SFC Path Consistency OA M


Ao Ting
Greg Mirsky
Zhonghua Chen
Theory of Operation in COAM

• With gathering COAM Reply1, COAM Reply2, COAM Reply3 and COAM Reply4, the path of the chain: SF1->SF2->SF3->SF4 is confirmed.
Update from -00

• SFC Echo request/reply has been introduced (draft-wang-sfc-multi-layer-oam). The draft is now viewed as extension of SFC Echo request/reply protocol.

• Rather then introduce new SF ID registry refer to section 10.5 New Service Type Registry of ietf-bess-nsh-bgp-control-plane

• Added Security Considerations section
Security Considerations

Security considerations discussed in [I-D.ietf-sfc-nsh] apply to this document.

In addition, since Service Function sub-TLV discloses information about the RSP the spoofed COAM Request packet may be used to obtain network information, it is RECOMMENDED that implementations provide a means of checking the source addresses of COAM Request messages, specified in SFC Source TLV [I-D.wang-sfc-multi-layer-oam], against an access list before accepting the message.
Next steps

• Comments, questions always welcome and greatly appreciated
• WG adoption?