Private Discovery Threat Considerations
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Abstract
This document provides a framework for evaluating and comparing solutions for privacy-respecting discovery mechanisms.

Status of This Memo
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1. Introduction

When AppleTalk was introduced in 1986, privacy concerns were not foremost in most people’s minds. The fact that a printer was offering printing service was not considered a secret, and the fact that a computer was seeking printing service was not considered a secret. The fact that the computer could discover the printer without expert configuration was considered remarkable.

Thirty years later, the landscape has changed. We now have many more network service types, and mobile wireless devices offering and consuming those services are common. Those mobile wireless devices and the services they offer or use often involve sensitive financial or medical data. Furthermore, the ubiquity of such mobile wireless devices makes them an attractive target for mischievous or outright criminal activity. The fact that a person’s smartphone is communicating with their implanted glucose monitor or insulin pump is not something that should be public information.

Hence there is now a need for discovery mechanisms that utilize privacy-preserving techniques. There have been various different efforts to address this, but they tend to offer solutions based on assumptions of what privacy aspects are important, without articulating what those assumptions are. Without knowing the assumptions and design goals of a particular proposal it is hard to evaluate whether that proposal meets those goals, or indeed whether they are the right goals.

Without advocating for any particular solution, this document presents an overview of the various aspects of device discovery and service discovery, and outlines the privacy concerns of each. Any given proposal may not address all possible privacy concerns. Depending on the scenario, it may not be necessary to address every privacy concern. Indeed, it may turn out to be impossible, or at least impractical, to address all possible privacy concerns. This document provides a framework to help evaluate whether a given solution meets the privacy needs of some particular usage scenario.
2. Discovery Operations

Device discovery and service discovery involve three principal operations:

1. Offer
2. Discover
3. Use

The "Offer" operation is how a device offers a service on the network. Typically this involves, using today's terminology, (a) a "listening" UDP or TCP socket, which accepts incoming packets or connections, and (b) a way of advertising to other local and remote devices what kind of service is being offered, its name, and other metadata including how to reach it. Observe that there are three levels of information in use here: (i) the type of service, (ii) the name of the particular instance of that type of service, and (iii) the operational details of how to connect to and make use of that particular instance.

The "Discover" operation is how a client device learns what service instances are being offered (by local devices, and/or remote devices, depending on the discovery mechanism being used). Typically a client device knows what kind of service it is seeking, and wants to discover named instances of that service. The "Discover" operation is linking information level (i) type of service, with information level (ii) names of specific instances offering that type of service. The "Discover" operation can be viewed as providing a little information (just the name) about many different instances. In terms of complexity and efficiency, it's a 1 x n operation, getting one piece of information about n instances.

The "Use" operation is how a client device requests additional information (IP address(es), port number, and possibly other metadata), and then uses this information to communicate with the service instance and make use of the service it offers. The "Use" operation is linking information level (ii) specific instance name, with information level (iii) detailed information about that individual instance. The "Use" operation can be viewed as providing a lot of information about one particular instance. In terms of complexity and efficiency, it's an m x 1 operation, getting m pieces of information about 1 instance, and then proceeding to use that instance.

All three operations, and the three levels of information they use, need to be considered from a privacy perspective.
Note that some discovery mechanisms conflate "Discover" and "Use" into a single operation. Instead of requesting a little information about a lot of instances, or a lot of information about a single instance, they are only able to request everything about everything. They replace a 1 x n operation and an m x 1 operation with a combined m x n operation, always requesting m pieces of information each about n different instances.
3. Trust Granularity

When we talk about entities trusting other entities, what entities are we talking about?

Are the entities physical devices, like a smartphone or laptop computer?

Are the entities human users? If a device like a laptop computer has multiple users, we should not assume that because one user is authorized to discover certain services that means that all other users of that laptop are also authorized to discover those services.

Are the entities software applications? If a device like a smartphone has multiple apps installed, we should not assume that because one app is authorized to discover certain services that means that all other apps on that smartphone are also authorized to discover those services. For example, just because a medical app on a smartphone is authorized to discover and communicate with the user's medical devices such as an implanted insulin monitor, that doesn’t mean that social network apps or games on that same smartphone are also authorized to discover and communicate with those medical devices.

Note that when the text above talks about a user or app being "authorized" we’re not talking about authorization controls being enforced by the laptop or smartphone. Controls enforced by the laptop or smartphone operating system are appropriate and have their place, but the kind of authorization controls we’re talking about here are enforced by the entity being discovered. When the entity being discovered receives a query from an authorized source, it answers the query. When the entity being discovered receives a query from an unauthorized source, it does not answer the query. The important question is the granularity of the "source" referred to -- is it a physical device, a user, or an app? (This analysis presupposes that the host operating system on the device has sufficient memory protection and access controls to protect one user's secret key material from being accessed and abused by another user, or one app's secret key material from being accessed and abused by another app. For a device without such protection, only the per-device granularity of trust is applicable.)
4. Desirable Security Properties

For each of the operations and information levels described above, we need to consider what threats we are concerned about.

Authenticity & Integrity
Can we trust the information we receive? Has it been modified in flight by an adversary? Do we trust the source of the information?

Confidentiality
Who can read the information sent in messages? Ideally this should only be the appropriate trusted parties, but it can be hard to define who "the appropriate trusted parties" are. The "Discover" operation in particular is often used to discover new entities that the device did not previously know about. It may be tricky to work out how a device can have an established trust relationship with a new entity it has never previously communicated with.

Anonymity
Does the information exchange reveal the identity of either participant? In this context "identity" can mean things like the name, email address, or phone number of the human user. It could mean things like the hostname or MAC address of the device. Even when information is authenticated and confidential, there can be unexpected sources of information leakage. For example, if suitable precautions are not taken, the source MAC address in data packets can reveal the identity of the device manufacturer, which can yield clues about the nature of the device.

Resistance to Dictionary Attacks
It can be tempting to use simple one-way hash functions to obscure sensitive identifiers. This transforms a sensitive unique identifier such as an email address into a scrambled (but still unique) identifier. Unfortunately simple solutions may be vulnerable to offline dictionary attacks. Given a scrambled unique identifier, it may be possible to do a brute-force attack, trying billions of known and speculative email addresses until a match is found.

Resistance to Tracking
In today's world, we have to be sensitive to any unchanging unique identifier, no matter how thoroughly and irreversibly scrambled it may be. Even though an attacker may not be able to divine the origin of a scrambled unique identifier, the unchanging unique identifier may still be correlated with other things. If a given unchanging unique identifier appears on a cafe network every
morning when a certain person comes in to get coffee, then with some certainty that unchanging unique identifier can be associated with that person, and used to track their movements around the city for the rest of their workday. Consequently, in cases where this threat is a concern, all cleartext identifiers used on the network need to be rotated according to some policy, so that a given identifier is not reused for too long or in different locations. These changing identifiers can be decoded by trusted entities, but are meaningless to anyone else.

Resistance to Message Linking

Is it possible to link or correlate exchanges across discovery operations? For example, do Discovery messages reveal information about future Use messages, or vice versa? This can be done via sender MAC address, for example. An adversary can use linkability information to de-anonymize service users or providers, even in the event that, individually, no information leaks from any particular message alone (e.g., because it’s encrypted in transit). For example, even if persistent identifiers are rotated periodically, if all identifiers are not rotated in unison then the overlap period can be used to track the user across identifier rotations.

Resistance to Denial-of-Service Attack

In any protocol where the receiver of messages has to perform cryptographic operations on those messages, there is a risk of a brute-force flooding attack causing the receiver to expend excessive amounts of CPU time (and battery power) just processing and discarding those messages.
5. Other Operational Requirements

5.1. Power Management

Many modern devices, especially battery-powered devices, use power management techniques to conserve energy. One such technique is for a device to transfer information about itself to a proxy, which will act on behalf of the device for some functions, while the device itself goes to sleep to reduce power consumption. When the proxy determines that some action is required which only the device itself can perform, the proxy may have some way (such as Ethernet "Magic Packet") to wake the device.

In many cases, the device may not trust the network proxy sufficiently to share all its confidential key material with the proxy. This poses challenges for combining private discovery that relies on per-query cryptographic operations, with energy-saving techniques that rely on having (somewhat untrusted) network proxies answer queries on behalf of sleeping devices.

5.2. Protocol Efficiency

Creating a discovery protocol that has the desired security properties may result in a design that is not efficient. To perform the necessary operations the protocol may need to send and receive a large number of network packets. This may consume an unreasonable amount of network capacity (particularly problematic when it’s shared wireless spectrum), cause an unnecessary level of power consumption (particularly problematic on battery devices) and may result in the discovery process being slow.

It is a difficult challenge to design a discovery protocol that has the property of obscuring the details of what it is doing from unauthorized observers, while also managing to do that quickly and efficiently.

5.3. Secure Initialization

One of the challenges implicit in the preceding discussions is that whenever we discuss "trusted entities" versus "untrusted entities", there needs to be some way that trust is initially established, to convert an "untrusted entity" into a "trusted entity".

One way to establish trust between two entities is to trust a third party to make that determination for us. For example, the X.509 certificates used by TLS and HTTPS web browsing are based on the model of trusting a third party to tell us who to trust. There are some difficulties in using this model for establishing trust for
service discovery uses. If we want to print our tax returns or medical documents on "our" printer, then we need to know which printer on the network we can trust to be "our" printer. All of the printers we discover on the network may be legitimate printers made by legitimate printer manufacturers, but not all of them are "our" printer. A third-party certificate authority cannot tell us which one of the printers is ours.

Another common way to establish a trust relationship is Trust On First Use (TOFU), as used by ssh. The first usage is a Leap Of Faith, but after that public keys are exchanged and at least we can confirm that subsequent communications are with the same entity. In today’s world, where there may be attackers present even at that first use, it would be preferable to be able to establish a trust relationship without requiring an initial Leap Of Faith.

Techniques now exist for securely establishing a trust relationship without requiring an initial Leap Of Faith. Trust can be established securely using a short passphrase or PIN with cryptographic algorithms such as Secure Remote Password (SRP) [RFC5054] or a Password Authenticated Key Exchange like J-PAKE [RFC8236] using a Schnorr Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof [RFC8235].

Such techniques require a user to enter the correct passphrase or PIN in order for the cryptographic algorithms to establish working communication. This avoids the human tendency to simply press the "OK" button when asked if they want to do something on their electronic device. It removes the human fallibility element from the equation, and avoids the human users inadvertently sabotaging their own security.

Using these techniques, if a user tries to print their tax return on a printer they’ve never used before (even though the name looks right) they’ll be prompted to enter a pairing PIN, and the user *cannot* ignore that warning. They can’t just press an "OK" button. They have to walk to the printer and read the displayed PIN and enter it. And if the intended printer is not displaying a pairing PIN, or is displaying a different pairing PIN, that means the user may be being spoofed, and the connection will not succeed, and the failure will not reveal any secret information to the attacker. As much as the human desires to "just give me an OK button to make it print" (and the attacker desires them to click that OK button too) the cryptographic algorithms do not give the user the ability to opt out of the security, and consequently do not give the attacker any way to persuade the user to opt out of the security protections.
6. Informative References


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Abstract

Over the course of several years, a rich collection of technologies has developed around DNS-Based Service Discovery, described across multiple documents. This "Road Map" document gives an overview of how these related but separate technologies (and their documents) fit together, to facilitate service discovery in various environments.

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1. Road Map

DNS-Based Service Discovery [RFC6763] is a component of Zero Configuration Networking [RFC6760] [ZC].

Over the course of several years, a rich collection of technologies has developed around DNS-Based Service Discovery. These various related but separate technologies are described across multiple documents. This "Road Map" document gives an overview of how these technologies (and their documents) fit together to facilitate service discovery across a broad range of operating environments, from small scale zero-configuration networks to large scale administered networks, from local area to wide area, and from low-speed wireless links in the kb/s range to high-speed wired links operating at multiple Gb/s.

Not all of the available components are necessary or appropriate in all scenarios. One goal of this "Road Map" document is to provide guidance about which components to use depending on the problem being solved.

2. Namespace of Service Types

The single most important concept in service discovery is the namespace specifying how different service types are identified. This is how a client communicates what it needs, and how a server communicates what it offers. For a client to discover a server, the client and server need to have a common language to describe what they need and what they offer. The need to use the same namespace of service types, otherwise they may actually speak the same application protocol over the air or on the wire, and may in fact be completely compatible, and yet may be unable to detect this because they are using different names to refer to the same actual service. Hence, having a consistent namespace of service types is the essential prerequisite for any useful service discovery.

IANA manages the registry of Service Types [RFC6335][STR]. This registry of Service Types can (and should) be used in any service discovery protocol as the vocabulary for describing *all* IP-based services, not only DNS-Based Service Discovery [RFC6763].

In this document we focus on the use of the IANA Service Type Registry [STR] in conjunction with DNS-Based Service Discovery, though that should not be taken in any way to imply any criticism of other service discovery protocols sharing the same namespace of service types. In different circumstances different Service Discovery protocols are appropriate.
For example, for service discovery of services potentially available via a Wi-Fi access point, prior to association with that Wi-Fi access point, when no IP link has yet been established, a service discovery protocol may use raw 802.11 frames, not necessarily IP, UDP, or DNS-formatted messages. For Service Discovery using peer-to-peer Wi-Fi technologies, without any Wi-Fi access point at all, it may also be preferable to use raw 802.11 frames instead of IP, UDP, or DNS-formatted messages. Service Discovery using IEEE 802.15.4 radios may use yet another over-the-air protocol. What is important is that they all share the same vocabulary to describe all IP-based services. Using the same service type vocabulary means that client and server software, using agnostic APIs to consume and offer services on the network, has a common language to identify those services, independent of the medium or the particular service discovery protocol in use on that medium. Just as TCP/IP runs on many different link layers, and the concept of using an IP address to identify a particular peer is consistent across many different link layers, the concept of using a name from the IANA Service Type Registry to identify a particular service type also needs to be consistent across all IP-supporting link layers.

Originally, the IANA Service Type Registry [RFC6335][STR] used the term "Service Name" rather than "Service Type". Later it became clear that this term could be ambiguous. For a given service instance on the network, there is the machine-visible name of the type of service it provides, and the human-visible name of the particular instance of that type of service. For clarity, this document and related specifications use the term "Service Type" to denote the machine-visible name of the type of service, and the term "Instance Name" to denote the human-visible name of a particular instance.
3. Service Discovery Operational Model

The original DNS-Based Service Discovery specifications [RFC6763] used the terms "register" (advertise a service), "browse" (discover service instances), and "resolve" (get IP address and port for a specific service instance). This terminology is reflective of the thinking at the time, which viewed service discovery as a new and separate step, added to existing networking code. For example, a server would first open a listening socket as it always had, and then "register" that listening socket with the service discovery engine. Similarly, a client would first "resolve" a service instance to an IP address and port, and then, having done that, "connect" to that IP address and port.

More recent thinking in this area [RFC8305] has come to the conclusion that it is preferable wherever possible to insulate application software from networking details like having to decide between IPv4 and IPv6, having to decide among multiple IP addresses of either or both address families, and having to decide among multiple available network interfaces. Consequently this document and related specifications adopt newer terminology as follows:

1. Offer
2. Enumerate
3. Use

The first step, "Offer", is when a server is offering a service using some application-layer protocol, on a listening TCP or UDP (or other transport protocol) port, and wishes to make that known to other devices. This encompasses both making a listening socket (or the equivalent concept in whatever underlying networking API is being used) and advertising the existence of that listening socket via a service discovery mechanism.

The second step, "Enumerate", is when a client device wishes to perform some action, but does not yet know which particular service instance will be used to perform that action. For example, when a user taps the "AirPrint" button on an iPhone or iPad, the iPhone or iPad knows that the user wishes to print, but not which particular printer to use. The desired "function" is known (IPP printing), but not the particular instance. In this case, the client device needs to enumerate the list of available service instances that are able to perform the desired task. In most cases this list of service instances is presented to a human user to choose from; in some cases it is software that examines the list of available service instances and determines the best one to use. This second step is the operation that was called "browsing" in the original specifications.
The third step, "Use", is when particular service instance has been selected, and the client wants to make use of that service instance. This encompasses both the "resolve" step (finding IP address(es) and port(s) for the service instance) and the subsequent steps to establish communication with it, which may include details like address family selection, interface selection, transport protocol selection, etc. Ideally, application-layer code should never be exposed to IP addresses at all, just as application-layer code today is generally not exposed to details like MAC addresses [RFC8305].

The second and third steps are intentionally separate. In the second step, a limited amount of information (typically just the name) is requested about a large number of service instances. In the third step more detailed information (e.g., target host IP address, port number, etc.) is requested about one specific service instance. Requesting all the detailed information about all available service instances would be inefficient and wasteful on the network. If the information about services on the network is imagined as a table, then the second step is requesting just one column from that table (the name column) and the third step is requesting just one row from that table (the information pertaining to just one named service instance).

To give an example, clicking the "+" button in the printer settings on macOS is an operation performing the second step. It is requesting the names of all available printers. Once a desired printer has been chosen and configured, subsequent printing of documents is an operation performing the third step. It only needs to request information about the specific printer in question. It is not necessary to repeatedly discover the list of every printer on the network if the client device already knows which one it intends to use.

DNS-Based Service Discovery [RFC6763] implements these three principal service discovery operations using DNS records and queries, either using Multicast DNS [RFC6762] (for queries limited to the local link) or conventional unicast DNS [RFC1034] [RFC1035] (for queries beyond the local link).

Other service discovery protocol achieve the same semantics using different packet formats and mechanisms.

One incidental benefit of using DNS as the foundation layer for service discovery, in cases where that makes sense, is that both Multicast DNS and conventional unicast DNS are also used provide name resolution (mapping host names to IP addresses). There is some efficiency and code reuse gained by using the same underlying protocol for both service discovery and naming.
A final requirement is that the service discovery protocol perform discovery not only at a single moment in time, but also ongoing change notification (sometimes called "Publish & Subscribe"). Without support for ongoing change notification, clients would be forced to resort to polling to keep data up to date, which is inefficient and wasteful on the network.

Multicast DNS [RFC6762] implicitly includes change notification by virtue of announcing record changes via IP Multicast, which allows these changes to be seen by all peers on the same link (i.e., same broadcast domain).

Conventional unicast DNS [RFC1034] [RFC1035] has historically not had broad support for change notification. This capability is added via the new mechanism for DNS Push Notifications [Push].

When using DNS-Based Service Discovery [RFC6763] there are two aspects to consider: firstly how the clients choose what DNS names to query, and what query mechanisms to use, and secondly how the relevant information got into the DNS namespace in the first place, so as to be available when clients query for it.

The available namespaces are discussed below in Section 4. Client operation is discussed in Section 5 and server operation is discussed in Section 6.
4. Service Discovery Namespace

When used with Multicast DNS [RFC6762] queries are automatically performed in the ".local" parent domain.

When used with conventional unicast DNS [RFC1034] [RFC1035] some other domain must be used.

For individuals and organizations with a globally-unique domain name registered to them, their globally-unique domain name, or a subdomain of it, can be used for service discovery.

However, it would be convenient for capable service discovery to be available even to people who haven’t taken the step of registering and paying for a globally-unique domain name. For these people it would be useful if devices arrived preconfigured with some suitable factory-default service discovery domain, such as "services.home.arpa" [I-D.ietf-homenet-dot]. Services published in this factory-default service discovery domain would not be globally unique or globally resolvable, but they could have scope larger than the single link provided by Multicast DNS.
5. Client Configuration and Operation

When using DNS-Based Service Discovery [RFC6763], clients have to choose what DNS names to query.

When used with Multicast DNS [RFC6762] queries are automatically performed in the ".local" parent domain.

For discovery beyond the local link, a unicast DNS domain must be used. This unicast DNS domain can be configured manually by the user, or it can be learned dynamically from the network (as has been done for many years at IETF meetings to facilitate discovery of the IETF Terminal Room printer, from outside the IETF Terminal Room). In the DNS-SD specification [RFC6763] section 11, "Discovery of Browsing and Registration Domains (Domain Enumeration)" describes how a client device learns one or more recommended service discovery domains from the network, using the special ".lb._dns-sd._udp" query. All of the details from that specification are not repeated here. A walk-through describing one real-world example of how this works, using discovery of the IETF Terminal Room printer as a specific concrete case study, is given in Appendix A.

Given the service type that the user or client device is seeking (see Section 2) and one or more service discovery domains to look in, the client then sends its DNS queries, and processes the responses.

For some uses, one-shot conventional DNS queries and responses are perfectly adequate, but for service discovery, where a list may be displayed on a screen for a user to see, it is desirable to keep that list up to date without the user having to repeatedly tap a "refresh" button, and without the software repeatedly polling the network on the user's behalf.

And early solution to provide asynchronous change notifications for unicast DNS was the UDP-based protocol DNS Long-Lived Queries [DNS-LLQ]. This was used, among other things, by Apple's Back to My Mac Service [RFC6281] introduced in Mac OS X 10.5 Leopard in 2007.

Recent experience has shown that an asynchronous change notification protocol built on TCP would be preferable, so the IETF is now developing DNS Push Notifications [Push].

Because DNS Push Notifications is built on top of a DNS TCP connection, DNS Push Notifications adopts the conventions specified by DNS Stateful Operations [DSO] rather than inventing its own session management mechanisms.
6. Server Configuration and Operation

Section 5 above describes how clients perform their queries. The related question is how the relevant information got into the DNS namespace in the first place, so as to be available when clients query for it.

One way that relevant service discovery information can get into the DNS namespace is simply via manual configuration, creating the necessary PTR, SRV and TXT records [RFC6763], and indeed this is how the IETF Terminal Room printer has been advertised to IETF meeting attendees for many years. While this is easy for the experienced network operators at the IETF, it can be onerous to others less familiar with how to set up DNS-SD records.

Hence it would be convenient to automate this process of populating the DNS namespace with relevant service discovery information. Two efforts are underway to address this need, the Service Discovery Proxy [DisProx] (see Section 6.1) and the Service Registration Protocol [RegProt] (see Section 6.4).

6.1. Service Discovery Proxy

The first effort in the direction of automatically populating the DNS namespace is the Service Discovery Proxy [DisProx]. This technology is designed to work with today’s existing devices that advertise services using Multicast DNS only (such as almost all network printers sold in the last decade). A Service Discovery Proxy is a device colocated on the same link as the devices we wish to be able to discover from afar. A remote client sends unicast queries to the Discovery Proxy, which performs local Multicast DNS queries on behalf of the remote client, and then sends back the answers it discovers.

Because the time it takes to receive Multicast DNS responses is uncertain, this mechanism benefits from being able to deliver asynchronous change notifications as new answers come in, using DNS Long-Lived Queries [DNS-LLQ] or the newer DNS Push Notifications [Push] on top of DNS Stateful Operations [DSO].
6.2. Multicast DNS Discovery Relay

As an alternative to having to be physically connected to the desired network link, a Service Discovery Proxy [DisProx] can use a Multicast DNS Discovery Relay [Relay] to give it a ‘virtual’ presence on a remote link. Indeed, when using Discovery Relays, a single Discovery Proxy can have a ‘virtual’ presence on hundreds of remote links. A single Discovery Proxy in the data center can serve the needs of an entire enterprise. This is modeled after the DHCP protocol. In simple residential scenarios the DHCP server resides in the home gateway, which is physically attached to the (single) local link. In complex enterprise networks, it is common to have a single centralized DHCP server, which resides in the data center and communicates with a multitude of simple lightweight BOOTP relay agents, implemented in the routers on each physical link.

6.3. Service Discovery Broker

Finally, when clients are making TCP connections to multiple Service Discovery Proxies at the same time, this can be burdensome for the clients (which may be mobile and battery powered) and for the Service Discovery Proxies (which may have to serve hundreds of clients). This situation is remedied by use of a Service Discovery Broker [Broker]. A Service Discovery Broker is an intermediary between client and server. A client can issue a single query to the Service Discovery Broker and have the Service Discovery Broker do the hard work of issuing multiple queries on behalf of the client. And a Service Discovery Broker can shield a Service Discovery Proxy from excessive load by collapsing multiple duplicate queries from different client down to a single query to the Service Discovery Proxy.
6.4. Service Registration Protocol

The second effort in the direction of automatically populating the DNS namespace is the Service Registration Protocol [RegProt]. This technology is designed to enable future devices that will explicitly cooperate with the network infrastructure to advertise their services.

The Service Registration Protocol is effectively DNS Update, with some minor additions.

One addition is the introduction of a lifetime on DNS Updates, using the Dynamic DNS Update Lease EDNS(0) option [DNS-UL]. This option has similar semantics to a DHCP address lease, where a device is granted an address with a certain lease lifetime, and if the device fails to renew the lease before it expires then the address will be reclaimed and become available to be allocated to a different device. In cases where DHCP is being used, a device will generally request a DNS Update Lease with the same expiration time as its DHCP address lease. This way, if the device is abruptly disconnected from the network, around the same time as its address gets reclaimed its DNS records will also be garbage collected.

The second addition is the introduction of information that tells the Service Registration server that the device will be going to sleep to save power, combined with information specifying how to wake it up again on demand, using the EDNS(0) OWNER Option [Owner].

The use of an explicit Service Registration Protocol is beneficial in networks where multicast is expensive, inefficient, or outright blocked, such as many Wi-Fi networks. An explicit Service Registration Protocol is also beneficial in networks where multicast and broadcast are supported poorly, if at all, such as mesh networks like those using IEEE 802.15.4.

The use of power management information in the Service Registration messages allows devices to sleep to save power, which is especially beneficial for battery-powered devices in the home.

7. Security Considerations

As an informational document, this document introduces no new Security Considerations of its own. The various referenced documents each describe their own relevant Security Considerations as appropriate.
8. Informative References


Appendix A. IETF Terminal Room Printer Discovery Walk-through

For about a decade now, the capable IETF network staff have provided off-link DNS Service Discovery for the Terminal Room printer at IETF meetings three times a year. In the case of the IETF meetings the necessary DNS records are entered manually, whereas this document advocates for increased automation of that task, but the process by which clients query to discover services is the same either way.

This appendix gives a detailed step-by-step account of how this works. It starts with joining the Wi-Fi network and doing a DHCP request, and ends with paper coming out of the printer. The reason the explanation is so detailed is to avoid inadvertently having a hand-waving "and then a miracle occurs" part, which skips over important details. And one of the reasons for asking the IETF network team to set this up for IETF meetings is that operational use is an important reality check. When standing in front of a room, giving a presentation, if you miss out some vital step, people may not notice. When running an actual service used by actual people, if you miss out some vital step, no paper comes out of the printer, and everyone notices.

Using a macOS computer, at an IETF meeting, you can repeat the steps illustrated here to see exactly how it works. Or you can simply press Cmd-P in any application and see that "term-printer" appears as an available printer, to confirm that it does in fact work.

First, let’s see what the macOS computer learned from the local DHCP server:

```
% scutil
> list
...
subKey [74] = State:/Network/Service/21B5304C...54B28F4CA1D2/DHCP
...
> show State:/Network/Service/21B5304C...54B28F4CA1D2/DHCP
<dictionary> {
  Option_15 : <data> 0x6d656574696e672e696574662e6f7267
  ...
}
```

Option_15 is Domain Name. To see what domain name, we need to decode the hexadecimal data to ASCII.

```
% echo 6d656574696e672e696574662e6f7267 0A | xxd -r -p
meeting.ietf.org
```

Cheshire                Expires September 19, 2018               [Page 14]
Our DHCP domain name is meeting.ietf.org. Does meeting.ietf.org recommend that we look in any Wide Area Service Discovery domains?

```bash
% dig lb._dns_sd._udp.meeting.ietf.org. ptr
;; <<>> DiG 9.6-ESV-R4-P3 <<>> lb._dns_sd._udp.meeting.ietf.org. ptr
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 35624
;; flags: qr aa rd ra;
;; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 2, ADDITIONAL: 4

;; QUESTION SECTION:
;lb._dns_sd._udp.meeting.ietf.org. IN PTR

;; ANSWER SECTION:
lb._dns_sd._udp.meeting.ietf.org. 3600 IN PTR meeting.ietf.org.
...

;; Query time: 8 msec
;; SERVER: 130.129.5.6#53(130.129.5.6)
;; WHEN: Wed Mar 13 10:16:40 2013
;; MSG SIZE  rcvd: 188
```

In the middle there you’ll see that the answer is "meeting.ietf.org". In this case the answer is self-referential -- "meeting.ietf.org" is inviting us to look for services in "meeting.ietf.org", but the PTR record(s) could equally well point at any other domain, such as "services.ietf.org", or anything else.
Note that this answer does not depend on the client device being "on" the IETF meeting network, which is in any case a loosely defined concept at best. Nor does it depend on sending the DNS query to a DNS server that is "on" the IETF meeting network. Any capable DNS recursive resolver anywhere on the planet will give the same answer. We can test this by sending the same DNS query to Google’s 8.8.8.8 public resolver:

% dig @8.8.8.8 lb._dns-sd._udp.meeting.iotf.org. ptr

; (1 server found)
;; Got answer:
;; HEADER: opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 24571
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY:1, ANSWER:1, AUTHORITY:0, ADDITIONAL:0

;; QUESTION SECTION:
;lb._dns-sd._udp.meeting.iotf.org. IN PTR

;; ANSWER SECTION:
lb._dns-sd._udp.meeting.iotf.org. 1532 IN PTR meeting.iotf.org.

In the middle there you’ll see that the answer is still "meeting.iotf.org".
In this example, this particular test was done at the 86th IETF in Orlando, Florida, in March 2013. The Google 8.8.8.8 public resolver still gave the correct answer, even though it was 13 hops away:

```bash
% traceroute -q 1 8.8.8.8
traceroute to 8.8.8.8 (8.8.8.8), 64 hops max, 52 byte packets
1  rtra (130.129.80.2)  1.369 ms
2  75-112-170-148.net.bhntampa.com (75.112.170.148)  14.494 ms
3  bun2.tamp20-car1.bhn.net (71.44.3.73)  19.558 ms
4  hun0-0-0-0-tamp20-cbr1.bhn.net (72.31.117.156)  20.730 ms
5  xe-8-2-0.bar1.tampal.level3.net (4.53.172.9)  13.052 ms
6  ae-5-5.ebr1.miami1.level3.net (4.69.148.213)  27.413 ms
7  ae-1-51.edge1.miami2.level3.net (4.69.138.75)  15.552 ms
8  google-inc.edge1.miami2.level3.net (4.59.240.26)  40.852 ms
9  209.85.253.118 (209.85.253.118)  21.118 ms
10 216.239.48.192 (216.239.48.192)  21.890 ms
11 216.239.48.192 (216.239.48.192)  23.221 ms
12 *
13 google-public-dns-a.google.com (8.8.8.8)  32.961 ms
```

For the rest of this example we use the Google 8.8.8.8 public resolver for all the queries.

In the case of IETF meetings the PTR is self-referential -- meeting.ietf.org is advising us to look in meeting.ietf.org, but it could easily be set up to direct us elsewhere. However, since it’s suggesting we look for services in meeting.ietf.org, we’ll do that.

A macOS computer with appropriate printer drivers installed will look for instances of the "_pdl-datastream._tcp" service type at "meeting.ietf.org":

```bash
% dig +short @8.8.8.8 _pdl-datastream._tcp.meeting.ietf.org. ptr
term-printer._pdl-datastream._tcp.meeting.ietf.org.
```

There’s one printing service available here, called "term-printer". That’s what you see when you press the "+" button in the Print & Fax Preference Pane on macOS.
When the user actually prints something, macOS does these queries:

```
% dig +short @8.8.8.8 \
term-printer._pdl-datastream._tcp.meeting.ietf.org. srv
0 0 9100 term-printer.meeting.ietf.org.

% dig +short @8.8.8.8 term-printer.meeting.ietf.org. AAAA
2001:df8::48:200:74ff:fee0:6cf8
```

This tells the computer that to use this printer, it must connect to [2001:df8::48:200:74ff:fee0:6cf8]:9100, using the installed printer driver, which speaks the appropriate vendor-specific printing protocol for that printer.

Printing from an iPhone or iPad is similar, except there are no vendor-specific printer drivers installed. Instead, printing from an iPhone or iPad uses the IETF Standard IPP printing protocol, using an IPP printer that supports at least URF (Universal Raster Format):

```
% dig +short @8.8.8.8 \
_universal._sub._ipp._tcp.meeting.ietf.org. ptr
term-printer._ipp._tcp.meeting.ietf.org.
```

An iPhone or iPad will discover that there’s one IPP-based printing service available here, called "term-printer". It has the same name as the pdl-datastream printing service, and exists on the same physical hardware, but uses a different printing protocol.

When the user prints from their iPhone or iPad using AirPrint, iOS does these queries:

```
% dig +short @8.8.8.8 term-printer._ipp._tcp.meeting.ietf.org. srv
0 0 631 term-printer.meeting.ietf.org.

% dig +short @8.8.8.8 term-printer.meeting.ietf.org. aaaa
2001:df8::48:200:74ff:fee0:6cf8
```

Note that the "_ipp._tcp" service has the same target hostname and IPv6 address as the "_pdl-datastream" service, but is accessed at a different TCP port on that hardware device.

To use this printer, the iPhone or iPad connects to [2001:df8::48:200:74ff:fee0:6cf8]:631, and uses IPP to print.
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EDNS0 OWNER Option
draft-cheshire-edns0-owner-option-01.txt

Abstract

The DNS-SD Sleep Proxy Service uses a message format identical to that used by standard DNS Update, with two additional pieces of information: the identity of the sleeping server to which the records belong, and the Wake-on-LAN Magic Packet bit pattern which should be used to wake the sleeping server. This document specifies the EDNS0 option used to carry that additional information.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

The EDNS0 'Owner' Option is used by the DNS-SD Sleep Proxy Service. The DNS-SD Sleep Proxy Service [RFC6762] [RFC6763] uses a message format identical to that used by standard DNS Update [RFC2136] [RFC3007], with two additional pieces of information: the identity of the sleeping server to which the records belong, and the Wake-on-LAN Magic Packet [WoL] bit pattern which should be used to wake the sleeping server. This document specifies the EDNS0 option [RFC2671] used to carry that additional information.

The EDNS0 'Owner' Option is specified here with reference to the DNS-SD Sleep Proxy Service, but could also be used for other purposes not related to the Sleep Proxy Service.

2. Conventions and Terminology Used in this Document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" [RFC2119].

3. EDNS0 'Owner' Option

When a server that supports the DNS-SD Sleep Proxy protocol goes to sleep, it communicates relevant DNS records, which describe its role on the network, to the Sleep Proxy, in one or more DNS Update messages [RFC2136] [RFC3007]. Typically these record registrations with the Sleep Proxy do not last forever; they have a finite lifetime, communicated using EDNS0 option 2 "DNS Update Lease" [DNS-UL].

When the Sleep Proxy observes traffic on the network which warrants waking the sleeping server, it does so by sending a Wake-on-LAN "Magic Packet" [WoL].

A Wake-on-LAN "Magic Packet" consists of the following bit-pattern:

- Sync sequence: 48 binary 1s (i.e. 6 bytes of 0xFF)
- Sixteen repetitions of the 48-bit MAC address of the sleeping server’s network interface
- Optional 32-bit or 48-bit ‘password’
When the Sleep Proxy determines that the sleeping server has awoken, it can cease proxying for that server.

The Sleep Proxy needs to know the 48-bit MAC address (and possibly 32-bit or 48-bit ‘password’) to use to wake the sleeping server.

It also needs a way to determine when the sleeping server has awoken. Because, when a sleeping server wakes it may be attached to the network via a different interface (e.g. 802.11 wireless instead of Ethernet), merely observing the source MAC address in the packets it sends may not be sufficient to identify that this server on wireless is the same server that moments earlier went to sleep while attached via Ethernet. Also, merely observing packets apparently originating from the sleeping server may not be sufficient to conclude reliably that it has woken — since these could be old packets, from before it slept, that were delayed in transit.

The necessary information is communicated in the EDNS0 ‘Owner’ option:

- The 48-bit MAC address of the sleeping server’s network interface
- Optional 32-bit or 48-bit ‘password’
- A 48-bit value that uniquely identifies this machine regardless of which interface it is using. Typically the MAC address of the machine’s ‘primary’ interface is used for this purpose.
- A sleep/wake sequence number. Each time the server wakes and begins a new period of wakefulness, this sequence number is incremented. If the Sleep Proxy observes the server send a packet with the same sleep/wake sequence number as it saw in the proxy registration, this is an old packet delayed in the network and does not constitute evidence that the server has awoken. If the Sleep Proxy observes the server send a packet with a different sleep/wake sequence number then the Sleep Proxy can conclude that the server has awoken and the proxy need not continue answering for it.
3.1. EDNS0 'Owner' Option Format

A full EDNS0 'Owner' option has the following format:

```
+-----------------------------------+
| Opt | Len | V | S | Primary MAC | Wakeup MAC | Password |
+-----------------------------------+
```

The two-byte EDNS0 Option code 'Opt' for the 'Owner' option is 4.

The two-byte length field 'Len' for this option is 24 in the full-length case, or less when using the "compact" variants described below.

The one-byte version field 'V' is currently zero. In the current version of the protocol, senders MUST set this field to zero on transmission, and receivers receiving an EDNS0 option 4 where the version field is not zero MUST ignore the entire option.

The one-byte sequence number field 'S' is set to zero the first time this option is used after boot, and then after that incremented each time the machine awakens from sleep.

The six-byte Primary MAC field identifies the machine. Typically, the MAC address of the machine’s ‘primary’ interface is used for this purpose.

The six-byte pattern to be repeated 16 times in the wakeup packet. This SHOULD be the MAC address of the interface through which the packet containing this 'Owner' option is being sent.

The six-byte 'password' to be appended after the sixteen repetitions of the MAC address.
3.2. Compact EDNS0 ‘Owner’ Option Formats

Where the ‘password’ is only four bytes, a shorter format is used, identified by the length field ‘Len’ having the value 22:

```
+---------------------------+
|Opt|Len|V|S|Primary MAC|Wakeup MAC |Passwd |
+---------------------------+ (Len = 22)
```

When the ‘password’ is not required, it can be omitted entirely, identified by the length field ‘Len’ having the value 18:

```
+---------------------------+
|Opt|Len|V|S|Primary MAC|Wakeup MAC |
+---------------------------+ (Len = 18)
```

In the common case where the ‘password’ is not required and the Primary MAC and Wakeup MAC are the same, both Wakeup MAC and password may be omitted, identified by the length field ‘Len’ having the value 12:

```
+---------------------------+
|Opt|Len|V|S|Primary MAC|
+---------------------------+ (Len = 12)
```
4. Acknowledgements

Thanks to Rory McGuire for his work Bonjour Sleep Proxy and contributions to this document.

5. Security Considerations

When a Wake-on-LAN Magic Packet is sent to wake a machine up, it is sent in the clear, making it vulnerable to eavesdropping.

6. IANA Considerations

The EDNS0 OPTION CODE 4 has been assigned for this DNS extension. No additional IANA services are required by this document.
7. References

7.1. Normative References


7.2. Informative References


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Privacy Extensions for DNS-SD
draft-huitema-dnssd-privacyscaling-00

Abstract

DNS-SD (DNS Service Discovery) normally discloses information about both the devices offering services and the devices requesting services. This information includes host names, network parameters, and possibly a further description of the corresponding service instance. Especially when mobile devices engage in DNS Service Discovery over Multicast DNS at a public hotspot, a serious privacy problem arises.

The draft currently progressing in the DNSSD Working Group assumes peer-to-peer pairing between the service to be discovered and each of its client. This has good security properties, but create scaling issues. Each server needs to publish as many announcements as it has paired clients. Each client needs to process all announcements from all servers present in the network. This leads to large number of operations when each server is paired with many clients.

Different designs are possible. For example, if there was only one server "discovery key" known by each authorized client, each server would only have to announce a single record, and clients would only have to process one response for each server that is present on the network. Yet, these designs will present different privacy profiles, and pose different management challenges. This draft analyses the tradeoffs between privacy and scaling in a set of different designs, using either shared secrets or public keys.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

DNS-SD [RFC6763] over mDNS [RFC6762] enables configurationless service discovery in local networks. It is very convenient for users, but it requires the public exposure of the offering and requesting identities along with information about the offered and requested services. Parts of the published information can seriously breach the user’s privacy. These privacy issues and potential solutions are discussed in [KW14a] and [KW14b].
A recent draft [I-D.ietf-dnssd-privacy] proposes to solve this problem by relying on device pairing. Only clients that have paired with a device would be able to discover that device, and the discovery would not be observable by third parties. This design has a number of good privacy and security properties, but it has a cost, because each server must provide separate announcements for each clients. In this draft, we compare scaling and privacy properties of three different designs:

- The individual pairing defined in [I-D.ietf-dnssd-privacy],
- A single server discovery secret, shared by all authorized clients,
- A single server discovery public key, known by all authorized clients.

After presenting briefly these three solutions, the draft presents the scaling and privacy properties of each of them.

2. Privacy and Secrets

Private discovery tries to ensure that clients and servers can discover each other in a potentially hostile network context, while maintaining privacy. Unauthorized third parties must not be able to discover that a specific server or device is currently present on the network, and they must not be able to discover that a particular client is trying to discover a particular service. This cannot be achieved without some kind of shared secret between client and servers. We review here three particular design for sharing these secrets.

2.1. Pairing secrets

The solution proposed in [I-D.ietf-dnssd-privacy] relies on pairing secrets. Each client obtains a pairing secret from each server that they are authorized to use. The servers publish announcements of the form "nonce|proof", in which the proof is the hash of the nonce and the pairing secret. The proof is of course different for each client, because the secrets are different. For better scaling, the nonce is common to all clients, and defined as a coarse function of time, such as the current 30 minutes interval.

Clients discover the required server by issuing queries containing the current nonce and proof. Servers respond to these queries if the nonce matches the current time interval, and if the proof matches the hash of the nonce with one of the pairing key of an authorized client.
2.2. Discovery secret

Instead of using a different secret for each client as in Section 2.1, another design is to have a single secret per server, shared by all authorized clients of that server. As in the previous solution, the servers publish announcements of the form "nonce|proof", but this time they only need to publish a single announcement per server, because each server maintains a single discovery secret. Again, the nonce can be common to all clients, and defined as a coarse function of time.

Clients discover the required server by issuing queries containing the current nonce and proof. Servers respond to these queries if the nonce matches the current time interval, and if the proof matches the hash of the nonce with one of the discovery secret.

2.3. Discovery public key

Instead of a discovery secret used in Section 2.2, clients could obtain the public keys of the servers that they are authorized to use.

Many public key systems assume that the public key of the server is, well, not secret. But if adversaries know the public key of a server, they can use that public key as a unique identifier to track the server. Moreover, they could use variations of the padding oracle to observe discovery protocol messages and attribute them to a specific public key, thus breaking server privacy. For these reasons, we assume here that the discovery public key is kept secret, only known to authorized clients.

As in the previous solution, the servers publish announcements of the form "nonce|proof", but this time they only need to publish a single announcement per server, because each server maintains a single discovery secret. The proof is obtained by either hashing the nonce with the public key, or using the public key to encrypt the nonce -- the point being that both clients and server can contruct the proof. Again, the nonce can be common to all clients, and defined as a coarse function of time.

The advantage of public key based solutions is that the clients can easily verify the identity of the server, for example if the service is accessed over TLS. On the other hand, just using standard TLS would disclose the certificate of the server to any client that attempts a connection, not just to authorized clients. The server should thus only accept connections from clients that demonstrate knowledge of its public key.
3. Scaling properties of different solutions

To analyze scaling issues we will use the following variables:

N: The average number of authorized clients per server.

M: The average number of servers per client.

P: The average total number of servers present during discovery.

The big difference between the three proposals is the number of records that need to be published by a server when using DNS-SD in server mode, or the number of broadcast messages that needs to be announced per server in MDNS mode:

- **Pairing secrets**: $O(N)$. One record per client.

- **Discovery secrets**: $O(1)$. One record for all clients.

- **Discovery public key**: $O(1)$. One record for all clients.

There are other elements of scaling, linked to the mapping of the privacy discovery service to DNSSD. DNSSD identifies services by a combination of a service type and an instance name. In classic mapping behavior, clients send a query for a service type, and will receive responses from each server instance supporting that type:

- **Pairing secrets**: $O(P \times N)$. There are $O(P)$ servers present, and each publishes $O(N)$ instances.

- **Discovery secrets**: $O(P)$. One record per server present.

- **Discovery public key**: $O(P)$. One record per server present.

The DNSSD Privacy draft suggests an optimization that considerably reduces the considerations about scaling of responses -- see section 4.6 of [I-D.ietf-dnssd-privacy]. In that case, clients compose the list of instance names that they are looking for, and specifically query for these instance names:

- **Pairing secrets**: $O(M)$. The client will compose $O(M)$ queries to discover all the servers that it is interested in. There will be at most $O(M)$ responses.

- **Discovery secrets**: $O(M)$. Same behavior as in the pairing secret case.
Discovery public key: $O(M)$. Same behavior as in the pairing secret case.

Finally, another element of scaling is cacheability. Responses to DNS queries can be cached by DNS resolvers, and MDNS responses can be cached by MDNS resolvers. If several clients send the same queries, and if previous responses could be cached, the client can be served immediately. There are of course differences between the solutions:

Pairing secrets: No caching possible, since there are separate server instances for separate clients.

Discovery secrets: Caching is possible, since there is just one server instance.

Discovery public key: Caching is possible, since there is just one server instance.

4. Comparing privacy posture of different solutions

The analysis of scaling issues in Section 3 shows that the solutions base on a common discovery secret or discovery public key scale much better than the solutions based on pairing secret. All these solutions protect against tracking of clients or servers by third parties, as long as the secret on which they rely are kept secret. There are however significant differences in privacy properties, which become visible when one of the clients becomes compromised.

4.1. Effects of compromised client

If a client is compromised, an adversary will take possession of the secrets owned by that client. The effects will be the following:

Pairing secrets: With a valid pairing key, the adversary can issue queries or parse announcements. It will be able to track the presence of all the servers to which the compromised client was paired. It may be able to track other clients of these servers if it can infer that multiple independent instances are tied to the same server, for example by assessing the IP address associated with a specific instance. It will not be able to impersonate the servers for other clients.

Discovery secrets: With a valid discovery secret, the adversary can issue queries or parse announcements. It will be able to track the presence of all the servers that the compromised client could discover. It will also be able to detect the clients that try to use one of these servers. This will not reveal the identity of the client, but it can provide clues for network analysis. The
adversary will also be able to spoof the server’s announcements, which could be the first step in a serve impersonation attack.

Discovery public key: With a valid discovery public key, the adversary can issue queries or parse announcements. It will be able to track the presence of all the servers that the compromised client could discover. It will also be able to detect the clients that try to use one of these servers. This will not reveal the identity of the client, but it can provide clues for network analysis. The adversary will not be able to spoof the server’s announcements, or to impersonate the server.

4.2. Remediation of compromised client

Let’s assume that an administrator discovers that a client has been compromised. As seen in Section 4.1, compromising a client entails a loss of privacy for all the servers that the client was authorized to use, and also to all other users of these servers. The worse situation happens in the solutions based on "discovery secrets", but no solution provides a great defense. The administrator will have to remedy the problem, which means different actions based on the different solutions:

Pairing secrets: The administrator will need to revoke the pairing keys used by the compromised client. This implies contacting the $O(M)$ servers to which the client was paired.

Discovery secrets: The administrator will need to revoke the discovery secrets used by the compromised client. This implies contacting the $O(M)$ servers that the client was authorized to discover, and then the $O(N)$ clients of each of these servers. This will require a total of $O(N*M)$ management operations.

Discovery public key: The administrator will need to revoke the discovery public keys used by the compromised client. This implies contacting the $O(M)$ servers that the client was authorized to discover, and then the $O(N)$ clients of each of these servers. Just as in the case of discovery secrets, this will require $O(N*M)$ management operations.

The revocation of public keys might benefit from some kind of centralized revocation list, and thus may actually be easier to organize than simple scaling considerations would dictate.
4.3. Effect of compromised server

If a server is compromised, an adversary will take possession of the secrets owned by that server. The effects are pretty much the same in all configurations. With a set of valid credentials, the adversary can impersonate the server. It can track all of the server’s clients. There are no differences between the various solutions.

As remedy, once the compromise is discovered, the administrator will have to revoke the credentials of $O(N)$ clients connected to that server. In all cases, this could be done by notifying all potential clients to not trust this particular server anymore.

5. Summary of tradeoffs

In the preceding sections, we have reviewed the scaling and privacy properties of three possible secret sharing solutions for privacy discovery. The comparison can be summed up as follow:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Solution</th>
<th>Scaling</th>
<th>Resistance</th>
<th>Remediation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pairing secret</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Bad</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discovery secret</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Really bad</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discovery public key</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Bad</td>
<td>Maybe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Comparison of secret sharing solutions

All three types of solutions provide reasonable privacy when the secrets are not compromized. They all have poor resistance to the compromise of one a client, as explained in Section 4.1, but pairing secret and public key solution have the advantage of preventing server impersonation. The pairing secret solution scales worse than the discovery secret and discovery public key solutions. The pairing secret solution can recover from a compromise with a smaller number of updates, but the public key solution may benefit from a simple recovery solution using some form of "revocation list".

6. Security Considerations

This document does not specify a solution, but inform future choices when providing privacy for discovery protocols.
7. IANA Considerations

This draft does not require any IANA action.

8. Acknowledgments

This draft results from initial feedback in the DNS SD working group on [I-D.ietf-dnssd-privacy].

9. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-dnssd-privacy]


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DNS-SD Privacy Scaling Tradeoffs
draft-huitema-dnssd-privacyscaling-01

Abstract

DNS-SD (DNS Service Discovery) normally discloses information about both the devices offering services and the devices requesting services. This information includes host names, network parameters, and possibly a further description of the corresponding service instance. Especially when mobile devices engage in DNS Service Discovery over Multicast DNS at a public hotspot, a serious privacy problem arises.

The draft currently progressing in the DNS-SD Working Group assumes peer-to-peer pairing between the service to be discovered and each of its clients. This has good security properties, but creates scaling issues, because each server needs to publish as many announcements as it has paired clients. This leads to large number of operations when servers are paired with many clients.

Different designs are possible. For example, if there was only one server "discovery key" known by each authorized client, each server would only have to announce a single record, and clients would only have to process one response for each server that is present on the network. Yet, these designs will present different privacy profiles, and pose different management challenges. This draft analyses the tradeoffs between privacy and scaling in a set of different designs, using either shared secrets or public keys.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

DNS-SD [RFC6763] over mDNS [RFC6762] enables configurationless service discovery in local networks. It is very convenient for users, but it requires the public exposure of the offering and
requesting identities along with information about the offered and requested services. Parts of the published information can seriously breach the users’ privacy. These privacy issues and potential solutions are discussed in [KW14a] and [KW14b].

A recent draft [I-D.ietf-dnssd-privacy] proposes to solve this problem by relying on device pairing. Only clients that have paired with a device would be able to discover that device, and the discovery would not be observable by third parties. This design has a number of good privacy and security properties, but it has a cost, because each server must provide separate announcements for each client. In this draft, we compare scaling and privacy properties of three different designs:

- The individual pairing defined in [I-D.ietf-dnssd-privacy],
- A single server discovery secret, shared by all authorized clients,
- A single server discovery public key, known by all authorized clients.

After presenting briefly these three solutions, the draft presents the scaling and privacy properties of each of them.

2. Privacy and Secrets

Private discovery tries to ensure that clients and servers can discover each other in a potentially hostile network context, while maintaining privacy. Unauthorized third parties must not be able to discover that a specific server or device is currently present on the network, and they must not be able to discover that a particular client is trying to discover a particular service. This cannot be achieved without some kind of shared secret between client and servers. We review here three particular designs for sharing these secrets.

2.1. Pairing secrets

The solution proposed in [I-D.ietf-dnssd-privacy] relies on pairing secrets. Each client obtains a pairing secret from each server that they are authorized to use. The servers publish announcements of the form "nonce|proof", in which the proof is the hash of the nonce and the pairing secret. The proof is of course different for each client, because the secrets are different. For better scaling, the nonce is common to all clients, and defined as a coarse function of time, such as the current 30 minutes interval.
Clients discover the required server by issuing queries containing the current nonce and proof. Servers respond to these queries if the nonce matches the current time interval, and if the proof matches the hash of the nonce with one of the pairing key of an authorized client.

2.2. Group public keys

In contrast to pair-wise shared secrets, applications may associate public and private key pairs with groups of equally authorized clients. This is identical to the pairwise sharing case if each client is given a unique key pair. However, this option permits multiple users to belong to the same group associated with a public key, depending on the type of public key and cryptographic scheme used. For example, broadcast encryption is a scheme where many users, each with their own private key, can access content encrypted under a single broadcast key. The scaling properties of this variant depend not only on how private keys are managed, but also on the associated cryptographic algorithm(s) by which those keys are used.

2.3. Shared symmetric secret

Instead of using a different secret for each client as in Section 2.1, another design is to have a single secret per server, shared by all authorized clients of that server. As in the previous solution, the servers publish announcements of the form "nonce|proof", but this time they only need to publish a single announcement per server, because each server maintains a single discovery secret. Again, the nonce can be common to all clients, and defined as a coarse function of time.

Clients discover the required server by issuing queries containing the current nonce and proof. Servers respond to these queries if the nonce matches the current time interval, and if the proof matches the hash of the nonce with one of the discovery secrets.

2.4. Shared public key

Instead of a discovery secret used in Section 2.3, clients could obtain the public keys of the servers that they are authorized to use.

Many public key systems assume that the public key of the server is, well, not secret. But if adversaries know the public key of a server, they can use that public key as a unique identifier to track the server. Moreover, they could use variations of the padding oracle to observe discovery protocol messages and attribute them to a specific public key, thus breaking server privacy. For these
reasons, we assume here that the discovery public key is kept secret, only known to authorized clients.

As in the previous solution, the servers publish announcements of the form "nonce|proof", but this time they only need to publish a single announcement per server, because each server maintains a single discovery secret. The proof is obtained by either hashing the nonce with the public key, or using the public key to encrypt the nonce -- the point being that both clients and server can construct the proof. Again, the nonce can be common to all clients, and defined as a coarse function of time.

The advantage of public key based solutions is that the clients can easily verify the identity of the server, for example if the service is accessed over TLS. On the other hand, just using standard TLS would disclose the certificate of the server to any client that attempts a connection, not just to authorized clients. The server should thus only accept connections from clients that demonstrate knowledge of its public key.

3. Scaling properties of different solutions

To analyze scaling issues we will use the following variables:

N: The average number of authorized clients per server.
G: The average number of authorized groups per server.
M: The average number of servers per client.
P: The average total number of servers present during discovery.

The big difference between the three proposals is the number of records that need to be published by a server when using DNS-SD in server mode, or the number of broadcast messages that needs to be announced per server in mDNS mode:

Pairing secrets: \( O(N) \): One record per client.
Group public keys: \( O(G) \): One record per group.
Shared symmetric secret: \( O(1) \): One record for all (shared) clients.
Shared public key: \( O(1) \): One record for all (shared) clients.

There are other elements of scaling, linked to the mapping of the privacy discovery service to DNS-SD. DNS-SD identifies services by a combination of a service type and an instance name. In classic
mapping behavior, clients send a query for a service type, and will receive responses from each server instance supporting that type:

Pairing secrets: \(O(P \times N)\): There are \(O(P)\) servers present, and each publishes \(O(N)\) instances.

Group public keys: \(O(P \times G)\): There are \(O(P)\) servers present, and each publishes \(O(G)\) instances.

Shared symmetric secret: \(O(P)\): One record per server present.

Shared public secret: \(O(P)\): One record per server present.

The DNS-SD Privacy draft suggests an optimization that considerably reduces the considerations about scaling of responses -- see section 4.6 of [I-D.ietf-dnssd-privacy]. In that case, clients compose the list of instance names that they are looking for, and specifically query for these instance names:

Pairing secrets: \(O(M)\): The client will compose \(O(M)\) queries to discover all the servers that it is interested in. There will be at most \(O(M)\) responses.

Group public keys: \(O(M)\): The client will compose \(O(M)\) queries to discover all the servers that it is interested in. There will be at most \(O(M)\) responses.

Shared symmetric secret: \(O(M)\): Same behavior as in the pairing secret case.

Shared public secret: \(O(M)\): Same behavior as in the pairing secret case.

Finally, another element of scaling is cacheability. Responses to DNS queries can be cached by DNS resolvers, and mDNS responses can be cached by mDNS resolvers. If several clients send the same queries, and if previous responses could be cached, the client can be served immediately. There are of course differences between the solutions:

Pairing secrets: No caching possible, since there are separate server instances for separate clients.

Group public keys: Caching is possible for among members of a group.

Shared symmetric secret: Caching is possible, since there is just one server instance.
Shared public secret: Caching is possible, since there is just one server instance.

4. Comparing privacy posture of different solutions

The analysis of scaling issues in Section 3 shows that the solutions based on a common discovery secret or discovery public key scale much better than the solutions based on pairing secret. All these solutions protect against tracking of clients or servers by third parties, as long as the secret on which they rely are kept secret. There are however significant differences in privacy properties, which become visible when one of the clients becomes compromised.

4.1. Effects of compromised client

If a client is compromised, an adversary will take possession of the secrets owned by that client. The effects will be the following:

Pairing secrets: With a valid pairing key, the adversary can issue queries and parse announcements. It will be able to track the presence of all the servers to which the compromised client was paired. It may be able to track other clients of these servers if it can infer that multiple independent instances are tied to the same server, for example by assessing the IP address associated with a specific instance. It will not be able to impersonate the servers for other clients.

Group public keys: With a valid group private key, the adversary can issue queries and parse announcements. It will be able to track the presence of all the servers with which the compromised group was authenticated. It may be able to track other clients of these servers if it can infer that multiple independent instances are tied to the same server, for example by assessing the IP address associated with a specific instance. It will not be able to impersonate the servers for other clients or groups.

Shared symmetric secret: With a valid discovery secret, the adversary can issue queries and parse announcements. It will be able to track the presence of all the servers that the compromised client could discover. It will also be able to detect the clients that try to use one of these servers. This will not reveal the identity of the client, but it can provide clues for network analysis. The adversary will also be able to spoof the server’s announcements, which could be the first step in a server impersonation attack.

Shared public secret: With a valid discovery public key, the adversary can issue queries and parse announcements. It will be
able to track the presence of all the servers that the compromised client could discover. It will also be able to detect the clients that try to use one of these servers. This will not reveal the identity of the client, but it can provide clues for network analysis. The adversary will not be able to spoof the server’s announcements, or to impersonate the server.

4.2. Revocation

Assume an administrator discovers that a client has been compromised. As seen in Section 4.1, compromising a client entails a loss of privacy for all the servers that the client was authorized to use, and also to all other users of these servers. The worse situation happens in the solutions based on "discovery secrets", but no solution provides a great defense. The administrator will have to remedy the problem, which means different actions based on the different solutions:

Pairing secrets: The administrator will need to revoke the pairing keys used by the compromised client. This implies contacting the O(M) servers to which the client was paired.

Group public key: The administrator must revoke the private key associated with the compromised group members and, depending on the cryptographic scheme in use, generate new private keys for each existing, non-compromised group member. The latter is necessary for public key encryption schemes wherein group access is permitted based on ownership (or not) to an included private key. Some public key encryption schemes permit revocation without rotating any non-compromised group member private keys.

Shared symmetric secret: The administrator will need to revoke the discovery secrets used by the compromised client. This implies contacting the O(M) servers that the client was authorized to discover, and then the O(N) clients of each of these servers. This will require a total of O(N*M) management operations.

Shared public secret: The administrator will need to revoke the discovery public keys used by the compromised client. This implies contacting the O(M) servers that the client was authorized to discover, and then the O(N) clients of each of these servers. Just as in the case of discovery secrets, this will require O(N*M) management operations.

The revocation of public keys might benefit from some kind of centralized revocation list, and thus may actually be easier to organize than simple scaling considerations would dictate.
4.3. Effect of compromised server

If a server is compromised, an adversary will take possession of the secrets owned by that server. The effects are pretty much the same in all configurations. With a set of valid credentials, the adversary can impersonate the server. It can track all of the server’s clients. There are no differences between the various solutions.

As remedy, once the compromise is discovered, the administrator will have to revoke the credentials of O(N) clients, or O(G) groups, connected to that server. In all cases, this could be done by notifying all potential clients to not trust this particular server anymore.

