

EAP Usage in 5G

*Jari Arkko, Vesa Lehtovirta, Karl Norrman, Vesa Torvinen
Ericsson Research*

In early 2000s, IETF worked on the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP, RFC 3748) framework

We also defined authentication methods in the EAP and EMU WGs, including ones relating to GSM and 3/4G authentication mechanisms:

- EAP-SIM (RFC 4186)
- EAP-AKA (RFC 4187), revised in EAP-AKA' (RFC 5448)

Very widely implemented, somewhat widely used for WLAN access authentication (2/3/4G access uses native SIM card and AKA, not EAP)

5G access authentication introduces the use of EAP for 5G access

draft-arkko-eap-rfc5448bis

- A tiny update of EAP-AKA'
- EAP-AKA' binds the context of authentication to the produced keys (context = authentication to WLAN, etc)
- Part of the binding context is defined in 3GPP TS 24.302 Table 8.1.1.2 (2008 version) — for 5G, “5G” added to table
- Reference version change seems like a small reason to update an RFC... but it is on a key part
- Could also update security considerations, but not a place for new functionality

draft-arkko-eap-aka-pfs

The
Intercept

THE GREAT SIM HEIST

How Spies Stole the Keys to the Encryption Castle



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draft-arkko-eap-aka-pfs

- The 2015 revelations lead to SIM card manufacturers, the operators, and GSMA reconsider their processes & much improvements have been made ... but vulnerabilities cannot be ruled out
- Backwards-compatible extension that adds Diffie-Hellman exchange to EAP-AKA'; output keys from EAP will now provide Perfect Forward Secrecy
- If there is a compromise of smart card long-term keys, the use of EAP AKA' PFS requires protects against passive attackers (or forces active attack)
- Details... look at the draft / can probably be done in different ways
- No current official requirements for this, but I think prudent design

Next Steps

- Feedback on these drafts very welcome!
- Coordination between IETF and 3GPP in EAP space would be useful — there are topics beyond what I talked about here
- I'd like to keep existing RFCs up-to-date whenever there are updates, even if small — how to pursue?
- I believe we should consider enhancing our protocols to match current pervasive surveillance and other threats — more substantial work than the above
 - FYI: also other potential documents in EAP method space, e.g., draft-mattsson-eap-tls13