


OAuth 2.0 Token Binding

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draft-ietf-oauth-token-binding

<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-token-binding-05>

The Setting of the Context

Provide an OAuth 2.0 proof-of-possession mechanism based on Token Binding to defeat (re)play of lost or stolen tokens (access, refresh, authorization codes, etc.)



Quick Refresher on -04


- Token Bind access tokens with referred Token Binding ID
 - Representation in JWT access tokens and introspection responses
- Token Bind refresh tokens with provided Token Binding ID
- Token Bind authorization codes via PKCE
 - Native app clients
 - Web server clients

Dependency Status


- Token Binding WG documents; -tokbind-negotiation, -tokbind-protocol, and -tokbind-https are all very close to RFC publication
 - I may have said something similar in Prague...
 - But all have been Submitted to IESG for Publication and are in AD evaluation



Current Status

- 
- A nighttime photograph of Prague, showing the illuminated Prague Castle on a hill in the background and the Charles Bridge in the foreground. The bridge is crowded with people and lined with bright, glowing streetlights that reflect on the Vltava River. The city's historic architecture is visible in the mid-ground, with various buildings and churches lit up.
- -05 of draft-ietf-oauth-token-binding published on October 26th with changes/additions discussed in Prague
 - “OpenID Connect Token Bound Authentication 1.0 - draft 02” also published

Changes in -05




- Specify that authorization servers don't token bind refresh tokens issued to a client that doesn't support bound refresh tokens
 - Support indicated by the client metadata parameter or via 'static' registration information
 - Added security considerations on unbound refresh tokens
 - Potentially infeasible for some distributed web-based confidential clients
 - RTs are indirectly bound to the client's credentials and cannot be used without the associated client authentication
- Adjust the language around aborting authorizations in the 'Phasing in Token Binding' text to be somewhat more general and not only about downgrades
- Remove reference to (and usage of) 'OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata', which is no longer a going concern

Changes in -05 cont.

- Added/described Token Binding for JWT Authorization Grants and JWT Client Authentication
 - JWT must have a “cnf” (confirmation) claim with a “tbh” (token binding hash) member identifying the Token Binding ID of the Provided Token Binding used by the client on the TLS connection to the authorization server
 - client_assertion_type:
urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-token-bound
 - Authentication method values:
 - private_key_token_bound_jwt
 - client_secret_token_bound_jwt
 - grant_type: urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-token-bound

Looking Ahead



- Token Binding documents progress to RFC
 - For real this time
- Implementation experience and feedback
- Get the band back together again for IETF 101 in London

