Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Architecture
draft-ietf-dots-architecture-05

Abstract

This document describes an architecture for establishing and maintaining Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) within and between domains. The document does not specify protocols or protocol extensions, instead focusing on defining architectural relationships, components and concepts used in a DOTS deployment.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Context and Motivation

Signaling the need for help defending against an active distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack requires a common understanding of mechanisms and roles among the parties coordinating defensive response. The signaling layer and supplementary messaging is the focus of DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS). DOTS defines a method of coordinating defensive measures among willing peers to mitigate attacks quickly and efficiently, enabling hybrid attack responses coordinated locally at or near the target of an active attack, or anywhere in-path between attack sources and target. Sample DOTS use cases are elaborated in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases].

This document describes an architecture used in establishing, maintaining or terminating a DOTS relationship within a domain or between domains.

1.1. Terminology

1.1.1. Key Words

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.1.2. Definition of Terms

This document uses the terms defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements].

1.2. Scope

In this architecture, DOTS clients and servers communicate using DOTS signaling. As a result of signals from a DOTS client, the DOTS server may modify the forwarding path of traffic destined for the attack target(s), for example by diverting traffic to a mitigator or pool of mitigators, where policy may be applied to distinguish and discard attack traffic. Any such policy is deployment-specific.

The DOTS architecture presented here is applicable across network administrative domains - for example, between an enterprise domain and the domain of a third-party attack mitigation service - as well as to a single administrative domain. DOTS is generally assumed to be most effective when aiding coordination of attack response between
two or more participating networks, but single domain scenarios are valuable in their own right, as when aggregating intra-domain DOTS client signals for inter-domain coordinated attack response.

This document does not address any administrative or business agreements that may be established between involved DOTS parties. Those considerations are out of scope. Regardless, this document assumes necessary authentication and authorization mechanisms are put in place so that only authorized clients can invoke the DOTS service.

A detailed set of DOTS requirements are discussed in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements], and the DOTS architecture is designed to follow those requirements. Only new behavioral requirements are described in this document.

1.3. Assumptions

This document makes the following assumptions:

- All domains in which DOTS is deployed are assumed to offer the required connectivity between DOTS agents and any intermediary network elements, but the architecture imposes no additional limitations on the form of connectivity.

- Congestion and resource exhaustion are intended outcomes of a DDoS attack [RFC4732]. Some operators may utilize non-impacted paths or networks for DOTS, but in general conditions should be assumed to be hostile and DOTS must be able to function in all circumstances, including when the signaling path is significantly impaired.

- There is no universal DDoS attack scale threshold triggering a coordinated response across administrative domains. A network domain administrator, or service or application owner may arbitrarily set attack scale threshold triggers, or manually send requests for mitigation.

- Mitigation requests may be sent to one or more upstream DOTS servers based on criteria determined by DOTS client administrators and the underlying network configuration. The number of DOTS servers with which a given DOTS client has established communications is determined by local policy and is deployment-specific. For example, a DOTS client of a multi-homed network may support built-in policies to establish DOTS relationships with DOTS servers located upstream of each interconnection link.

- The mitigation capacity and/or capability of domains receiving requests for coordinated attack response is opaque to the domains...
sending the request. The domain receiving the DOTS client signal may or may not have sufficient capacity or capability to filter any or all DDoS attack traffic directed at a target. In either case, the upstream DOTS server may redirect a request to another DOTS server. Redirection may be local to the redirecting DOTS server’s domain, or may involve a third-party domain.

- DOTS client and server signals, as well as messages sent through the data channel, are sent across any transit networks with the same probability of delivery as any other traffic between the DOTS client domain and the DOTS server domain. Any encapsulation required for successful delivery is left untouched by transit network elements. DOTS server and DOTS client cannot assume any preferential treatment of DOTS signals. Such preferential treatment may be available in some deployments (e.g., intra-domain scenarios), and the DOTS architecture does not preclude its use when available. However, DOTS itself does not address how that may be done.

- The architecture allows for, but does not assume, the presence of Quality of Service (QoS) policy agreements between DOTS-enabled peer networks or local QoS prioritization aimed at ensuring delivery of DOTS messages between DOTS agents. QoS is an operational consideration only, not a functional part of the DOTS architecture.

- The signal and data channels are loosely coupled, and may not terminate on the same DOTS server.

2. DOTS Architecture

The basic high-level DOTS architecture is illustrated in Figure 1:

```
+-----------+  +-------------+  +-----------+
| Mitigator | ˜˜˜˜˜˜˜˜˜˜ | DOTS Server |
+-----------+  +-------------+  +-----------+

+---------------+  +-------------+
| Attack Target | ˜˜˜˜ | DOTS Client |
+---------------+  +-------------+
```

Figure 1: Basic DOTS Architecture

A simple example instantiation of the DOTS architecture could be an enterprise as the attack target for a volumetric DDoS attack, and an upstream DDoS mitigation service as the mitigator. The enterprise
(attack target) is connected to the Internet via a link that is getting saturated, and the enterprise suspects it is under DDoS attack. The enterprise has a DOTS client, which obtains information about the DDoS attack, and signals the DOTS server for help in mitigating the attack. The DOTS server in turn invokes one or more mitigators, which are tasked with mitigating the actual DDoS attack, and hence aim to suppress the attack traffic while allowing valid traffic to reach the attack target.

The scope of the DOTS specifications is the interfaces between the DOTS client and DOTS server. The interfaces to the attack target and the mitigator are out of scope of DOTS. Similarly, the operation of both the attack target and the mitigator is out of scope of DOTS. Thus, DOTS neither specifies how an attack target decides it is under DDoS attack, nor does DOTS specify how a mitigator may actually mitigate such an attack. A DOTS client’s request for mitigation is advisory in nature, and may not lead to any mitigation at all, depending on the DOTS server domain’s capacity and willingness to mitigate on behalf of the DOTS client’s domain.

The DOTS client may be provided with a list of DOTS servers, each associated with one or more IP addresses. These addresses may or may not be of the same address family. The DOTS client establishes one or more sessions by connecting to the provided DOTS server addresses.

As illustrated in Figure 2, there are two interfaces between a DOTS server and a DOTS client; a signal channel and (optionally) a data channel.

```
+-------------------+  <------- Signal Channel ------->  +-------------------+
| DOTS Client       |                                 | DOTS Server        |
|                   | <========== Data Channel =========> |                   |
+-------------------+                             +-------------------+
```

**Figure 2: DOTS Interfaces**

The primary purpose of the signal channel is for a DOTS client to ask a DOTS server for help in mitigating an attack, and for the DOTS server to inform the DOTS client about the status of such mitigation. The DOTS client does this by sending a client signal, which contains information about the attack target(s). The client signal may also include telemetry information about the attack, if the DOTS client has such information available. The DOTS server in turn sends a server signal to inform the DOTS client of whether it will honor the mitigation request. Assuming it will, the DOTS server initiates attack mitigation, and periodically informs the DOTS client about the status of the mitigation. Similarly, the DOTS client periodically
informs the DOTS server about the client’s status, which at a minimum
provides client (attack target) health information, but it should
also include efficacy information about the attack mitigation as it
is now seen by the client. At some point, the DOTS client may decide
to terminate the server-side attack mitigation, which it indicates to
the DOTS server over the signal channel. A mitigation may also be
terminated if a DOTS client-specified mitigation lifetime is
exceeded. Note that the signal channel may need to operate over a
link that is experiencing a DDoS attack and hence is subject to
severe packet loss and high latency.

While DOTS is able to request mitigation with just the signal
channel, the addition of the DOTS data channel provides for
additional and more efficient capabilities. The primary purpose of
the data channel is to support DOTS related configuration and policy
information exchange between the DOTS client and the DOTS server.
Examples of such information include, but are not limited to:

- Creating identifiers, such as names or aliases, for resources for
  which mitigation may be requested. Such identifiers may then be
  used in subsequent signal channel exchanges to refer more
  efficiently to the resources under attack, as seen in Figure 3,
  using JSON to serialize the data:

  ```json
  {
    "https1": [
      "192.0.2.1:443",
      "198.51.100.2:443",
    ],
    "proxies": [
      "203.0.113.3:3128",
      "[2001:db8:ac10::1]:3128"
    ],
    "api_urls": "https://apiserver.example.com/api/v1",
  }
  
  Figure 3: Protected resource identifiers
```

- Black-list management, which enables a DOTS client to inform the
  DOTS server about sources to suppress.

- White-list management, which enables a DOTS client to inform the
  DOTS server about sources from which traffic is always accepted.

- Filter management, which enables a DOTS client to install or
  remove traffic filters dropping or rate-limiting unwanted traffic.

- DOTS client provisioning.
Note that while it is possible to exchange the above information before, during or after a DDoS attack, DOTS requires reliable delivery of this information and does not provide any special means for ensuring timely delivery of it during an attack. In practice, this means that DOTS deployments should not rely on such information being exchanged during a DDoS attack.

2.1. DOTS Operations

DOTS does not prescribe any specific deployment models, however DOTS is designed with some specific requirements around the different DOTS agents and their relationships.

First of all, a DOTS agent belongs to a domain that has an identity which can be authenticated and authorized. DOTS agents communicate with each other over a mutually authenticated signal channel and (optionally) data channel. However, before they can do so, a service relationship needs to be established between them. The details and means by which this is done is outside the scope of DOTS, however an example would be for an enterprise A (DOTS client) to sign up for DDoS service from provider B (DOTS server). This would establish a (service) relationship between the two that enables enterprise A’s DOTS client to establish a signal channel with provider B’s DOTS server. A and B will authenticate each other, and B can verify that A is authorized for its service.

From an operational and design point of view, DOTS assumes that the above relationship is established prior to a request for DDoS attack mitigation. In particular, it is assumed that bi-directional communication is possible at this time between the DOTS client and DOTS server. Furthermore, it is assumed that additional service provisioning, configuration and information exchange can be performed by use of the data channel, if operationally required. It is not until this point that the mitigation service is available for use.

Once the mutually authenticated signal channel has been established, it will remain active. This is done to increase the likelihood that the DOTS client can signal the DOTS server for help when the attack target is being flooded, and similarly raise the probability that DOTS server signals reach the client regardless of inbound link congestion. This does not necessarily imply that the attack target and the DOTS client have to be co-located in the same administrative domain, but it is expected to be a common scenario.

DDoS mitigation with the help of an upstream mitigator may involve some form of traffic redirection whereby traffic destined for the attack target is steered towards the mitigator. Common mechanisms to achieve this redirection depend on BGP [RFC4271] and DNS [RFC1035].
The mitigator in turn inspects and scrubs the traffic, and forwards the resulting (hopefully non-attack) traffic to the attack target. Thus, when a DOTS server receives an attack mitigation request from a DOTS client, it can be viewed as a way of causing traffic redirection for the attack target indicated.

DOTS relies on mutual authentication and the pre-established service relationship between the DOTS client’s domain and the DOTS server’s domain to provide basic authorization. The DOTS server should enforce additional authorization mechanisms to restrict the mitigation scope a DOTS client can request, but such authorization mechanisms are deployment-specific.

Although co-location of DOTS server and mitigator within the same domain is expected to be a common deployment model, it is assumed that operators may require alternative models. Nothing in this document precludes such alternatives.

2.2. Components

2.2.1. DOTS Client

A DOTS client is a DOTS agent from which requests for help coordinating attack response originate. The requests may be in response to an active, ongoing attack against a target in the DOTS client’s domain, but no active attack is required for a DOTS client to request help. Operators may wish to have upstream mitigators in the network path for an indefinite period, and are restricted only by business relationships when it comes to duration and scope of requested mitigation.

The DOTS client requests attack response coordination from a DOTS server over the signal channel, including in the request the DOTS client’s desired mitigation scoping, as described in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]. The actual mitigation scope and countermeasures used in response to the attack are up to the DOTS server and mitigator operators, as the DOTS client may have a narrow perspective on the ongoing attack. As such, the DOTS client’s request for mitigation should be considered advisory: guarantees of DOTS server availability or mitigation capacity constitute service level agreements and are out of scope for this document.

The DOTS client adjusts mitigation scope and provides available mitigation feedback (e.g. mitigation efficacy) at the direction of its local administrator. Such direction may involve manual or automated adjustments in response to updates from the DOTS server.
To provide a metric of signal health and distinguish an idle signal channel from a disconnected or defunct session, the DOTS client sends a heartbeat over the signal channel to maintain its half of the channel. The DOTS client similarly expects a heartbeat from the DOTS server, and may consider a session terminated in the extended absence of a DOTS server heartbeat.

2.2.2. DOTS Server

A DOTS server is a DOTS agent capable of receiving, processing and possibly acting on requests for help coordinating attack response from DOTS clients. The DOTS server authenticates and authorizes DOTS clients as described in Section 3.1, and maintains session state, tracking requests for mitigation, reporting on the status of active mitigations, and terminating sessions in the extended absence of a client heartbeat or when a session times out.

Assuming the preconditions discussed below exist, a DOTS client maintaining an active session with a DOTS server may reasonably expect some level of mitigation in response to a request for coordinated attack response.

The DOTS server enforces authorization of DOTS clients’ signals for mitigation. The mechanism of enforcement is not in scope for this document, but is expected to restrict requested mitigation scope to addresses, prefixes, and/or services owned by the DOTS client’s administrative domain, such that a DOTS client from one domain is not able to influence the network path to another domain. A DOTS server MUST reject requests for mitigation of resources not owned by the requesting DOTS client’s administrative domain. A DOTS server MAY also refuse a DOTS client’s mitigation request for arbitrary reasons, within any limits imposed by business or service level agreements between client and server domains. If a DOTS server refuses a DOTS client’s request for mitigation, the DOTS server SHOULD include the refusal reason in the server signal sent to the client.

A DOTS server is in regular contact with one or more mitigators. If a DOTS server accepts a DOTS client’s request for help, the DOTS server forwards a translated form of that request to the mitigator(s) responsible for scrubbing attack traffic. Note that the form of the translated request passed from the DOTS server to the mitigator is not in scope; it may be as simple as an alert to mitigator operators, or highly automated using vendor or open application programming interfaces supported by the mitigator. The DOTS server MUST report the actual scope of any mitigation enabled on behalf of a client.

The DOTS server SHOULD retrieve available metrics for any mitigations activated on behalf of a DOTS client, and SHOULD include them in
server signals sent to the DOTS client originating the request for mitigation.

To provide a metric of signal health and distinguish an idle signal channel from a disconnected or defunct channel, the DOTS server MUST send a heartbeat over the signal channel to maintain its half of the channel. The DOTS server similarly expects a heartbeat from the DOTS client, and MAY consider a session terminated in the extended absence of a DOTS client heartbeat.

2.2.3. DOTS Gateway

Traditional client/server relationships may be expanded by chaining DOTS sessions. This chaining is enabled through "logical concatenation" of a DOTS server and a DOTS client, resulting in an application analogous to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261] logical entity of a Back-to-Back User Agent (B2BUA) [RFC7092]. The term DOTS gateway is used here in the descriptions of selected scenarios involving this application.

A DOTS gateway may be deployed client-side, server-side or both. The gateway may terminate multiple discrete client connections and may aggregate these into a single or multiple DOTS sessions.

The DOTS gateway will appear as a server to its downstream agents and as a client to its upstream agents, a functional concatenation of the DOTS client and server roles, as depicted in Figure 4:

```
+-------------+          |    | O |    |         +----+
|    | D |    |    |    |    |    |         |
|    | G |    |    |    |    |    |         +----+
+----+    |    | S |    |    |    |         +----+

Figure 4: DOTS gateway
```

The DOTS gateway MUST perform full stack DOTS session termination and reorigination between its client and server side. The details of how this is achieved are implementation specific. The DOTS protocol does not include any special features related to DOTS gateways, and hence from a DOTS perspective, whenever a DOTS gateway is present, the DOTS session simply terminates/originates there.
2.3. DOTS Agent Relationships

So far, we have only considered a relatively simple scenario of a single DOTS client associated with a single DOTS server, however DOTS supports more advanced relationships.

A DOTS server may be associated with one or more DOTS clients, and those DOTS clients may belong to different domains. An example scenario is a mitigation provider serving multiple attack targets (Figure 5).

```
DOTS clients       DOTS server
+----+         +----+
| c  |         | S  |
+----+         +----+
      |            |
c1.example.org      dots1.example.net
      |            |
+----+         +----+
| c  |         | S  |
+----+         +----+
      |            |
c1.example.com      dots1.example.net
      |            |
+----+         +----+
| c  |         |
+----+         |
c2.example.com
```

Figure 5: DOTS server with multiple clients

A DOTS client may be associated with one or more DOTS servers, and those DOTS servers may belong to different domains. This may be to ensure high availability or co-ordinate mitigation with more than one directly connected ISP. An example scenario is for an enterprise to have DDoS mitigation service from multiple providers, as shown in Figure 6.
Deploying a multi-homed client requires extra care and planning, as the DOTS servers with which the multi-homed client communicates may not be affiliated. Should the multi-homed client simultaneously request for mitigation from all servers with which it has established signal channels, the client may unintentionally inflict additional network disruption on the resources it intends to protect. In one of the worst cases, a multi-homed DOTS client could cause a permanent routing loop of traffic destined for the client’s protected services, as the uncoordinated DOTS servers’ mitigators all try to divert that traffic to their own scrubbing centers.