5. Summary of tradeoffs

In the preceding sections, we have reviewed the scaling and privacy properties of three possible secret sharing solutions for privacy discovery. The comparison can be summed up as follow:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Solution</th>
<th>Scaling</th>
<th>Resistance</th>
<th>Remediation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pairing secret</td>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>Bad</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group public key</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Bad</td>
<td>Maybe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared symmetric secret</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Really bad</td>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared public secret</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Bad</td>
<td>Maybe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Comparison of secret sharing solutions

All four types of solutions provide reasonable privacy when the secrets are not compromised. They all have poor resistance to the compromise of a client, as explained in Section 4.1, but sharing a symmetric secret is much worse because it does not prevent server impersonation. The pairing secret solution scales worse than the discovery secret and discovery public key solutions. The group public key scales as the number of groups for the total set of clients; this depends on group assignment and will be intermediate between the pairing secret and shared secret solutions. The pairing secret solution can recover from a compromise with a smaller number of updates, but the public key solutions may benefit from a simple recovery solution using some form of "revocation list".
6. Security Considerations

This document does not specify a solution, but discusses future choices when providing privacy for discovery protocols.

7. IANA Considerations

This draft does not require any IANA action.

8. Acknowledgments

This draft results from initial feedback in the DNS SD working group on [I-D.ietf-dnssd-privacy]. The text on Group public keys is based on Chris Wood's contributions.

9. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-dnssd-pairing]

[I-D.ietf-dnssd-privacy]


Appendix A. Survey of Implementations

This section surveys several private service discovery designs in the context of the threat model detailed above.

A.1. DNS-SD Privacy Extensions

Huitema and Kaiser [I-D.ietf-dnssd-privacy] decompose private service discovery into two stages: (1) identify specific peers offering private services, and (2) issue unicast DNS-SD queries to those hosts after connecting over TLS using a previously agreed upon pre-shared key (PSK), or pairing key. Any out-of-band pairing mechanism will suffice for PSK establishment, though the authors specifically mention [I-D.ietf-dnssd-pairing] as the pairing mechanism. Step (1) is done by broadcasting "private instance names" to local peers, using service-specific pairing keys. A private instance name N' for some service with name N is composed of a unique nonce r and commitment to r using N_k. Commitments are constructed by hashing N_k with the nonce. Only owners of N_k may verify its correctness and, upon doing so, answer as needed. The draft recommends randomizing hostnames in SRV responses along with other identifiers, such as MAC addresses, to minimize likability to specific hosts. Note that this alone does not prevent fingerprinting and tracking using that hostname. However, when done in conjunction with steps (1) and (2) above, this mitigates fingerprinting and tracking since different hostnames are used across venues and real discovered services remain hidden behind private instance names.

After discovering its peers, a node will directly connect to each device using TLS, authenticated with a PSK derived from each associated pairing key, and issue DNS-SD queries per usual. DNS messages are formulated as per [RFC7858].
As an optimization, the authors recommend that each nonce be
deterministically derived based on time so that commitment proofs may
be precomputed asynchronously. This avoids $O(N*M)$ computation, where
$N$ is the number of nodes in a local network and $M$ is the number of
per-node pairings.

This system has the following properties:

1. Symmetric work load: clients and servers can pre-compute private
   instance names as a function of their pairing secret and
   predictable nonce.

2. Mutual identity privacy: Both client and server identities are
   hidden from active and passive attackers that do not subvert the
   pairing process.

3. No client set size hiding: The number of private instance names
   reveals the number of unique pairings a server has with its
   clients. (Servers may pad the list of records with random
   instance names, though this introduces more work for clients.)

4. Unlinkability: Private service names are unlinkable to post-
   discovery TLS connections. (Note that if deterministic nonces
   repeat, servers risk linkability across private service names.)

5. No fingerprinting: Assuming servers use fresh nonces per private
   instance name, advertisements change regularly.

A.2. Private IoT

Boneh et al. [Wu16] developed an approach for private service
discovery that reduces to private mutual authentication. Moreover,
 it should be infeasible for any adversary to forge advertisements or
 impersonate anyone else on the network. Specifically, service
 discoverers only wish to reveal their identity to services they
 trust, and vice versa. Existing protocols such as TLS, IKE, and
 SIGMA [SIGMA] require that one side reveal its identity first. Their
 approach first allocates, via some policy manager, key pairs
 associated with human-readable policy names. For example, user Alice
 might have a key pair associated with the names /Alice, /Alice/
 Family, and /Alice/Device. Her key is bound to each of these names.
 Authentication policies (and trust models) are then expressed as
 policy prefix patterns, e.g., /Alice/*. Broadcast messages are
 encrypted to policies. For example, Alice might encrypt a message $m$
 to the policy /Bob/*. Only Bob, who owns a private key bound to,
 e.g., /Bob/Devices, can decrypt $m$. (This procedure uses a form of
 identity-based encryption called prefix-based encryption. Readers
 are referred to [Wu16] for a thorough description.)
Using prefix- and policy-based encryption, service discovery is decomposed into two steps: (1) service announcement and (2) key exchange, similar to [I-D.ietf-dnssd-privacy]. Announcements carry service identities, ephemeral key shares, and a signature, all encrypted under the service’s desired policy prefix, e.g., /Alice/Family/*. Upon receipt of an announcement, clients with matching policy private keys can decrypt the announcement and use the ephemeral key share to perform an Authenticated Diffie Hellman key exchange with the service. Upon completion, the derived shared secret may be used for any further communication, e.g., DNS-SD queries, if needed.

This system has the following properties:

1. Asymmetric work load: computation for clients is on the order of advertisements.

2. Mutual identity privacy: Both client and server identities are hidden from active and passive attackers.

3. Client set size hiding: Policy-based encryption advertisements hides the number of clients with matching policy keys.

4. Unlinkability: Client initiated connections are unlinkable to service advertisements (modulo network-layer connection information, such as advertisement origin and connection destination).

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CoRE Resource Directory: DNS-SD mapping
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Abstract

Resource and service discovery are complimentary. Resource discovery provides fine-grained detail about the content of a server, while service discovery can provide a scalable method to locate servers in large networks. This document defines a method for mapping between CoRE Link Format attributes and DNS-Based Service Discovery fields to facilitate the use of either method to locate RESTful service interfaces (APIs) in mixed HTTP/CoAP environments.

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1. Introduction

The Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) working group aims at realizing the REST architecture in a suitable form for the most constrained devices (e.g. 8-bit microcontrollers with limited RAM and ROM) and networks (e.g. 6LoWPAN). CoRE is aimed at machine-to-machine (M2M) applications such as smart energy and building automation. The main deliverable of CoRE is the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) specification [RFC7252].

Automated discovery of resources hosted by a constrained server is critical in M2M applications where human intervention is minimal and static interfaces result in brittleness. CoRE Resource Discovery is intended to support fine-grained discovery of hosted resources, their attributes, and possibly other resource relations [RFC6690].
In contrast, service discovery generally refers to a coarse-grained resolution of an end-point’s IP address, port number, and protocol. This definition may be extended to include multi-function devices, where the result of the discovery process may include a path to a resource representing a RESTful service interface and possibly a reference to a description of the interface such as a JSON Hyper-Schema document [I-D.handrews-json-schema-hyperschema].

Resource and service discovery are complimentary in the case of large networks, where the latter can facilitate scaling. This document defines a mapping between CoRE Link Format attributes and DNS-Based Service Discovery (DNS-SD) [RFC6763] fields that permits discovery of CoAP services by either means. It also addresses the CoRE charter goal to interoperate with DNS-SD.

1.1. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. The term "byte" is used in its now customary sense as a synonym for "octet".

This specification requires readers to be familiar with all the terms and concepts that are discussed in [-link] and [RFC6690]. Readers should also be familiar with the terms and concepts discussed in [RFC7252]. To describe the REST interfaces defined in this specification, the URI Template format is used [RFC6570].

This specification also makes use of the terminology of [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory].

1.2. Resource Discovery

The main function of Resource Discovery is to provide Universal Resource Identifiers (URIs, also called "links") for the resources hosted by the server, complemented by attributes about those resources and perhaps additional link relations. In CoRE this collection of links and attributes is itself a resource (as opposed to HTTP headers delivered with a specific resource).

[RFC6690] specifies a link format for use in CoRE Resource Discovery by extending the HTTP Link Header Format [RFC8288] to describe these link descriptions. The CoRE Link Format is carried as a payload and is assigned an Internet media type. A well-known URI "/.well-known/core" is defined as a default entry-point for requesting the list of links about resources hosted by a server, and thus performing CoRE Resource Discovery.
Resource Discovery can be performed either via unicast or multicast. When a server’s IP address is already known, either a priori or resolved via the Domain Name System (DNS) [RFC1034][RFC1035], unicast discovery is performed in order to locate a URI for the resource of interest. This is performed using a GET to /.well-known/core on the server, which returns a payload in the CoRE Link Format. A client would then match the appropriate Resource Type, Interface Description, and possible Content-Type [RFC2045] for its application. These attributes may also be included in the query string in order to filter the number of links returned in a response.

1.3. Resource Directories

In many M2M scenarios, direct discovery of resources is not practical due to sleeping nodes, limited bandwidth, or networks where multicast traffic is inefficient. These problems can be solved by deploying a network element called a Resource Directory (RD), which hosts descriptions of resources held on other servers (referred to as "end-points") and allows lookups to be performed for those resources. An end-point is a web server associated with specific IP address and port; thus a physical device may host one or more end-points. End-points may also act as clients.

The Resource Directory implements a set of REST interfaces for end-points to register and maintain sets of Web Links, called resource directory entries. [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory] specifies the web interfaces that an RD supports in order for web servers to discover the RD and to register, maintain, lookup and remove resource descriptions; for the RD to validate entries; and for clients to lookup resources from the RD. Furthermore, new link attributes useful in conjunction with an RD are defined.

1.4. DNS-Based Service Discovery

DNS-Based Service Discovery (DNS-SD) defines a conventional method of configuring DNS PTR, SRV, and TXT resource records to facilitate discovery of services (such as CoAP servers in a subdomain) using the existing DNS infrastructure. This section gives a brief overview of DNS-SD; see [RFC6763] for a detailed specification.

DNS-SD service names are limited to 255 bytes and are of the form:

Service Name = <Instance>.<ServiceType>.<Domain>

The service name is the label of SRV/TXT resource records. The SRV RR specifies the host and the port of the endpoint. The TXT RR provides additional information in the form of key/value pairs.
The <Domain> part of the service name is identical to the global (DNS subdomain) part of the authority in URIs that identify the resources on an individual server or group of servers.

The <ServiceType> part is composed of at least two labels. The first label of the pair is the application protocol name [RFC6335] preceded by an underscore character. The second label indicates the transport and is always ".udp" for CoAP services. In cases where narrowing the scope of the search may be useful, these labels may be optionally preceded by a subtype name followed by the "_sub" label. An example of this more specific <ServiceType> is "lamp._sub._dali._udp". Only the rightmost pair of labels is used in SRV and TXT record names.

The default <Instance> part of the service name may be set at the factory or during the commissioning process. It SHOULD uniquely identify an instance of <ServiceType> within a <Domain>. Taken together, these three elements comprise a unique name for an SRV/ TXT record pair within the DNS subdomain.

The granularity of a service name MAY be that of a host or group, or it could represent a particular resource within a CoAP server. The SRV record contains the host name (AAAA record name) and port of the service while protocol is part of the service name. In the case where a service name identifies a particular resource, the path part of the URI must be carried in a corresponding TXT record.

A DNS TXT record is in practice limited to a few hundred bytes in length, which is indicated in the resource record header in the DNS response message [RFC6763]. The data consists of one or more strings comprising a key=value pair. By convention, the first pair is txtver=<number> (to support different versions of a service description). An example string is:

```
| 0x08 | t | x | t | v | e | r | = | 1 |
```

2. New Link-Format Attributes

When using the CoRE Link Format to describe resources being discovered by or posted to a resource directory service, additional information about those resources is useful. This specification defines the following new attributes for use in the CoRE Link Format [RFC6690]:

```
link-extension = ( "ins" ="" (ptoken | quoted-string) )

; The token or string is max 63 bytes

link-extension = ( "exp" )
```

2.1. Resource Instance attribute "ins"

The Resource Instance "ins" attribute is an identifier for this resource, which makes it possible to distinguish it from other similar resources. This attribute is similar in use to the <Instance> portion of a DNS-SD record (see Section 1.4, and SHOULD be unique across resources with the same Resource Type attribute in the domain it is used. A Resource Instance might be a descriptive string like "Ceiling Light, Room 3", a short ID like "AF39" or a unique UUID or iNumber. This attribute is used by a Resource Directory to distinguish between multiple instances of the same resource type within the directory.

This attribute MUST be no more than 63 bytes in length. The resource identifier attribute MUST NOT appear more than once in a link description. This attribute MAY be used as a query parameter in the RD Lookup Function Set defined in Section 7 of [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory].

2.2. Export attribute "exp"

The Export "exp" attribute is used as a flag to indicate that a link description MAY be exported by a resource directory to external directories.

The CoRE Link Format is used for many purposes between CoAP endpoints. Some are useful mainly locally, for example checking the observability of a resource before accessing it, determining the size of a resource, or traversing dynamic resource structures. However, other links are very useful to be exported to other directories, for example the entry point resource to a functional service. This attribute MAY be used as a query parameter in the RD Lookup Function Set defined in Section 7 of [I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory].

3. Mapping CoRE Link Attributes to DNS-SD Record Fields

3.1. Mapping Resource Instance attribute "ins" to <Instance>

The Resource Instance "ins" attribute maps to the <Instance> part of a DNS-SD service name. It is stored directly in the DNS as a single DNS label of canonical precomposed UTF-8 [RFC3629] "Net-Unicode" (Unicode Normalization Form C) [RFC5198] text. However, to the extent that the "ins" attribute may be chosen to match the DNS host name of a service, it SHOULD use the syntax defined in Section 3.5 of [RFC1034] and Section 2.1 of [RFC1123].

The <Instance> part of the name of a service being offered on the network SHOULD be configurable by the user setting up the service, so
that he or she may give it an informative name. However, the device or service SHOULD NOT require the user to configure a name before it can be used. A sensible choice of default name can allow the device or service to be accessed in many cases without any manual configuration at all. The default name should be short and descriptive, and MAY include a collision-resistant substring such as the lower bits of the device’s MAC address, serial number, fingerprint, or other identifier in an attempt to make the name relatively unique.

DNS labels are currently limited to 63 bytes in length and the entire service name may not exceed 255 bytes.

3.2. Mapping Resource Type attribute "rt" to <ServiceType>

The resource type "rt" attribute is mapped into the <ServiceType> part of a DNS-SD service name and SHOULD conform to the reg-rel-type production of the Link Format defined in Section 2 of [RFC6690]. The "rt" attribute MUST be composed of at least a single Net-Unicode text string, without underscore '_-' or period '.' and limited to 15 bytes in length, which represents the application protocol name. This string is mapped to the DNS-SD <ServiceType> by prepending an underscore and appending a period followed by the "_udp" label. For example, rt="dali" is mapped into "_dali._udp".

The application protocol name may be optionally followed by a period and a service subtype name consisting of a Net-Unicode text string, without underscore or period and limited to 63 bytes. This string is mapped to the DNS-SD <ServiceType> by appending a period followed by the "_sub" label and then appending a period followed by the service type label pair derived as in the previous paragraph. For example, rt="dali.light" is mapped into "light._sub._dali._udp".

The resulting string is used to form labels for DNS-SD records which are stored directly in the DNS.

3.3. Domain mapping

TBD: A method must be specified to determine in which DNS zone the CoAP service should be registered. See, for example, Section 11 in [RFC6763].

3.4. TXT Record key=value strings

A number of [RFC6763] key/value pairs are derived from link-format information, to be exported in the DNS-SD as key=value strings in a TXT record ([RFC6763], Section 6.3).
The resource <URI> is exported as key/value pair "path=<URI>".

The Interface Description "if" attribute is exported as key/value pair "if=<Interface Description>".

The DNS TXT record can be further populated by importing any other resource description attributes as they share the same key=value format specified in Section 6 of [RFC6763].

3.5. Importing resource links into DNS-SD

Assuming the ability to query a Resource Directory or multicast a GET (?exp) over the local link, CoAP resource discovery may be used to populate the DNS-SD database in an automated fashion. CoAP resource descriptions (links) can be exported to DNS-SD for exposure to service discovery by using the Resource Instance attribute as the basis for a unique service name, composed with the Resource Type as the <ServiceType>, and registered in the correct <Domain>. The agent responsible for exporting records to the DNS zone file SHOULD be authenticated to the DNS server. The following example, using the example lookup location /rd-lookup, shows an agent discovering a resource to be exported:

Req: GET /rd-lookup/res?exp

Res: 2.05 Content
<coap://[FDFD::1234]:5683/light/1>; exp;rt="dali.light";ins="Spot";
d="office";ep="node1"

The agent subsequently registers the following DNS-SD RRs, assuming a zone name "example.com" prefixed with "office":

node1.office.example.com. IN AAAA FDFD::1234
_dali._udp.office.example.com IN PTR
    Spot._dali._udp.office.example.com
light._sub._dali._udp.example.com IN PTR
    Spot._dali._udp.office.example.com
Spot._dali._udp.office.example.com IN SRV 0 0 5683
    node1.office.example.com.
Spot._dali._udp.office.example.com IN TXT
    txtver=1;path=/light/1

In the above figure the Service Name is chosen as Spot._dali._udp.office.example.com without the light._sub service prefix. An alternative Service Name would be: Spot.light._sub._dali._udp.office.example.com.
4. Examples

4.1. DNS entries

It may be profitable to discover the light groups for applications, which are unaware of the existence of the RD. An agent needs to query the RD to return all groups which are exported to be inserted into DNS.

Req: GET /rd-lookup/gp?exp

Res: 2.05 Content
<coap://[FF05::1]/>;exp;gp="grp_R2-4-015;ins="grp1234";
ep="lm_R2-4-015_wndw";
ep="lm_R2-4-015_door"

The group with FQDN grp_R2-4-015.bc.example.com can be entered into the DNS by the agent. The accompanying instance name is grp1234. The <ServiceType> is chosen to be _group._udp. The agent enters the following RRs into the DNS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>grp_R2-4-015.bc.example.com</td>
<td>AAAA</td>
<td>FF05::1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_group._udp.bc.example.com</td>
<td>PTR</td>
<td>grp1234._group._udp.bc.example.com</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grp1234._group._udp.bc.example.com</td>
<td>SRV</td>
<td>0 0 5683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grp1234._group._udp.bc.example.com</td>
<td>TXT</td>
<td>txtver=1;path=/light/grp1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From then on, applications unaware of the existence of the RD can use DNS to access the lighting group.

5. IANA considerations

TBD

6. Security considerations

TBD

7. References

7.1. Normative References

Lynn, et al. Expires September 6, 2018
7.2. Informative References

[I-D.handrews-json-schema-hyperschema]

[I-D.ietf-core-resource-directory]

[RFC1034]
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DNS Stateful Operations
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Abstract

This document defines a new DNS OPCODE for DNS Stateful Operations (DSO). DSO messages communicate operations within persistent stateful sessions, using type-length-value (TLV) syntax. Three TLVs are defined that manage session timeouts, termination, and encryption padding, and a framework is defined for extensions to enable new stateful operations.

Status of This Memo

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction ........................................... 3
2. Terminology ............................................ 5
3. Discussion .............................................. 9
4. Protocol Details ........................................ 10
   4.1. DSO Session Establishment ......................... 10
   4.1.1. Connection Sharing .............................. 12
   4.1.2. Zero Round-Trip Operation ...................... 12
   4.1.3. Middlebox Considerations ........................ 13
   4.2. Message Format ..................................... 14
   4.2.1. DNS Header Fields in DSO Messages .............. 15
   4.2.2. DSO Data ........................................ 17
   4.2.3. EDNS(0) and TSIG .............................. 22
   4.3. Message Handling ................................... 23
   4.3.1. Error Responses ................................. 24
   4.4. DSO Response Generation ........................... 25
   4.5. Responder-Initiated Operation Cancellation ........ 26
5. DSO Session Lifecycle and Timers .......................... 27
   5.1. DSO Session Initiation ............................ 27
   5.2. DSO Session Timeouts .............................. 27
   5.3. Inactive DSO Sessions .............................. 28
   5.4. The Inactivity Timeout ............................ 29
       5.4.1. Closing Inactive DSO Sessions ................. 29
       5.4.2. Values for the Inactivity Timeout ............ 30
   5.5. The Keepalive Interval ............................ 31
       5.5.1. Keepalive Interval Expiry .................... 31
       5.5.2. Values for the Keepalive Interval ............ 31
   5.6. Server-Initiated Session Termination ............... 33
       5.6.1. Server-Initiated Retry Delay Message ......... 34
6. Base TLVs for DNS Stateful Operations ..................... 37
   6.1. Keepalive TLV ..................................... 37
       6.1.1. Client handling of received Session Timeout values 39
       6.1.2. Relation to EDNS(0) TCP Keepalive Option .... 41
   6.2. Retry Delay TLV ................................... 42
       6.2.1. Retry Delay TLV used as a Primary TLV ....... 42
       6.2.2. Retry Delay TLV used as a Response Additional TLV 44
   6.3. Encryption Padding TLV ............................. 44
1. Introduction

The use of transports for DNS other than UDP is being increasingly specified, for example, DNS over TCP [RFC1035] [RFC7766] and DNS over TLS [RFC7858]. Such transports can offer persistent, long-lived sessions and therefore when using them for transporting DNS messages it is of benefit to have a mechanism that can establish parameters associated with those sessions, such as timeouts. In such situations it is also advantageous to support server-initiated messages.

The existing EDNS(0) Extension Mechanism for DNS [RFC6891] is explicitly defined to only have "per-message" semantics. While EDNS(0) has been used to signal at least one session-related parameter (the EDNS(0) TCP Keepalive option [RFC7828]) the result is less than optimal due to the restrictions imposed by the EDNS(0) semantics and the lack of server-initiated signalling. For example, a server cannot arbitrarily instruct a client to close a connection because the server can only send EDNS(0) options in responses to queries that contained EDNS(0) options.

This document defines a new DNS OPCODE, DSO (tentatively 6), for DNS Stateful Operations. DSO messages are used to communicate operations within persistent stateful sessions, expressed using type-length-value (TLV) syntax. This document defines an initial set of three TLVs, used to manage session timeouts, termination, and encryption padding.

The three TLVs defined here are all mandatory for all implementations of DSO. Further TLVs may be defined in additional specifications.

The format for DSO messages (Section 4.2) differs somewhat from the traditional DNS message format used for standard queries and responses. The standard twelve-byte header is used, but the four count fields (QDCOUNT, ANCOUNT, NSCOUNT, ARCOUNT) are set to zero and
accordingly their corresponding sections are not present. The actual
data pertaining to DNS Stateful Operations (expressed in TLV syntax)
is appended to the end of the DNS message header. When displayed
using packet analyzer tools that have not been updated to recognize
the DSO format, this will result in the DSO data being displayed as
unknown additional data after the end of the DNS message. It is
likely that future updates to these tools will add the ability to
recognize, decode, and display the DSO data.

This new format has distinct advantages over an RR-based format
because it is more explicit and more compact. Each TLV definition is
specific to its use case, and as a result contains no redundant or
overloaded fields. Importantly, it completely avoids conflating DNS
Stateful Operations in any way with normal DNS operations or with
existing EDNS(0)-based functionality. A goal of this approach is to
avoid the operational issues that have befallen EDNS(0), particularly
relating to middlebox behaviour.

With EDNS(0), multiple options may be packed into a single OPT
pseudo-RR, and there is no generalized mechanism for a client to be
able to tell whether a server has processed or otherwise acted upon
each individual option within the combined OPT pseudo-RR. The
specifications for each individual option need to define how each
different option is to be acknowledged, if necessary.

In contrast to EDNS(0), with DSO there is no compelling motivation to
pack multiple operations into a single message for efficiency
reasons, because DSO always operates using a connection-oriented
transport protocol. Each DSO operation is communicated in its own
separate DNS message, and the transport protocol can take care of
packing several DNS messages into a single IP packet if appropriate.
For example, TCP can pack multiple small DNS messages into a single
TCP segment. This simplification allows for clearer semantics. Each
DSO request message communicates just one primary operation, and the
RCODE in the corresponding response message indicates the success or
failure of that operation.
2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here [RFC2119] [RFC8174].

"DSO" is used to mean DNS Stateful Operation.

The term "connection" means a bidirectional byte (or message) stream, where the bytes (or messages) are delivered reliably and in-order, such as provided by using DNS over TCP [RFC1035] [RFC7766] or DNS over TLS [RFC7858].

The unqualified term "session" in the context of this document means the exchange of DNS messages over a connection where:

- The connection between client and server is persistent and relatively long-lived (i.e., minutes or hours, rather than seconds).
- Either end of the connection may initiate messages to the other.

In this document the term "session" is used exclusively as described above. The term has no relationship to the "session layer" of the OSI "seven-layer model" popularized in the 1980s.

A "DSO Session" is established between two endpoints that acknowledge persistent DNS state via the exchange of DSO messages over the connection. This is distinct from a DNS-over-TCP session as described in the previous specification for DNS over TCP [RFC7766].

A "DSO Session" is terminated when the underlying connection is closed. The underlying connection can be closed in two ways:

Where this specification says, "close gracefully," that means sending a TLS close_notify (if TLS is in use) followed by a TCP FIN, or the equivalents for other protocols. Where this specification requires a connection to be closed gracefully, the requirement to initiate that graceful close is placed on the client, to place the burden of TCP’s TIME-WAIT state on the client rather than the server.

Where this specification says, "forcibly abort," that means sending a TCP RST, or the equivalent for other protocols. In the BSD Sockets API this is achieved by setting the SO_LINGER option to zero before closing the socket.
The term "server" means the software with a listening socket, awaiting incoming connection requests.

The term "client" means the software which initiates a connection to the server's listening socket.

The terms "initiator" and "responder" correspond respectively to the initial sender and subsequent receiver of a DSO request message or unacknowledged message, regardless of which was the "client" and "server" in the usual DNS sense.

The term "sender" may apply to either an initiator (when sending a DSO request message or unacknowledged message) or a responder (when sending a DSO response message).

Likewise, the term "receiver" may apply to either a responder (when receiving a DSO request message or unacknowledged message) or an initiator (when receiving a DSO response message).

In protocol implementation there are generally two kinds of errors that software writers have to deal with. The first is situations that arise due to factors in the environment, such as temporary loss of connectivity. While undesirable, these situations do not indicate a flaw in the software, and they are situations that software should generally be able to recover from. The second is situations that should never happen when communicating with a correctly-implemented peer. If they do happen, they indicate a serious flaw in the protocol implementation, beyond what it is reasonable to expect software to recover from. This document describes this latter form of error condition as a "fatal error" and specifies that an implementation encountering a fatal error condition "MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately". Given that these fatal error conditions signify defective software, and given that defective software is likely to remain defective for some time until it is fixed, after forcibly aborting a connection, a client SHOULD refrain from automatically reconnecting to that same server instance for at least one hour.

This document uses the term "same server instance" as follows:

- In cases where a server is specified or configured using an IP address and TCP port number, two different configurations are referring to the same server instance if they contain the same IP address and TCP port number.

- In cases where a server is specified or configured using a hostname and TCP port number, such as in the content of a DNS SRV record [RFC2782], two different configurations (or DNS SRV
records) are considered to be referring to the same server instance if they contain the same hostname (subject to the usual case insensitive DNS name matching rules [RFC1034] [RFC1035]) and TCP port number. In these cases, configurations with different hostnames are considered to be referring to different server instances, even if those different hostnames happen to be aliases, or happen to resolve to the same IP address(es). Implementations SHOULD NOT resolve hostnames and then perform matching of IP address(es) in order to evaluate whether two entities should be determined to be the "same server instance".

The term "long-lived operations" refers to operations such as Push Notification subscriptions [I-D.ietf-dnssd-push], Discovery Relay interface subscriptions [I-D.sctl-dnssd-mdns-relay], and other future long-lived DNS operations that choose to use DSO as their basis, that establish state that persists beyond the lifetime of a traditional brief request/response transaction. This document, the base specification for DNS Stateful Operations, defines a framework for supporting long-lived operations, but does not itself define any long-lived operations. Nonetheless, to appreciate the design rationale behind DNS Stateful Operations, it is helpful to understand the kind of long-lived operations that it is intended to support.

DNS Stateful Operations uses three kinds of message: "DSO request messages", "DSO response messages", and "DSO unacknowledged messages". A DSO request message elicits a DSO response message. DSO unacknowledged messages are unidirectional messages and do not generate any response.

Both DSO request messages and DSO unacknowledged messages are formatted as DNS request messages (the header QR bit is set to zero, as described in Section 4.2). One difference is that in DSO request messages the MESSAGE ID field is nonzero; in DSO unacknowledged messages it is zero.

The content of DSO messages is expressed using type-length-value (TLV) syntax.

In a DSO request message or DSO unacknowledged message the first TLV is referred to as the "Primary TLV" and determines the nature of the operation being performed, including whether it is an acknowledged or unacknowledged operation; any other TLVs in a DSO request message or unacknowledged message are referred to as "Additional TLVs" and serve additional non-primary purposes, which may be related to the primary purpose, or not, as in the case of the encryption padding TLV.

A DSO response message may contain no TLVs, or it may contain one or more TLVs as appropriate to the information being communicated. In
the context of DSO response messages, one or more TLVs with the same
DSO-TYPE as the Primary TLV in the corresponding DSO request message
are referred to as "Response Primary TLVs". Any other TLVs with
different DSO-TYPEs are referred to as "Response Additional TLVs".
The Response Primary TLV(s), if present, MUST occur first in the
response message, before any Response Additional TLVs.

Two timers (elapsed time since an event) are defined in this
document:

o an inactivity timer (see Section 5.4 and Section 6.1)

o a keepalive timer (see Section 5.5 and Section 6.1)

The timeouts associated with these timers are called the inactivity
timeout and the keepalive interval, respectively. The term "Session
Timeouts" is used to refer to this pair of timeout values.

Resetting a timer means resetting the timer value to zero and
starting the timer again. Clearing a timer means resetting the timer
value to zero but NOT starting the timer again.
3. Discussion

There are several use cases for DNS Stateful operations that can be described here.

Firstly, establishing session parameters such as server-defined timeouts is of great use in the general management of persistent connections. For example, using DSO sessions for stub-to-recursive DNS-over-TLS [RFC7858] is more flexible for both the client and the server than attempting to manage sessions using just the EDNS(0) TCP Keepalive option [RFC7828]. The simple set of TLVs defined in this document is sufficient to greatly enhance connection management for this use case.

Secondly, DNS-SD [RFC6763] has evolved into a naturally session-based mechanism where, for example, long-lived subscriptions lend themselves to ‘push’ mechanisms as opposed to polling. Long-lived stateful connections and server-initiated messages align with this use case [I-D.ietf-dnssd-push].

A general use case is that DNS traffic is often bursty but session establishment can be expensive. One challenge with long-lived connections is to maintain sufficient traffic to maintain NAT and firewall state. To mitigate this issue this document introduces a new concept for the DNS, that is DSO "Keepalive traffic". This traffic carries no DNS data and is not considered ‘activity’ in the classic DNS sense, but serves to maintain state in middleboxes, and to assure client and server that they still have connectivity to each other.
4. Protocol Details

4.1. DSO Session Establishment

DSO messages MUST be carried in only protocols and in environments where a session may be established according to the definition given above in the Terminology section (Section 2).

DNS over plain UDP [RFC0768] is not appropriate since it fails on the requirement for in-order message delivery, and, in the presence of NAT gateways and firewalls with short UDP timeouts, it fails to provide a persistent bi-directional communication channel unless an excessive amount of keepalive traffic is used.

At the time of publication, DSO is specified only for DNS over TCP [RFC1035] [RFC7766], and for DNS over TLS over TCP [RFC7858]. Any use of DSO over some other connection technology needs to be specified in an appropriate future document.

Determining whether a given connection is using DNS over TCP, or DNS over TLS over TCP, is outside the scope of this specification, and must be determined using some out-of-band configuration information. There is no provision within the DSO specification to turn TLS on or off during the lifetime of a connection. For service types where the service instance is discovered using a DNS SRV record [RFC2782], the specification for that service type SRV name [RFC6335] will state whether the connection uses plain TCP, or TLS over TCP. For example, the specification for the "_dns-push-tls._tcp" service [I-D.ietf-dnssd-push], states that it uses TLS. It is a common convention that protocols specified to run over TLS are given IANA service type names ending in "-tls".

In some environments it may be known in advance by external means that both client and server support DSO, and in these cases either client or server may initiate DSO messages at any time.

However, in the typical case a server will not know in advance whether a client supports DSO, so in general, unless it is known in advance by other means that a client does support DSO, a server MUST NOT initiate DSO request messages or DSO unacknowledged messages until a DSO Session has been mutually established by at least one successful DSO request/response exchange initiated by the client, as described below. Similarly, unless it is known in advance by other means that a server does support DSO, a client MUST NOT initiate DSO unacknowledged messages until after a DSO Session has been mutually established.
A DSO Session is established over a connection by the client sending a DSO request message, such as a DSO Keepalive request message (Section 6.1), and receiving a response, with matching MESSAGE ID, and RCODE set to NOERROR (0), indicating that the DSO request was successful.

If the RCODE in the response is set to DSOTYPENI ("DSO-TYPE Not Implemented", tentatively RCODE 11) this indicates that the server does support DSO, but does not implement the DSO-TYPE of the primary TLV in this DSO request message. A server implementing DSO MUST NOT return DSOTYPENI for a DSO Keepalive request message, because the Keepalive TLV is mandatory to implement. But in the future, if a client attempts to establish a DSO Session using a response-requiring DSO request message using some newly-defined DSO-TYPE that the server does not understand, that would result in a DSOTYPENI response. If the server returns DSOTYPENI then a DSO Session is not considered established, but the client is permitted to continue sending DNS messages on the connection, including other DSO messages such as the DSO Keepalive, which may result in a successful NOERROR response, yielding the establishment of a DSO Session.

If the RCODE is set to any value other than NOERROR (0) or DSOTYPENI (tentatively 11), then the client MUST assume that the server does not implement DSO at all. In this case the client is permitted to continue sending DNS messages on that connection, but the client SHOULD NOT issue further DSO messages on that connection.

When the server receives a DSO request message from a client, and transmits a successful NOERROR response to that request, the server considers the DSO Session established.

When the client receives the server’s NOERROR response to its DSO request message, the client considers the DSO Session established.

Once a DSO Session has been established, either end may unilaterally send appropriate DSO messages at any time, and therefore either client or server may be the initiator of a message.

Once a DSO Session has been established, clients and servers should behave as described in this specification with regard to inactivity timeouts and session termination, not as previously prescribed in the earlier specification for DNS over TCP [RFC7766].

Note that for clients that implement only the DSO-TYPEs defined in this base specification, sending a DSO Keepalive TLV is the only DSO request message they have available to initiate a DSO Session. Even for clients that do implement other future DSO-TYPEs, for simplicity they MAY elect to always send an initial DSO Keepalive request.
message as their way of initiating a DSO Session. A future
definition of a new response-requiring DSO-TYPE gives implementers
the option of using that new DSO-TYPE if they wish, but does not
change the fact that sending a DSO Keepalive TLV remains a valid way
of initiating a DSO Session.

4.1.1. Connection Sharing

As previously specified for DNS over TCP [RFC7766]:

To mitigate the risk of unintentional server overload, DNS
clients MUST take care to minimize the number of concurrent
TCP connections made to any individual server. It is RECOMMENDED
that for any given client/server interaction there SHOULD be
no more than one connection for regular queries, one for zone
transfers, and one for each protocol that is being used on top
of TCP (for example, if the resolver was using TLS). However,
it is noted that certain primary/secondary configurations
with many busy zones might need to use more than one TCP
connection for zone transfers for operational reasons (for
example, to support concurrent transfers of multiple zones).

A single server may support multiple services, including DNS Updates
[RFC2136], DNS Push Notifications [I-D.ietf-dnssd-push], and other
services, for one or more DNS zones. When a client discovers that
the target server for several different operations is the same target
hostname and port, the client SHOULD use a single shared DSO Session
for all those operations. A client SHOULD NOT open multiple
connections to the same target host and port just because the names
being operated on are different or happen to fall within different
zones. This requirement is to reduce unnecessary connection load on
the DNS server.

However, server implementers and operators should be aware that
connection sharing may not be possible in all cases. A single host
device may be home to multiple independent client software instances
that don’t coordinate with each other. Similarly, multiple
independent client devices behind the same NAT gateway will also
typically appear to the DNS server as different source ports on the
same client IP address. Because of these constraints, a DNS server
MUST be prepared to accept multiple connections from different source
ports on the same client IP address.

4.1.2. Zero Round-Trip Operation

There is increased awareness today of the performance benefits of
eliminating round trips in session establishment. Technologies like
TCP Fast Open [RFC7413] and TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] provide
mechanisms to reduce or eliminate round trips in session establishment.

Similarly, DSO supports zero round-trip operation.

Having initiated a connection to a server, possibly using zero round-trip TCP Fast Open and/or zero round-trip TLS 1.3, a client MAY send multiple response-requiring DSO request messages to the server in succession without having to wait for a response to the first request message to confirm successful establishment of a DSO session.

However, a client MUST NOT send non-response-requiring DSO request messages until after a DSO Session has been mutually established.

Similarly, a server MUST NOT send DSO request messages until it has received a response-requiring DSO request message from a client and transmitted a successful NOERROR response for that request.

Caution must be taken to ensure that DSO messages sent before the first round-trip is completed are idempotent, or are otherwise immune to any problems that could be result from the inadvertent replay that can occur with zero round-trip operation.

4.1.3. Middlebox Considerations

Where an application-layer middlebox (e.g., a DNS proxy, forwarder, or session multiplexer) is in the path, the middlebox MUST NOT blindly forward DSO messages in either direction, and MUST treat the inbound and outbound connections as separate sessions. This does not preclude the use of DSO messages in the presence of an IP-layer middlebox, such as a NAT that rewrites IP-layer and/or transport-layer headers but otherwise preserves the effect of a single session between the client and the server.

To illustrate the above, consider a network where a middlebox terminates one or more TCP connections from clients and multiplexes the queries therein over a single TCP connection to an upstream server. The DSO messages and any associated state are specific to the individual TCP connections. A DSO-aware middlebox MAY in some circumstances be able to retain associated state and pass it between the client and server (or vice versa) but this would be highly TLV-specific. For example, the middlebox may be able to maintain a list of which clients have made Push Notification subscriptions [I-D.ietf-dnssd-push] and make its own subscription(s) on their behalf, relaying any subsequent notifications to the client (or clients) that have subscribed to that particular notification.
4.2. Message Format

A DSO message begins with the standard twelve-byte DNS message header [RFC1035] with the OPCODE field set to the DSO OPCODE (tentatively 6). However, unlike standard DNS messages, the question section, answer section, authority records section and additional records sections are not present. The corresponding count fields (QDCOUNT, ANCOUNT, NSCOUNT, ARCOUNT) MUST be set to zero on transmission.

If a DSO message is received where any of the count fields are not zero, then a FORMERR MUST be returned, unless a future IETF Standard specifies otherwise.
4.2.1. DNS Header Fields in DSO Messages

In an unacknowledged message the MESSAGE ID field MUST be set to zero. In an acknowledged request message the MESSAGE ID field MUST be set to a unique nonzero value, that the initiator is not currently using for any other active operation on this connection. For the purposes here, a MESSAGE ID is in use in this DSO Session if the initiator has used it in a request for which it is still awaiting a response, or if the client has used it to set up a long-lived operation that has not yet been cancelled. For example, a long-lived operation could be a Push Notification subscription [I-D.ietf-dnssd-push] or a Discovery Relay interface subscription [I-D.sctl-dnssd-mdns-relay].

Whether a message is acknowledged or unacknowledged is determined only by the specification for the Primary TLV. An acknowledgment cannot be requested by including a nonzero message ID in a message the primary TLV of which is specified to be unacknowledged, nor can an acknowledgment be prevented by sending a message ID of zero in a message with a primary TLV that is specified to be acknowledged. A responder that receives either such malformed message MUST treat it as a fatal error and forcibly abort the connection immediately.

In a request or unacknowledged message the DNS Header QR bit MUST be zero (QR=0). If the QR bit is not zero the message is not a request or unacknowledged message.

In a response message the DNS Header QR bit MUST be one (QR=1). If the QR bit is not one the message is not a response message.

In a response message (QR=1) the MESSAGE ID field MUST contain a copy of the value of the MESSAGE ID field in the request message being responded to. In a response message (QR=1) the MESSAGE ID field MUST NOT be zero. If a response message (QR=1) is received where the MESSAGE ID is zero this is a fatal error and the recipient MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately.

The DNS Header OPCODE field holds the DSO OPCODE value (tentatively 6).

The Z bits are currently unused in DSO messages, and in both DSO requests and DSO responses the Z bits MUST be set to zero (0) on transmission and MUST be silently ignored on reception, unless a future IETF Standard specifies otherwise.
In a DNS request message (QR=0) the RCODE is set according to the definition of the request. For example, in a Retry Delay message (Section 5.6.1) the RCODE indicates the reason for termination. However, in most cases, except where clearly specified otherwise, in a DNS request message (QR=0) the RCODE is set to zero on transmission, and silently ignored on reception.

The RCODE value in a response message (QR=1) may be one of the following values:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Mnemonic</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>NOERROR</td>
<td>Operation processed successfully</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>FORMERR</td>
<td>Format error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>SERVFAIL</td>
<td>Server failed to process request due to a problem with the server</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>NXDOMAIN</td>
<td>Name Error -- Named entity does not exist (TLV-dependent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>NOTIMP</td>
<td>DSO not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>REFUSED</td>
<td>Operation declined for policy reasons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>NOTAUTH</td>
<td>Not Authoritative (TLV-dependent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>DSOTYPENI</td>
<td>Primary TLV’s DSO-Type is not implemented</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Use of the above RCODEs is likely to be common in DSO but does not preclude the definition and use of other codes in future documents that make use of DSO.

If a document defining a new DSO-TYPE makes use of NXDOMAIN (Name Error) or NOTAUTH (Not Authoritative) then that document MUST specify the specific interpretation of these RCODE values in the context of that new DSO TLV.
4.2.2. DSO Data

The standard twelve-byte DNS message header with its zero-valued count fields is followed by the DSO Data, expressed using TLV syntax, as described below Section 4.2.2.1.

A DSO message may be a request message, a response message, or an unacknowledged message.

A DSO request message or DSO unacknowledged message MUST contain at least one TLV. The first TLV in a DSO request message or DSO unacknowledged message is referred to as the "Primary TLV" and determines the nature of the operation being performed, including whether it is an acknowledged or unacknowledged operation. In some cases it may be appropriate to include other TLVs in a request message or unacknowledged message, such as the Encryption Padding TLV (Section 6.3), and these extra TLVs are referred to as the "Additional TLVs".

A DSO response message may contain no TLVs, or it may be specified to contain one or more TLVs appropriate to the information being communicated.

A DSO response message may contain one or more TLVs with DSO-TYPE the same as the Primary TLV from the corresponding DSO request message, in which case those TLV(s) are referred to as "Response Primary TLVs". A DSO response message is not required to carry Response Primary TLVs. The MESSAGE ID field in the DNS message header is sufficient to identify the DSO request message to which this response message relates.

A DSO response message may contain one or more TLVs with DSO-TYPEs different from the Primary TLV from the corresponding DSO request message, in which case those TLV(s) are referred to as "Response Additional TLVs".

Response Primary TLV(s), if present, MUST occur first in the response message, before any Response Additional TLVs.

It is anticipated that most DSO operations will be specified to use request messages, which generate corresponding responses. In some specialized high-traffic use cases, it may be appropriate to specify unacknowledged messages. Unacknowledged messages can be more efficient on the network, because they don’t generate a stream of corresponding reply messages. Using unacknowledged messages can also simplify software in some cases, by removing need for an initiator to maintain state while it waits to receive replies it doesn’t care about. When the specification for a particular TLV states that, when
used as a Primary TLV (i.e., first) in an outgoing DNS request message (i.e., QR=0), that message is to be unacknowledged, the MESSAGE ID field MUST be set to zero and the receiver MUST NOT generate any response message corresponding to this unacknowledged message.

The previous point, that the receiver MUST NOT generate responses to unacknowledged messages, applies even in the case of errors. When a DSO message is received where both the QR bit and the MESSAGE ID field are zero, the receiver MUST NOT generate any response. For example, if the DSO-TYPE in the Primary TLV is unrecognized, then a DSOTYPENI error MUST NOT be returned; instead the receiver MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately.

Unacknowledged messages MUST NOT be used "speculatively" in cases where the sender doesn’t know if the receiver supports the Primary TLV in the message, because there is no way to receive any response to indicate success or failure of the request message (the request message does not contain a unique MESSAGE ID with which to associate a response with its corresponding request). Unacknowledged messages are only appropriate in cases where the sender already knows that the receiver supports, and wishes to receive, these messages.

For example, after a client has subscribed for Push Notifications [I-D.ietf-dnssd-push], the subsequent event notifications are then sent as unacknowledged messages, and this is appropriate because the client initiated the message stream by virtue of its Push Notification subscription, thereby indicating its support of Push Notifications, and its desire to receive those notifications.

Similarly, after an mDNS Relay client has subscribed to receive inbound mDNS traffic from an mDNS Relay, the subsequent stream of received packets is then sent using unacknowledged messages, and this is appropriate because the client initiated the message stream by virtue of its mDNS Relay link subscription, thereby indicating its support of mDNS Relay, and its desire to receive inbound mDNS packets over that DSO session [I-D.sctl-dnssd-mdns-relay].
4.2.2.1. TLV Syntax

All TLVs, whether used as "Primary", "Additional", "Response Primary", or "Response Additional", use the same encoding syntax.

The specification for a TLV states whether that DSO-TYPE may be used in "Primary", "Additional", "Response Primary", or "Response Additional" TLVs. The specification for a TLV also states whether, when used as the Primary (i.e., first) TLV in a DNS request message (i.e., QR=0), that DSO message is to be acknowledged. If the DSO message is to be acknowledged, the specification also states which TLVs, if any, are to be included in the response. The Primary TLV may or may not be contained in the response, depending on what is stated in the specification for that TLV.

1   1   1   1   1   1
0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   0   1   2   3   4   5
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|                           DSO-TYPE                           |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|                          DSO-LENGTH                          |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|                                                               |
/                           DSO-DATA                           /
/                                                               /
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

DSO-TYPE: A 16-bit unsigned integer, in network (big endian) byte order, giving the DSO-TYPE of the current DSO TLV per the IANA DSO Type Code Registry.

DSO-LENGTH: A 16-bit unsigned integer, in network (big endian) byte order, giving the size in bytes of the DSO-DATA.

DSO-DATA: Type-code specific format. The generic DSO machinery treats the DSO-DATA as an opaque "blob" without attempting to interpret it. Interpretation of the meaning of the DSO-DATA for a particular DSO-TYPE is the responsibility of the software that implements that DSO-TYPE.
4.2.2.2. Request TLVs

The first TLV in a DSO request message or unacknowledged message is the "Primary TLV" and indicates the operation to be performed. A DSO request message or unacknowledged message MUST contain at least one TLV, the Primary TLV.

Immediately following the Primary TLV, a DSO request message or unacknowledged message MAY contain one or more "Additional TLVs", which specify additional parameters relating to the operation.

4.2.2.3. Response TLVs

Depending on the operation, a DSO response message MAY contain no TLVs, because it is simply a response to a previous request message, and the MESSAGE ID in the header is sufficient to identify the request in question. Or it may contain a single response TLV, with the same DSO-TYPE as the Primary TLV in the request message. Alternatively it may contain one or more TLVs of other types, or a combination of the above, as appropriate for the information that needs to be communicated. The specification for each DSO TLV determines what TLVs are required in a response to a request using that TLV.

If a DSO response is received for an operation where the specification requires that the response carry a particular TLV or TLVs, and the required TLV(s) are not present, then this is a fatal error and the recipient of the defective response message MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately.
4.2.2.4. Unrecognized TLVs

If DSO request message is received containing an unrecognized Primary TLV, with a nonzero MESSAGE ID (indicating that a response is expected), then the receiver MUST send an error response with matching MESSAGE ID, and RCODE DSOTYPENI (tentatively 11). The error response MUST NOT contain a copy of the unrecognized Primary TLV.

If DSO unacknowledged message is received containing an unrecognized Primary TLV, with a zero MESSAGE ID (indicating that no response is expected), then this is a fatal error and the recipient MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately.

If a DSO request message or unacknowledged message is received where the Primary TLV is recognized, containing one or more unrecognized Additional TLVs, the unrecognized Additional TLVs MUST be silently ignored, and the remainder of the message is interpreted and handled as if the unrecognized parts were not present.

Similarly, if a DSO response message is received containing one or more unrecognized TLVs, the unrecognized TLVs MUST be silently ignored, and the remainder of the message is interpreted and handled as if the unrecognized parts were not present.
4.2.3. EDNS(0) and TSIG

Since the ARCOUNT field MUST be zero, a DSO message MUST NOT contain an EDNS(0) option in the additional records section. If functionality provided by current or future EDNS(0) options is desired for DSO messages, one or more new DSO TLVs need to be defined to carry the necessary information.

For example, the EDNS(0) Padding Option [RFC7830] used for security purposes is not permitted in a DSO message, so if message padding is desired for DSO messages then the Encryption Padding TLV described in Section 6.3 MUST be used.

Similarly, a DSO message MUST NOT contain a TSIG record. A TSIG record in a conventional DNS message is added as the last record in the additional records section, and carries a signature computed over the preceding message content. Since DSO data appears *after* the additional records section, it would not be included in the signature calculation. If use of signatures with DSO messages becomes necessary in the future, a new DSO TLV needs to be defined to perform this function.

Note however that, while DSO *messages* cannot include EDNS(0) or TSIG records, a DSO *session* is typically used to carry a whole series of DNS messages of different kinds, including DSO messages, and other DNS message types like Query [RFC1034] [RFC1035] and Update [RFC2136], and those messages can carry EDNS(0) and TSIG records.

Although messages may contain other EDNS(0) options as appropriate, this specification explicitly prohibits use of the EDNS(0) TCP Keepalive Option [RFC7828] in *any* messages sent on a DSO Session (because it is obsoleted by the functionality provided by the DSO Keepalive operation). If any message sent on a DSO Session contains an EDNS(0) TCP Keepalive Option this is a fatal error and the recipient of the defective message MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately.
4.3. Message Handling

The initiator MUST set the value of the QR bit in the DNS header to zero (0), and the responder MUST set it to one (1).

As described above in Section 4.2.1 whether an outgoing message with QR=0 is unacknowledged or acknowledged is determined by the specification for the Primary TLV, which in turn determines whether the MESSAGE ID field in that outgoing message will be zero or nonzero.

A DSO unacknowledged message has both the QR bit and the MESSAGE ID field set to zero, and MUST NOT elicit a response.

Every DSO request message (QR=0) with a nonzero MESSAGE ID field is an acknowledged DSO request, and MUST elicit a corresponding response (QR=1), which MUST have the same MESSAGE ID in the DNS message header as in the corresponding request.

Valid DSO request messages sent by the client with a nonzero MESSAGE ID field elicit a response from the server, and Valid DSO request messages sent by the server with a nonzero MESSAGE ID field elicit a response from the client.

The namespaces of 16-bit MESSAGE IDs are independent in each direction. This means it is *not* an error for both client and server to send request messages at the same time as each other, using the same MESSAGE ID, in different directions. This simplification is necessary in order for the protocol to be implementable. It would be infeasible to require the client and server to coordinate with each other regarding allocation of new unique MESSAGE IDs. It is also not necessary to require the client and server to coordinate with each other regarding allocation of new unique MESSAGE IDs. The value of the 16-bit MESSAGE ID combined with the identity of the initiator (client or server) is sufficient to unambiguously identify the operation in question. This can be thought of as a 17-bit message identifier space, using message identifiers 0x00001-0xFFFF for client-to-server DSO request messages, and message identifiers 0x10001-0xFFFF for server-to-client DSO request messages. The least-significant 16 bits are stored explicitly in the MESSAGE ID field of the DSO message, and the most-significant bit is implicit from the direction of the message.

As described above in Section 4.2.1, an initiator MUST NOT reuse a MESSAGE ID that it already has in use for an outstanding request (unless specified otherwise by the relevant specification for the DSO-TYPE in question). At the very least, this means that a MESSAGE ID MUST NOT be reused in a particular direction on a particular DSO
Session while the initiator is waiting for a response to a previous request using that MESSAGE ID on that DSO Session (unless specified otherwise by the relevant specification for the DSO-TYPE in question), and for a long-lived operation the MESSAGE ID for the operation MUST NOT be reused while that operation remains active.

If a client or server receives a response (QR=1) where the MESSAGE ID is zero, or is any other value that does not match the MESSAGE ID of any of its outstanding operations, this is a fatal error and the recipient MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately.

4.3.1. Error Responses

When a DSO unacknowledged message is unsuccessful for some reason, the responder immediately aborts the connection.

When a DSO request message is unsuccessful for some reason, the responder returns an error code to the initiator.

In the case of a server returning an error code to a client in response to an unsuccessful DSO request message, the server MAY choose to end the DSO Session, or MAY choose to allow the DSO Session to remain open. For error conditions that only affect the single operation in question, the server SHOULD return an error response to the client and leave the DSO Session open for further operations.

For error conditions that are likely to make all operations unsuccessful in the immediate future, the server SHOULD return an error response to the client and then end the DSO Session by sending a Retry Delay message, as described in Section 5.6.1.

Upon receiving an error response from the server, a client SHOULD NOT automatically close the DSO Session. An error relating to one particular operation on a DSO Session does not necessarily imply that all other operations on that DSO Session have also failed, or that future operations will fail. The client should assume that the server will make its own decision about whether or not to end the DSO Session, based on the server’s determination of whether the error condition pertains to this particular operation, or would also apply to any subsequent operations. If the server does not end the DSO Session by sending the client a Retry Delay message (Section 5.6.1) then the client SHOULD continue to use that DSO Session for subsequent operations.
4.4. DSO Response Generation

With most TCP implementations, for DSO requests that generate a response, the TCP data acknowledgement (generated because data has been received by TCP), the TCP window update (generated because TCP has delivered that data to the receiving software), and the DSO response (generated by the receiving application-layer software itself) are all combined into a single IP packet. Combining these three elements into a single IP packet can give a significant improvement in network efficiency.

For DSO requests that do not generate a response, the TCP implementation generally doesn’t have any way to know that no response will be forthcoming, so it waits fruitlessly for the application-layer software to generate a response, until the Delayed ACK timer fires [RFC1122] (typically 200 milliseconds) and only then does it send the TCP ACK and window update. In conjunction with Nagle’s Algorithm at the sender, this can delay the sender’s transmission of its next (non-full-sized) TCP segment, while the sender is waiting for its previous (non-full-sized) TCP segment to be acknowledged, which won’t happen until the Delayed ACK timer fires. Nagle’s Algorithm exists to combine multiple small application writes into more-efficient large TCP segments, to guard against wasteful use of the network by applications that would otherwise transmit a stream of small TCP segments, but in this case Nagle’s Algorithm (created to improve network efficiency) can interact badly with TCP’s Delayed ACK feature (also created to improve network efficiency) [NagleDA] with the result of delaying some messages by up to 200 milliseconds.

Possible mitigations for this problem include:

- Disable Nagle’s Algorithm at the sender. This is not great, because it results in less efficient use of the network.

- Disable Delayed ACK at the receiver. This is not great, because it results in less efficient use of the network.

- Use a networking API that lets the receiver signal to the TCP implementation that the receiver has received and processed a client request for which it will not be generating any immediate response. This allows the TCP implementation to operate efficiently in both cases; for requests that generate a response, the TCP ACK, window update, and DSO response are transmitted together in a single TCP segment, and for requests that do not generate a response, the application-layer software informs the TCP implementation that it should go ahead and send the TCP ACK and window update immediately, without waiting for the Delayed ACK timer. Unfortunately it is not known at this time which (if any)
of the widely-available networking APIs currently include this capability.

4.5. Responder-Initiated Operation Cancellation

This document, the base specification for DNS Stateful Operations, does not itself define any long-lived operations, but it defines a framework for supporting long-lived operations, such as Push Notification subscriptions [I-D.ietf-dnssd-push] and Discovery Relay interface subscriptions [I-D.sctl-dnssd-mdns-relay].

Generally speaking, a long-lived operation is initiated by the initiator, and, if successful, remains active until the initiator terminates the operation.

However, it is possible that a long-lived operation may be valid at the time it was initiated, but then a later change of circumstances may render that previously valid operation invalid.

For example, a long-lived client operation may pertain to a name that the server is authoritative for, but then the server configuration is changed such that it is no longer authoritative for that name.

In such cases, instead of terminating the entire session it may be desirable for the responder to be able to cancel selectively only those operations that have become invalid.

The responder performs this selective cancellation by sending a new response message, with the MESSAGE ID field containing the MESSAGE ID of the long-lived operation that is to be terminated (that it had previously acknowledged with a NOERROR RCODE), and the RCODE field of the new response message giving the reason for cancellation.

After a response message with nonzero RCODE has been sent, that operation has been terminated from the responder’s point of view, and the responder sends no more messages relating to that operation.

After a response message with nonzero RCODE has been received by the initiator, that operation has been terminated from the initiator’s point of view, and the cancelled operation’s MESSAGE ID is now free for reuse.
5. DSO Session Lifecycle and Timers

5.1. DSO Session Initiation

A DSO Session begins as described in Section 4.1.

The client may perform as many DNS operations as it wishes using the newly created DSO Session. Operations SHOULD be pipelined (i.e., the client doesn’t need wait for a response before sending the next message). The server MUST act on messages in the order they are transmitted, but responses to those messages SHOULD be sent out of order when appropriate.

5.2. DSO Session Timeouts

Two timeout values are associated with a DSO Session: the inactivity timeout, and the keepalive interval. Both values are communicated in the same TLV, the DSO Keepalive TLV (Section 6.1).

The first timeout value, the inactivity timeout, is the maximum time for which a client may speculatively keep a DSO Session open in the expectation that it may have future requests to send to that server.

The second timeout value, the keepalive interval, is the maximum permitted interval between messages if the client wishes to keep the DSO Session alive.

The two timeout values are independent. The inactivity timeout may be lower, the same, or higher than the keepalive interval, though in most cases the inactivity timeout is expected to be shorter than the keepalive interval.

A shorter inactivity timeout with a longer keepalive interval signals to the client that it should not speculatively keep an inactive DSO Session open for very long without reason, but when it does have an active reason to keep a DSO Session open, it doesn’t need to be sending an aggressive level of keepalive traffic to maintain that session.

A longer inactivity timeout with a shorter keepalive interval signals to the client that it may speculatively keep an inactive DSO Session open for a long time, but to maintain that inactive DSO Session it should be sending a lot of keepalive traffic. This configuration is expected to be less common.

In the usual case where the inactivity timeout is shorter than the keepalive interval, it is only when a client has a very long-lived, low-traffic, operation that the keepalive interval comes into play,
to ensure that a sufficient residual amount of traffic is generated to maintain NAT and firewall state and to assure client and server that they still have connectivity to each other.

On a new DSO Session, if no explicit DSO Keepalive message exchange has taken place, the default value for both timeouts is 15 seconds.

For both timeouts, lower values of the timeout result in higher network traffic and higher CPU load on the server.

5.3. Inactive DSO Sessions

At both servers and clients, the generation or reception of any complete DNS message, including DNS requests, responses, updates, or DSO messages, resets both timers for that DSO Session, with the exception that a DSO Keepalive message resets only the keepalive timer, not the inactivity timeout timer.

In addition, for as long as the client has an outstanding operation in progress, the inactivity timer remains cleared, and an inactivity timeout cannot occur.

For short-lived DNS operations like traditional queries and updates, an operation is considered in progress for the time between request and response, typically a period of a few hundred milliseconds at most. At the client, the inactivity timer is cleared upon transmission of a request and remains cleared until reception of the corresponding response. At the server, the inactivity timer is cleared upon reception of a request and remains cleared until transmission of the corresponding response.

For long-lived DNS Stateful operations (such as a Push Notification subscription [I-D.ietf-dnssd-push] or a Discovery Relay interface subscription [I-D.sctl-dnssd-mdns-relay]), an operation is considered in progress for as long as the operation is active, until it is cancelled. This means that a DSO Session can exist, with active operations, with no messages flowing in either direction, for far longer than the inactivity timeout, and this is not an error. This is why there are two separate timers: the inactivity timeout, and the keepalive interval. Just because a DSO Session has no traffic for an extended period of time does not automatically make that DSO Session "inactive", if it has an active operation that is awaiting events.
5.4. The Inactivity Timeout

The purpose of the inactivity timeout is for the server to balance its trade off between the costs of setting up new DSO Sessions and the costs of maintaining inactive DSO Sessions. A server with abundant DSO Session capacity can offer a high inactivity timeout, to permit clients to keep a speculative DSO Session open for a long time, to save the cost of establishing a new DSO Session for future communications with that server. A server with scarce memory resources can offer a low inactivity timeout, to cause clients to promptly close DSO Sessions whenever they have no outstanding operations with that server, and then create a new DSO Session later when needed.

