configuration parameters and all negotiated IPsec SAs information (including traffic selectors), with the exception of the cryptographic keys used by the IPsec SAs which are protected by the PPK.

Deployments that treat this information as sensitive or that send other sensitive data (like cryptographic keys) over IKE SA MUST rekey the IKE SA before the sensitive information is sent to ensure this information is protected by the PPK. It is possible to create a childless IKE SA as specified in [RFC6023]. This prevents Child SA configuration information from being transmitted in the original IKE SA that is not protected by a PPK. Some information related to IKE SA, that is sent in the IKE\_AUTH exchange, such as peer identities, feature notifications, Vendor ID's etc. cannot be hidden from the attack described above, even if the additional IKE SA rekey is performed.

In addition, the policy SHOULD be set to negotiate only quantum-resistant symmetric algorithms; while this RFC doesn't claim to give advice as to what algorithms are secure (as that may change based on future cryptographical results), below is a list of defined IKEv2 and IPsec algorithms that should NOT be used, as they are known not to be quantum resistant

- o Any IKEv2 Encryption algorithm, PRF or Integrity algorithm with key size less than 256 bits.
- o Any ESP Transform with key size less than 256 bits.
- o PRF\_AES128\_XCBC and PRF\_AES128\_CBC; even though they are defined to be able to use an arbitrary key size, they convert it into a 128-bit key internally.

Section 3 requires the initiator to abort the initial exchange if using PPKs is mandatory for it, but the responder might not include the USE\_PPK notification in the response. In this situation when the initiator aborts negotiation he leaves half-open IKE SA on the responder (because IKE\_SA\_INIT completes successfully from the responder's point of view). This half-open SA will eventually expire and be deleted, but if the initiator continues its attempts to create IKE SA with a high enough rate, then the responder may consider it as a Denial-of-Service attack and take protection measures (see [RFC8019] for more detail). It is RECOMMENDED that implementations

in this situation cache the negative result of negotiation for some time and don't make attempts to create it again for some time, because this is a result of misconfiguration and probably some re-configuration of the peers is needed.

If using PPKs is optional for both peers and they authenticate themselves using digital signatures, then an attacker in between, equipped with a Quantum Computer capable of breaking public key operations in real time, is able to mount downgrade attack by removing USE\_PPK notification from the IKE\_SA\_INIT and forging digital signatures in the subsequent exchange. If using PPKs is mandatory for at least one of the peers or PSK is used for authentication, then the attack will be detected and the SA won't be created.

If using PPKs is mandatory for the initiator, then an attacker capable to eavesdrop and to inject packets into the network can prevent creating IKE SA by mounting the following attack. The attacker intercepts the initial request containing the USE\_PPK notification and injects the forget response containing no USE\_PPK. If the attacker manages to inject this packet before the responder sends a genuine response, then the initiator would abort the exchange. To thwart this kind of attack it is RECOMMENDED, that if using PPKs is mandatory for the initiator and the received response doesn't contain the USE\_PPK notification, then the initiator doesn't abort the exchange immediately, but instead waits some time for more responses (possibly retransmitting the request). If all the received responses contain no USE\_PPK, then the exchange is aborted.

## 7. IANA Considerations

This document defines three new Notify Message Types in the "Notify Message Types - Status Types" registry:

```
16435      USE_PPK
16436      PPK_IDENTITY
16437      NO_PPK_AUTH
```

This document also creates a new IANA registry for the PPK\_ID types. The initial values of this registry are:

PPK_ID Type	Value
-----	-----
Reserved	0
PPK_ID_OPAQUE	1
PPK_ID_FIXED	2
Unassigned	3-127
Reserved for private use	128-255

Changes and additions to this registry are by Expert Review [RFC8126].

## 8. References

### 8.1. Normative References

- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>>.
- [RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T. Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October 2014, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>>.

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#### Appendix A. Discussion and Rationale

The idea behind this document is that while a Quantum Computer can easily reconstruct the shared secret of an (EC)DH exchange, they cannot as easily recover a secret from a symmetric exchange. This makes the SK<sub>d</sub>, and hence the IPsec KEYMAT and any child SA's SKEYSEED, depend on both the symmetric PPK, and also the Diffie-Hellman exchange. If we assume that the attacker knows everything except the PPK during the key exchange, and there are 2<sup>n</sup> plausible PPKs, then a Quantum Computer (using Grover's algorithm) would take O(2<sup>(n/2)</sup>) time to recover the PPK. So, even if the (EC)DH can be trivially solved, the attacker still can't recover any key material (except for the SK<sub>ei</sub>, SK<sub>er</sub>, SK<sub>ai</sub>, SK<sub>ar</sub> values for the initial IKE exchange) unless they can find the PPK, which is too difficult if the PPK has enough entropy (for example, 256 bits). Note that we do allow an attacker with a Quantum Computer to rederive the keying material for the initial IKE SA; this was a compromise to allow the responder to select the correct PPK quickly.