The DOTS protocol itself provides no fool-proof method to prevent such self-inflicted harms as a result deploying multi-homed DOTS clients. If DOTS client implementations nevertheless include support for multi-homing, they are expected to be aware of the risks, and consequently to include measures aimed at reducing the likelihood of negative outcomes. Simple measures might include:

- Requesting mitigation serially, ensuring only one mitigation request for a given address space is active at any given time;
- Dividing the protected resources among the DOTS servers, such that no two mitigators will be attempting to divert and scrub the same traffic;
- Restricting multi-homing to deployments in which all DOTS servers are coordinating management of a shared pool of mitigation resources.
2.3.1. Gatewayed Signaling

As discussed in Section 2.2.3, a DOTS gateway is a logical function chaining DOTS sessions through concatenation of a DOTS server and DOTS client.

An example scenario, as shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8, is for an enterprise to have deployed multiple DOTS capable devices which are able to signal intra-domain using TCP [RFC0793] on un-congested links to a DOTS gateway which may then transform these to a UDP [RFC0768] transport inter-domain where connection oriented transports may degrade; this applies to the signal channel only, as the data channel requires a connection-oriented transport. The relationship between the gateway and its upstream agents is opaque to the initial clients.

```
+---+                      +---+
| c | \                  |   |
+---+ \                  |   |
|-----TCP----- D O S-----| S |
+---+                   |   |
|-----TCP----- G        |   |
+---+                   |   |
|   c |                  |   |
+---+                   |   |
example.com   example.com   example.net
DOTS clients   DOTS gateway (DOTSG)   DOTS server
```

Figure 7: Client-Side Gateway with Aggregation

```
+---+
| c | \                  |   |
+---+ \                  |   |
|-----TCP----- D          |   |
+---+                   |   |
|-----TCP----- T S ------|   |
+---+                   |   |
|-----TCP----- G          |
+---+                   |   |
|   c |                  |
+---+                   |
example.com   example.com   example.net
DOTS clients   DOTS gateway (DOTSG)   DOTS server
```

Figure 8: Client-Side Gateway without Aggregation
This may similarly be deployed in the inverse scenario where the gateway resides in the server-side domain and may be used to terminate and/or aggregate multiple clients to single transport as shown in figures Figure 9 and Figure 10.

```
+---+  | c | \               +---+
| c | \----UDP-----| D |----+---+
| c |----TCP------| T |----TCP----| S |
| c |                | S |
| c |----TCP------| G |----+---+
| c |               |   |
| c |               |   |
/----UDP-----| G |----TCP----| S |
+---+ /              +---+
| c |/
+---+
example.com  example.net  example.net
DOTS clients  DOTS gateway (DOTSG)  DOTS server
```

Figure 9: Server-Side Gateway with Aggregation

```
+---+  | c | \               +---+
| c | \----UDP-----| D |----+---+
| c |----TCP------| T |----TCP----| S |
| c |                | S |
| c |----TCP------| G |----+---+
| c |               |   |
| c |               |   |
/----UDP-----| G |----TCP----| S |
+---+ /              +---+
| c |/
+---+
example.com  example.net  example.net
DOTS clients  DOTS gateway (DOTSG)  DOTS server
```

Figure 10: Server-Side Gateway without Aggregation

This document anticipates scenarios involving multiple DOTS gateways. An example is a DOTS gateway at the network client’s side, and another one at the server side. The first gateway can be located at a CPE to aggregate requests from multiple DOTS clients enabled in an enterprise network. The second DOTS gateway is deployed on the provider side. This scenario can be seen as a combination of the client-side and server-side scenarios.
3. Concepts

3.1. DOTS Sessions

In order for DOTS to be effective as a vehicle for DDoS mitigation requests, one or more DOTS clients must establish ongoing communication with one or more DOTS servers. While the preconditions for enabling DOTS in or among network domains may also involve business relationships, service level agreements, or other formal or informal understandings between network operators, such considerations are out of scope for this document.

A DOTS session is established to support bilateral exchange of data between an associated DOTS client and a DOTS server. In the DOTS architecture, data is exchanged between DOTS agents over signal and data channels. Regardless, a DOTS session is characterized by the presence of an established signal channel. A data channel may be established as well, however it is not a prerequisite. Conversely, a DOTS session cannot exist without an established signal channel: when an established signal channel is terminated for any reason, the DOTS session is also said to be terminated.

3.1.1. Preconditions

Prior to establishing a DOTS session between agents, the owners of the networks, domains, services or applications involved are assumed to have agreed upon the terms of the relationship involved. Such agreements are out of scope for this document, but must be in place for a functional DOTS architecture.

It is assumed that as part of any DOTS service agreement, the DOTS client is provided with all data and metadata required to establish communication with the DOTS server. Such data and metadata would include any cryptographic information necessary to meet the message confidentiality, integrity and authenticity requirement in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements], and might also include the pool of DOTS server addresses and ports the DOTS client should use for signal and data channel messaging.

3.1.2. Establishing the DOTS Session

With the required business agreements in place, the DOTS client initiates a signal session by contacting its DOTS server(s) over the signal channel and (possibly) the data channel. To allow for DOTS service flexibility, neither the order of contact nor the time interval between channel creations is specified. A DOTS client MAY establish signal channel first, and then data channel, or vice versa.
The methods by which a DOTS client receives the address and associated service details of the DOTS server are not prescribed by this document. For example, a DOTS client may be directly configured to use a specific DOTS server IP address and port, and directly provided with any data necessary to satisfy the Peer Mutual Authentication requirement in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements], such as symmetric or asymmetric keys, usernames and passwords, etc. All configuration and authentication information in this scenario is provided out-of-band by the domain operating the DOTS server.

At the other extreme, the architecture in this document allows for a form of DOTS client auto-provisioning. For example, the domain operating the DOTS server or servers might provide the client domain only with symmetric or asymmetric keys to authenticate the provisioned DOTS clients. Only the keys would then be directly configured on DOTS clients, but the remaining configuration required to provision the DOTS clients could be learned through mechanisms similar to DNS SRV [RFC2782] or DNS Service Discovery [RFC6763].

The DOTS client SHOULD successfully authenticate and exchange messages with the DOTS server over both signal and (if used) data channel as soon as possible to confirm that both channels are operational.

As described in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements], the DOTS client can configure preferred values for acceptable signal loss, mitigation lifetime, and heartbeat intervals when establishing the DOTS session. A DOTS session is not active until DOTS agents have agreed on the values for these DOTS session parameters, a process defined by the protocol.

Once the DOTS client begins receiving DOTS server signals, the DOTS session is active. At any time during the DOTS session, the DOTS client may use the data channel to manage aliases, manage black- and white-listed prefixes or addresses, leverage vendor-specific extensions, and so on. Note that unlike the signal channel, there is no requirement that the data channel remains operational in attack conditions (See Data Channel Requirements, [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]).

3.1.3. Maintaining the DOTS Session

DOTS clients and servers periodically send heartbeats to each other over the signal channel, per Operational Requirements discussed in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]. DOTS agent operators SHOULD configure the heartbeat interval such that the frequency does not lead to accidental denials of service due to the overwhelming number of heartbeats a DOTS agent must field.
Either DOTS agent may consider a DOTS session terminated in the extended absence of a heartbeat from its peer agent. The period of that absence will be established in the protocol definition.

3.2. Modes of Signaling

This section examines the modes of signaling between agents in a DOTS architecture.

3.2.1. Direct Signaling

A DOTS session may take the form of direct signaling between the DOTS clients and servers, as shown in Figure 11.

```
+-------------+    +-------------+
| DOTS client |<------signal session------>| DOTS server |
+-------------+    +-------------+
```

Figure 11: Direct Signaling

In a direct DOTS session, the DOTS client and server are communicating directly. Direct signaling may exist inter- or intra-domain. The DOTS session is abstracted from the underlying networks or network elements the signals traverse: in direct signaling, the DOTS client and server are logically adjacent.

3.2.2. Redirected Signaling

In certain circumstances, a DOTS server may want to redirect a DOTS client to an alternative DOTS server for a DOTS session. Such circumstances include but are not limited to:

- Maximum number of DOTS sessions with clients has been reached;
- Mitigation capacity exhaustion in the mitigator with which the specific DOTS server is communicating;
- Mitigator outage or other downtime, such as scheduled maintenance;
- Scheduled DOTS server maintenance;
- Scheduled modifications to the network path between DOTS server and DOTS client.

A basic redirected DOTS session resembles the following, as shown in Figure 12.
1. Previously established DOTS session 1 exists between a DOTS client and DOTS server A.

2. DOTS server A sends a server signal redirecting the client to DOTS server B.

3. If the DOTS client does not already have a separate DOTS session with the redirection target, the DOTS client initiates and establishes DOTS session 2 with DOTS server B.

4. Having redirected the DOTS client, DOTS server A ceases sending server signals. The DOTS client likewise stops sending client signals to DOTS server A. DOTS session 1 is terminated.

3.2.3. Recursive Signaling

DOTS is centered around improving the speed and efficiency of coordinated response to DDoS attacks. One scenario not yet discussed involves coordination among federated domains operating DOTS servers and mitigators.

In the course of normal DOTS operations, a DOTS client communicates the need for mitigation to a DOTS server, and that server initiates mitigation on a mitigator with which the server has an established service relationship. The operator of the mitigator may in turn monitor mitigation performance and capacity, as the attack being mitigated may grow in severity beyond the mitigating domain’s capabilities.
The operator of the mitigator has limited options in the event a DOTS client-requested mitigation is being overwhelmed by the severity of the attack. Out-of-scope business or service level agreements may permit the mitigating domain to drop the mitigation and let attack traffic flow unchecked to the target, but this only encourages attack escalation. In the case where the mitigating domain is the upstream service provider for the attack target, this may mean the mitigating domain and its other services and users continue to suffer the incidental effects of the attack.

A recursive signaling model as shown in Figure 13 offers an alternative. In a variation of the use case "End-customer with a single upstream transit provider offering DDoS mitigation services" described in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases], a domain operating a DOTS server and mitigator also operates a DOTS client. This DOTS client has an established DOTS session with a DOTS server belonging to a separate administrative domain.

With these preconditions in place, the operator of the mitigator being overwhelmed or otherwise performing inadequately may request mitigation for the attack target from this separate DOTS-aware domain. Such a request recurses the originating mitigation request to the secondary DOTS server, in the hope of building a cumulative mitigation against the attack.
In Figure 13, client Cc signals a request for mitigation across inter-domain DOTS session 1 to the DOTS server Sn belonging to the example.net domain. DOTS server Sn enables mitigation on mitigator Mn. DOTS server Sn is half of DOTS gateway Gn, being deployed logically back-to-back with DOTS client Cn, which has pre-existing inter-domain DOTS session 2 with the DOTS server So belonging to the example.org domain. At any point, DOTS server Sn MAY recurse an on-going mitigation request through DOTS client Cn to DOTS server So, in the expectation that mitigator Mo will be activated to aid in the defense of the attack target.

Recursive signaling is opaque to the DOTS client. To maximize mitigation visibility to the DOTS client, however, the recursing domain SHOULD provide recursed mitigation feedback in signals reporting on mitigation status to the DOTS client. For example, the recursing domain’s mitigator should incorporate into mitigation status messages available metrics such as dropped packet or byte counts from the recursed mitigation.

DOTS clients involved in recursive signaling must be able to withdraw requests for mitigation without warning or justification, per [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements].
Operators recursing mitigation requests MAY maintain the recursed mitigation for a brief, protocol-defined period in the event the DOTS client originating the mitigation withdraws its request for help, as per the discussion of managing mitigation toggling in the operational requirements ([I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]).

Deployment of recursive signaling may result in traffic redirection, examination and mitigation extending beyond the initial bilateral relationship between DOTS client and DOTS server. As such, client control over the network path of mitigated traffic may be reduced. DOTS client operators should be aware of any privacy concerns, and work with DOTS server operators employing recursive signaling to ensure shared sensitive material is suitably protected.

3.2.4. Anycast Signaling

The DOTS architecture does not assume the availability of anycast within a DOTS deployment, but neither does the architecture exclude it. Domains operating DOTS servers MAY deploy DOTS servers with an anycast Service Address as described in BCP 126 [RFC4786]. In such a deployment, DOTS clients connecting to the DOTS Service Address may be communicating with distinct DOTS servers, depending on the network configuration at the time the DOTS clients connect. Among other benefits, anycast signaling potentially offers the following:

- Simplified DOTS client configuration, including service discovery through the methods described in [RFC7094]. In this scenario, the "instance discovery" message would be a DOTS client initiating a DOTS session to the DOTS server anycast Service Address, to which the DOTS server would reply with a redirection to the DOTS server unicast address the client should use for DOTS.

- Region- or customer-specific deployments, in which the DOTS Service Addresses route to distinct DOTS servers depending on the client region or the customer network in which a DOTS client resides.

- Operational resiliency, spreading DOTS signaling traffic across the DOTS server domain’s networks, and thereby also reducing the potential attack surface, as described in BCP 126 [RFC4786].

3.2.4.1. Anycast Signaling Considerations

As long as network configuration remains stable, anycast DOTS signaling is to the individual DOTS client indistinct from direct signaling. However, the operational challenges inherent in anycast signaling are anything but negligible, and DOTS server operators must carefully weigh the risks against the benefits before deploying.
While the DOTS signal channel primarily operates over UDP per [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements], the signal channel also requires mutual authentication between DOTS agents, with associated security state on both ends.

Network instability is of particular concern with anycast signaling, as DOTS signal channels are expected to be long-lived, and potentially operating under congested network conditions caused by a volumetric DDoS attack.

For example, a network configuration altering the route to the DOTS server during active anycast signaling may cause the DOTS client to send messages to a DOTS server other than the one with which it initially established a signaling session. That second DOTS server may not have the security state of the existing session, forcing the DOTS client to initialize a new DOTS session. This challenge might in part be mitigated by use of pre-shared keys and session resumption [RFC5246][RFC6347], but keying material must be available to all DOTS servers sharing the anycast Service Address in that case.

While the DOTS client will try to establish a new DOTS session with the DOTS server now acting as the anycast DOTS Service Address, the link between DOTS client and server may be congested with attack traffic, making signal session establishment difficult. In such a scenario, anycast Service Address instability becomes a sort of signal session flapping, with obvious negative consequences for the DOTS deployment.

Anycast signaling deployments similarly must also take into account active mitigations. Active mitigations initiated through a DOTS session may involve diverting traffic to a scrubbing center. If the DOTS session flaps due to anycast changes as described above, mitigation may also flap as the DOTS servers sharing the anycast DOTS service address toggles mitigation on detecting DOTS session loss, depending on whether the client has configured mitigation on loss of signal.

3.3. Triggering Requests for Mitigation

[I-D.ietf-dots-requirements] places no limitation on the circumstances in which a DOTS client operator may request mitigation, nor does it demand justification for any mitigation request, thereby reserving operational control over DDoS defense for the domain requesting mitigation. This architecture likewise does not prescribe the network conditions and mechanisms triggering a mitigation request from a DOTS client.
However, considering selected possible mitigation triggers from an architectural perspective offers a model for alternative or unanticipated triggers for DOTS deployments. In all cases, what network conditions merit a mitigation request are at the discretion of the DOTS client operator.

The mitigation request itself is defined by DOTS, however the interfaces required to trigger the mitigation request in the following scenarios are implementation-specific.

### 3.3.1. Manual Mitigation Request

A DOTS client operator may manually prepare a request for mitigation, including scope and duration, and manually instruct the DOTS client to send the mitigation request to the DOTS server. In context, a manual request is a request directly issued by the operator without automated decision-making performed by a device interacting with the DOTS client. Modes of manual mitigation requests include an operator entering a command into a text interface, or directly interacting with a graphical interface to send the request.

An operator might do this, for example, in response to notice of an attack delivered by attack detection equipment or software, and the alerting detector lacks interfaces or is not configured to use available interfaces to translate the alert to a mitigation request automatically.

In a variation of the above scenario, the operator may have preconfigured on the DOTS client mitigation requests for various resources in the operator’s domain. When notified of an attack, the DOTS client operator manually instructs the DOTS client to send the relevant preconfigured mitigation request for the resources under attack.

A further variant involves recursive signaling, as described in Section 3.2.3. The DOTS client in this case is the second half of a DOTS gateway (back-to-back DOTS server and client). As in the previous scenario, the scope and duration of the mitigation request are pre-existing, but in this case are derived from the mitigation request received from a downstream DOTS client by the DOTS server. Assuming the preconditions required by Section 3.2.3 are in place, the DOTS gateway operator may at any time manually request mitigation from an upstream DOTS server, sending a mitigation request derived from the downstream DOTS client’s request.

The motivations for a DOTS client operator to request mitigation manually are not prescribed by this architecture, but are expected to include some of the following:
Notice of an attack delivered via e-mail or alternative messaging

- Notice of an attack delivered via phone call

- Notice of an attack delivered through the interface(s) of networking monitoring software deployed in the operator’s domain

- Manual monitoring of network behavior through network monitoring software

### 3.3.2. Automated Conditional Mitigation Request

Unlike manual mitigation requests, which depend entirely on the DOTS client operator’s capacity to react with speed and accuracy to every detected or detectable attack, mitigation requests triggered by detected attack conditions reduce the operational burden on the DOTS client operator, and minimize the latency between attack detection and the start of mitigation.