5.4.1. Closing Inactive DSO Sessions

When a connection’s inactivity timeout is reached the client MUST begin closing the idle connection, but a client is NOT REQUIRED to keep an idle connection open until the inactivity timeout is reached. A client MAY close a DSO Session at any time, at the client’s discretion. If a client determines that it has no current or reasonably anticipated future need for a currently inactive DSO Session, then the client SHOULD gracefully close that connection.

If, at any time during the life of the DSO Session, the inactivity timeout value (i.e., 15 seconds by default) elapses without there being any operation active on the DSO Session, the client MUST close the connection gracefully.

If, at any time during the life of the DSO Session, twice the inactivity timeout value (i.e., 30 seconds by default), or five seconds, if twice the inactivity timeout value is less than five seconds, elapses without there being any operation active on the DSO Session, the server SHOULD consider the client delinquent, and SHOULD forcibly abort the DSO Session.

In this context, an operation being active on a DSO Session includes a query waiting for a response, an update waiting for a response, or an active long-lived operation, but not a DSO Keepalive message exchange itself. A DSO Keepalive message exchange resets only the keepalive interval timer, not the inactivity timeout timer.

If the client wishes to keep an inactive DSO Session open for longer than the default duration then it uses the DSO Keepalive message to request longer timeout values, as described in Section 6.1.
5.4.2. Values for the Inactivity Timeout

For the inactivity timeout value, lower values result in more frequent DSO Session teardown and re-establishment. Higher values result in lower traffic and lower CPU load on the server, but higher memory burden to maintain state for inactive DSO Sessions.

A server may dictate any value it chooses for the inactivity timeout (either in a response to a client-initiated request, or in a server-initiated message) including values under one second, or even zero.

An inactivity timeout of zero informs the client that it should not speculatively maintain idle connections at all, and as soon as the client has completed the operation or operations relating to this server, the client should immediately begin closing this session.

A server will abort an idle client session after twice the inactivity timeout value, or five seconds, whichever is greater. In the case of a zero inactivity timeout value, this means that if a client fails to close an idle client session then the server will forcibly abort the idle session after five seconds.

An inactivity timeout of 0xFFFFFFFF represents "infinity" and informs the client that it may keep an idle connection open as long as it wishes. Note that after granting an unlimited inactivity timeout in this way, at any point the server may revise that inactivity timeout by sending a new Keepalive message dictating new Session Timeout values to the client.

The largest *finite* inactivity timeout supported by the current DSO Keepalive TLV is 0xFFFFFFFF (2^{32−2} milliseconds, approximately 49.7 days).
5.5. The Keepalive Interval

The purpose of the keepalive interval is to manage the generation of sufficient messages to maintain state in middleboxes (such as NAT gateways or firewalls) and for the client and server to periodically verify that they still have connectivity to each other. This allows them to clean up state when connectivity is lost, and to establish a new session if appropriate.

5.5.1. Keepalive Interval Expiry

If, at any time during the life of the DSO Session, the keepalive interval value (i.e., 15 seconds by default) elapses without any DNS messages being sent or received on a DSO Session, the client MUST take action to keep the DSO Session alive, by sending a DSO Keepalive message (Section 6.1). A DSO Keepalive message exchange resets only the keepalive timer, not the inactivity timer.

If a client disconnects from the network abruptly, without cleanly closing its DSO Session, perhaps leaving a long-lived operation uncanceled, the server learns of this after failing to receive the required keepalive traffic from that client. If, at any time during the life of the DSO Session, twice the keepalive interval value (i.e., 30 seconds by default) elapses without any DNS messages being sent or received on a DSO Session, the server SHOULD consider the client delinquent, and SHOULD forcibly abort the DSO Session.

5.5.2. Values for the Keepalive Interval

For the keepalive interval value, lower values result in a higher volume of keepalive traffic. Higher values of the keepalive interval reduce traffic and CPU load, but have minimal effect on the memory burden at the server, because clients keep a DSO Session open for the same length of time (determined by the inactivity timeout) regardless of the level of keepalive traffic required.

It may be appropriate for clients and servers to select different keepalive interval values depending on the nature of the network they are on.

A corporate DNS server that knows it is serving only clients on the internal network, with no intervening NAT gateways or firewalls, can impose a higher keepalive interval, because frequent keepalive traffic is not required.

A public DNS server that is serving primarily residential consumer clients, where it is likely there will be a NAT gateway on the path,
may impose a lower keepalive interval, to generate more frequent keepalive traffic.

A smart client may be adaptive to its environment. A client using a private IPv4 address [RFC1918] to communicate with a DNS server at an address outside that IPv4 private address block, may conclude that there is likely to be a NAT gateway on the path, and accordingly request a lower keepalive interval.

By default it is RECOMMENDED that clients request, and servers grant, a keepalive interval of 60 minutes. This keepalive interval provides for reasonably timely detection if a client abruptly disconnects without cleanly closing the session, and is sufficient to maintain state in firewalls and NAT gateways that follow the IETF recommended Best Current Practice that the "established connection idle-timeout" used by middleboxes be at least 2 hours 4 minutes [RFC5382].

Note that the lower the keepalive interval value, the higher the load on client and server. For example, a hypothetical keepalive interval value of 100ms would result in a continuous stream of at least ten messages per second, in both directions, to keep the DSO Session alive. And, in this extreme example, a single packet loss and retransmission over a long path could introduce a momentary pause in the stream of messages, long enough to cause the server to overzealously abort the connection.

Because of this concern, the server MUST NOT send a Keepalive message (either a response to a client-initiated request, or a server-initiated message) with a keepalive interval value less than ten seconds. If a client receives a Keepalive message specifying a keepalive interval value less than ten seconds this is a fatal error and the client MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately.

A keepalive interval value of 0xFFFFFFFF represents "infinity" and informs the client that it should generate no keepalive traffic. Note that after signaling that the client should generate no keepalive traffic in this way, at any point the server may revise that keepalive traffic requirement by sending a new Keepalive message dictating new Session Timeout values to the client.

The largest "finite" keepalive interval supported by the current DSO Keepalive TLV is 0xFFFFFFFF (2^32-2 milliseconds, approximately 49.7 days).
5.6. Server-Initiated Session Termination

In addition to cancelling individual long-lived operations selectively (Section 4.5) there are also occasions where a server may need to terminate one or more entire sessions. An entire session may need to be terminated if the client is defective in some way, or departs from the network without closing its session. Sessions may also need to be terminated if the server becomes overloaded, or if the server is reconfigured and lacks the ability to be selective about which operations need to be cancelled.

This section discusses various reasons a session may be terminated, and the mechanisms for doing so.

Normally a server MUST NOT close a DSO Session with a client. A server only causes a DSO Session to be ended in the exceptional circumstances outlined below. In normal operation, closing a DSO Session is the client’s responsibility. The client makes the determination of when to close a DSO Session based on an evaluation of both its own needs, and the inactivity timeout value dictated by the server.

Some of the exceptional situations in which a server may terminate a DSO Session include:

- The server application software or underlying operating system is shutting down or restarting.
- The server application software terminates unexpectedly (perhaps due to a bug that makes it crash).
- The server is undergoing a reconfiguration or maintenance procedure, that, due to the way the server software is implemented, requires clients to be disconnected. For example, some software is implemented such that it reads a configuration file at startup, and changing the server’s configuration entails modifying the configuration file and then killing and restarting the server software, which generally entails a loss of network connections.
- The client fails to meet its obligation to generate the required keepalive traffic, or to close an inactive session by the prescribed time (twice the time interval dictated by the server, or five seconds, whichever is greater, as described in Section 5.2).
- The client sends a grossly invalid or malformed request that is indicative of a seriously defective client implementation.
The server is over capacity and needs to shed some load.

5.6.1. Server-Initiated Retry Delay Message

In the cases described above where a server elects to terminate a DSO Session, it could do so simply by forcibly aborting the connection. However, if it did this the likely behavior of the client might be simply to to treat this as a network failure and reconnect immediately, putting more burden on the server.

Therefore, to avoid this reconnection implosion, a server SHOULD instead choose to shed client load by sending a Retry Delay message, with an appropriate RCODE value informing the client of the reason the DSO Session needs to be terminated. The format of the Retry Delay TLV, and the interpretations of the various RCODE values, are described in Section 6.2. After sending a Retry Delay message, the server MUST NOT send any further messages on that DSO Session.

Upon receipt of a Retry Delay message from the server, the client MUST make note of the reconnect delay for this server, and then immediately close the connection gracefully.

After sending a Retry Delay message the server SHOULD allow the client five seconds to close the connection, and if the client has not closed the connection after five seconds then the server SHOULD forcibly abort the connection.

A Retry Delay message MUST NOT be initiated by a client. If a server receives a Retry Delay message this is a fatal error and the server MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately.
5.6.1.1. Outstanding Operations

At the instant a server chooses to initiate a Retry Delay message there may be DNS requests already in flight from client to server on this DSO Session, which will arrive at the server after its Retry Delay message has been sent. The server MUST silently ignore such incoming requests, and MUST NOT generate any response messages for them. When the Retry Delay message from the server arrives at the client, the client will determine that any DNS requests it previously sent on this DSO Session, that have not yet received a response, now will certainly not be receiving any response. Such requests should be considered failed, and should be retried at a later time, as appropriate.

In the case where some, but not all, of the existing operations on a DSO Session have become invalid (perhaps because the server has been reconfigured and is no longer authoritative for some of the names), but the server is terminating all affected DSO Sessions en masse by sending them all a Retry Delay message, the RECONNECT DELAY MAY be zero, indicating that the clients SHOULD immediately attempt to re-establish operations.

It is likely that some of the attempts will be successful and some will not, depending on the nature of the reconfiguration.

In the case where a server is terminating a large number of DSO Sessions at once (e.g., if the system is restarting) and the server doesn’t want to be inundated with a flood of simultaneous retries, it SHOULD send different RECONNECT delay values to each client. These adjustments MAY be selected randomly, pseudorandomly, or deterministically (e.g., incrementing the time value by one tenth of a second for each successive client, yielding a post-restart reconnection rate of ten clients per second).
5.6.1.2. Client Reconnection

After a DSO Session is ended by the server (either by sending the client a Retry Delay message, or by forcibly aborting the underlying transport connection) the client SHOULD try to reconnect, to that server instance, or to another suitable server instance, if more than one is available. If reconnecting to the same server instance, the client MUST respect the indicated delay, if available, before attempting to reconnect.

If the server instance will only be out of service for a short maintenance period, it should use a value a little longer than the expected maintenance window. It should not default to a very large delay value, or clients may not attempt to reconnect after it resumes service.

If a particular server instance does not want a client to reconnect ever (perhaps the server instance is being de-commissioned), it SHOULD set the retry delay to the maximum value 0xFFFFFFFF (2^32-1 milliseconds, approximately 49.7 days). It is not possible to instruct a client to stay away for longer than 49.7 days. If, after 49.7 days, the DNS or other configuration information still indicates that this is the valid server instance for a particular service, then clients MAY attempt to reconnect. In reality, if a client is rebooted or otherwise lose state, it may well attempt to reconnect before 49.7 days elapses, for as long as the DNS or other configuration information continues to indicate that this is the server instance the client should use.
6. Base TLVs for DNS Stateful Operations

This section describes the three base TLVs for DNS Stateful Operations: Keepalive, Retry Delay, and Encryption Padding.

6.1. Keepalive TLV

The Keepalive TLV (DSO-TYPE=1) performs two functions: to reset the keepalive timer for the DSO Session, and to establish the values for the Session Timeouts.

The DSO-DATA for the Keepalive TLV is as follows:

```
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                 INACTIVITY TIMEOUT (32 bits)                  |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                 KEEPALIVE INTERVAL (32 bits)                  |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

**INACTIVITY TIMEOUT**: The inactivity timeout for the current DSO Session, specified as a 32-bit unsigned integer, in network (big endian) byte order, in units of milliseconds. This is the timeout at which the client MUST begin closing an inactive DSO Session. The inactivity timeout can be any value of the server’s choosing. If the client does not gracefully close an inactive DSO Session, then after twice this interval, or five seconds, whichever is greater, the server will forcibly abort the connection.

**KEEPALIVE INTERVAL**: The keepalive interval for the current DSO Session, specified as a 32-bit unsigned integer, in network (big endian) byte order, in units of milliseconds. This is the interval at which a client MUST generate keepalive traffic to maintain connection state. The keepalive interval MUST NOT be less than ten seconds. If the client does not generate the mandated keepalive traffic, then after twice this interval the server will forcibly abort the connection. Since the minimum allowed keepalive interval is ten seconds, the minimum time at which a server will forcibly disconnect a client for failing to generate the mandated keepalive traffic is twenty seconds.

The transmission or reception of DSO Keepalive messages (i.e., messages where the Keepalive TLV is the first TLV) reset only the keepalive timer, not the inactivity timer. The reason for this is that periodic Keepalive messages are sent for the sole purpose of keeping a DSO Session alive, when that DSO Session has current or recent non-maintenance activity that warrants keeping that DSO
Session alive. Sending keepalive traffic itself is not considered a client activity; it is considered a maintenance activity that is performed in service of other client activities. If keepalive traffic itself were to reset the inactivity timer, then that would create a circular livelock where keepalive traffic would be sent indefinitely to keep a DSO Session alive, where the only activity on that DSO Session would be the keepalive traffic keeping the DSO Session alive so that further keepalive traffic can be sent. For a DSO Session to be considered active, it must be carrying something more than just keepalive traffic. This is why merely sending or receiving a Keepalive message does not reset the inactivity timer.

When sent by a client, the Keepalive request message MUST be sent as an acknowledged request, with a nonzero MESSAGE ID. If a server receives a Keepalive DSO message with a zero MESSAGE ID then this is a fatal error and the server MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately. The Keepalive request message resets a DSO Session’s keepalive timer, and at the same time communicates to the server the client’s requested Session Timeout values. In a server response to a client-initiated Keepalive request message, the Session Timeouts contain the server’s chosen values from this point forward in the DSO Session, which the client MUST respect. This is modeled after the DHCP protocol, where the client requests a certain lease lifetime using DHCP option 51 [RFC2132], but the server is the ultimate authority for deciding what lease lifetime is actually granted.

When a client is sending its second and subsequent Keepalive DSO requests to the server, the client SHOULD continue to request its preferred values each time. This allows flexibility, so that if conditions change during the lifetime of a DSO Session, the server can adapt its responses to better fit the client’s needs.

Once a DSO Session is in progress (Section 4.1) a Keepalive message MAY be initiated by a server. When sent by a server, the Keepalive message MUST be sent as an unacknowledged message, with the MESSAGE ID set to zero. The client MUST NOT generate a response to a server-initiated DSO Keepalive message. If a client receives a Keepalive request message with a nonzero MESSAGE ID then this is a fatal error and the client MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately. The Keepalive unacknowledged message from the server resets a DSO Session’s keepalive timer, and at the same time unilaterally informs the client of the new Session Timeout values to use from this point forward in this DSO Session. No client DSO response message to this unilateral declaration is required or allowed.

The Keepalive TLV is not used as an Additional TLV.
In response messages the Keepalive TLV is used only as a Response Primary TLV, replying to a Keepalive request message from the client. A Keepalive TLV MUST NOT be added as to other responses a Response Additional TLV. If the server wishes to update a client’s Session Timeout values other than in response to a Keepalive request message from the client, then it does so by sending an unacknowledged Keepalive message of its own, as described above.

It is not required that the Keepalive TLV be used in every DSO Session. While many DNS Stateful operations will be used in conjunction with a long-lived session state, not all DNS Stateful operations require long-lived session state, and in some cases the default 15-second value for both the inactivity timeout and keepalive interval may be perfectly appropriate. However, note that for clients that implement only the DSO-TYPEs defined in this document, a Keepalive request message is the only way for a client to initiate a DSO Session.

6.1.1. Client handling of received Session Timeout values

When a client receives a response to its client-initiated DSO Keepalive message, or receives a server-initiated DSO Keepalive message, the client has then received Session Timeout values dictated by the server. The two timeout values contained in the DSO Keepalive TLV from the server may each be higher, lower, or the same as the respective Session Timeout values the client previously had for this DSO Session.

In the case of the keepalive timer, the handling of the received value is straightforward. The act of receiving the message containing the DSO Keepalive TLV itself resets the keepalive timer and updates the keepalive interval for the DSO Session. The new keepalive interval indicates the maximum time that may elapse before another message must be sent or received on this DSO Session, if the DSO Session is to remain alive.
In the case of the inactivity timeout, the handling of the received value is a little more subtle, though the meaning of the inactivity timeout remains as specified -- it still indicates the maximum permissible time allowed without useful activity on a DSO Session. The act of receiving the message containing the DSO Keepalive TLV does not itself reset the inactivity timer. The time elapsed since the last useful activity on this DSO Session is unaffected by exchange of DSO Keepalive messages. The new inactivity timeout value in the DSO Keepalive TLV in the received message does update the timeout associated with the running inactivity timer; that becomes the new maximum permissible time without activity on a DSO Session.

- If the current inactivity timer value is less than the new inactivity timeout, then the DSO Session may remain open for now. When the inactivity timer value reaches the new inactivity timeout, the client MUST then begin closing the DSO Session, as described above.

- If the current inactivity timer value is equal to the new inactivity timeout, then this DSO Session has been inactive for exactly as long as the server will permit, and now the client MUST immediately begin closing this DSO Session.

- If the current inactivity timer value is already greater than the new inactivity timeout, then this DSO Session has already been inactive for longer than the server permits, and the client MUST immediately begin closing this DSO Session.

- If the current inactivity timer value is already more than twice the new inactivity timeout, then the client is immediately considered delinquent (this DSO Session is immediately eligible to be forcibly terminated by the server) and the client MUST immediately begin closing this DSO Session. However if a server abruptly reduces the inactivity timeout in this way, then, to give the client time to close the connection gracefully before the server resorts to forcibly aborting it, the server SHOULD give the client an additional grace period of one quarter of the new inactivity timeout, or five seconds, whichever is greater.
6.1.2. Relation to EDNS(0) TCP Keepalive Option

The inactivity timeout value in the Keepalive TLV (DSO-TYPE=1) has similar intent to the EDNS(0) TCP Keepalive Option [RFC7828]. A client/server pair that supports DSO MUST NOT use the EDNS(0) TCP KeepAlive option within any message after a DSO Session has been established. Once a DSO Session has been established, if either client or server receives a DNS message over the DSO Session that contains an EDNS(0) TCP Keepalive option, this is a fatal error and the receiver of the EDNS(0) TCP Keepalive option MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately.
6.2. Retry Delay TLV

The Retry Delay TLV (DSO-TYPE=2) can be used as a Primary TLV (unacknowledged) in a server-to-client message, or as a Response Additional TLV in either direction.

The DSO-DATA for the Retry Delay TLV is as follows:

```
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| RETRY DELAY (32 bits) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

RETRY DELAY: A time value, specified as a 32-bit unsigned integer, in network (big endian) byte order, in units of milliseconds, within which the initiator MUST NOT retry this operation, or retry connecting to this server. Recommendations for the RETRY DELAY value are given in Section 5.6.1.

6.2.1. Retry Delay TLV used as a Primary TLV

When sent from server to client, the Retry Delay TLV is used as the Primary TLV in an unacknowledged message. It is used by a server to instruct a client to close the DSO Session and underlying connection, and not to reconnect for the indicated time interval.

In this case it applies to the DSO Session as a whole, and the client MUST begin closing the DSO Session, as described in Section 5.6.1. The RCODE in the message header SHOULD indicate the principal reason for the termination:

- NOERROR indicates a routine shutdown or restart.
- FORMERR indicates that the client requests are too badly malformed for the session to continue.
- SERVFAIL indicates that the server is overloaded due to resource exhaustion and needs to shed load.
- REFUSED indicates that the server has been reconfigured, and at this time it is now unable to perform one or more of the long-lived client operations that were previously being performed on this DSO Session.
- NOTAUTH indicates that the server has been reconfigured and at this time it is now unable to perform one or more of the long-lived client operations that were previously being performed on
this DSO Session because it does not have authority over the names in question (for example, a DNS Push Notification server could be reconfigured such that it is no longer accepting DNS Push Notification requests for one or more of the currently subscribed names).

This document specifies only these RCODE values for Retry Delay message. Servers sending Retry Delay messages SHOULD use one of these values. However, future circumstances may create situations where other RCODE values are appropriate in Retry Delay messages, so clients MUST be prepared to accept Retry Delay messages with any RCODE value.

In some cases, when a server sends a Retry Delay message to a client, there may be more than one reason for the server wanting to end the session. Possibly the configuration could have been changed such that some long-lived client operations can no longer be continued due to policy (REFUSED), and other long-lived client operations can no longer be performed due to the server no longer being authoritative for those names (NOTAUTH). In such cases the server MAY use any of the applicable RCODE values, or RCODE=NOERROR (routine shutdown or restart).

Note that the selection of RCODE value in a Retry Delay message is not critical, since the RCODE value is generally used only for information purposes, such as writing to a log file for future human analysis regarding the nature of the disconnection. Generally clients do not modify their behavior depending on the RCODE value. The RETRY DELAY in the message tells the client how long it should wait before attempting a new connection to this server instance.

For clients that do in some way modify their behavior depending on the RCODE value, they should treat unknown RCODE values the same as RCODE=NOERROR (routine shutdown or restart).

A Retry Delay message from server to client is an unacknowledged message; the MESSAGE ID MUST be set to zero in the outgoing message and the client MUST NOT send a response.

A client MUST NOT send a Retry Delay DSO request message or DSO unacknowledged message to a server. If a server receives a DNS request message (i.e., QR=0) where the Primary TLV is the Retry Delay TLV, this is a fatal error and the server MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately.
6.2.2. Retry Delay TLV used as a Response Additional TLV

In the case of a request that returns a nonzero RCODE value, the responder MAY append a Retry Delay TLV to the response, indicating the time interval during which the initiator SHOULD NOT attempt this operation again.

The indicated time interval during which the initiator SHOULD NOT retry applies only to the failed operation, not to the DSO Session as a whole.

6.3. Encryption Padding TLV

The Encryption Padding TLV (DSO-TYPE=3) can only be used as an Additional or Response Additional TLV. It is only applicable when the DSO Transport layer uses encryption such as TLS.

The DSO-DATA for the the Padding TLV is optional and is a variable length field containing non-specified values. A DSO-LENGTH of 0 essentially provides for 4 bytes of padding (the minimum amount).

```
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
|                      VARIABLE NUMBER OF BYTES                     |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
```

As specified for the EDNS(0) Padding Option [RFC7830] the PADDING bytes SHOULD be set to 0x00. Other values MAY be used, for example, in cases where there is a concern that the padded message could be subject to compression before encryption. PADDING bytes of any value MUST be accepted in the messages received.

The Encryption Padding TLV may be included in either a DSO request, response, or both. As specified for the EDNS(0) Padding Option [RFC7830] if a request is received with an Encryption Padding TLV, then the response MUST also include an Encryption Padding TLV.

The length of padding is intentionally not specified in this document and is a function of current best practices with respect to the type and length of data in the preceding TLVs [I-D.ietf-dprive-padding-policy].
7. Summary Highlights

This section summarizes some noteworthy highlights about various components of the DSO protocol.

7.1. QR bit and MESSAGE ID

In DSO Request Messages the QR bit is 0 and the MESSAGE ID is nonzero.

In DSO Response Messages the QR bit is 1 and the MESSAGE ID is nonzero.

In DSO Unacknowledged Messages the QR bit is 0 and the MESSAGE ID is zero.

The table below illustrates which combinations are legal and how they are interpreted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QR</th>
<th>MESSAGE ID zero</th>
<th>MESSAGE ID nonzero</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Unacknowledged Message</td>
<td>Request Message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Invalid - Fatal Error</td>
<td>Response Message</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.2. TLV Usage

The table below indicates, for each of the three TLVs defined in this document, whether they are valid in each of ten different contexts.

The first five contexts are requests or unacknowledged messages from client to server, and the corresponding responses from server back to client:

- **C-P** - Primary TLV, sent in DSO Request message, from client to server, with nonzero MESSAGE ID indicating that this request MUST generate response message.
- **C-U** - Primary TLV, sent in DSO Unacknowledged message, from client to server, with zero MESSAGE ID indicating that this request MUST NOT generate response message.
- **C-A** - Additional TLV, optionally added to request message or unacknowledged message from client to server.
- **CRP** - Response Primary TLV, included in response message sent to back the client (in response to a client "C-P" request with nonzero MESSAGE ID indicating that a response is required) where the DSO-TYPE of the Response TLV matches the DSO-TYPE of the Primary TLV in the request.
- **CRA** - Response Additional TLV, included in response message sent to back the client (in response to a client "C-P" request with nonzero MESSAGE ID indicating that a response is required) where the DSO-TYPE of the Response TLV does not match the DSO-TYPE of the Primary TLV in the request.

The second five contexts are their counterparts in the opposite direction: requests or unacknowledged messages from server to client, and the corresponding responses from client back to server.

```plaintext
+-------------------------+-------------------------+
| C-P  C-U  C-A  CRP  CRA | S-P  S-U  S-A  SRP  SRA |
| KeepAlive  |  X              X       |       X                 |
| RetryDelay |                      X  |       X                 |
| Padding    |            X         X  |            X         X  |
+-------------------------+-------------------------+
```

Note that some of the columns in this table are currently empty. The table provides a template for future TLV definitions to follow. It
is recommended that definitions of future TLVs include a similar table summarizing the contexts where the new TLV is valid.
8. IANA Considerations

8.1. DSO OPCODE Registration

The IANA is requested to record the value (tentatively) 6 for the DSO OPCODE in the DNS OPCODE Registry. DSO stands for DNS Stateful Operations.

8.2. DSO RCODE Registration

The IANA is requested to record the value (tentatively) 11 for the DSOTYPENI error code in the DNS RCODE Registry. The DSOTYPENI error code ("DSO-TYPE Not Implemented") indicates that the receiver does not implement DNS Stateful Operations, but does not implement the specific DSO-TYPE of the primary TLV in the DSO request message.

8.3. DSO Type Code Registry

The IANA is requested to create the 16-bit DSO Type Code Registry, with initial (hexadecimal) values as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0000</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>RFC-TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0001</td>
<td>KeepAlive</td>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>RFC-TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0002</td>
<td>RetryDelay</td>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>RFC-TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0003</td>
<td>EncryptionPadding</td>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>RFC-TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0004-003F</td>
<td>Unassigned, reserved for DSO session-management TLVs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0040-F7FF</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F800-FBFF</td>
<td>Reserved for experimental/local use</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FC00-FFFF</td>
<td>Reserved for future expansion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DSO Type Code zero is reserved and is not currently intended for allocation.

Registrations of new DSO Type Codes in the "Reserved for DSO session-management" range 0004-003F and the "Reserved for future expansion"...
range FC00-FFFF require publication of an IETF Standards Action
document [RFC8126].

Requests to register additional new DSO Type Codes in the
"Unassigned" range 0040-F7FF are to be recorded by IANA after Expert
Review [RFC8126]. At the time of publication of this document, the
Designated Expert for the newly created DSO Type Code registry is
[*TBD*].

DSO Type Codes in the "experimental/local" range F800-FBFF may be
used as Experimental Use or Private Use values [RFC8126] and may be
used freely for development purposes, or for other purposes within a
single site. No attempt is made to prevent multiple sites from using
the same value in different (and incompatible) ways. There is no
need for IANA to review such assignments (since IANA does not record
them) and assignments are not generally useful for broad
interoperability. It is the responsibility of the sites making use
of "experimental/local" values to ensure that no conflicts occur
within the intended scope of use.

9. Security Considerations

If this mechanism is to be used with DNS over TLS, then these
messages are subject to the same constraints as any other DNS-over-
TLS messages and MUST NOT be sent in the clear before the TLS session
is established.

The data field of the "Encryption Padding" TLV could be used as a
covert channel.

When designing new DSO TLVs, the potential for data in the TLV to be
used as a tracking identifier should be taken into consideration, and
should be avoided when not required.

When used without TLS or similar cryptographic protection, a
malicious entity maybe able to inject a malicious Retry Delay
Unacknowledged Message into the data stream, specifying an
unreasonably large RETRY DELAY, causing a denial-of-service attack
against the client.

10. Acknowledgements

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11. References

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11.2. Informative References

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DNS Stateful Operations
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Abstract

This document defines a new DNS OPCODE for DNS Stateful Operations (DSO). DSO messages communicate operations within persistent stateful sessions, using type-length-value (TLV) syntax. Three TLVs are defined that manage session timeouts, termination, and encryption padding, and a framework is defined for extensions to enable new stateful operations. This document updates RFC 1035 by adding a new DNS header opcode which has different message semantics, and a new result code. This document updates RFC 7766 by redefining a session, providing new guidance on connection re-use, and providing a new mechanism for handling session idle timeouts.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on March 31, 2019.
1. Introduction

This document specifies a mechanism for managing stateful DNS connections. DNS most commonly operates over a UDP transport, but can also operate over streaming transports; the original DNS RFC specifies DNS over TCP [RFC1035] and a profile for DNS over TLS [RFC7858] has been specified. These transports can offer persistent, long-lived sessions and therefore when using them for transporting DNS messages it is of benefit to have a mechanism that can establish parameters associated with those sessions, such as timeouts. In such situations it is also advantageous to support server-initiated messages (such as DNS Push Notifications [I-D.ietf-dnssd-push]).
The existing EDNS(0) Extension Mechanism for DNS [RFC6891] is explicitly defined to only have "per-message" semantics. While EDNS(0) has been used to signal at least one session-related parameter (edns-tcp-keepalive EDNS0 Option [RFC7828]) the result is less than optimal due to the restrictions imposed by the EDNS(0) semantics and the lack of server-initiated signalling. For example, a server cannot arbitrarily instruct a client to close a connection because the server can only send EDNS(0) options in responses to queries that contained EDNS(0) options.

This document defines a new DNS OPCODE, DSO ([TBA1], tentatively 6), for DNS Stateful Operations. DSO messages are used to communicate operations within persistent stateful sessions, expressed using type-length-value (TLV) syntax. This document defines an initial set of three TLVs, used to manage session timeouts, termination, and encryption padding.

All three TLVs defined here are mandatory for all implementations of DSO. Further TLVs may be defined in additional specifications.

DSO messages may or may not be acknowledged; this is signalled by providing a non-zero message ID for messages that must be acknowledged (DSO request messages) and a zero message ID for messages that are not to be acknowledged (DSO unidirectional messages), and is also specified in the definition of a particular DSO message type. Messages are pipelined; answers may appear out of order when more than one answer is pending.

The format for DSO messages (Section 5.4) differs somewhat from the traditional DNS message format used for standard queries and responses. The standard twelve-byte header is used, but the four count fields (QDCOUNT, ANCOUNT, NSCOUNT, ARCOUNT) are set to zero and accordingly their corresponding sections are not present.

The actual data pertaining to DNS Stateful Operations (expressed in TLV syntax) is appended to the end of the DNS message header. Just as in traditional DNS over TCP [RFC1035] [RFC7766] the stream protocol carrying DSO messages (which are just another kind of DNS message) frames them by putting a 16-bit message length at the start, so the length of the DSO message is determined from that length, rather than from any of the DNS header counts.

When displayed using packet analyzer tools that have not been updated to recognize the DSO format, this will result in the DSO data being displayed as unknown additional data after the end of the DNS message.
This new format has distinct advantages over an RR-based format because it is more explicit and more compact. Each TLV definition is specific to its use case, and as a result contains no redundant or overloaded fields. Importantly, it completely avoids conflating DNS Stateful Operations in any way with normal DNS operations or with existing EDNS(0)-based functionality. A goal of this approach is to avoid the operational issues that have befallen EDNS(0), particularly relating to middlebox behaviour (see for example [I-D.ietf-dnsop-no-response-issue] sections 3.2 and 4).

With EDNS(0), multiple options may be packed into a single OPT pseudo-RR, and there is no generalized mechanism for a client to be able to tell whether a server has processed or otherwise acted upon each individual option within the combined OPT pseudo-RR. The specifications for each individual option need to define how each different option is to be acknowledged, if necessary.

In contrast to EDNS(0), with DSO there is no compelling motivation to pack multiple operations into a single message for efficiency reasons, because DSO always operates using a connection-oriented transport protocol. Each DSO operation is communicated in its own separate DNS message, and the transport protocol can take care of packing several DNS messages into a single IP packet if appropriate. For example, TCP can pack multiple small DNS messages into a single TCP segment. This simplification allows for clearer semantics. Each DSO request message communicates just one primary operation, and the RCODE in the corresponding response message indicates the success or failure of that operation.

2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
3. Terminology

DSO: DNS Stateful Operations.

connection: a bidirectional byte (or message) stream, where the bytes (or messages) are delivered reliably and in-order, such as provided by using DNS over TCP [RFC1035] [RFC7766] or DNS over TLS [RFC7858].

session: The unqualified term "session" in the context of this document refers to a persistent network connection between two endpoints which allows for the exchange of DNS messages over a connection where either end of the connection can send messages to the other end. (The term has no relationship to the "session layer" of the OSI "seven-layer model".)

DSO Session: a session established between two endpoints that acknowledge persistent DNS state via the exchange of DSO messages over the connection. This is distinct from a DNS-over-TCP session as described in the previous specification for DNS over TCP [RFC7766].

close gracefully: a normal session shutdown, where the client closes the TCP connection to the server using a graceful close, such that no data is lost (e.g., using TCP FIN, see Section 5.3).

forcibly abort: a session shutdown as a result of a fatal error, where the TCP connection is unilaterally aborted without regard for data loss (e.g., using TCP RST, see Section 5.3).

server: the software with a listening socket, awaiting incoming connection requests, in the usual DNS sense.

client: the software which initiates a connection to the server’s listening socket, in the usual DNS sense.

initiator: the software which sends a DSO request message or a DSO unidirectional message during a DSO session. Either a client or server can be an initiator.

responder: the software which receives a DSO request message or a DSO unidirectional message during a DSO session. Either a client or server can be a responder.

sender: the software which is sending a DNS message, a DSO message, a DNS response, or a DSO response.
receiver: the software which is receiving a DNS message, a DSO message, a DNS response, or a DSO response.

service instance: a specific instance of server software running on a specific host (Section 9.1).

long-lived operation: a long-lived operation is an outstanding operation on a DSO session where either the client or server, acting as initiator, has requested that the responder send new information regarding the request, as it becomes available.

Fast Open message: A TCP SYN packet that begins a DSO connection and contains early data ([RFC8446] section 2.3). Fast Open is only permitted when using TLS encapsulation: a TCP SYN message that does not use TLS encapsulation but contains early data is not permitted.

DNS message: any DNS message, including DNS queries, response, updates, DSO messages, etc.

DNS request message: any DNS message where the QR bit is 0.

DNS response message: any DNS message where the QR bit is 1.

DSO message: a DSO request message, DSO unidirectional message, or a DSO response to a DSO request message. If the QR bit is 1 in a DSO message, it is a DSO response message. If the QR bit is 0 in a DSO message, it is a DSO request message or DSO unidirectional message, as determined by the specification of its primary TLV.

DSO response message: a response to a DSO request message.

DSO request message: a DSO message that requires a response.

DSO unidirectional message: a DSO message that does not require and cannot induce a response.

Primary TLV: The first TLV in a DSO message or DSO response; in the DSO message this determines the nature of the operation being performed.

Additional TLV: Any TLVs in a DSO message response that follow the primary TLV.

Response Primary TLV: The (optional) first TLV in a DSO response.

Response Additional TLV: Any TLVs in a DSO response that follow the (optional) Response Primary TLV.
inactivity timer: the time since the most recent non-keepalive DNS message was sent or received. (see Section 6.4)

keepalive timer: the time since the most recent DNS message was sent or received. (see Section 6.5)

session timeouts: the inactivity timer and the keepalive timer.

inactivity timeout: the maximum value that the inactivity timer can have before the connection is gracefully closed.

keepalive interval: the maximum value that the keepalive timer can have before the client is required to send a keepalive. (see Section 7.1)

resetting a timer: setting the timer value to zero and restarting the timer.

clearing a timer: setting the timer value to zero but not restarting the timer.
4. Applicability

DNS Stateful Operations are applicable to several known use cases and are only applicable on transports that are capable of supporting a DSO Session.

4.1. Use Cases

There are several use cases for DNS Stateful operations that can be described here.

4.1.1. Session Management

Firstly, establishing session parameters such as server-defined timeouts is of great use in the general management of persistent connections. For example, using DSO sessions for stub-to-recursive DNS-over-TLS [RFC7858] is more flexible for both the client and the server than attempting to manage sessions using just the edns-tcp-keepalive EDNS0 Option [RFC7828]. The simple set of TLVs defined in this document is sufficient to greatly enhance connection management for this use case.

4.1.2. Long-lived Subscriptions

Secondly, DNS-SD [RFC6763] has evolved into a naturally session-based mechanism where, for example, long-lived subscriptions lend themselves to ‘push’ mechanisms as opposed to polling. Long-lived stateful connections and server-initiated messages align with this use case [I-D.ietf-dnssd-push].

A general use case is that DNS traffic is often bursty but session establishment can be expensive. One challenge with long-lived connections is to maintain sufficient traffic to maintain NAT and firewall state. To mitigate this issue this document introduces a new concept for the DNS, that is DSO "Keepalive traffic". This traffic carries no DNS data and is not considered ‘activity’ in the classic DNS sense, but serves to maintain state in middleboxes, and to assure client and server that they still have connectivity to each other.
4.2. Applicable Transports

DNS Stateful Operations are applicable in cases where it is useful to maintain an open session between a DNS client and server, where the transport allows such a session to be maintained, and where the transport guarantees in-order delivery of messages, on which DSO depends. Examples of transports that can support DNS Stateful Operations are DNS-over-TCP [RFC1035] [RFC7766] and DNS-over-TLS [RFC7858].

Note that in the case of DNS over TLS, there is no mechanism for upgrading from DNS-over-TCP to DNS-over-TLS mid-connection (see [RFC7858] section 7). A connection is either DNS-over-TCP from the start, or DNS-over-TLS from the start.

DNS Stateful Operations are not applicable for transports that cannot support clean session semantics, or that do not guarantee in-order delivery. While in principle such a transport could be constructed over UDP, the current DNS specification over UDP transport [RFC1035] does not provide in-order delivery or session semantics, and hence cannot be used. Similarly, DNS-over-HTTP [I-D.ietf-doh-dns-over-https] cannot be used because HTTP has its own mechanism for managing sessions, and this is incompatible with the mechanism specified here.

No other transports are currently defined for use with DNS Stateful Operations. Such transports can be added in the future, if they meet the requirements set out in the first paragraph of this section.
5. Protocol Details

The overall flow of DNS Stateful Operations goes through a series of phases:

Connection Establishment: A client establishes a connection to a server. (Section 4.2)

Connected but sessionless: A connection exists, but a DSO session has not been established. DNS messages can be sent from the client to server, and DNS responses can be sent from servers to clients. In this state a client that wishes to use DSO can attempt to establish a DSO session (Section 5.1). Standard DNS-over-TCP inactivity timeout handling is in effect [RFC7766] (see Section 7.1.2).

DSO Session Establishment in Progress: A client has sent a DSO request, but has not yet received a DSO response. In this phase, the client may send more DSO requests and more DNS requests, but MUST NOT send DSO unidirectional messages (Section 5.1).

DSO Session Establishment Failed: The attempt to establish the DSO session did not succeed. At this point, the client is permitted to continue operating without a DSO session (Connected but Sessionless) but does not send further DSO messages (Section 5.1).

DSO Session Established: Both client and server may send DSO messages and DNS messages; both may send replies in response to messages they receive (Section 5.2). The inactivity timer (Section 6.4) is active; the keepalive timer (Section 6.5) is active. Standard DNS-over-TCP inactivity timeout handling is no longer in effect [RFC7766] (see Section 7.1.2).

Server Shutdown: The server has decided to gracefully terminate the session, and has sent the client a Retry Delay message (Section 6.6.1). There may still be unprocessed messages from the client; the server will ignore these. The server will not send any further messages to the client (Section 6.6.1.1).

Client Shutdown: The client has decided to disconnect, either because it no longer needs service, the connection is inactive (Section 6.4.1), or because the server sent it a Retry Delay message (Section 6.6.1). The client closes the connection gracefully Section 5.3.

Reconnect: The client disconnected as a result of a server shutdown. The client either waits for the server-specified Retry Delay to expire (Section 6.6.2), or else contacts a different server.
instance. If the client no longer needs service, it does not reconnect.

Forcibly Abort: The client or server detected a protocol error, and further communication would have undefined behavior. The client or server forcibly aborts the connection (Section 5.3).

Abort Reconnect Wait: The client has forcibly aborted the connection, but still needs service. Or, the server forcibly aborted the connection, but the client still needs service. The client either connects to a different service instance (Section 9.1) or waits to reconnect (Section 6.6.2.1).

5.1. DSO Session Establishment

In order for a session to be established between a client and a server, the client must first establish a connection to the server, using an applicable transport (see Section 4).

In some environments it may be known in advance by external means that both client and server support DSO, and in these cases either client or server may initiate DSO messages at any time. In this case, the session is established as soon as the connection is established; this is referred to as implicit session establishment.

However, in the typical case a server will not know in advance whether a client supports DSO, so in general, unless it is known in advance by other means that a client does support DSO, a server MUST NOT initiate DSO request messages or DSO unidirectional messages until a DSO Session has been mutually established by at least one successful DSO request/response exchange initiated by the client, as described below. This is referred to as explicit session establishment.

Until a DSO session has been implicitly or explicitly established, a client MUST NOT initiate DSO unidirectional messages.

A DSO Session is established over a connection by the client sending a DSO request message, such as a DSO Keepalive request message (Section 7.1), and receiving a response, with matching MESSAGE ID, and RCODE set to NOERROR (0), indicating that the DSO request was successful.

Some DSO messages are permitted in Fast Open messages (Section 11.1). Others are not. Unidirectional messages are never permitted in Fast Open messages unless an implicit session exists.
If a server receives a Fast Open message containing a DSO message whose primary TLV is not permitted to appear in a Fast Open message, the server MUST forcibly abort the connection. If a client receives a Fast Open message containing any DSO message, and there is no implicit DSO session, the client MUST forcibly abort the connection. If a server or client receives a Fast Open message that is not a TLS 1.3 message, it MUST forcibly abort the connection.

5.1.1. Session Establishment Failure

If the response RCODE is set to NOTIMP (4), or in practice any value other than NOERROR (0) or DSOTYPENI (defined below), then the client MUST assume that the server does not implement DSO at all. In this case the client is permitted to continue sending DNS messages on that connection, but the client MUST NOT issue further DSO messages on that connection.

If the RCODE in the response is set to DSOTYPENI ("DSO-TYPE Not Implemented", [TBA2] tentatively RCODE 11) this indicates that the server does support DSO, but does not implement the DSO-TYPE of the primary TLV in this DSO request message. A server implementing DSO MUST NOT return DSOTYPENI for a DSO Keepalive request message, because the Keepalive TLV is mandatory to implement. But in the future, if a client attempts to establish a DSO Session using a response-requiring DSO request message using some newly-defined DSO-TYPE that the server does not understand, that would result in a DSOTYPENI response. If the server returns DSOTYPENI then a DSO Session is not considered established, but the client is permitted to continue sending DNS messages on the connection, including other DSO messages such as the DSO Keepalive, which may result in a successful NOERROR response, yielding the establishment of a DSO Session.

Two other possibilities exist: the server might drop the connection, or the server might send no response to the DSO message.

In the first case, the client SHOULD mark that service instance as not supporting DSO, and not attempt a DSO connection for some period of time (at least an hour) after the failed attempt. The client MAY reconnect but not use DSO, if appropriate (Section 6.6.2.2).

In the second case, the client SHOULD wait 30 seconds, after which time the server will be assumed not to support DSO. If the server doesn’t respond within 30 seconds, the client MUST forcibly abort the connection to the server, since the server’s behavior is out of spec, and hence its state is undefined. The client MAY reconnect, but not use DSO, if appropriate (Section 6.6.2.1).
5.1.2. Session Establishment Success

When the server receives a DSO request message from a client, and transmits a successful NOERROR response to that request, the server considers the DSO Session established.

When the client receives the server’s NOERROR response to its DSO request message, the client considers the DSO Session established.

Once a DSO Session has been established, either end may unilaterally send appropriate DSO messages at any time, and therefore either client or server may be the initiator of a message.

5.2. Operations After Session Establishment

Once a DSO Session has been established, clients and servers should behave as described in this specification with regard to inactivity timeouts and session termination, not as previously prescribed in the earlier specification for DNS over TCP [RFC7766].

Because a server that supports DNS Stateful Operations MUST return an RCODE of NOERROR when it receives a Keepalive TLV DSO request message, the Keepalive TLV is an ideal candidate for use in establishing a DSO session. Any other option that can only succeed when sent to a server of the desired kind is also a good candidate for use in establishing a DSO session. For clients that implement only the DSO-TYPEs defined in this base specification, sending a Keepalive TLV is the only DSO request message they have available to initiate a DSO Session. Even for clients that do implement other future DSO-TYPEs, for simplicity they MAY elect to always send an initial DSO Keepalive request message as their way of initiating a DSO Session. A future definition of a new response-requiring DSO-TYPE gives implementers the option of using that new DSO-TYPE if they wish, but does not change the fact that sending a Keepalive TLV remains a valid way of initiating a DSO Session.
5.3. Session Termination

A "DSO Session" is terminated when the underlying connection is closed. Sessions are "closed gracefully" as a result of the server closing a session because it is overloaded, the client closing the session because it is done, or the client closing the session because it is inactive. Sessions are "forcibly aborted" when either the client or server closes the connection because of a protocol error.

- Where this specification says, "close gracefully," that means sending a TLS close_notify (if TLS is in use) followed by a TCP FIN, or the equivalents for other protocols. Where this specification requires a connection to be closed gracefully, the requirement to initiate that graceful close is placed on the client, to place the burden of TCP’s TIME-WAIT state on the client rather than the server.

- Where this specification says, "forcibly abort," that means sending a TCP RST, or the equivalent for other protocols. In the BSD Sockets API this is achieved by setting the SO_LINGER option to zero before closing the socket.

5.3.1. Handling Protocol Errors

In protocol implementation there are generally two kinds of errors that software writers have to deal with. The first is situations that arise due to factors in the environment, such as temporary loss of connectivity. While undesirable, these situations do not indicate a flaw in the software, and they are situations that software should generally be able to recover from.

The second is situations that should never happen when communicating with a compliant DSO implementation. If they do happen, they indicate a serious flaw in the protocol implementation, beyond what it is reasonable to expect software to recover from. This document describes this latter form of error condition as a "fatal error" and specifies that an implementation encountering a fatal error condition "MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately".
5.4. Message Format

A DSO message begins with the standard twelve-byte DNS message header [RFC1035] with the OPCODE field set to the DSO OPCODE. However, unlike standard DNS messages, the question section, answer section, authority records section and additional records sections are not present. The corresponding count fields (QDCOUNT, ANCOUNT, NSCOUNT, ARCOUNT) MUST be set to zero on transmission.

If a DSO message is received where any of the count fields are not zero, then a FORMERR MUST be returned.
5.4.1. DNS Header Fields in DSO Messages

In a DSO unidirectional message the MESSAGE ID field MUST be set to zero. In a DSO request message the MESSAGE ID field MUST be set to a unique nonzero value, that the initiator is not currently using for any other active operation on this connection. For the purposes here, a MESSAGE ID is in use in this DSO Session if the initiator has used it in a DSO request message for which it is still awaiting a response, or if the client has used it to set up a long-lived operation that has not yet been cancelled. For example, a long-lived operation could be a Push Notification subscription [I-D.ietf-dnssd-push] or a Discovery Relay interface subscription [I-D.ietf-dnssd-mdns-relay].

Whether a message is a DSO request message or a DSO unidirectional message is determined only by the specification for the Primary TLV. An acknowledgment cannot be requested by including a nonzero message ID in a message that is required according to its primary TLV to be unidirectional. Nor can an acknowledgment be prevented by sending a message ID of zero in a message that is required to be a DSO request message according to its primary TLV. A responder that receives either such malformed message MUST treat it as a fatal error and forcibly abort the connection immediately.

In a DSO request message or DSO unidirectional message the DNS Header QR bit MUST be zero (QR=0). If the QR bit is not zero the message is not a DSO request or DSO unidirectional message.

In a DSO response message the DNS Header QR bit MUST be one (QR=1). If the QR bit is not one, the message is not a response message.

In a DSO response message (QR=1) the MESSAGE ID field MUST contain a copy of the value of the MESSAGE ID field in the DSO request message being responded to. In a DSO response message (QR=1) the MESSAGE ID field MUST NOT be zero. If a DSO response message (QR=1) is received where the MESSAGE ID is zero this is a fatal error and the recipient MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately.

The DNS Header OPCODE field holds the DSO OPCODE value.

The Z bits are currently unused in DSO messages, and in both DSO request messages and DSO responses the Z bits MUST be set to zero (0) on transmission and MUST be ignored on reception.

In a DSO request message (QR=0) the RCODE is set according to the definition of the request. For example, in a Retry Delay message (Section 6.6.1) the RCODE indicates the reason for termination. However, in most cases, except where clearly specified otherwise, in
a DSO request message (QR=0) the RCODE is set to zero on transmission, and silently ignored on reception.

The RCODE value in a response message (QR=1) may be one of the following values:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Mnemonic</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>NOERROR</td>
<td>Operation processed successfully</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>FORMERR</td>
<td>Format error</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>SERVFAIL</td>
<td>Server failed to process DSO request message due to a problem with the server</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>NOTIMP</td>
<td>DSO not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>REFUSED</td>
<td>Operation declined for policy reasons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[TBA2]</td>
<td>DSOTYPENI</td>
<td>Primary TLV’s DSO-Type is not implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Use of the above RCODEs is likely to be common in DSO but does not preclude the definition and use of other codes in future documents that make use of DSO.

If a document defining a new DSO-TYPE makes use of response codes not defined here, then that document MUST specify the specific interpretation of those RCODE values in the context of that new DSO TLV.
5.4.2. DSO Data

The standard twelve-byte DNS message header with its zero-valued count fields is followed by the DSO Data, expressed using TLV syntax, as described below in Section 5.4.3.

A DSO request message or DSO unidirectional message MUST contain at least one TLV. The first TLV in a DSO request message or DSO unidirectional message is referred to as the "Primary TLV" and determines the nature of the operation being performed, including whether it is a DSO request or a DSO unidirectional operation. In some cases it may be appropriate to include other TLVs in a DSO request message or DSO unidirectional message, such as the Encryption Padding TLV (Section 7.3), and these extra TLVs are referred to as the "Additional TLVs" and are not limited to what is defined in this document. New "Additional TLVs" may be defined in the future and those definitions will describe when their use is appropriate.

A DSO response message may contain no TLVs, or it may be specified to contain one or more TLVs appropriate to the information being communicated. This includes "Primary TLVs" and "Additional TLVs" defined in this document as well as in future TLV definitions. It may be permissible for an additional TLV to appear in a response to a primary TLV even though the specification of that primary TLV does not specify it explicitly. See Section 8.2 for more information.

A DSO response message may contain one or more TLVs with the Primary TLV DSO-TYPE the same as the Primary TLV from the corresponding DSO request message or it may contain zero or more Additional TLVs only. The MESSAGE ID field in the DNS message header is sufficient to identify the DSO request message to which this response message relates.

A DSO response message may contain one or more TLVs with DSO-TYPEs different from the Primary TLV from the corresponding DSO request message, in which case those TLV(s) are referred to as "Response Additional TLVs".

Response Primary TLV(s), if present, MUST occur first in the response message, before any Response Additional TLVs.

It is anticipated that most DSO operations will be specified to use DSO request messages, which generate corresponding DSO responses. In some specialized high-traffic use cases, it may be appropriate to specify DSO unidirectional messages. DSO unidirectional messages can be more efficient on the network, because they don't generate a stream of corresponding reply messages. Using DSO unidirectional messages can also simplify software in some cases, by removing need...
for an initiator to maintain state while it waits to receive replies it doesn’t care about. When the specification for a particular TLV states that, when used as a Primary TLV (i.e., first) in an outgoing DSO request message (i.e., QR=0), that message is to be unidirectional, the MESSAGE ID field MUST be set to zero and the receiver MUST NOT generate any response message corresponding to this DSO unidirectional message.

The previous point, that the receiver MUST NOT generate responses to DSO unidirectional messages, applies even in the case of errors. When a DSO message is received where both the QR bit and the MESSAGE ID field are zero, the receiver MUST NOT generate any response. For example, if the DSO-TYPE in the Primary TLV is unrecognized, then a DSOTYPENI error MUST NOT be returned; instead the receiver MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately.

DSO unidirectional messages MUST NOT be used "speculatively" in cases where the sender doesn’t know if the receiver supports the Primary TLV in the message, because there is no way to receive any response to indicate success or failure. DSO unidirectional messages are only appropriate in cases where the sender already knows that the receiver supports, and wishes to receive, these messages.

For example, after a client has subscribed for Push Notifications [I-D.ietf-dnssd-push], the subsequent event notifications are then sent as DSO unidirectional messages, and this is appropriate because the client initiated the message stream by virtue of its Push Notification subscription, thereby indicating its support of Push Notifications, and its desire to receive those notifications.

Similarly, after a Discovery Relay client has subscribed to receive inbound mDNS (multicast DNS, [RFC6762]) traffic from a Discovery Relay, the subsequent stream of received packets is then sent using DSO unidirectional messages, and this is appropriate because the client initiated the message stream by virtue of its Discovery Relay link subscription, thereby indicating its support of Discovery Relay, and its desire to receive inbound mDNS packets over that DSO session [I-D.ietf-dnssd-mdns-relay].
5.4.3. TLV Syntax

All TLVs, whether used as "Primary", "Additional", "Response Primary", or "Response Additional", use the same encoding syntax.

Specifications that define new TLVs must specify whether the DSO-TYPE can be used as the Primary TLV, used as an Additional TLV, or used in either context, both in the case of requests and of responses. The specification for a TLV must also state whether, when used as the Primary (i.e., first) TLV in a DSO message (i.e., QR=0), that DSO message is unidirectional or is a request message which requires a response. If the DSO message requires a response, the specification must also state which TLVs, if any, are to be included in the response. The Primary TLV may or may not be contained in the response, depending on what is specified for that TLV.

```
  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|                           DSO-TYPE                            |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|                          DSO-LENGTH                          |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|                                                               |
/                           DSO-DATA                           /
/                                                               /
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
```

DSO-TYPE: A 16-bit unsigned integer, in network (big endian) byte order, giving the DSO-TYPE of the current DSO TLV per the IANA DSO Type Code Registry.

DSO-LENGTH: A 16-bit unsigned integer, in network (big endian) byte order, giving the size in bytes of the DSO-DATA.

DSO-DATA: Type-code specific format. The generic DSO machinery treats the DSO-DATA as an opaque "blob" without attempting to interpret it. Interpretation of the meaning of the DSO-DATA for a particular DSO-TYPE is the responsibility of the software that implements that DSO-TYPE.
5.4.3.1. Request TLVs

The first TLV in a DSO request message or DSO unidirectional message is the "Primary TLV" and indicates the operation to be performed. A DSO request message or DSO unidirectional message MUST contain at least one TLV - the Primary TLV.

Immediately following the Primary TLV, a DSO request message or DSO unidirectional message MAY contain one or more "Additional TLVs", which specify additional parameters relating to the operation.

5.4.3.2. Response TLVs

Depending on the operation, a DSO response message MAY contain no TLVs, because it is simply a response to a previous DSO request message, and the MESSAGE ID in the header is sufficient to identify the DSO request in question. Or it may contain a single response TLV, with the same DSO-TYPE as the Primary TLV in the request message. Alternatively it may contain one or more TLVs of other types, or a combination of the above, as appropriate for the information that needs to be communicated. The specification for each DSO TLV determines what TLVs are required in a response to a DSO request message using that TLV.

If a DSO response is received for an operation where the specification requires that the response carry a particular TLV or TLVs, and the required TLV(s) are not present, then this is a fatal error and the recipient of the defective response message MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately.
5.4.3.3. Unrecognized TLVs

If DSO request message is received containing an unrecognized Primary TLV, with a nonzero MESSAGE ID (indicating that a response is expected), then the receiver MUST send an error response with matching MESSAGE ID, and RCODE DSOTYPENI. The error response MUST NOT contain a copy of the unrecognized Primary TLV.

If DSO unidirectional message is received containing an unrecognized Primary TLV, with a zero MESSAGE ID (indicating that no response is expected), then this is a fatal error and the recipient MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately.

If a DSO request message or DSO unidirectional message is received where the Primary TLV is recognized, containing one or more unrecognized Additional TLVs, the unrecognized Additional TLVs MUST be silently ignored, and the remainder of the message is interpreted and handled as if the unrecognized parts were not present.

Similarly, if a DSO response message is received containing one or more unrecognized TLVs, the unrecognized TLVs MUST be silently ignored, and the remainder of the message is interpreted and handled as if the unrecognized parts were not present.
5.4.4. EDNS(0) and TSIG

Since the ARCOUNT field MUST be zero, a DSO message cannot contain a valid EDNS(0) option in the additional records section. If functionality provided by current or future EDNS(0) options is desired for DSO messages, one or more new DSO TLVs need to be defined to carry the necessary information.

For example, the EDNS(0) Padding Option [RFC7830] used for security purposes is not permitted in a DSO message, so if message padding is desired for DSO messages then the Encryption Padding TLV described in Section 7.3 MUST be used.

A DSO message can’t contain a TSIG record, because a TSIG record is included in the additional section of the message, which would mean that ARCOUNT would be greater than zero. DSO messages are required to have an ARCOUNT of zero. Therefore, if use of signatures with DSO messages becomes necessary in the future, a new DSO TLV would have to be defined to perform this function.

Note however that, while DSO *messages* cannot include EDNS(0) or TSIG records, a DSO *session* is typically used to carry a whole series of DNS messages of different kinds, including DSO messages, and other DNS message types like Query [RFC1034] [RFC1035] and Update [RFC2136], and those messages can carry EDNS(0) and TSIG records.

Although messages may contain other EDNS(0) options as appropriate, this specification explicitly prohibits use of the edns-tcp-keepalive EDNS0 Option [RFC7828] in *any* messages sent on a DSO Session (because it is obsoleted by the functionality provided by the DSO Keepalive operation). If any message sent on a DSO Session contains an edns-tcp-keepalive EDNS0 Option this is a fatal error and the recipient of the defective message MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately.
5.5. Message Handling

As described above in Section 5.4.1, whether an outgoing DSO message with the QR bit in the DNS header set to zero is a DSO request or DSO unidirectional message is determined by the specification for the Primary TLV, which in turn determines whether the MESSAGE ID field in that outgoing message will be zero or nonzero.

Every DSO message with the QR bit in the DNS header set to zero and a nonzero MESSAGE ID field is a DSO request message, and MUST elicit a corresponding response, with the QR bit in the DNS header set to one and the MESSAGE ID field set to the value given in the corresponding DSO request message.

Valid DSO request messages sent by the client with a nonzero MESSAGE ID field elicit a response from the server, and valid DSO request messages sent by the server with a nonzero MESSAGE ID field elicit a response from the client.

Every DSO message with both the QR bit in the DNS header and the MESSAGE ID field set to zero is a DSO unidirectional message, and MUST NOT elicit a response.
5.5.1. Delayed Acknowledgement Management

Generally, most good TCP implementations employ a delayed acknowledgement timer to provide more efficient use of the network and better performance.

With a DSO request message, the TCP implementation waits for the application-layer client software to generate the corresponding DSO response message, which enables the TCP implementation to send a single combined IP packet containing the TCP acknowledgement, the TCP window update, and the application-generated DSO response message. This is more efficient than sending three separate IP packets.

With a DSO unidirectional message or DSO response message, there is no corresponding application-generated DSO response message, and consequently, no hint to the transport protocol about when it should send its acknowledgement and window update. Some networking APIs provide a mechanism that allows the application-layer client software to signal to the transport protocol that no response will be forthcoming (in effect it can be thought of as a zero-length "empty" write). Where available in the networking API being used, the recipient of a DSO unidirectional message or DSO response message, having parsed and interpreted the message, SHOULD then use this mechanism provided by the networking API to signal that no response for this message will be forthcoming, so that the TCP implementation can go ahead and send its acknowledgement and window update without further delay. See Section 9.5 for further discussion of why this is important.
5.5.2. MESSAGE ID Namespaces

The namespaces of 16-bit MESSAGE IDs are independent in each direction. This means it is *not* an error for both client and server to send DSO request messages at the same time as each other, using the same MESSAGE ID, in different directions. This simplification is necessary in order for the protocol to be implementable. It would be infeasible to require the client and server to coordinate with each other regarding allocation of new unique MESSAGE IDs. It is also not necessary to require the client and server to coordinate with each other regarding allocation of new unique MESSAGE IDs. The value of the 16-bit MESSAGE ID combined with the identity of the initiator (client or server) is sufficient to unambiguously identify the operation in question. This can be thought of as a 17-bit message identifier space, using message identifiers 0x00001-0x0FFFF for client-to-server DSO request messages, and message identifiers 0x10001-0x1FFFF for server-to-client DSO request messages. The least-significant 16 bits are stored explicitly in the MESSAGE ID field of the DSO message, and the most-significant bit is implicit from the direction of the message.