Another goal of this protocol is to minimize the number of changes within the IKEv2 protocol, and in particular, within the cryptography of IKEv2. By limiting our changes to notifications, and adjusting the SK<sub>d</sub>, SK<sub>pi</sub>, SK<sub>pr</sub>, it is hoped that this would be implementable, even on systems that perform most of the IKEv2 processing in hardware.

A third goal was to be friendly to incremental deployment in operational networks, for which we might not want to have a global shared key, or quantum resistant IKEv2 is rolled out incrementally. This is why we specifically try to allow the PPK to be dependent on the peer, and why we allow the PPK to be configured as optional.

A fourth goal was to avoid violating any of the security goals of IKEv2.

## Appendix B. Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Tero Kivinen, Paul Wouters, Graham Bartlett, Tommy Pauly, Quynh Dang and the rest of the IPsecME Working Group for their feedback and suggestions for the scheme.

## Authors' Addresses

Scott Fluhner  
Cisco Systems

Email: [sfluhner@cisco.com](mailto:sfluhner@cisco.com)

David McGrew  
Cisco Systems

Email: [mcgrew@cisco.com](mailto:mcgrew@cisco.com)

Panos Kampanakis  
Cisco Systems

Email: [pkampana@cisco.com](mailto:pkampana@cisco.com)

Valery Smyslov  
ELVIS-PLUS

Phone: +7 495 276 0211  
Email: [svan@elvis.ru](mailto:svan@elvis.ru)

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T. Pauly  
Apple Inc.  
P. Wouters  
Red Hat  
March 11, 2019

Split DNS Configuration for IKEv2  
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Abstract

This document defines two Configuration Payload Attribute Types (INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN and INTERNAL\_DNSSEC\_TA) for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2). These payloads add support for private (internal-only) DNS domains. These domains are intended to be resolved using non-public DNS servers that are only reachable through the IPsec connection. DNS resolution for other domains remains unchanged. These Configuration Payloads only apply to split tunnel configurations.

Status of This Memo

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## 1. Introduction

Split tunnel Virtual Private Network ("VPN") configurations only send packets with a specific destination IP range, usually chosen from [RFC1918], via the VPN. All other traffic is not sent via the VPN. This allows an enterprise deployment to offer Remote Access VPN services without needing to accept and forward all the non-enterprise related network traffic generated by their remote users. Resources within the enterprise can be accessed by the user via the VPN, while all other traffic generated by the user is not sent over the VPN.

These internal resources tend to only have internal-only DNS names and require the use of special internal-only DNS servers to get resolved. Split DNS [RFC2775] is a common configuration that is part of split tunnel VPN configurations to support configuring Remote Access users to use these special internal-only domain names.

The IKEv2 protocol [RFC7296] negotiates configuration parameters using Configuration Payload Attribute Types. This document defines two Configuration Payload Attribute Types that add support for trusted Split DNS domains.

The INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN attribute type is used to convey that the specified DNS domain MUST be resolved using the provided DNS nameserver IP addresses as specified in the INTERNAL\_IP4\_DNS and INTERNAL\_IP6\_DNS Configuration Payloads, causing these requests to use the IPsec connection.

The INTERNAL\_DNSSEC\_TA attribute type is used to convey a DNSSEC trust anchor for such a domain. This is required if the external view uses DNSSEC that would prove the internal view does not exist or would expect a different DNSSEC key on the different versions (internal and external) of the enterprise domain.

If an INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN is sent by the responder, the responder MUST also include one or more INTERNAL\_IP4\_DNS or INTERNAL\_IP6\_DNS attributes that contain the IPv4 or IPv6 address of the internal DNS server.

For the purposes of this document, DNS resolution servers accessible through an IPsec connection will be referred to as "internal DNS servers", and other DNS servers will be referred to as "external DNS servers".