Mitigation requests are triggered in this scenario by operator-specified network conditions. Attack detection is deployment-specific, and not constrained by this architecture. Similarly the specifics of a condition are left to the discretion of the operator, though common conditions meriting mitigation include the following:

- Detected attack exceeding a rate in packets per second (pps).

- Detected attack exceeding a rate in bytes per second (bps).

- Detected resource exhaustion in an attack target.

- Detected resource exhaustion in the local domain’s mitigator.

- Number of open connections to an attack target.

- Number of attack sources in a given attack.

- Number of active attacks against targets in the operator’s domain.

- Conditional detection developed through arbitrary statistical analysis or deep learning techniques.

- Any combination of the above.

When automated conditional mitigation requests are enabled, violations of any of the above conditions, or any additional operator-defined conditions, will trigger a mitigation request from the DOTS client to the DOTS server. The interfaces between the
3.3.3. Automated Mitigation on Loss of Signal

To maintain a DOTS session, the DOTS client and the DOTS server exchange regular but infrequent messages across the signal channel. In the absence of an attack, the probability of message loss in the signaling channel should be extremely low. Under attack conditions, however, some signal loss may be anticipated as attack traffic congests the link, depending on the attack type.

While [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements] specifies the DOTS protocol be robust when signaling under attack conditions, there are nevertheless scenarios in which the DOTS signal is lost in spite of protocol best efforts. To handle such scenarios, a DOTS operator may configure the DOTS session to trigger mitigation when the DOTS server ceases receiving DOTS client signals (or vice versa) beyond the miss count or period permitted by the protocol.

The impact of mitigating due to loss of signal in either direction must be considered carefully before enabling it. Signal loss is not caused by links congested with attack traffic alone, and as such mitigation requests triggered by signal channel degradation in either direction may incur unnecessary costs, in network performance and operational expense alike.

4. Security Considerations

This section describes identified security considerations for the DOTS architecture.

DOTS is at risk from three primary attack vectors: agent impersonation, traffic injection and signal blocking. These vectors may be exploited individually or in concert by an attacker to confuse, disable, take information from, or otherwise inhibit DOTS agents.

Any attacker with the ability to impersonate a legitimate DOTS client or server or, indeed, inject false messages into the stream may potentially trigger/withdraw traffic redirection, trigger/cancel mitigation activities or subvert black/whitelists. From an architectural standpoint, operators SHOULD ensure best current practices for secure communication are observed for data and signal channel confidentiality, integrity and authenticity. Care must be taken to ensure transmission is protected by appropriately secure means, reducing attack surface by exposing only the minimal required
services or interfaces. Similarly, received data at rest SHOULD be stored with a satisfactory degree of security.

As many mitigation systems employ diversion to scrub attack traffic, operators of DOTS agents SHOULD ensure DOTS sessions are resistant to Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks. An attacker with control of a DOTS client may negatively influence network traffic by requesting and withdrawing requests for mitigation for particular prefixes, leading to route or DNS flapping.

Any attack targeting the availability of DOTS servers may disrupt the ability of the system to receive and process DOTS signals resulting in failure to fulfill a mitigation request. DOTS agents SHOULD be given adequate protections, again in accordance with best current practices for network and host security.

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7. References

7.1. Normative References


7.2. Informative References


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Distributed-Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Architecture
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Abstract
This document describes an architecture for establishing and maintaining Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) within and between domains. The document does not specify protocols or protocol extensions, instead focusing on defining architectural relationships, components and concepts used in a DOTS deployment.

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Table of Contents

1.  Context and Motivation .......................... 3
  1.1.  Terminology ................................. 3
        1.1.1.  Key Words ............................. 3
        1.1.2.  Definition of Terms .................... 3
  1.2.  Scope ..................................... 3
  1.3.  Assumptions ................................. 4
2.  DOTS Architecture ............................... 5
  2.1.  DOTS Operations ............................. 8
  2.2.  Components ................................ 9
        2.2.1.  DOTS Client ............................ 9
        2.2.2.  DOTS Server ............................ 10
        2.2.3.  DOTS Gateway ........................... 11
  2.3.  DOTS Agent Relationships .................... 12
        2.3.1.  Gatewayed Signaling ..................... 14
3.  Concepts ..................................... 16
  3.1.  DOTS Sessions ............................... 16
        3.1.1.  Preconditions ............................ 16
        3.1.2.  Establishing the DOTS Session ............. 16
        3.1.3.  Maintaining the DOTS Session .............. 17
  3.2.  Modes of Signaling ........................... 18
        3.2.1.  Direct Signaling ......................... 18
        3.2.2.  Redirected Signaling ..................... 18
        3.2.3.  Recursive Signaling ..................... 19
        3.2.4.  Anycast Signaling ....................... 22
        3.2.5.  Signaling Considerations for Network Address
                Translation ................................ 23
  3.3.  Triggering Requests for Mitigation .............. 25
        3.3.1.  Manual Mitigation Request .................. 26
        3.3.2.  Automated Conditional Mitigation Request .... 27
        3.3.3.  Automated Mitigation on Loss of Signal .... 27
4.  Security Considerations .......................... 28
1. Context and Motivation

Signaling the need for help defending against an active distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack requires a common understanding of mechanisms and roles among the parties coordinating defensive response. The signaling layer and supplementary messaging is the focus of DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS). DOTS defines a method of coordinating defensive measures among willing peers to mitigate attacks quickly and efficiently, enabling hybrid attack responses coordinated locally at or near the target of an active attack, or anywhere in-path between attack sources and target. Sample DOTS use cases are elaborated in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases].

This document describes an architecture used in establishing, maintaining or terminating a DOTS relationship within a domain or between domains.

1.1. Terminology

1.1.1. Key Words

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.1.2. Definition of Terms

This document uses the terms defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements].

1.2. Scope

In this architecture, DOTS clients and servers communicate using DOTS signaling. As a result of signals from a DOTS client, the DOTS server may modify the forwarding path of traffic destined for the attack target(s), for example by diverting traffic to a mitigator or pool of mitigators, where policy may be applied to distinguish and discard attack traffic. Any such policy is deployment-specific.

The DOTS architecture presented here is applicable across network administrative domains - for example, between an enterprise domain and the domain of a third-party attack mitigation service - as well
as to a single administrative domain. DOTS is generally assumed to be most effective when aiding coordination of attack response between two or more participating networks, but single domain scenarios are valuable in their own right, as when aggregating intra-domain DOTS client signals for inter-domain coordinated attack response.

This document does not address any administrative or business agreements that may be established between involved DOTS parties. Those considerations are out of scope. Regardless, this document assumes necessary authentication and authorization mechanisms are put in place so that only authorized clients can invoke the DOTS service.

A detailed set of DOTS requirements are discussed in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements], and the DOTS architecture is designed to follow those requirements. Only new behavioral requirements are described in this document.

1.3. Assumptions

This document makes the following assumptions:

- All domains in which DOTS is deployed are assumed to offer the required connectivity between DOTS agents and any intermediary network elements, but the architecture imposes no additional limitations on the form of connectivity.

- Congestion and resource exhaustion are intended outcomes of a DDoS attack [RFC4732]. Some operators may utilize non-impacted paths or networks for DOTS, but in general conditions should be assumed to be hostile and DOTS must be able to function in all circumstances, including when the signaling path is significantly impaired.

- There is no universal DDoS attack scale threshold triggering a coordinated response across administrative domains. A network domain administrator, or service or application owner may arbitrarily set attack scale threshold triggers, or manually send requests for mitigation.

- Mitigation requests may be sent to one or more upstream DOTS servers based on criteria determined by DOTS client administrators and the underlying network configuration. The number of DOTS servers with which a given DOTS client has established communications is determined by local policy and is deployment-specific. For example, a DOTS client of a multi-homed network may support built-in policies to establish DOTS relationships with DOTS servers located upstream of each interconnection link.
The mitigation capacity and/or capability of domains receiving requests for coordinated attack response is opaque to the domains sending the request. The domain receiving the DOTS client signal may or may not have sufficient capacity or capability to filter any or all DDoS attack traffic directed at a target. In either case, the upstream DOTS server may redirect a request to another DOTS server. Redirection may be local to the redirecting DOTS server’s domain, or may involve a third-party domain.

DOTS client and server signals, as well as messages sent through the data channel, are sent across any transit networks with the same probability of delivery as any other traffic between the DOTS client domain and the DOTS server domain. Any encapsulation required for successful delivery is left untouched by transit network elements. DOTS server and DOTS client cannot assume any preferential treatment of DOTS signals. Such preferential treatment may be available in some deployments (e.g., intra-domain scenarios), and the DOTS architecture does not preclude its use when available. However, DOTS itself does not address how that may be done.

The architecture allows for, but does not assume, the presence of Quality of Service (QoS) policy agreements between DOTS-enabled peer networks or local QoS prioritization aimed at ensuring delivery of DOTS messages between DOTS agents. QoS is an operational consideration only, not a functional part of the DOTS architecture.

The signal and data channels are loosely coupled, and may not terminate on the same DOTS server.

2. DOTS Architecture

The basic high-level DOTS architecture is illustrated in Figure 1:

```
+-----------+            +-------------+
| Mitigator | ˜˜˜˜˜˜˜˜˜˜ | DOTS Server |
+-----------+            +-------------+
|              |        |          |
+---------------+        +-------------+
| Attack Target | ˜˜˜˜ | DOTS Client |
+---------------+        +-------------+
```

Figure 1: Basic DOTS Architecture
A simple example instantiation of the DOTS architecture could be an enterprise as the attack target for a volumetric DDoS attack, and an upstream DDoS mitigation service as the mitigator. The enterprise (attack target) is connected to the Internet via a link that is getting saturated, and the enterprise suspects it is under DDoS attack. The enterprise has a DOTS client, which obtains information about the DDoS attack, and signals the DOTS server for help in mitigating the attack. The DOTS server in turn invokes one or more mitigators, which are tasked with mitigating the actual DDoS attack, and hence aim to suppress the attack traffic while allowing valid traffic to reach the attack target.

The scope of the DOTS specifications is the interfaces between the DOTS client and DOTS server. The interfaces to the attack target and the mitigator are out of scope of DOTS. Similarly, the operation of both the attack target and the mitigator is out of scope of DOTS. Thus, DOTS neither specifies how an attack target decides it is under DDoS attack, nor does DOTS specify how a mitigator may actually mitigate such an attack. A DOTS client’s request for mitigation is advisory in nature, and may not lead to any mitigation at all, depending on the DOTS server domain’s capacity and willingness to mitigate on behalf of the DOTS client’s domain.

The DOTS client may be provided with a list of DOTS servers, each associated with one or more IP addresses. These addresses may or may not be of the same address family. The DOTS client establishes one or more sessions by connecting to the provided DOTS server addresses.

As illustrated in Figure 2, there are two interfaces between a DOTS server and a DOTS client; a signal channel and (optionally) a data channel.

```
+------------+                  +------------+
|            | <------- Signal Channel ------> |            |
|  DOTS Client |                         |  DOTS Server |
+------------+                  +------------+
|            | <====== Data Channel ======> |            |

Figure 2: DOTS Interfaces
```

The primary purpose of the signal channel is for a DOTS client to ask a DOTS server for help in mitigating an attack, and for the DOTS server to inform the DOTS client about the status of such mitigation. The DOTS client does this by sending a client signal, which contains information about the attack target(s). The client signal may also include telemetry information about the attack, if the DOTS client has such information available. The DOTS server in turn sends a server signal to inform the DOTS client of whether it will honor the
mitigation request. Assuming it will, the DOTS server initiates attack mitigation, and periodically informs the DOTS client about the status of the mitigation. Similarly, the DOTS client periodically informs the DOTS server about the client’s status, which at a minimum provides client (attack target) health information, but it should also include efficacy information about the attack mitigation as it is now seen by the client. At some point, the DOTS client may decide to terminate the server-side attack mitigation, which it indicates to the DOTS server over the signal channel. A mitigation may also be terminated if a DOTS client-specified mitigation lifetime is exceeded. Note that the signal channel may need to operate over a link that is experiencing a DDoS attack and hence is subject to severe packet loss and high latency.

While DOTS is able to request mitigation with just the signal channel, the addition of the DOTS data channel provides for additional and more efficient capabilities. The primary purpose of the data channel is to support DOTS related configuration and policy information exchange between the DOTS client and the DOTS server. Examples of such information include, but are not limited to:

- Creating identifiers, such as names or aliases, for resources for which mitigation may be requested. Such identifiers may then be used in subsequent signal channel exchanges to refer more efficiently to the resources under attack, as seen in Figure 3, using JSON to serialize the data:

```json
{
  "https1": [
    "192.0.2.1:443",
    "198.51.100.2:443",
  ],
  "proxies": [
    "203.0.113.3:3128",
    "[2001:db8:ac10::1]:3128"
  ],
  "api_urls": "https://apiserver.example.com/api/v1",
}
```

Figure 3: Protected resource identifiers

- Black-list management, which enables a DOTS client to inform the DOTS server about sources to suppress.

- White-list management, which enables a DOTS client to inform the DOTS server about sources from which traffic is always accepted.
Filter management, which enables a DOTS client to install or remove traffic filters dropping or rate-limiting unwanted traffic.

- DOTS client provisioning.

Note that while it is possible to exchange the above information before, during or after a DDoS attack, DOTS requires reliable delivery of this information and does not provide any special means for ensuring timely delivery of it during an attack. In practice, this means that DOTS deployments should not rely on such information being exchanged during a DDoS attack.

2.1. DOTS Operations

DOTS does not prescribe any specific deployment models, however DOTS is designed with some specific requirements around the different DOTS agents and their relationships.

First of all, a DOTS agent belongs to a domain that has an identity which can be authenticated and authorized. DOTS agents communicate with each other over a mutually authenticated signal channel and (optionally) data channel. However, before they can do so, a service relationship needs to be established between them. The details and means by which this is done is outside the scope of DOTS, however an example would be for an enterprise A (DOTS client) to sign up for DDoS service from provider B (DOTS server). This would establish a (service) relationship between the two that enables enterprise A’s DOTS client to establish a signal channel with provider B’s DOTS server. A and B will authenticate each other, and B can verify that A is authorized for its service.

From an operational and design point of view, DOTS assumes that the above relationship is established prior to a request for DDoS attack mitigation. In particular, it is assumed that bi-directional communication is possible at this time between the DOTS client and DOTS server. Furthermore, it is assumed that additional service provisioning, configuration and information exchange can be performed by use of the data channel, if operationally required. It is not until this point that the mitigation service is available for use.

Once the mutually authenticated signal channel has been established, it will remain active. This is done to increase the likelihood that the DOTS client can signal the DOTS server for help when the attack target is being flooded, and similarly raise the probability that DOTS server signals reach the client regardless of inbound link congestion. This does not necessarily imply that the attack target and the DOTS client have to be co-located in the same administrative domain, but it is expected to be a common scenario.
DDoS mitigation with the help of an upstream mitigator may involve some form of traffic redirection whereby traffic destined for the attack target is steered towards the mitigator. Common mechanisms to achieve this redirection depend on BGP [RFC4271] and DNS [RFC1035]. The mitigator in turn inspects and scrubs the traffic, and forwards the resulting (hopefully non-attack) traffic to the attack target. Thus, when a DOTS server receives an attack mitigation request from a DOTS client, it can be viewed as a way of causing traffic redirection for the attack target indicated.

DOTS relies on mutual authentication and the pre-established service relationship between the DOTS client’s domain and the DOTS server’s domain to provide basic authorization. The DOTS server should enforce additional authorization mechanisms to restrict the mitigation scope a DOTS client can request, but such authorization mechanisms are deployment-specific.

Although co-location of DOTS server and mitigator within the same domain is expected to be a common deployment model, it is assumed that operators may require alternative models. Nothing in this document precludes such alternatives.

2.2. Components

2.2.1. DOTS Client

A DOTS client is a DOTS agent from which requests for help coordinating attack response originate. The requests may be in response to an active, ongoing attack against a target in the DOTS client’s domain, but no active attack is required for a DOTS client to request help. Operators may wish to have upstream mitigators in the network path for an indefinite period, and are restricted only by business relationships when it comes to duration and scope of requested mitigation.

The DOTS client requests attack response coordination from a DOTS server over the signal channel, including in the request the DOTS client's desired mitigation scoping, as described in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]. The actual mitigation scope and countermeasures used in response to the attack are up to the DOTS server and mitigator operators, as the DOTS client may have a narrow perspective on the ongoing attack. As such, the DOTS client’s request for mitigation should be considered advisory: guarantees of DOTS server availability or mitigation capacity constitute service level agreements and are out of scope for this document.

The DOTS client adjusts mitigation scope and provides available mitigation feedback (e.g. mitigation efficacy) at the direction of
its local administrator. Such direction may involve manual or automated adjustments in response to updates from the DOTS server.

To provide a metric of signal health and distinguish an idle signal channel from a disconnected or defunct session, the DOTS client sends a heartbeat over the signal channel to maintain its half of the channel. The DOTS client similarly expects a heartbeat from the DOTS server, and may consider a session terminated in the extended absence of a DOTS server heartbeat.

