

Connection ID

draft-rescorla-tls-connection-id-02

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Recap from last time

- Lack of Connection IDs clearly a problem for NATs/IoT, etc.
- Connection IDs are also a clear privacy problem
 - Lots of proposals for how to do privacy preserving Conn IDs
 - ... but they're complicated and none of them seem totally baked
- Proposal: use a fixed connection ID for now
 - In an extension
 - We can always replace it later
- This got pulled out of DTLS and into its own draft

Basic idea

- IDs are used if client offers and server answers
 - On all (non-0RTT)? encrypted records
- Each side *sends* with the other's ID
 - Because IDs are unframed, 0-length IDs are just omitted

DTLS 1.2

```
struct {
    ContentType type;
    ProtocolVersion version;
    uint16 epoch;
    uint48 sequence_number;
    opaque cid[cid_length];           // New field
    uint16 length;
    select (CipherSpec.cipher_type) {
        case block:  GenericBlockCipher;
        case aead:   GenericAEADCipher;
    } fragment;
} DTLSCiphertext;
```

DTLS 1.3*

```
struct {
    ContentType opaque_type = 23; /* application_data */
    uint32 epoch_and_sequence;
    opaque cid[cid_length];           // New field
    uint16 length;
    opaque encrypted_record[length];
} DTLSCiphertext;
```

```
struct {
    uint16 short_epoch_and_sequence; // 001ESSSS SSSSSSSS
    opaque cid[cid_length];           // New field
    opaque encrypted_record[remainder_of_datagram];
} DTLSShortCiphertext;
```

*Not in the draft. Ugh.

Connection ID Update (TLS 1.3 only)

```
enum {  
    cid_immediate(0), cid_spare(1), (255)  
} ConnectionIdUsage;
```

```
struct {  
    opaque cid<0..28-1>;  
    ConnectionIdUsage usage;  
} NewConnectionId;
```

- `cid_immediate` means “delete all your older conn ids”
- `cid_spare` means “add to the valid conn ids”
- I am not sure this is ideal

Open Issues

- Do we need a way to tell if a CID is present
 - to deal with servers which have both CID and non-CID connections
- Do we need CID update for TLS 1.2 (how?)
- The record sequence number allows cross-CID linkage
 - Solution: adopt the technique we used for QUIC of predictable jumps

Other issues? WG adoption?

Options for TLS 1.2 Post-Handshake CID Refresh

- Do nothing
- TLS 1.2 renegotiation
- Port over TLS 1.3 post-handshake messaging
 - I think we'd need to deprecate renegotiation