Other tunnel-establishment protocols already support the assignment of Split DNS domains. For example, there are proprietary extensions to IKEv1 that allow a server to assign Split DNS domains to a client. However, the IKEv2 standard does not include a method to configure this option. This document defines a standard way to negotiate this option for IKEv2.

### 1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all captials, as shown here.

## 2. Applicability

If the negotiated IPsec connection is not a split tunnel configuration, the INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN and INTERNAL\_DNSSEC\_TA Configuration Payloads MUST be ignored. This prevents generic (non-

enterprise) VPN services from overriding the public DNS hierarchy, which could lead to malicious overrides of DNS and DNSSEC.

Such configurations SHOULD instead use only the INTERNAL\_IP4\_DNS and INTERNAL\_IP6\_DNS Configuration Payloads to ensure all of the user's DNS traffic is sent through the IPsec connection and does not leak unencrypted onto the local network, as the local network is often explicitly exempted from IPsec encryption.

For split tunnel configurations, an enterprise can require one or more DNS domains to be resolved via internal DNS servers. This can be a special domain, such as "corp.example.com" for an enterprise that is publicly known to use "example.com". In this case, the remote user needs to be informed what the internal-only domain names are and what the IP addresses of the internal DNS servers are. An enterprise can also run a different version of its public domain on its internal network. In that case, the VPN client is instructed to send DNS queries for the enterprise public domain (eg "example.com") to the internal DNS servers. A configuration for this deployment scenario is referred to as a Split DNS configuration.

Split DNS configurations are often preferable to sending all DNS queries to the enterprise. This allows the remote user to only send DNS queries for the enterprise to the internal DNS servers. The enterprise remains unaware of all non-enterprise (DNS) activity of the user. It also allows the enterprise DNS servers to only be configured for the enterprise DNS domains which removes the legal and technical responsibility of the enterprise to resolve every DNS domain potentially asked for by the remote user.

A client using these configuration payloads will be able to request and receive Split DNS configurations using the INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN and INTERNAL\_DNSSEC\_TA configuration attributes. These attributes MUST be accompanied by one or more INTERNAL\_IP4\_DNS or INTERNAL\_IP6\_DNS configuration attributes. The client device can then use the internal DNS server(s) for any DNS queries within the assigned domains. DNS queries for other domains SHOULD be sent to the regular DNS service of the client unless it prefers to use the IPsec tunnel for all its DNS queries. For example, the client could trust the IPsec provided DNS servers more than the locally provided DNS servers especially in the case of connecting to unknown or untrusted networks (eg coffee shops or hotel networks). Or the client could prefer the IPsec based DNS servers because those provide additional features over the local DNS servers.

### 3. Protocol Exchange

In order to negotiate which domains are considered internal to an IKEv2 tunnel, initiators indicate support for Split DNS in their CFG\_REQUEST payloads, and responders assign internal domains (and DNSSEC trust anchors) in their CFG\_REPLY payloads. When Split DNS has been negotiated, the INTERNAL\_IP4\_DNS and INTERNAL\_IP6\_DNS DNS server configuration attributes will be interpreted as internal DNS servers that can resolve hostnames within the internal domains.

#### 3.1. Configuration Request

To indicate support for Split DNS, an initiator includes one or more INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN attributes as defined in Section 4 as part of the CFG\_REQUEST payload. If an INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN attribute is included in the CFG\_REQUEST, the initiator MUST also include one or more INTERNAL\_IP4\_DNS or INTERNAL\_IP6\_DNS attributes in the CFG\_REQUEST.

The INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN attribute sent by the initiator is usually empty but MAY contain a suggested domain name.

The absence of INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN attributes in the CFG\_REQUEST payload indicates that the initiator does not support or is unwilling to accept Split DNS configuration.

To indicate support for receiving DNSSEC trust anchors for Split DNS domains, an initiator includes one or more INTERNAL\_DNSSEC\_TA attributes as defined in Section 4 as part of the CFG\_REQUEST payload. If an INTERNAL\_DNSSEC\_TA attribute is included in the CFG\_REQUEST, the initiator MUST also include one or more INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN attributes in the CFG\_REQUEST. If the initiator includes an INTERNAL\_DNSSEC\_TA attribute, but does not include an INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN attribute, the responder MAY still respond with both INTERNAL\_DNSSEC\_TA and INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN attributes.

An initiator MAY convey its current DNSSEC trust anchors for the domain specified in the INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN attribute. A responder can use this information to determine that it does not need to send a different trust anchor. If the initiator does not wish to convey this information, it MUST use a length of 0.

