REQUIRETLS draft-ietf-uta-require-tls-00

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Review: Problem statement

- Senders (including users) have no idea whether transmission will be TLS protected
 - STARTTLS is opportunistic; delivery takes priority
 - TLS certificate verification typically ignored
 - But this is often what you want
- Some senders want to prioritize security over delivery for (at least) some messages
 - Sensitive message content
 - Sender or recipient in sensitive location





Review: Goals

- Allow <u>senders</u> to specify when envelope and headers require protection
- Fine-grained
 - Don't affect messages not specifying REQUIRETLS
- Some control over certificate verification
 - Bad actors with root certs
 - Unknown trust by intermediate MTAs
- MTA <-> MTA only
 - But last hop could require secure retrieval?



REQUIRETLS

Review: Approach

- Negotiate REQUIRETLS service extension
- Send messages with specific TLS requirements using REQUIRETLS option on MAIL FROM:
 - Can require use of TLS, optional cert verification
 - Can also NOT require TLS, for "priority" messages when SMTP TLS policy exists
- REQUIRETLS requirements follow the message
- No policy discovery needed!



What's new?

- Now a WG draft!
- Working with author of 'swaks' tool to use it for testing support
- Still two implementations (Exim and MDaemon) [not new]



Issues: REQUIRETLS=NO

- Pro:
 - Increases utility by adding mechanism for sending high priority messages regardless of MTA-STS
- Con:
 - Fragile: Also has to deliver to non-REQUIRETLS
 MTAs, so message can easily lose NO option
 - Adds implementation complexity: works in opposite direction of other REQUIRETLS options



Issue: Option granularity

- Basic STARTTLS+REQUIRETLS requirement
- Option to require DNSSEC MX lookup
- Option to constrain type of cert verification
 - X.509 trust chain
 - Use of DANE certificates
- Optional constraints on crypto characteristics
 - Minimum TLS version
 - Cipher choices, etc.
- Options can greatly complicate implementation but make protocol robust against additional attackers





MORE REVIEWS **PLEASE!**