2.2.2. DOTS Server

A DOTS server is a DOTS agent capable of receiving, processing and possibly acting on requests for help coordinating attack response from DOTS clients. The DOTS server authenticates and authorizes DOTS clients as described in Section 3.1, and maintains session state, tracking requests for mitigation, reporting on the status of active mitigations, and terminating sessions in the extended absence of a client heartbeat or when a session times out.

Assuming the preconditions discussed below exist, a DOTS client maintaining an active session with a DOTS server may reasonably expect some level of mitigation in response to a request for coordinated attack response.

The DOTS server enforces authorization of DOTS clients’ signals for mitigation. The mechanism of enforcement is not in scope for this document, but is expected to restrict requested mitigation scope to addresses, prefixes, and/or services owned by the DOTS client’s administrative domain, such that a DOTS client from one domain is not able to influence the network path to another domain. A DOTS server MUST reject requests for mitigation of resources not owned by the requesting DOTS client’s administrative domain. A DOTS server MAY also refuse a DOTS client’s mitigation request for arbitrary reasons, within any limits imposed by business or service level agreements between client and server domains. If a DOTS server refuses a DOTS client’s request for mitigation, the DOTS server SHOULD include the refusal reason in the server signal sent to the client.

A DOTS server is in regular contact with one or more mitigators. If a DOTS server accepts a DOTS client’s request for help, the DOTS server forwards a translated form of that request to the mitigator(s) responsible for scrubbing attack traffic. Note that the form of the translated request passed from the DOTS server to the mitigator is not in scope: it may be as simple as an alert to mitigator operators, or highly automated using vendor or open application programming interfaces supported by the mitigator. The DOTS server MUST report the actual scope of any mitigation enabled on behalf of a client.
The DOTS server SHOULD retrieve available metrics for any mitigations activated on behalf of a DOTS client, and SHOULD include them in server signals sent to the DOTS client originating the request for mitigation.

To provide a metric of signal health and distinguish an idle signal channel from a disconnected or defunct channel, the DOTS server MUST send a heartbeat over the signal channel to maintain its half of the channel. The DOTS server similarly expects a heartbeat from the DOTS client, and MAY consider a session terminated in the extended absence of a DOTS client heartbeat.

2.2.3. DOTS Gateway

Traditional client/server relationships may be expanded by chaining DOTS sessions. This chaining is enabled through "logical concatenation" of a DOTS server and a DOTS client, resulting in an application analogous to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261] logical entity of a Back-to-Back User Agent (B2BUA) [RFC7092]. The term DOTS gateway is used here in the descriptions of selected scenarios involving this application.

A DOTS gateway may be deployed client-side, server-side or both. The gateway may terminate multiple discrete client connections and may aggregate these into a single or multiple DOTS sessions.

The DOTS gateway will appear as a server to its downstream agents and as a client to its upstream agents, a functional concatenation of the DOTS client and server roles, as depicted in Figure 4:

```
+-------------+       +-------------+       +-------------+
|    | D |    |       |    | G |    |       |    | O |    |         +----+
+----+          |    |    |          |         +----+
| c1 |----------| s1 | T | c2 |---------| s2 |
+----+          |    |    |          |         +----+
|    | S |    |       |    |    |    |       |    |    |
+-------------+       +-------------+       +-------------+
```

**Figure 4: DOTS gateway**

The DOTS gateway MUST perform full stack DOTS session termination and reorigination between its client and server side. The details of how this is achieved are implementation specific. The DOTS protocol does not include any special features related to DOTS gateways, and hence from a DOTS perspective, whenever a DOTS gateway is present, the DOTS session simply terminates/originates there.
2.3. DOTS Agent Relationships

So far, we have only considered a relatively simple scenario of a single DOTS client associated with a single DOTS server, however DOTS supports more advanced relationships.

A DOTS server may be associated with one or more DOTS clients, and those DOTS clients may belong to different domains. An example scenario is a mitigation provider serving multiple attack targets (Figure 5).

A DOTS client may be associated with one or more DOTS servers, and those DOTS servers may belong to different domains. This may be to ensure high availability or co-ordinate mitigation with more than one directly connected ISP. An example scenario is for an enterprise to have DDoS mitigation service from multiple providers, as shown in Figure 6.
Deploying a multi-homed client requires extra care and planning, as the DOTS servers with which the multi-homed client communicates may not be affiliated. Should the multi-homed client simultaneously request for mitigation from all servers with which it has established signal channels, the client may unintentionally inflict additional network disruption on the resources it intends to protect. In one of the worst cases, a multi-homed DOTS client could cause a permanent routing loop of traffic destined for the client’s protected services, as the uncoordinated DOTS servers’ mitigators all try to divert that traffic to their own scrubbing centers.

The DOTS protocol itself provides no fool-proof method to prevent such self-inflicted harms as a result deploying multi-homed DOTS clients. If DOTS client implementations nevertheless include support for multi-homing, they are expected to be aware of the risks, and consequently to include measures aimed at reducing the likelihood of negative outcomes. Simple measures might include:

- Requesting mitigation serially, ensuring only one mitigation request for a given address space is active at any given time;
- Dividing the protected resources among the DOTS servers, such that no two mitigators will be attempting to divert and scrub the same traffic;
- Restricting multi-homing to deployments in which all DOTS servers are coordinating management of a shared pool of mitigation resources.
2.3.1. Gatewayed Signaling

As discussed in Section 2.2.3, a DOTS gateway is a logical function chaining DOTS sessions through concatenation of a DOTS server and DOTS client.

An example scenario, as shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8, is for an enterprise to have deployed multiple DOTS capable devices which are able to signal intra-domain using TCP [RFC0793] on un-congested links to a DOTS gateway which may then transform these to a UDP [RFC0768] transport inter-domain where connection oriented transports may degrade; this applies to the signal channel only, as the data channel requires a connection-oriented transport. The relationship between the gateway and its upstream agents is opaque to the initial clients.

```
+---+   
|   c  |
+---+   
\-----TCP-----+-----+-----+
|       D      | O     |
+---+   
| c   |-----TCP-----+-----|
| T   | S-----UDP-----+-----|
+---+   
/-----TCP-----+-----+
|       G      |
+---+   
\   |
+---+
example.com  example.com  example.net
DOTS clients  DOTS gateway (DOTSG)  DOTS server

Figure 7: Client-Side Gateway with Aggregation
```

```
+---+   
|   c  |
+---+   
\-----TCP-----+-----|
|       D      |
+---+   
| c   |-----TCP-----+-----|
| T   | S-----UDP-----|
+---+   
/-----TCP-----+-----|
|       G      |
+---+   
\   |
+---+
example.com  example.com  example.net
DOTS clients  DOTS gateway (DOTSG)  DOTS server

Figure 8: Client-Side Gateway without Aggregation
```
This may similarly be deployed in the inverse scenario where the gateway resides in the server-side domain and may be used to terminate and/or aggregate multiple clients to single transport as shown in figures Figure 9 and Figure 10.

![Diagram of Server-Side Gateway with Aggregation](image1.png)

**Figure 9: Server-Side Gateway with Aggregation**

![Diagram of Server-Side Gateway without Aggregation](image2.png)

**Figure 10: Server-Side Gateway without Aggregation**

This document anticipates scenarios involving multiple DOTS gateways. An example is a DOTS gateway at the network client’s side, and another one at the server side. The first gateway can be located at a CPE to aggregate requests from multiple DOTS clients enabled in an enterprise network. The second DOTS gateway is deployed on the provider side. This scenario can be seen as a combination of the client-side and server-side scenarios.
3. Concepts

3.1. DOTS Sessions

In order for DOTS to be effective as a vehicle for DDoS mitigation requests, one or more DOTS clients must establish ongoing communication with one or more DOTS servers. While the preconditions for enabling DOTS in or among network domains may also involve business relationships, service level agreements, or other formal or informal understandings between network operators, such considerations are out of scope for this document.

A DOTS session is established to support bilateral exchange of data between an associated DOTS client and a DOTS server. In the DOTS architecture, data is exchanged between DOTS agents over signal and data channels. Regardless, a DOTS session is characterized by the presence of an established signal channel. A data channel may be established as well, however it is not a prerequisite. Conversely, a DOTS session cannot exist without an established signal channel: when an established signal channel is terminated for any reason, the DOTS session is also said to be terminated.

3.1.1. Preconditions

Prior to establishing a DOTS session between agents, the owners of the networks, domains, services or applications involved are assumed to have agreed upon the terms of the relationship involved. Such agreements are out of scope for this document, but must be in place for a functional DOTS architecture.

It is assumed that as part of any DOTS service agreement, the DOTS client is provided with all data and metadata required to establish communication with the DOTS server. Such data and metadata would include any cryptographic information necessary to meet the message confidentiality, integrity and authenticity requirement in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements], and might also include the pool of DOTS server addresses and ports the DOTS client should use for signal and data channel messaging.

3.1.2. Establishing the DOTS Session

With the required business agreements in place, the DOTS client initiates a signal session by contacting its DOTS server(s) over the signal channel and (possibly) the data channel. To allow for DOTS service flexibility, neither the order of contact nor the time interval between channel creations is specified. A DOTS client MAY establish signal channel first, and then data channel, or vice versa.
The methods by which a DOTS client receives the address and associated service details of the DOTS server are not prescribed by this document. For example, a DOTS client may be directly configured to use a specific DOTS server IP address and port, and directly provided with any data necessary to satisfy the Peer Mutual Authentication requirement in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements], such as symmetric or asymmetric keys, usernames and passwords, etc. All configuration and authentication information in this scenario is provided out-of-band by the domain operating the DOTS server.

At the other extreme, the architecture in this document allows for a form of DOTS client auto-provisioning. For example, the domain operating the DOTS server or servers might provide the client domain only with symmetric or asymmetric keys to authenticate the provisioned DOTS clients. Only the keys would then be directly configured on DOTS clients, but the remaining configuration required to provision the DOTS clients could be learned through mechanisms similar to DNS SRV [RFC2782] or DNS Service Discovery [RFC6763].

The DOTS client SHOULD successfully authenticate and exchange messages with the DOTS server over both signal and (if used) data channel as soon as possible to confirm that both channels are operational.

As described in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements], the DOTS client can configure preferred values for acceptable signal loss, mitigation lifetime, and heartbeat intervals when establishing the DOTS session. A DOTS session is not active until DOTS agents have agreed on the values for these DOTS session parameters, a process defined by the protocol.

Once the DOTS client begins receiving DOTS server signals, the DOTS session is active. At any time during the DOTS session, the DOTS client may use the data channel to manage aliases, manage black- and white-listed prefixes or addresses, leverage vendor-specific extensions, and so on. Note that unlike the signal channel, there is no requirement that the data channel remains operational in attack conditions (See Data Channel Requirements, [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]).

3.1.3. Maintaining the DOTS Session

DOTS clients and servers periodically send heartbeats to each other over the signal channel, per Operational Requirements discussed in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]. DOTS agent operators SHOULD configure the heartbeat interval such that the frequency does not lead to accidental denials of service due to the overwhelming number of heartbeats a DOTS agent must field.
Either DOTS agent may consider a DOTS session terminated in the extended absence of a heartbeat from its peer agent. The period of that absence will be established in the protocol definition.

3.2. Modes of Signaling

This section examines the modes of signaling between agents in a DOTS architecture.

3.2.1. Direct Signaling

A DOTS session may take the form of direct signaling between the DOTS clients and servers, as shown in Figure 11.

```
+-------------+                           +-------------+
| DOTS client |<-----signal session------>| DOTS server |
+-------------+                           +-------------+
```

Figure 11: Direct Signaling

In a direct DOTS session, the DOTS client and server are communicating directly. Direct signaling may exist inter- or intra-domain. The DOTS session is abstracted from the underlying networks or network elements the signals traverse: in direct signaling, the DOTS client and server are logically adjacent.

3.2.2. Redirected Signaling

In certain circumstances, a DOTS server may want to redirect a DOTS client to an alternative DOTS server for a DOTS session. Such circumstances include but are not limited to:

- Maximum number of DOTS sessions with clients has been reached;
- Mitigation capacity exhaustion in the mitigator with which the specific DOTS server is communicating;
- Mitigator outage or other downtime, such as scheduled maintenance;
- Scheduled DOTS server maintenance;
- Scheduled modifications to the network path between DOTS server and DOTS client.

A basic redirected DOTS session resembles the following, as shown in Figure 12.
1. Previously established DOTS session 1 exists between a DOTS client and DOTS server A.

2. DOTS server A sends a server signal redirecting the client to DOTS server B.

3. If the DOTS client does not already have a separate DOTS session with the redirection target, the DOTS client initiates and establishes DOTS session 2 with DOTS server B.

4. Having redirected the DOTS client, DOTS server A ceases sending server signals. The DOTS client likewise stops sending client signals to DOTS server A. DOTS session 1 is terminated.

3.2.3. Recursive Signaling

DOTS is centered around improving the speed and efficiency of coordinated response to DDoS attacks. One scenario not yet discussed involves coordination among federated domains operating DOTS servers and mitigators.

In the course of normal DOTS operations, a DOTS client communicates the need for mitigation to a DOTS server, and that server initiates mitigation on a mitigator with which the server has an established service relationship. The operator of the mitigator may in turn monitor mitigation performance and capacity, as the attack being mitigated may grow in severity beyond the mitigating domain’s capabilities.
The operator of the mitigator has limited options in the event a DOTS client-requested mitigation is being overwhelmed by the severity of the attack. Out-of-scope business or service level agreements may permit the mitigating domain to drop the mitigation and let attack traffic flow unchecked to the target, but this only encourages attack escalation. In the case where the mitigating domain is the upstream service provider for the attack target, this may mean the mitigating domain and its other services and users continue to suffer the incidental effects of the attack.

A recursive signaling model as shown in Figure 13 offers an alternative. In a variation of the use case "End-customer with a single upstream transit provider offering DDoS mitigation services" described in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases], a domain operating a DOTS server and mitigator also operates a DOTS client. This DOTS client has an established DOTS session with a DOTS server belonging to a separate administrative domain.

With these preconditions in place, the operator of the mitigator being overwhelmed or otherwise performing inadequately may request mitigation for the attack target from this separate DOTS-aware domain. Such a request recurses the originating mitigation request to the secondary DOTS server, in the hope of building a cumulative mitigation against the attack.
In Figure 13, client Cc signals a request for mitigation across inter-domain DOTS session 1 to the DOTS server Sn belonging to the example.net domain. DOTS server Sn enables mitigation on mitigator Mn. DOTS server Sn is half of DOTS gateway Gn, being deployed logically back-to-back with DOTS client Cn, which has pre-existing inter-domain DOTS session 2 with the DOTS server So belonging to the example.org domain. At any point, DOTS server Sn MAY recurse an ongoing mitigation request through DOTS client Cn to DOTS server So, in the expectation that mitigator Mo will be activated to aid in the defense of the attack target.

Recursive signaling is opaque to the DOTS client. To maximize mitigation visibility to the DOTS client, however, the recursing domain SHOULD provide recursed mitigation feedback in signals reporting on mitigation status to the DOTS client. For example, the recursing domain’s mitigator should incorporate into mitigation status messages available metrics such as dropped packet or byte counts from the recursed mitigation.

DOTS clients involved in recursive signaling must be able to withdraw requests for mitigation without warning or justification, per [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements].
Operators recursing mitigation requests MAY maintain the recursed mitigation for a brief, protocol-defined period in the event the DOTS client originating the mitigation withdraws its request for help, as per the discussion of managing mitigation toggling in the operational requirements ([I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]).

Deployment of recursive signaling may result in traffic redirection, examination and mitigation extending beyond the initial bilateral relationship between DOTS client and DOTS server. As such, client control over the network path of mitigated traffic may be reduced. DOTS client operators should be aware of any privacy concerns, and work with DOTS server operators employing recursive signaling to ensure shared sensitive material is suitably protected.

3.2.4. Anycast Signaling

The DOTS architecture does not assume the availability of anycast within a DOTS deployment, but neither does the architecture exclude it. Domains operating DOTS servers MAY deploy DOTS servers with an anycast Service Address as described in BCP 126 [RFC4786]. In such a deployment, DOTS clients connecting to the DOTS Service Address may be communicating with distinct DOTS servers, depending on the network configuration at the time the DOTS clients connect. Among other benefits, anycast signaling potentially offers the following:

- Simplified DOTS client configuration, including service discovery through the methods described in [RFC7094]. In this scenario, the "instance discovery" message would be a DOTS client initiating a DOTS session to the DOTS server anycast Service Address, to which the DOTS server would reply with a redirection to the DOTS server unicast address the client should use for DOTS.

- Region- or customer-specific deployments, in which the DOTS Service Addresses route to distinct DOTS servers depending on the client region or the customer network in which a DOTS client resides.

- Operational resiliency, spreading DOTS signaling traffic across the DOTS server domain's networks, and thereby also reducing the potential attack surface, as described in BCP 126 [RFC4786].

3.2.4.1. Anycast Signaling Considerations

As long as network configuration remains stable, anycast DOTS signaling is to the individual DOTS client indistinct from direct signaling. However, the operational challenges inherent in anycast signaling are anything but negligible, and DOTS server operators must carefully weigh the risks against the benefits before deploying.
While the DOTS signal channel primarily operates over UDP per [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements], the signal channel also requires mutual authentication between DOTS agents, with associated security state on both ends.