The absence of INTERNAL\_DNSSEC\_TA attributes in the CFG\_REQUEST payload indicates that the initiator does not support or is unwilling to accept DNSSEC trust anchor configuration.

### 3.2. Configuration Reply

Responders MAY send one or more `INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN` attributes in their `CFG_REPLY` payload. If an `INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN` attribute is included in the `CFG_REPLY`, the responder MUST also include one or both of the `INTERNAL_IP4_DNS` and `INTERNAL_IP6_DNS` attributes in the `CFG_REPLY`. These DNS server configurations are necessary to define which servers can receive queries for hostnames in internal domains. If the `CFG_REQUEST` included an `INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN` attribute, but the `CFG_REPLY` does not include an `INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN` attribute, the initiator MUST behave as if Split DNS configurations are not supported by the server, unless the initiator has been configured with local policy to define a set of Split DNS domains to use by default.

Each `INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN` represents a domain that the DNS servers address listed in `INTERNAL_IP4_DNS` and `INTERNAL_IP6_DNS` can resolve.

If the `CFG_REQUEST` included `INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN` attributes with non-zero lengths, the content MAY be ignored or be interpreted as a suggestion by the responder.

For each DNS domain specified in an `INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN` attribute, one or more `INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA` attributes MAY be included by the responder. This attribute lists the corresponding internal DNSSEC trust anchor information of a DS record (see [RFC4034]). The `INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA` attribute MUST immediately follow the `INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN` attribute that it applies to.

### 3.3. Mapping DNS Servers to Domains

All DNS servers provided in the `CFG_REPLY` MUST support resolving hostnames within all `INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN` domains. In other words, the `INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN` attributes in a `CFG_REPLY` payload form a single list of Split DNS domains that applies to the entire list of `INTERNAL_IP4_DNS` and `INTERNAL_IP6_DNS` attributes.

### 3.4. Example Exchanges

#### 3.4.1. Simple Case

In this example exchange, the initiator requests `INTERNAL_IP4_DNS`, `INTERNAL_IP6_DNS`, and `INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN` attributes in the `CFG_REQUEST`, but does not specify any value for either. This indicates that it supports Split DNS, but has no preference for which DNS requests will be routed through the tunnel.



The responder replies with two DNS server addresses, and two internal domains, "example.com" and "city.other.test".

Any subsequent DNS queries from the initiator for domains such as "www.example.com" SHOULD use 198.51.100.2 or 198.51.100.4 to resolve.

```
CP(CFG_REQUEST) =
  INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS()
  INTERNAL_IP4_DNS()
  INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS()
  INTERNAL_IP6_DNS()
  INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN()

CP(CFG_REPLY) =
  INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS(198.51.100.234)
  INTERNAL_IP4_DNS(198.51.100.2)
  INTERNAL_IP4_DNS(198.51.100.4)
  INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS(2001:DB8:0:1:2:3:4:5/64)
  INTERNAL_IP6_DNS(2001:DB8:99:88:77:66:55:44)
  INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN(example.com)
  INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN(city.other.test)
```

#### 3.4.2. Requesting Domains and DNSSEC trust anchors

In this example exchange, the initiator requests INTERNAL\_IP4\_DNS, INTERNAL\_IP6\_DNS, INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN and INTERNAL\_DNSSEC\_TA attributes in the CFG\_REQUEST.

Any subsequent DNS queries from the initiator for domains such as "www.example.com" or "city.other.test" would be DNSSEC validated using the DNSSEC trust anchor received in the CFG\_REPLY.

In this example, the initiator has no existing DNSSEC trust anchors would the requested domain. The "example.com" domain has DNSSEC trust anchors that are returned, while the "other.test" domain has no DNSSEC trust anchors.

```


CP (CFG_REQUEST) =
INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS ()
INTERNAL_IP4_DNS ()
INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS ()
INTERNAL_IP6_DNS ()
INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN ()
INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA ()

CP (CFG_REPLY) =
INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS (198.51.100.234)
INTERNAL_IP4_DNS (198.51.100.2)
INTERNAL_IP4_DNS (198.51.100.4)
INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS (2001:DB8:0:1:2:3:4:5/64)
INTERNAL_IP6_DNS (2001:DB8:99:88:77:66:55:44)
INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN (example.com)
INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA (43547,8,1,B6225AB2CC613E0DCA7962BDC2342EA4...)
INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA (31406,8,2,F78CF3344F72137235098ECBBD08947C...)
INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN (city.other.test)
    
```

4. Payload Formats

All multi-octet fields representing integers are laid out in big endian order (also known as "most significant byte first", or "network byte order").