As described above in Section 5.4.1, an initiator MUST NOT reuse a MESSAGE ID that it already has in use for an outstanding DSO request message (unless specified otherwise by the relevant specification for the DSO-TYPE in question). At the very least, this means that a MESSAGE ID can’t be reused in a particular direction on a particular DSO Session while the initiator is waiting for a response to a previous DSO request message using that MESSAGE ID on that DSO Session (unless specified otherwise by the relevant specification for the DSO-TYPE in question), and for a long-lived operation the MESSAGE ID for the operation can’t be reused while that operation remains active.

If a client or server receives a response (QR=1) where the MESSAGE ID is zero, or is any other value that does not match the MESSAGE ID of any of its outstanding operations, this is a fatal error and the recipient MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately.

If a responder receives a DSO request message (QR=0) where the MESSAGE ID is not zero, and the responder tracks request MESSAGE IDs, and the MESSAGE ID matches the MESSAGE ID of a DSO request message it received for which a response has not yet been sent, it MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately. This behavior is required to prevent a hypothetical attack that takes advantage of undefined behavior in this case. However, if the responder does not track MESSAGE IDs in this way, no such risk exists, so tracking MESSAGE IDs just to implement this sanity check is not required.
5.5.3. Error Responses

When a DSO unidirectional message type is received (MESSAGE ID field is zero), the receiver should already be expecting this DSO message type. Section 5.4.3.3 describes the handling of unknown DSO message types. Parsing errors MUST also result in the receiver forcibly aborting the connection. When a DSO unidirectional message of an unexpected type is received, the receiver SHOULD forcibly abort the connection. Whether the connection should be forcibly aborted for other internal errors processing the DSO unidirectional message is implementation dependent, according to the severity of the error.

When a DSO request message is unsuccessful for some reason, the responder returns an error code to the initiator.

In the case of a server returning an error code to a client in response to an unsuccessful DSO request message, the server MAY choose to end the DSO Session, or MAY choose to allow the DSO Session to remain open. For error conditions that only affect the single operation in question, the server SHOULD return an error response to the client and leave the DSO Session open for further operations.

For error conditions that are likely to make all operations unsuccessful in the immediate future, the server SHOULD return an error response to the client and then end the DSO Session by sending a Retry Delay message, as described in Section 6.6.1.

Upon receiving an error response from the server, a client SHOULD NOT automatically close the DSO Session. An error relating to one particular operation on a DSO Session does not necessarily imply that all other operations on that DSO Session have also failed, or that future operations will fail. The client should assume that the server will make its own decision about whether or not to end the DSO Session, based on the server’s determination of whether the error condition pertains to this particular operation, or would also apply to any subsequent operations. If the server does not end the DSO Session by sending the client a Retry Delay message (Section 6.6.1) then the client SHOULD continue to use that DSO Session for subsequent operations.
5.6. Responder-Initiated Operation Cancellation

This document, the base specification for DNS Stateful Operations, does not itself define any long-lived operations, but it defines a framework for supporting long-lived operations, such as Push Notification subscriptions [I-D.ietf-dnssd-push] and Discovery Relay interface subscriptions [I-D.ietf-dnssd-mdns-relay].

Long-lived operations, if successful, will remain active until the initiator terminates the operation.

However, it is possible that a long-lived operation may be valid at the time it was initiated, but then a later change of circumstances may render that operation invalid. For example, a long-lived client operation may pertain to a name that the server is authoritative for, but then the server configuration is changed such that it is no longer authoritative for that name.

In such cases, instead of terminating the entire session it may be desirable for the responder to be able to cancel selectively only those operations that have become invalid.

The responder performs this selective cancellation by sending a new response message, with the MESSAGE ID field containing the MESSAGE ID of the long-lived operation that is to be terminated (that it had previously acknowledged with a NOERROR RCODE), and the RCODE field of the new response message giving the reason for cancellation.

After a response message with nonzero RCODE has been sent, that operation has been terminated from the responder’s point of view, and the responder sends no more messages relating to that operation.

After a response message with nonzero RCODE has been received by the initiator, that operation has been terminated from the initiator’s point of view, and the cancelled operation’s MESSAGE ID is now free for reuse.
6. DSO Session Lifecycle and Timers

6.1. DSO Session Initiation

A DSO Session begins as described in Section 5.1.

The client may perform as many DNS operations as it wishes using the newly created DSO Session. When the client has multiple messages to send, it SHOULD NOT wait for each response before sending the next message.

The server MUST act on messages in the order they are received, but SHOULD NOT delay sending responses to those messages as they become available in order to return them in the order the requests were received.

Section 6.2.1.1 of the DNS-over-TCP specification [RFC7766] specifies this in more detail.
6.2. DSO Session Timeouts

Two timeout values are associated with a DSO Session: the inactivity timeout, and the keepalive interval. Both values are communicated in the same TLV, the Keepalive TLV (Section 7.1).

The first timeout value, the inactivity timeout, is the maximum time for which a client may speculatively keep an inactive DSO Session open in the expectation that it may have future requests to send to that server.

The second timeout value, the keepalive interval, is the maximum permitted interval between messages if the client wishes to keep the DSO Session alive.

The two timeout values are independent. The inactivity timeout may be lower, the same, or higher than the keepalive interval, though in most cases the inactivity timeout is expected to be shorter than the keepalive interval.

A shorter inactivity timeout with a longer keepalive interval signals to the client that it should not speculatively keep an inactive DSO Session open for very long without reason, but when it does have an active reason to keep a DSO Session open, it doesn’t need to be sending an aggressive level of DSO keepalive traffic to maintain that session. An example of this would be a client that has subscribed to DNS Push notifications: in this case, the client is not sending any traffic to the server, but the session is not inactive, because there is a active request to the server to receive push notifications.

A longer inactivity timeout with a shorter keepalive interval signals to the client that it may speculatively keep an inactive DSO Session open for a long time, but to maintain that inactive DSO Session it should be sending a lot of DSO keepalive traffic. This configuration is expected to be less common.

In the usual case where the inactivity timeout is shorter than the keepalive interval, it is only when a client has a long-lived, low-traffic, operation that the keepalive interval comes into play, to ensure that a sufficient residual amount of traffic is generated to maintain NAT and firewall state and to assure client and server that they still have connectivity to each other.

On a new DSO Session, if no explicit DSO Keepalive message exchange has taken place, the default value for both timeouts is 15 seconds.

For both timeouts, lower values of the timeout result in higher network traffic, and higher CPU load on the server.
6.3. Inactive DSO Sessions

At both servers and clients, the generation or reception of any complete DNS message (including DNS requests, responses, updates, DSO messages, etc.) resets both timers for that DSO Session, with the one exception that a DSO Keepalive message resets only the keepalive timer, not the inactivity timeout timer.

In addition, for as long as the client has an outstanding operation in progress, the inactivity timer remains cleared, and an inactivity timeout cannot occur.

For short-lived DNS operations like traditional queries and updates, an operation is considered in progress for the time between request and response, typically a period of a few hundred milliseconds at most. At the client, the inactivity timer is cleared upon transmission of a request and remains cleared until reception of the corresponding response. At the server, the inactivity timer is cleared upon reception of a request and remains cleared until transmission of the corresponding response.

For long-lived DNS Stateful operations (such as a Push Notification subscription [I-D.ietf-dnssd-push] or a Discovery Relay interface subscription [I-D.ietf-dnssd-mdns-relay]), an operation is considered in progress for as long as the operation is active, i.e. until it is cancelled. This means that a DSO Session can exist, with active operations, with no messages flowing in either direction, for far longer than the inactivity timeout, and this is not an error. This is why there are two separate timers: the inactivity timeout, and the keepalive interval. Just because a DSO Session has no traffic for an extended period of time does not automatically make that DSO Session "inactive", if it has an active operation that is awaiting events.
6.4. The Inactivity Timeout

The purpose of the inactivity timeout is for the server to balance the trade off between the costs of setting up new DSO Sessions and the costs of maintaining inactive DSO Sessions. A server with abundant DSO Session capacity can offer a high inactivity timeout, to permit clients to keep a speculative DSO Session open for a long time, to save the cost of establishing a new DSO Session for future communications with that server. A server with scarce memory resources can offer a low inactivity timeout, to cause clients to promptly close DSO Sessions whenever they have no outstanding operations with that server, and then create a new DSO Session later when needed.

6.4.1. Closing Inactive DSO Sessions

When a connection’s inactivity timeout is reached the client MUST begin closing the idle connection, but a client is not required to keep an idle connection open until the inactivity timeout is reached. A client MAY close a DSO Session at any time, at the client’s discretion. If a client determines that it has no current or reasonably anticipated future need for a currently inactive DSO Session, then the client SHOULD gracefully close that connection.

If, at any time during the life of the DSO Session, the inactivity timeout value (i.e., 15 seconds by default) elapses without there being any operation active on the DSO Session, the client MUST close the connection gracefully.

If, at any time during the life of the DSO Session, twice the inactivity timeout value (i.e., 30 seconds by default), or five seconds, if twice the inactivity timeout value is less than five seconds, elapses without there being any operation active on the DSO Session, the server MUST consider the client delinquent, and MUST forcibly abort the DSO Session.

In this context, an operation being active on a DSO Session includes a query waiting for a response, an update waiting for a response, or an active long-lived operation, but not a DSO Keepalive message exchange itself. A DSO Keepalive message exchange resets only the keepalive interval timer, not the inactivity timeout timer.

If the client wishes to keep an inactive DSO Session open for longer than the default duration then it uses the DSO Keepalive message to request longer timeout values, as described in Section 7.1.
6.4.2. Values for the Inactivity Timeout

For the inactivity timeout value, lower values result in more frequent DSO Session teardown and re-establishment. Higher values result in lower traffic and lower CPU load on the server, but higher memory burden to maintain state for inactive DSO Sessions.

A server may dictate any value it chooses for the inactivity timeout (either in a response to a client-initiated request, or in a server-initiated message) including values under one second, or even zero.

An inactivity timeout of zero informs the client that it should not speculatively maintain idle connections at all, and as soon as the client has completed the operation or operations relating to this server, the client should immediately begin closing this session.

A server will forcibly abort an idle client session after twice the inactivity timeout value, or five seconds, whichever is greater. In the case of a zero inactivity timeout value, this means that if a client fails to close an idle client session then the server will forcibly abort the idle session after five seconds.

An inactivity timeout of 0xFFFFFFFF represents "infinity" and informs the client that it may keep an idle connection open as long as it wishes. Note that after granting an unlimited inactivity timeout in this way, at any point the server may revise that inactivity timeout by sending a new DSO Keepalive message dictating new Session Timeout values to the client.

The largest *finite* inactivity timeout supported by the current Keepalive TLV is 0xFFFFFFFF (2^32-2 milliseconds, approximately 49.7 days).
6.5. The Keepalive Interval

The purpose of the keepalive interval is to manage the generation of sufficient messages to maintain state in middleboxes (such as NAT gateways or firewalls) and for the client and server to periodically verify that they still have connectivity to each other. This allows them to clean up state when connectivity is lost, and to establish a new session if appropriate.

6.5.1. Keepalive Interval Expiry

If, at any time during the life of the DSO Session, the keepalive interval value (i.e., 15 seconds by default) elapses without any DNS messages being sent or received on a DSO Session, the client MUST take action to keep the DSO Session alive, by sending a DSO Keepalive message (Section 7.1). A DSO Keepalive message exchange resets only the keepalive timer, not the inactivity timer.

If a client disconnects from the network abruptly, without cleanly closing its DSO Session, perhaps leaving a long-lived operation uncanceled, the server learns of this after failing to receive the required DSO keepalive traffic from that client. If, at any time during the life of the DSO Session, twice the keepalive interval value (i.e., 30 seconds by default) elapses without any DNS messages being sent or received on a DSO Session, the server SHOULD consider the client delinquent, and SHOULD forcibly abort the DSO Session.

6.5.2. Values for the Keepalive Interval

For the keepalive interval value, lower values result in a higher volume of DSO keepalive traffic. Higher values of the keepalive interval reduce traffic and CPU load, but have minimal effect on the memory burden at the server, because clients keep a DSO Session open for the same length of time (determined by the inactivity timeout) regardless of the level of DSO keepalive traffic required.

It may be appropriate for clients and servers to select different keepalive interval values depending on the nature of the network they are on.

A corporate DNS server that knows it is serving only clients on the internal network, with no intervening NAT gateways or firewalls, can impose a higher keepalive interval, because frequent DSO keepalive traffic is not required.

A public DNS server that is serving primarily residential consumer clients, where it is likely there will be a NAT gateway on the path,
may impose a lower keepalive interval, to generate more frequent DSO keepalive traffic.

A smart client may be adaptive to its environment. A client using a private IPv4 address [RFC1918] to communicate with a DNS server at an address outside that IPv4 private address block, may conclude that there is likely to be a NAT gateway on the path, and accordingly request a lower keepalive interval.

By default it is RECOMMENDED that clients request, and servers grant, a keepalive interval of 60 minutes. This keepalive interval provides for reasonably timely detection if a client abruptly disconnects without cleanly closing the session, and is sufficient to maintain state in firewalls and NAT gateways that follow the IETF recommended Best Current Practice that the "established connection idle-timeout" used by middleboxes be at least 2 hours 4 minutes [RFC5382] [RFC7857].

Note that the lower the keepalive interval value, the higher the load on client and server. For example, a (hypothetical and unrealistic) keepalive interval value of 100 ms would result in a continuous stream of ten messages per second or more, in both directions, to keep the DSO Session alive. And, in this extreme example, a single packet loss and retransmission over a long path could introduce a momentary pause in the stream of messages of over 200 ms, long enough to cause the server to overzealously abort the connection.

Because of this concern, the server MUST NOT send a DSO Keepalive message (either a response to a client-initiated request, or a server-initiated message) with a keepalive interval value less than ten seconds. If a client receives a DSO Keepalive message specifying a keepalive interval value less than ten seconds this is a fatal error and the client MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately.

A keepalive interval value of 0xFFFFFFFF represents "infinity" and informs the client that it should generate no DSO keepalive traffic. Note that after signaling that the client should generate no DSO keepalive traffic in this way, at any point the server may revise that DSO keepalive traffic requirement by sending a new DSO Keepalive message dictating new Session Timeout values to the client.

The largest *finite* keepalive interval supported by the current Keepalive TLV is 0xFFFFFFFF (2^32-2 milliseconds, approximately 49.7 days).
6.6. Server-Initiated Session Termination

In addition to cancelling individual long-lived operations selectively (Section 5.6) there are also occasions where a server may need to terminate one or more entire sessions. An entire session may need to be terminated if the client is defective in some way, or departs from the network without closing its session. Sessions may also need to be terminated if the server becomes overloaded, or if the server is reconfigured and lacks the ability to be selective about which operations need to be cancelled.

This section discusses various reasons a session may be terminated, and the mechanisms for doing so.

In normal operation, closing a DSO Session is the client’s responsibility. The client makes the determination of when to close a DSO Session based on an evaluation of both its own needs, and the inactivity timeout value dictated by the server. A server only causes a DSO Session to be ended in the exceptional circumstances outlined below. Some of the exceptional situations in which a server may terminate a DSO Session include:

- The server application software or underlying operating system is shutting down or restarting.
- The server application software terminates unexpectedly (perhaps due to a bug that makes it crash, causing the underlying operating system to send a TCP RST).
- The server is undergoing a reconfiguration or maintenance procedure, that, due to the way the server software is implemented, requires clients to be disconnected. For example, some software is implemented such that it reads a configuration file at startup, and changing the server’s configuration entails modifying the configuration file and then killing and restarting the server software, which generally entails a loss of network connections.
- The client fails to meet its obligation to generate the required DSO keepalive traffic, or to close an inactive session by the prescribed time (twice the time interval dictated by the server, or five seconds, whichever is greater, as described in Section 6.2).
- The client sends a grossly invalid or malformed request that is indicative of a seriously defective client implementation.
- The server is over capacity and needs to shed some load.
6.6.1. Server-Initiated Retry Delay Message

In the cases described above where a server elects to terminate a DSO Session, it could do so simply by forcibly aborting the connection. However, if it did this the likely behavior of the client might be simply to treat this as a network failure and reconnect immediately, putting more burden on the server.

Therefore, to avoid this reconnection implosion, a server SHOULD instead choose to shed client load by sending a Retry Delay message, with an appropriate RCODE value informing the client of the reason the DSO Session needs to be terminated. The format of the Retry Delay TLV, and the interpretations of the various RCODE values, are described in Section 7.2. After sending a Retry Delay message, the server MUST NOT send any further messages on that DSO Session.

The server MAY randomize retry delays in situations where many retry delays are sent in quick succession, so as to avoid all the clients attempting to reconnect at once. In general, implementations should avoid using the Retry Delay message in a way that would result in many clients reconnecting at the same time, if every client attempts to reconnect at the exact time specified.

Upon receipt of a Retry Delay message from the server, the client MUST make note of the reconnect delay for this server, and then immediately close the connection gracefully.

After sending a Retry Delay message the server SHOULD allow the client five seconds to close the connection, and if the client has not closed the connection after five seconds then the server SHOULD forcibly abort the connection.

A Retry Delay message MUST NOT be initiated by a client. If a server receives a Retry Delay message this is a fatal error and the server MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately.

6.6.1.1. Outstanding Operations

At the instant a server chooses to initiate a Retry Delay message there may be DNS requests already in flight from client to server on this DSO Session, which will arrive at the server after its Retry Delay message has been sent. The server MUST silently ignore such incoming requests, and MUST NOT generate any response messages for them. When the Retry Delay message from the server arrives at the client, the client will determine that any DNS requests it previously sent on this DSO Session, that have not yet received a response, now will certainly not be receiving any response. Such requests should
be considered failed, and should be retried at a later time, as appropriate.

In the case where some, but not all, of the existing operations on a DSO Session have become invalid (perhaps because the server has been reconfigured and is no longer authoritative for some of the names), but the server is terminating all affected DSO Sessions en masse by sending them all a Retry Delay message, the reconnect delay MAY be zero, indicating that the clients SHOULD immediately attempt to re-establish operations.

It is likely that some of the attempts will be successful and some will not, depending on the nature of the reconfiguration.

In the case where a server is terminating a large number of DSO Sessions at once (e.g., if the system is restarting) and the server doesn’t want to be inundated with a flood of simultaneous retries, it SHOULD send different reconnect delay values to each client. These adjustments MAY be selected randomly, pseudorandomly, or deterministically (e.g., incrementing the time value by one tenth of a second for each successive client, yielding a post-restart reconnection rate of ten clients per second).

6.6.2. Client Reconnection

After a DSO Session is ended by the server (either by sending the client a Retry Delay message, or by forcibly aborting the underlying transport connection) the client SHOULD try to reconnect, to that service instance, or to another suitable service instance, if more than one is available. If reconnecting to the same service instance, the client MUST respect the indicated delay, if available, before attempting to reconnect. Clients should not attempt to randomize the delay; the server will randomly jitter the retry delay values it sends to each client if this behavior is desired.

If the service instance will only be out of service for a short maintenance period, it should use a value a little longer that the expected maintenance window. It should not default to a very large delay value, or clients may not attempt to reconnect after it resumes service.

If a particular service instance does not want a client to reconnect ever (perhaps the service instance is being de-commissioned), it SHOULD set the retry delay to the maximum value 0xFFFFFFFF (2^32-1 milliseconds, approximately 49.7 days). It is not possible to instruct a client to stay away for longer than 49.7 days. If, after 49.7 days, the DNS or other configuration information still indicates that this is the valid service instance for a particular service,
then clients MAY attempt to reconnect. In reality, if a client is
rebooted or otherwise lose state, it may well attempt to reconnect
before 49.7 days elapses, for as long as the DNS or other
configuration information continues to indicate that this is the
service instance the client should use.

6.6.2.1. Reconnecting After a Forcible Abort

If a connection was forcibly aborted by the client, the client SHOULD
mark that service instance as not supporting DSO. The client MAY
reconnect but not attempt to use DSO, or may connect to a different
service instance, if applicable.

6.6.2.2. Reconnecting After an Unexplained Connection Drop

It is also possible for a server to forcibly terminate the
connection; in this case the client doesn’t know whether the
termination was the result of a protocol error or a network outage.
The client could determine which of the two is occurring by noticing
if a connection is repeatedly dropped by the server; if so, the
client can mark the server as not supporting DSO.

6.6.2.3. Probing for Working DSO Support

Once a server has been marked by the client as not supporting DSO,
the client SHOULD NOT attempt DSO operations on that server until
some time has elapsed. A reasonable minimum would be an hour. Since
forcibly aborted connections are the result of a software failure,
it’s not likely that the problem will be solved in the first hour
after it’s first encountered. However, by restricting the retry
interval to an hour, the client will be able to notice when the
problem has been fixed without placing an undue burden on the server.
7. Base TLVs for DNS Stateful Operations

This section describes the three base TLVs for DNS Stateful Operations: Keepalive, Retry Delay, and Encryption Padding.

7.1. Keepalive TLV

The Keepalive TLV (DSO-TYPE=1) performs two functions. Primarily it establishes the values for the Session Timeouts. Incidentally, it also resets the keepalive timer for the DSO Session, meaning that it can be used as a kind of "no-op" message for the purpose of keeping a session alive. The client will request the desired session timeout values and the server will acknowledge with the response values that it requires the client to use.

DSO messages with the Keepalive TLV as the primary TLV may appear in Fast Open messages.

The DSO-DATA for the Keepalive TLV is as follows:

```
+-----------------------------------------------+
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INACTIVITY TIMEOUT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KEEPALIVE INTERVAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
+-----------------------------------------------+
```

INACTIVITY TIMEOUT: The inactivity timeout for the current DSO Session, specified as a 32-bit unsigned integer, in network (big endian) byte order, in units of milliseconds. This is the timeout at which the client MUST begin closing an inactive DSO Session. The inactivity timeout can be any value of the server’s choosing. If the client does not gracefully close an inactive DSO Session, then after twice this interval, or five seconds, whichever is greater, the server will forcibly abort the connection.

KEEPALIVE INTERVAL: The keepalive interval for the current DSO Session, specified as a 32-bit unsigned integer, in network (big endian) byte order, in units of milliseconds. This is the interval at which a client MUST generate DSO keepalive traffic to maintain connection state. The keepalive interval MUST NOT be less than ten seconds. If the client does not generate the mandated DSO keepalive traffic, then after twice this interval the server will forcibly abort the connection. Since the minimum allowed keepalive interval is ten seconds, the minimum time at which a server will forcibly disconnect a client for failing to generate the mandated DSO keepalive traffic is twenty seconds.
The transmission or reception of DSO Keepalive messages (i.e., messages where the Keepalive TLV is the first TLV) reset only the keepalive timer, not the inactivity timer. The reason for this is that periodic DSO Keepalive messages are sent for the sole purpose of keeping a DSO Session alive, when that DSO Session has current or recent non-maintenance activity that warrants keeping that DSO Session alive. Sending DSO keepalive traffic itself is not considered a client activity; it is considered a maintenance activity that is performed in service of other client activities. If DSO keepalive traffic itself were to reset the inactivity timer, then that would create a circular livelock where keepalive traffic would be sent indefinitely to keep a DSO Session alive, where the only activity on that DSO Session would be the keepalive traffic keeping the DSO Session alive so that further keepalive traffic can be sent. For a DSO Session to be considered active, it must be carrying something more than just keepalive traffic. This is why merely sending or receiving a DSO Keepalive message does not reset the inactivity timer.

When sent by a client, the DSO Keepalive request message MUST be sent as a DSO request message, with a nonzero MESSAGE ID. If a server receives a DSO Keepalive message with a zero MESSAGE ID then this is a fatal error and the server MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately. The DSO Keepalive request message resets a DSO Session’s keepalive timer, and at the same time communicates to the server the client’s requested Session Timeout values. In a server response to a client-initiated DSO Keepalive request message, the Session Timeouts contain the server’s chosen values from this point forward in the DSO Session, which the client MUST respect. This is modeled after the DHCP protocol, where the client requests a certain lease lifetime using DHCP option 51 [RFC2132], but the server is the ultimate authority for deciding what lease lifetime is actually granted.

When a client is sending its second and subsequent DSO Keepalive request messages to the server, the client SHOULD continue to request its preferred values each time. This allows flexibility, so that if conditions change during the lifetime of a DSO Session, the server can adapt its responses to better fit the client’s needs.

Once a DSO Session is in progress (Section 5.1) a DSO Keepalive message MAY be initiated by a server. When sent by a server, the DSO Keepalive message MUST be sent as a DSO unidirectional message, with the MESSAGE ID set to zero. The client MUST NOT generate a response to a server-initiated DSO Keepalive message. If a client receives a DSO Keepalive request message with a nonzero MESSAGE ID then this is a fatal error and the client MUST forcibly abort the connection immediately. The DSO Keepalive unidirectional message from the
server resets a DSO Session’s keepalive timer, and at the same time unilaterally informs the client of the new Session Timeout values to use from this point forward in this DSO Session. No client DSO response to this unilateral declaration is required or allowed.

In DSO Keepalive response messages, the Keepalive TLV is REQUIRED and is used only as a Response Primary TLV sent as a reply to a DSO Keepalive request message from the client. A Keepalive TLV MUST NOT be added to other responses as a Response Additional TLV. If the server wishes to update a client’s Session Timeout values other than in response to a DSO Keepalive request message from the client, then it does so by sending a DSO Keepalive unidirectional message of its own, as described above.

It is not required that the Keepalive TLV be used in every DSO Session. While many DNS Stateful operations will be used in conjunction with a long-lived session state, not all DNS Stateful operations require long-lived session state, and in some cases the default 15-second value for both the inactivity timeout and keepalive interval may be perfectly appropriate. However, note that for clients that implement only the DSO-TYPEs defined in this document, a DSO Keepalive request message is the only way for a client to initiate a DSO Session.

7.1.1. Client handling of received Session Timeout values

When a client receives a response to its client-initiated DSO Keepalive message, or receives a server-initiated DSO Keepalive message, the client has then received Session Timeout values dictated by the server. The two timeout values contained in the Keepalive TLV from the server may each be higher, lower, or the same as the respective Session Timeout values the client previously had for this DSO Session.

In the case of the keepalive timer, the handling of the received value is straightforward. The act of receiving the message containing the DSO Keepalive TLV itself resets the keepalive timer, and updates the keepalive interval for the DSO Session. The new keepalive interval indicates the maximum time that may elapse before another message must be sent or received on this DSO Session, if the DSO Session is to remain alive.

In the case of the inactivity timeout, the handling of the received value is a little more subtle, though the meaning of the inactivity timeout remains as specified — it still indicates the maximum permissible time allowed without useful activity on a DSO Session. The act of receiving the message containing the Keepalive TLV does not itself reset the inactivity timer. The time elapsed since the
last useful activity on this DSO Session is unaffected by exchange of
DSO Keepalive messages. The new inactivity timeout value in the
Keepalive TLV in the received message does update the timeout
associated with the running inactivity timer; that becomes the new
maximum permissible time without activity on a DSO Session.

- If the current inactivity timer value is less than the new
  inactivity timeout, then the DSO Session may remain open for now.
  When the inactivity timer value reaches the new inactivity
  timeout, the client MUST then begin closing the DSO Session, as
described above.

- If the current inactivity timer value is equal to the new
  inactivity timeout, then this DSO Session has been inactive for
  exactly as long as the server will permit, and now the client MUST
  immediately begin closing this DSO Session.

- If the current inactivity timer value is already greater than the
  new inactivity timeout, then this DSO Session has already been
  inactive for longer than the server permits, and the client MUST
  immediately begin closing this DSO Session.

- If the current inactivity timer value is already more than twice
  the new inactivity timeout, then the client is immediately
  considered delinquent (this DSO Session is immediately eligible to
  be forcibly terminated by the server) and the client MUST
  immediately begin closing this DSO Session. However if a server
  abruptly reduces the inactivity timeout in this way, then, to give
  the client time to close the connection gracefully before the
  server resorts to forcibly aborting it, the server SHOULD give the
  client an additional grace period of one quarter of the new
  inactivity timeout, or five seconds, whichever is greater.

7.1.2. Relationship to edns-tcp-keepalive EDNS0 Option

The inactivity timeout value in the Keepalive TLV (DSO-TYPE=1) has
similar intent to the edns-tcp-keepalive EDNS0 Option [RFC7828]. A
client/server pair that supports DSO MUST NOT use the edns-tcp-
keepalive EDNS0 Option within any message after a DSO Session has
been established. A client that has sent a DSO message to establish
a session MUST NOT send an edns-tcp-keepalive EDNS0 Option from this
point on. Once a DSO Session has been established, if either client
or server receives a DNS message over the DSO Session that contains
an edns-tcp-keepalive EDNS0 Option, this is a fatal error and the
receiver of the edns-tcp-keepalive EDNS0 Option MUST forcibly abort
the connection immediately.
7.2. Retry Delay TLV

The Retry Delay TLV (DSO-TYPE=2) can be used as a Primary TLV (unidirectional) in a server-to-client message, or as a Response Additional TLV in either direction. DSO messages with a Relay Delay TLV as their primary TLV are not permitted in Fast Open messages.

The DSO-DATA for the Retry Delay TLV is as follows:

```
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  3  3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| RETRY DELAY (32 bits) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

RETRY DELAY: A time value, specified as a 32-bit unsigned integer, in network (big endian) byte order, in units of milliseconds, within which the initiator MUST NOT retry this operation, or retry connecting to this server. Recommendations for the RETRY DELAY value are given in Section 6.6.1.

7.2.1. Retry Delay TLV used as a Primary TLV

When sent from server to client, the Retry Delay TLV is used as the Primary TLV in a DSO unidirectional message. It is used by a server to instruct a client to close the DSO Session and underlying connection, and not to reconnect for the indicated time interval.

In this case it applies to the DSO Session as a whole, and the client MUST begin closing the DSO Session, as described in Section 6.6.1. The RCODE in the message header SHOULD indicate the principal reason for the termination:

- NOERROR indicates a routine shutdown or restart.
- FORMERR indicates that a client request was too badly malformed for the session to continue.
- SERVFAIL indicates that the server is overloaded due to resource exhaustion and needs to shed load.
- REFUSED indicates that the server has been reconfigured, and at this time it is now unable to perform one or more of the long-lived client operations that were previously being performed on this DSO Session.
- NOTAUTH indicates that the server has been reconfigured and at this time it is now unable to perform one or more of the long-
lived client operations that were previously being performed on
this DSO Session because it does not have authority over the names
in question (for example, a DNS Push Notification server could be
reconfigured such that it is no longer accepting DNS Push
Notification requests for one or more of the currently subscribed
names).

This document specifies only these RCODE values for the Retry Delay
message. Servers sending Retry Delay messages SHOULD use one of
these values. However, future circumstances may create situations
where other RCODE values are appropriate in Retry Delay messages, so
clients MUST be prepared to accept Retry Delay messages with any
RCODE value.

In some cases, when a server sends a Retry Delay message to a client,
there may be more than one reason for the server wanting to end the
session. Possibly the configuration could have been changed such
that some long-lived client operations can no longer be continued due
to policy (REFUSED), and other long-lived client operations can no
longer be performed due to the server no longer being authoritative
for those names (NOTAUTH). In such cases the server MAY use any of
the applicable RCODE values, or RCODE=NOERROR (routine shutdown or
restart).

Note that the selection of RCODE value in a Retry Delay message is
not critical, since the RCODE value is generally used only for
information purposes, such as writing to a log file for future human
analysis regarding the nature of the disconnection. Generally
clients do not modify their behavior depending on the RCODE value.
The RETRY DELAY in the message tells the client how long it should
wait before attempting a new connection to this service instance.

For clients that do in some way modify their behavior depending on
the RCODE value, they should treat unknown RCODE values the same as
RCODE=NOERROR (routine shutdown or restart).

A Retry Delay message from server to client is a DSO unidirectional
message; the MESSAGE ID MUST be set to zero in the outgoing message
and the client MUST NOT send a response.

A client MUST NOT send a Retry Delay DSO message to a server. If a
server receives a DSO message where the Primary TLV is the Retry
Delay TLV, this is a fatal error and the server MUST forcibly abort
the connection immediately.
7.2.2. Retry Delay TLV used as a Response Additional TLV

In the case of a DSO request message that results in a nonzero RCODE value, the responder MAY append a Retry Delay TLV to the response, indicating the time interval during which the initiator SHOULD NOT attempt this operation again.

The indicated time interval during which the initiator SHOULD NOT retry applies only to the failed operation, not to the DSO Session as a whole.
7.3. Encryption Padding TLV

The Encryption Padding TLV (DSO-TYPE=3) can only be used as an Additional or Response Additional TLV. It is only applicable when the DSO Transport layer uses encryption such as TLS.

The DSO-DATA for the Padding TLV is optional and is a variable length field containing non-specified values. A DSO-LENGTH of 0 essentially provides for 4 bytes of padding (the minimum amount).

```
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|PADDING -- VARIABLE NUMBER OF BYTES                                    |
|                                                                      |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
```

As specified for the EDNS(0) Padding Option [RFC7830] the PADDING bytes SHOULD be set to 0x00. Other values MAY be used, for example, in cases where there is a concern that the padded message could be subject to compression before encryption. PADDING bytes of any value MUST be accepted in the messages received.

The Encryption Padding TLV may be included in either a DSO request message, response, or both. As specified for the EDNS(0) Padding Option [RFC7830] if a DSO request message is received with an Encryption Padding TLV, then the DSO response MUST also include an Encryption Padding TLV.

The length of padding is intentionally not specified in this document and is a function of current best practices with respect to the type and length of data in the preceding TLVs [I-D.ietf-dprive-padding-policy].
8. Summary Highlights

This section summarizes some noteworthy highlights about various aspects of the DSO protocol.

8.1. QR bit and MESSAGE ID

In DSO Request Messages the QR bit is 0 and the MESSAGE ID is nonzero.

In DSO Response Messages the QR bit is 1 and the MESSAGE ID is nonzero.

In DSO Unidirectional Messages the QR bit is 0 and the MESSAGE ID is zero.

The table below illustrates which combinations are legal and how they are interpreted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QR</th>
<th>MESSAGE ID zero</th>
<th>MESSAGE ID nonzero</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>DSO unidirectional Message</td>
<td>DSO Request Message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Invalid - Fatal Error</td>
<td>DSO Response Message</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8.2. TLV Usage

The table below indicates, for each of the three TLVs defined in this document, whether they are valid in each of ten different contexts.

The first five contexts are DSO requests or DSO unidirectional messages from client to server, and the corresponding responses from server back to client:

- **C-P** - Primary TLV, sent in DSO Request message, from client to server, with nonzero MESSAGE ID indicating that this request MUST generate response message.
- **C-U** - Primary TLV, sent in DSO Unidirectional message, from client to server, with zero MESSAGE ID indicating that this request MUST NOT generate response message.
- **C-A** - Additional TLV, optionally added to a DSO request message or DSO unidirectional message from client to server.
- **CRP** - Response Primary TLV, included in response message sent back to the client (in response to a client "C-P" request with nonzero MESSAGE ID indicating that a response is required) where the DSO-TYPE of the Response TLV matches the DSO-TYPE of the Primary TLV in the request.
- **CRA** - Response Additional TLV, included in response message sent back to the client (in response to a client "C-P" request with nonzero MESSAGE ID indicating that a response is required) where the DSO-TYPE of the Response TLV does not match the DSO-TYPE of the Primary TLV in the request.

The second five contexts are their counterparts in the opposite direction: DSO requests or DSO unidirectional messages from server to client, and the corresponding responses from client back to server.

- **S-P** - Primary TLV, sent in DSO Request message, from server to client, with nonzero MESSAGE ID indicating that this request MUST generate response message.
- **S-U** - Primary TLV, sent in DSO Unidirectional message, from server to client, with zero MESSAGE ID indicating that this request MUST NOT generate response message.
- **S-A** - Additional TLV, optionally added to a DSO request message or DSO unidirectional message from server to client.
- SRP - Response Primary TLV, included in response message sent back to the server (in response to a server "S-P" request with nonzero MESSAGE ID indicating that a response is required) where the DSO-TYPE of the Response TLV matches the DSO-TYPE of the Primary TLV in the request.

- SRA - Response Additional TLV, included in response message sent back to the server (in response to a server "S-P" request with nonzero MESSAGE ID indicating that a response is required) where the DSO-TYPE of the Response TLV does not match the DSO-TYPE of the Primary TLV in the request.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>C-P</th>
<th>C-U</th>
<th>C-A</th>
<th>CRP</th>
<th>CRA</th>
<th>S-P</th>
<th>S-U</th>
<th>S-A</th>
<th>SRP</th>
<th>SRA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KeepAlive</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RetryDelay</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Padding</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that some of the columns in this table are currently empty. The table provides a template for future TLV definitions to follow. It is recommended that definitions of future TLVs include a similar table summarizing the contexts where the new TLV is valid.
9. Additional Considerations

9.1. Service Instances

We use the term service instance to refer to software running on a host which can receive connections on some set of IP address and port tuples. What makes the software an instance is that regardless of which of these tuples the client uses to connect to it, the client is connected to the same software, running on the same node (but see Section 9.2), and will receive the same answers and the same keying information.

Service instances are identified from the perspective of the client. If the client is configured with IP addresses and port number tuples, it has no way to tell if the service offered at one tuple is the same server that is listening on a different tuple. So in this case, the client treats each such tuple as if it references a separate service instance.

In some cases a client is configured with a hostname and a port number (either implicitly, where the port number is omitted and assumed, or explicitly, as in the case of DNS SRV records). In these cases, the (hostname, port) tuple uniquely identifies the service instance (hostname comparisons are case-insensitive [RFC1034]).

It is possible that two hostnames might point to some common IP addresses; this is a configuration error which the client is not obliged to detect. The effect of this could be that after being told to disconnect, the client might reconnect to the same server because it is represented as a different service instance.

Implementations SHOULD NOT resolve hostnames and then perform matching of IP address(es) in order to evaluate whether two entities should be determined to be the "same service instance".
9.2. Anycast Considerations

When an anycast service is configured on a particular IP address and port, it must be the case that although there is more than one physical server responding on that IP address, each such server can be treated as equivalent. What we mean by "equivalent" here is that both servers can provide the same service and, where appropriate, the same authentication information, such as PKI certificates, when establishing connections.

In principle, anycast servers could maintain sufficient state that they can both handle packets in the same TCP connection. In order for this to work with DSO, they would need to also share DSO state. It is unlikely that this can be done successfully, however, so we recommend that each anycast server instance maintain its own session state.

If a change in network topology causes packets in a particular TCP connection to be sent to an anycast server instance that does not know about the connection, the new server will automatically terminate the connection with a TCP reset, since it will have no record of the connection, and then the client can reconnect or stop using the connection, as appropriate.

If after the connection is re-established, the client’s assumption that it is connected to the same service is violated in some way, that would be considered to be incorrect behavior in this context. It is however out of the possible scope for this specification to make specific recommendations in this regard; that would be up to follow-on documents that describe specific uses of DNS stateful operations.
9.3. Connection Sharing

As previously specified for DNS over TCP [RFC7766]:

To mitigate the risk of unintentional server overload, DNS clients MUST take care to minimize the number of concurrent TCP connections made to any individual server. It is RECOMMENDED that for any given client/server interaction there SHOULD be no more than one connection for regular queries, one for zone transfers, and one for each protocol that is being used on top of TCP (for example, if the resolver was using TLS). However, it is noted that certain primary/secondary configurations with many busy zones might need to use more than one TCP connection for zone transfers for operational reasons (for example, to support concurrent transfers of multiple zones).

A single server may support multiple services, including DNS Updates [RFC2136], DNS Push Notifications [I-D.ietf-dnssd-push], and other services, for one or more DNS zones. When a client discovers that the target server for several different operations is the same service instance (see Section 9.1), the client SHOULD use a single shared DSO Session for all those operations.

This requirement has two benefits. First, it reduces unnecessary connection load on the DNS server. Second, it avoids paying the TCP slow start penalty when making subsequent connections to the same server.

However, server implementers and operators should be aware that connection sharing may not be possible in all cases. A single host device may be home to multiple independent client software instances that don’t coordinate with each other. Similarly, multiple independent client devices behind the same NAT gateway will also typically appear to the DNS server as different source ports on the same client IP address. Because of these constraints, a DNS server MUST be prepared to accept multiple connections from different source ports on the same client IP address.
9.4. Operational Considerations for Middlebox

Where an application-layer middlebox (e.g., a DNS proxy, forwarder, or session multiplexer) is in the path, care must be taken to avoid a configuration in which DSO traffic is mis-handled. The simplest way to avoid such problems is to avoid using middleboxes. When this is not possible, middleboxes should be evaluated to make sure that they behave correctly.

Correct behavior for middleboxes consists of one of:

- The middlebox does not forward DSO messages, and responds to DSO messages with a response code other than NOERROR or DSOTYPENI.
- The middlebox acts as a DSO server and follows this specification in establishing connections.
- There is a 1:1 correspondence between incoming and outgoing connections, such that when a connection is established to the middlebox, it is guaranteed that exactly one corresponding connection will be established from the middlebox to some DNS resolver, and all incoming messages will be forwarded without modification or reordering. An example of this would be a NAT forwarder or TCP connection optimizer (e.g. for a high-latency connection such as a geosynchronous satellite link).

Middleboxes that do not meet one of the above criteria are very likely to fail in unexpected and difficult-to-diagnose ways. For example, a DNS load balancer might unbundle DNS messages from the incoming TCP stream and forward each message from the stream to a different DNS server. If such a load balancer is in use, and the DNS servers it points implement DSO and are configured to enable DSO, DSO session establishment will succeed, but no coherent session will exist between the client and the server. If such a load balancer is pointed at a DNS server that does not implement DSO or is configured not to allow DSO, no such problem will exist, but such a configuration risks unexpected failure if new server software is installed which does implement DSO.

It is of course possible to implement a middlebox that properly supports DSO. It is even possible to implement one that implements DSO with long-lived operations. This can be done either by maintaining a 1:1 correspondence between incoming and outgoing connections, as mentioned above, or by terminating incoming sessions at the middlebox, but maintaining state in the middlebox about any long-lived that are requested. Specifying this in detail is beyond the scope of this document.
9.5. TCP Delayed Acknowledgement Considerations

Most modern implementations of the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) include a feature called "Delayed Acknowledgement" [RFC1122].

Without this feature, TCP can be very wasteful on the network. For illustration, consider a simple example like remote login, using a very simple TCP implementation that lacks delayed acks. When the user types a keystroke, a data packet is sent. When the data packet arrives at the server, the simple TCP implementation sends an immediate acknowledgement. Mere milliseconds later, the server process reads the one byte of keystroke data, and consequently the simple TCP implementation sends an immediate window update. Mere milliseconds later, the server process generates the character echo, and sends this data back in reply. The simple TCP implementation then sends this data packet immediately too. In this case, this simple TCP implementation sends a burst of three packets almost instantaneously (ack, window update, data).

Clearly it would be more efficient if the TCP implementation were to combine the three separate packets into one, and this is what the delayed ack feature enables.

With delayed ack, the TCP implementation waits after receiving a data packet, typically for 200 ms, and then send its ack if (a) more data packet(s) arrive (b) the receiving process generates some reply data, or (c) 200 ms elapses without either of the above occurring.

With delayed ack, remote login becomes much more efficient, generating just one packet instead of three for each character echo.

The logic of delayed ack is that the 200 ms delay cannot do any significant harm. If something at the other end were waiting for something, then the receiving process should generate the reply that the thing at the end is waiting for, and TCP will then immediately send that reply (and the ack and window update). And if the receiving process does not in fact generate any reply for this particular message, then by definition the thing at the other end cannot be waiting for anything, so the 200 ms delay is harmless.

This assumption may be true, unless the sender is using Nagle’s algorithm, a similar efficiency feature, created to protect the network from poorly written client software that performs many rapid small writes in succession. Nagle’s algorithm allows these small writes to be combined into larger, less wasteful packets.
Unfortunately, Nagle’s algorithm and delayed ack, two valuable efficiency features, can interact badly with each other when used together [NagleDA].

DSO request messages elicit responses; DSO unidirectional messages and DSO response messages do not.

For DSO request messages, which do elicit responses, Nagle’s algorithm and delayed ack work as intended.

For DSO messages that do not elicit responses, the delayed ack mechanism causes the ack to be delayed by 200 ms. The 200 ms delay on the ack can in turn cause Nagle’s algorithm to prevent the sender from sending any more data for 200 ms until the awaited ack arrives. On an enterprise GigE backbone with sub-millisecond round-trip times, a 200 ms delay is enormous in comparison.

When this issues is raised, there are two solutions that are often offered, neither of them ideal:

1. Disable delayed ack. For DSO messages that elicit no response, removing delayed ack avoids the needless 200 ms delay, and sends back an immediate ack, which tells Nagle’s algorithm that it should immediately grant the sender permission to send its next packet. Unfortunately, for DSO messages that *do* elicit a response, removing delayed ack removes the efficiency gains of combining acks with data, and the responder will now send two or three packets instead of one.

2. Disable Nagle’s algorithm. When acks are delayed by the delayed ack algorithm, removing Nagle’s algorithm prevents the sender from being blocked from sending its next small packet immediately. Unfortunately, on a network with a higher round-trip time, removing Nagle’s algorithm removes the efficiency gains of combining multiple small packets into fewer larger ones, with the goal of limiting the number of small packets in flight at any one time.

For DSO messages that elicit a response, delayed ack and Nagle’s algorithm do the right thing.

The problem here is that with DSO messages that elicit no response, the TCP implementation is stuck waiting, unsure if a response is about to be generated, or whether the TCP implementation should go ahead and send an ack and window update.

The solution is networking APIs that allow the receiver to inform the TCP implementation that a received message has been read, processed,
and no response for this message will be generated. TCP can then stop waiting for a response that will never come, and immediately go ahead and send an ack and window update.

For implementations of DSO, disabling delayed ack is NOT RECOMMENDED, because of the harm this can do to the network.

For implementations of DSO, disabling Nagle’s algorithm is NOT RECOMMENDED, because of the harm this can do to the network.

At the time that this document is being prepared for publication, it is known that at least one TCP implementation provides the ability for the recipient of a TCP message to signal that it is not going to send a response, and hence the delayed ack mechanism can stop waiting. Implementations on operating systems where this feature is available SHOULD make use of it.
10. IANA Considerations

10.1. DSO OPCODE Registration

The IANA is requested to record the value [TBA1] (tentatively 6) for the DSO OPCODE in the DNS OPCODE Registry. DSO stands for DNS Stateful Operations.

10.2. DSO RCODE Registration

The IANA is requested to record the value [TBA2] (tentatively 11) for the DSOTYPENI error code in the DNS RCODE Registry. The DSOTYPENI error code ("DSO-TYPE Not Implemented") indicates that the receiver does implement DNS Stateful Operations, but does not implement the specific DSO-TYPE of the primary TLV in the DSO request message.

10.3. DSO Type Code Registry

The IANA is requested to create the 16-bit DSO Type Code Registry, with initial (hexadecimal) values as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Fast</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0000</td>
<td>Reserved</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>RFC-TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0001</td>
<td>KeepAlive</td>
<td>OK</td>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>RFC-TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0002</td>
<td>RetryDelay</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>RFC-TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0003</td>
<td>EncryptionPadding</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>RFC-TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0004-003F</td>
<td>Unassigned, reserved for DSO session-management TLVs</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>RFC-TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0040-F7FF</td>
<td>Unassigned</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F800-FBFF</td>
<td>Experimental/local use</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FC00-FFFF</td>
<td>Reserved for future expansion</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The meanings of the fields are as follows:

Type: the 16-bit DSO type code
Name: the human-readable name of the TLV

Fast Open: If OK, this TLV may be sent in a Fast Open (TLS 0-RTT) ([RFC8446] Section 2.3) message. If NA, the TLV may appear as a secondary TLV in a DSO message that is included in a Fast Open message.

Status: IETF Document status (or "External" if not documented in an IETF document.

Reference: A stable reference to the document in which this TLV is defined.

DSO Type Code zero is reserved and is not currently intended for allocation.

Registrations of new DSO Type Codes in the "Reserved for DSO session-management" range 0004-003F and the "Reserved for future expansion" range FC00-FFFF require publication of an IETF Standards Action document [RFC8126].

Any document defining a new TLV which lists a value of "OK" in the Fast Open or 0-RTT column must include a threat analysis for the use of the TLV in the case of TCP Fast Open and in the case of TLS 0-RTT. See Section 11.1 for details.

Requests to register additional new DSO Type Codes in the "Unassigned" range 0040-F7FF are to be recorded by IANA after Expert Review [RFC8126]. The expert review should validate that the requested type code is specified in a way that conforms to this specification, and that the intended use for the code would not be addressed with an experimental/local assignment.

DSO Type Codes in the "experimental/local" range F800-FBFF may be used as Experimental Use or Private Use values [RFC8126] and may be used freely for development purposes, or for other purposes within a single site. No attempt is made to prevent multiple sites from using the same value in different (and incompatible) ways. There is no need for IANA to review such assignments (since IANA does not record them) and assignments are not generally useful for broad interoperability. It is the responsibility of the sites making use of "experimental/local" values to ensure that no conflicts occur within the intended scope of use.
11. Security Considerations

If this mechanism is to be used with DNS over TLS, then these messages are subject to the same constraints as any other DNS-over-TLS messages and MUST NOT be sent in the clear before the TLS session is established.

The data field of the "Encryption Padding" TLV could be used as a covert channel.

When designing new DSO TLVs, the potential for data in the TLV to be used as a tracking identifier should be taken into consideration, and should be avoided when not required.

When used without TLS or similar cryptographic protection, a malicious entity maybe able to inject a malicious unidirectional DSO Retry Delay Message into the data stream, specifying an unreasonably large RETRY DELAY, causing a denial-of-service attack against the client.

The establishment of DSO sessions has an impact on the number of open TCP connections on a DNS server. Additional resources may be used on the server as a result. However, because the server can limit the number of DSO sessions established and can also close existing DSO sessions as needed, denial of service or resource exhaustion should not be a concern.

11.1. TCP Fast Open and TLS 0-RTT Considerations

DSO permits zero round-trip operation using TCP Fast Open [RFC7413] with TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] 0-RTT to reduce or eliminate round trips in session establishment.

A DSO message may or may not be permitted to be sent in a Fast Open message. The definition for each TLV that can be used as a primary TLV is required to state whether or not that TLV is permitted in Fast Open messages. Only response-requiring messages are ever permitted in Fast Open messages, and only clients are permitted to send any DSO message in a Fast Open message, unless there is an implicit session (see Section 5.1).

For DSO messages that are permitted in Fast Open messages, a client MAY include one or more such messages messages in a Fast Open message without having to wait for a DSO response to the first DSO request message to confirm successful establishment of a DSO session.
However, unless there is an implicit session, a client MUST NOT send DSO unidirectional messages until after a DSO Session has been mutually established.

Similarly, unless there is an implicit session, a server MUST NOT send DSO request messages until it has received a response-requiring DSO request message from a client and transmitted a successful NOERROR response for that request.

Caution must be taken to ensure that DSO messages sent before the first round-trip is completed are idempotent, or are otherwise immune to any problems that could be result from the inadvertent replay that can occur with zero round-trip operation.

It would be possible to add a TLV that requires the server to do some significant work, and send that to the server as initial data in a TCP SYN packet. A flood of such packets could be used as a DoS attack on the server. None of the TLVs defined here have this property.

If a new TLV is specified that does have this property, that TLV must be specified as not permitted in 0-RTT messages. This prevents work from being done until a round-trip has occurred from the server to the client to verify that the source address of the packet is reachable.

Documents that define new TLVs must state whether each new TLV is permitted for use with TCP Fast Open and 0-RTT. Such documents must include a threat analysis in the security considerations section for each TLV defined in the document that is permitted to be used for TCP Fast Open and 0-RTT. This threat analysis should be done based on the advice given in [RFC8446] Section 2.3, 8 and Appendix E.5.

12. Acknowledgements

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13. References

13.1. Normative References

13.2. Informative References

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[I-D.ietf-dnssd-mdns-relay]

[I-D.ietf-dnssd-push]

[I-D.ietf-doh-dns-over-https]

[I-D.ietf-dprive-padding-policy]


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Discovery Proxy for Multicast DNS-Based Service Discovery
draft-ietf-dnssd-hybrid-08

Abstract
This document specifies a network proxy that uses Multicast DNS to automatically populate the wide-area unicast Domain Name System namespace with records describing devices and services found on the local link.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction .................................................. 3
2. Operational Analogy ........................................... 6
3. Conventions and Terminology Used in this Document .......... 7
4. Compatibility Considerations .................................. 7
5. Discovery Proxy Operation ..................................... 8
   5.1. Delegated Subdomain for Service Discovery Records .... 9
   5.2. Domain Enumeration ....................................... 11
   5.2.1. Domain Enumeration via Unicast Queries ............... 11
   5.2.2. Domain Enumeration via Multicast Queries .......... 13
   5.3. Delegated Subdomain for LDH Host Names ............... 14
   5.4. Delegated Subdomain for Reverse Mapping ............... 16
   5.5. Data Translation ......................................... 18
   5.5.1. DNS TTL limiting ...................................... 18
   5.5.2. Suppressing Unusable Records ......................... 19
   5.5.3. NSEC and NSEC3 queries ................................ 20
   5.5.4. No Text Encoding Translation ......................... 20
   5.5.5. Application-Specific Data Translation ............... 21
   5.6. Answer Aggregation ....................................... 23
6. Administrative DNS Records ................................... 26
   6.1. DNS SOA (Start of Authority) Record ..................... 26
   6.2. DNS NS Records ........................................... 27
   6.3. DNS SRV Records .......................................... 27
7. DNSSEC Considerations ......................................... 28
   7.1. On-line signing only ...................................... 28
   7.2. NSEC and NSEC3 Records .................................. 28
8. IPv6 Considerations ........................................... 29
9. Security Considerations ....................................... 30
   9.1. Authenticity .............................................. 30
   9.2. Privacy ................................................... 30
   9.3. Denial of Service ........................................ 30
10. IANA Considerations .......................................... 31
11. Acknowledgments .............................................. 31
12. References .................................................... 32
   12.1. Normative References .................................... 32
   12.2. Informative References .................................. 33
Appendix A. Implementation Status ................................ 36
   A.1. Already Implemented and Deployed ....................... 36
   A.2. Already Implemented ...................................... 36
   A.3. Partially Implemented .................................... 36
   A.4. Not Yet Implemented ...................................... 37
Author's Address ................................................. 37
1. Introduction

Multicast DNS [RFC6762] and its companion technology DNS-based Service Discovery [RFC6763] were created to provide IP networking with the ease-of-use and autoconfiguration for which AppleTalk was well known [RFC6760] [ZC] [Roadmap].

For a small home network consisting of just a single link (or a few physical links bridged together to appear as a single logical link from the point of view of IP) Multicast DNS [RFC6762] is sufficient for client devices to look up the "local" host names of peers on the same home network, and to use Multicast DNS-Based Service Discovery (DNS-SD) [RFC6763] to discover services offered on that home network.

For a larger network consisting of multiple links that are interconnected using IP-layer routing instead of link-layer bridging, link-local Multicast DNS alone is insufficient because link-local Multicast DNS packets, by design, are not propagated onto other links.

Using link-local multicast packets for Multicast DNS was a conscious design choice [RFC6762]. Even when limited to a single link, multicast traffic is still generally considered to be more expensive than unicast, because multicast traffic impacts many devices, instead of just a single recipient. In addition, with some technologies like Wi-Fi [IEEE-11], multicast traffic is inherently less efficient and less reliable than unicast, because Wi-Fi multicast traffic is sent at lower data rates, and is not acknowledged. Increasing the amount of expensive multicast traffic by flooding it across multiple links would make the traffic load even worse.

Partitioning the network into many small links curtails the spread of expensive multicast traffic, but limits the discoverability of services. At the opposite end of the spectrum, using a very large local link with thousands of hosts enables better service discovery, but at the cost of larger amounts of multicast traffic.

Performing DNS-Based Service Discovery using purely Unicast DNS is more efficient and doesn’t require large multicast domains, but does require that the relevant data be available in the Unicast DNS namespace. The Unicast DNS namespace in question could fall within a traditionally assigned globally unique domain name, or could use a private local unicast domain name such as "home.arpa" [I-D.ietf-homenet-dot].

In the DNS-SD specification [RFC6763], Section 10 ("Populating the DNS with Information") discusses various possible ways that a service’s PTR, SRV, TXT and address records can make their way into
the Unicast DNS namespace, including manual zone file configuration
[RFC1034] [RFC1035], DNS Update [RFC2136] [RFC3007] and proxies of
various kinds.

Making the relevant data available in the Unicast DNS namespace by
manual DNS configuration is one option. This option has been used
for many years at IETF meetings to advertise the IETF Terminal Room
printer. Details of this example are given in Appendix A of the
Roadmap document [Roadmap]. However, this manual DNS configuration
is labor intensive, error prone, and requires a reasonable degree of
DNS expertise.

Populating the Unicast DNS namespace via DNS Update by the devices
offering the services themselves is another option [RegProt]
[DNS-UL]. However, this requires configuration of DNS Update keys on
those devices, which has proven onerous and impractical for simple
devices like printers and network cameras.

Hence, to facilitate efficient and reliable DNS-Based Service
Discovery, a compromise is needed that combines the ease-of-use of
Multicast DNS with the efficiency and scalability of Unicast DNS.

This document specifies a type of proxy called a "Discovery Proxy"
that uses Multicast DNS [RFC6762] to discover Multicast DNS records
on its local link, and makes corresponding DNS records visible in the
Unicast DNS namespace.

In principle, similar mechanisms could be defined using other local
service discovery protocols, to discover local information and then
make corresponding DNS records visible in the Unicast DNS namespace.
Such mechanisms for other local service discovery protocols could be
addressed in future documents.

The design of the Discovery Proxy is guided by the previously
published requirements document [RFC7558].

In simple terms, a descriptive DNS name is chosen for each link in an
organization. Using a DNS NS record, responsibility for that DNS
name is delegated to a Discovery Proxy physically attached to that
link. Now, when a remote client issues a unicast query for a name
falling within the delegated subdomain, the normal DNS delegation
mechanism results in the unicast query arriving at the Discovery
Proxy, since it has been declared authoritative for those names.
Now, instead of consulting a textual zone file on disk to discover
the answer to the query, as a traditional DNS server would, a
Discovery Proxy consults its local link, using Multicast DNS, to find
the answer to the question.
For fault tolerance reasons there may be more than one Discovery Proxy serving a given link.

Note that the Discovery Proxy uses a "pull" model. The local link is not queried using Multicast DNS until some remote client has requested that data. In the idle state, in the absence of client requests, the Discovery Proxy sends no packets and imposes no burden on the network. It operates purely "on demand".

An alternative proposal that has been discussed is a proxy that performs DNS updates to a remote DNS server on behalf of the Multicast DNS devices on the local network. The difficulty with this is that Multicast DNS devices do not routinely announce their records on the network. Generally they remain silent until queried. This means that the complete set of Multicast DNS records in use on a link can only be discovered by active querying, not by passive listening. Because of this, a proxy can only know what names exist on a link by issuing queries for them, and since it would be impractical to issue queries for every possible name just to find out which names exist and which do not, there is no reasonable way for a proxy to programatically learn all the answers it would need to push up to the remote DNS server using DNS Update. Even if such a mechanism were possible, it would risk generating high load on the network continuously, even when there are no clients with any interest in that data.

Hence, having a model where the query comes to the Discovery Proxy is much more efficient than a model where the Discovery Proxy pushes the answers out to some other remote DNS server.

A client seeking to discover services and other information achieves this by sending traditional DNS queries to the Discovery Proxy, or by sending DNS Push Notification subscription requests [Push].

How a client discovers what domain name(s) to use for its service discovery queries, (and consequently what Discovery Proxy or Proxies to use) is described in Section 5.2.

The diagram below illustrates a network topology using a Discovery Proxy to provide discovery service to a remote client.
2. Operational Analogy

A Discovery Proxy does not operate as a multicast relay, or multicast forwarder. There is no danger of multicast forwarding loops that result in traffic storms, because no multicast packets are forwarded. A Discovery Proxy operates as a *proxy* for a remote client, performing queries on its behalf and reporting the results back.

A reasonable analogy is making a telephone call to a colleague at your workplace and saying, "I’m out of the office right now. Would you mind bringing up a printer browser window and telling me the names of the printers you see?" That entails no risk of a forwarding loop causing a traffic storm, because no multicast packets are sent over the telephone call.

A similar analogy, instead of enlisting another human being to initiate the service discovery operation on your behalf, is to log into your own desktop work computer using screen sharing, and then run the printer browser yourself to see the list of printers. Or log in using ssh and type "dns-sd -B _ipp._tcp" and observe the list of discovered printer names. In neither case is there any risk of a forwarding loop causing a traffic storm, because no multicast packets are being sent over the screen sharing or ssh connection.

The Discovery Proxy provides another way of performing remote queries, just using a different protocol instead of screen sharing or ssh.

When the Discovery Proxy software performs Multicast DNS operations, the exact same Multicast DNS caching mechanisms are applied as when any other client software on that Discovery Proxy device performs Multicast DNS operations, whether that be running a printer browser client locally, or a remote user running the printer browser client via a screen sharing connection, or a remote user logged in via ssh running a command-line tool like "dns-sd".
3. Conventions and Terminology Used in this Document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here [RFC2119] [RFC8174].

The Discovery Proxy builds on Multicast DNS, which works between hosts on the same link. For the purposes of this document a set of hosts is considered to be "on the same link" if:

- when any host from that set sends a packet to any other host in that set, using unicast, multicast, or broadcast, the entire link-layer packet payload arrives unmodified, and

- a broadcast sent over that link, by any host from that set of hosts, can be received by every other host in that set.

The link-layer *header* may be modified, such as in Token Ring Source Routing [IEEE-5], but not the link-layer *payload*. In particular, if any device forwarding a packet modifies any part of the IP header or IP payload then the packet is no longer considered to be on the same link. This means that the packet may pass through devices such as repeaters, bridges, hubs or switches and still be considered to be on the same link for the purpose of this document, but not through a device such as an IP router that decrements the IP TTL or otherwise modifies the IP header.

4. Compatibility Considerations

No changes to existing devices are required to work with a Discovery Proxy.

Existing devices that advertise services using Multicast DNS work with Discovery Proxy.

Existing clients that support DNS-Based Service Discovery over Unicast DNS work with Discovery Proxy. Service Discovery over Unicast DNS was introduced in Mac OS X 10.4 in April 2005, as is included in Apple products introduced since then, including iPhone and iPad, as well as products from other vendors, such as Microsoft Windows 10.

An overview of the larger collection of related Service Discovery technologies, and how Discovery Proxy relates to those, is given in the Service Discovery Road Map document [Roadmap].
5. Discovery Proxy Operation

In a typical configuration, a Discovery Proxy is configured to be authoritative [RFC1034] [RFC1035] for four or more DNS subdomains, and authority for these subdomains is delegated to it via NS records:

A DNS subdomain for service discovery records. This subdomain name may contain rich text, including spaces and other punctuation. This is because this subdomain name is used only in graphical user interfaces, where rich text is appropriate.

A DNS subdomain for host name records. This subdomain name SHOULD be limited to letters, digits and hyphens, to facilitate convenient use of host names in command-line interfaces.

One or more DNS subdomains for IPv4 Reverse Mapping records. These subdomains will have names that ends in "in-addr.arpa."

One or more DNS subdomains for IPv6 Reverse Mapping records. These subdomains will have names that ends in "ip6.arpa."

In an enterprise network the naming and delegation of these subdomains is typically performed by conscious action of the network administrator. In a home network naming and delegation would typically be performed using some automatic configuration mechanism such as HNCP [RFC7788].

These three varieties of delegated subdomains (service discovery, host names, and reverse mapping) are described below in Section 5.1, Section 5.3 and Section 5.4.

How a client discovers where to issue its service discovery queries is described below in Section 5.2.
5.1. Delegated Subdomain for Service Discovery Records

In its simplest form, each link in an organization is assigned a unique Unicast DNS domain name, such as "Building 1.example.com" or "2nd Floor.Building 3.example.com". Grouping multiple links under a single Unicast DNS domain name is to be specified in a future companion document, but for the purposes of this document, assume that each link has its own unique Unicast DNS domain name. In a graphical user interface these names are not displayed as strings with dots as shown above, but something more akin to a typical file browser graphical user interface (which is harder to illustrate in a text-only document) showing folders, subfolders and files in a file system.

| +---------------+--------------+-------------+-------------------+ |
| | *example.com* | Building 1   | 1st Floor   | Alice’s printer   |
| | Building 2    | *2nd Floor* | 3rd Floor   | Bob’s printer     |
| | *Building 3*  | Building 4   | 4th Floor   | Charlie’s printer |
| | Building 5    | Building 6   |             |                   |
| +---------------+--------------+-------------+-------------------+ |

Figure 1: Illustrative GUI

Each named link in an organization has one or more Discovery Proxies which serve it. This Discovery Proxy function for each link could be performed by a device like a router or switch that is physically attached to that link. In the parent domain, NS records are used to delegate ownership of each defined link name (e.g., "Building 1.example.com") to the one or more Discovery Proxies that serve the named link. In other words, the Discovery Proxies are the authoritative name servers for that subdomain. As in the rest of DNS-Based Service Discovery, all names are represented as-is using plain UTF-8 encoding, and, as described in Section 5.5.4, no text encoding translations are performed.

With appropriate VLAN configuration [IEEE-1Q] a single Discovery Proxy device could have a logical presence on many links, and serve as the Discovery Proxy for all those links. In such a configuration the Discovery Proxy device would have a single physical Ethernet [IEEE-3] port, configured as a VLAN trunk port, which would appear to software on that device as multiple virtual Ethernet interfaces, one connected to each of the VLAN links.

As an alternative to using VLAN technology, using a Multicast DNS Discovery Relay [Relay] is another way that a Discovery Proxy can have a ‘virtual’ presence on a remote link.
When a DNS-SD client issues a Unicast DNS query to discover services in a particular Unicast DNS subdomain (e.g., 
"_printer._tcp.Building 1.example.com. PTR ?") the normal DNS delegation mechanism results in that query being forwarded until it reaches the delegated authoritative name server for that subdomain, namely the Discovery Proxy on the link in question. Like a conventional Unicast DNS server, a Discovery Proxy implements the usual Unicast DNS protocol [RFC1034] [RFC1035] over UDP and TCP. However, unlike a conventional Unicast DNS server that generates answers from the data in its manually-configured zone file, a Discovery Proxy generates answers using Multicast DNS. A Discovery Proxy does this by consulting its Multicast DNS cache and/or issuing Multicast DNS queries for the corresponding Multicast DNS name, type and class, (e.g., in this case, "_printer._tcp.local. PTR ?"). Then, from the received Multicast DNS data, the Discovery Proxy synthesizes the appropriate Unicast DNS response. How long the Discovery Proxy should wait to accumulate Multicast DNS responses is described below in Section 5.6.

The existing Multicast DNS caching mechanism is used to minimize unnecessary Multicast DNS queries on the wire. The Discovery Proxy is acting as a client of the underlying Multicast DNS subsystem, and benefits from the same caching and efficiency measures as any other client using that subsystem.
5.2. Domain Enumeration

A DNS-SD client performs Domain Enumeration [RFC6763] via certain PTR queries, using both unicast and multicast. If it receives a Domain Name configuration via DHCP option 15 [RFC2132], then it issues unicast queries using this domain. It issues unicast queries using names derived from its IPv4 subnet address(es) and IPv6 prefix(es). These are described below in Section 5.2.1. It also issues multicast Domain Enumeration queries in the "local" domain [RFC6762]. These are described below in Section 5.2.2. The results of all the Domain Enumeration queries are combined for Service Discovery purposes.

5.2.1. Domain Enumeration via Unicast Queries

The administrator creates Domain Enumeration PTR records [RFC6763] to inform clients of available service discovery domains. Two varieties of such Domain Enumeration PTR records exist; those with names derived from the domain name communicated to the clients via DHCP, and those with names derived from IPv4 subnet address(es) and IPv6 prefix(es) in use by the clients. Below is an example showing the name-based variety:

```
b._dns-sd._udp.example.com.   PTR   Building 1.example.com.
PTR   Building 2.example.com.
PTR   Building 3.example.com.
PTR   Building 4.example.com.
db._dns-sd._udp.example.com.   PTR   Building 1.example.com.
lb._dns-sd._udp.example.com.   PTR   Building 1.example.com.
```

The meaning of these records is defined in the DNS Service Discovery specification [RFC6763] but for convenience is repeated here. The "b" ("browse") records tell the client device the list of browsing domains to display for the user to select from. The "db" ("default browse") record tells the client device which domain in that list should be selected by default. The "db" domain MUST be one of the domains in the "b" list; if not then no domain is selected by default. The "lb" ("legacy browse") record tells the client device which domain to automatically browse on behalf of applications that don’t implement UI for multi-domain browsing (which is most of them, at the time of writing). The "lb" domain is often the same as the "db" domain, or sometimes the "db" domain plus one or more others that should be included in the list of automatic browsing domains for legacy clients.

Note that in the example above, for clarity, space characters in names are shown as actual spaces. If this data is manually entered...
into a textual zone file for authoritative server software such as
BIND, care must be taken because the space character is used as a
field separator, and other characters like dot (('.'), semicolon
(';'), dollar ('$'), backslash ('\'), etc., also have special
meaning. These characters have to be escaped when entered into a
textual zone file, following the rules in Section 5.1 of the DNS
specification [RFC1035]. For example, a literal space in a name is
represented in the textual zone file using '\032', so "Building
1.example.com." is entered as "Building\0321.example.com."

DNS responses are limited to a maximum size of 65535 bytes. This
limits the maximum number of domains that can be returned for a
Domain Enumeration query, as follows:

A DNS response header is 12 bytes. That’s typically followed by a
single qname (up to 256 bytes) plus qtype (2 bytes) and qclass
(2 bytes), leaving 65275 for the Answer Section.

An Answer Section Resource Record consists of:

- Owner name, encoded as a two-byte compression pointer
- Two-byte rrtype (type PTR)
- Two-byte rrclass (class IN)
- Four-byte ttl
- Two-byte rdlength
- rdata (domain name, up to 256 bytes)

This means that each Resource Record in the Answer Section can take
up to 268 bytes total, which means that the Answer Section can
contain, in the worst case, no more than 243 domains.

In a more typical scenario, where the domain names are not all
maximum-sized names, and there is some similarity between names so
that reasonable name compression is possible, each Answer
Section Resource Record may average 140 bytes, which means that the
Answer Section can contain up to 466 domains.

It is anticipated that this should be sufficient for even a large
corporate network or university campus.
5.2.2. Domain Enumeration via Multicast Queries

In the case where Discovery Proxy functionality is widely deployed within an enterprise (either by having a Discovery Proxy on each link, or by having a Discovery Proxy with a remote ‘virtual’ presence on each link using VLANs or Multicast DNS Discovery Relays [Relay]) this offers an additional way to provide Domain Enumeration data for clients.

A Discovery Proxy can be configured to generate Multicast DNS responses for the following Multicast DNS Domain Enumeration queries issued by clients:

- b._dns-sd._udp.local. PTR ?
- db._dns-sd._udp.local. PTR ?
- lb._dns-sd._udp.local. PTR ?

This provides the ability for Discovery Proxies to indicate recommended browsing domains to DNS-SD clients on a per-link granularity. In some enterprises it may be preferable to provide this per-link configuration data in the form of Discovery Proxy configuration, rather than populating the Unicast DNS servers with the same data (in the "ip6.arpa" or "in-addr.arpa" domains).

Regardless of how the network operator chooses to provide this configuration data, clients will perform Domain Enumeration via both unicast and multicast queries, and then combine the results of these queries.
5.3. Delegated Subdomain for LDH Host Names

DNS-SD service instance names and domains are allowed to contain arbitrary Net-Unicode text [RFC5198], encoded as precomposed UTF-8 [RFC3629].

Users typically interact with service discovery software by viewing a list of discovered service instance names on a display, and selecting one of them by pointing, touching, or clicking. Similarly, in software that provides a multi-domain DNS-SD user interface, users view a list of offered domains on the display and select one of them by pointing, touching, or clicking. To use a service, users don’t have to remember domain or instance names, or type them; users just have to be able to recognize what they see on the display and touch or click on the thing they want.

In contrast, host names are often remembered and typed. Also, host names have historically been used in command-line interfaces where spaces can be inconvenient. For this reason, host names have traditionally been restricted to letters, digits and hyphens (LDH), with no spaces or other punctuation.

While we do want to allow rich text for DNS-SD service instance names and domains, it is advisable, for maximum compatibility with existing usage, to restrict host names to the traditional letter-digit-hyphen rules. This means that while a service name "My Printer._ipp._tcp.Building 1.example.com" is acceptable and desirable (it is displayed in a graphical user interface as an instance called "My Printer" in the domain "Building 1" at "example.com"), a host name "My-Printer.Building 1.example.com" is less desirable (because of the space in "Building 1").

To accommodate this difference in allowable characters, a Discovery Proxy SHOULD support having two separate subdomains delegated to it for each link it serves, one whose name is allowed to contain arbitrary Net-Unicode text [RFC5198], and a second more constrained subdomain whose name is restricted to contain only letters, digits, and hyphens, to be used for host name records (names of ‘A’ and ‘AAAA’ address records). The restricted names may be any valid name consisting of only letters, digits, and hyphens, including Punycode-encoded names [RFC3492].
For example, a Discovery Proxy could have the two subdomains "Building 1.example.com" and "bldg1.example.com" delegated to it. The Discovery Proxy would then translate these two Multicast DNS records:

```
My Printer._ipp._tcp.local.   SRV 0 0 631 prnt.local.
prnt.local.                 A   203.0.113.2
```

into Unicast DNS records as follows:

```
prnt.bldg1.example.com.       SRV 0 0 631 prnt.bldg1.example.com.
prnt.bldg1.example.com.       A   203.0.113.2
```

Note that the SRV record name is translated using the rich-text domain name ("Building 1.example.com") and the address record name is translated using the LDR domain ("bldg1.example.com").

A Discovery Proxy MAY support only a single rich text Net-Unicode domain, and use that domain for all records, including ‘A’ and ‘AAAA’ address records, but implementers choosing this option should be aware that this choice may produce host names that are awkward to use in command-line environments. Whether this is an issue depends on whether users in the target environment are expected to be using command-line interfaces.

A Discovery Proxy MUST NOT be restricted to support only a letter-digit-hyphen subdomain, because that results in an unnecessarily poor user experience.

As described above in Section 5.2.1, for clarity, space characters in names are shown as actual spaces. If this data were to be manually entered into a textual zone file (which it isn’t) then spaces would need to be represented using ‘\032’, so "My Printer._ipp._tcp.Building 1.example.com." would become "My\032Printer._ipp._tcp.Building\0321.example.com."

Note that the ‘\032’ representation does not appear in the network packets sent over the air. In the wire format of DNS messages, spaces are sent as spaces, not as ‘\032’, and likewise, in a graphical user interface at the client device, spaces are shown as spaces, not as ‘\032’.
5.4. Delegated Subdomain for Reverse Mapping

A Discovery Proxy can facilitate easier management of reverse mapping domains, particularly for IPv6 addresses where manual management may be more onerous than it is for IPv4 addresses.

To achieve this, in the parent domain, NS records are used to delegate ownership of the appropriate reverse mapping domain to the Discovery Proxy. In other words, the Discovery Proxy becomes the authoritative name server for the reverse mapping domain. For fault tolerance reasons there may be more than one Discovery Proxy serving a given link.

If a given link is using the IPv4 subnet 203.0.113/24, then the domain "113.0.203.in-addr.arpa" is delegated to the Discovery Proxy for that link.

For example, if a given link is using the IPv6 prefix 2001:0DB8:1234:5678/64, then the domain "8.7.6.5.4.3.2.1.8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa" is delegated to the Discovery Proxy for that link.

When a reverse mapping query arrives at the Discovery Proxy, it issues the identical query on its local link as a Multicast DNS query. The mechanism to force an apparently unicast name to be resolved using link-local Multicast DNS varies depending on the API set being used. For example, in the "dns_sd.h" APIs (available on macOS, iOS, Bonjour for Windows, Linux and Android), using kDNSServiceFlagsForceMulticast indicates that the DNSServiceQueryRecord() call should perform the query using Multicast DNS. Other APIs sets have different ways of forcing multicast queries. When the host owning that IPv4 or IPv6 address responds with a name of the form "something.local", the Discovery Proxy rewrites that to use its configured LDH host name domain instead of "local", and returns the response to the caller.
For example, a Discovery Proxy with the two subdomains "113.0.203.in-addr.arpa" and "bldg1.example.com" delegated to it would translate this Multicast DNS record:

2.113.0.203.in-addr.arpa. PTR prnt.local.

into this Unicast DNS response:

2.113.0.203.in-addr.arpa. PTR prnt.bldg1.example.com.

Subsequent queries for the prnt.bldg1.example.com address record, falling as it does within the bldg1.example.com domain, which is delegated to the Discovery Proxy, will arrive at the Discovery Proxy, where they are answered by issuing Multicast DNS queries and using the received Multicast DNS answers to synthesize Unicast DNS responses, as described above.

Note that this design assumes that all addresses on a given IPv4 subnet or IPv6 prefix are mapped to hostnames using the Discovery Proxy mechanism. It would be possible to implement a Discovery Proxy that can be configured so that some address-to-name mappings are performed using Multicast DNS on the local link, while other address-to-name mappings within the same IPv4 subnet or IPv6 prefix are configured manually.
5.5. Data Translation

Generating the appropriate Multicast DNS queries involves, at the very least, translating from the configured DNS domain (e.g., "Building 1.example.com") on the Unicast DNS side to "local" on the Multicast DNS side.

Generating the appropriate Unicast DNS responses involves translating back from "local" to the appropriate configured DNS Unicast domain.

Other beneficial translation and filtering operations are described below.

5.5.1. DNS TTL limiting

For efficiency, Multicast DNS typically uses moderately high DNS TTL values. For example, the typical TTL on DNS-SD PTR records is 75 minutes. What makes these moderately high TTLs acceptable is the cache coherency mechanisms built in to the Multicast DNS protocol which protect against stale data persisting for too long. When a service shuts down gracefully, it sends goodbye packets to remove its PTR records immediately from neighboring caches. If a service shuts down abruptly without sending goodbye packets, the Passive Observation Of Failures (POOF) mechanism described in Section 10.5 of the Multicast DNS specification [RFC6762] comes into play to purge the cache of stale data.

A traditional Unicast DNS client on a distant remote link does not get to participate in these Multicast DNS cache coherency mechanisms on the local link. For traditional Unicast DNS queries (those received without using Long-Lived Query [DNS-LLQ] or DNS Push Notification subscriptions [Push]) the DNS TTLs reported in the resulting Unicast DNS response MUST be capped to be no more than ten seconds.

Similarly, for negative responses, the negative caching TTL indicated in the SOA record [RFC2308] should also be ten seconds (Section 6.1).

This value of ten seconds is chosen based on user-experience considerations.

For negative caching, suppose a user is attempting to access a remote device (e.g., a printer), and they are unsuccessful because that device is powered off. Suppose they then place a telephone call and ask for the device to be powered on. We want the device to become available to the user within a reasonable time period. It is reasonable to expect it to take on the order of ten seconds for a simple device with a simple embedded operating system to power on.
Once the device is powered on and has announced its presence on the network via Multicast DNS, we would like it to take no more than a further ten seconds for stale negative cache entries to expire from Unicast DNS caches, making the device available to the user desiring to access it.

Similar reasoning applies to capping positive TTLs at ten seconds. In the event of a device moving location, getting a new DHCP address, or other renumbering events, we would like the updated information to be available to remote clients in a relatively timely fashion.

However, network administrators should be aware that many recursive (caching) DNS servers by default are configured to impose a minimum TTL of 30 seconds. If stale data appears to be persisting in the network to the extent that it adversely impacts user experience, network administrators are advised to check the configuration of their recursive DNS servers.

For received Unicast DNS queries that use LLQ [DNS-LLQ] or DNS Push Notifications [Push], the Multicast DNS record’s TTL SHOULD be returned unmodified, because the Push Notification channel exists to inform the remote client as records come and go. For further details about Long-Lived Queries, and its newer replacement, DNS Push Notifications, see Section 5.6.

5.5.2. Suppressing Unusable Records

A Discovery Proxy SHOULD suppress Unicast DNS answers for records that are not useful outside the local link. For example, DNS A and AAAA records for IPv4 link-local addresses [RFC3927] and IPv6 link-local addresses [RFC4862] SHOULD be suppressed. Similarly, for sites that have multiple private address realms [RFC1918], in cases where the Discovery Proxy can determine that the querying client is in a different address realm, private addresses SHOULD NOT be communicated to that client. IPv6 Unique Local Addresses [RFC4193] SHOULD be suppressed in cases where the Discovery Proxy can determine that the querying client is in a different IPv6 address realm.

By the same logic, DNS SRV records that reference target host names that have no addresses usable by the requester should be suppressed, and likewise, DNS PTR records that point to unusable SRV records should be similarly be suppressed.
5.5.3.  NSEC and NSEC3 queries

Multicast DNS devices do not routinely announce their records on the network. Generally they remain silent until queried. This means that the complete set of Multicast DNS records in use on a link can only be discovered by active querying, not by passive listening. Because of this, a Discovery Proxy can only know what names exist on a link by issuing queries for them, and since it would be impractical to issue queries for every possible name just to find out which names exist and which do not, a Discovery Proxy cannot programatically generate the traditional NSEC [RFC4034] and NSEC3 [RFC5155] records which assert the nonexistence of a large range of names.

When queried for an NSEC or NSEC3 record type, the Discovery Proxy issues a qtype "ANY" query using Multicast DNS on the local link, and then generates an NSEC or NSEC3 response with a Type Bit Map signifying which record types do and do not exist for just the specific name queried, and no other names.

Multicast DNS NSEC records received on the local link MUST NOT be forwarded unmodified to a unicast querier, because there are slight differences in the NSEC record data. In particular, Multicast DNS NSEC records do not have the NSEC bit set in the Type Bit Map, whereas conventional Unicast DNS NSEC records do have the NSEC bit set.

5.5.4.  No Text Encoding Translation

A Discovery Proxy does no translation between text encodings. Specifically, a Discovery Proxy does no translation between Punycode encoding [RFC3492] and UTF-8 encoding [RFC3629], either in the owner name of DNS records, or anywhere in the RDATA of DNS records (such as the RDATA of PTR records, SRV records, NS records, or other record types like TXT, where it is ambiguous whether the RDATA may contain DNS names). All bytes are treated as-is, with no attempt at text encoding translation. A client implementing DNS-based Service Discovery [RFC6763] will use UTF-8 encoding for its service discovery queries, which the Discovery Proxy passes through without any text encoding translation to the Multicast DNS subsystem. Responses from the Multicast DNS subsystem are similarly returned, without any text encoding translation, back to the requesting client.
5.5.5. Application-Specific Data Translation

There may be cases where Application-Specific Data Translation is appropriate.

For example, AirPrint printers tend to advertise fairly verbose information about their capabilities in their DNS-SD TXT record. TXT record sizes in the range 500-1000 bytes are not uncommon. This information is a legacy from LPR printing, because LPR does not have in-band capability negotiation, so all of this information is conveyed using the DNS-SD TXT record instead. IPP printing does have in-band capability negotiation, but for convenience printers tend to include the same capability information in their IPP DNS-SD TXT records as well. For local mDNS use this extra TXT record information is inefficient, but not fatal. However, when a Discovery Proxy aggregates data from multiple printers on a link, and sends it via unicast (via UDP or TCP) this amount of unnecessary TXT record information can result in large responses. A DNS reply over TCP carrying information about 70 printers with an average of 700 bytes per printer adds up to about 50 kilobytes of data. Therefore, a Discovery Proxy that is aware of the specifics of an application-layer protocol such as AirPrint (which uses IPP) can elide unnecessary key/value pairs from the DNS-SD TXT record for better network efficiency.

Also, the DNS-SD TXT record for many printers contains an "adminurl" key something like "adminurl=http://printername.local/status.html". For this URL to be useful outside the local link, the embedded ".local" hostname needs to be translated to an appropriate name with larger scope. It is easy to translate ".local" names when they appear in well-defined places, either as a record’s name, or in the rdata of record types like PTR and SRV. In the printing case, some application-specific knowledge about the semantics of the "adminurl" key is needed for the Discovery Proxy to know that it contains a name that needs to be translated. This is somewhat analogous to the need for NAT gateways to contain ALGs (Application-Specific Gateways) to facilitate the correct translation of protocols that embed addresses in unexpected places.

To avoid the need for application-specific knowledge about the semantics of particular TXT record keys, protocol designers are advised to avoid placing link-local names or link-local IP addresses in TXT record keys, if translation of those names or addresses would be required for off-link operation. In the printing case, the operational failure of failing to translate the "adminurl" key correctly is that, when accessed from a different link, printing will still work, but clicking the "Admin" UI button will fail to open the printer’s administration page. Rather than duplicating the host name
from the service’s SRV record in its "adminurl" key, thereby having the same host name appear in two places, a better design might have been to omit the host name from the "adminurl" key, and instead have the client implicitly substitute the target host name from the service’s SRV record in place of a missing host name in the "adminurl" key. That way the desired host name only appears once, and it is in a well-defined place where software like the Discovery Proxy is expecting to find it.

Note that this kind of Application-Specific Data Translation is expected to be very rare. It is the exception, rather than the rule. This is an example of a common theme in computing. It is frequently the case that it is wise to start with a clean, layered design, with clear boundaries. Then, in certain special cases, those layer boundaries may be violated, where the performance and efficiency benefits outweigh the inelegance of the layer violation.

These layer violations are optional. They are done primarily for efficiency reasons, and generally should not be required for correct operation. A Discovery Proxy MAY operate solely at the mDNS layer, without any knowledge of semantics at the DNS-SD layer or above.
5.6. Answer Aggregation

In a simple analysis, simply gathering multicast answers and forwarding them in a unicast response seems adequate, but it raises the question of how long the Discovery Proxy should wait to be sure that it has received all the Multicast DNS answers it needs to form a complete Unicast DNS response. If it waits too little time, then it risks its Unicast DNS response being incomplete. If it waits too long, then it creates a poor user experience at the client end. In fact, there may be no time which is both short enough to produce a good user experience and at the same time long enough to reliably produce complete results.

Similarly, the Discovery Proxy -- the authoritative name server for the subdomain in question -- needs to decide what DNS TTL to report for these records. If the TTL is too long then the recursive (caching) name servers issuing queries on behalf of their clients risk caching stale data for too long. If the TTL is too short then the amount of network traffic will be more than necessary. In fact, there may be no TTL which is both short enough to avoid undesirable stale data and at the same time long enough to be efficient on the network.

Both these dilemmas are solved by use of DNS Long-Lived Queries (DNS LLQ) [DNS-LLQ] or its newer replacement, DNS Push Notifications [Push].

Clients supporting unicast DNS Service Discovery SHOULD implement DNS Push Notifications [Push] for improved user experience.

Clients and Discovery Proxies MAY support both DNS LLQ and DNS Push, and when talking to a Discovery Proxy that supports both, the client may use either protocol, as it chooses, though it is expected that only DNS Push will continue to be supported in the long run.

When a Discovery Proxy receives a query using DNS LLQ or DNS Push Notifications, it responds immediately using the Multicast DNS records it already has in its cache (if any). This provides a good client user experience by providing a near-instantaneous response. Simultaneously, the Discovery Proxy issues a Multicast DNS query on the local link to discover if there are any additional Multicast DNS records it did not already know about. Should additional Multicast DNS responses be received, these are then delivered to the client using additional DNS LLQ or DNS Push Notification update messages. The timeliness of such update messages is limited only by the timeliness of the device responding to the Multicast DNS query. If the Multicast DNS device responds quickly, then the update message is delivered quickly. If the Multicast DNS device responds slowly, then
the update message is delivered slowly. The benefit of using update messages is that the Discovery Proxy can respond promptly because it doesn’t have to delay its unicast response to allow for the expected worst-case delay for receiving all the Multicast DNS responses. Even if a proxy were to try to provide reliability by assuming an excessively pessimistic worst-case time (thereby giving a very poor user experience) there would still be the risk of a slow Multicast DNS device taking even longer than that (e.g., a device that is not even powered on until ten seconds after the initial query is received) resulting in incomplete responses. Using update message solves this dilemma: even very late responses are not lost; they are delivered in subsequent update messages.

There are two factors that determine specifically how responses are generated:

The first factor is whether the query from the client used LLQ or DNS Push Notifications (used for long-lived service browsing PTR queries) or not (used for one-shot operations like SRV or address record queries). Note that queries using LLQ or DNS Push Notifications are received directly from the client. Queries not using LLQ or DNS Push Notifications are generally received via the client’s configured recursive (caching) name server.

The second factor is whether the Discovery Proxy already has at least one record in its cache that positively answers the question.

- Not using LLQ or Push Notifications; no answer in cache:
  Issue an mDNS query, exactly as a local client would issue an mDNS query on the local link for the desired record name, type and class, including retransmissions, as appropriate, according to the established mDNS retransmission schedule [RFC6762]. As soon as any Multicast DNS response packet is received that contains one or more positive answers to that question (with or without the Cache Flush bit [RFC6762] set), or a negative answer (signified via a Multicast DNS NSEC record [RFC6762]), the Discovery Proxy generates a Unicast DNS response packet containing the corresponding (filtered and translated) answers and sends it to the remote client. If after six seconds no Multicast DNS answers have been received, return a negative response to the remote client. Six seconds is enough time to transmit three mDNS queries, and allow some time for responses to arrive. DNS TTLs in responses MUST be capped to at most ten seconds. (Reasoning: Queries not using LLQ or Push Notifications are generally queries that that expect an answer from only one device, so the first response is also the only response.)
o Not using LLQ or Push Notifications; at least one answer in cache:
Send response right away to minimise delay.
DNS TTLs in responses MUST be capped to at most ten seconds.
No local mDNS queries are performed.
(Reasoning: Queries not using LLQ or Push Notifications are
generally queries that that expect an answer from only one device.
Given RRSet TTL harmonisation, if the proxy has one Multicast DNS
answer in its cache, it can reasonably assume that it has all of
them.)

o Using LLQ or Push Notifications; no answer in cache:
As in the case above with no answer in the cache, perform mDNS
querying for six seconds, and send a response to the remote client
as soon as any relevant mDNS response is received.
If after six seconds no relevant mDNS response has been received,
return negative response to the remote client (for LLQ; not
applicable for Push Notifications).
(Reasoning: We don’t need to rush to send an empty answer.)
Whether or not a relevant mDNS response is received within six
seconds, the query remains active for as long as the client
maintains the LLQ or Push Notification state, and if mDNS answers
are received later, LLQ or Push Notification messages are sent.
DNS TTLs in responses are returned unmodified.

o Using LLQ or Push Notifications; at least one answer in cache:
As in the case above with at least one answer in cache, send
response right away to minimise delay.
The query remains active for as long as the client maintains the
LLQ or Push Notification state, and results in transmission of
mDNS queries, with appropriate Known Answer lists, to determine if
further answers are available. If additional mDNS answers are
received later, LLQ or Push Notification messages are sent.
(Reasoning: We want UI that is displayed very rapidly, yet
continues to remain accurate even as the network environment
changes.)
DNS TTLs in responses are returned unmodified.

Note that the "negative responses" referred to above are "no error no
answer" negative responses, not NXDOMAIN. This is because the
Discovery Proxy cannot know all the Multicast DNS domain names that
may exist on a link at any given time, so any name with no answers
may have child names that do exist, making it an "empty nonterminal"
name.
6. Administrative DNS Records

6.1. DNS SOA (Start of Authority) Record

The MNAME field SHOULD contain the host name of the Discovery Proxy device (i.e., the same domain name as the rdata of the NS record delegating the relevant zone(s) to this Discovery Proxy device).

The RNAME field SHOULD contain the mailbox of the person responsible for administering this Discovery Proxy device.

The SERIAL field MUST be zero.

Zone transfers are undefined for Discovery Proxy zones, and consequently the REFRESH, RETRY and EXPIRE fields have no useful meaning for Discovery Proxy zones. These fields SHOULD contain reasonable default values. The RECOMMENDED values are: REFRESH 7200, RETRY 3600, EXPIRE 86400.

The MINIMUM field (used to control the lifetime of negative cache entries) SHOULD contain the value 10. The value of ten seconds is chosen based on user-experience considerations (see Section 5.5.1).

In the event that there are multiple Discovery Proxy devices on a link for fault tolerance reasons, this will result in clients receiving inconsistent SOA records (different MNAME, and possibly RNAME) depending on which Discovery Proxy answers their SOA query. However, since clients generally have no reason to use the MNAME or RNAME data, this is unlikely to cause any problems.
6.2. DNS NS Records

In the event that there are multiple Discovery Proxy devices on a link for fault tolerance reasons, the parent zone MUST be configured with glue records giving the names and addresses of all the Discovery Proxy devices on the link.

Each Discovery Proxy device MUST be configured with its own NS record, and with the NS records of its fellow Discovery Proxy devices on the same link, so that it can return the correct answers for NS queries.

6.3. DNS SRV Records

In the event that a Discovery Proxy implements Long-Lived Queries [DNS-LLQ] and/or DNS Push Notifications [Push] (as most SHOULD) they MUST generate answers for the appropriate corresponding _dns-llq._udp.<zone> and/or _dns-push-tls._tcp.<zone> SRV record queries. These records are conceptually inserted into the namespace of the relevant zones. They do not exist in the corresponding ".local" namespace of the local link.
7. DNSSEC Considerations

7.1. On-line signing only

The Discovery Proxy acts as the authoritative name server for designated subdomains, and if DNSSEC is to be used, the Discovery Proxy needs to possess a copy of the signing keys, in order to generate authoritative signed data from the local Multicast DNS responses it receives. Off-line signing is not applicable to Discovery Proxy.

7.2. NSEC and NSEC3 Records

In DNSSEC NSEC [RFC4034] and NSEC3 [RFC5155] records are used to assert the nonexistence of certain names, also described as "authenticated denial of existence".

Since a Discovery Proxy only knows what names exist on the local link by issuing queries for them, and since it would be impractical to issue queries for every possible name just to find out which names exist and which do not, a Discovery Proxy cannot programmatically synthesize the traditional NSEC and NSEC3 records which assert the nonexistence of a large range of names. Instead, when generating a negative response, a Discovery Proxy programmatically synthesizes a single NSEC record assert the nonexistence of just the specific name queried, and no others. Since the Discovery Proxy has the zone signing key, it can do this on demand. Since the NSEC record asserts the nonexistence of only a single name, zone walking is not a concern, so NSEC3 is not necessary.

Note that this applies only to traditional immediate DNS queries, which may return immediate negative answers when no immediate positive answer is available. When used with a DNS Push Notification subscription [Push] there are no negative answers, merely the absence of answers so far, which may change in the future if answers become available.
8. IPv6 Considerations

An IPv4-only host and an IPv6-only host behave as "ships that pass in the night". Even if they are on the same Ethernet [IEEE-3], neither is aware of the other’s traffic. For this reason, each link may have *two* unrelated ".local." zones, one for IPv4 and one for IPv6. Since for practical purposes, a group of IPv4-only hosts and a group of IPv6-only hosts on the same Ethernet act as if they were on two entirely separate Ethernet segments, it is unsurprising that their use of the ".local." zone should occur exactly as it would if they really were on two entirely separate Ethernet segments.

It will be desirable to have a mechanism to ‘stitch’ together these two unrelated ".local." zones so that they appear as one. Such mechanism will need to be able to differentiate between a dual-stack (v4/v6) host participating in both ".local." zones, and two different hosts, one IPv4-only and the other IPv6-only, which are both trying to use the same name(s). Such a mechanism will be specified in a future companion document.

At present, it is RECOMMENDED that a Discovery Proxy be configured with a single domain name for both the IPv4 and IPv6 ".local." zones on the local link, and when a unicast query is received, it should issue Multicast DNS queries using both IPv4 and IPv6 on the local link, and then combine the results.
9. Security Considerations

9.1. Authenticity

A service proves its presence on a link by its ability to answer link-local multicast queries on that link. If greater security is desired, then the Discovery Proxy mechanism should not be used, and something with stronger security should be used instead, such as authenticated secure DNS Update [RFC2136] [RFC3007].

9.2. Privacy

The Domain Name System is, generally speaking, a global public database. Records that exist in the Domain Name System name hierarchy can be queried by name from, in principle, anywhere in the world. If services on a mobile device (like a laptop computer) are made visible via the Discovery Proxy mechanism, then when those services become visible in a domain such as "My House.example.com" that might indicate to (potentially hostile) observers that the mobile device is in my house. When those services disappear from "My House.example.com" that change could be used by observers to infer when the mobile device (and possibly its owner) may have left the house. The privacy of this information may be protected using techniques like firewalls, split-view DNS, and Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), as are customarily used today to protect the privacy of corporate DNS information.

The privacy issue is particularly serious for the IPv4 and IPv6 reverse zones. If the public delegation of the reverse zones points to the Discovery Proxy, and the Discovery Proxy is reachable globally, then it could leak a significant amount of information. Attackers could discover hosts that otherwise might not be easy to identify, and learn their hostnames. Attackers could also discover the existence of links where hosts frequently come and go.

The Discovery Proxy could also provide sensitive records only to authenticated users. This is a general DNS problem, not specific to the Discovery Proxy. Work is underway in the IETF to tackle this problem [RFC7626].

9.3. Denial of Service

A remote attacker could use a rapid series of unique Unicast DNS queries to induce a Discovery Proxy to generate a rapid series of corresponding Multicast DNS queries on one or more of its local links. Multicast traffic is generally more expensive than unicast traffic -- especially on Wi-Fi links -- which makes this attack particularly serious. To limit the damage that can be caused by such
attacks, a Discovery Proxy (or the underlying Multicast DNS subsystem which it utilizes) MUST implement Multicast DNS query rate limiting appropriate to the link technology in question. For today’s 802.11b/g/n/ac Wi-Fi links (for which approximately 200 multicast packets per second is sufficient to consume approximately 100% of the wireless spectrum) a limit of 20 Multicast DNS query packets per second is RECOMMENDED. On other link technologies like Gigabit Ethernet higher limits may be appropriate. A consequence of this rate limiting is that a rogue remote client could issue an excessive number of queries, resulting in denial of service to other legitimate remote clients attempting to use that Discovery Proxy. However, this is preferable to a rogue remote client being able to inflict even greater harm on the local network, which could impact the correct operation of all local clients on that network.

10. IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA Considerations.

11. Acknowledgments

   Thanks to Markus Stenberg for helping develop the policy regarding the four styles of unicast response according to what data is immediately available in the cache. Thanks to Anders Brandt, Ben Campbell, Tim Chown, Alissa Cooper, Spencer Dawkins, Ralph Droms, Joel Halpern, Ray Hunter, Joel Jaeggli, Warren Kumari, Ted Lemon, Alexey Melnikov, Kathleen Moriarty, Tom Pusateri, Eric Rescorla, Adam Roach, David Schinazi, Markus Stenberg, Dave Thaler, and Andrew Yourtchenko for their comments.
12. References

12.1. Normative References


12.2. Informative References


"Discovery Proxy (Hybrid Proxy) implementation for OpenWrt", <https://github.com/sbyx/ohybridproxy/>.


Appendix A.  Implementation Status

Some aspects of the mechanism specified in this document already exist in deployed software. Some aspects are new. This section outlines which aspects already exist and which are new.

A.1.  Already Implemented and Deployed

Domain enumeration by the client (the "b._dns-sd._udp" queries) is already implemented and deployed.

Unicast queries to the indicated discovery domain is already implemented and deployed.

These are implemented and deployed in Mac OS X 10.4 and later (including all versions of Apple iOS, on all iPhone and iPads), in Bonjour for Windows, and in Android 4.1 "Jelly Bean" (API Level 16) and later.

Domain enumeration and unicast querying have been used for several years at IETF meetings to make Terminal Room printers discoverable from outside the Terminal room. When an IETF attendee presses Cmd-P on a Mac, or selects AirPrint on an iPad or iPhone, and the Terminal room printers appear, that is because the client is sending unicast DNS queries to the IETF DNS servers. A walk-through giving the details of this particular specific example is given in Appendix A of the Roadmap document [Roadmap].

A.2.  Already Implemented

A minimal portable Discovery Proxy implementation has been produced by Markus Stenberg and Steven Barth, which runs on OS X and several Linux variants including OpenWrt [ohp]. It was demonstrated at the Berlin IETF in July 2013.

Tom Pusateri also has an implementation that runs on any Unix/Linux. It has a RESTful interface for management and an experimental demo CLI and web interface.

A.3.  Partially Implemented

The current APIs make multiple domains visible to client software, but most client UI today lumps all discovered services into a single flat list. This is largely a chicken-and-egg problem. Application writers were naturally reluctant to spend time writing domain-aware UI code when few customers today would benefit from it. If Discovery Proxy deployment becomes common, then application writers will have a reason to provide better UI. Existing applications will work with
the Discovery Proxy, but will show all services in a single flat list. Applications with improved UI will group services by domain.

The Long-Lived Query mechanism [DNS-LLQ] referred to in this specification exists and is deployed, but has not been standardized by the IETF. The IETF is developing a superior Long-Lived Query mechanism called DNS Push Notifications [Push], which is based on DNS Stateful Operations [DSO]. The pragmatic short-term deployment approach is for vendors to produce Discovery Proxies that implement both the deployed Long-Lived Query mechanism [DNS-LLQ] (for today’s clients) and the new DNS Push Notifications mechanism [Push] as the preferred long-term direction.

Implementations of the translating/filtering Discovery Proxy specified in this document are under development, and operational experience with these implementations has guided updates to this document.

A.4. Not Yet Implemented

Client implementations of the new DNS Push Notifications mechanism [Push] are currently underway.

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Abstract

DNS-SD (DNS Service Discovery) normally discloses information about both the devices offering services and the devices requesting services. This information includes host names, network parameters, and possibly a further description of the corresponding service instance. Especially when mobile devices engage in DNS Service Discovery over Multicast DNS at a public hotspot, a serious privacy problem arises.

We propose to solve this problem by a two-stage approach. In the first stage, hosts discover Private Discovery Service Instances via DNS-SD using special formats to protect their privacy. These service instances correspond to Private Discovery Servers running on peers. In the second stage, hosts directly query these Private Discovery Servers via DNS-SD over TLS. A pairwise shared secret necessary to establish these connections is only known to hosts authorized by a pairing system.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on March 14, 2018.
1. Introduction .................................................. 3
  1.1. Requirements ................................................. 4
2. Privacy Implications of DNS-SD ................................. 4
  2.1. Privacy Implication of Publishing Service Instance Names ... 4
  2.2. Privacy Implication of Publishing Node Names ................. 5
  2.3. Privacy Implication of Publishing Service Attributes .......... 5
  2.4. Device Fingerprinting ............................... 6
  2.5. Privacy Implication of Discovering Services ................. 7
3. Design of the Private DNS-SD Discovery Service ............... 7
  3.1. Device Pairing ................................................. 8
  3.2. Discovery of the Private Discovery Service ................. 8
  3.2.1. Obfuscated Instance Names ................................. 9
  3.2.2. Using a Predictable Nonce ................................ 9
  3.2.3. Using a Short Proof ...................................... 10
  3.2.4. Direct Queries ............................................ 12
  3.3. Private Discovery Service .................................. 12
  3.3.1. A Note on Private DNS Services ........................... 13
  3.4. Randomized Host Names ...................................... 14
  3.5. Timing of Obfuscation and Randomization ..................... 14
4. Private Discovery Service Specification ....................... 14
  4.1. Host Name Randomization .................................... 15
  4.2. Device Pairing .............................................. 15
  4.3. Private Discovery Server .................................... 15
  4.3.1. Establishing TLS Connections ............................. 15
  4.4. Publishing Private Discovery Service Instances ............. 16
  4.5. Discovering Private Discovery Service Instances ............ 17
  4.6. Direct Discovery of Private Discovery Service Instances ... 18
  4.7. Using the Private Discovery Service ........................ 19
5. Security Considerations ........................................ 19
  5.1. Attacks Against the Pairing System .......................... 19
  5.2. Denial of Discovery of the Private Discovery Service ......... 19
1. Introduction

DNS-SD [RFC6763] over mDNS [RFC6762] enables configurationless service discovery in local networks. It is very convenient for users, but it requires the public exposure of the offering and requesting identities along with information about the offered and requested services. Parts of the published information can seriously breach the user’s privacy. These privacy issues and potential solutions are discussed in [KW14a] and [KW14b].

There are cases when nodes connected to a network want to provide or consume services without exposing their identity to the other parties connected to the same network. Consider for example a traveler wanting to upload pictures from a phone to a laptop when connected to the Wi-Fi network of an Internet cafe, or two travelers who want to share files between their laptops when waiting for their plane in an airport lounge.

We expect that these exchanges will start with a discovery procedure using DNS-SD [RFC6763] over mDNS [RFC6762]. One of the devices will publish the availability of a service, such as a picture library or a file store in our examples. The user of the other device will discover this service, and then connect to it.

When analyzing these scenarios in Section 2, we find that the DNS-SD messages leak identifying information such as the instance name, the host name or service properties. We review the design constraint of a solution in Section 3, and describe the proposed solution in Section 4.

While we focus on a mDNS-based distribution of the DNS-SD resource records, our solution is agnostic about the distribution method and also works with other distribution methods, e.g. the classical hierarchical DNS.
1.1. Requirements

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2. Privacy Implications of DNS-SD

DNS-Based Service Discovery (DNS-SD) is defined in [RFC6763]. It allows nodes to publish the availability of an instance of a service by inserting specific records in the DNS ([RFC1033], [RFC1034], [RFC1035]) or by publishing these records locally using multicast DNS (mDNS) [RFC6762]. Available services are described using three types of records:

PTR Record: Associates a service type in the domain with an "instance" name of this service type.

SRV Record: Provides the node name, port number, priority and weight associated with the service instance, in conformance with [RFC2782].

TXT Record: Provides a set of attribute-value pairs describing specific properties of the service instance.

In the remaining subsections, we will review the privacy issues related to publishing instance names, node names, service attributes and other data, as well as review the implications of using the discovery service as a client.

2.1. Privacy Implication of Publishing Service Instance Names

In the first phase of discovery, the client obtains all the PTR records associated with a service type in a given naming domain. Each PTR record contains a Service Instance Name defined in Section 4 of [RFC6763]:

Service Instance Name = <Instance> . <Service> . <Domain>

The <Instance> portion of the Service Instance Name is meant to convey enough information for users of discovery clients to easily select the desired service instance. Nodes that use DNS-SD over mDNS [RFC6762] in a mobile environment will rely on the specificity of the instance name to identify the desired service instance. In our example of users wanting to upload pictures to a laptop in an Internet Cafe, the list of available service instances may look like:
Alice’s Images . _imageStore._tcp . local
Alice’s Mobile Phone . _presence._tcp . local
Alice’s Notebook . _presence._tcp . local
Bob’s Notebook . _presence._tcp . local
Carol’s Notebook . _presence._tcp . local

Alice will see the list on her phone and understand intuitively that she should pick the first item. The discovery will "just work".

However, DNS-SD/mDNS will reveal to anybody that Alice is currently visiting the Internet Cafe. It further discloses the fact that she uses two devices, shares an image store, and uses a chat application supporting the _presence protocol on both of her devices. She might currently chat with Bob or Carol, as they are also using a _presence supporting chat application. This information is not just available to devices actively browsing for and offering services, but to anybody passively listening to the network traffic.

2.2. Privacy Implication of Publishing Node Names

The SRV records contain the DNS name of the node publishing the service. Typical implementations construct this DNS name by concatenating the "host name" of the node with the name of the local domain. The privacy implications of this practice are reviewed in [RFC8117]. Depending on naming practices, the host name is either a strong identifier of the device, or at a minimum a partial identifier. It enables tracking of both the device, and, by extension, the device’s owner.

2.3. Privacy Implication of Publishing Service Attributes

The TXT record’s attribute-value pairs contain information on the characteristics of the corresponding service instance. This in turn reveals information about the devices that publish services. The amount of information varies widely with the particular service and its implementation:

- Some attributes like the paper size available in a printer, are the same on many devices, and thus only provide limited information to a tracker.
- Attributes that have freeform values, such as the name of a directory, may reveal much more information.

Combinations of attributes have more information power than specific attributes, and can potentially be used for "fingerprinting" a specific device.
Information contained in TXT records does not only breach privacy by making devices trackable, but might directly contain private information about the user. For instance the _presence service reveals the "chat status" to everyone in the same network. Users might not be aware of that.

Further, TXT records often contain version information about services allowing potential attackers to identify devices running exploit-prone versions of a certain service.

2.4. Device Fingerprinting

The combination of information published in DNS-SD has the potential to provide a "fingerprint" of a specific device. Such information includes:

- The list of services published by the device, which can be retrieved because the SRV records will point to the same host name.
- The specific attributes describing these services.
- The port numbers used by the services.
- The values of the priority and weight attributes in the SRV records.

This combination of services and attributes will often be sufficient to identify the version of the software running on a device. If a device publishes many services with rich sets of attributes, the combination may be sufficient to identify the specific device.

A sometimes heard argument is that devices providing services can be identified by observing the local traffic, and that trying to hide the presence of the service is futile. This argument, however, does not carry much weight because

1. proving privacy at the discovery layer is of the essence for enabling automatically configured privacy-preserving network applications. Application layer protocols are not forced to leverage the offered privacy, but if device tracking is not prevented at the deeper layers, including the service discovery layer, obfuscating a certain service’s protocol at the application layer is futile.

2. Further, even if the application layer does not protect privacy, it is hard to record and analyse the unicast traffic (which most
applications will generate) compared to just listening to the multicast messages sent by DNS-SD/mDNS.

The same argument can be extended to say that the pattern of services offered by a device allows for fingerprinting the device. This may or may not be true, since we can expect that services will be designed or updated to avoid leaking fingerprints. In any case, the design of the discovery service should avoid making a bad situation worse, and should as much as possible avoid providing new fingerprinting information.

2.5. Privacy Implication of Discovering Services

The consumers of services engage in discovery, and in doing so reveal some information such as the list of services they are interested in and the domains in which they are looking for the services. When the clients select specific instances of services, they reveal their preference for these instances. This can be benign if the service type is very common, but it could be more problematic for sensitive services, such as for example some private messaging services.

One way to protect clients would be to somehow encrypt the requested service types. Of course, just as we noted in Section 2.4, traffic analysis can often reveal the service.

3. Design of the Private DNS-SD Discovery Service

In this section, we present the design of a two-stage solution that enables private use of DNS-SD, without affecting existing users. The solution is largely based on the architecture proposed in [KW14b] and [K17], which separates the general private discovery problem in three components. The first component is an offline pairing mechanism, which is performed only once per pair of users. It establishes a shared secret over an authenticated channel, allowing devices to authenticate using this secret without user interaction at any later point in time. We use the pairing system proposed in [I-D.ietf-dnssd-pairing].

The further two components are online (in contrast to pairing they are performed anew each time joining a network) and compose the two service discovery stages, namely

- Discovery of the Private Discovery Service -- the first stage -- in which hosts discover the Private Discovery Service (PDS), a special service offered by every host supporting our extension. After the discovery, hosts connect to the PSD offered by paired peers.
Actual Service Discovery -- the second stage -- is performed through the Private Discovery Service, which only accepts encrypted messages associated with an authenticated session; thus not compromising privacy.

In other words, the hosts first discover paired peers and then directly engage in privacy preserving service discovery.

The stages are independent with respect to means used for transmitting the necessary data. While in our extension the messages for the first stage are transmitted using IP multicast, the messages for the second stage are transmitted via unicast. One could also imagine using a Distributed Hash Table for the first stage, being completely independent of multicast.

3.1. Device Pairing

Any private discovery solution needs to differentiate between authorized devices, which are allowed to get information about discoverable entities, and other devices, which should not be aware of the availability of private entities. The commonly used solution to this problem is establishing a "device pairing".

Device pairing has to be performed only once per pair of users. This is important for user-friendliness, as it is the only step that demands user-interaction. After this single pairing, privacy preserving service discovery works fully automatically. In this document, we utilize [I-D.ietf-dnssd-pairing] as the pairing mechanism.

The pairing yields a mutually authenticated shared secret, and optionally mutually authenticated public keys or certificates added to a local web of trust. Public key technology has many advantages, but shared secrets are typically easier to handle on small devices.

3.2. Discovery of the Private Discovery Service

The first stage of service discovery is to check whether instances of compatible Private Discovery Services are available in the local scope. The goal of that stage is to identify devices that share a pairing with the querier, and are available locally. The service instances can be browsed using regular DNS-SD procedures, and then filtered so that only instances offered by paired devices are retained.
3.2.1. Obfuscated Instance Names

The instance names for the Private Discovery Service are obfuscated, so that authorized peers can associate the instance with its publisher, but unauthorized peers can only observe what looks like a random name. To achieve this, the names are composed as the concatenation of a nonce and a proof, which is composed by hashing the nonce with a pairing key:

\[
\text{PrivateInstanceName} = \text{nonce} | \text{proof}
\]

\[
\text{proof} = \text{hash}(<\text{nonce} | \text{key}>)
\]

The publisher will publish as many instances as it has established pairings.

The discovering party that looks for instances of the service will receive lists of advertisements from nodes present on the network. For each advertisement, it will parse the instance name, and then, for each available pairing key, compares the proof to the hash of the nonce concatenated with this pairing key. If there is no match, it discards the instance name. If there is a match, it has discovered a peer.

3.2.2. Using a PredictableNonce

Assume that there are N nodes on the local scope, and that each node has on average M pairings. Each node will publish on average M records, and the node engaging in discovery may have to process on average N*M instance names. The discovering node will have to compute on average M potential hashes for each nonce. The number of hash computations would scale as O(N*M*M), which means that it could cause a significant drain of resource in large networks.

In order to minimize the amount of computing resource, we suggest that the nonce be derived from the current time, for example set to a representation of the current time rounded to some period. With this convention, receivers can predict the nonces that will appear in the published instances.

The publishers will have to create new records at the end of each rounding period. If the rounding period is set too short, they will have to repeat that very often, which is inefficient. On the other hand, if the rounding period is too long, the system may be exposed to replay attacks. We initially proposed a value of about 5 minutes, which would work well for the mDNS variant of DNS-SD. However, this may cause an excessive number of updates for the DNS server based version of DNS-SD. We propose to set a value of about 30 minutes, which seems to be a reasonable compromise.
Receivers can pre-calculate all the $M$ relevant proofs once per time interval and then establish a mapping from the corresponding instance names to the pairing data in form of a hash table. These $M$ relevant proofs are the proofs resulting from hashing a host’s $M$ pairing keys alongside the current nonce. Each time they receive an instance name, they can test in $O(1)$ time if the received service information is relevant or not.

Unix defines a 32 bit time stamp as the number of seconds elapsed since January 1st, 1970 not counting leap seconds. The most significant 20 bits of this 32 bit number represent the number of 2048 seconds intervals since the epoch. 2048 seconds correspond to 34 minutes and 8 seconds, which is close enough to our design goal of 30 minutes. We will thus use this 20 bit number as nonce, which for simplicity will be padded zeroes to 24 bits and encoded in 3 octets.

For coping with time skew, receivers pre-calculate proofs for the respective next time interval and store hash tables for the last, the current, and the next time interval. When receiving a service instance name, receivers first check whether the nonce corresponds to the current, the last or the next time interval, and if so, check whether the instance name is in the corresponding hash table. For (approximately) meeting our design goal of 5 min validity, the last time interval may only be considered if the current one is less than half way over and the next time interval may only be considered if the current time interval is more than half way over.

Publishers will need to compute $O(M)$ hashes at most once per time stamp interval. If records can be created "on the fly", publishers will only need to perform that computation upon receipt of the first query during a given interval, and cache the computed results for the remainder of the interval. There are however scenarios in which records have to be produced in advance, for example when records are published within a scope defined by a domain name and managed by a "classic" DNS server. In such scenarios, publishers will need to perform the computations and publication exactly once per time stamp interval.

3.2.3. Using a Short Proof

Devices will have to publish as many instance names as they have peers. The instance names will have to be represented via a text string, which means that the binary concatenation of nonce and proof will have to be encoded using a binary-to-text conversion such as BASE64 ([RFC2045] section 6.8) or BASE32 ([RFC4648] section 6).

Using long proofs, such as the full output of SHA256 ([RFC4055]), would generate fairly long instance names: 48 characters using BASE64, or
56 using BASE32. These long names would inflate the network traffic required when discovering the privacy service. They would also limit the number of DNS-SD PTR records that could be packed in a single 1500 octet sized packet, to 23 or fewer with BASE64, or 20 or fewer with BASE32.

Shorter proofs lead to shorter messages, which is more efficient as long as we do not encounter too many collisions. A collision will happen if the proof computed by the publisher using one key matches a proof computed by a receiver using another key. If a receiver mistakenly believes that a proof fits one of its peers, it will attempt to connect to the service as explained in section 4.5 but in the absence of the proper pairwise shared key, the connection will fail. This will not create an actual error, but the probability of such events should be kept low.

The following table provides the probability that a discovery agent maintaining 100 pairings will observe a collision after receiving 100000 advertisement records. It also provides the number of characters required for the encoding of the corresponding instance name in BASE64 or BASE32, assuming 24 bit nonces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proof</th>
<th>Collisions</th>
<th>BASE64</th>
<th>BASE32</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>5.96046%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>0.02328%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>0.00009%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>3.6E-09</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>1.4E-11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1

The table shows that for a proof, 24 bits would be too short. 32 bits might be long enough, but the BASE64 encoding requires padding if the input is not an even multiple of 24 bits, and BASE32 requires padding if the input is not a multiple of 40 bits. Given that, the desirable proof lengths are thus 48 bits if using BASE64, or 56 bits if using BASE32. The resulting instance name will be either 12 characters long with BASE64, allowing 54 advertisements in an 1500 byte mDNS message, or 16 characters long with BASE32, allowing 47 advertisements per message.

In the specification section, we will assume BASE64, and 48 bit proofs composed of the first 6 bytes of a SHA256 hash.
3.2.4. Direct Queries

The preceding sections assume that the discovery is performed using the classic DNS-SD process, in which a query for all available "instance names" of a service provides a list of PTR records. The discoverer will then select the instance names that correspond to its peers, and request the SRV and TXT records corresponding to the service instance, and then obtain the relevant A or AAAA records. This is generally required in DNS-SD because the instance names are not known in advance, but for the Private Discovery Service the instance names can be predicted, and a more efficient Direct Query method can be used.

At a given time, the node engaged in discovery can predict the nonce that its peer will use, since that nonce is composed by rounding the current time. The node can also compute the proofs that its peers might use, since it knows the nonce and the keys. The node can thus build a list of instance names, and directly query the SRV records corresponding to these names. If peers are present, they will answer directly.

This "direct query" process will result in fewer network messages than the regular DNS-SD query process in some circumstances, depending on the number of peers per node and the number of nodes publishing the presence discovery service in the desired scope.

When using mDNS, it is possible to pack multiple queries in a single broadcast message. Using name compression and 12 characters per instance name, it is possible to pack 70 queries in a 1500 octet mDNS multicast message. It is also possible to request unicast replies to the queries, resulting in significant efficiency gains in wireless networks.

3.3. Private Discovery Service

The Private Discovery Service discovery allows discovering a list of available paired devices, and verifying that either party knows the corresponding shared secret. At that point, the querier can engage in a series of directed discoveries.

We have considered defining an ad-hoc protocol for the private discovery service, but found that just using TLS would be much simpler. The directed Private Discovery Service is just a regular DNS-SD service, accessed over TLS, using the encapsulation of DNS over TLS defined in [RFC7858]. The main difference with plain DNS over TLS is the need for an authentication based on pre-shared keys.
We assume that the pairing process has provided each pair of authorized client and server with a shared secret. We can use that shared secret to provide mutual authentication of clients and servers using "Pre-Shared Key" authentication, as defined in [RFC4279] and incorporated in the latest version of TLS [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13].

One difficulty is the reliance on a key identifier in the protocol. For example, in TLS 1.3 the PSK extension is defined as:

```c
opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>;
struct {
    select (Role) {
        case client:
            psk_identity identities<2..2^16-1>;
        case server:
            uint16 selected_identity;
    }
} PreSharedKeyExtension
```

According to the protocol, the PSK identity is passed in clear text at the beginning of the key exchange. This is logical, since server and clients need to identify the secret that will be used to protect the connection. But if we used a static identifier for the key, adversaries could use that identifier to track server and clients. The solution is to use a time-varying identifier, constructed exactly like the "proof" described in Section 3.2, by concatenating a nonce and the hash of the nonce with the shared secret.

3.3.1. A Note on Private DNS Services

Our solution uses a variant of the DNS over TLS protocol [RFC7858] defined by the DNS Private Exchange working group (DPRIVE). DPRIVE further published an UDP variant, DNS over DTLS [RFC8094], which would also be a candidate.

DPRIVE and Private Discovery, however, solve two somewhat different problems. While DPRIVE is concerned with the confidentiality of DNS transactions addressing the problems outlined in [RFC7626], DPRIVE does not address the confidentiality or privacy issues with publication of services, and is not a direct solution to DNS-SD privacy:

- Discovery queries are scoped by the domain name within which services are published. As nodes move and visit arbitrary networks, there is no guarantee that the domain services for these networks will be accessible using DNS over TLS or DNS over DTLS.
Information placed in the DNS is considered public. Even if the server does support DNS over TLS, third parties will still be able to discover the content of PTR, SRV and TXT records.

Neither DNS over TLS nor DNS over DTLS applies to mDNS. In contrast, we propose using mutual authentication of the client and server as part of the TLS solution, to ensure that only authorized parties learn the presence of a service.

3.4. Randomized Host Names

Instead of publishing their actual host names in the SRV records, nodes could publish randomized host names. That is the solution argued for in [RFC8117].

Randomized host names will prevent some of the tracking. Host names are typically not visible by the users, and randomizing host names will probably not cause much usability issues.

3.5. Timing of Obfuscation and Randomization

It is important that the obfuscation of instance names is performed at the right time, and that the obfuscated names change in synchrony with other identifiers, such as MAC Addresses, IP Addresses or host names. If the randomized host name changed but the instance name remained constant, an adversary would have no difficulty linking the old and new host names. Similarly, if IP or MAC addresses changed but host names remained constant, the adversary could link the new addresses to the old ones using the published name.

The problem is handled in [RFC8117], which recommends to pick a new random host name at the time of connecting to a new network. New instance names for the Private Discovery Services should be composed at the same time.

4. Private Discovery Service Specification

The proposed solution uses the following components:

- Host name randomization to prevent tracking.
- Device pairing yielding pairwise shared secrets.
- A Private Discovery Server (PDS) running on each host.
- Discovery of the PDS instances using DNS-SD.
These components are detailed in the following subsections.

4.1. Host Name Randomization

Nodes publishing services with DNS-SD and concerned about their privacy MUST use a randomized host name. The randomized name MUST be changed when network connectivity changes, to avoid the correlation issues described in Section 3.5. The randomized host name MUST be used in the SRV records describing the service instance, and the corresponding A or AAAA records MUST be made available through DNS or mDNS, within the same scope as the PTR, SRV and TXT records used by DNS-SD.

If the link-layer address of the network connection is properly obfuscated (e.g. using MAC Address Randomization), the Randomized Host Name MAY be computed using the algorithm described in section 3.7 of [RFC7844]. If this is not possible, the randomized host name SHOULD be constructed by simply picking a 48 bit random number meeting the Randomness Requirements for Security expressed in [RFC4075], and then use the hexadecimal representation of this number as the obfuscated host name.

4.2. Device Pairing

Nodes that want to leverage the Private Directory Service for private service discovery among peers MUST share a secret with each of these peers. Each shared secret MUST be a 256 bit randomly chosen number. We RECOMMEND using the pairing mechanism proposed in [I-D.ietf-dnssd-pairing] to establish these secrets.

4.3. Private Discovery Server

A Private Discovery Server (PDS) is a minimal DNS server running on each host. Its task is to offer resource records corresponding to private services only to authorized peers. These peers MUST share a secret with the host (see Section 4.2). To ensure privacy of the requests, the service is only available over TLS [RFC5246], and the shared secrets are used to mutually authenticate peers and servers.

The Private Name Server SHOULD support DNS push notifications [I-D.ietf-dnssd-push], e.g. to facilitate an up-to-date contact list in a chat application without polling.

4.3.1. Establishing TLS Connections

The PDS MUST only answer queries via DNS over TLS [RFC7858] and MUST use a PSK authenticated TLS handshake [RFC4279]. The client and server SHOULD negotiate a forward secure cipher suite such as DHE-PSK...
or ECDHE-PSK when available. The shared secret exchanged during pairing MUST be used as PSK. To guarantee interoperability, implementations of the Private Name Server MUST support TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384.

When using the PSK based authentication, the "psk_identity" parameter identifying the pre-shared key MUST be identical to the "Instance Identifier" defined in Section 4.4, i.e. 24 bit nonce and 48 bit proof encoded in BASE64 as 12 character string. The server will use the pairing key associated with this instance identifier.

4.4. Publishing Private Discovery Service Instances

Nodes that provide the Private Discovery Service SHOULD advertise their availability by publishing instances of the service through DNS-SD.

The DNS-SD service type for the Private Discovery Service is "_pds._tcp".

Each published instance describes one server and one pairing. In the case where a node manages more than one pairing, it should publish as many instances as necessary to advertise the PDS to all paired peers.

Each instance name is composed as follows:

- pick a 24 bit nonce, set to the 20 most significant bits of the 32 bit Unix GMT time padded with 4 zeroes.
  
  For example, on August 22, 2017 at 20h 4 min and 54 seconds international time, the Unix 32 bit time had the hexadecimal value 0x599C8E68. The corresponding nonce would be set to the 24 bits: 0x599C80.

- compute a 48 bit proof:
  
  proof = first 48 bits of HASH(<nonce>|<pairing key>)

- set the 72 bit binary identifier as the concatenation of nonce and proof

- set instance_name = BASE64(binary identifier)

In this formula, HASH SHOULD be the function SHA256 defined in [RFC4055], and BASE64 is defined in section 6.8 of [RFC2045]. The concatenation of a 24 bit nonce and 48 bit proof result in a 72 bit string. The BASE64 conversion is 12 characters long per [RFC6763].
4.5. Discovering Private Discovery Service Instances

Nodes that wish to discover Private Discovery Service Instances SHOULD issue a DNS-SD discovery request for the service type 
"_pds._tcp". They MAY, as an alternative, use the Direct Discovery procedure defined in Section 4.6. When using the Direct Discovery procedure over mDNS, nodes SHOULD always set the QU-bit (unicast response requested, see [RFC6762] Section 5.4) because responses related to a "_pds._tcp" instance are only relevant for the querying node itself.

When nodes send a DNS-SD discovery request, they will receive in response a series of PTR records, each providing the name of one of the instances present in the scope.

For each time interval, the querier SHOULD pre-calculate a hash table mapping instance names to pairings according to the following conceptual algorithm:

nonce = 20 bit rounded time stamp of the respective next time interval padded to 24 bits with four zeroes
for each available pairing
    retrieve the key Xj of pairing number j
    compute F = first 48 bits of hash(nonce, Xj)
    construct the binary instance_name as described in the previous section
    instance_names[nonce][instance_name] = Xj;

The querier SHOULD store the hash tables for the previous, the current, and the next time interval.

The querier SHOULD examine each instance to see whether it corresponds to one of its available pairings, according to the following conceptual algorithm:
for each received instance_name:
    convert the instance name to binary using BASE64
    if the conversion fails,
        discard the instance.
    if the binary instance length is not 72 bits,
        discard the instance.

nonce = first 24 bits of binary.

Check that the 4 least significant bits of the nonce have the value 0, and that the 20 most significant bits of the nonce match the first 20 bits of the current time, or the previous interval (20 bit number minus 1) if the current interval is less than half over, or the next interval (20 bit number plus 1) if the current interval is more than half over. If the nonce does not match an acceptable value, discard the instance.

if ((Xj = instance_names[nonce][instance_name]) != null)
    mark the pairing number j as available

The check of the current time is meant to mitigate replay attacks, while not mandating a time synchronization precision better than 15 minutes.

Once a pairing has been marked available, the querier SHOULD try connecting to the corresponding instance, using the selected key. The connection is likely to succeed, but it MAY fail for a variety of reasons. One of these reasons is the probabilistic nature of the proof, which entails a small chance of "false positive" match. This will occur if the hash of the nonce with two different keys produces the same result. In that case, the TLS connection will fail with an authentication error or a decryption error.

4.6. Direct Discovery of Private Discovery Service Instances

Nodes that wish to discover Private Discovery Service Instances MAY use the following Direct Discovery procedure instead of the regular DNS-SD Discovery explained in Section 4.5.

To perform Direct Discovery, nodes should compose a list of Private Discovery Service Instances Names. There will be one name for each pairing available to the node. The Instance name for each name will be composed of a nonce and a proof, using the algorithm specified in Section 4.4.
The querier will issue SRV record queries for each of these names. The queries will only succeed if the corresponding instance is present, in which case a pairing is discovered. After that, the querier SHOULD try connecting to the corresponding instance, as explained in Section 4.4.

4.7. Using the Private Discovery Service

Once instances of the Private Discovery Service have been discovered, peers can establish TLS connections and send DNS requests over these connections, as specified in DNS-SD.

5. Security Considerations

This document specifies a method for protecting the privacy of nodes that offer and query for services. This is especially useful when operating in a public space. Hiding the identity of the publishing nodes prevents some forms of "targeting" of high value nodes. However, adversaries can attempt various attacks to break the anonymity of the service, or to deny it. A list of these attacks and their mitigations are described in the following sections.

5.1. Attacks Against the Pairing System

There are a variety of attacks against pairing systems, which may result in compromised pairing secrets. If an adversary manages to acquire a compromised key, the adversary will be able to perform private service discovery according to Section 4.5. This will allow tracking of the service. The adversary will also be able to discover which private services are available for the compromised pairing.

Attacks on pairing systems are detailed in [I-D.ietf-dnssd-pairing].

5.2. Denial of Discovery of the Private Discovery Service

The algorithm described in Section 4.5 scales as \( O(M^2N) \), where \( M \) is the number of pairings per node and \( N \) is the number of nodes in the local scope. Adversaries can attack this service by publishing "fake" instances, effectively increasing the number \( N \) in that scaling equation.

Similar attacks can be mounted against DNS-SD: creating fake instances will generally increase the noise in the system and make discovery less usable. Private Discovery Service discovery SHOULD use the same mitigations as DNS-SD.

The attack could be amplified if the clients needed to compute proofs for all the nonces presented in Private Discovery Service Instance
names. This is mitigated by the specification of nonces as rounded
time stamps in Section 4.5. If we assume that timestamps must not be
too old, there will be a finite number of valid rounded timestamps at
any time. Even if there are many instances present, they would all
pick their nonces from this small number of rounded timestamps, and a
smart client will make sure that proofs are only computed once per
valid time stamp.

5.3. Replay Attacks Against Discovery of the Private Discovery Service

Adversaries can record the service instance names published by
Private Discovery Service instances, and replay them later in
different contexts. Peers engaging in discovery can be misled into
believing that a paired server is present. They will attempt to
connect to the absent peer, and in doing so will disclose their
presence in a monitored scope.

The binary instance identifiers defined in Section 4.4 start with 24
bits encoding the most significant bits of the "UNIX" time. In order
to protect against replay attacks, clients SHOULD verify that this
time is reasonably recent, as specified in Section 4.5.

5.4. Denial of Private Discovery Service

The Private Discovery Service is only available through a mutually
authenticated TLS connection, which provides state-of-the-art
protection mechanisms. However, adversaries can mount a denial of
service attack against the service. In the absence of shared
secrets, the connections will fail, but the servers will expend some
CPU cycles defending against them.

To mitigate such attacks, nodes SHOULD restrict the range of network
addresses from which they accept connections, matching the expected
scope of the service.

This mitigation will not prevent denial of service attacks performed
by locally connected adversaries; but protecting against local denial
of service attacks is generally very difficult. For example, local
attackers can also attack mDNS and DNS-SD by generating a large
number of multicast requests.

5.5. Replay Attacks against the Private Discovery Service

Adversaries may record the PSK Key Identifiers used in successful
connections to a private discovery service. They could attempt to
replay them later against nodes advertising the private service at
other times or at other locations. If the PSK identifier is still
valid, the server will accept the TLS connection, and in doing so
will reveal being the same server observed at a previous time or location.

The PSK identifiers defined in Section 4.3.1 start with the 24 most significant bits of the "UNIX" time. In order to mitigate replay attacks, servers SHOULD verify that this time is reasonably recent, and fail the connection if it is too old, or if it occurs too far in the future.

The processing of timestamps is however affected by the accuracy of computer clocks. If the check is too strict, reasonable connections could fail. To further mitigate replay attacks, servers MAY record the list of valid PSK identifiers received in a recent past, and fail connections if one of these identifiers is replayed.

5.6. Replay attacks and clock synchronization

The mitigation of replay attacks relies on verification of the time encoded in the nonce. This verification assumes that the hosts engaged in discovery have a reasonably accurate sense of the current time.

5.7. Fingerprinting the number of published instances

Adversaries could monitor the number of instances published by a particular device, which in the absence of mitigations will reflect the number of pairings established by that device. This number will probably vary between 1 and maybe 100, providing the adversary with maybe 6 or 7 bits of input in a fingerprinting algorithm.

Devices MAY protect against this fingerprinting by publishing a number of "fake" instances in addition to the real ones. The fake instance identifiers will contain the same nonce as the genuine instance identifiers, and random bits instead of the proof. Peers should be able to quickly discard these fake instances, as the proof will not match any of the values that they expect. One plausible padding strategy is to ensure that the total number of published instances, either fake or genuine, matches one of a few values such as 16, 32, 64, or higher powers of 2.

6. IANA Considerations

This draft does not require any IANA action.
7. Acknowledgments

This draft results from initial discussions with Dave Thaler, and encouragements from the DNS-SD working group members. We would like to thank Stephane Bortzmeyer and Ted Lemon for their detailed reviews of the working draft.

8. References

8.1. Normative References


8.2. Informative References

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Internet-Draft          DNS-SD Privacy Extensions         September 2017

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Abstract

The Domain Name System (DNS) was designed to return matching records efficiently for queries for data that are relatively static. When those records change frequently, DNS is still efficient at returning the updated results when polled, as long as the polling rate is not too high. But there exists no mechanism for a client to be asynchronously notified when these changes occur. This document defines a mechanism for a client to be notified of such changes to DNS records, called DNS Push Notifications.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction .................................................. 3
   1.1. Requirements Language .................................. 3
2. Motivation ..................................................... 4
3. Overview ....................................................... 5
4. Transport ...................................................... 7
5. State Considerations ........................................... 8
6. Protocol Operation ............................................. 9
   6.1. Discovery .................................................. 10
   6.2. DNS Push Notification SUBSCRIBE ............................ 13
      6.2.1. SUBSCRIBE Request ..................................... 13
      6.2.2. SUBSCRIBE Response .................................... 16
   6.3. DNS Push Notification Updates ............................... 19
      6.3.1. PUSH Message ........................................ 19
   6.4. DNS Push Notification UNSUBSCRIBE .......................... 22
      6.4.1. UNSUBSCRIBE Request .................................. 22
   6.5. DNS Push Notification RECONFIRM ............................. 24
      6.5.1. RECONFIRM Request ..................................... 24
      6.5.2. RECONFIRM Response .................................... 26
   6.6. Client-Initiated Termination ................................. 28
7. Security Considerations ......................................... 29
   7.1. Security Services .......................................... 29
   7.2. TLS Name Authentication ................................... 29
   7.3. TLS Compression ........................................... 30
   7.4. TLS Session Resumption .................................... 30
8. IANA Considerations ............................................ 30
9. Acknowledgements ............................................... 31
10. References .................................................... 31
   10.1. Normative References ..................................... 31
   10.2. Informative References .................................... 33
Authors’ Addresses ................................................ 35
1. Introduction

Domain Name System (DNS) records may be updated using DNS Update [RFC2136]. Other mechanisms such as a Discovery Proxy [DisProx] can also generate changes to a DNS zone. This document specifies a protocol for DNS clients to subscribe to receive asynchronous notifications of changes to RRSets of interest. It is immediately relevant in the case of DNS Service Discovery [RFC6763] but is not limited to that use case, and provides a general DNS mechanism for DNS record change notifications. Familiarity with the DNS protocol and DNS packet formats is assumed [RFC1034] [RFC1035] [RFC6895].

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here [RFC2119] [RFC8174].
2. Motivation

As the domain name system continues to adapt to new uses and changes in deployment, polling has the potential to burden DNS servers at many levels throughout the network. Other network protocols have successfully deployed a publish/subscribe model following the Observer design pattern [obs]. XMPP Publish-Subscribe [XEP0060] and Atom [RFC4287] are examples. While DNS servers are generally highly tuned and capable of a high rate of query/response traffic, adding a publish/subscribe model for tracking changes to DNS records can deliver more timely notification of changes with reduced CPU usage and lower network traffic.

Multicast DNS [RFC6762] implementations always listen on a well known link-local IP multicast group, and record changes are sent to that multicast group address for all group members to receive. Therefore, Multicast DNS already has asynchronous change notification capability. However, when DNS Service Discovery [RFC6763] is used across a wide area network using Unicast DNS (possibly facilitated via a Discovery Proxy [DisProx]) it would be beneficial to have an equivalent capability for Unicast DNS, to allow clients to learn about DNS record changes in a timely manner without polling.

The DNS Long-Lived Queries (LLQ) mechanism [LLQ] is an existing deployed solution to provide asynchronous change notifications, used by Apple’s Back to My Mac Service [RFC6281] introduced in Mac OS X 10.5 Leopard in 2007. Back to My Mac was designed in an era when the data center operations staff asserted that it was impossible for a server to handle large numbers of mostly-idle TCP connections, so LLQ was defined as a UDP-based protocol, effectively replicating much of TCP’s connection state management logic in user space, and creating its own poor imitations of existing TCP features like the three-way handshake, flow control, and reliability.

This document builds on experience gained with the LLQ protocol, with an improved design. Instead of using UDP, this specification uses DNS Stateful Operations (DSO) [DSO] running over TLS over TCP, and therefore doesn’t need to reinvent existing TCP functionality. Using TCP also gives long-lived low-traffic connections better longevity through NAT gateways without resorting to excessive keepalive traffic. Instead of inventing a new vocabulary of messages to communicate DNS zone changes as LLQ did, this specification borrows the established syntax and semantics of DNS Update messages [RFC2136].
3. Overview

The existing DNS Update protocol [RFC2136] provides a mechanism for clients to add or delete individual resource records (RRs) or entire resource record sets (RRSets) on the zone’s server.

This specification adopts a simplified subset of these existing syntax and semantics, and uses them for DNS Push Notification messages going in the opposite direction, from server to client, to communicate changes to a zone. The client subscribes for Push Notifications by connecting to the server and sending DNS message(s) indicating the RRSet(s) of interest. When the client loses interest in receiving further updates to these records, it unsubscribes.

The DNS Push Notification server for a zone is any server capable of generating the correct change notifications for a name. It may be a master, slave, or stealth name server [RFC7719]. Consequently, the "_dns-push-tls._tcp.<zone>" SRV record for a zone MAY reference the same target host and port as that zone’s "_dns-update-tls._tcp.<zone>" SRV record. When the same target host and port is offered for both DNS Updates and DNS Push Notifications, a client MAY use a single TCP connection to that server for both DNS Updates and DNS Push Notification Queries.

Supporting DNS Updates and DNS Push Notifications on the same server is OPTIONAL. A DNS Push Notification server does NOT also have to support DNS Update.

DNS Updates and DNS Push Notifications may be handled on different ports on the same target host, in which case they are not considered to be the "same server" for the purposes of this specification, and communications with these two ports are handled independently.

Standard DNS Queries MAY be sent over a DNS Push Notification connection, provided that these are queries for names falling within the server’s zone (the <zone> in the "_dns-push-tls._tcp.<zone>" SRV record). The RD (Recursion Desired) bit MUST be zero. If a query is received with the RD bit set, matching records for names falling within the server’s zones should be returned with the RA (Recursion Available) bit clear. If the query is for a name not in the server’s zone, an error with RCODE NOTAUTH (Not Authoritative) should be returned.

DNS Push Notification clients are NOT required to implement DNS Update Prerequisite processing. Prerequisites are used to perform tentative atomic test-and-set type operations when a client updates records on a server, and that concept has no applicability when it
comes to an authoritative server unilaterally informing a client of changes to DNS records.

This DNS Push Notification specification includes support for DNS classes, for completeness. However, in practice, it is anticipated that for the foreseeable future the only DNS class in use will be DNS class "IN", as is the reality today with existing DNS servers and clients. A DNS Push Notification server MAY choose to implement only DNS class "IN". If messages are received for a class other than "IN", and that class is not supported, an error with RCODE NOTIMPL (Not Implemented) should be returned.

DNS Push Notifications impose less load on the responding server than rapid polling would, but Push Notifications do still have a cost, so DNS Push Notification clients must not recklessly create an excessive number of Push Notification subscriptions. Specifically:

(a) A subscription should only be active when there is a valid reason to need live data (for example, an on-screen display is currently showing the results to the user) and the subscription SHOULD be cancelled as soon as the need for that data ends (for example, when the user dismisses that display). Implementations MAY want to implement idle timeouts, so that if the user ceases interacting with the device, the display showing the result of the DNS Push Notification subscription is automatically dismissed after a certain period of inactivity. For example, if a user presses the "Print" button on their smartphone, and then leaves the phone showing the printer discovery screen until the phone goes to sleep, then the printer discovery screen should be automatically dismissed as the device goes to sleep. If the user does still intend to print, this will require them to press the "Print" button again when they wake their phone up.

(b) A DNS Push Notification client SHOULD NOT routinely keep a DNS Push Notification subscription active 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, just to keep a list in memory up to date so that if the user does choose to bring up an on-screen display of that data, it can be displayed really fast. DNS Push Notifications are designed to be fast enough that there is no need to pre-load a "warm" list in memory just in case it might be needed later.

Generally, as described in the DNS Stateful Operations specification [DSO], a client must not keep a session to a server open indefinitely if it has no subscriptions (or other operations) active on that session. A client MAY close a session as soon as it becomes idle, and then if needed in the future, open a new session when required. Alternatively, a client MAY speculatively keep an idle session open for some time, subject to the constraint that it MUST NOT keep a
session open that has been idle for more than the session’s idle timeout (15 seconds by default).

4. Transport

Other DNS operations like DNS Update [RFC2136] MAY use either User Datagram Protocol (UDP) [RFC0768] or Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [RFC0793] as the transport protocol, in keeping with the historical precedent that DNS queries must first be sent over UDP [RFC1123]. This requirement to use UDP has subsequently been relaxed [RFC7766].

In keeping with the more recent precedent, DNS Push Notification is defined only for TCP. DNS Push Notification clients MUST use DNS Stateful Operations (DSO) [DSO] running over TLS over TCP [RFC7858].

Connection setup over TCP ensures return reachability and alleviates concerns of state overload at the server through anonymous subscriptions. All subscribers are guaranteed to be reachable by the server by virtue of the TCP three-way handshake. Flooding attacks are possible with any protocol, and a benefit of TCP is that there are already established industry best practices to guard against SYN flooding and similar attacks [SYN] [RFC4953].

Use of TCP also allows DNS Push Notifications to take advantage of current and future developments in TCP, such as Multipath TCP (MPTCP) [RFC6824], TCP Fast Open (TFO) [RFC7413], Tail Loss Probe (TLP) [I-D.dukkipati-tcpm-tcp-loss-probe], and so on.

Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246] is well understood and deployed across many protocols running over TCP. It is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery. TLS is REQUIRED for every connection between a client subscriber and server in this protocol specification. Additional security measures such as client authentication during TLS negotiation MAY also be employed to increase the trust relationship between client and server.
5. State Considerations

Each DNS Push Notification server is capable of handling some finite number of Push Notification subscriptions. This number will vary from server to server and is based on physical machine characteristics, network bandwidth, and operating system resource allocation. After a client establishes a session to a DNS server, each subscription is individually accepted or rejected. Servers may employ various techniques to limit subscriptions to a manageable level. Correspondingly, the client is free to establish simultaneous sessions to alternate DNS servers that support DNS Push Notifications for the zone and distribute subscriptions at the client’s discretion. In this way, both clients and servers can react to resource constraints. Token bucket rate limiting schemes are also effective in providing fairness by a server across numerous client requests.
6. Protocol Operation

The DNS Push Notification protocol is a session-oriented protocol, and makes use of DNS Stateful Operations (DSO) [DSO].

For details of the DSO message format refer to the DNS Stateful Operations specification [DSO]. Those details are not repeated here.

DNS Push Notification clients and servers MUST support DSO, but (as stated in the DSO specification [DSO]) the server SHOULD NOT issue any DSO messages until after the client has first initiated an acknowledged DSO message of its own. A single server can support DNS Queries, DNS Updates, and DNS Push Notifications (using DSO) on the same TCP port, and until the client has sent at least one DSO message, the server does not know what kind of client has connected to it. Once the client has indicated willingness to use DSO by sending one of its own, either side of the session may then initiate further DSO messages at any time.

A DNS Push Notification exchange begins with the client discovering the appropriate server, using the procedure described in Section 6.1, and then making a TLS/TCP connection to it.

A typical DNS Push Notification client will immediately issue a DSO Keepalive operation to request a session timeout or keepalive interval longer than the 15-second defaults, but this is not required. A DNS Push Notification client MAY issue other requests on the session first, and only issue a DSO Keepalive operation later if it determines that to be necessary.

Once the session is made, the client may then add and remove Push Notification subscriptions. In accordance with the current set of active subscriptions the server sends relevant asynchronous Push Notifications to the client. Note that a client MUST be prepared to receive (and silently ignore) Push Notifications for subscriptions it has previously removed, since there is no way to prevent the situation where a Push Notification is in flight from server to client while the client’s UNSUBSCRIBE message cancelling that subscription is simultaneously in flight from client to server.
6.1. Discovery

The first step in DNS Push Notification subscription is to discover an appropriate DNS server that supports DNS Push Notifications for the desired zone.

The client begins by opening a DSO Session to its normal configured DNS recursive resolver and requesting a Push Notification subscription. If this is successful, then the recursive resolver will make appropriate Push Notification subscriptions on the client’s behalf, and the client will receive appropriate results. If the recursive resolver does not support Push Notification subscriptions, then it will return an error code, and the client should proceed to discover the appropriate server for direct communication. The client MUST also determine which TCP port on the server is listening for connections, which need not be (and often is not) the typical TCP port 53 used for conventional DNS, or TCP port 853 used for DNS over TLS [RFC7858].

The algorithm described here is an iterative algorithm, which starts with the full name of the record to which the client wishes to subscribe. Successive SOA queries are then issued, trimming one label each time, until the closest enclosing authoritative server is discovered. There is also an optimization to enable the client to take a "short cut" directly to the SOA record of the closest enclosing authoritative server in many cases.

1. The client begins the discovery by sending a DNS query to its local resolver, with record type SOA [RFC1035] for the record name to which it wishes to subscribe. As an example, suppose the client wishes to subscribe to PTR records with the name _ipp._tcp.foo.example.com (to discover Internet Printing Protocol (IPP) printers [RFC8010] [RFC8011] being advertised at "foo.example.com"). The client begins by sending an SOA query for _ipp._tcp.foo.example.com to the local recursive resolver. The goal is to determine the server authoritative for the name _ipp._tcp.foo.example.com. The DNS zone containing the name _ipp._tcp.foo.example.com could be example.com, or foo.example.com, or _tcp.foo.example.com, or even _ipp._tcp.foo.example.com. The client does not know in advance where the closest enclosing zone cut occurs, which is why it uses the procedure described here to discover this information.

2. If the requested SOA record exists, it will be returned in the Answer section with a NOERROR response code, and the client has succeeded in discovering the information it needs. (This text is not placing any new requirements on DNS recursive resolvers. It
is merely describing the existing operation of the DNS protocol
[RFC1034] [RFC1035].)

3. If the requested SOA record does not exist, the client will get
back a NOERROR/NODATA response or an NXDOMAIN/Name Error
response. In either case, the local resolver SHOULD include the
SOA record for the zone of the requested name in the Authority
Section. If the SOA record is received in the Authority Section,
then the client has succeeded in discovering the information it
needs. (This text is not placing any new requirements on DNS
recursive resolvers. It is merely describing the existing
operation of the DNS protocol regarding negative responses
[RFC2308].)

4. If the client receives a response containing no SOA record, then
it proceeds with the iterative approach. The client strips the
leading label from the current query name and if the resulting
name has at least one label in it, the client sends a new SOA
query, and processing continues at step 2 above, repeating the
iterative search until either an SOA is received, or the query
name is empty. In the case of an empty name, this is a network
configuration error which should not happen and the client gives
up. The client may retry the operation at a later time, of the
client’s choosing, such after a change in network attachment.

5. Once the SOA is known (either by virtue of being seen in the
Answer Section, or in the Authority Section), the client sends a
DNS query with type SRV [RFC2782] for the record name
"_dns-push-tls._tcp.<zone>", where <zone> is the owner name of
the discovered SOA record.

6. If the zone in question does not offer DNS Push Notifications
then SRV record MUST NOT exist, and the SRV query will return a
negative answer. (The "_dns-push-tls._tcp" service type is
allocated by IANA for this purpose, and, like any allocated IANA
service type, MUST NOT be used for other services. Other
services that require an IANA service type should use a unique
service type allocated by IANA for that service [RFC6335][ST].)

7. If the zone in question is set up to offer DNS Push Notifications
then this SRV record MUST exist. (If this SRV record does not
exist then the zone is not correctly configured for DNS Push
Notifications as specified in this document.) The SRV "target"
contains the name of the server providing DNS Push Notifications
for the zone. The port number on which to contact the server is
in the SRV record "port" field. The address(es) of the target
host MAY be included in the Additional Section, however, the
address records SHOULD be authenticated before use as described
below in Section 7.2 and in the specification for using DANE TLSA Records with SRV Records [RFC7673].

8. More than one SRV record may be returned. In this case, the "priority" and "weight" values in the returned SRV records are used to determine the order in which to contact the servers for subscription requests. As described in the SRV specification [RFC2782], the server with the lowest "priority" is first contacted. If more than one server has the same "priority", the "weight" indicates the weighted probability that the client should contact that server. Higher weights have higher probabilities of being selected. If a server is not willing to accept a subscription request, or is not reachable within a reasonable time, as determined by the client, then a subsequent server is to be contacted.

Each time a client makes a new DNS Push Notification subscription session, it SHOULD repeat the discovery process in order to determine the preferred DNS server for subscriptions at that time. However, the client device MUST respect the DNS TTL values on records it receives, and store them in its local cache with this lifetime. This means that, as long as the DNS TTL values on the authoritative records were set to reasonable values, repeated application of this discovery process can be completed nearly instantaneously by the client, using only locally-stored cached data.
6.2. DNS Push Notification SUBSCRIBE

After connecting, and requesting a longer idle timeout and/or keepalive interval if necessary, a DNS Push Notification client then indicates its desire to receive DNS Push Notifications for a given domain name by sending a SUBSCRIBE request over the established DSO session to the server. A SUBSCRIBE request is encoded in a DSO [DSO] message. This specification defines a DSO TLV for DNS Push Notification SUBSCRIBE Requests/Responses (tentatively DSO Type Code 0x40).

The entity that initiates a SUBSCRIBE request is by definition the client. A server MUST NOT send a SUBSCRIBE request over an existing session from a client. If a server does send a SUBSCRIBE request over a DSO session initiated by a client, this is a fatal error and the client should immediately abort the connection with a TCP RST (or equivalent for other protocols).

6.2.1. SUBSCRIBE Request

A SUBSCRIBE request begins with the standard DSO 12-byte header [DSO], followed by the SUBSCRIBE TLV. A SUBSCRIBE request message is illustrated in Figure 1.

The MESSAGE ID field MUST be set to a unique value, that the client is not using for any other active operation on this session. For the purposes here, a MESSAGE ID is in use on this session if the client has used it in a request for which it has not yet received a response, or if the client has used it for a subscription which it has not yet cancelled using UNSUBSCRIBE. In the SUBSCRIBE response the server MUST echo back the MESSAGE ID value unchanged.

The other header fields MUST be set as described in the DSO specification [DSO]. The DNS Opcode is the DSO Opcode (tentatively 6). The four count fields MUST be zero, and the corresponding four sections MUST be empty (i.e., absent).

The DSO-TYPE is SUBSCRIBE (tentatively 0x40). The DSO-LENGTH is the length of the DSO-DATA that follows, which specifies the name, type, and class of the record(s) being sought.
The DSO-DATA for a SUBSCRIBE request MUST contain exactly one question. The DSO-DATA for a SUBSCRIBE request has no QDCOUNT field to specify more than one question. Since SUBSCRIBE requests are sent over TCP, multiple SUBSCRIBE request messages can be concatenated in a single TCP stream and packed efficiently into TCP segments.

If accepted, the subscription will stay in effect until the client cancels the subscription using UNSUBSCRIBE or until the DSO session between the client and the server is closed.

SUBSCRIBE requests on a given session MUST be unique. A client MUST NOT send a SUBSCRIBE message that duplicates the NAME, TYPE and CLASS of an existing active subscription on that DSO session. For the purpose of this matching, the established DNS case-insensitivity for US-ASCII letters applies (e.g., "example.com" and "Example.com" are the same). If a server receives such a duplicate SUBSCRIBE message this is an error and the server MUST immediately terminate the connection with a TCP RST (or equivalent for other protocols).
DNS wildcarding is not supported. That is, a wildcard ("*") in a SUBSCRIBE message matches only a literal wildcard character ("**") in the zone, and nothing else.

Aliasing is not supported. That is, a CNAME in a SUBSCRIBE message matches only a literal CNAME record in the zone, and nothing else.

A client may SUBSCRIBE to records that are unknown to the server at the time of the request (providing that the name falls within one of the zone(s) the server is responsible for) and this is not an error. The server MUST accept these requests and send Push Notifications if and when matching records are found in the future.

If neither TYPE nor CLASS are ANY (255) then this is a specific subscription to changes for the given NAME, TYPE and CLASS. If one or both of TYPE or CLASS are ANY (255) then this subscription matches any type and/or any class, as appropriate.

NOTE: A little-known quirk of DNS is that in DNS QUERY requests, QTYPE and QCLASS 255 mean "ANY" not "ALL". They indicate that the server should respond with ANY matching records of its choosing, not necessarily ALL matching records. This can lead to some surprising and unexpected results, where a query returns some valid answers but not all of them, and makes QTYPE=ANY queries less useful than people sometimes imagine.

When used in conjunction with SUBSCRIBE, TYPE and CLASS 255 should be interpreted to mean "ALL", not "ANY". After accepting a subscription where one or both of TYPE or CLASS are 255, the server MUST send Push Notification Updates for ALL record changes that match the subscription, not just some of them.
6.2.2. SUBSCRIBE Response

Each SUBSCRIBE request generates exactly one SUBSCRIBE response from the server.

A SUBSCRIBE response message begins with the standard DSO 12-byte header [DSO], possibly followed by one or more optional TLVs, such as a Retry Delay TLV.

The MESSAGE ID field MUST echo the value given in the ID field of the SUBSCRIBE request. This is how the client knows which request is being responded to.

A SUBSCRIBE response message MUST NOT include a SUBSCRIBE TLV. If a client receives a SUBSCRIBE response message containing a SUBSCRIBE TLV then the response message is processed but the SUBSCRIBE TLV MUST be silently ignored.

In the SUBSCRIBE response the RCODE indicates whether or not the subscription was accepted. Supported RCODEs are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mnemonic</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NOERROR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>SUBSCRIBE successful.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORMERR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Server failed to process request due to a malformed request.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERVFAIL</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Server failed to process request due to a problem with the server.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NXDOMAIN</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>NOT APPLICABLE. DNS Push Notification servers MUST NOT return NXDOMAIN errors in response to SUBSCRIBE requests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTIMP</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Server does not implement DSO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFUSED</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Server refuses to process request for policy or security reasons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTAUTH</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Server is not authoritative for the requested name.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSOTYPENI</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>SUBSCRIBE operation not supported.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SUBSCRIBE Response codes

This document specifies only these RCODE values for SUBSCRIBE Responses. Servers sending SUBSCRIBE Responses SHOULD use one of these values. However, future circumstances may create situations where other RCODE values are appropriate in SUBSCRIBE Responses, so clients MUST be prepared to accept SUBSCRIBE Responses with any RCODE value.
If the server sends a nonzero RCODE in the SUBSCRIBE response, that means (a) the client is (at least partially) misconfigured, (b) the server resources are exhausted, or (c) there is some other unknown failure on the server. In any case, the client shouldn’t retry the subscription right away. Either end can terminate the session, but the client may want to try this subscription again, or it may have other successful subscriptions that it doesn’t want to abandon. If the server sends a nonzero RCODE then it SHOULD append a Retry Delay TLV [DSO] to the response specifying a delay before the client attempts this operation again. Recommended values for the delay for different RCODE values are given below. These recommended values apply both to the default values a server should place in the Retry Delay TLV, and the default values a client should assume if the server provides no Retry Delay TLV.

For RCODE = 1 (FORMERR) the delay may be any value selected by the implementer. A value of five minutes is RECOMMENDED, to reduce the risk of high load from defective clients.

For RCODE = 2 (SERVFAIL) the delay should be chosen according to the level of server overload and the anticipated duration of that overload. By default, a value of one minute is RECOMMENDED. If a more serious server failure occurs, the delay may be longer in accordance with the specific problem encountered.

For RCODE = 4 (NOTIMP), which occurs on a server that doesn’t implement DSO [DSO], it is unlikely that the server will begin supporting DSO in the next few minutes, so the retry delay SHOULD be one hour. Note that in such a case, a server that doesn’t implement DSO is unlikely to place a Retry Delay TLV in its response, so this recommended value in particular applies to what a client should assume by default.

For RCODE = 5 (REFUSED), which occurs on a server that implements DNS Push Notifications, but is currently configured to disallow DNS Push Notifications, the retry delay may be any value selected by the implementer and/or configured by the operator. This is a misconfiguration, since this server is listed in a "+_dns-push-tls._tcp.<zone>" SRV record, but the server itself is not currently configured to support DNS Push Notifications. Since it is possible that the misconfiguration may be repaired at any time, the retry delay should not be set too high. By default, a value of 5 minutes is RECOMMENDED.

For RCODE = 9 (NOTAUTH), which occurs on a server that implements DNS Push Notifications, but is not configured to be authoritative for the requested name, the retry delay may be any value selected by the implementer and/or configured by the operator.
This is a misconfiguration, since this server is listed in a 
"_dns-push-tls._tcp.<zone>" SRV record, but the server itself is 
not currently configured to support DNS Push Notifications for 
that zone. Since it is possible that the misconfiguration may be 
repaired at any time, the retry delay should not be set too high. 
By default, a value of 5 minutes is RECOMMENDED.

For RCODE = 11 (DNS Push SUBSCRIBE operation not supported), which 
occurs on a server that doesn’t implement DNS Push Notifications, 
it is unlikely that the server will begin supporting DNS Push 
Notifications in the next few minutes, so the retry delay SHOULD 
be one hour.

For other RCODE values, the retry delay should be set by the 
server as appropriate for that error condition. By default, a 
value of 5 minutes is RECOMMENDED.

For RCODE = 9 (NOTAUTH), the time delay applies to requests for other 
names falling within the same zone. Requests for names falling 
within other zones are not subject to the delay. For all other 
RCODEs the time delay applies to all subsequent requests to this 
server.

After sending an error response the server MAY allow the session to 
remain open, or MAY send a DNS Push Notification Retry Delay 
Operation TLV instructing the client to close the session, as 
described in the DSO specification [DSO]. Clients MUST correctly 
handle both cases.
6.3. DNS Push Notification Updates

Once a subscription has been successfully established, the server generates PUSH messages to send to the client as appropriate. In the case that the answer set was non-empty at the moment the subscription was established, an initial PUSH message will be sent immediately following the SUBSCRIBE Response. Subsequent changes to the answer set are then communicated to the client in subsequent PUSH messages.

6.3.1. PUSH Message

A PUSH message begins with the standard DSO 12-byte header [DSO], followed by the PUSH TLV. A PUSH message is illustrated in Figure 2.

The MESSAGE ID field MUST be zero. There is no client response to a PUSH message.

The other header fields MUST be set as described in the DSO specification [DSO]. The DNS Opcode is the DSO Opcode (tentatively 6). The four count fields MUST be zero, and the corresponding four sections MUST be empty (i.e., absent).

The DSO-TYPE is PUSH (tentatively 0x41). The DSO-LENGTH is the length of the DSO-DATA that follows, which specifies the changes being communicated.

The DSO-DATA contains one or more Update records. A PUSH Message MUST contain at least one Update record. If a PUSH Message is received that contains no Update records, this is a fatal error, and the receiver MUST immediately terminate the connection with a TCP RST (or equivalent for other protocols). The Update records are formatted in the customary way for Resource Records in DNS messages. Update records in a PUSH Message are interpreted according to the same rules as for DNS Update [RFC2136] messages, namely:

Delete all RRsets from a name:
TTL=0, CLASS=ANY, RDLENGTH=0, TYPE=ANY.

Delete an RRset from a name:
TTL=0, CLASS=ANY, RDLENGTH=0;
TYPE specifies the RRset being deleted.

Delete an individual RR from a name:
TTL=0, CLASS=NONE;
TYPE, RDLENGTH and RDATA specifies the RR being deleted.

Add to an RRset:
TTL, CLASS, TYPE, RDLENGTH and RDATA specifies the RR being added.
When processing the records received in a PUSH Message, the receiving client MUST validate that the records being added or deleted correspond with at least one currently active subscription on that session. Specifically, the record name MUST match the name given in the SUBSCRIBE request, subject to the usual established DNS case-insensitivity for US-ASCII letters. If the TYPE in the SUBSCRIBE request was not ANY (255) then the TYPE of the record must match the TYPE given in the SUBSCRIBE request. If the CLASS in the SUBSCRIBE request was not ANY (255) then the CLASS of the record must match the CLASS given in the SUBSCRIBE request. If a matching active
subscription on that session is not found, then that individual record addition/deletion is silently ignored. Processing of other additions and deletions in this message is not affected. The DSO session is not closed. This is to allow for the unavoidable race condition where a client sends an outbound UNSUBSCRIBE while inbound PUSH messages for that subscription from the server are still in flight.

In the case where a single change affects more than one active subscription, only one PUSH message is sent. For example, a PUSH message adding a given record may match both a SUBSCRIBE request with the same TYPE and a different SUBSCRIBE request with TYPE=ANY. It is not the case that two PUSH messages are sent because the new record matches two active subscriptions.

The server SHOULD encode change notifications in the most efficient manner possible. For example, when three AAAA records are deleted from a given name, and no other AAAA records exist for that name, the server SHOULD send a "delete an RRset from a name" PUSH message, not three separate "delete an individual RR from a name" PUSH messages. Similarly, when both an SRV and a TXT record are deleted from a given name, and no other records of any kind exist for that name, the server SHOULD send a "delete all RRsets from a name" PUSH message, not two separate "delete an RRset from a name" PUSH messages.

A server SHOULD combine multiple change notifications in a single PUSH message when possible, even if those change notifications apply to different subscriptions. Conceptually, a PUSH message is a session-level mechanism, not a subscription-level mechanism.

The TTL of an added record is stored by the client and decremented as time passes, with the caveat that for as long as a relevant subscription is active, the TTL does not decrement below 1 second. For as long as a relevant subscription remains active, the client SHOULD assume that when a record goes away the server will notify it of that fact. Consequently, a client does not have to poll to verify that the record is still there. Once a subscription is cancelled (individually, or as a result of the DSO session being closed) record aging resumes and records are removed from the local cache when their TTL reaches zero.
6.4. DNS Push Notification UNSUBSCRIBE

To cancel an individual subscription without closing the entire DSO session, the client sends an UNSUBSCRIBE message over the established DSO session to the server. The UNSUBSCRIBE message is encoded in a DSO [DSO] message. This specification defines a DSO TLV for DNS Push Notification UNSUBSCRIBE Requests/Responses (tentatively DSO Type Code 0x42).

A server MUST NOT initiate an UNSUBSCRIBE request. If a server does send an UNSUBSCRIBE request over a DSO session initiated by a client, this is a fatal error and the client should immediately abort the connection with a TCP RST (or equivalent for other protocols).

6.4.1. UNSUBSCRIBE Request

An UNSUBSCRIBE request begins with the standard DSO 12-byte header [DSO], followed by the UNSUBSCRIBE TLV. An UNSUBSCRIBE request message is illustrated in Figure 3.

The MESSAGE ID field MUST be zero. There is no server response to a UNSUBSCRIBE message.

The other header fields MUST be set as described in the DSO specification [DSO]. The DNS Opcode is the DSO Opcode (tentatively 6). The four count fields MUST be zero, and the corresponding four sections MUST be empty (i.e., absent).

In the UNSUBSCRIBE TLV the DSO-TYPE is UNSUBSCRIBE (tentatively 0x42). The DSO-LENGTH is 2 octets.

The DSO-DATA contains the MESSAGE ID field of the value given in the ID field of an active SUBSCRIBE request. This is how the server knows which SUBSCRIBE request is being cancelled. After receipt of the UNSUBSCRIBE request, the SUBSCRIBE request is no longer active.

It is allowable for the client to issue an UNSUBSCRIBE request for a previous SUBSCRIBE request for which the client has not yet received a SUBSCRIBE response. This is to allow for the case where a client starts and stops a subscription in less than the round-trip time to the server. The client is NOT required to wait for the SUBSCRIBE response before issuing the UNSUBSCRIBE request.
Figure 3: UNSUBSCRIBE Request
6.5. DNS Push Notification RECONFIRM

Sometimes, particularly when used with a Discovery Proxy (DisProx), a DNS Zone may contain stale data. When a client encounters data that it believes may be stale (e.g., an SRV record referencing a target host+port that is not responding to connection requests) the client can send a RECONFIRM request to ask the server to re-verify that the data is still valid. For a Discovery Proxy, this causes it to issue new Multicast DNS requests to ascertain whether the target device is still present. For other types of DNS server, the RECONFIRM operation is currently undefined, and SHOULD result in a NOERROR response, but otherwise need not cause any action to occur. Frequent RECONFIRM operations may be a sign of network unreliability, or some kind of misconfiguration, so RECONFIRM operations MAY be logged or otherwise communicated to a human administrator to assist in detecting, and remedying, such network problems.

If, after receiving a valid RECONFIRM request, the server determines that the disputed records are in fact no longer valid, then subsequent DNS PUSH Messages will be generated to inform interested clients. Thus, one client discovering that a previously-advertised device (like a network printer) is no longer present has the side effect of informing all other interested clients that the device in question is now gone.

6.5.1. RECONFIRM Request

A RECONFIRM request begins with the standard DSO 12-byte header [DSO], followed by the RECONFIRM TLV. A RECONFIRM request message is illustrated in Figure 4.

The MESSAGE ID field MUST be set to a unique value, that the client is not using for any other active operation on this DSO session. For the purposes here, a MESSAGE ID is in use on this session if the client has used it in a request for which it has not yet received a response, or if the client has used it for a subscription which it has not yet cancelled using UNSUBSCRIBE. In the RECONFIRM response the server MUST echo back the MESSAGE ID value unchanged.

The other header fields MUST be set as described in the DSO specification [DSO]. The DNS Opcode is the DSO Opcode (tentatively 6). The four count fields MUST be zero, and the corresponding four sections MUST be empty (i.e., absent).

The DSO-TYPE is RECONFIRM (tentatively 0x43). The DSO-LENGTH is the length of the data that follows, which specifies the name, type, class, and content of the record being disputed.
The DSO-DATA for a RECONFIRM request MUST contain exactly one record. The DSO-DATA for a RECONFIRM request has no count field to specify more than one record. Since RECONFIRM requests are sent over TCP, multiple RECONFIRM request messages can be concatenated in a single TCP stream and packed efficiently into TCP segments.

TYPE MUST NOT be the value ANY (255) and CLASS MUST NOT be the value ANY (255).

DNS wildcarding is not supported. That is, a wildcard ("*" in a RECONFIRM message matches only a literal wildcard character ("*")) in the zone, and nothing else.

Aliasing is not supported. That is, a CNAME in a RECONFIRM message matches only a literal CNAME record in the zone, and nothing else.
6.5.2. RECONFIRM Response

Each RECONFIRM request generates exactly one RECONFIRM response from the server.

A RECONFIRM response message begins with the standard DSO 12-byte header [DSO], possibly followed by one or more optional TLVs, such as a Retry Delay TLV. For suggested values for the Retry Delay TLV, see Section 6.2.2.

The MESSAGE ID field MUST echo the value given in the ID field of the RECONFIRM request. This is how the client knows which request is being responded to.

A RECONFIRM response message MUST NOT include a DSO RECONFIRM TLV. If a client receives a RECONFIRM response message containing a RECONFIRM TLV then the response message is processed but the RECONFIRM TLV MUST be silently ignored.

In the RECONFIRM response the RCODE confirms receipt of the reconfirmation request. Supported RCODEs are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mnemonic</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NOERROR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>RECONFIRM accepted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORMERR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Server failed to process request due to a malformed request.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERVFAIL</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Server failed to process request due to a problem with the server.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NXDOMAIN</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>NOT APPLICABLE. DNS Push Notification servers MUST NOT return NXDOMAIN errors in response to RECONFIRM requests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTIMP</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Server does not implement DSO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFUSED</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Server refuses to process request for policy or security reasons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTAUTH</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Server is not authoritative for the requested name.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSOTYPENI</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>RECONFIRM operation not supported.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RECONFIRM Response codes

This document specifies only these RCODE values for RECONFIRM Responses. Servers sending RECONFIRM Responses SHOULD use one of these values. However, future circumstances may create situations where other RCODE values are appropriate in RECONFIRM Responses, so
clients MUST be prepared to accept RECONFIRM Responses with any RCODE value.

Nonzero RCODE values signal some kind of error.

RCODE value FORMERR indicates a message format error, for example TYPE or CLASS being ANY (255).

RCODE value SERVFAIL indicates that the server has exhausted its resources or other serious problem occurred.

RCODE values NOTIMP indicates that the server does not support DSO, and DSO is required for RECONFIRM requests.

RCODE value REFUSED indicates that the server supports RECONFIRM requests but is currently not configured to accept them from this client.

RCODE value NOTAUTH indicates that the server is not authoritative for the requested name, and can do nothing to remedy the apparent error. Note that there may be future cases in which a server is able to pass on the RECONFIRM request to the ultimate source of the information, and in these cases the server should return NOERROR.

RCODE value DSOTYPENI indicates that the server does not support RECONFIRM requests.

Nonzero RCODE values SERVFAIL, REFUSED and DSOTYPENI are benign from the client’s point of view. The client may log them to aid in debugging, but otherwise they require no special action.

Nonzero RCODE values other than these three indicate a serious problem with the client. After sending an error response other than one of these three, the server SHOULD send a DSO Retry Delay TLV to end the DSO session, as described in the DSO specification [DSO].
6.6. Client-Initiated Termination

An individual subscription is terminated by sending an UNSUBSCRIBE TLV for that specific subscription, or all subscriptions can be cancelled at once by the client closing the DSO session. When a client terminates an individual subscription (via UNSUBSCRIBE) or all subscriptions on that DSO session (by ending the session) it is signaling to the server that it is longer interested in receiving those particular updates. It is informing the server that the server may release any state information it has been keeping with regards to these particular subscriptions.

After terminating its last subscription on a session via UNSUBSCRIBE, a client MAY close the session immediately, or it may keep it open if it anticipates performing further operations on that session in the future. If a client wishes to keep an idle session open, it MUST respect the maximum idle time required by the server [DSO].

If a client plans to terminate one or more subscriptions on a session and doesn’t intend to keep that session open, then as an efficiency optimization it MAY instead choose to simply close the session, which implicitly terminates all subscriptions on that session. This may occur because the client computer is being shut down, is going to sleep, the application requiring the subscriptions has terminated, or simply because the last active subscription on that session has been cancelled.

When closing a session, a client will generally do an abortive disconnect, sending a TCP RST. This immediately discards all remaining inbound and outbound data, which is appropriate if the client no longer has any interest in this data. In the BSD Sockets API, sending a TCP RST is achieved by setting the SO_LINGER option with a time of 0 seconds and then closing the socket.

If a client has performed operations on this session that it would not want lost (like DNS updates) then the client SHOULD do an orderly disconnect, sending a TLS close_notify followed by a TCP FIN. (In the BSD Sockets API, sending a TCP FIN is achieved by calling "shutdown(s,SHUT_WR)" and keeping the socket open until all remaining data has been read from it.)
7. Security Considerations

The Strict Privacy Usage Profile for DNS over TLS is strongly recommended for DNS Push Notifications as defined in "Authentication and (D)TLS Profile for DNS-over-(D)TLS" [I-D.ietf-dprive-dtls-and-tls-profiles]. The Opportunistic Privacy Usage Profile is permissible as a way to support incremental deployment of security capabilities. Cleartext connections for DNS Push Notifications are not permissible.

DNSSEC is RECOMMENDED for the authentication of DNS Push Notification servers. TLS alone does not provide complete security. TLS certificate verification can provide reasonable assurance that the client is really talking to the server associated with the desired host name, but since the desired host name is learned via a DNS SRV query, if the SRV query is subverted then the client may have a secure connection to a rogue server. DNSSEC can provide added confidence that the SRV query has not been subverted.

7.1. Security Services

It is the goal of using TLS to provide the following security services:

Confidentiality: All application-layer communication is encrypted with the goal that no party should be able to decrypt it except the intended receiver.

Data integrity protection: Any changes made to the communication in transit are detectable by the receiver.

Authentication: An end-point of the TLS communication is authenticated as the intended entity to communicate with.

Deployment recommendations on the appropriate key lengths and cypher suites are beyond the scope of this document. Please refer to TLS Recommendations [RFC7525] for the best current practices. Keep in mind that best practices only exist for a snapshot in time and recommendations will continue to change. Updated versions or errata may exist for these recommendations.

7.2. TLS Name Authentication

As described in Section 6.1, the client discovers the DNS Push Notification server using an SRV lookup for the record name "_dns-push-tls._tcp.<zone>". The server connection endpoint SHOULD then be authenticated using DANE TLSA records for the associated SRV record. This associates the target’s name and port number with a
trusted TLS certificate [RFC7673]. This procedure uses the TLS Sever
Name Indication (SNI) extension [RFC6066] to inform the server of the
name the client has authenticated through the use of TLSA records.
Therefore, if the SRV record passes DNSSEC validation and a TLSA
record matching the target name is usable, an SNI extension must be
used for the target name to ensure the client is connecting to the
server it has authenticated. If the target name does not have a
usable TLSA record, then the use of the SNI extension is optional.

See Authentication and (D)TLS Profile for DNS-over-(D)TLS
[I-D.ietf-dprive-dtls-and-tls-profiles] for more information on
authenticating domain names. Also note that a DNS Push server is an
authoritative server and a DNS Push client is a standard DNS client.
While the terminology in Authentication and (D)TLS Profile for DNS-
over-(D)TLS [I-D.ietf-dprive-dtls-and-tls-profiles] explicitly states
it does not apply to authoritative servers, it does in this case
apply to DNS Push Notification clients and servers.

7.3. TLS Compression

In order to reduce the chances of compression-related attacks, TLS-
level compression SHOULD be disabled when using TLS versions 1.2 and
earlier. In the draft version of TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13], TLS-
level compression has been removed completely.

7.4. TLS Session Resumption

TLS Session Resumption is permissible on DNS Push Notification
servers. The server may keep TLS state with Session IDs [RFC5246] or
operate in stateless mode by sending a Session Ticket [RFC5077] to
the client for it to store. However, once the DSO session is closed,
any existing subscriptions will be dropped. When the TLS session is
resumed, the DNS Push Notification server will not have any
subscription state and will proceed as with any other new DSO
session. Use of TLS Session Resumption allows a new TLS connection
to be set up more quickly, but the client will still have to recreate
any desired subscriptions.

8. IANA Considerations

This document defines the service name: "_dns-push-tls._tcp".
It is only applicable for the TCP protocol.
This name is to be published in the IANA Registry Service Types
[RFC6335][ST].

This document defines four DNS Stateful Operations TLV types:
SUBSCRIBE with (tentative) value 0x40 (64), PUSH with (tentative)
value 0x41 (65), UNSUBSCRIBE with (tentative) value 0x42 (66), and
RECONFIRM with (tentative) value 0x43 (67).

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10. References

10.1. Normative References


Pusateri & Cheshire Expires September 19, 2018 [Page 32]
10.2. Informative References


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DNS Push Notifications
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Abstract

The Domain Name System (DNS) was designed to return matching records efficiently for queries for data that are relatively static. When those records change frequently, DNS is still efficient at returning the updated results when polled, as long as the polling rate is not too high. But there exists no mechanism for a client to be asynchronously notified when these changes occur. This document defines a mechanism for a client to be notified of such changes to DNS records, called DNS Push Notifications.

Status of This Memo

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction ........................................... 3
   1.1. Requirements Language ................................. 3
2. Motivation ............................................. 4
3. Overview ................................................. 5
4. Transport ............................................... 7
5. State Considerations ................................. 8
6. Protocol Operation ................................. 9
   6.1. Discovery ........................................ 10
   6.2. DNS Push Notification SUBSCRIBE ........................ 13
       6.2.1. SUBSCRIBE Request ............................ 13
       6.2.2. SUBSCRIBE Response ............................. 16
   6.3. DNS Push Notification Updates ....................... 19
       6.3.1. PUSH Message .................................. 19
   6.4. DNS Push Notification UNSUBSCRIBE .................... 22
       6.4.1. UNSUBSCRIBE Request ............................ 22
   6.5. DNS Push Notification RECONFIRM ..................... 24
       6.5.1. RECONFIRM Request .............................. 24
       6.5.2. RECONFIRM Response ............................. 26
   6.6. Client-Initiated Termination ........................ 28
7. Security Considerations ............................. 29
   7.1. Security Services .................................. 29
   7.2. TLS Name Authentication ............................. 29
   7.3. TLS Compression .................................. 30
   7.4. TLS Session Resumption ............................. 30
8. IANA Considerations ................................. 30
9. Acknowledgements ....................................... 31
10. References ............................................. 31
    10.1. Normative References .............................. 31
    10.2. Informative References ............................ 33
Authors’ Addresses ....................................... 35
1. Introduction

Domain Name System (DNS) records may be updated using DNS Update [RFC2136]. Other mechanisms such as a Discovery Proxy [DisProx] can also generate changes to a DNS zone. This document specifies a protocol for DNS clients to subscribe to receive asynchronous notifications of changes to RRSets of interest. It is immediately relevant in the case of DNS Service Discovery [RFC6763] but is not limited to that use case, and provides a general DNS mechanism for DNS record change notifications. Familiarity with the DNS protocol and DNS packet formats is assumed [RFC1034] [RFC1035] [RFC6895].

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here [RFC2119] [RFC8174].
2. Motivation

As the domain name system continues to adapt to new uses and changes in deployment, polling has the potential to burden DNS servers at many levels throughout the network. Other network protocols have successfully deployed a publish/subscribe model following the Observer design pattern [obs]. XMPP Publish-Subscribe [XEP0060] and Atom [RFC4287] are examples. While DNS servers are generally highly tuned and capable of a high rate of query/response traffic, adding a publish/subscribe model for tracking changes to DNS records can deliver more timely notification of changes with reduced CPU usage and lower network traffic.

Multicast DNS [RFC6762] implementations always listen on a well known link-local IP multicast group, and record changes are sent to that multicast group address for all group members to receive. Therefore, Multicast DNS already has asynchronous change notification capability. However, when DNS Service Discovery [RFC6763] is used across a wide area network using Unicast DNS (possibly facilitated via a Discovery Proxy [DisProx]) it would be beneficial to have an equivalent capability for Unicast DNS, to allow clients to learn about DNS record changes in a timely manner without polling.

The DNS Long-Lived Queries (LLQ) mechanism [LLQ] is an existing deployed solution to provide asynchronous change notifications, used by Apple’s Back to My Mac Service [RFC6281] introduced in Mac OS X 10.5 Leopard in 2007. Back to My Mac was designed in an era when the data center operations staff asserted that it was impossible for a server to handle large numbers of mostly-idle TCP connections, so LLQ was defined as a UDP-based protocol, effectively replicating much of TCP’s connection state management logic in user space, and creating its own poor imitations of existing TCP features like the three-way handshake, flow control, and reliability.

This document builds on experience gained with the LLQ protocol, with an improved design. Instead of using UDP, this specification uses DNS Stateful Operations (DSO) [DSO] running over TLS over TCP, and therefore doesn’t need to reinvent existing TCP functionality. Using TCP also gives long-lived low-traffic connections better longevity through NAT gateways without resorting to excessive keepalive traffic. Instead of inventing a new vocabulary of messages to communicate DNS zone changes as LLQ did, this specification borrows the established syntax and semantics of DNS Update messages [RFC2136].
3. Overview

The existing DNS Update protocol [RFC2136] provides a mechanism for clients to add or delete individual resource records (RRs) or entire resource record sets (RRSets) on the zone’s server.

This specification adopts a simplified subset of these existing syntax and semantics, and uses them for DNS Push Notification messages going in the opposite direction, from server to client, to communicate changes to a zone. The client subscribes for Push Notifications by connecting to the server and sending DNS message(s) indicating the RRSet(s) of interest. When the client loses interest in receiving further updates to these records, it unsubscribes.

The DNS Push Notification server for a zone is any server capable of generating the correct change notifications for a name. It may be a primary, secondary, or stealth name server [RFC7719]. Consequently, the "_dns-push-tls._tcp.<zone>" SRV record for a zone MAY reference the same target host and port as that zone’s "_dns-update-tls._tcp.<zone>" SRV record. When the same target host and port is offered for both DNS Updates and DNS Push Notifications, a client MAY use a single TCP connection to that server for both DNS Updates and DNS Push Notification Subscriptions.

Supporting DNS Updates and DNS Push Notifications on the same server is OPTIONAL. A DNS Push Notification server does NOT also have to support DNS Update.

DNS Updates and DNS Push Notifications may be handled on different ports on the same target host, in which case they are not considered to be the "same server" for the purposes of this specification, and communications with these two ports are handled independently.

Standard DNS Queries MAY be sent over a DNS Push Notification connection, provided that these are queries for names falling within the server’s zone (the <zone> in the "_dns-push-tls._tcp.<zone>" SRV record). The RD (Recursion Desired) bit MUST be zero. If a query is received with the RD bit set, matching records for names falling within the server’s zones should be returned with the RA (Recursion Available) bit clear. If the query is for a name not in the server’s zone, an error with RCODE NOTAUTH (Not Authoritative) should be returned.

DNS Push Notification clients are NOT required to implement DNS Update Prerequisite processing. Prerequisites are used to perform tentative atomic test-and-set type operations when a client updates records on a server, and that concept has no applicability when it
comes to an authoritative server unilaterally informing a client of changes to DNS records.

This DNS Push Notification specification includes support for DNS classes, for completeness. However, in practice, it is anticipated that for the foreseeable future the only DNS class in use will be DNS class "IN", as is the reality today with existing DNS servers and clients. A DNS Push Notification server MAY choose to implement only DNS class "IN". If messages are received for a class other than "IN", and that class is not supported, an error with RCODE NOTIMPL (Not Implemented) should be returned.

DNS Push Notifications impose less load on the responding server than rapid polling would, but Push Notifications do still have a cost, so DNS Push Notification clients must not recklessly create an excessive number of Push Notification subscriptions. Specifically:

(a) A subscription should only be active when there is a valid reason to need live data (for example, an on-screen display is currently showing the results to the user) and the subscription SHOULD be cancelled as soon as the need for that data ends (for example, when the user dismisses that display). Implementations MAY want to implement idle timeouts, so that if the user ceases interacting with the device, the display showing the result of the DNS Push Notification subscription is automatically dismissed after a certain period of inactivity. For example, if a user presses the "Print" button on their smartphone, and then leaves the phone showing the printer discovery screen until the phone goes to sleep, then the printer discovery screen should be automatically dismissed as the device goes to sleep. If the user does still intend to print, this will require them to press the "Print" button again when they wake their phone up.

(b) A DNS Push Notification client SHOULD NOT routinely keep a DNS Push Notification subscription active 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, just to keep a list in memory up to date so that if the user does choose to bring up an on-screen display of that data, it can be displayed really fast. DNS Push Notifications are designed to be fast enough that there is no need to pre-load a "warm" list in memory just in case it might be needed later.

Generally, as described in the DNS Stateful Operations specification [DSO], a client must not keep a session to a server open indefinitely if it has no subscriptions (or other operations) active on that session. A client MAY close a session as soon as it becomes idle, and then if needed in the future, open a new session when required. Alternatively, a client MAY speculatively keep an idle session open for some time, subject to the constraint that it MUST NOT keep a
session open that has been idle for more than the session’s idle
timeout (15 seconds by default).

4. Transport

Other DNS operations like DNS Update [RFC2136] MAY use either User
Datagram Protocol (UDP) [RFC0768] or Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP) [RFC0793] as the transport protocol, in keeping with the
historical precedent that DNS queries must first be sent over UDP
[RFC1123]. This requirement to use UDP has subsequently been relaxed
[RFC7766].

In keeping with the more recent precedent, DNS Push Notification is
defined only for TCP. DNS Push Notification clients MUST use DNS
Stateful Operations (DSO) [DSO] running over TLS over TCP [RFC7858].

Connection setup over TCP ensures return reachability and alleviates
concerns of state overload at the server through anonymous
subscriptions. All subscribers are guaranteed to be reachable by the
server by virtue of the TCP three-way handshake. Flooding attacks
are possible with any protocol, and a benefit of TCP is that there
are already established industry best practices to guard against SYN
flooding and similar attacks [SYN] [RFC4953].

Use of TCP also allows DNS Push Notifications to take advantage of
current and future developments in TCP, such as Multipath TCP (MPTCP)
[RFC6824], TCP Fast Open (TFO) [RFC7413], Tail Loss Probe (TLP)
[I-D.dukkipati-tcpm-tcp-loss-probe], and so on.

Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246] is well understood and
deployed across many protocols running over TCP. It is designed to
prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery. TLS is
REQUIRED for every connection between a client subscriber and server
in this protocol specification. Additional security measures such as
client authentication during TLS negotiation MAY also be employed to
increase the trust relationship between client and server.
5. State Considerations

Each DNS Push Notification server is capable of handling some finite number of Push Notification subscriptions. This number will vary from server to server and is based on physical machine characteristics, network bandwidth, and operating system resource allocation. After a client establishes a session to a DNS server, each subscription is individually accepted or rejected. Servers may employ various techniques to limit subscriptions to a manageable level. Correspondingly, the client is free to establish simultaneous sessions to alternate DNS servers that support DNS Push Notifications for the zone and distribute subscriptions at the client’s discretion. In this way, both clients and servers can react to resource constraints. Token bucket rate limiting schemes are also effective in providing fairness by a server across numerous client requests.
6. Protocol Operation

The DNS Push Notification protocol is a session-oriented protocol, and makes use of DNS Stateful Operations (DSO) [DSO].

For details of the DSO message format refer to the DNS Stateful Operations specification [DSO]. Those details are not repeated here.

DNS Push Notification clients and servers MUST support DSO, but (as stated in the DSO specification [DSO]) the server SHOULD NOT issue any DSO messages until after the client has first initiated an acknowledged DSO message of its own. A single server can support DNS Queries, DNS Updates, and DNS Push Notifications (using DSO) on the same TCP port, and until the client has sent at least one DSO message, the server does not know what kind of client has connected to it. Once the client has indicated willingness to use DSO by sending one of its own, either side of the session may then initiate further DSO messages at any time.

A DNS Push Notification exchange begins with the client discovering the appropriate server, using the procedure described in Section 6.1, and then making a TLS/TCP connection to it.

A typical DNS Push Notification client will immediately issue a DSO Keepalive operation to request a session timeout or keepalive interval longer than the the 15-second default, but this is not required. A DNS Push Notification client MAY issue other requests on the session first, and only issue a DSO Keepalive operation later if it determines that to be necessary. However, Push Notification subscriptions can also be used to establish the DSO session.

In accordance with the current set of active subscriptions, the server sends relevant asynchronous Push Notifications to the client. Note that a client MUST be prepared to receive (and silently ignore) Push Notifications for subscriptions it has previously removed, since there is no way to prevent the situation where a Push Notification is in flight from server to client while the client’s UNSUBSCRIBE message cancelling that subscription is simultaneously in flight from client to server.
6.1. Discovery

The first step in DNS Push Notification subscription is to discover an appropriate DNS server that supports DNS Push Notifications for the desired zone.

The client begins by opening a DSO Session to its normal configured DNS recursive resolver and requesting a Push Notification subscription. If this is successful, then the recursive resolver will make appropriate Push Notification subscriptions on the client’s behalf, and the client will receive appropriate results. If the recursive resolver does not support Push Notification subscriptions, then it will return an error code, and the client should proceed to discover the appropriate server for direct communication. The client MUST also determine which TCP port on the server is listening for connections, which need not be (and often is not) the typical TCP port 53 used for conventional DNS, or TCP port 853 used for DNS over TLS [RFC7858].

The algorithm described here is an iterative algorithm, which starts with the full name of the record to which the client wishes to subscribe. Successive SOA queries are then issued, trimming one label each time, until the closest enclosing authoritative server is discovered. There is also an optimization to enable the client to take a "short cut" directly to the SOA record of the closest enclosing authoritative server in many cases.

1. The client begins the discovery by sending a DNS query to its local resolver, with record type SOA [RFC1035] for the record name to which it wishes to subscribe. As an example, suppose the client wishes to subscribe to PTR records with the name _ipp._tcp.foo.example.com (to discover Internet Printing Protocol (IPP) printers [RFC8010] [RFC8011] being advertised at "foo.example.com"). The client begins by sending an SOA query for _ipp._tcp.foo.example.com to the local recursive resolver. The goal is to determine the server authoritative for the name _ipp._tcp.foo.example.com. The DNS zone containing the name _ipp._tcp.foo.example.com could be example.com, or foo.example.com, or _tcp.foo.example.com, or even _ipp._tcp.foo.example.com. The client does not know in advance where the closest enclosing zone cut occurs, which is why it uses the procedure described here to discover this information.

2. If the requested SOA record exists, it will be returned in the Answer section with a NOERROR response code, and the client has succeeded in discovering the information it needs. (This text is not placing any new requirements on DNS recursive resolvers. It
is merely describing the existing operation of the DNS protocol [RFC1034] [RFC1035].

3. If the requested SOA record does not exist, the client will get
back a NOERROR/NODATA response or an NXDOMAIN/Name Error
response. In either case, the local resolver SHOULD include the
SOA record for the zone of the requested name in the Authority
Section. If the SOA record is received in the Authority Section,
then the client has succeeded in discovering the information it
needs. (This text is not placing any new requirements on DNS
recursive resolvers. It is merely describing the existing
operation of the DNS protocol regarding negative responses
[RFC2308].)

4. If the client receives a response containing no SOA record, then
it proceeds with the iterative approach. The client strips the
leading label from the current query name and if the resulting
name has at least one label in it, the client sends a new SOA
query, and processing continues at step 2 above, repeating the
iterative search until either an SOA is received, or the query
name is empty. In the case of an empty name, this is a network
configuration error which should not happen and the client gives
up. The client may retry the operation at a later time, of the
client’s choosing, such after a change in network attachment.

5. Once the SOA is known (either by virtue of being seen in the
Answer Section, or in the Authority Section), the client sends a
DNS query with type SRV [RFC2782] for the record name
"_dns-push-tls._tcp.<zone>" , where <zone> is the owner name of
the discovered SOA record.

6. If the zone in question is set up to offer DNS Push Notifications
then this SRV record MUST exist. (If this SRV record does not
exist then the zone is not correctly configured for DNS Push
Notifications as specified in this document.) The SRV "target"
contains the name of the server providing DNS Push Notifications
for the zone. The port number on which to contact the server is
in the SRV record "port" field. The address(es) of the target
host MAY be included in the Additional Section, however, the
address records SHOULD be authenticated before use as described
below in Section 7.2 and in the specification for using DANE TLSA
Records with SRV Records [RFC7673], if applicable.

7. More than one SRV record may be returned. In this case, the
"priority" and "weight" values in the returned SRV records are
used to determine the order in which to contact the servers for
subscription requests. As described in the SRV specification
[RFC2782], the server with the lowest "priority" is first
contacted. If more than one server has the same "priority", the "weight" indicates the weighted probability that the client should contact that server. Higher weights have higher probabilities of being selected. If a server is not willing to accept a subscription request, or is not reachable within a reasonable time, as determined by the client, then a subsequent server is to be contacted.

Each time a client makes a new DNS Push Notification subscription session, it SHOULD repeat the discovery process in order to determine the preferred DNS server for subscriptions at that time. However, the client device MUST respect the DNS TTL values on records it receives, and store them in its local cache with this lifetime. This means that, as long as the DNS TTL values on the authoritative records were set to reasonable values, repeated application of this discovery process can be completed nearly instantaneously by the client, using only locally-stored cached data.
6.2. DNS Push Notification SUBSCRIBE

After connecting, and requesting a longer idle timeout and/or keepalive interval if necessary, a DNS Push Notification client then indicates its desire to receive DNS Push Notifications for a given domain name by sending a SUBSCRIBE request over the established DSO session to the server. A SUBSCRIBE request is encoded in a DSO [DSO] message. This specification defines a DSO TLV for DNS Push Notification SUBSCRIBE Requests/Responses (tentatively DSO Type Code 0x40).

The entity that initiates a SUBSCRIBE request is by definition the client. A server MUST NOT send a SUBSCRIBE request over an existing session from a client. If a server does send a SUBSCRIBE request over a DSO session initiated by a client, this is a fatal error and the client should immediately abort the connection with a TCP RST (or equivalent for other protocols).

6.2.1. SUBSCRIBE Request

A SUBSCRIBE request begins with the standard DSO 12-byte header [DSO], followed by the SUBSCRIBE TLV. A SUBSCRIBE request message is illustrated in Figure 1.

The MESSAGE ID field MUST be set to a unique value, that the client is not using for any other active operation on this session. For the purposes here, a MESSAGE ID is in use on this session if the client has used it in a request for which it has not yet received a response, or if the client has used it for a subscription which it has not yet cancelled using UNSUBSCRIBE. In the SUBSCRIBE response the server MUST echo back the MESSAGE ID value unchanged.

The other header fields MUST be set as described in the DSO specification [DSO]. The DNS Opcode is the DSO Opcode. The four count fields MUST be zero, and the corresponding four sections MUST be empty (i.e., absent).

The DSO-TYPE is SUBSCRIBE. The DSO-LENGTH is the length of the DSO-DATA that follows, which specifies the name, type, and class of the record(s) being sought.
The DSO-DATA for a SUBSCRIBE request MUST contain exactly one NAME, Type, and CLASS. Since SUBSCRIBE requests are sent over TCP, multiple SUBSCRIBE request messages can be concatenated in a single TCP stream and packed efficiently into TCP segments.

If accepted, the subscription will stay in effect until the client cancels the subscription using UNSUBSCRIBE or until the DSO session between the client and the server is closed.

SUBSCRIBE requests on a given session MUST be unique. A client MUST NOT send a SUBSCRIBE message that duplicates the NAME, TYPE and CLASS of an existing active subscription on that DSO session. For the purpose of this matching, the established DNS case-insensitivity for US-ASCII letters applies (e.g., "example.com" and "Example.com" are the same). If a server receives such a duplicate SUBSCRIBE message this is an error and the server MUST immediately terminate the connection with a TCP RST (or equivalent for other protocols).
DNS wildcarding is not supported. That is, a wildcard ("*") in a
SUBSCRIBE message matches only a literal wildcard character ("*"") in
the zone, and nothing else.

Aliasing is not supported. That is, a CNAME in a SUBSCRIBE message
matches only a literal CNAME record in the zone, and nothing else.

A client may SUBSCRIBE to records that are unknown to the server at
the time of the request (providing that the name falls within one of
the zone(s) the server is responsible for) and this is not an error.
The server MUST accept these requests and send Push Notifications if
and when matching records are found in the future.

If neither TYPE nor CLASS are ANY (255) then this is a specific
subscription to changes for the given NAME, TYPE and CLASS. If one
or both of TYPE or CLASS are ANY (255) then this subscription matches
any type and/or any class, as appropriate.

NOTE: A little-known quirk of DNS is that in DNS QUERY requests,
QTYPE and QCLASS 255 mean "ANY" not "ALL". They indicate that the
server should respond with ANY matching records of its choosing, not
necessarily ALL matching records. This can lead to some surprising
and unexpected results, where a query returns some valid answers but
not all of them, and makes QTYPE=ANY queries less useful than people
sometimes imagine.

When used in conjunction with SUBSCRIBE, TYPE and CLASS 255 should be
interpreted to mean "ALL", not "ANY". After accepting a subscription
where one or both of TYPE or CLASS are 255, the server MUST send Push
Notification Updates for ALL record changes that match the
subscription, not just some of them.
6.2.2. SUBSCRIBE Response

Each SUBSCRIBE request generates exactly one SUBSCRIBE response from the server.

A SUBSCRIBE response message begins with the standard DSO 12-byte header [DSO], possibly followed by one or more optional TLVs, such as a Retry Delay TLV.

The MESSAGE ID field MUST echo the value given in the ID field of the SUBSCRIBE request. This is how the client knows which request is being responded to.

A SUBSCRIBE response message MUST NOT include a SUBSCRIBE TLV. If a client receives a SUBSCRIBE response message containing a SUBSCRIBE TLV then the response message is processed but the SUBSCRIBE TLV MUST be silently ignored.

In the SUBSCRIBE response the RCODE indicates whether or not the subscription was accepted. Supported RCODEs are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mnemonic</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NOERROR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>SUBSCRIBE successful.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORMERR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Server failed to process request due to a malformed request.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERVFAIL</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Server failed to process request due to a problem with the server.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NXDOMAIN</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>NOT APPLICABLE. DNS Push Notification servers MUST NOT return NXDOMAIN errors in response to SUBSCRIBE requests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTIMP</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Server does not implement DSO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFUSED</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Server refuses to process request for policy or security reasons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTAUTH</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Server is not authoritative for the requested name.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSOTYPENI</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>SUBSCRIBE operation not supported.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SUBSCRIBE Response codes

This document specifies only these RCODE values for SUBSCRIBE Responses. Servers sending SUBSCRIBE Responses SHOULD use one of these values. However, future circumstances may create situations where other RCODE values are appropriate in SUBSCRIBE Responses, so clients MUST be prepared to accept SUBSCRIBE Responses with any RCODE value.
If the server sends a nonzero RCODE in the SUBSCRIBE response, that means (a) the client is (at least partially) misconfigured, (b) the server resources are exhausted, or (c) there is some other unknown failure on the server. In any case, the client shouldn’t retry the subscription right away. Either end can terminate the session, but the client may want to try this subscription again, or it may have other successful subscriptions that it doesn’t want to abandon. If the server sends a nonzero RCODE then it SHOULD append a Retry Delay TLV [DSO] to the response specifying a delay before the client attempts this operation again. Recommended values for the delay for different RCODE values are given below. These recommended values apply both to the default values a server should place in the Retry Delay TLV, and the default values a client should assume if the server provides no Retry Delay TLV.

For RCODE = 1 (FORMERR) the delay may be any value selected by the implementer. A value of five minutes is RECOMMENDED, to reduce the risk of high load from defective clients.

For RCODE = 2 (SERVFAIL) the delay should be chosen according to the level of server overload and the anticipated duration of that overload. By default, a value of one minute is RECOMMENDED. If a more serious server failure occurs, the delay may be longer in accordance with the specific problem encountered.

For RCODE = 4 (NOTIMP), which occurs on a server that doesn’t implement DSO [DSO], it is unlikely that the server will begin supporting DSO in the next few minutes, so the retry delay SHOULD be one hour. Note that in such a case, a server that doesn’t implement DSO is unlikely to place a Retry Delay TLV in its response, so this recommended value in particular applies to what a client should assume by default.

For RCODE = 5 (REFUSED), which occurs on a server that implements DNS Push Notifications, but is currently configured to disallow DNS Push Notifications, the retry delay may be any value selected by the implementer and/or configured by the operator.

This is a misconfiguration, since this server is listed in a "._dns-push-tls._tcp.<zone>" SRV record, but the server itself is not currently configured to support DNS Push Notifications. Since it is possible that the misconfiguration may be repaired at any time, the retry delay should not be set too high. By default, a value of 5 minutes is RECOMMENDED.

For RCODE = 9 (NOTAUTH), which occurs on a server that implements DNS Push Notifications, but is not configured to be authoritative
for the requested name, the retry delay may be any value selected
by the implementer and/or configured by the operator.

This is a misconfiguration, since this server is listed in a
"_dns-push-tls._tcp.<zone>" SRV record, but the server itself is
not currently configured to support DNS Push Notifications for
that zone. Since it is possible that the misconfiguration may be
repaired at any time, the retry delay should not be set too high.
By default, a value of 5 minutes is RECOMMENDED.

For RCODE = 11 (DSOTYPENI), which occurs on a server that doesn’t
implement DNS Push Notifications, it is unlikely that the server
will begin supporting DNS Push Notifications in the next few
minutes, so the retry delay SHOULD be one hour.

For other RCODE values, the retry delay should be set by the
server as appropriate for that error condition. By default, a
value of 5 minutes is RECOMMENDED.

For RCODE = 9 (NOTAUTH), the time delay applies to requests for other
names falling within the same zone. Requests for names falling
within other zones are not subject to the delay. For all other
RCODEs the time delay applies to all subsequent requests to this
server.

After sending an error response the server MAY allow the session to
remain open, or MAY send a DNS Push Notification Retry Delay
Operation TLV instructing the client to close the session, as
described in the DSO specification [DSO]. Clients MUST correctly
handle both cases.
6.3. DNS Push Notification Updates

Once a subscription has been successfully established, the server generates PUSH messages to send to the client as appropriate. In the case that the answer set was non-empty at the moment the subscription was established, an initial PUSH message will be sent immediately following the SUBSCRIBE Response. Subsequent changes to the answer set are then communicated to the client in subsequent PUSH messages.

6.3.1. PUSH Message

A PUSH message begins with the standard DSO 12-byte header [DSO], followed by the PUSH TLV. A PUSH message is illustrated in Figure 2.

In accordance with the definition of DSO unidirectional messages, the MESSAGE ID field MUST be zero. There is no client response to a PUSH message.

The other header fields MUST also be set as described in the DSO specification [DSO]. The DNS Opcode is the DSO Opcode. The four count fields MUST be zero, and the corresponding four sections MUST be empty (i.e., absent).

The DSO-TYPE is PUSH (tentatively 0x41). The DSO-LENGTH is the length of the DSO-DATA that follows, which specifies the changes being communicated.

The DSO-DATA contains one or more Update records. A PUSH Message MUST contain at least one Update record. If a PUSH Message is received that contains zero Update records, this is a fatal error, and the receiver MUST immediately terminate the connection with a TCP RST (or equivalent for other protocols). The Update records are formatted in the customary way for Resource Records in DNS messages. Update records in a PUSH Message are interpreted according to the same rules as for DNS Update [RFC2136] messages, namely:

- Delete all RRsets from a name:
  
  TTL=0, CLASS=ANY, RDLENGTH=0, TYPE=ANY.

- Delete an RRset from a name:
  
  TTL=0, CLASS=ANY, RDLENGTH=0;
  TYPE specifies the RRset being deleted.

- Delete an individual RR from a name:
  
  TTL=0, CLASS=NONE;
  TYPE, RDLENGTH and RDATA specifies the RR being deleted.

- Add to an RRset:
TTL, CLASS, TYPE, RDLENGTH and RDATA specifies the RR being added.

When processing the records received in a PUSH Message, the receiving client MUST validate that the records being added or deleted correspond with at least one currently active subscription on that session. Specifically, the record name MUST match the name given in the SUBSCRIBE request, subject to the usual established DNS case-insensitivity for US-ASCII letters. If the TYPE in the SUBSCRIBE request was not ANY (255) then the TYPE of the record must match the TYPE given in the SUBSCRIBE request. If the CLASS in the SUBSCRIBE request was not ANY (255) then the CLASS of the record must match the CLASS given in the SUBSCRIBE request.
request was not ANY (255) then the CLASS of the record must match the CLASS given in the SUBSCRIBE request. If a matching active subscription on that session is not found, then that individual record addition/deletion is silently ignored. Processing of other additions and deletions in this message is not affected. The DSO session is not closed. This is to allow for the unavoidable race condition where a client sends an outbound UNSUBSCRIBE while inbound PUSH messages for that subscription from the server are still in flight.

In the case where a single change affects more than one active subscription, only one PUSH message is sent. For example, a PUSH message adding a given record may match both a SUBSCRIBE request with the same TYPE and a different SUBSCRIBE request with TYPE=ANY. It is not the case that two PUSH messages are sent because the new record matches two active subscriptions.

The server SHOULD encode change notifications in the most efficient manner possible. For example, when three AAAA records are deleted from a given name, and no other AAAA records exist for that name, the server SHOULD send a "delete an RRset from a name" PUSH message, not three separate "delete an individual RR from a name" PUSH messages. Similarly, when both an SRV and a TXT record are deleted from a given name, and no other records of any kind exist for that name, the server SHOULD send a "delete all RRsets from a name" PUSH message, not two separate "delete an RRset from a name" PUSH messages.

A server SHOULD combine multiple change notifications in a single PUSH message when possible, even if those change notifications apply to different subscriptions. Conceptually, a PUSH message is a session-level mechanism, not a subscription-level mechanism.

The TTL of an added record is stored by the client and decremented as time passes, with the caveat that for as long as a relevant subscription is active, the TTL does not decrement below 1 second. For as long as a relevant subscription remains active, the client SHOULD assume that when a record goes away the server will notify it of that fact. Consequently, a client does not have to poll to verify that the record is still there. Once a subscription is cancelled (individually, or as a result of the DSO session being closed) record aging resumes and records are removed from the local cache when their TTL reaches zero.
6.4. DNS Push Notification UNSUBSCRIBE

To cancel an individual subscription without closing the entire DSO session, the client sends an UNSUBSCRIBE message over the established DSO session to the server. The UNSUBSCRIBE message is encoded as a DSO [DSO] unidirectional message. This specification defines a DSO TLV for DNS Push Notification UNSUBSCRIBE Requests/Responses (tentatively DSO Type Code 0x42).

A server MUST NOT initiate an UNSUBSCRIBE request. If a server does send an UNSUBSCRIBE request over a DSO session initiated by a client, this is a fatal error and the client should immediately abort the connection with a TCP RST (or equivalent for other protocols).

6.4.1. UNSUBSCRIBE Request

An UNSUBSCRIBE request begins with the standard DSO 12-byte header [DSO], followed by the UNSUBSCRIBE TLV. An UNSUBSCRIBE request message is illustrated in Figure 3.

The MESSAGE ID field MUST be zero. There is no server response to a UNSUBSCRIBE message.

The other header fields MUST be set as described in the DSO specification [DSO]. The DNS Opcode is the DSO Opcode. The four count fields MUST be zero, and the corresponding four sections MUST be empty (i.e., absent).

In the UNSUBSCRIBE TLV the DSO-TYPE is UNSUBSCRIBE. The DSO-LENGTH is 2 octets.

The DSO-DATA contains the MESSAGE ID field of the value given in the ID field of an active SUBSCRIBE request. This is how the server knows which SUBSCRIBE request is being cancelled. After receipt of the UNSUBSCRIBE request, the SUBSCRIBE request is no longer active.

It is allowable for the client to issue an UNSUBSCRIBE request for a previous SUBSCRIBE request for which the client has not yet received a SUBSCRIBE response. This is to allow for the case where a client starts and stops a subscription in less than the round-trip time to the server. The client is NOT required to wait for the SUBSCRIBE response before issuing the UNSUBSCRIBE request.
Figure 3: UNSUBSCRIBE Request
6.5. DNS Push Notification RECONFIRM

Sometimes, particularly when used with a Discovery Proxy [DisProx], a DNS Zone may contain stale data. When a client encounters data that it believes may be stale (e.g., an SRV record referencing a target host+port that is not responding to connection requests) the client can send a RECONFIRM request to ask the server to re-verify that the data is still valid. For a Discovery Proxy, this causes it to issue new Multicast DNS requests to ascertain whether the target device is still present. For other types of DNS server, the RECONFIRM operation is currently undefined, and SHOULD result in a NOERROR response, but otherwise need not cause any action to occur. Frequent RECONFIRM operations may be a sign of network unreliability, or some kind of misconfiguration, so RECONFIRM operations MAY be logged or otherwise communicated to a human administrator to assist in detecting, and remedying, such network problems.

If, after receiving a valid RECONFIRM request, the server determines that the disputed records are in fact no longer valid, then subsequent DNS PUSH Messages will be generated to inform interested clients. Thus, one client discovering that a previously-advertised device (like a network printer) is no longer present has the side effect of informing all other interested clients that the device in question is now gone.

6.5.1. RECONFIRM Request

A RECONFIRM request begins with the standard DSO 12-byte header [DSO], followed by the RECONFIRM TLV. A RECONFIRM request message is illustrated in Figure 4.

The MESSAGE ID field MUST be set to a unique value, that the client is not using for any other active operation on this DSO session. For the purposes here, a MESSAGE ID is in use on this session if the client has used it in a request for which it has not yet received a response, or if the client has used it for a subscription which it has not yet cancelled using UNSUBSCRIBE. In the RECONFIRM response the server MUST echo back the MESSAGE ID value unchanged.

The other header fields MUST be set as described in the DSO specification [DSO]. The DNS Opcode is the DSO Opcode. The four count fields MUST be zero, and the corresponding four sections MUST be empty (i.e., absent).

The DSO-TYPE is RECONFIRM (tentatively 0x43). The DSO-LENGTH is the length of the data that follows, which specifies the name, type, class, and content of the record being disputed.
The DSO-DATA for a RECONFIRM request MUST contain exactly one record. The DSO-DATA for a RECONFIRM request has no count field to specify more than one record. Since RECONFIRM requests are sent over TCP, multiple RECONFIRM request messages can be concatenated in a single TCP stream and packed efficiently into TCP segments.

TYPE MUST NOT be the value ANY (255) and CLASS MUST NOT be the value ANY (255).

DNS wildcarding is not supported. That is, a wildcard ("*"), in a RECONFIRM message matches only a literal wildcard character ("*") in the zone, and nothing else.

Aliasing is not supported. That is, a CNAME in a RECONFIRM message matches only a literal CNAME record in the zone, and nothing else.
6.5.2. RECONFIRM Response

Each RECONFIRM request generates exactly one RECONFIRM response from the server.

A RECONFIRM response message begins with the standard DSO 12-byte header [DSO], possibly followed by one or more optional TLVs, such as a Retry Delay TLV. For suggested values for the Retry Delay TLV, see Section 6.2.2.

The MESSAGE ID field MUST echo the value given in the ID field of the RECONFIRM request. This is how the client knows which request is being responded to.

A RECONFIRM response message MUST NOT include a DSO RECONFIRM TLV. If a client receives a RECONFIRM response message containing a RECONFIRM TLV then the response message is processed but the RECONFIRM TLV MUST be silently ignored.

In the RECONFIRM response the RCODE confirms receipt of the reconfirmation request. Supported RCODEs are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mnemonic</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NOERROR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>RECONFIRM accepted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORMERR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Server failed to process request due to a malformed request.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SERVFAIL</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Server failed to process request due to a problem with the server.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NXDOMAIN</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>NOT APPLICABLE. DNS Push Notification servers MUST NOT return NXDOMAIN errors in response to RECONFIRM requests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTIMP</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Server does not implement DSO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFUSED</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Server refuses to process request for policy or security reasons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTAUTH</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Server is not authoritative for the requested name.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSOTYPENI</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>RECONFIRM operation not supported.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RECONFIRM Response codes

This document specifies only these RCODE values for RECONFIRM Responses. Servers sending RECONFIRM Responses SHOULD use one of these values. However, future circumstances may create situations where other RCODE values are appropriate in RECONFIRM Responses, so
clients MUST be prepared to accept RECONFIRM Responses with any RCODE value.

Nonzero RCODE values signal some kind of error.

RCODE value FORMERR indicates a message format error, for example TYPE or CLASS being ANY (255).

RCODE value SERVFAIL indicates that the server has exhausted its resources or other serious problem occurred.

RCODE values NOTIMP indicates that the server does not support DSO, and DSO is required for RECONFIRM requests.

RCODE value REFUSED indicates that the server supports RECONFIRM requests but is currently not configured to accept them from this client.

RCODE value NOTAUTH indicates that the server is not authoritative for the requested name, and can do nothing to remedy the apparent error. Note that there may be future cases in which a server is able to pass on the RECONFIRM request to the ultimate source of the information, and in these cases the server should return NOERROR.

RCODE value DSOTYPENI indicates that the server does not support RECONFIRM requests.

Nonzero RCODE values SERVFAIL, REFUSED and DSOTYPENI are benign from the client’s point of view. The client may log them to aid in debugging, but otherwise they require no special action.

Nonzero RCODE values other than these three indicate a serious problem with the client. After sending an error response other than one of these three, the server SHOULD send a DSO Retry Delay TLV to end the DSO session, as described in the DSO specification [DSO].
6.6. Client-Initiated Termination

An individual subscription is terminated by sending an UNSUBSCRIBE TLV for that specific subscription, or all subscriptions can be cancelled at once by the client closing the DSO session. When a client terminates an individual subscription (via UNSUBSCRIBE) or all subscriptions on that DSO session (by ending the session) it is signaling to the server that it is longer interested in receiving those particular updates. It is informing the server that the server may release any state information it has been keeping with regards to these particular subscriptions.

After terminating its last subscription on a session via UNSUBSCRIBE, a client MAY close the session immediately, or it may keep it open if it anticipates performing further operations on that session in the future. If a client wishes to keep an idle session open, it MUST respect the maximum idle time required by the server [DSO].

If a client plans to terminate one or more subscriptions on a session and doesn’t intend to keep that session open, then as an efficiency optimization it MAY instead choose to simply close the session, which implicitly terminates all subscriptions on that session. This may occur because the client computer is being shut down, is going to sleep, the application requiring the subscriptions has terminated, or simply because the last active subscription on that session has been cancelled.

When closing a session, a client will generally do an abortive disconnect, sending a TCP RST. This immediately discards all remaining inbound and outbound data, which is appropriate if the client no longer has any interest in this data. In the BSD Sockets API, sending a TCP RST is achieved by setting the SO_LINGER option with a time of 0 seconds and then closing the socket.

If a client has performed operations on this session that it would not want lost (like DNS updates) then the client SHOULD do an orderly disconnect, sending a TLS close_notify followed by a TCP FIN. (In the BSD Sockets API, sending a TCP FIN is achieved by calling "shutdown(s,SHUT_WR)" and keeping the socket open until all remaining data has been read from it.)
7. Security Considerations

The Strict Privacy Usage Profile for DNS over TLS is strongly recommended for DNS Push Notifications as defined in "Usage Profiles for DNS over TLS and DNS over DTLS" [RFC8310]. The Opportunistic Privacy Usage Profile is permissible as a way to support incremental deployment of security capabilities. Cleartext connections for DNS Push Notifications are not permissible.

DNSSEC is RECOMMENDED for the authentication of DNS Push Notification servers. TLS alone does not provide complete security. TLS certificate verification can provide reasonable assurance that the client is really talking to the server associated with the desired host name, but since the desired host name is learned via a DNS SRV query, if the SRV query is subverted then the client may have a secure connection to a rogue server. DNSSEC can provide added confidence that the SRV query has not been subverted.

7.1. Security Services

It is the goal of using TLS to provide the following security services:

Confidentiality: All application-layer communication is encrypted with the goal that no party should be able to decrypt it except the intended receiver.

Data integrity protection: Any changes made to the communication in transit are detectable by the receiver.

Authentication: An end-point of the TLS communication is authenticated as the intended entity to communicate with.

Deployment recommendations on the appropriate key lengths and cipher suites are beyond the scope of this document. Please refer to TLS Recommendations [RFC7525] for the best current practices. Keep in mind that best practices only exist for a snapshot in time and recommendations will continue to change. Updated versions or errata may exist for these recommendations.

7.2. TLS Name Authentication

As described in Section 6.1, the client discovers the DNS Push Notification server using an SRV lookup for the record name "_dns-push-tls._tcp.<zone>". The server connection endpoint SHOULD then be authenticated using DANE TLSA records for the associated SRV record. This associates the target’s name and port number with a trusted TLS certificate [RFC7673]. This procedure uses the TLS Sever
Name Indication (SNI) extension [RFC6066] to inform the server of the name the client has authenticated through the use of TLSA records. Therefore, if the SRV record passes DNSSEC validation and a TLSA record matching the target name is usable, an SNI extension must be used for the target name to ensure the client is connecting to the server it has authenticated. If the target name does not have a usable TLSA record, then the use of the SNI extension is optional.

See Usage Profiles for DNS over TLS and DNS over DTLS [RFC8310] for more information on authenticating domain names. Also note that a DNS Push server is an authoritative server and a DNS Push client is a standard DNS client. While the terminology in Usage Profiles for DNS over TLS and DNS over DTLS [RFC8310] explicitly states it does not apply to authoritative servers, it does in this case apply to DNS Push Notification clients and servers.

7.3. TLS Compression

In order to reduce the chances of compression-related attacks, TLS-level compression SHOULD be disabled when using TLS versions 1.2 and earlier. In TLS 1.3 [RFC8446], TLS-level compression has been removed completely.

7.4. TLS Session Resumption

TLS Session Resumption is permissible on DNS Push Notification servers. The server may keep TLS state with Session IDs [RFC5246] or operate in stateless mode by sending a Session Ticket [RFC5077] to the client for it to store. However, once the DSO session is closed, any existing subscriptions will be dropped. When the TLS session is resumed, the DNS Push Notification server will not have any subscription state and will proceed as with any other new DSO session. Use of TLS Session Resumption allows a new TLS connection to be set up more quickly, but the client will still have to recreate any desired subscriptions.

8. IANA Considerations

This document defines a new service name to be published in the IANA Registry Service Types [RFC6335][ST] that is only applicable for the TCP protocol.

This document also defines four new DNS Stateful Operation TLV types to be recorded in the IANA DSO Type Code Registry.
Table 1: IANA Assignments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DNS Push Notification</td>
<td>&quot;.dns-push-tls._tcp&quot;</td>
<td>Section 6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBSCRIBE</td>
<td>TBA (tentatively 0x40)</td>
<td>Section 6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUSH</td>
<td>TBA (tentatively 0x41)</td>
<td>Section 6.3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSUBSCRIBE</td>
<td>TBA (tentatively 0x42)</td>
<td>Section 6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECONFIRM</td>
<td>TBA (tentatively 0x43)</td>
<td>Section 6.5.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Acknowledgements

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10. References

10.1. Normative References


10.2. Informative References


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Simple Homenet Naming and Service Discovery Architecture
draft-ietf-homenet-simple-naming-01

Abstract

This document describes how names are published and resolved on homenets, and how hosts are configured to use these names to discover services on homenets. It presents the complete architecture, and describes a simple subset of that architecture that can be used in low-cost homenet routers.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Introduction

This document is a homenet architecture document. The term ‘homenet’ refers to a set of technologies that allow home network users to have a local-area network (LAN) with more than one physical link and, optionally, more than one internet service provider. Home network users are assumed not to be knowledgeable in network operations, so homnets automatically configure themselves, providing connectivity and service discovery within the home with no operator intervention. This document describes the aspect of homnet automatic configuration that has to do with service discovery and name resolution.

The homenet naming architecture consists of two parts: the simple naming architecture, and the advanced naming architecture. The advanced architecture provides approximate parity of features with a managed network, including the ability to publish services on the internet. The simple architecture provides a minimal set of features required to enable seamless service discovery on a multi-link home...
network, but does not attempt to provide feature parity with a managed LAN.

This document begins by presenting a motivational list of requirements and considerations, which should give the reader a clear idea of the scope of the problem being solved. It then explains how each requirement is addressed, and provides references for relevant standards documents describing the details of the implementation. Some requirements are not satisfied by the simple architecture; these are discussed in this document, but explained in more detail in the Advanced Homenet Naming Architecture document, which is to follow.

2. Requirements

Name service on a local area network (LAN) requires the following:

- **Name**: a forward domain under which information about local services will be published
- **Authority**: a name server that is authoritative for at least a forward and one or two reverse domains that are applicable to that network
- **Resolution**: a full-service caching DNS resolver
- **Publication**: a mechanism that
  - allows services on the LAN to publish information about the services they provide
  - allows services to publish information on how to reach them
  - manages the lifetime of such information, so that it persists long enough to prevent spoofing, but protects end users from seeing stale information
- **Host configuration**: one or more automatic mechanisms (e.g. DHCP or RA) that provide:
  - caching resolver information to hosts on the LAN
  - information about how services on the LAN can publish information
- **Trust**: some basis for trusting the information that is provided by the service discovery system
2.1. Managed LAN versus Homenet

On a managed LAN, many of these services can be provided by operators. When a new printer is added to the network, it can be added to the service discovery system (the authoritative server) manually. When a printer is taken out of service, it can be removed. In this scenario, the role of "publisher" is filled by the network operator.

In many managed LANs, establishment of trust for service discovery is simply on the basis of a belief that the local resolver will give a correct answer. Once the service has been discovered and chosen, there may be some security (e.g., TLS) that protects the connection to the service, but the trust model is often just "you’re connected to a network you trust, so you can trust the printer that you discovered on this network."

A homenet does not have an operator, so functions that would normally be performed by the operator have to happen automatically. This has implications for trust establishment--since there is no operator controlling what services are published locally, some other mechanism is required for basic trust establishment. Additionally, whereas in a managed LAN with multiple links to the Internet, the network operator can configure the network so that multihoming is handled seamlessly, in a homenet, multihoming must be handled using multiple provisioning domains [RFC7556].

2.2. Homenet-specific considerations

A naming architecture for homenets therefore adds the following considerations:

- All of the operations mentioned here must reliably function automatically, without any user intervention or debugging.
- Because user intervention cannot be required, naming conflicts must be resolved automatically, and, to the extent possible, transparently.
- Devices that provide services must be able to publish those services on the homenet, and those services must be available from any part of the homenet, not just the link to which the device is attached.
- Homenets must address the problem of multiple provisioning domains, in the sense that the DNS may give a different answer depending on whether caching resolvers at one ISP or another are queried.
An additional requirement from the Homenet Architecture [9] is that hosts are not required to implement any homenet-specific capabilities in order to discover and access services on the homenet. This architecture may define optional homenet-specific features, but hosts that do not implement these features must work on homenets.

3. Terminology

This document uses the following terms and abbreviations:

HNR  Homenet Router

SHNR  Homenet Router implementing simple homenet naming architecture

AHNR  Homenet Router implementing advanced homenet naming architecture

ISP  Internet Service Provider

4. Name

In order for names to be published on a homenet, it is necessary that there be a set of domain names under which such names are published. These domain names, together, are referred to as the "local domains." By default, homenets use the reserved domain ‘home.arpa.’ for publishing names for forward lookups. So a host called ‘example’ that published its name on the homenet would publish its records on the domain name ‘example.home.arpa.’. Because ‘home.arpa.’ is used by all homenets, it has no global meaning, and names published under the domain ‘home.arpa’ cannot be used outside of the homenet on which they are published.

Homenet routers that implement advanced homenet naming may also be configured with a global domain. How such a domain is configured is out of scope for this document, and is described in the Advanced Homenet Naming Architecture document [advanced].

In addition to the name, which defaults to ‘home.arpa.’, names are needed for reverse lookups. These names are dependent on the IP addressing used on the homenet. If the homenet is addressed with IPv4, a reverse domain corresponding to the IPv4 subnet [1] section 5.2.1 should be constructed. For example, if the homenet is allocating local IP addresses out of net 10 [3], a domain, ‘10.in-addr.arpa’ would be required. Like ‘home.arpa.’, ‘10.in-addr.arpa’ is a locally-served zone, and has no validity outside of the homenet.

If the homenet is addressed with IPv6, it is expected to have a unique local address prefix; subsets of this prefix will be
advertised on every link on the homenet. Every service on the homenet that supports IPv6 is expected to be reachable at an address that is configured using the ULA prefix. Therefore there is no need for any IPv6 reverse zone to be populated other than the ULA zone. So for example if the homenet’s ULA prefix is fd00:2001:db8::/48, then the reverse domain name for the homenet would end in ‘8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2.0.0.d.f.ip6.arpa’.

5. Authority

The authority role is provided by a name server that is authoritative for each of the local domains. SHNRs provide authoritative service for the homenet using DNSSD Discovery Broker [17]. SHNRs also provide Discovery Relay service [12]. On a homenet that has only SHNRs, each SHNR individually provides authoritative service for the whole homenet by using Discovery relays to discover services off the local link.

The Discovery Proxy model relies on each link having its own name. However, homenets do not actually have a way to name local links that will make any sense to the end user. Consequently, this mechanism will not work without some tweaks. In order to address this, homenets will use Discovery Brokers [17]. The discovery broker will be configured so that a single query for a particular service will be successful in providing the information required to access that service, regardless of the link it is on.

Artificial link names will be generated using HNCP. These should only be visible to the user in graphical user interfaces in the event that the same name is claimed by a service on two links. Services that are expected to be accessed by users who type in names should use [13] if it is available.

It is possible that local services may offer services available on IP addresses in public as well as ULA prefixes. Homenet hybrid proxies MUST filter out global IP addresses, providing only ULA addresses, similar to the process described in section 5.5.2 of [11].

This filtering applies to queries within the homenet; it is appropriate for non-ULA addresses to be used for offering services, because in some cases end users may want such services to be reachable outside of the homenet. Configuring this is however out of scope for this document.
6. Resolution

Name resolution is provided by a local DNS cache or proxy on the homenet, henceforth the "local resolver." All host queries are sent to this local resolver. The local resolver may either act as a full-service caching resolver, or as a DNS proxy. Its responsibility with respect to queries on the homenet is to notice queries for names for which the local authoritative server is authoritative. Queries for such names are handled through the local authoritative server. Queries for all other names are resolved either by forwarding them to an ISP-provided full service resolver, or by providing the full service resolver function locally.

7. Publication

7.1. DNS Service Discovery Registration Protocol

The DNSSD Service Registration protocol [13] requires that DNS updates be validated on the basis that they are received on the local link. To ensure that such registrations are actually received on local links in the homenet, updates are sent to the local relay proxy ([12]) (XXX how?).

The relay proxy encapsulates the update and sends it to whatever Discovery Proxy is listening on the link; the Discovery proxy then either consumes the update directly, or forwards it to the authoritative resolver for the local service discovery zone. If the registration protocol is not supported on the homenet, the Discovery Proxy rejects the update with a ??? RCODE.

Homenets are not required to support Service Registration. Service registration requires a stateful authoritative DNS server; this may be beyond the capability of the minimal Homenet router. However, more capable Homenet routers should provide this capability. In order to make this work, minimal Homenet routers MUST implement the split hybrid proxy [12]. This enables a Homenet with one or more Homenet routers that provide a stateful registration cache to allow those routers to take over service, using Discovery Relays to service links that are connected using Homenet routers with more limited functionality.

7.2. Configuring Service Discovery

Clients discovering services using DNS-SD [7] follow a two-step process. The first step is for the client device to determine in which domain(s) to attempt to discover services. The second step is for the client device to then seek desired service(s) in those domain(s). For an example of the second step, given the desired
service type "IPP Printing", and the domains "local" and "meeting.ietf.org", the client device forms the queries "_ipp._tcp.local. PTR ?" (resolved using Multicast DNS) and "_ipp._tcp.meeting.ietf.org PTR. ?" (resolved using Unicast DNS) and then presents the combined list of results to the user.

The first step, determining in which domain(s) to attempt to discover services, is performed in a variety of ways, as described in Section 11 of the DNS-Based Service Discovery specification [7].

The domain "local" is generally always in the set of domains in which the client devices attempt to discover services, and other domains for service discovery may be configured manually by the user.

The device also learns additional domains automatically from its network environment. For this automatic configuration discovery, special DNS queries are formulated. To learn additional domain(s) in which to attempt to discover services, the query string "lb._dns_sd._udp" is prepended onto three different kinds of "bootstrap domain" to form DNS queries that allow the device to learn the configuration information.

One of these bootstrap domains is the fixed string "local". The device issues the query "lb._dns_sd._udp.local. PTR ?" (resolved using Multicast DNS), and if any answers are received, then they are added to the set of domains in which the client devices attempt to discover services.

Another kind of these bootstrap domains is name-based, derived from the DHCPv4 "domain name" option (code 15) [4] (for IPv4) or the DNS Search List (DNSSL) Router Advertisement option [10] (for IPv6). If a domain in the DNSSL is "example.com", then the device issues the query "lb._dns_sd._udp.example.com. PTR ?" (resolved using Unicast DNS), and if any answers are received, then they are likewise added to the set of domains in which the client devices attempt to discover services.

Finally, the third kind of bootstrap domain is address-based, derived from the device’s IP address(es) themselves. If the device has IP address 192.168.1.100/24, then the device issues the query "lb._dns_sd._udp.0.1.168.192.in-addr.arpa. PTR ?" (resolved using Unicast DNS), and if any answers are received, then they are also added to the set of domains in which the client devices attempt to discover services.

Since there is an HNR on every link of a homenet, automatic configuration could be performed by having HNRs answer the "lb._dns_sd._udp.local. PTR ?" (Multicast DNS) queries. However,
because multicast is slow and unreliable on many modern network
technologies like Wi-Fi, we prefer to avoid using it. Instead we
require that a homenet be configured to answer the name-based
bootstrap queries. By default the domain in the DNSSL communicated
to the client devices will be "home.arpa", and the homenet will be
configured to correctly answer queries such as
"lb._dns_sd._udp.example.com. PTR ?", though client devices must not
assume that the name will always be "home.arpa". A client could be
configured with any valid DNSSL, and should construct the appropriate
bootstrap queries derived from the name(s) in their configured DNS
Search List.

HNRs will answer domain enumeration queries against every IPv4
address prefix advertised on a homenet link, and every IPv6 address
prefix advertised on a homenet link, including prefixes derived from
the homenet’s ULA(s). Whenever the "<domain>" sequence appears in
this paragraph, it references each of the domains mentioned in this
paragraph.

Homenets advertise the availability of several browsing zones in the
"b._dns_sd._udp.<domain>" subdomain. By default, the 'home.arpa'
domain is advertised. Similarly, 'home.arpa' is advertised as the
default browsing and service registration domain under
"db._dns_sd._udp.<domain>", "r._dns_sd._udp.<domain>",
"dr._dns_sd._udp.<domain>" and "lb._dns_sd._udp.<domain>".

In order for this discovery process to work, the homenet must provide
authoritative answers for each of the domains that might be queried.
To do this, it provides authoritative name service for the 'ip6.arpa'
and 'in-addr.arpa' subdomains corresponding to each of the prefixes
advertised on the homenet. For example, consider a homenet with the
192.168.1.0/24, 2001:db8:1234:5600::/56 and fc01:2345:6789:1000::/56
prefixes. This homenet will have to provide a name server that
claims to be authoritative for 1.168.192.in-addr.arpa,
6.5.4.3.2.1.8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa and
0.0.9.8.7.6.5.4.3.2.1.0.c.f.ip6.arpa.

An IPv6-only homenet would not have an authoritative server for a
subdomain of in-addr.arpa. These public authoritative zones are
required for the public prefixes even if the prefixes are not
delegated. However, they need not be accessible outside of the
homenet.

It is out of the scope of this document to specify ISP behavior, but
we note that ISPs have the option of securely delegating the zone, or
providing an unsigned delegation, or providing no delegation. Any
delegation tree that does not include an unsigned delegation at or
above the zone cut for the ip6.arpa reverse zone for the assigned
prefix will fail to validate.

Ideally, an ISP should provide a secure delegation using a zone-
signing key provided by the homenet. However, that too is out of
scope for this document. Therefore, an ISP that wishes to support
users of the simple homenet naming architecture will have to provide
an unsigned delegation. We do not wish, however, to discourage
provisioning of signed delegations when that is possible.

8. Host Configuration

Hosts on the homenet receive a set of resolver IP addresses using
either DHCP or RA. IPv4-only hosts will receive IPv4 addresses of
resolvers, if available, over DHCP. IPv6-only hosts will receive
resolver IPv6 addresses using either stateful (if available) or
stateless DHCPv6, or through the Recursive DNS Server Option ([10],
Section 5.1) in router advertisements.

All Homenet routers provide resolver information using both stateless
DHCPv6 and RA; support for stateful DHCPv6 and DHCPv4 is optional,
however if either service is offered, resolver addresses will be
provided using that mechanism as well.

9. Globally Unique Name

Automatic configuration of a globally unique name for the homenet is
out of scope for this document. However, homenet servers MUST allow
the user to configure a globally unique name in place of the default
name, ‘home.arpa.’ By default, even if configured with a global
name, homenet routers MUST NOT answer queries from outside of the
homenet for subdomains of that name.

10. DNSSEC Validation

DNSSEC Validation for the ’home.arpa’ zone and for the locally-served
‘ip6.arpa’ and ‘in-adr.arpa’ domains is not possible without a trust
anchor. Establishment of a trust anchor for such validation is out of
scope for this document.

Homenets that have been configured with a globally unique domain MUST
support DNSSEC signing of local names, and must provide a way to
generate a KSK that can be used in the secure delegation of the
globally unique domain assigned to the homenet.
11. Support for Multiple Provisioning Domains

Homenets must support the Multiple Provisioning Domain Architecture [9]. Hosts connected to the homenet may or may not support multiple provisioning domains. For hosts that do not support multiple provisioning domains, the homenet provides one or more resolvers that will answer queries for any provisioning domain. Such hosts may receive answers to queries that either do not work as well if the host chooses a source address from a different provisioning domain, or does not work at all. However, the default source address selection policy, longest-match [CITE], will result in the correct source address being chosen as long as the destination address has a close match to the prefix assigned by the ISP.

Hosts that support multiple provisioning domains will be provisioned with one or more resolvers per provisioning domain. Such hosts can use the IP address of the resolver to determine which provisioning domain is applicable for a particular answer.

Each ISP has its own provisioning domain. Because ISPs connections cannot be assumed to be persistent, the homenet has its own separate provisioning domain.

Configuration from the IPv4 DHCP server are treated as being part of the homenet provisioning domain. The case where a homenet advertises IPv4 addresses from one or more public prefixes is out of scope for this document. Such a configuration is NOT RECOMMENDED for homenets.

Configuration for IPv6 provisioning domains is done using the Multiple Provisioning Domain RA option [CITE].

12. Using the Local Namespace While Away From Home

This architecture does not provide a way for service discovery to be performed on the homenet by devices that are not directly connected to a link that is part of the homenet.

13. Management Considerations

This architecture is intended to be self-healing, and should not require management. That said, a great deal of debugging and management can be done simply using the DNS Service Discovery protocol.
14. Privacy Considerations

Privacy is somewhat protected in the sense that names published on the homenet are only visible to devices connected to the homenet. This may be insufficient privacy in some cases.

The privacy of host information on the homenet is left to hosts. Various mechanisms are available to hosts to ensure that tracking does not occur if it is not desired. However, devices that need to have special permission to manage the homenet will inevitably reveal something about themselves when doing so. It may be possible to use something like HTTP token binding [15] to mitigate this risk.

15. Security Considerations

There are some clear issues with the security model described in this document, which will be documented in a future version of this section. A full analysis of the avenues of attack for the security model presented here have not yet been done, and must be done before the document is published.

16. IANA considerations

No new actions are required by IANA for this document.

Note however that this document is relying on the allocation of ‘home.arpa’ described in Special Use Top Level Domain ‘.home.arpa’ [16]. This document therefore can’t proceed until that allocation is done. [RFC EDITOR PLEASE REMOVE THIS PARAGRAPH PRIOR TO PUBLICATION].

17. Normative References


Appendix A. Existing solutions

Previous attempts to automate naming and service discovery in the context of a home network are able to function with varying degrees of success depending on the topology of the home network. Unfortunately, these solutions do not fully address the requirements of homenets.

For example, Multicast DNS [6] can provide naming and service discovery [7], but only within a single multicast domain.

The Domain Name System provides a hierarchical namespace [1], a mechanism for querying name servers to resolve names [2], a mechanism for updating namespaces by adding and removing names [5], and a mechanism for discovering services [7]. Unfortunately, DNS provides no mechanism for automatically provisioning new namespaces, and secure updates to namespaces require that the host submitting the update have a public or symmetric key that is known to the network and authorized for updates. In an unmanaged network, the publication of and authorization of these keys is an unsolved problem.

Some managed networks get around this problem by having the DHCP server do DNS updates. However, this doesn’t really work, because DHCP doesn’t provide a mechanism for updating service discovery records: it only supports publishing A and AAAA records.

This partially solves the trust problem: DHCP can validate that a device is at least connected to a network link that is actually part of the managed network. This prevents an off-network attacker from registering a name, but provides no mechanism for actually validating the identity of the host registering the name. For example, it would be easy for an attacker on the network to steal a registered name.

Hybrid Multicast DNS [11] proposes a mechanism for extending multicast DNS beyond a single multicast domain. However, in order to use this as a solution, some shortcomings need to be considered.
Most obviously, it requires that every multicast domain have a separate name. This then requires that the homenet generate names for every multicast domain. These names would then be revealed to the end user. But since they would be generated automatically and arbitrarily, they would likely cause confusion rather than clarity, and in degenerate cases requires that the end user have a mental model of the topology of the network in order to guess on which link a given service may appear.

At present, the approach we intend to take with respect to disambiguation is that this will not be solved at a protocol level for devices that do not implement the registration protocol.

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DNS-Based Service Discovery allows clients to discover available services using unicast DNS queries. In simple configurations these unicast DNS queries go directly to the appropriate authoritative server(s). In large networks that have complicated topology, or many client devices, or both, it can be advantageous to have an intermediary between the clients and authoritative servers. This intermediary, called a Discovery Broker, serves several purposes. A Discovery Broker can reduce load on both the servers and the clients, and gives the option of presenting clients with service discovery organized around logical, rather than physical, topology.
1. Introduction

DNS-Based Service Discovery (DNS-SD) [RFC6763] is a component of Zero Configuration Networking [RFC6760] [ZC] [Roadmap].

DNS-SD operates on a single network link (broadcast domain) using Multicast DNS [RFC6762]. DNS-SD can span multiple links using unicast DNS.

In the DNS-SD specification [RFC6763] section 11, "Discovery of Browsing and Registration Domains (Domain Enumeration)", describes how client devices are automatically configured with the appropriate unicast DNS domains in which to perform their service discovery queries. When used in conjunction with a Discovery Proxy [DisProx] this allows clients to discover services on remote links, even when the devices providing those services support only the basic Multicast DNS form of DNS-Based Service Discovery. A Discovery Broker is a companion technology that operates in conjunction with existing authoritative DNS servers (such as a Discovery Proxy [DisProx]) and existing clients performing service discovery using unicast DNS queries.
2. Problem Statement

The following description of how a Discovery Broker works is illustrated using the example of a long rectangular office building. The building is large enough to have hundreds or even thousands of employees working there, the network is large enough that it would be impractical to operate it as a single link (a single broadcast domain, with a single IPv4 subnet or IPv6 network prefix).

Suppose, for this example, that the network is divided into twelve separate links, connected by routers. Each link has its own IPv6 network prefix. The division of the network into twelve sections of roughly equal size is somewhat arbitrary, and does not necessarily follow any physical boundaries in the building that are readily apparent to its inhabitants. Two people in adjacent offices on the same corridor may have Ethernet ports connected to different links. Indeed, two devices in the same office, connected to the company network using secure Wi-Fi, may inadvertently associate with different access points, which happen to be connected to different wired links with different IPv6 network prefixes.

If this network were operated the way most networks have historically been operated, it would use only Multicast DNS Service Discovery, and adjacent devices that happen to connect to different underlying links would be unable to discover each other. And this would not be a rare occurrence. Since this example building contains eleven invisible boundaries between the twelve different links, anyone close to one of those invisible boundaries will have a population of nearby devices that are not discoverable on the network, because they’re on a different link. For example, a shared printer in a corridor outside one person’s office may not be discoverable by the person in the very next office.

One path to solving this problem is as follows:

1. Install a Discovery Proxy [DisProx] on each of the twelve links.
2. Create twelve named subdomains, such as, "services1.example.com", "services2.example.com", "services3.example.com", and so on.
3. Delegate each named subdomain to the corresponding Discovery Proxy on that link.
4. Create entries in the 'ip6.arpa' reverse mapping zone directing clients on each link to perform service discovery queries in the appropriate named subdomains, as documented in section 11 of the DNS-SD specification [RFC6763].
In step 4 above, it might be tempting to add only a single record in each reverse mapping domain referencing the corresponding services subdomain. This would work, but it would only facilitate each client discovering the same services it could already discover using Multicast DNS [RFC6762]. In some cases even this is useful, such as when using Wi-Fi Access Points with multicast disabled for efficiency. In such cases this configuration would allow wireless clients to discover services on the wired network segment without having to use costly Wi-Fi multicast.

But for this example we want to achieve more than just equivalency with Multicast DNS.

In this example, each reverse mapping domain is populated with the name of its own services subdomain, plus its neighbors. The reverse mapping domain for the first link has two "lb._dns-sd._udp" PTR records, referencing "services1.example.com" and "services2.example.com". The second link references services1, services2, and services3. The third link references services2, services3, and services4. This continues along the building, until the last link, which references services11 and services12.

In this way a "sliding window" is created, where devices on each link are directed to look for services both on that link and on its two immediate neighbors. Depending on the physical and logical topologies of the building and its network, it may be appropriate to direct clients to query in more than three services subdomains. If the building were a ring instead of a linear rectangle, then the network topology would "wrap around", so that links 1 and 12 would be neighbors.

This solves the problem of being unable to discover a nearby device because it happens to be just the other side of one of the twelve arbitrary invisible network link boundaries.

For many cases this solution is adequate, but there is an issue to consider. In the example above, a client device on link 5 has TCP connections to three Discovery Proxies, on links 4, 5 and 6. In a more complex setup each client could have many more TCP connections to different Discovery Proxies.

Similarly, if there are a many clients, each Discovery Proxy could be required to handle thousands of simultaneous TCP connections from clients.

The solution to these two problems is the Discovery Broker.
3. Discovery Broker Operation

The Discovery Broker is an intermediary between the client devices and the Discovery Proxies. It is a kind of multiplexing crossbar switch. It shields the clients from having to connect to multiple Discovery Proxies, and it shields the Discovery Proxies from having to accept connections from thousands of clients.

Each client needs only a single TCP connection to a single Discovery Broker, rather than multiple TCP connections directly to multiple Discovery Proxies. This eases the load on client devices, which may be mobile and battery-powered.

Each Discovery Proxy needs to support connections to at most a small number of Discovery Brokers. The burden of supporting thousands of clients is taken by the Discovery Broker, which can be a powerful server in a data center. This eases the load on the Discovery Proxy, which may be implemented in a device with limited RAM and CPU resources, like a Wi-Fi access point or IP router.

Recall that a Discovery Proxy [DisProx] is a special kind of authoritative DNS server [RFC1034] [RFC1035]. Externally it behaves like a traditional authoritative DNS server, except that instead of getting its zone data from a manually-administered zone file, it learns its zone data dynamically as a result of performing Multicast DNS queries on its local link.

A Discovery Broker is a similar concept, except that it learns its zone data dynamically as a result of performing *unicast* DNS queries. For example, a Discovery Broker could be configured so that the answer for "<something>.discovery5.example.com" is obtained by performing corresponding unicast DNS queries:

```
<something>.services4.example.com
<something>.services5.example.com
<something>.services6.example.com
```

and then returning the union of the results as the answer. The rdata of the returned answers is not rewritten or modified in any way by the Discovery Broker.
4. Protocol Transparency

From the point of view of an authoritative DNS server such as a Discovery Proxy, the protocol a Discovery Broker uses to make requests of it is the exact same DNS protocol that any other client would use to make requests of it (which may be traditional one-shot DNS queries [RFC1034] [RFC1035] or long-lived DNS Push Notifications [Push]).

A Discovery Broker making requests is no different from any other client making requests. The fact that the Discovery Broker may be making a single request on behalf of thousands of clients making the same request, thereby shielding the Discovery Proxy from excessive traffic burden, is invisible to the Discovery Proxy.

This means that an authoritative DNS server such as a Discovery Proxy does not have to be aware that it is being queried by a Discovery Broker. In some scenarios a Discovery Proxy may be deployed with clients talking to it directly; in other scenarios the same Discovery Proxy product may be deployed with clients talking via a Discovery Broker. The Discovery Proxy simply answers queries as usual in both cases.

Similarly, from the point of view of a client, the protocol it uses to talk to a Discovery Broker is the exact same DNS protocol it uses to talk to a Discovery Proxy or any other authoritative DNS server.

This means that the client does not have to be aware that it is using a Discovery Broker. The client simply sends service discovery queries as usual, according to configuration it received from the network or otherwise, and receives answers as usual. A Discovery Broker may be employed to shield a Discovery Proxy from excessive traffic burden, but this is transparent to a client.

Another benefit for the client is that by having the Discovery Broker query multiple subdomains and aggregate the results, it saves the client from having to do multiple separate queries of its own.
5. Logical vs. Physical Topology

In the example so far, we have focussed on facilitating discovery of devices and services that are physically nearby.

Another application of the Discovery Broker is to facilitate discovery of devices and services according to other logical relationships.

For example, it might be considered desirable for the company’s two file servers to be discoverable company-wide, but for its many printers to only be discovered (by default) by devices on nearby network links.

As another example, company policy may block access to certain resources from Wi-Fi; in such cases it would make sense to implement consistent policies at the service discovery layer, to avoid the user frustration of services being discoverable on Wi-Fi that are not usable from Wi-Fi.

Such policies, and countless variations thereon, may be implemented in a Discovery Broker, limited only by the imagination of the vendor creating the Discovery Broker implementation.
6. Recursive Application

Due to the Protocol Transparency property described above, multiple Discovery Brokers may be "stacked" in whatever combinations are useful. A Discovery Broker makes queries in exactly the same way a client would, and a Discovery Broker accepts queries in exactly the same way a Discovery Proxy (or other authoritative DNS server) would. This means that a Discovery Broker talking to another Discovery Broker is no different from client-to-broker or broker-to-proxy communication, or indeed, direct client-to-proxy communication. The arrows in the chart below are all instances of the same communication protocol.