Network instability is of particular concern with anycast signaling, as DOTS signal channels are expected to be long-lived, and potentially operating under congested network conditions caused by a volumetric DDoS attack.

For example, a network configuration altering the route to the DOTS server during active anycast signaling may cause the DOTS client to send messages to a DOTS server other than the one with which it initially established a signaling session. That second DOTS server may not have the security state of the existing session, forcing the DOTS client to initialize a new DOTS session. This challenge might in part be mitigated by use of pre-shared keys and session resumption [RFC5246][RFC6347], but keying material must be available to all DOTS servers sharing the anycast Service Address in that case.

While the DOTS client will try to establish a new DOTS session with the DOTS server now acting as the anycast DOTS Service Address, the link between DOTS client and server may be congested with attack traffic, making signal session establishment difficult. In such a scenario, anycast Service Address instability becomes a sort of signal session flapping, with obvious negative consequences for the DOTS deployment.

Anycast signaling deployments similarly must also take into account active mitigations. Active mitigations initiated through a DOTS session may involve diverting traffic to a scrubbing center. If the DOTS session flaps due to anycast changes as described above, mitigation may also flap as the DOTS servers sharing the anycast DOTS service address toggles mitigation on detecting DOTS session loss, depending on whether the client has configured mitigation on loss of signal.

3.2.5. Signaling Considerations for Network Address Translation

Network address translators (NATs) are expected to be a common feature of DOTS deployments. The Middlebox Traversal Guidelines in [RFC8085] include general NAT considerations for DOTS deployments when the signal channel is established over UDP.

Additional DOTS-specific considerations arise when NATs are part of the DOTS architecture. For example, DDoS attack detection behind a NAT will detect attacks against internal addresses. A DOTS client subsequently asked to request mitigation for the attacked scope of
addresses cannot reasonably perform the task, due to the lack of externally routable addresses in the mitigation scope.

The following considerations do not cover all possible scenarios, but are meant rather to highlight anticipated common issues when signaling through NATs.

3.2.5.1. Direct Provisioning of Internal-to-External Address Mappings

Operators may circumvent the problem of translating internal addresses or prefixes to externally routable mitigation scopes by directly provisioning the mappings of external addresses to internal protected resources on the DOTS client. When the operator requests mitigation scoped for internal addresses, directly or through automated means, the DOTS client looks up the matching external addresses or prefixes, and issues a mitigation request scoped to that externally routable information.

When directly provisioning the address mappings, operators must ensure the mappings remain up to date, or risk losing the ability to request accurate mitigation scopes. This document does not prescribe the method by which mappings are maintained once they are provisioned on the DOTS client.

3.2.5.2. Resolving Public Mitigation Scope with Session Traversal Utilities (STUN)

Internal resources may discover their external address through a STUN Binding request/response transaction, as described in [RFC5389]. After learning its reflexive transport address from the STUN server, the internal service can export its external/internal address pair to the DOTS client, allowing the DOTS client to request mitigation with the correct external scope, as depicted in Figure 14. The mechanism for provisioning the DOTS client with the address pair is unspecified.
3.2.5.3. Resolving Requested Mitigation Scope with DNS

DOTS supports mitigation scoped to DNS names. As discussed in [RFC3235], using DNS names instead of IP addresses potentially avoids the address translation problem, as long as the name is internally and externally resolvable by the same name. For example, a detected attack's internal target address can be mapped to a DNS name through a reverse lookup. The DNS name returned by the reverse lookup can then be provided to the DOTS client as the external scope for mitigation.

3.3. Triggering Requests for Mitigation

[I-D.ietf-dots-requirements] places no limitation on the circumstances in which a DOTS client operator may request mitigation, nor does it demand justification for any mitigation request, thereby reserving operational control over DDoS defense for the domain requesting mitigation. This architecture likewise does not prescribe the network conditions and mechanisms triggering a mitigation request from a DOTS client.

However, considering selected possible mitigation triggers from an architectural perspective offers a model for alternative or unanticipated triggers for DOTS deployments. In all cases, what network conditions merit a mitigation request are at the discretion of the DOTS client operator.

The mitigation request itself is defined by DOTS, however the interfaces required to trigger the mitigation request in the following scenarios are implementation-specific.
3.3.1. Manual Mitigation Request

A DOTS client operator may manually prepare a request for mitigation, including scope and duration, and manually instruct the DOTS client to send the mitigation request to the DOTS server. In context, a manual request is a request directly issued by the operator without automated decision-making performed by a device interacting with the DOTS client. Modes of manual mitigation requests include an operator entering a command into a text interface, or directly interacting with a graphical interface to send the request.

An operator might do this, for example, in response to notice of an attack delivered by attack detection equipment or software, and the alerting detector lacks interfaces or is not configured to use available interfaces to translate the alert to a mitigation request automatically.

In a variation of the above scenario, the operator may have preconfigured on the DOTS client mitigation requests for various resources in the operator's domain. When notified of an attack, the DOTS client operator manually instructs the DOTS client to send the relevant preconfigured mitigation request for the resources under attack.

A further variant involves recursive signaling, as described in Section 3.2.3. The DOTS client in this case is the second half of a DOTS gateway (back-to-back DOTS server and client). As in the previous scenario, the scope and duration of the mitigation request are pre-existing, but in this case are derived from the mitigation request received from a downstream DOTS client by the DOTS server. Assuming the preconditions required by Section 3.2.3 are in place, the DOTS gateway operator may at any time manually request mitigation from an upstream DOTS server, sending a mitigation request derived from the downstream DOTS client's request.

The motivations for a DOTS client operator to request mitigation manually are not prescribed by this architecture, but are expected to include some of the following:

- Notice of an attack delivered via e-mail or alternative messaging
- Notice of an attack delivered via phone call
- Notice of an attack delivered through the interface(s) of networking monitoring software deployed in the operator’s domain
- Manual monitoring of network behavior through network monitoring software
3.3.2. Automated Conditional Mitigation Request

Unlike manual mitigation requests, which depend entirely on the DOTS client operator’s capacity to react with speed and accuracy to every detected or detectable attack, mitigation requests triggered by detected attack conditions reduce the operational burden on the DOTS client operator, and minimize the latency between attack detection and the start of mitigation.

Mitigation requests are triggered in this scenario by operator-specified network conditions. Attack detection is deployment-specific, and not constrained by this architecture. Similarly the specifics of a condition are left to the discretion of the operator, though common conditions meriting mitigation include the following:

- Detected attack exceeding a rate in packets per second (pps).
- Detected attack exceeding a rate in bytes per second (bps).
- Detected resource exhaustion in an attack target.
- Detected resource exhaustion in the local domain’s mitigator.
- Number of open connections to an attack target.
- Number of attack sources in a given attack.
- Number of active attacks against targets in the operator’s domain.
- Conditional detection developed through arbitrary statistical analysis or deep learning techniques.
- Any combination of the above.

When automated conditional mitigation requests are enabled, violations of any of the above conditions, or any additional operator-defined conditions, will trigger a mitigation request from the DOTS client to the DOTS server. The interfaces between the application detecting the condition violation and the DOTS client are implementation-specific.

3.3.3. Automated Mitigation on Loss of Signal

To maintain a DOTS session, the DOTS client and the DOTS server exchange regular but infrequent messages across the signal channel. In the absence of an attack, the probability of message loss in the signaling channel should be extremely low. Under attack conditions,
however, some signal loss may be anticipated as attack traffic congests the link, depending on the attack type.

While [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements] specifies the DOTS protocol be robust when signaling under attack conditions, there are nevertheless scenarios in which the DOTS signal is lost in spite of protocol best efforts. To handle such scenarios, a DOTS operator may configure the DOTS session to trigger mitigation when the DOTS server ceases receiving DOTS client signals (or vice versa) beyond the miss count or period permitted by the protocol.

The impact of mitigating due to loss of signal in either direction must be considered carefully before enabling it. Signal loss is not caused by links congested with attack traffic alone, and as such mitigation requests triggered by signal channel degradation in either direction may incur unnecessary costs, in network performance and operational expense alike.

4. Security Considerations

This section describes identified security considerations for the DOTS architecture.

DOTS is at risk from three primary attack vectors: agent impersonation, traffic injection and signal blocking. These vectors may be exploited individually or in concert by an attacker to confuse, disable, take information from, or otherwise inhibit DOTS agents.

Any attacker with the ability to impersonate a legitimate DOTS client or server or, indeed, inject false messages into the stream may potentially trigger/withdraw traffic redirection, trigger/cancel mitigation activities or subvert black/whitelists. From an architectural standpoint, operators SHOULD ensure best current practices for secure communication are observed for data and signal channel confidentiality, integrity and authenticity. Care must be taken to ensure transmission is protected by appropriately secure means, reducing attack surface by exposing only the minimal required services or interfaces. Similarly, received data at rest SHOULD be stored with a satisfactory degree of security.

As many mitigation systems employ diversion to scrub attack traffic, operators of DOTS agents SHOULD ensure DOTS sessions are resistant to Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks. An attacker with control of a DOTS client may negatively influence network traffic by requesting and withdrawing requests for mitigation for particular prefixes, leading to route or DNS flapping.
Any attack targeting the availability of DOTS servers may disrupt the ability of the system to receive and process DOTS signals resulting in failure to fulfill a mitigation request. DOTS agents SHOULD be given adequate protections, again in accordance with best current practices for network and host security.

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7. References

7.1. Normative References


7.2. Informative References


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Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel Specification
draft-ietf-dots-data-channel-13

Abstract

The document specifies a Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) data channel used for bulk exchange of data that cannot easily or appropriately communicated through the DOTS signal channel under attack conditions.

This is a companion document to the DOTS signal channel specification.

Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)

Please update these statements with the RFC number to be assigned to this document:

- "This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX;"
- "RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel Specification;"
- reference: RFC XXXX

Please update this statement with the RFC number to be assigned to the following documents:

- "RFC YYYYY: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification;"
Status of This Memo

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction ................................. 3
2. Notational Conventions and Terminology .......... 5
3. DOTS Data Channel: Design Overview ............ 5
4. DOTS Server(s) Discovery ..................... 8
5. DOTS Data Channel YANG Module ................. 8
   5.1. Tree Structure .......................... 8
   5.2. YANG Module ........................... 13
6. Registering DOTS Clients ..................... 20
7. Managing DOTS Aliases ....................... 23
   7.1. Create Aliases ......................... 23
   7.2. Retrieve Installed Aliases ............. 28
   7.3. Delete Aliases ......................... 30
1. Introduction

A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack is an attempt to make machines or network resources unavailable to their intended users. In most cases, sufficient scale can be achieved by compromising enough end-hosts and using those infected hosts to perpetrate and amplify the attack. The victim of such attack can be an application server, a router, a firewall, an entire network, etc.

As discussed in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements], the lack of a common method to coordinate a real-time response among involved actors and network domains inhibits the speed and effectiveness of DDoS attack mitigation. From that standpoint, DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) defines an architecture that allows a DOTS client to send requests to a DOTS server for DDoS attack mitigation [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]. The DOTS approach is thus meant to minimize the impact of DDoS attacks, thereby contributing to the enforcement of more efficient defensive if not proactive security strategies. To that aim, DOTS defines two channels: the signal and the data channels (Figure 1).

```
+---------------+                                 +---------------+
|               | <------- Signal Channel ------> |               |
|  DOTS Client  |                                 |  DOTS Server  |
|<---------------|                                 |<---------------|
|<------ Data Channel ======> |                      |
|                      |                                 |
|                      |                                 |
|  +---------------+                                 +---------------+ |
```

Figure 1: DOTS Channels

The DOTS signal channel is used to carry information about a device or a network (or a part thereof) that is under a DDoS attack. Such information is sent by a DOTS client to an upstream DOTS server so that appropriate mitigation actions are undertaken on traffic deemed suspicious. The DOTS signal channel is further elaborated in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].
As for the DOTS data channel, it is used for infrequent bulk data exchange between DOTS agents to significantly improve the coordination of all the parties involved in the response to the attack. Section 2 of [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture] mentions that the DOTS data channel is used to perform the following tasks:

- Creating aliases for resources for which mitigation may be requested.

  A DOTS client may submit to its DOTS server a collection of prefixes which it would like to refer to by an alias when requesting mitigation. The DOTS server can respond to this request with either a success or failure response (see Section 2 in [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]). Refer to Section 7 for more details.

- Filter management, which enables a DOTS client to request the installation or withdrawal of traffic filters, dropping or rate-limiting unwanted traffic, and permitting white-listed traffic. A DOTS client is entitled to instruct filtering rules only on IP resources that belong to its domain.

Sample use cases for populating black- or white-list filtering rules are detailed hereafter:

- If a network resource (DOTS client) detects a potential DDoS attack from a set of IP addresses, the DOTS client informs its servicing DOTS gateway of all suspect IP addresses that need to be blocked or black-listed for further investigation. The DOTS client could also specify a list of protocols and port numbers in the black-list rule.

  The DOTS gateway then propagates the black-listed IP addresses to a DOTS server which will undertake appropriate actions so that traffic originated by these IP addresses to the target network (specified by the DOTS client) is blocked.

- A network, that has partner sites from which only legitimate traffic arrives, may want to ensure that the traffic from these sites is not subjected to DDoS attack mitigation. The DOTS client uses the DOTS data channel to convey the white-listed IP prefixes of the partner sites to its DOTS server.

  The DOTS server uses this information to white-list flows originated by such IP prefixes and which reach the network. Refer to Section 8 for more details.
2. Notational Conventions and Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

The reader should be familiar with the terms defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements].

The terminology for describing YANG data modules is defined in [RFC7950]. The meaning of the symbols in tree diagrams is defined in [I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams].

This document generalizes the notion of Access Control List (ACL) so that it is not device-specific [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model]. As such, this document defines an ACL as an ordered set of rules that is used to filter traffic. Each rule is represented by an Access Control Entry (ACE). ACLs communicated via the DOTS data channel are not bound to a device interface.

For the sake of simplicity, all of the examples in this document use "/restconf" as the discovered RESTCONF API root path. Many protocol header lines and message-body text within examples throughout the document are split into multiple lines for display purposes only. When a line ends with backslash ('\') as the last character, the line is wrapped for display purposes. It is to be considered to be joined to the next line by deleting the backslash, the following line break, and the leading whitespace of the next line.

3. DOTS Data Channel: Design Overview

Unlike the DOTS signal channel, which must remain operational even when confronted with signal degradation due to packets loss, the DOTS data channel is not expected to be fully operational at all times, especially when a DDoS attack is underway. The requirements for a DOTS data channel protocol are documented in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements].

This specification does not require an order of DOTS signal and data channel creations nor mandates a time interval between them. These considerations are implementation- and deployment-specific.

As the primary function of the data channel is data exchange, a reliable transport mode is required in order for DOTS agents to detect data delivery success or failure. This document uses RESTCONF [RFC8040] over TLS [RFC5246] over TCP as the DOTS data channel protocol. The abstract layering of DOTS data channel is shown in Figure 2.
The HTTP POST, PUT, PATCH, and DELETE methods are used to edit data resources represented by DOTS data channel YANG data modules. These basic edit operations allow the DOTS data channel running configuration to be altered by a DOTS client.

DOTS data channel configuration information as well as state information can be retrieved with the GET method. An HTTP status-line header field is returned for each request to report success or failure for RESTCONF operations (Section 5.4 of [RFC8040]). The "error-tag" provides more information about encountered errors (Section 7 of [RFC8040]).

DOTS clients perform the root resource discovery procedure discussed in Section 3.1 of [RFC8040] to determine the root of the RESTCONF API. After discovering the RESTCONF API root, a DOTS client uses this value as the initial part of the path in the request URI, in any subsequent request to the DOTS server. The DOTS server may support the retrieval of the YANG modules it supports (Section 3.7 in [RFC8040]). For example, a DOTS client may use RESTCONF to retrieve the vendor-specific YANG modules supported by its DOTS server.

JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [RFC7159] payload is used to propagate the DOTS data channel specific payload messages that carry request parameters and response information, such as errors. This specification uses the encoding rules defined in [RFC7951] for representing DOTS data channel configuration data using YANG (Section 5) as JSON text.

A DOTS client registers itself to its DOTS server(s) in order to set up DOTS data channel-related configuration data and receive state data (i.e., non-configuration data) from the DOTS server(s). Mutual authentication and coupling of signal and data channels are specified in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].
A single DOTS data channel between DOTS agents can be used to exchange multiple requests and multiple responses. To reduce DOTS client and DOTS server workload, DOTS clients SHOULD re-use the same TLS session. While the communication to the DOTS server is quiescent, the DOTS client MAY probe the server to ensure it has maintained cryptographic state. Such probes can also keep alive firewall and/or NAT bindings. A TLS heartbeat [RFC6520] verifies that the DOTS server still has TLS state by returning a TLS message.