4.1. INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN Configuration Attribute Type Request and Reply




- o Reserved (1 bit) - Defined in IKEv2 RFC [RFC7296].
- o Attribute Type (15 bits) set to value 25 for INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN.
- o Length (2 octets) - Length of domain name.
- o Domain Name (0 or more octets) - A Fully Qualified Domain Name used for Split DNS rules, such as "example.com", in DNS presentation format and using IDNA A-label [RFC5890] for Internationalized Domain Names. Implementors need to be careful that this value is not null-terminated.

4.2. INTERNAL\_DNSSEC\_TA Configuration Attribute


An INTERNAL\_DNSSEC\_TA Configuration Attribute can either be empty, or it can contain one Trust Anchor by containing a non-zero Length with a DNSKEY Key Tag, DNSKEY Algorithm, Digest Type and Digest Data fields.

An empty INTERNAL\_DNSSEC\_TA CFG attribute:



- o Reserved (1 bit) - Defined in IKEv2 RFC [RFC7296].
- o Attribute Type (15 bits) set to value 26 for INTERNAL\_DNSSEC\_TA.
- o Length (2 octets) - Set to 0 for an empty attribute.

A non-empty INTERNAL\_DNSSEC\_TA CFG attribute:



- o Reserved (1 bit) - Defined in IKEv2 RFC [RFC7296].
- o Attribute Type (15 bits) set to value 26 for INTERNAL\_DNSSEC\_TA.
- o Length (2 octets) - Length of DNSSEC Trust Anchor data (4 octets plus the length of the Digest Data).
- o DNSKEY Key Tag value (2 octets) - Delegation Signer (DS) Key Tag as specified in [RFC4034] Section 5.1.

- o DNSKEY Algorithm (1 octet) - DNSKEY algorithm value from the IANA DNS Security Algorithm Numbers Registry.
- o Digest Type (1 octet) - DS algorithm value from the IANA Delegation Signer (DS) Resource Record (RR) Type Digest Algorithms Registry.
- o Digest Data (1 or more octets) - The DNSKEY digest as specified in [RFC4034] Section 5.1 in presentation format.

Each INTERNAL\_DNSSEC\_TA attribute in the CFG\_REPLY payload MUST immediately follow a corresponding INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN attribute. As the INTERNAL\_DNSSEC\_TA format itself does not contain the domain name, it relies on the preceding INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN to provide the domain for which it specifies the trust anchor. Any INTERNAL\_DNSSEC\_TA attribute that is not immediately preceded by an INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN or another INTERNAL\_DNSSEC\_TA attribute applying to the same domain name MUST be ignored.

#### 5. INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN Usage Guidelines

If a CFG\_REPLY payload contains no INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN attributes, the client MAY use the provided INTERNAL\_IP4\_DNS or INTERNAL\_IP6\_DNS servers as the default DNS server(s) for all queries.

If a client is configured by local policy to only accept a limited set of INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN values, the client MUST ignore any other INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN values.

For each INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN entry in a CFG\_REPLY payload that is not prohibited by local policy, the client MUST use the provided INTERNAL\_IP4\_DNS or INTERNAL\_IP6\_DNS DNS servers as the only resolvers for the listed domains and its sub-domains and it MUST NOT attempt to resolve the provided DNS domains using its external DNS servers. Other domain names SHOULD be resolved using some other external DNS resolver(s), configured independently from IKE. Queries for these other domains MAY be sent to the internal DNS resolver(s) listed in that CFG\_REPLY message, but have no guarantee of being answered. For example, if the INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN attribute specifies "example.test", then "example.test", "www.example.test" and "mail.eng.example.test" MUST be resolved using the internal DNS resolver(s), but "otherexample.test" and "ple.test" MUST NOT be resolved using the internal resolver and MUST use the system's external DNS resolver(s).

The initiator SHOULD allow the DNS domains listed in the INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN attributes to resolve to special IP address ranges, such as those of [RFC1918], even if the initiator host is

otherwise configured to block DNS answer containing these special IP address ranges.