```
client -> proxy
client -> broker -> proxy
client -> broker -> broker -> proxy
```

This makes it possible to combine Discovery Brokers with different functionality. A Discovery Broker performing physical aggregation could be used in conjunction with a Discovery Broker performing policy-based filtering, as illustrated below:

```
+-----------------+    +-----------------+    +-----------------+
|  Ethernet Client |    | Aggregating Broker |    | Discovery Proxy |
+-----------------+    +-----------------+    +-----------------+
|                 |    |                   |    |                 |
|                 |    | Filtering Broker |    |                 |
+-----------------+    +-----------------+    +-----------------+
|  Wi-Fi Client   |    | Aggregating Broker |    | Discovery Proxy |
+-----------------+    +-----------------+    +-----------------+
```

Cheshire & Lemon
Expires January 3, 2018
[Page 8]
7. Security Considerations

Discovery (or non-discovery) of services is not a substitute for suitable access control. Servers listening on open ports are generally discoverable via a brute-force port scan anyway; DNS-Based Service Discovery makes access to these services easier for legitimate users.

8. Informative References


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Abstract

This document extends the specification of the Discovery Proxy for Multicast DNS-Based Service Discovery. It describes a lightweight relay mechanism, a Discovery Relay, which allows Discovery Proxies to provide service on multicast links to which they are not directly attached.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction ............................................. 3
2. Terminology .............................................. 4
3. Protocol Overview ......................................... 5
   3.1. Connections between Proxies and Relays (overview) .... 5
   3.2. mDNS Messages On Multicast Links ..................... 6
4. Connections between Proxies and Relays (details) .......... 6
5. Traffic from Relays to Proxies ............................ 7
6. Traffic from Proxies to Relays ............................ 8
7. Discovery Proxy Behavior ................................. 9
8. DSO TLVs .................................................. 10
   8.1. mDNS Link Request ................................. 10
   8.2. mDNS Link Discontinue ........................... 10
   8.3. Link Identifier .................................. 10
   8.4. mDNS Message .................................... 11
   8.5. Layer Two Source Address ......................... 11
   8.6. IP Source ......................................... 11
9. Provisioning ............................................... 12
   9.1. Provisioned Objects ................................. 12
      9.1.1. Multicast Link ............................... 13
      9.1.2. Discovery Proxy ............................. 14
      9.1.3. Discovery Relay ............................. 14
   9.2. Configuration Files ................................. 15
   9.3. Discovery Proxy Configuration .................... 17
   9.4. Discovery Relay Configuration ..................... 17
10. Security Considerations ................................. 18
11. IANA Considerations .................................... 18
12. Acknowledgments .......................................... 18
13. References .............................................. 19
   13.1. Normative References ............................. 19
   13.2. Informative References ........................... 20
Authors’ Addresses ......................................... 20
1. Introduction

The Discovery Proxy for Multicast DNS-Based Service Discovery [I-D.ietf-dnssd-hybrid] is a mechanism for discovering services on a subnetted network through the use of Discovery Proxies, which issue Multicast DNS (mDNS) requests [RFC6762] on various multicast links in the network on behalf of a remote host performing DNS-Based Service Discovery [RFC6763].

In the original Discovery Proxy specification, it is imagined that for every multicast link on which services will be discovered, a host will be present running a full Discovery Proxy. This document introduces a lightweight Discovery Relay which can be used to provide discovery services on a multicast link without requiring a full Discovery Proxy on every multicast link.

The Discovery Relay operates by listening for TCP connections from Discovery Proxies. When a Discovery Proxy connects, the connection is authenticated and secured using TLS. The Discovery Proxy can then specify one or more multicast links from which it wishes to receive mDNS traffic. The Discovery Proxy can also send messages to be transmitted on its behalf on one or more of those multicast links. DNS Stateful Operations (DSO) [I-D.ietf-dnsop-session-signal] is used as a framework for conveying interface and IP header information associated with each message.

The Discovery Relay functions essentially as a set of one or more remote virtual interfaces for the Discovery Proxy, one on each multicast link to which the Discovery Relay is connected. In a complex network, it is possible that more than one Discovery Relay will be connected to the same multicast link; in this case, the Discovery Proxy ideally should only be using one such Relay Proxy per multicast link, since using more than one will generate duplicate traffic.

How such duplication is detected and avoided is out of scope for this document; in principle it could be detected using HNCP [RFC7788] or configured using some sort of orchestration software in conjunction with NETCONF [RFC6241] or CPE WAN Management Protocol [TR-069].

Since the primary purpose of a Discovery Relay is providing remote virtual interface functionality to Discovery Proxies, this document is written with that usage in mind, and this document talks about Discovery Relays receiving requests from Discovery Proxies. However, in principle, a Discovery Relay could be used by any properly authorized client, so it should be understood that in this document the term, "Discovery Proxy," potentially means, "any properly authorized client."
2. Terminology

The following definitions may be of use:

mDNS Agent  A host which sends and/or responds to mDNS queries.

Discovery Proxy  A network service which receives well-formed questions using the DNS protocol, performs multicast DNS queries to answer those questions, and responds with those answers using the DNS protocol.

Discovery Relay  A network service which relays received mDNS messages to a Discovery Proxy, and can transmit mDNS messages on behalf of that Discovery Proxy.

multicast link  A maximal set of network connection points, such that any host connected to any connection point in the set may send a packet with a link-local multicast destination address (specifically the mDNS link-local multicast destination address [RFC6762]) that will be received by all hosts connected to all other connection points in the set. Note that it is becoming increasingly common for a multicast link to be smaller than its corresponding unicast link. For example it is becoming common to have multiple Wi-Fi Access Points on a shared Ethernet backbone, where the multiple Wi-Fi Access Points and their shared Ethernet backbone form a single unicast link (a single IPv4 subnet, or single IPv6 prefix) but not a single multicast link. Unicast packets between two hosts on that IPv4 subnet or IPv6 prefix are correctly delivered, but multicast packets are not forwarded between the various Wi-Fi Access Points. Given the slowness of Wi-Fi multicast, the decision to not forward multicast packets between Wi-Fi Access Points is reasonable, and that further supports the need for technologies like Discovery Proxy and Discovery Relay to facilitate discovery on these networks.

whitelist  A list of one or more IP addresses from which a Discovery Relay may accept connections.

silently discard  When a message that is not supported or not permitted is received, and the required response to that message is to "silently discard" it, that means that no response is sent by the service that is discarding the message to the service that sent it. The service receiving the message may log the event, and may also count such events: "silently" does not preclude such behavior.
3. Protocol Overview

This document describes a way for Discovery Proxies to communicate with mDNS agents on remote multicast links to which they are not directly connected, using a Discovery Relay. As such, there are two parts to the protocol: connections between Discovery Proxies and Discovery Relays, and communications between Discovery Relays and mDNS agents.

3.1. Connections between Proxies and Relays (overview)

Discovery Relays listen for incoming connection requests. Connections between Discovery Proxies and Discovery Relays are established by Discovery Proxies. Connections are authenticated and encrypted using TLS, with both client and server certificates. Connections are long-lived: a Discovery Proxy is expected to send many queries over a single connection, and Discovery Relays will forward all mDNS traffic from subscribed interfaces over the connection.

The stream encapsulated in TLS will carry DNS frames as in the DNS TCP protocol [RFC1035] Section 4.2.2. However, all messages will be DSO messages [I-D.ietf-dnsop-session-signal]. There will be three types of such messages between Discovery Proxy and Discovery Relay:

- Control messages from Proxy to Relay
- mDNS messages from Proxy to Relay
- mDNS messages from Relay to Proxy

Subscribe messages from the Discovery Proxy to the Discovery Relay indicate to the Discovery Relay that mDNS messages from one or more specified multicast links are to be relayed to the Discovery Proxy.

mDNS messages from a Discovery Proxy to a Discovery Relay cause the Discovery Relay to transmit the mDNS message on one or more multicast links to which the Discovery Relay host is directly attached.

mDNS messages from a Discovery Relay to a Discovery Proxy are sent whenever an mDNS message is received on a multicast link to which the Discovery Relay has subscribed.

During periods with no traffic flowing, Discovery Proxies are responsible for generating any necessary keepalive traffic, as stated in the DSO specification [I-D.ietf-dnsop-session-signal].
3.2. mDNS Messages On Multicast Links

Discovery Relays listen for mDNS traffic on all configured multicast links that have at least one active subscription from a Discovery Proxy. When an mDNS message is received on a multicast link, it is forwarded on every open Discovery Proxy connection that is subscribed to mDNS traffic on that multicast link. In the event of congestion, where a particular Discovery Proxy connection has no buffer space for an mDNS message that would otherwise be forwarded to it, the mDNS message is not forwarded to it. Normal mDNS retry behavior is used to recover from this sort of packet loss. Discovery Relays are not expected to buffer more than a few mDNS packets. Excess mDNS packets are silently discarded. In reality this is expected to be a nonissue. Particularly on networks like Wi-Fi, multicast packets are transmitted at rates ten or even a hundred times slower than unicast packets. This means that even at peak multicast packets rates, it is likely that a unicast TCP connection will be able to carry those packets with ease.

Discovery Proxies send mDNS messages they wish to have sent on their behalf on remote multicast link(s) on which the Discovery Proxy has an active subscription. A Discovery Relay will not transmit mDNS packets on any multicast link on which the remote Discovery Proxy does not have an active subscription, since it makes no sense for a Discovery Proxy to ask to have a query sent on its behalf if it’s not able to receive the responses to that query.

4. Connections between Proxies and Relays (details)

When a Discovery Relay starts, it opens a passive TCP listener to receive incoming connection requests from Discovery Proxies. This listener may be bound to one or more source IP addresses, or to the wildcard address, depending on the implementation. When a connection is received, the relay must first validate that it is a connection to an IP address to which connections are allowed. For example, it may be that only connections to ULAs are allowed, or to the IP addresses configured on certain interfaces. If the listener is bound to a specific IP address, this check is unnecessary.

If the relay is using an IP address whitelist, the next step is for the relay to verify that that the source IP address of the connection is on its whitelist. If the connection is not permitted either because of the source address or the destination address, the Discovery Relay responds to the TLS Client Hello message from the Discovery Proxy with a TLS user_canceled alert ([I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] Section 6.1).
Otherwise, the Discovery Relay will attempt to complete a TLS handshake with the Discovery Proxy. Discovery Proxies are required to send the post_handshake_auth extension ([I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] Section 4.2.5). If a Discovery Relay receives a ClientHello message with no post_handshake_auth extension, the Discovery Relay rejects the connection with a certificate_required alert ([I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] Section 6.2).

Once the TLS handshake is complete, the Discovery Relay MUST request post-handshake authentication as described in ([I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] Section 4.6.2). If the Discovery Proxy refuses to send a certificate, or the key presented does not match the key associated with the IP address from which the connection originated, or the CertificateVerify does not validate, the connection is dropped with the TLS access_denied alert ([I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] Section 6.2).

Once the connection is established and authenticated, it is treated as a DNS TCP connection [RFC1035].

Aliveness of connections between Discovery Proxies and Relays is maintained as described in Section 4 of [I-D.ietf-dnsop-session-signal]. Discovery Proxies must also honor the ‘Retry Delay’ TLV (section 5 of [I-D.ietf-dnsop-session-signal]) if sent by the Discovery Relay.

Discovery Proxies may establish more than one connection to a specific Discovery Relay. This would happen in the case that a TCP connection stalls, and the Discovery Proxy is able to reconnect before the previous connection has timed out. It could also happen as a result of a server restart. It is not likely that two active connections from the same Discovery Proxy would be present at the same time, but it must be possible for additional connections to be established. The Discovery Relay may drop the old connection when the new one has been fully established, including a successful TLS handshake. What it means for two connections to be from the same Discovery Proxy is that the connections both have source addresses that belong to the same Discovery Proxy, and that they were authenticated using the same client certificate.

5. Traffic from Relays to Proxies

The mere act of connecting to a Discovery Relay does not result in any mDNS traffic being forwarded. In order to request that mDNS traffic from a particular multicast link be forwarded on a particular connection, the Discovery Proxy must send one or more DSO messages, each containing a single mDNS Link Request TLV (Section 8.1) indicating the multicast link from which traffic is requested.
When such a message is received, the Discovery Relay validates that the specified multicast link is available for forwarding, and that forwarding is enabled for that multicast link. For each such message the Discovery Relay validates the multicast link specified and includes, in a single response, RCODE 0 if the multicast link specified is valid, or RCODE 3 (NXDOMAIN / Name Error -- Named entity does not exist) otherwise. For each valid multicast link, it begins forwarding all mDNS traffic from that link to the Discovery Proxy. Delivery is not guaranteed: if there is no buffer space, packets will be dropped. It is expected that regular mDNS retry processing will take care of retransmission of lost packets. The amount of buffer space is implementation dependent, but generally should not be more than the bandwidth delay product of the TCP connection [RFC1323]. The Discovery Relay should use the TCP_NOTSENT_LOWAT mechanism [NOTSENT][PRIO] or equivalent, to avoid building up a backlog of data in excess of the amount necessary to have in flight to fill the bandwidth delay product of the TCP connection.

mDNS messages from Relays to Proxies are framed within DSO messages. Each DSO message can contain multiple TLVs, but only a single mDNS message is conveyed per DSO message. Each forwarded mDNS message is contained in an mDNS Message TLV (Section 8.4). The layer two source address of the message, if known, MAY be encoded in a Layer Two Source TLV (Section 8.5). The source IP address and port of the message MUST be encoded in an IP Source TLV (Section 8.6). The multicast link on which the message was received MUST be encoded in a Link Identifier TLV (Section 8.3). The Discovery Proxy MUST silently ignore unrecognized TLVs in mDNS messages, and MUST NOT discard mDNS messages that include unrecognized TLVs.

A Discovery Proxy may discontinue listening for mDNS messages on a particular multicast link by sending a DSO message containing an mDNS Link Discontinue TLV (Section 8.2). Subsequent messages from that link that had previously been queued may arrive after listening has been discontinued. The Discovery Proxy should silently discard such messages. The Discovery Relay MUST discontinue generating such messages as soon as the request is received. The Discovery Relay does not respond to this message other than to discontinue forwarding mDNS messages from the specified links.

6. Traffic from Proxies to Relays

Like mDNS traffic from relays, each mDNS message sent by a Discovery Proxy to a Discovery Relay is encapsulated in an mDNS Message TLV (Section 8.4) within a DSO message. Each message MUST contain one or more Link Identifier TLVs (Section 8.3). The Discovery Relay will transmit the message to the mDNS port and multicast address on each link specified in the message using the specified IP address family.
7. Discovery Proxy Behavior

Discovery Proxies treat multicast links for which Discovery Relay service is being used as if they were virtual interfaces; in other words, a Discovery Proxy serving multiple multicast links using multiple Discovery Relays behaves the same as a Discovery Proxy serving multiple multicast links using multiple physical network interfaces. In this section we refer to multicast links served directly by the Discovery Proxy as locally-connected links, and multicast links served through the Discovery Relay as relay-connected links.

What this means is that when a Discovery Proxy receives a DNSSD query from a client via unicast, it will generate mDNS query messages on the relevant multicast link(s) for which it is acting as a proxy. For locally-connected link(s), those query messages will be sent directly. For relay-connected link(s), the query messages will be sent through the Discovery Relay that is being used to serve that multicast link.

Responses from devices on locally-connected links are processed normally. Responses from devices on relay-connected links are received by the Discovery Relay, encapsulated, and forwarded to the Discovery Proxy; the Discovery Proxy then processes these messages using the link-identifying information included in the encapsulation.

Discovery Proxies do not generally respond to mDNS queries on relay-connected links. The one exception is responding to the Domain Enumeration queries used to bootstrap unicast service discovery ("lb._dns-sd._udp.local", etc.) [RFC6763]. Apart from these Domain Enumeration queries, if any other mDNS query is received from a Discovery Relay, the Discovery Proxy silently discards it.

In principle it could be the case that some device is capable of performing service discovery using Multicast DNS, but not using traditional unicast DNS. Responding to mDNS queries received from the Discovery Relay could address this use case. However, continued reliance on multicast is counter to the goals of the current work in service discovery, and to benefit from wide-area service discovery such client devices should be updated to support service discovery using unicast queries.
8. DSO TLVs

This document defines a modest number of new DSO TLVs.

8.1. mDNS Link Request

The mDNS Link Request TLV conveys a link identifier from which a Discovery Proxy is requesting that a Discovery Relay forward mDNS traffic. The link identifier comes from the provisioning configuration (see Section 9). The DSO-TYPE for this TLV is TBD-R. DSO-LENGTH is always 5. DSO-DATA is the 8-bit address family followed by the 32-bit link identifier, in network byte order, as described in Section 9. An address family value of 1 indicates IPv4 and 2 indicates IPv6, as recorded in the IANA Registry of Address Family Numbers [AdFam].

The mDNS Link Request TLV can only be used as a primary TLV, and requires an acknowledgement.

At most one mDNS Link Request TLV may appear in a DSO message. To request multiple link subscriptions, multiple separate DSO messages are sent, each containing a single mDNS Link Request TLV.

8.2. mDNS Link Discontinue

The mDNS Link Discontinue TLV is used by Discovery Proxies to unsubscribe to mDNS messages on the specified multicast link. DSO-TYPE is TBD-D. DSO-LENGTH is always 5. DSO-DATA is the 8-bit address family followed by the 32-bit link identifier, in network byte order, as described in Section 9.

The mDNS Link Discontinue TLV can only be used as a primary TLV, and is not acknowledged.

At most one mDNS Link Discontinue TLV may appear in a DSO message. To unsubscribe from multiple links, multiple separate DSO messages are sent, each containing a single mDNS Link Discontinue TLV.

8.3. Link Identifier

This option is used both in DSO messages from Discovery Relays to Discovery Proxies that contain received mDNS messages, and from Discovery Proxies to Discovery Relays that contain mDNS messages to be transmitted on the multicast link. In the former case, it indicates the multicast link on which the message was received; in the latter case, it indicates the multicast link on which the message should be transmitted. DSO-TYPE is TBD-L. DSO-LENGTH is always 5.
DSO-DATA is the 8-bit address family followed by the 32-bit link identifier, in network byte order, as described in Section 9.

The Link Identifier TLV can only be used as an additional TLV.

8.4. mDNS Message

The mDNS Message TLV is used to encapsulate an mDNS message that is being forwarded from a multicast link to a Discovery Proxy, or is being sent from a Discovery Proxy for transmission on a multicast link. Only the application layer payload of the mDNS message is carried in the DSO mDNS Message TLV, i.e., just the DNS message itself, beginning with the DNS Message ID, not the IP or UDP headers. The DSO-TYPE for this TLV is TBD-M. DSO-LENGTH is the length of the encapsulated mDNS message. DSO-DATA is the content of the encapsulated mDNS message.

The mDNS Message TLV can only be used as a primary TLV, and is not acknowledged.

8.5. Layer Two Source Address

The Layer Two Source Address TLV is used to report the link-layer address from which an mDNS message was received. This TLV is optionally present in DSO messages from Discovery Relays to Discovery Proxies that contain mDNS messages when the source link-layer address is known. The DSO-TYPE is TBD-2. DSO-LENGTH is variable, depending on the length of link-layer addresses on the link from which the message was received. DSO-DATA is the link-layer address as it was received on the link.

The Layer Two Source Address TLV can only be used as an additional TLV.

8.6. IP Source

The IP Source TLV is used to report the IP source address and port from which an mDNS message was received. This TLV is present in DSO messages from Discovery Relays to Discovery Proxies that contain mDNS messages. DSO-TYPE is TBD-A. DSO-LENGTH is either 6, for an IPv4 address, or 18, for an IPv6 address. DSO-DATA is the source port, followed by the IP Address, in network byte order.

The IP Source TLV can only be used as an additional TLV.
9. Provisioning

In order for a Discovery Proxy to use Discovery Relays, it must be configured with sufficient information to identify multicast links on which service discovery is to be supported and connect to discovery relays supporting those multicast links, if it is not running on a host that is directly connected to those multicast links.

A Discovery Relay must be configured both with a set of multicast links to which the host on which it is running is connected, on which mDNS relay service is to be provided, and also with a list of one or more Discovery Proxies authorized to use it.

On a network supporting DNS Service Discovery using Discovery Relays, more than one different Discovery Relay implementation is likely be present. While it may be that only a single Discovery Proxy is present, that implementation will need to be able to be configured to interoperate with all of the Discovery Relays that are present. Consequently, it is necessary that a standard set of configuration parameters be defined for both Discovery Proxies and Discovery Relays.

DNS Service Discovery generally operates within a constrained set of links, not across the entire internet. This section assumes that what will be configured will be a limited set of links operated by a single entity or small set of cooperating entities, among which services present on each link should be available to users on that link and every other link. This could be, for example, a home network, a small office network, or even a network covering an entire building or small set of buildings. The set of Discovery Proxies and Discovery Relays within such a network will be referred to in this section as a 'Discovery Domain'.

Depending on the context, several different candidates for configuration of Discovery Proxies and Discovery relays may be applicable. The simplest such mechanism is a manual configuration file, but regardless of provisioning mechanism, certain configuration information needs to be communicated to the devices, as outlined below.

9.1. Provisioned Objects

Three types of objects must be described in order for Discovery Proxies and Discovery Relays to be provisioned: Discovery Proxies, Multicast Links, and Discovery Relays. "Human-readable" below means actual words or proper names that will make sense to an untrained human being. "Machine-readable" means a name that will be used by machines to identify the entity to which the name refers. Each
entity must have a machine-readable name and may have a human-
readable name. No two entities can have the same human-readable
name. Similarly, no two entities can have the same machine-readable
name.

9.1.1. Multicast Link

The description of a multicast link consists of:

link-identifier  A 32-bit identifier that uniquely identifies that
link within the Discovery Domain. Each link MUST have exactly one
such identifier. Link Identifiers do not have any special
semantics, and are not intended to be human-readable.

ldh-name  A fully-qualified domain name for the multicast link that
is used to form an LDH domain name as described in section 5.3 of
the Discovery Proxy specification [I-D.ietf-dnssd-hybrid]. This
name is used to identify the link during provisioning, and must be
present.

hr-name  A human-readable user-friendly fully-qualified domain name
for the multicast link. This name MUST be unique within the
Discovery Domain. Each multicast link MUST have exactly one such
name. The hr-name MAY be the same as the ldh-name. (The hr-name
is allowed to contain spaces, punctuation and rich text, but it is
not required to do so.)

The ldh-name and hr-name can be used to form the LDH and human-
readable domain names as described in [I-D.ietf-dnssd-hybrid],
section 5.3.

Note that the ldh-name and hr-name can be used in two different ways.

On a small home network with little or no human administrative
configuration, link names may be directly visible to the user. For
example, a search in ‘home.arpa’ on a small home network may discover
services on both ethernet.home.arpa and wi-fi.home.arpa. In the case
of a home user who has one Ethernet-connected printer and one Wi-Fi-
connected printer, discovering that they have one printer on
ethernet.home.arpa and another on wi-fi.home.arpa is understandable
and meaningful.

On a large corporate network with hundreds of Wi-Fi Access Points,
the individual link names of the hundreds of multicast links are less
likely to be useful to end users. In these cases, Discovery Broker
functionality [I-D.sctl-discovery-broker] is used to translate the
many link names to something more meaningful to users. For example,
in a building with 50 Wi-Fi Access Points, each with their own link
names, services on all the different physical links may be presented to the user as appearing in ‘headquarters.example.com’. In this case, the individual link names can be thought of similar to MAC addresses or IPv6 addresses. They are used internally by the software as unique identifiers, but generally are not exposed to end users.

9.1.2. Discovery Proxy

The description of a Discovery Proxy consists of:

name  a machine-readable name used to reference this Discovery Proxy in provisioning.

hr-name  an optional human-readable name which can appear in provisioning, monitoring and debugging systems. Must be unique within a Discovery Domain.

public-key  a public key that identifies the Discovery Proxy. This key can be shared across services on the Discovery Proxy Host. The public key is used both to uniquely identify the Discovery Proxy and to authenticate connections from it.

private-key  the private key corresponding to the public key.

source-ip-addresses  a list of IP addresses that may be used by the Discovery Proxy when connecting to Discovery Relays. These addresses should be addresses that are configured on the Discovery Proxy Host. They should not be temporary addresses. All such addresses must be reachable within the Discovery Domain.

public-ip-addresses  a list of IP addresses that may be used to submit DNS queries to the Discovery Proxy. This is not used for interoperation with Discovery Relays, but is mentioned here for completeness: this list of addresses may differ from the ‘source-ip-addresses’ list. If any of these addresses are reachable from outside of the Discovery Domain, services in that domain will be discoverable outside of the domain.

multicast links  a list of multicast links on which this Discovery Proxy is expected to provide service

The private key should never be distributed to other hosts; all of the other information describing a Discovery Proxy can be safely shared with Discovery Relays.
9.1.3. Discovery Relay

The description of a Discovery Relay consists of:

- **name**: a required machine-readable identifier used to reference the relay
- **hr-name**: an optional human-readable name which can appear in provisioning, monitoring and debugging systems. Must be unique within a Discovery Domain.
- **public-key**: a public key that identifies the Discovery Relay. This key can be shared across services on the Discovery Relay Host. Indeed, if a Discovery Proxy and Discovery Relay are running on the same host, the same key may be used for both. The public key uniquely identifies the Discovery Relay and is used by the Discovery Proxy to verify that it is talking to the intended Discovery Relay after a TLS connection has been established.
- **private-key**: the private key corresponding to the public key.
- **connect-tuples**: a list of IP address/port tuples that may be used to connect to the Discovery Relay. The relay may be configured to listen on all addresses on a single port, but this is not required, so the port as well as the address must be specified.
- **multicast links**: a list of multicast links to which this relay is physically connected.

The private key should never be distributed to other hosts; all of the other information describing a Discovery Relay can be safely shared with Discovery Proxies.

9.2. Configuration Files

For this discussion, we assume the simplest possible means of configuring Discovery Proxies and Discovery Relays: the configuration file. Any environment where changes will happen on a regular basis will either require some automatic means of generating these configuration files as the network topology changes, or will need to use a more automatic method for configuration, such as HNCP [RFC7788].

There are many different ways to organize configuration files. This discussion assumes that multicast links, relays and proxies will be specified as objects, as described above, perhaps in a master file, and then the specific configuration of each proxy or relay will reference the set of objects in the master file, referencing objects...
by name. This approach is not required, but is simply shown as an example. In addition, the private keys for each proxy or relay must appear only in that proxy or relay’s configuration file.

The master file contains a list of Discovery Relays, Discovery Proxies and Multicast Links. Each object has a name and all the other data associated with it. We do not formally specify the format of the file, but it might look something like this:

```
Relay upstairs
  public-key xxx
  connect-tuple 192.0.2.1 1917
  connect-tuple fd00::1 1917
  link upstairs-wifi
  link upstairs-wired
Relay downstairs
  public-key yyy
  connect-tuple 192.51.100.1 2088
  connect-tuple fd00::2 2088
  link downstairs-wifi
  link downstairs-wired
Proxy main
  public-key zzz
  address 203.1.113.1
Link upstairs-wifi
  id 1
  name Upstairs Wifi
Link upstairs-wired
  id 2
  hr-name Upstairs Wired
Link downstairs-wifi
  id 3
  name Downstairs Wifi
Link downstairs-wired
  id 4
  hr-name Downstairs Wired
```
9.3. Discovery Proxy Configuration

The Discovery Proxy configuration contains enough information to identify which Discovery Proxy is being configured, enumerate the list of multicast links it is intended to serve, and provide keying information it can use to authenticate to Discovery Relays. It may also contain custom information about the port and/or IP address(es) on which it will respond to DNS queries.

An example configuration, following the convention used in this section, might look something like this:

```
Proxy main
    private-key zzz
    subscribe upstairs-wifi
    subscribe downstairs-wifi
    subscribe upstairs-wired
    subscribe downstairs-wired
```

When combined with the master file, this configuration is sufficient for the Discovery Proxy to identify and connect to the relay proxies that serve the links it is configured to support.

9.4. Discovery Relay Configuration

The discovery relay configuration just needs to tell the discovery relay what name to use to find its configuration in the master file, and what the private key is corresponding to its public key in the master file. For example:

```
Relay Downstairs
    private-key yyy
```
10. Security Considerations

11. IANA Considerations

The IANA is kindly requested to update the DSO Type Codes Registry [I-D.ietf-dnsop-session-signal] by allocating codes for each of the TBD type codes listed in the following table, and by updating this document, here and in Section 8. Each type code should list this document as its reference document.

| Opcode | Status   | Name                     |
|--------+----------+--------------------------|
| TBD-R  | Standard | mDNS Link Request        |
| TBD-D  | Standard | mDNS Discontinue         |
| TBD-L  | Standard | Link Identifier          |
| TBD-M  | Standard | mDNS Message             |
| TBD-2  | Standard | Layer Two Source Address |
| TBD-A  | Standard | IP Source                |

DSO Type Codes to be allocated

12. Acknowledgments
13. References

13.1. Normative References

[I-D.ietf-dnsop-session-signal]

[I-D.ietf-dnssd-hybrid]
Cheshire, S., "Discovery Proxy for Multicast DNS-Based Service Discovery", draft-ietf-dnssd-hybrid-07 (work in progress), September 2017.

[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]

[I-D.sctl-discovery-broker]


13.2. Informative References


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Service Registration Protocol for DNS-Based Service Discovery
draft-sctl-service-registration-00

Abstract

The DNS-SD Service Registration Protocol provides a way to perform DNS-Based Service Discovery using only unicast packets. This eliminates the dependency on Multicast DNS as the foundation layer, which has worked well in some environments, like the simplest of home networks, but not in others, like large enterprise networks (where multicast does not scale well to thousands of devices) and mesh networks (where multicast and broadcast are supported poorly, if at all). Broadly speaking, the DNS-SD Service Registration Protocol is DNS Update, with a few additions.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

DNS-Based Service Discovery [RFC6763] is a component of Zero Configuration Networking [RFC6760] [ZC] [Roadmap].

There are two facets of DNS-Based Service Discovery to consider: how relevant information makes its way into the DNS namespace (how a server offers its services to interested clients) and how clients access that information (how an interested client discovers and uses a service instance).

This document is concerned with the first of those two facets: how relevant information makes its way into the DNS namespace.

In the DNS-Based Service Discovery specification [RFC6763] Section 10 "Populating the DNS with Information" briefly discusses ways that relevant information can make its way into the DNS namespace. In the case of Multicast DNS [RFC6762], the relevant information trivially becomes visible in the ".local" namespace by virtue of devices answering for themselves. For unicast DNS names, ways that information makes its way into the DNS namespace include manual configuration of DNS zone files, possibly assisted using tools such as the "dns-sd -Z" command, automated tools such as a Discovery Proxy [DisProx], or explicit registration by the services themselves. It is the last option -- explicit registration by the services themselves -- that is the subject of this document.
2. Service Registration Protocol

The DNS-SD Service Registration Protocol is largely built on DNS Update [RFC2136] [RFC3007], with some additions.

When a device advertises services using Multicast DNS, the parent domain is implicitly ".local".

When a device advertises services in the traditional unicast DNS namespace, it needs to know the parent domain name for its services. This parent domain can be manually configured by a human operator, or learned from the network. In the DNS-SD specification [RFC6763] section 11, "Discovery of Browsing and Registration Domains (Domain Enumeration)", describes how a client device can learn a recommended default registration domain from the network.

In the remainder of this document, Section 3 covers cleanup of stale data, and Section 4 covers advertising services on behalf of devices that are sleeping to reduce power consumption.

The final question is security. Most dynamic DNS servers will not accept unauthenticated updates. In the case of manual configuration of registration domain by a human operator, the human operator can also configure an appropriate TSIG security key. In the case of automatic configuration via DNS-SD Domain Enumeration queries, it would be nice to also have zero-configuration security. While at first glance zero-configuration security may seem to be a self-contradiction, this document proposes a simple first-come first-served security mechanism, described below in Section 5.
3. Cleanup of Stale Data

The traditional DNS Update mechanisms [RFC2136] [RFC3007] implicitly assume they are being used by a human operator. If a human operator uses DNS Update (perhaps via the ‘nsupdate’ command) to create a record, then that record should stay created until the human operator decides to remove it.

The same assumptions do not apply to machine-generated records. If a mobile device creates one or more records using DNS Update, and later unceremoniously departs the network, then those stale records should eventually be removed.

The mechanism proposed here is modeled on DHCP. Just like a DHCP address lease, a record created using DNS Update has a lifetime. If the record is not refreshed before its lifetime expires, then the record is deleted.

When a client performs a DNS Update, it includes a EDNS(0) Update Lease option [DNS-UL]. The DNS Update Lease option indicates the requested lifetime of the records created or updated in the associated DNS Update message. In the DNS Update reply, the server returns its own EDNS(0) Update Lease option indicating the granted lifetime, which may be shorter, the same, or longer than the client requested. If the records are not refreshed before the granted lifetime expires, then the records are deleted.

DNS servers may be configured to refuse DNS Updates that do not include a DNS Update Lease option.
4. Sleep Proxy

Another use of Service Registration Protocol is for devices that sleep to reduce power consumption.

In this case, in addition to the DNS Update Lease option [DNS-UL] described above, the device includes an EDNS(0) OWNER Option [Owner].

The DNS Update Lease option constitutes a promise by the device that it will wake up before this time elapses, to renew its records and thereby demonstrate that it is still attached to the network. If it fails to renew the records by this time, that indicates that it is no longer attached to the network, and its records should be deleted.

The EDNS(0) OWNER Option indicates that the device will be asleep, and will not be receptive to normal network traffic. When a DNS server receives a DNS Update with an EDNS(0) OWNER Option, that signifies that the DNS server should act as a proxy for any IPv4 or IPv6 address records in the DNS Update message. This means that the DNS server should send ARP or ND messages claiming ownership of the IPv4 and/or IPv6 addresses in the records in question. In addition, the DNS server should answer future ARP or ND requests for those IPv4 and/or IPv6 addresses, claiming ownership of them. When the DNS server receives a TCP SYN or UDP packet addressed to one of the IPv4 or IPv6 addresses for which it proxying, it should then wake up the sleeping device using the information in the EDNS(0) OWNER Option. At present version 0 of the OWNER Option specifies the "Wake-on-LAN Magic Packet" that needs to be sent; future versions could be extended to specify other wakeup mechanisms.
5. First-Come First-Served Naming

In some environments, such as home networks with an appropriate border gateway, it may be preferable to have some limited security on the protected internal network rather than no security at all.

Users have shown limited willingness to endure complicated configuration for their networked home devices. It is rare for home users to change even the factory-default name for their wireless printer, so it’s questionable whether it’s reasonable to expect them to configure passwords or security keys.

This document presents a zero-configuration first-come first-served naming mechanism.

Instead of requiring a preconfigured key installed by manual administration, a new device optimistically creates its DNS Service Discovery records, plus a DNS SIG(0) public key, using a DNS Update signed with its DNS SIG(0) private key.

The DNS server validates the signature on the message using the SIG(0) key already stored on the name, if present, and otherwise with the key sent in the update, if the requested name is not yet present. The server may check that the two public keys are the same before validating, and refuse the update if they are not, to avoid the cost of verifying the signature.

The lifetime of the DNS-SD PTR, SRV and TXT records [RFC6763] is typically set to two hours. That way, if a device is disconnected from the network, its stale data does not persist for too long, advertising a service that is not accessible.

However, the lifetime of its DNS SIG(0) public key should be set to a much longer time, typically 14 days. The result of this is that even though a device may be temporarily unplugged, disappearing from the network for a few days, it makes a claim on its name that lasts much longer.

This way, even if a device is unplugged from the network for a few days, and its services are not available for that time, no other rogue device can come along and immediately claim its name the moment it disappears from the network. It takes a much longer time before an abandoned name becomes available for re-use.

When using this first-come first-served security mechanism, the server accepting or rejecting the updates utilizes knowledge of the DNS-Based Service Discovery semantics [RFC6763]. Specifically, for all records aside from PTR records, the update must be validly signed.
using the SIG(0) key with the same DNS resource record owner name (the name on the left in a traditional textual zone file). For additions or deletions of PTR records, the update must be validly signed using the SIG(0) key with the same DNS resource record owner name as the rdata in the PTR record (the name on the right in a traditional textual zone file).

6. Security Considerations

To be completed.
7. References

7.1. Normative References


7.2. Informative References


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Abstract

The DNS-SD Service Registration Protocol uses the standard DNS Update mechanism to enable DNS-Based Service Discovery using only unicast packets. This eliminates the dependency on Multicast DNS as the foundation layer, which greatly improves scalability and improves performance on networks where multicast service is not an optimal choice, particularly 802.11 (Wi-Fi) and 802.15.4 (IoT) networks.

DNS-SD Service registration uses public keys and SIG(0) to allow services to defend their registrations against attack.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

DNS-Based Service Discovery [RFC6763] is a component of Zero Configuration Networking [RFC6760] [ZC] [I-D.cheshire-dnssd-roadmap]. This document describes an enhancement to DNS-Based Service Discovery [RFC6763] that allows services to automatically register their services using the DNS protocol rather than using mDNS. There is already a large installed base of DNS-SD clients that can do service discovery using the DNS protocol. This extension makes it much easier to take advantage of this existing functionality.

This document is intended for three audiences: implementors of software that provides services that should be advertised using DNS-SD, implementors of DNS servers that will be used in contexts where DNS-SD registration is needed, and administrators of networks where DNS-SD service is required. The document is intended to provide sufficient information to allow interoperable implementation of the registration protocol.

DNS-Based Service Discovery (DNS-SD) allows services to advertise the fact that they provide service, and to provide the information required to access that service. Clients can then discover the set of services of a particular type that are available. They can then select a service from among those that are available and obtain the information required to use it.

The DNS-SD Service Registration protocol, described in this document, provides a reasonably secure mechanism for publishing this information. Once published, these services can be readily discovered by clients using standard DNS lookups.

In the DNS-Based Service Discovery specification [RFC6763] Section 10 "Populating the DNS with Information" briefly discusses ways that services can publish their information in the DNS namespace. In the case of Multicast DNS [RFC6762], it allows services to publish their information on the local link, using names in the ".local" namespace, which makes their services directly discoverable by peers attached to that same local link.

RFC6763 also allows clients to discover services using the DNS protocol [RFC1035]. This can be done by having a system administrator manually configure service information in the DNS, but
manually populating DNS authoritative server databases is costly and potentially error-prone, and requires a knowledgable network administrator. Consequently, although all DNS-SD client implementations of which we are aware support DNS-SD using DNS queries, in practice it is used much less frequently than mDNS. The Discovery Proxy [I-D.ietf-dnssd-hybrid] provides one way to automatically populate the DNS namespace, but is only appropriate on networks where services are already advertised using mDNS. This document describes a solution more suitable for networks where multicast is inefficient, or undesirable for other reasons, by supporting both offering of services, and discovery of services, using unicast.

2. Service Registration Protocol

Services that implement the DNS-SD Service Registration Protocol use DNS Update [RFC2136] [RFC3007] to publish service information in the DNS. Two variants exist, one for full-featured devices, and one for devices designed for "Constrained-Node Networks" [RFC7228].

Full-featured devices are either configured manually, or use the "dr._dns-sd._udp" query [RFC6763] to learn the default registration domain from the network. Using the chosen service registration domain, full-featured devices construct the names of the SRV, TXT, and PTR records describing their service(s). For these names they then discover the zone apex of the closest enclosing DNS zone using SOA queries [I-D.ietf-dnssd-push]. Having discovered the enclosing DNS zone, they query for the "_dns-update._udp<zone>" SRV record to discover the server to which they should send DNS updates.

For devices designed for "Constrained-Node Networks" [RFC7228] some simplifications are used. Instead of being configured with (or discovering) the service registration domain, the (proposed) special use domain name [RFC6761] "services.arpa" is used. Instead of learning the server to which they should send DNS updates, a fixed IPv6 anycast address is used (value TBD). It is the responsibility of a "Constrained-Node Network" supporting DNS-SD Service Registration Protocol to provide appropriate anycast routing to deliver the DNS updates to the appropriate server. It is the responsibility of the DNS-SD Service Registration server on a "Constrained-Node Network" to handle the updates appropriately. In some network environments, updates may be accepted directly into a local "services.arpa" zone, which has only local visibility. In other network environments, updates for names ending in "services.arpa" may be rewritten internally to names with broader visibility.
The reason for these different assumptions is that "Constrained-Node Networks" generally require special egress support, and Anycast packets captured at the "Constrained-Node Network" egress can be assumed to have originated locally. Low-power devices that typically use "Constrained-Node Networks" may have very limited battery power. The additional DNS lookups required to discover a registration server and then communicate with it will increase the power required to advertise a service; for low-power devices, the additional flexibility this provides does not justify the additional use of power.

General networks have the potential to have more complicated topologies at the Internet layer, which makes anycast routing more difficult. Such networks may or may not have the infrastructure required to route anycast to a server that can process it. However, they can be assumed to be able to provide registration domain discovery and routing. By requiring the use of TCP, the possibility of off-network spoofing is eliminated.

We will discuss several parts to this process: how to know what to publish, how to know where to publish it (under what name), how to publish it, how to secure its publication, and how to maintain the information once published.

2.1. What to publish

We refer to the message that services using the DNSSD Registration Protocol send as a Registration. Three types of updates appear in a Registration: Service Discovery records, Service Description records, and Host Description records.

- Service Discovery records are one or more PTR RRs, mapping from the generic service type (or subtype) to the specific Service Instance Name.

- Service Description records are exactly one SRV RR, and one or more TXT RRs, both with the same name, the Service Instance Name ([RFC6763] section 4.1). In principle Service Description records can include other record types, with the same Service Instance Name, though in practice they rarely do. The Service Instance Name MUST be referenced by one or more Service Discovery PTR records, unless it is a placeholder service registration for an intentionally non-discoverable service name.

- The Host Description records for a service are a KEY RR, used to claim exclusive ownership of the service registration, and one or more RRs of type A or AAAA, giving the IPv4 or IPv6 address(es) of the host where the service resides.
RFC 6763 describes the details of what each of these types of updates contains and is the definitive source for information about what to publish; the reason for mentioning it here is to provide the reader with enough information about what will be published that the service registration process can be understood at a high level without first learning the full details of DNS-SD. Also, the "Service Instance Name" is an important aspect of first-come, first-serve naming, which we describe later on in this document.

2.2. Where to publish it

Multicast DNS uses a single namespace, ".local", which is valid on the local link. This convenience is not available for DNS-SD using the DNS protocol: services must exist in some specific unicast namespace.

As described above, full-featured devices are responsible for knowing in what domain they should register their services. Devices made for "Constrained-Node Networks" register in the (proposed) special use domain name [RFC6761] "services.arpa", and let the DNS-SD Service Registration server handle rewriting that to a different domain if necessary.

2.3. How to publish it

It is possible to issue a DNS Update that does several things at once; this means that it’s possible to do all the work of adding a PTR resource record to the PTR RRset on the Service Name if it already exists, or creating one if it doesn’t, and creating or updating the Service Instance Name and Host Description in a single transaction.

A Registration is therefore implemented as a single DNS Update message that contains a service’s Service Discovery records, Service Description records, and Host Description records.

Updates done according to this specification are somewhat different than regular DNS Updates as defined in RFC2136. RFC2136 assumes that updating is a fairly heavyweight process, so you might first attempt to add a name if it doesn’t exist, and then in a second message update the name if it does exist but matches certain preconditions. Because the registration protocol uses a single transaction, some of this adaptability is lost.

In order to allow updates to happen in a single transaction, Registrations do not include update constraints. The constraints specified in Section 2.4.2 are implicit in the processing of
Registrations, and so there is no need for the service sending the Registration to put in any explicit constraints.

2.3.1. How DNS-SD Service Registration differs from standard RFC2136 DNS Update

DNS-SD Service Registration is based on standard RFC2136 DNS Update, with some differences:

- It implements first-come first-served name allocation, protected using SIG(0).
- It enforces policy about what updates are allowed.
- It optionally performs rewriting of "services.arpa" to some other domain.
- It optionally performs automatic population of the address-to-name reverse mapping domains.
- A DNS-SD Service Registration server is not required to implement general DNS Update prerequisite processing.
- Simplified clients are allowed to send updates to an anycast address, for names ending in "services.arpa"

2.3.2. Testing using standard RFC2136-compliant servers

It may be useful to set up a DNS server for testing that does not implement the Registration protocol. This can be done by configuring the server to listen on the anycast address, or advertising it in the _dns-update._udp SRV record. It must be configured to be authoritative for "services.arpa", and to accept updates from hosts on local networks for names under "services.arpa" without authentication.

A server configured in this way will be able to successfully accept and process Registrations from services that send Registrations. However, no constraints will be applied, and this means that the test server will accept internally inconsistent Registrations, and will not stop two Registrations, sent by different services, that claim the same name(s), from overwriting each other.
2.3.3. How to allow services to update standard RFC2136-compliant servers

Ordinarily Registrations will fail when sent to any non-Registration Protocol server because the zone being updated is "services.arpa", and no DNS server that is not a Registration Protocol server should normally be configured to be authoritative for "services.arpa". Therefore, a service that sends a Registration can tell that the receiving server does not support the Registration Protocol, but does support RFC2136, because the RCODE will either be NOTZONE, NOTAUTH or REFUSED, or because there is no response to the update request (when using the anycast address).

In this case a service MAY attempt to register itself using regular RFC2136 DNS updates. To do so, it must discover default registration zone and the DNS server designated to receive updates for that zone, as described earlier using the _dns-update._udp SRV record. It can then make the update using the port and host pointed to by the SRV record, and should use appropriate constraints to avoid overwriting competing records. Such updates are out of scope for the DNSSD Registration Protocol, and a service that implements the DNSSD Registration Protocol MUST first attempt to use the Registration Protocol to register itself, and should only attempt to use RFC2136 backwards compatibility if that fails.

2.4. How to secure it

Traditional DNS update is secured using the TSIG protocol, which uses a secret key shared between the client (which issues the update) and the server (which authenticates it). This model does not work for automatic service registration.

The goal of securing the DNS-SD Registration Protocol is to provide the best possible security given the constraint that service registration has to be automatic. It is possible to layer more operational security on top of what we describe here, but what we describe here improves upon the security of mDNS. The goal is not to provide the level of security of a network managed by a skilled operator.

2.4.1. First-Come First-Served Naming

First-Come First-Serve naming provides a limited degree of security: a service that registers its service using DNS-SD Registration protocol is given ownership of a name for an extended period of time based on the key used to authenticate the DNS Update. As long as the registration service remembers the Service Instance Name and the key...
used to register that Service Instance Name, no other service can add or update the information associated with that Service Instance Name.

### 2.4.1.1. Service Behavior

The service generates a public/private key pair. This key pair MUST be stored in stable storage; if there is no writable stable storage on the client, the client MUST be pre-configured with a public/private key pair that can be used.

When sending DNS updates, the service includes a KEY record containing the public portion of the key in each Host Description update. The update is signed using SIG(0), using the private key that corresponds to the public key in the KEY record. The lifetimes of the records in the update is set using the EDNS(0) Update Lease option.

The lifetime of the DNS-SD PTR, SRV, A, AAAA and TXT records [RFC6763] is typically set to two hours. This means that if a device is disconnected from the network, it does not appear in the user interfaces of devices looking for services of that type for too long.

However, the lifetime of its KEY record should be set to a much longer time, typically 14 days. The result of this is that even though a device may be temporarily unplugged, disappearing from the network for a few days, it makes a claim on its name that lasts much longer.

This way, even if a device is unplugged from the network for a few days, and its services are not available for that time, no other rogue device can come along and immediately claim its name the moment it disappears from the network. In the event that a device is unplugged from the network and permanently discarded, then its name is eventually cleaned up and made available for re-use.

### 2.4.2. Registration Server Behavior

The Registration server checks each update in the Registration to see that it contains a Service Discovery update, a Service Description update, and a Host Description update.

An update is a Service Discovery update if it contains

- exactly one RRset update,
- which is for a PTR RR,
- which points to a Service Instance Name
- for which an update is present in the Registration.
An update is a Service Description update if, for the appropriate Service Instance Name, it contains
  o exactly one "Delete all RRsets from a name" update,
  o exactly one SRV RRset update,
  o one or more TXT RRset updates,
  o and the target of the SRV record update references a hostname for which there is a Host Description update in the Registration.

An update is a Host Description update if, for the appropriate hostname, it contains
  o exactly one "Delete all RRsets from a name" update,
  o A or AAAA RR update(s)
  o a KEY RR update that adds a KEY RR that contains the public key corresponding to the private key that was used to sign the message,
  o there is a Service Instance Name update in the Registration that updates an SRV RR so that it points to the hostname being updated by this update.

A Registration MUST include at least one Service Name update, at least one Service Description update, and exactly one Host Description update. An update message that does not not a Registration. An update message that contains any other updates, or any update constraints, is not a Registration. Such messages should either be processed as regular RFC2136 updates, including access control checks and constraint checks, if supported, or else rejected with RCODE=REFUSED.

Note that if the definitions of each of these update types are followed carefully, this means that many things that look very much like Registrations nevertheless are not. For example, a Registration that contains an update to a Service Name and an update to a Service Instance Name, where the Service Name does not reference the Service Instance Name, is not a valid Registration message, but may be a valid RFC2136 update.

Assuming that an update message has been validated with these conditions and is a valid Registration, the server checks that the name in the Host Description update exists. If so, then the server checks to see if the KEY record on the name is the same as the KEY record in the update. If it is not, then the server MUST reject the Registration with the YXDOMAIN RCODE.

Otherwise, the server validates the update using SIG(0) on the public key in the KEY record of the Host Description update. If the validation fails, the server MUST reject the rejection rejected
with the REFUSED RCODE. Otherwise, the update is considered valid
and authentic, and is processed according to the method described in
RFC2136. The status that is returned depends on the result of
processing the update.

The server MAY add a Reverse Mapping that corresponds to the Host
Description. This is not required because the Reverse Mapping serves
no protocol function, but it may be useful for debugging, e.g. in
annotating network packet traces or logs.

The server MAY apply additional criteria when accepting updates. In
some networks, it may be possible to do out-of-band registration of
keys, and only accept updates from pre-registered keys. In this
case, an update for a key that has not been registered should be
rejected with the REFUSED RCODE.

There are at least two benefits to doing this rather than simply
using normal SIG(0) DNS updates. First, the same registration
protocol can be used in both cases, so both use cases can be
addressed by the same service implementation. Second, the
registration protocol includes maintenance functionality not present
with normal DNS updates.

Note that the semantics of using the Registration Protocol in this
way are different than for typical RFC2136 implementations: the KEY
used to sign the update in the Registration Protocol only allows the
client to update records that refer to its Host Description. RFC2136
implementations do not normally provide a way to enforce a constraint
of this type.

The server may also have a dictionary of names or name patterns that
are not permitted. If such a list is used, updates for Service
Instance Names that match entries in the dictionary are rejected with
YXDOMAIN.

2.5. TTL Consistency

All RRs within an RRset are required to have the same TTL
(Clarifications to the DNS Specification [RFC2181], Section 5.2). In
order to avoid inconsistencies, the Registration Protocol places
restrictions on TTLs sent by services and requires that Registration
Protocol Servers enforce consistency.

Services sending Registrations MUST use consistent TTLs in all RRs
within the Registration.
Registration Protocol servers MUST check that the TTLs for all RRs within the Registration are the same. If they are not, the Registration MUST be rejected with a REFUSED RCODE.

Additionally, when adding RRs to an RRset, for example when processing Service Discovery records, the server MUST use the same TTL on all RRs in the RRset. How this consistency is enforced is up to the implementation.

2.6. Maintenance

2.6.1. Cleaning up stale data

Because the DNS-SD registration protocol is automatic, and not managed by humans, some additional bookkeeping is required. When an update is constructed by the client, it MUST include include an EDNS(0) Update Lease Option [I-D.sekar-dns-ul]. The Update Lease Option contains two lease times: the Update Lease Time and the Instance Lease Time.

These leases are promises, similar to DHCP leases [RFC2131], from the client that it will send a new update for the service registration before the lease time expires. The Update Lease time is chosen to represent the time after the update during which the registered records other than the KEY record should be assumed to be valid. The Instance Lease time represents the time after the update during which the KEY record should be assumed to be valid.

The reasoning behind the different lease times is discussed in the section on first-come, first-served naming Section 2.4.1. DNS-SD Registration Protocol servers may be configured with limits for these values. A default limit of two hours for the Update Lease and 14 days for the SIG(0) KEY are currently thought to be good choices. Clients that are going to continue to use names on which they hold leases should update well before the lease ends, in case the registration service is unavailable or under heavy load.

The Registration Protocol server MUST include an EDNS(0) Update Lease option in the response if the lease time proposed by the service has been shortened. The service MUST check for the EDNS(0) Update Lease option in the response and MUST use the lease times from that option in place of the options that it sent to the server when deciding when to update its registration.

Clients should assume that each lease ends N seconds after the update was first transmitted, where N is the lease duration. Servers should assume that each lease ends N seconds after the update that was successfully processed was received. Because the server will always
receive the update after the client sent it, this avoids the possibility of misunderstandings.

DNS-SD Registration Protocol servers MUST reject updates that do not include an EDNS(0) Update Lease option. Dual-use servers MAY accept updates that don’t include leases, but SHOULD differentiate between DNS-SD registration protocol updates and other updates, and MUST reject updates that are known to be DNS-SD Registration Protocol updates if they do not include leases.

2.6.2.  Sleep Proxy

Another use of Service Registration Protocol is for devices that sleep to reduce power consumption.

In this case, in addition to the DNS Update Lease option [I-D.sekar-dns-ul] described above, the device includes an EDNS(0) OWNER Option [I-D.cheshire-edns0-owner-option].

The EDNS(0) Update Lease option constitutes a promise by the device that it will wake up before this time elapses, to renew its registration and thereby demonstrate that it is still attached to the network. If it fails to renew the registration by this time, that indicates that it is no longer attached to the network, and its registration (except for the KEY in the Host Description) should be deleted.

The EDNS(0) OWNER Option indicates that the device will be asleep, and will not be receptive to normal network traffic. When a DNS server receives a DNS Update with an EDNS(0) OWNER Option, that signifies that the Registration Protocol server should set up a proxy for any IPv4 or IPv6 address records in the DNS Update message. This proxy should send ARP or ND messages claiming ownership of the IPv4 and/or IPv6 addresses in the records in question. In addition, proxy should answer future ARP or ND requests for those IPv4 and/or IPv6 addresses, claiming ownership of them. When the DNS server receives a TCP SYN or UDP packet addressed to one of the IPv4 or IPv6 addresses for which it proxying, it should then wake up the sleeping device using the information in the EDNS(0) OWNER Option. At present version 0 of the OWNER Option specifies the "Wake-on-LAN Magic Packet" that needs to be sent; future versions could be extended to specify other wakeup mechanisms.

Note that although the authoritative DNS server that implements the DNSSSD Service Registration Protocol function need not be on the same link as the sleeping host, the Sleep Proxy must be on the same link.

Cheshire & Lemon        Expires January 15, 2019               [Page 12]
3. Security Considerations

DNS-SD Service Registration Protocol updates have no authorization semantics other than first-come, first-served. This means that if an attacker from outside of the administrative domain of the server knows the server’s IP address, it can in principle send updates to the server that will be processed successfully. Servers should therefore be configured to reject updates from source addresses outside of the administrative domain of the server.

For Anycast updates, this validation must be enforced by every router that connects the CDN to the unconstrained portion of the network. For TCP updates, the initial SYN-SYN+ACK handshake prevents updates being forged from off-network. In order to ensure that this handshake happens, Service Discovery Protocol servers MUST NOT accept 0-RTT TCP payloads.

Note that these rules only apply to the validation of DNS-SD registration protocol updates. A server that accepts updates from DNS-SD registration protocol clients may also accept other DNS updates, and those DNS updates may be validated using different rules. However, in the case of a DNS service that accepts automatic updates, the intersection of the DNS-SD service registration update rules and whatever other update rules are present must be considered very carefully.

For example, a normal, authenticated RFC2136 update to any RR that was added using the Registration protocol, but that is authenticated using a different key, could be used to override a promise made by the registration protocol, by replacing all or part of the service registration information with information provided by a different client. An implementation that allows both kinds of updates should not allow updates to records added by Registrations using different authentication and authorization credentials.

4. Privacy Considerations

5. Acknowledgments

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6. References

6.1. Normative References


6.2. Informative References


Authors' Addresses