In deployments where one or more translators (e.g., NAT44, NAT64, NPI6) are enabled between the client’s network and the DOTS server, DOTS data channel messages forwarded to a DOTS server must not include internal IP addresses/prefixes and/or port numbers; external addresses/prefixes and/or port numbers as assigned by the translator MUST be used instead. This document does not make any recommendation about possible translator discovery mechanisms. The following are some (non-exhaustive) deployment examples that may be considered:

- Port Control Protocol (PCP) [RFC6887] or Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) [RFC5389] may be used to retrieve the external addresses/prefixes and/or port numbers. Information retrieved by means of PCP or STUN will be used to feed the DOTS data channel messages that will be sent to a DOTS server.

- A DOTS gateway may be co-located with the translator. The DOTS gateway will need to update the DOTS messages, based upon the local translator’s binding table.

When a server-domain DOTS gateway is involved in DOTS data channel exchanges, the same considerations for manipulating the ‘cdid’ (client domain identifier) parameter specified in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] MUST be followed by DOTS agents. As a reminder, ‘cdid’ is meant to assist the DOTS server to enforce some policies (e.g., limit the number of filtering rules per DOTS client or per DOTS client domain).

If a DOTS gateway is involved, the DOTS gateway verifies that the DOTS client is authorized to undertake a data channel action (e.g., instantiate filtering rules). If the DOTS client is authorized, it propagates the rules to the upstream DOTS server. Likewise, the DOTS server verifies that the DOTS gateway is authorized to relay data channel actions. For example, to create or purge filters, a DOTS client sends its request to its DOTS gateway. The DOTS gateway validates the rules in the request and proxies the requests containing the filtering rules to its DOTS server. When the DOTS gateway receives the associated response from the DOTS server, it propagates the response back to the DOTS client.
A DOTS server may detect conflicting filtering requests from distinct DOTS clients which belong to the same domain. For example, a DOTS client could request to blacklist a prefix by specifying the source prefix, while another DOTS client could request to whitelist that same source prefix, but both having the same destination prefix. It is out of scope of this specification to recommend the behavior to follow for handling conflicting requests (e.g., reject all, reject the new request, notify an administrator for validation). DOTS servers SHOULD support a configuration parameter to indicate the behavior to follow when a conflict is detected. Section 8.1 specifies the behavior when no instruction is supplied to a DOTS server.

How filtering rules instantiated on a DOTS server are translated into network configurations actions is out of scope.

4. DOTS Server(s) Discovery

This document assumes that DOTS clients are provisioned with the reachability information of their DOTS server(s) using a variety of means (e.g., local configuration, or dynamic means such as DHCP). The specification of such means are out of scope of this document.

Likewise, it is out of scope of this document to specify the behavior to follow by a DOTS client to place its requests (e.g., contact all servers, select one server among the list) when multiple DOTS servers are provisioned.

5. DOTS Data Channel YANG Module

5.1. Tree Structure

The tree structure for the DOTS data channel YANG module is as follows:

module: ietf-dots-data-channel
  |--rw dots-data
    |--rw dots-client* [cuid]
      |--rw cuid           string
      |--rw cdid?          string
      |--rw aliases
        |--rw alias* [name]
          |--rw name     string
          |--rw target-prefix* inet:ip-prefix
          |--rw target-port-range* [lower-port upper-port]
            |--rw lower-port  inet:port-number
            |--rw upper-port  inet:port-number
          |--rw target-protocol* uint8
Internet-Draft         DOTS Data Channel Protocol           January 2018

|     +--rw target-fqdn*         inet:domain-name
|     +--rw target-uri*          inet:uri
|     +--rw lifetime             int32
+-rw access-lists
  +--rw acl* [name]
    ++rw name        string
    ++rw type?       ietf-acl:acl-type
    ++rw lifetime    int32
    ++rw aces
      +--rw ace* [name]
        ++rw name        string
        ++rw matches
          +--rw (13)?
            +--:(ipv4)
              +--rw ipv4
                +--rw dscp?
                  | inet:dscp
                +--rw ecn?
                  | uint8
                +--rw length?
                  | uint16
                +--rw ttl?
                  | uint8
                +--rw protocol?
                  | uint8
              +--rw source-port-range-or-operator
                +--rw (port-range-or-operator)?
                  +--:(range)
                    +--rw lower-port
                      | inet:port-number
                    +--rw upper-port
                      | inet:port-number
                    +--:(operator)
                      +--rw operator?
                        | operator
                      +--rw port
                        | inet:port-number
              +--rw destination-port-range-or-operator
                +--rw (port-range-or-operator)?
                  +--:(range)
                    +--rw lower-port
                      | inet:port-number
                    +--rw upper-port
                      | inet:port-number
                    +--:(operator)
                      +--rw operator?
                        | operator
                      +--rw port
The DOTS data channel YANG module (ietf-dots-data-channel) allows to manage aliases for resources for which mitigation may be requested.
Such aliases may be used in subsequent DOTS signal channel exchanges to refer more efficiently to the resources under attack.

Also, the module allows managing filtering rules. Examples of filtering management in a DOTS context include, but not limited to:

- **Black-list management**, which enables a DOTS client to inform a DOTS server about sources from which traffic should be discarded.

- **White-list management**, which enables a DOTS client to inform a DOTS server about sources from which traffic should always be accepted.

- **Filter management**, which enables a DOTS client to request the installation or withdrawal of traffic filters, dropping or rate-limiting unwanted traffic and permitting white-listed traffic.

Early versions of this document investigated to what extent augmenting ‘ietf-access-control-list’ meet DOTS requirements, but that design approach was abandoned because it does not support meeting many of DOTS requirements, e.g.,

- Retrieve a filtering entry (or all entries) created by a DOTS client.

- Delete a filtering entry that was instantiated by a DOTS client.

DOTS filtering entries (i.e., Access Control List (ACL)) mimic the structure specified in [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model]. Concretely, DOTS agents are assumed to manipulate an ordered list of ACLs; each ACL contains a separately ordered list of Access Control Entries (ACEs). Each ACE has a group of match and a group of action criteria.

The ‘ietf-dots-data-channel’ module reuses the packet fields module ‘ietf-packet-fields’ [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model] which defines matching on fields in the packet including IPv4, IPv6, and transport layer fields. DOTS implementations MUST support the following matching criteria: match based on the IP header (IPv4 and IPv6), match based on the transport header (TCP, UDP, and ICMP), and any combination thereof.

DOTS forwarding actions can be ‘accept’ (i.e., accept matching traffic) or ‘drop’ (i.e., drop matching traffic without sending any ICMP error message). Accepted traffic can be subject to rate limiting ‘rate-limit’. Note that ‘reject’ action (i.e., drop matching traffic and send an ICMP error message to the source) is not supported in ‘ietf-dots-data-channel’ because it is not appropriate in the context of DDoS mitigation. Generating ICMP messages to
notify drops when mitigating a DDoS attack will exacerbate the DDoS attack. Furthermore, these ICMP messages will be used by an attacker as an explicit signal that the traffic is being blocked.

Filtering rules instructed by a DOTS client assumes a default direction: the destination is the DOTS client domain.

This document supports fragment filtering which adds an additional layer of protection against a DoS attack that uses non-initial fragments only. When there is only layer 3 information in the ACL entry and the fragments keyword is present, for non-initial fragments matching the ACE entry, the ‘deny’ or ‘accept’ action associated with the ACE entry will be enforced. For initial or non-fragment matching the ACE entry, the next ACE entry will be processed. When there is both layer 3 and layer 4 information in the ACE entry and the fragments keyword is present, the ACE action is conservative for both ‘accept’ and ‘deny’ actions. The actions are conservative to not accidentally deny a fragmented portion of a flow because the fragments do not contain sufficient information to match all of the filter attributes. In the ‘deny’ action case, instead of denying a non-initial fragment, the next ACE entry is processed. In the ‘accept’ case, it is assumed that the layer 4 information in the non-initial fragment, if available, matches the layer 4 information in the ACE entry.

Once all the ACE entries have been iterated though with no match, then all the following ACL’s ACE entries are iterated through until the first match at which point the specified action is applied. If there is no match, then there is no action to be taken against the packet.

In order to avoid stale entries, a lifetime is associated with alias and filtering entries. DOTS clients include a suggested lifetime in the request, but it is up to the DOTS server to decide whether it honors that hint or it has to proceed as per its local policies.

5.2. YANG Module

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-dots-data-channel@2018-01-22.yang"

module ietf-dots-data-channel {
  yang-version 1.1;
  prefix data-channel;

  import ietf-access-control-list {
    prefix ietf-acl;
  }

import ietf-packet-fields {
    prefix packet-fields;
}
import ietf-dots-signal-channel {
    prefix dots-signal;
}

organization
    "IETF DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Working Group";
contact
    "WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dots/>
    WG List: <mailto:dots@ietf.org>
    Editor: Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy
        <mailto:TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com>
    Editor: Mohamed Boucadair
        <mailto:mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
    Author: Kaname Nishizuka
        <mailto:kaname@nttv6.jp>
    Author: Liang Xia
        <mailto:frank.xialiang@huawei.com>
    Author: Prashanth Patil
        <mailto:praspati@cisco.com>
    Author: Andrew Mortensen
        <mailto:amortensen@arbor.net>
    Author: Nik Teague
        <mailto:nteague@verisign.com>
    Author: Jon Shallow
        <mailto:jon.shallow@nccgroup.trust">

description
    "This module contains YANG definition for configuring
    aliases for resources and filtering rules using DOTS
    data channel."

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set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
grouping aliases {
  description "Top level container for aliases";
  list alias {
    key "name";
    description "List of aliases";
    leaf name {
      type string;
      description "The name of the alias";
    }
    uses dots-signal:target;
    leaf lifetime {
      type int32;
      units "minutes";
      mandatory true;
      description "Indicates the lifetime of the alias entry.
      A lifetime of negative one (-1) indicates indefinite lifetime for the alias."
    }
  }
}

grouping access-lists {
  description "Specifies the ordered set of Access Control Lists.";
  list acl {
    key "name";
    ordered-by user;
    description "An Access Control List (ACL) is an ordered list of"
Access List Entries (ACE). Each Access Control Entry has a list of match criteria and a list of actions.

leaf name {
  type string {
    length "1..64";
  }
  description
    "The name of access-list.";
  reference
    "RFC ZZZZ: Network Access Control List (ACL) YANG Data Model";
}

leaf type {
  type ietf-acl:acl-type;
  description
    "Type of access control list. Indicates the primary intended type of match criteria (e.g., IPv4, IPv6) used in the list instance.";
  reference
    "RFC ZZZZ: Network Access Control List (ACL) YANG Data Model";
}

leaf lifetime {
  type int32;
  units "minutes";
  mandatory true;
  description
    "Indicates the lifetime of the filtering rule. A lifetime of negative one (-1) indicates indefinite lifetime for the filtering request.";
}

container aces {
  description
    "The access-list-entries container contains a list of ACEs.";
  list ace {
    key "name";
    ordered-by user;
    description
      "List of access list entries.";
    leaf name {
      type string {
        length "1..64";
      }
      description
        "A unique name identifying this Access List Entry (ACE).";
    }
  }
}

reference
"RFC ZZZZ: Network Access Control List (ACL)
YANG Data Model";

} container matches {
  description
  "The rules in this set determine what fields will be
  matched upon before any action is taken on them.

  If no matches are defined in a particular container,
  then any packet will match that container.

  If no matches are specified at all in an ACE, then any
  packet will match the ACE.";
  reference
"RFC ZZZZ: Network Access Control List (ACL)
YANG Data Model";

 choice l3 {
  container ipv4 {
    when "derived-from(../../../../type," +
    "ietf-acl:ipv4-acl-type’)"
    uses packet-fields:acl-ip-header-fields;
    uses packet-fields:acl-ipv4-header-fields;
    leaf v4-fragments {
      type empty;
      description
      "Handle IPv4 fragments.";
    }
    description
    "Rule set that matches IPv4 header.";
  }
  container ipv6 {
    when "derived-from(../../../../type," +
    "ietf-acl:ipv6-acl-type’)"
    uses packet-fields:acl-ip-header-fields;
    uses packet-fields:acl-ipv6-header-fields;
    leaf v6-fragments {
      type empty;
      description
      "Handle IPv6 fragments.";
    }
    description
    "Rule set that matches IPv6 header.";
  }
  description
  "Either IPv4 or IPv6.";
}
choice 14 {
    container tcp {
        uses packet-fields:acl-tcp-header-fields;
        description
            "Rule set that matches TCP header.";
    }
    container udp {
        uses packet-fields:acl-udp-header-fields;
        description
            "Rule set that matches UDP header.";
    }
    container icmp {
        uses packet-fields:acl-icmp-header-fields;
        description
            "Rule set that matches ICMP header.";
    }
    description
        "Can be TCP, UDP, or ICMP";
}
container actions {
    description
        "Definitions of action for this ACE.";
    leaf forwarding {
        type identityref {
            base ietf-acl:forwarding-action;
        }
        mandatory true;
        description
            "Specifies the forwarding action per ACE.";
        reference
            "RFC ZZZZ: Network Access Control List (ACL)
             YANG Data Model";
    }
    leaf rate-limit {
        when "./forwarding = 'ietf-acl:accept'" {
            description
                "rate-limit valid only when accept action is used";
        }
        type decimal64 {
            fraction-digits 2;
        }
        description
            "rate-limit traffic";
    }
}
container statistics {
    config false;
container dots-data {
  description
  "Main container for DOTS data channel.";
  list dots-client {
    key "cuid";
    description
    "List of DOTS clients.";
    leaf cuid {
      type string;
      description
      "A unique identifier that is randomly generated by
       a DOTS client to prevent request collisions.";
      reference
      "RFC YYYY: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
       Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification";
    }
    leaf cdid {
      type string;
      description
      "A client domain identifier conveyed by a
       server-domain DOTS gateway to a remote DOTS server.";
      reference
      "RFC YYYY: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
       Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification";
    }
    container aliases {
      description
      "Set of aliases that are bound to a DOTS client.";
      uses aliases;
    }
    container access-lists {
      description
      "Access lists that are bound to a DOTS client.";
      uses access-lists;
    }
  }
}

<CODE ENDS>
6. Registering DOTS Clients

In order to create a new DOTS client ("dots-client") resource on DOTS servers, DOTS clients MUST send a POST request (shown in Figure 3).

```
POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json
{
    "ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-client": [
        {
            "cuid": "string"
        }
    ]
}
```

Figure 3: POST to Register

The 'cuid' (client unique identifier) parameter is described below:

cuid: A globally unique identifier that is meant to prevent collisions among DOTS clients. This attribute has the same meaning, syntax, and processing rules as the 'cuid' attribute defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].

DOTS clients MUST use the same 'cuid' for both signal and data channels.
This is a mandatory attribute.

In deployments where server-domain DOTS gateways are enabled, identity information about the origin source client domain SHOULD be supplied to the DOTS server. That information is meant to assist the DOTS server to enforce some policies. These policies can be enforced per-client, per-client domain, or both. Figure 4 shows an example of a request relayed by a server-domain DOTS gateway.
POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json
{
  "ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-client": [
    {
      "cuid": "string",
      "cdid": "string"
    }
  ]
}

Figure 4: POST to Register (DOTS Gateway)

A server-domain DOTS gateway SHOULD add the following attribute:

**cdid**: This attribute has the same meaning, syntax, and processing rules as the ‘cdid’ attribute defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].

The DOTS gateway that inserted a ‘cdid’ in a request, MUST strip the ‘cdid’ parameter in the corresponding response before forwarding the response to the DOTS client.

This is an optional attribute.

A request example to create a ‘dots-client’ resource is depicted in Figure 5. This request is relayed by a server-domain DOTS gateway as hinted by the presence of the ‘cdid’ attribute.

POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json
{
  "ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-client": [
    {
      "cuid": "dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw",
      "cdid": "7eeaf349529eb55ed50113"
    }
  ]
}

Figure 5: POST to Register (DOTS gateway)

DOTS servers MUST limit the number of ‘dots-client’ resources to be created by the same DOTS client to 1 per request. Requests with multiple ‘dots-client’ resources MUST be rejected by DOTS servers. To that aim, the DOTS server MUST rely on the same procedure to
unambiguously identify a DOTS client as discussed in Section 4.4.1 of [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].

The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the POST request using status-line codes. Status codes in the range "2xx" codes are success, "4xx" codes are some sort of invalid requests and "5xx" codes are returned if the DOTS server has erred or is incapable of accepting the creation of the 'dots-client' resource. In particular,

- "201 Created" status-line is returned in the response, if the DOTS server has accepted the request.
- "400 Bad Request" status-line is returned by the DOTS server, if the request does not include a 'cuid' parameter. The error-tag "missing-attribute" is used in this case.
- "409 Conflict" status-line is returned to the requesting DOTS client, if the data resource already exists. The error-tag "resource-denied" is used in this case.

Once a DOTS client registers itself to a DOTS server, it can create/delete/retrieve aliases (Section 7) and filtering rules (Section 8).

A DOTS client MAY use the PUT request (Section 4.5 in [RFC8040]) to register a DOTS client within the DOTS server. An example is shown in Figure 6.

```
PUT /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data/
dots-client=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json
{
  "ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-client": [
    {
      "cuid": "dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
    }
  ]
}
```

Figure 6: PUT to Register

A DOTS client may de-register from its DOTS server by deleting the 'cuid' resource. An example is shown in Figure 7.
DELETE /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data/
dots-client=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}

Figure 7: De-register a DOTS Client

7. Managing DOTS Aliases

The following sub-sections define means for a DOTS client to create aliases (Section 7.1), retrieve one or a list of aliases (Section 7.2), and delete an alias (Section 7.3).