When an IKE SA is terminated, the DNS forwarding MUST be unconfigured. This includes deleting the DNS forwarding rules; flushing all cached data for DNS domains provided by the INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN attribute, including negative cache entries; removing any obtained DNSSEC trust anchors from the list of trust anchors; and clearing the outstanding DNS request queue.

INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN attributes SHOULD only be used on split tunnel configurations where only a subset of traffic is routed into a private remote network using the IPsec connection. If all traffic is routed over the IPsec connection, the existing global INTERNAL\_IP4\_DNS and INTERNAL\_IP6\_DNS can be used without creating specific DNS or DNSSEC exemptions.

## 6. INTERNAL\_DNSSEC\_TA Usage Guidelines

DNS records can be used to publish specific records containing trust anchors for applications. The most common record type is the TLSA record specified in [RFC6698]. This DNS record type publishes which Certificate Authority (CA) certificate or End Entity (EE) certificate to expect for a certain host name. These records are protected by DNSSEC and thus are trustable by the application. Whether to trust TLSA records instead of the traditional WebPKI depends on the local policy of the client. By accepting an INTERNAL\_DNSSEC\_TA trust anchor via IKE from the remote IKE server, the IPsec client might be allowing the remote IKE server to override the trusted certificates for TLS. Similar override concerns apply to other public key or fingerprint-based DNS records, such as OPENPGPKEY, SMIMEA or IPSECKEY records.

Thus, installing an INTERNAL\_DNSSEC\_TA trust anchor can be seen as the equivalent of installing an Enterprise CA certificate. It allows the remote IKE/IPsec server to modify DNS answers including DNSSEC cryptographic signatures by overriding existing DNS information with trust anchor conveyed via IKE and (temporarily) installed on the IKE client. Of specific concern is the overriding of [RFC6698] based TLSA records, which represent a confirmation or override of an existing WebPKI TLS certificate. Other DNS record types that convey cryptographic materials (public keys or fingerprints) are OPENPGPKEY, SMIMEA, SSHP and IPSECKEY records.

IKE clients willing to accept INTERNAL\_DNSSEC\_TA attributes MUST use a whitelist of one or more domains that can be updated out of band. IKE clients with an empty whitelist MUST NOT use any INTERNAL\_DNSSEC\_TA attributes received over IKE. Such clients MAY

interpret receiving an `INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA` attribute for a non-whitelisted domain as an indication that their local configuration may need to be updated out of band.

IKE clients should take care to only whitelist domains that apply to internal or managed domains, rather than to generic Internet traffic. The DNS root zone (".") MUST be ignored if it appears in a whitelist. Other generic or public domains, such as top-level domains (TLDs), similarly MUST be ignored if these appear in a whitelist unless the entity actually is the operator of the TLD. To determine this, an implementation MAY interactively ask the user when a VPN profile is installed or activated to confirm this. Alternatively, it MAY provide a special override keyword in its provisioning configuration to ensure non-interactive agreement can be achieved only by the party provisioning the VPN client, who presumably is a trusted entity by the end-user. Similarly, an entity might be using a special domain name, such as ".internal", for its internal-only view and might wish to force its provisioning system to accept such a domain in a Split DNS configuration.

Any updates to this whitelist of domain names MUST happen via explicit human interaction or by a trusted automated provision system to prevent malicious invisible installation of trust anchors in case of aIKE server compromise.

IKE clients SHOULD accept any `INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA` updates for subdomain names of the whitelisted domain names. For example, if "example.net" is whitelisted, then `INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA` received for "antartica.example.net" SHOULD be accepted.

IKE clients MUST ignore any received `INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA` attributes for a `FDQN` for which it did not receive and accept an `INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN` Configuration Payload.

In most deployment scenarios, the IKE client has an expectation that it is connecting, using a split-network setup, to a specific organisation or enterprise. A recommended policy would be to only accept `INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA` directives from that organization's DNS names. However, this might not be possible in all deployment scenarios, such as one where the IKE server is handing out a number of domains that are not within one parent domain.

## 7. Security Considerations

As stated in Section 2, if the negotiated IPsec connection is not a split tunnel configuration, the `INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN` and `INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA` Configuration Payloads MUST be ignored.

Otherwise, generic VPN service providers could maliciously override DNSSEC based trust anchors of public DNS domains.