7.1. Create Aliases

A POST or PUT request is used by a DOTS client to create aliases, for resources for which a mitigation may be requested. Such aliases may be used in subsequent DOTS signal channel exchanges to refer more efficiently to the resources under attack.

DOTS clients within the same domain can create different aliases for the same resource.

The structure of POST requests used to create aliases is shown in Figure 8.
POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\  /dots-client=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json
{
    "ietf-dots-data-channel:aliases": {  
        "alias": [   
            {  "name": "string",   
                "target-prefix": [   
                    "string"   
                ],   
                "target-port-range": [   
                    {  "lower-port": integer,   
                        "upper-port": integer   
                    }   
                ],   
                "target-protocol": [   
                    integer   
                ],   
                "target-fqdn": [   
                    "string"   
                ],   
                "target-uri": [   
                    "string"   
                ],   
                "lifetime": integer   
            }   
        ]   
    }   
}   

Figure 8: POST to Create Aliases

The parameters are described below:

name: Name of the alias.

This is a mandatory attribute.

target-prefix: Prefixes are separated by commas. Prefixes are represented using Classless Inter-domain Routing (CIDR) notation [RFC4632]. As a reminder, the prefix length must be less than or equal to 32 (resp. 128) for IPv4 (resp. IPv6).

The prefix list MUST NOT include broadcast, loopback, or multicast addresses. These addresses are considered as invalid values. In
addition, the DOTS server MUST validate that these prefixes are within the scope of the DOTS client’s domain. Other validation checks may be supported by DOTS servers.

This is an optional attribute.

target-port-range: A range of port numbers.

The port range is defined by two bounds, a lower port number (lower-port) and an upper port number (upper-port).

When only ‘lower-port’ is present, it represents a single port number.

For TCP, UDP, Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) [RFC4960], or Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP) [RFC4340], the range of port numbers can be, for example, 1024-65535.

This is an optional attribute.

target-protocol: A list of protocols. Values are taken from the IANA protocol registry [proto_numbers].

The value ‘0’ has a special meaning for ‘all protocols’.

This is an optional attribute.

target-fqdn: A list of Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs). An FQDN is the full name of a resource, rather than just its hostname. For example, "venera" is a hostname, and "venera.isi.edu" is an FQDN [RFC1983].

How a name is passed to an underlying name resolution library is implementation- and deployment-specific. Nevertheless, once the name is resolved into one or multiple IP addresses, DOTS servers MUST apply the same validation checks as those for ’target-prefix’.

This is an optional attribute.

target-uri: A list of Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) [RFC3986].

The same validation checks used for ‘target-fqdn’ MUST be followed by DOTS servers to validate a target URI.

This is an optional attribute.
lifetime: Lifetime of the alias, in minutes. The RECOMMENDED lifetime of an alias is 10080 minutes (1 week). DOTS clients MUST include this parameter in their alias creation requests. Upon the expiry of this lifetime, and if the request is not refreshed but no mitigation is active, the alias entry is removed.

The request can be refreshed by sending the same request again.

A lifetime of ‘0’ in a request is an invalid value.

A lifetime of negative one (-1) indicates indefinite lifetime for the alias. The DOTS server MAY refuse indefinite lifetime, for policy reasons; the granted lifetime value is returned in the response. DOTS clients MUST be prepared to not be granted aliases with indefinite lifetimes.

The DOTS server MUST always indicate the actual lifetime in the response and the remaining lifetime in status messages sent to the DOTS client.

This is a mandatory attribute.

In POST requests, at least one of the ‘target-prefix’, ‘target-fqdn’, or ‘target-uri’ attributes MUST be present. DOTS agents can safely ignore Vendor-Specific parameters they don’t understand.

Figure 9 shows a POST request to create an alias called "https1" for HTTPS servers with IP addresses 2001:db8:6401::1 and 2001:db8:6401::2 listening on port number 443.
POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data/
dots-client=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json
{
  "ietf-dots-data-channel:aliases": {
    "alias": [
      {
        "name": "https1",
        "target-protocol": [6],
        "target-prefix": [
          "2001:db8:6401::1/128",
          "2001:db8:6401::2/128"
        ],
        "target-port-range": [
          {
            "lower-port": 443
          }
        ],
        "lifetime": 10080
      }
    ]
  }
}

Figure 9: Example of a POST to Create an Alias

"201 Created" status-line MUST be returned in the response if the DOTS server has accepted the alias.

"409 Conflict" status-line MUST be returned to the requesting DOTS client, if the request is conflicting with an existing alias name. The error-tag "resource-denied" is used in this case.

If the request is missing a mandatory attribute or its contains an invalid or unknown parameter, "400 Bad Request" status-line MUST be returned by the DOTS server. The error-tag is set to "missing-attribute", "invalid-value", or "unknown-element" as a function of the encountered error.

A DOTS client MAY use the PUT request to modify the aliases in the DOTS server.
7.2. Retrieve Installed Aliases

GET request is used to retrieve one or all installed aliases by a DOTS client from a DOTS server (Section 3.3.1 in [RFC8040]). If no 'name' is included in the request, this is an indication that the request is about retrieving all aliases instantiated by the DOTS client.

Figure 10 shows an example to retrieve all the aliases that were instantiated by the requesting DOTS client. The 'content' parameter and its permitted values are defined in Section 4.8.1 of [RFC8040].

GET /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data/
dots-client=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw/
/aliases?content=config HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Accept: application/yang-data+json

Figure 10: GET to Retrieve All Installed Aliases

Figure 11 shows an example of the response message body that includes all the aliases that are maintained by the DOTS server for the DOTS client identified by the 'cuid' parameter.
Figure 11: An Example of Response Body

Figure 12 shows an example of a GET request to retrieve the alias "Server2" that was instantiated by the DOTS client.
GET /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data/
dots-client=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw/
aliases/alias=Server2?content=config HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Accept: application/yang-data+json

Figure 12: GET to Retrieve an Alias

If an alias name ('name') is included in the request, but the DOTS server does not find that alias name for this DOTS client in its configuration data, it MUST respond with a "404 Not Found" status-line.

7.3. Delete Aliases

DELETE request is used to delete an alias maintained by a DOTS server.

If the DOTS server does not find the alias name, conveyed in the DELETE request, in its configuration data for this DOTS client, it MUST respond with a "404 Not Found" status-line.

The DOTS server successfully acknowledges a DOTS client’s request to remove the alias using "204 No Content" status-line in the response.

Figure 13 shows an example of a request to delete an alias.

DELETE /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data/
dots-client=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw/
aliases/alias=Server1 HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}

Figure 13: Delete an Alias

8. Managing DOTS Filtering Rules

The following sub-sections define means for a DOTS client to create filtering rules (Section 8.1), retrieve active filtering rules (Section 8.2), and delete a filtering rule (Section 8.3).

8.1. Install Filtering Rules

A POST or PUT request is used by a DOTS client to communicate filtering rules to a DOTS server.

Figure 14 shows a POST request example to block traffic from 192.0.2.0/24 and destined to 198.51.100.0/24.
POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data/
dots-client=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json
{
  "ietf-dots-data-channel:access-lists": {
    "acl": [
      {"name": "sample-ipv4-acl",
       "type": "ipv4-acl-type",
       "lifetime": 10080,
       "aces": {
         "ace": [
           {"name": "rule1",
            "matches": {"l3": {
              "ipv4": {
                "destination-ipv4-network": "198.51.100.0/24",
                "source-ipv4-network": "192.0.2.0/24",
              }
            },
            "actions": {
              "forwarding": "drop"
            }
          }
        }
      }
    ]
  }
}
}

Figure 14: POST to Install Filtering Rules

The meaning of these parameters is as follows:

name: The name of the access-list.

This is a mandatory attribute.

type: Indicates the primary intended type of match criteria (e.g., IPv4, IPv6). It is set to 'ipv4-acl-type' in this example.

This is an optional attribute.
lifetime: Lifetime of the ACL, in minutes. It MUST follow the same rules specified in Section 7.1 for alias lifetime, but applied to an ACL.

This is a mandatory attribute.

matches: Define criteria used to identify a flow on which to apply the rule. It can be "l3" (IPv4, IPv6) or "l4" (TCP, UDP, ..). The detailed match parameters are specified in Section 5.

In this example, an IPv4 matching criteria is used.

This is an optional attribute.

destination-ipv4-network: The destination IPv4 prefix. DOTS servers MUST validate that these prefixes are within the scope of the DOTS client’s domain. Other validation checks may be supported by DOTS servers. If this attribute is not provided, the DOTS server enforces the ACL on any destination IP address that belong to the DOTS client’s domain.

This is an optional attribute.

source-ipv4-network: The source IPv4 prefix.

This is an optional attribute.

actions: Actions in the forwarding ACL category can be "drop" or "accept". The "accept" action is used to white-list traffic. The "drop" action is used to black-list traffic.

Accepted traffic may be subject to "rate-limit"; the allowed traffic rate is represented in bytes per second indicated in IEEE floating point format [IEEE.754.1985].

This is a mandatory attribute.

The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the POST request using the status-line header. Concretely, "201 Created" status-line MUST be returned in the response if the DOTS server has accepted the filtering rules. If the request is missing a mandatory attribute or contains an invalid or unknown parameter, "400 Bad Request" status-line MUST be returned by the DOTS server in the response. The error-tag is set to "missing-attribute", "invalid-value", or "unknown-element" as a function of the encountered error.

If the request is conflicting with an existing filtering installed by another DOTS client of the domain, the DOTS server returns "409
The "insert" query parameter (Section 4.8.5 of [RFC8040]) MAY be used to specify how an access control entry is inserted within an ACL and how an ACL is inserted within an ACL set.

The DOTS client MAY use the PUT request to modify its filtering rules maintained by the DOTS server.

8.2. Retrieve Installed Filtering Rules

The DOTS client periodically queries the DOTS server to check the counters for installed filtering rules. GET request is used to retrieve filtering rules from a DOTS server.

If the DOTS server does not find the access list name conveyed in the GET request in its configuration data for this DOTS client, it responds with a "404 Not Found" status-line.

Figure 15 shows how to retrieve all the filtering rules that were instantiated by the DOTS client and the number of matches for the installed filtering rules.

GET /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\ /dots-client=dz6pHjaADKaFTbjr0JGBpw\ /access-lists?content=all HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Accept: application/yang-data+json

Figure 15: GET to Retrieve the Configuration Data and State Data for the Filtering Rules

Figure 16 shows how to retrieve "sample-ipv6-acl" filtering rule instantiated by the DOTS client, having "cuid=dz6pHjaADKaFTbjr0JGBpw", and the number of matches for the installed filtering rules.

GET /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\ /dots-client=dz6pHjaADKaFTbjr0JGBpw/access-lists\ /acl=sample-ipv6-acl?content=all HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Accept: application/yang-data+json

Figure 16: GET to Retrieve the Configuration Data and State Data for a Filtering Rule
8.3. Remove Filtering Rules

DELETE request is used by a DOTS client to delete filtering rules from a DOTS server.

If the DOTS server does not find the access list name carried in the DELETE request in its configuration data for this DOTS client, it MUST respond with a "404 Not Found" status-line. The DOTS server successfully acknowledges a DOTS client’s request to withdraw the filtering rules using "204 No Content" status-line, and removes the filtering rules accordingly.

Figure 17 shows an example of a request to remove the IPv4 ACL named "sample-ipv4-acl".

```
DELETE /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data/
dots-client=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw/access-lists/
/acl=sample-ipv4-acl HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
```

Figure 17: DELETE to Remove a Filtering Rule

9. IANA Considerations

This document requests IANA to register the following URI in the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:

```
```

Registrant Contact: The IESG.

XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.

This document requests IANA to register the following YANG module in the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC7950].

```
name: ietf-dots-data-channel
prefix: data-channel
reference: RFC XXXX
```

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11. Security Considerations

RESTCONF security considerations are discussed in [RFC8040]. In particular, DOTS agents MUST follow the security recommendations in Sections 2 and 12 of [RFC8040]. Also, DOTS agents MUST support the mutual authentication TLS profile discussed in Sections 7.1 and 8 of [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]. YANG ACL-specific security considerations are discussed in [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model].

Authenticated encryption MUST be used for data confidentiality and message integrity. The interaction between the DOTS agents requires Transport Layer Security (TLS) with a cipher suite offering confidentiality protection and the guidance given in [RFC7525] MUST be followed to avoid attacks on TLS.

An attacker may be able to inject RST packets, bogus application segments, etc., regardless of whether TLS authentication is used. Because the application data is TLS protected, this will not result in the application receiving bogus data, but it will constitute a DoS on the connection. This attack can be countered by using TCP-AO [RFC5925]. If TCP-AO is used, then any bogus packets injected by an attacker will be rejected by the TCP-AO integrity check and therefore will never reach the TLS layer.

In order to prevent leaking internal information outside a client-domain, client-side DOTS gateways SHOULD NOT reveal the identity of internal DOTS clients (e.g., source IP address, client’s hostname) unless explicitly configured to do so.

DOTS servers MUST verify that requesting DOTS clients are entitled to enforce filtering rules on a given IP prefix. That is, only filtering rules on IP resources that belong to the DOTS client’s domain MUST be authorized by a DOTS server.

Rate-limiting DOTS requests, including those with new ‘cuid’ values, from the same DOTS client defends against DoS attacks that would result in varying the ‘cuid’ to exhaust DOTS server resources. Rate-limit policies SHOULD be enforced on DOTS gateways (if deployed) and DOTS servers.

Applying resources quota per DOTS client and/or per DOTS client domain (e.g., limit the number of aliases and filters to be install by DOTS clients) prevents DOTS server resources to be aggressively used by some DOTS clients and ensures, therefore, DDoS mitigation usage fairness. Additionally, DOTS servers may limit the number of DOTS clients that can be enabled per domain.
All data nodes defined in the YANG module which can be created, modified, and deleted (i.e., config true, which is the default) are considered sensitive. Write operations applied to these data nodes without proper protection can negatively affect network operations. Appropriate security measures are recommended to prevent illegitimate users from invoking DOTS data channel primitives. Nevertheless, an attacker who can access a DOTS client is technically capable of launching various attacks, such as:

- Set an arbitrarily low rate-limit, which may prevent legitimate traffic from being forwarded (rate-limit).
- Set an arbitrarily high rate-limit, which may lead to the forwarding of illegitimate DDoS traffic (rate-limit).
- Communicate invalid aliases to the server (alias), which will cause the failure of associating both data and signal channels.
- Set invalid ACL entries, which may prevent legitimate traffic from being forwarded. Likewise, invalid ACL entries may lead to forward DDoS traffic.

12. Acknowledgements

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13. References

13.1. Normative References

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13.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]

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Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel Specification
draft-ietf-dots-data-channel-18

Abstract

The document specifies a Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) data channel used for bulk exchange of data that cannot easily or appropriately communicated through the DOTS signal channel under attack conditions.

This is a companion document to the DOTS signal channel specification.

Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)

Please update these statements within the document with the RFC number to be assigned to this document:

- "This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX;"
- "RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel Specification";
- reference: RFC XXXX

Please update these statements with the RFC number to be assigned to the following documents:
Please update the "revision" date of the YANG module.

Status of This Memo

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Table of Contents

1.  Introduction ........................................... 3
2.  Terminology ........................................... 5
3.  DOTS Data Channel ..................................... 6
   3.1.  Design Overview .................................. 6
   3.2.  DOTS Server(s) Discovery ......................... 8
   3.3.  NAT Considerations ............................... 8
   3.4.  DOTS Gateways .................................... 8
   3.5.  Detect and Prevent Infinite Loops ................. 9
   3.6.  Stale Entries .................................... 10
4.  DOTS Data Channel YANG Module ........................ 10
   4.1.  Tree Structure .................................. 10
   4.2.  Filtering Fields ................................ 14
   4.3.  YANG Module .................................... 21
5.  Managing DOTS Clients .................................. 36
   5.1.  Registering DOTS Clients ......................... 36
   5.2.  Uregistering DOTS Clients ....................... 39
6.  Managing DOTS Aliases .................................. 39
   6.1.  Create Aliases .................................. 39
   6.2.  Retrieve Installed Aliases ....................... 43
   6.3.  Delete Aliases .................................. 45
7.  Managing DOTS Filtering Rules .......................... 45
   7.1.  Retrieve DOTS Filtering Capabilities ............. 45
   7.2.  Install Filtering Rules .......................... 47
   7.3.  Retrieve Installed Filtering Rules ............... 50
   7.4.  Remove Filtering Rules ........................... 56
8.  IANA Considerations .................................... 57
9.  Security Considerations ................................ 57
10. Contributors ............................................ 59
11. Acknowledgements ...................................... 59
12. References ............................................. 59
    12.1.  Normative References ........................... 59
    12.2.  Informative References ......................... 60
Appendix A.  Sample Examples: Filtering Fragments .......... 62
Authors’ Addresses .......................................... 65

1.  Introduction

A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack is an attempt to make machines or network resources unavailable to their intended users. In most cases, sufficient scale can be achieved by compromising enough end-hosts and using those infected hosts to perpetrate and amplify the attack. The victim of such attack can be an application server, a router, a firewall, an entire network, etc.