An initiator MUST only accept INTERNAL\_DNSSEC\_TAs for which it has a whitelist, since this mechanism allows the credential used to authenticate an IKEv2 association to be leveraged into authenticating credentials for other connections. Initiators should ensure that they have sufficient trust in the responder when using this mechanism. An initiator MAY treat a received INTERNAL\_DNSSEC\_TA for an non-whitelisted domain as a signal to update the whitelist via a non-IKE provisioning mechanism. See Section 6 for additional security considerations for DNSSEC trust anchors.

The use of Split DNS configurations assigned by an IKEv2 responder is predicated on the trust established during IKE SA authentication. However, if IKEv2 is being negotiated with an anonymous or unknown endpoint (such as for Opportunistic Security [RFC7435]), the initiator MUST ignore Split DNS configurations assigned by the responder.

If a host connected to an authenticated IKE peer is connecting to another IKE peer that attempts to claim the same domain via the INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN attribute, the IKE connection SHOULD only process the DNS information if the two connections are part of the same logical entity. Otherwise, the client SHOULD refuse the DNS information and potentially warn the end-user. For example, if a VPN profile for "Example Corporation" is installed that provides two IPsec connections, one covering 192.168.100.0/24 and one covering 10.13.14.0/24 it could be that both connections negotiate the same INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN and INTERNAL\_DNSSEC\_TA values. Since these are part of the same remote organisation (or provisioning profile), the Configuration Payloads can be used. However, if a user installs two VPN profiles from two different unrelated independent entities, both of these could be configured to use the same domain, for example ".internal". These two connections MUST NOT be allowed to be active at the same time.

If the initiator is using DNSSEC validation for a domain in its public DNS view, and it requests and receives an INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN attribute without an INTERNAL\_DNSSEC\_TA, it will need to reconfigure its DNS resolver to allow for an insecure delegation. It SHOULD NOT accept insecure delegations for domains that are DNSSEC signed in the public DNS view, for which it has not explicitly requested such delegation by specifying the domain specifically using a INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN request.

Deployments that configure INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN domains should pay close attention to their use of indirect reference RRTypes in their

internal-only domain names. Examples of such RRtypes are NS, CNAME, DNAME, MX or SRV records. For example, if the MX record for "internal.example.com" points to "mx.internal.example.net", then both "internal.example.com" and "internal.example.net" should be sent using an INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN Configuration Payload.

IKE clients MAY want to require whitelisted domains for Top Level Domains (TLDs) and Second Level Domains (SLDs) to further prevent malicious DNS redirections for well known domains. This prevents users from unknowingly giving DNS queries to third parties. This is even more important if those well known domains are not deploying DNSSEC, as the VPN service provider could then even modify the DNS answers without detection.

The content of INTERNAL\_DNS\_DOMAIN and INTERNAL\_DNSSEC\_TA may be passed to another (DNS) program for processing. As with any network input, the content SHOULD be considered untrusted and handled accordingly.

## 8. IANA Considerations

This document defines two new IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute Types, which are allocated from the "IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute Types" namespace.

Value	Attribute Type	Multi-Valued	Length	Reference
25	INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN	YES	0 or more	[this document]
26	INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA	YES	0 or more	[this document]

Figure 1

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## Authors' Addresses

Tommy Pauly  
Apple Inc.  
One Apple Park Way  
Cupertino, California 95014  
US

Email: [tpauly@apple.com](mailto:tpauly@apple.com)

Paul Wouters  
Red Hat

Email: [pwouters@redhat.com](mailto:pwouters@redhat.com)

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D. Migault, Ed.  
Ericsson  
T. Guggemos, Ed.  
LMU Munich  
Y. Nir  
Dell EMC  
June 20, 2017

Implicit IV for Counter-based Ciphers in IPsec  
draft-mglt-ipsecme-implicit-iv-04

Abstract

IPsec ESP sends an initialization vector (IV) or nonce in each packet, adding 8 or 16 octets. Some algorithms such as AES-GCM, AES-CCM, AES-CTR and ChaCha20-Poly1305 require a unique nonce but do not require an unpredictable nonce. When using such algorithms the packet counter value can be used to generate a nonce, saving 8 octets per packet. This document describes how to do this.

Status of This Memo

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### 1. Requirements notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

### 2. Introduction

Counter-based AES modes of operation such as AES-CTR ([RFC3686]), AES-CCM ([RFC4309]), and AES-GCM ([RFC4106]) require the specification of a nonce for each ESP packet. The same applies for ChaCha20-Poly1305 ([RFC7634]). Currently this nonce is sent in each ESP packet ([RFC4303]). This practice is designated in this document as "explicit nonce".

In some context, such as IoT, it may be preferable to avoid carrying the extra bytes associated to the IV and instead generate it locally on each peer. The local generation of the nonce is designated in this document as "implicit IV".

The size of this nonce depends on the specific algorithm, but all of the algorithms mentioned above take an 8-octet nonce.

This document defines how to compute the nonce locally when it is implicit. It also specifies how peers agree with the Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2 - [RFC7296]) on using an implicit IV versus an explicit IV.

This document limits its scope to the algorithms mentioned above. Other algorithms with similar properties may later be defined to use this extension.

This document does not consider AES-CBC ([RFC3602]) as AES-CBC requires the IV to be unpredictable. Deriving it directly from the packet counter as described below is insecure as mentioned in Security Consideration of [RFC3602] and has led to real world chosen plain-text attack such as BEAST [BEAST].

3. Terminology

- o IoT: Internet of Things.
- o IV: Initialization Vector.
- o Nonce: a fixed-size octet string used only once. This is similar to IV, except that in common usage there is no implication of non-predictability.

4. Implicit IV

With the algorithms listed in Section 2, the 8 byte nonce MUST NOT repeat. The binding between a ESP packet and its nonce is provided using the Sequence Number or the Extended Sequence Number. Figure 1 and Figure 2 represent the IV with a regular 4-byte Sequence Number and with an 8-byte Extended Sequence Number respectively.




Figure 1: Implicit IV with a 4 byte Sequence Number

- o Sequence Number: the 4 byte Sequence Number carried in the ESP packet.
- o Zero: a 4 byte array with all bits set to zero.




Figure 2: Implicit IV with an 8 byte Extended Sequence Number

- o Extended Sequence Number: the 8 byte Extended Sequence Number of the Security Association. The 4 byte low order bytes are carried in the ESP packet.

5. Initiator Behavior

An initiator supporting this feature SHOULD propose implicit IV for all relevant algorithms. To facilitate backward compatibility with non-supporting peers the initiator SHOULD also include those same algorithms without IIV. This may require extra transforms.

6. Responder Behavior

The rules of SA payload processing ensure that the responder will never send an SA payload containing the IIV indicator to an initiator that does not support IIV.

7. Security Consideration

Nonce generation for these algorithms has not been explicitly defined. It has been left to the implementation as long as certain security requirements are met. This document provides an explicit and normative way to generate IVs. The mechanism described in this document meets the IV security requirements of all relevant algorithms.

As the IV MUST NOT repeat for one SPI when Counter-Mode ciphers are used, Implicit IV as described in this document MUST NOT be used in setups with the chance that the Sequence Number overlaps for one SPI. Multicast as described in [RFC5374], [RFC6407] and [I-D.yeung-g-ikev2] is a prominent example, where many senders share one secret and thus one SPI. Section 3.5 of [RFC6407] explains how repetition MAY BE prevented by using a prefix for each group member, which could be prefixed to the Sequence Number. Otherwise, Implicit IV MUST NOT be used in multicast scenarios.

## 8. IANA Considerations

AES-CTR, AES-CCM, AES-GCM and ChaCha20-Poly1305 are likely to implement the implicit IV described in this document. This section limits assignment of new code points to the recommended suites provided in [I-D.ietf-ipsecme-rfc4307bis] and [I-D.ietf-ipsecme-rfc7321bis], thus the new Transform Type 1 - Encryption Algorithm Transform IDs are as defined below:

- ENCR\_AES-CCM\_8\_IIV
- ENCR\_AES-GCM\_16\_IIV
- ENCR\_CHACHA20-POLY1305\_IIV

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Authors' Addresses

Daniel Migault (editor)  
Ericsson  
8400 boulevard Decarie  
Montreal, QC H4P 2N2  
Canada

Email: [daniel.migault@ericsson.com](mailto:daniel.migault@ericsson.com)

Tobias Guggemos (editor)  
LMU Munich  
Oettingenstr. 67  
80538 Munich, Bavaria  
Germany

Email: [guggemos@mnm-team.org](mailto:guggemos@mnm-team.org)  
URI: <http://mnm-team.org/~guggemos>

Yoav Nir  
Dell EMC  
9 Andrei Sakharov St  
Haifa 3190500  
Israel

Email: [ynir.ietf@gmail.com](mailto:ynir.ietf@gmail.com)