As discussed in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements], the lack of a common method to coordinate a real-time response among involved actors and
network domains inhibits the speed and effectiveness of DDoS attack mitigation. From that standpoint, DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) defines an architecture that allows a DOTS client to send requests to a DOTS server for DDoS attack mitigation [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]. The DOTS approach is thus meant to minimize the impact of DDoS attacks, thereby contributing to the enforcement of more efficient defensive if not proactive security strategies. To that aim, DOTS defines two channels: the signal and the data channels (Figure 1).

```
+---------------+                                 +---------------+
|               | <------- Signal Channel -------> |               |
|  DOTS Client  |                                 |  DOTS Server  |
+---------------+                                 +---------------+
```

**Figure 1: DOTS Channels**

The DOTS signal channel is used to carry information about a device or a network (or a part thereof) that is under a DDoS attack. Such information is sent by a DOTS client to an upstream DOTS server so that appropriate mitigation actions are undertaken on traffic deemed suspicious. The DOTS signal channel is further elaborated in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].

As for the DOTS data channel, it is used for infrequent bulk data exchange between DOTS agents to significantly improve the coordination of all the parties involved in the response to the attack. Section 2 of [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture] mentions that the DOTS data channel is used to perform the following tasks:

- Creating aliases for resources for which mitigation may be requested.

  A DOTS client may submit to its DOTS server a collection of prefixes which it would like to refer to by an alias when requesting mitigation. The DOTS server can respond to this request with either a success or failure response (see Section 2 in [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]).

  Refer to Section 6 for more details.

- Filter management, which enables a DOTS client to request the installation or withdrawal of traffic filters, dropping or rate-limiting unwanted traffic, and permitting white-listed traffic. A DOTS client is entitled to instruct filtering rules only on IP resources that belong to its domain.
Sample use cases for populating black- or white-list filtering rules are detailed hereafter:

* If a network resource (DOTS client) detects a potential DDoS attack from a set of IP addresses, the DOTS client informs its servicing DOTS gateway of all suspect IP addresses that need to be blocked or black-listed for further investigation. The DOTS client could also specify a list of protocols and port numbers in the black-list rule.

The DOTS gateway then propagates the black-listed IP addresses to a DOTS server which will undertake appropriate actions so that traffic originated by these IP addresses to the target network (specified by the DOTS client) is blocked.

* A network, that has partner sites from which only legitimate traffic arrives, may want to ensure that the traffic from these sites is not subjected to DDoS attack mitigation. The DOTS client uses the DOTS data channel to convey the white-listed IP prefixes of the partner sites to its DOTS server.

The DOTS server uses this information to white-list flows originated by such IP prefixes and which reach the network.

Refer to Section 7 for more details.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

The reader should be familiar with the terms defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements].

The terminology for describing YANG data modules is defined in [RFC7950]. The meaning of the symbols in tree diagrams is defined in [RFC8340].

This document generalizes the notion of Access Control List (ACL) so that it is not device-specific [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model]. As such, this document defines an ACL as an ordered set of rules that is used to filter traffic. Each rule is represented by an Access Control Entry (ACE). ACLs communicated via the DOTS data channel are not bound to a device interface.

For the sake of simplicity, all of the examples in this document use "/restconf" as the discovered RESTCONF API root path. Many protocol
header lines and message-body text within examples throughout the
document are split into multiple lines for display purposes only.
When a line ends with backslash (‘\’) as the last character, the line
is wrapped for display purposes. It is to be considered to be joined
to the next line by deleting the backslash, the following line break,
and the leading whitespace of the next line.

3. DOTS Data Channel

3.1. Design Overview

Unlike the DOTS signal channel, which must remain operational even
when confronted with signal degradation due to packets loss, the DOTS
data channel is not expected to be fully operational at all times,
especially when a DDoS attack is underway. The requirements for a
DOTS data channel protocol are documented in
[I-D.ietf-dots-requirements].

This specification does not require an order of DOTS signal and data
channel creations nor mandates a time interval between them. These
considerations are implementation- and deployment-specific.

As the primary function of the data channel is data exchange, a
reliable transport mode is required in order for DOTS agents to
detect data delivery success or failure. This document uses RESTCONF
[RFC8040] over TLS [RFC5246] over TCP as the DOTS data channel
protocol. The abstract layering of DOTS data channel is shown in
Figure 2.

```
+-------------------+
| DOTS Data Channel |
+-------------------+
    | RESTCONF |
+-------------------+
    | TLS     |
+-------------------+
    | TCP     |
+-------------------+
    | IP       |

Figure 2: Abstract Layering of DOTS Data Channel
```

The HTTP POST, PUT, PATCH, and DELETE methods are used to edit data
resources represented by DOTS data channel YANG data modules. These
basic edit operations allow the DOTS data channel running
configuration to be altered by a DOTS client.
DOTS data channel configuration information as well as state information can be retrieved with the GET method. An HTTP status-line header field is returned for each request to report success or failure for RESTCONF operations (Section 5.4 of [RFC8040]). The "error-tag" provides more information about encountered errors (Section 7 of [RFC8040]).

DOTS clients perform the root resource discovery procedure discussed in Section 3.1 of [RFC8040] to determine the root of the RESTCONF API. After discovering the RESTCONF API root, a DOTS client uses this value as the initial part of the path in the request URI, in any subsequent request to the DOTS server. The DOTS server may support the retrieval of the YANG modules it supports (Section 3.7 in [RFC8040]). For example, a DOTS client may use RESTCONF to retrieve the vendor-specific YANG modules supported by its DOTS server.

JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [RFC8259] payload is used to propagate the DOTS data channel specific payload messages that carry request parameters and response information, such as errors. This specification uses the encoding rules defined in [RFC7951] for representing DOTS data channel configuration data using YANG (Section 4) as JSON text.

A DOTS client registers itself to its DOTS server(s) in order to set up DOTS data channel-related configuration data and receive state data (i.e., non-configuration data) from the DOTS server(s) (Section 5). Mutual authentication and coupling of signal and data channels are specified in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].

A single DOTS data channel between DOTS agents can be used to exchange multiple requests and multiple responses. To reduce DOTS client and DOTS server workload, DOTS clients SHOULD re-use the same TLS session. While the communication to the DOTS server is quiescent, the DOTS client MAY probe the server to ensure it has maintained cryptographical state. Such probes can also keep alive firewall and/or NAT bindings. A TLS heartbeat [RFC6520] verifies that the DOTS server still has TLS state by returning a TLS message.

A DOTS server may detect conflicting filtering requests from distinct DOTS clients which belong to the same domain. For example, a DOTS client could request to blacklist a prefix by specifying the source prefix, while another DOTS client could request to whitelist that same source prefix, but both having the same destination prefix. It is out of scope of this specification to recommend the behavior to follow for handling conflicting requests (e.g., reject all, reject the new request, notify an administrator for validation). DOTS servers SHOULD support a configuration parameter to indicate the behavior to follow when a conflict is detected. Section 7.2
specifies the behavior when no instruction is supplied to a DOTS server.

How filtering rules instantiated on a DOTS server are translated into network configurations actions is out of scope.

### 3.2. DOTS Server(s) Discovery

This document assumes that DOTS clients are provisioned with the reachability information of their DOTS server(s) using a variety of means (e.g., local configuration, or dynamic means such as DHCP). The specification of such means are out of scope of this document.

Likewise, it is out of scope of this document to specify the behavior to be followed by a DOTS client to send DOTS requests when multiple DOTS servers are provisioned (e.g., contact all DOTS servers, select one DOTS server among the list).

### 3.3. NAT Considerations

In deployments where one or more translators (e.g., NAT44, NAT64, NPTv6) are enabled between the client’s network and the DOTS server, DOTS data channel messages forwarded to a DOTS server MUST NOT include internal IP addresses/prefixes and/or port numbers; external addresses/prefixes and/or port numbers as assigned by the translator MUST be used instead. This document does not make any recommendation about possible translator discovery mechanisms. The following are some (non-exhaustive) deployment examples that may be considered:

- Port Control Protocol (PCP) [RFC6887] or Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) [RFC5389] may be used to retrieve the external addresses/prefixes and/or port numbers. Information retrieved by means of PCP or STUN will be used to feed the DOTS data channel messages that will be sent to a DOTS server.

- A DOTS gateway may be co-located with the translator. The DOTS gateway will need to update the DOTS messages, based upon the local translator’s binding table.

### 3.4. DOTS Gateways

When a server-domain DOTS gateway is involved in DOTS data channel exchanges, the same considerations for manipulating the ‘cdid’ (client domain identifier) parameter specified in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel] MUST be followed by DOTS agents. As a reminder, ‘cdid’ is meant to assist the DOTS server to enforce some policies (e.g., limit the number of filtering rules per DOTS client.
or per DOTS client domain). A loop detect mechanism for DOTS gateways is specified in Section 3.5.

If a DOTS gateway is involved, the DOTS gateway verifies that the DOTS client is authorized to undertake a data channel action (e.g., instantiate filtering rules). If the DOTS client is authorized, it propagates the rules to the upstream DOTS server. Likewise, the DOTS server verifies that the DOTS gateway is authorized to relay data channel actions. For example, to create or purge filters, a DOTS client sends its request to its DOTS gateway. The DOTS gateway validates the rules in the request and proxies the requests containing the filtering rules to its DOTS server. When the DOTS gateway receives the associated response from the DOTS server, it propagates the response back to the DOTS client.

3.5. Detect and Prevent Infinite Loops

In order to detect and prevent infinite loops, DOTS gateways MUST support the procedure defined in Section 5.7.1 of [RFC7230]. In particular, each intermediate DOTS gateway MUST check that none of its own information (e.g., server names, literal IP addresses) is present in the "Via" header of a DOTS message it receives:

- If it detects that its own information is present in the "Via" header, the DOTS gateway MUST NOT forward the DOTS message. Messages that cannot be forwarded because of a loop SHOULD be logged with a "508 Loop Detected" status-line returned sent back to the DOTS peer. The structure of the reported error is depicted in Figure 3.

```plaintext
error-tag:      loop-detected
error-type:     transport, application
error-severity: error
error-info:     <via-header> : A copy of the Via header when the loop was detected.
Description:    An infinite loop has been detected when forwarding a requests via a proxy.
```

Figure 3: Loop Detected Error

It is RECOMMENDED that DOTS clients and gateways support means to alert administrators about loop errors so that appropriate actions are undertaken.

- Otherwise, the DOTS agent MUST update or insert the "Via" header by appending its own information.
Unless configured otherwise, DOTS gateways at the boundaries of a DOTS client domain SHOULD remove the previous "Via" header information after checking for a loop before forwarding. This behavior is required for topology hiding purposes but also to minimizing potential conflicts that may arise if overlapping information is used in distinct DOTS domains (e.g., private IPv4 addresses, non globally unique aliases).

3.6. Stale Entries

In order to avoid stale entries, a lifetime is associated with alias and filtering entries created by DOTS clients. Also, DOTS servers may track the inactivity timeout of DOTS clients to detect stale entries.

4. DOTS Data Channel YANG Module

4.1. Tree Structure

The DOTS data channel YANG module (ietf-dots-data-channel) allows a DOTS client to manage aliases for resources for which mitigation may be requested. Such aliases may be used in subsequent DOTS signal channel exchanges to refer more efficiently to the resources under attack.

The tree structure for the DOTS alias is depicted in Figure 4.
module: ietf-dots-data-channel
   +--rw dots-data
      +--rw dots-client* [cuid]
         +--rw cuid            string
         +--rw cdid?           string
         +--rw aliases
            +--rw alias* [name]
               +--rw name                 string
               +--rw target-prefix*      inet:ip-prefix
               +--rw target-port-range* [lower-port upper-port]
                  +--rw lower-port    inet:port-number
                  +--rw upper-port    inet:port-number
               +--rw target-protocol*     uint8
               +--rw target-fqdn*         inet:domain-name
               +--rw target-uri*          inet:uri
               +--ro pending-lifetime?    int32
            +--rw acls
             ...
      +--ro capabilities
       ...

Figure 4: DOTS Alias Subtree

Also, the 'ietf-dots-data-channel' module allows DOTS clients to manage filtering rules. Examples of filtering management in a DOTS context include, but not limited to:

- Black-list management, which enables a DOTS client to inform a DOTS server about sources from which traffic should be discarded.

- White-list management, which enables a DOTS client to inform a DOTS server about sources from which traffic should always be accepted.

- Filter management, which enables a DOTS client to request the installation or withdrawal of traffic filters, dropping or rate-limiting unwanted traffic and permitting white-listed traffic.

The tree structure for the DOTS filtering entries is depicted in Figure 5.

Early versions of this document investigated to what extent augmenting 'ietf-access-control-list' meet DOTS requirements, but that design approach was abandoned because it does not support meeting many of DOTS requirements, e.g.,

- Retrieve a filtering entry (or all entries) created by a DOTS client.
- Delete a filtering entry that was instantiated by a DOTS client.

DOTS filtering entries (i.e., Access Control List (ACL)) mimic the structure specified in [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model]. Concretely, DOTS agents are assumed to manipulate an ordered list of ACLs; each ACL contains a separately ordered list of Access Control Entries (ACEs). Each ACE has a group of match and a group of action criteria.

Once all the ACE entries have been iterated though with no match, then all the following ACL’s ACE entries are iterated through until the first match at which point the specified action is applied. If there is no match, then there is no action to be taken against the packet.
Figure 5: DOTS ACLs Subtree

Filtering rules instructed by a DOTS client assumes a default direction: the destination is the DOTS client domain.

DOTS forwarding actions can be 'accept' (i.e., accept matching traffic) or 'drop' (i.e., drop matching traffic without sending any ICMP error message). Accepted traffic can be subject to rate limiting 'rate-limit'. Note that 'reject' action (i.e., drop matching traffic and send an ICMP error message to the source) is not
supported in ‘ietf-dots-data-channel’ because it is not appropriate in the context of DDoS mitigation. Generating ICMP messages to notify drops when mitigating a DDoS attack will exacerbate the DDoS attack. Furthermore, these ICMP messages will be used by an attacker as an explicit signal that the traffic is being blocked.

4.2. Filtering Fields


This specification defines a new IPv4/IPv6 matching field called ‘fragment’ to efficiently handle fragment-related filtering rules. Indeed, [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model] does not support such capability for IPv6 but offers a partial support for IPv4 by means of ‘flags’. Nevertheless, the use of ‘flags’ is problematic since it does not allow to define a bitmask. For example, setting other bits not covered by the ‘flags’ filtering clause in a packet will allow that packet to get through (because it won’t match the ACE). Sample examples to illustrate how ‘fragment’ can be used are provided in Appendix A.

Figure 6 shows the IPv4 match subtree.
module: ietf-dots-data-channel
  +--rw dots-data
  |  +--rw dots-client* [cuid]
  |     ...
  |     +--rw acls
  |     |  +--rw acl* [name]
  |     |     ...
  |     |     +--rw aces
  |     |     |  +--rw ace* [name]
  |     |     |     +--rw name          string
  |     |     |     +--rw matches
  |     |     |        +--rw (13)?
  |     |     |           +--:(ipv4)
  |     |     |           +--rw ipv4
  |     |     |           +--rw dscp?         inet:dscp
  |     |     |           +--rw ecn?          uint8
  |     |     |           +--rw length?        uint16
  |     |     |           +--rw ttl?           uint8
  |     |     |           +--rw protocol?      uint8
  |     |     |           +--rw ihl?          uint8
  |     |     |           +--rw flags?         bits
  |     |     |           +--rw offset?        uint16
  |     |     |           +--rw identification? inet16
  |     |     |        +--:(destination-network)?
  |     |     |           +--:(destination-ipv4-network)
  |     |     |           +--: destination-ipv4-network? inet:ipv4-prefix
  |     |     |           +--:(source-network)?
  |     |     |           +--:(source-ipv4-network)
  |     |     |           +--: source-ipv4-network? inet:ipv4-prefix
  |     |     |           +--rw fragment
  |     |     |           +--rw operator?       operator
  |     |     |           +--rw type            fragment-type
  |     |     |           +--:(ipv6)
  |     |     |     ...
  |     |     |     +--rw (14)?
  |     |     |     ...
  |     |     +--rw actions
  |     |     |     ...
  |     |     +--ro statistics
  |     |     |     ...
  |     +--ro capabilities
  |     |     ...

Figure 6: DOTS ACLs Subtree (IPv4 Match)

Figure 7 shows the IPv6 match subtree.
Figure 7: DOTS ACLs Subtree (IPv6 Match)

Figure 8 shows the TCP match subtree. In addition to the fields defined in [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model], this specification defines a
new TCP matching field, called ‘flags-bitmask’, to efficiently handle TCP flags filtering rules.

module: ietf-dots-data-channel
  +--rw dots-data
  |  +--rw dots-client* [cuid]
  |  |  ...
  |  +--rw acls
  |  |  +--rw acl* [name]
  |  |  |  ...
  |  +--rw aces
  |  |  +--rw ace* [name]
  |  |  |  +--rw name string
  |  |  |  +--rw matches
  |  |  |  |  +--rw (13)?
  |  |  |  |  |  ... 
  |  |  |  +--rw (14)?
  |  |  |  +--:(tcp)
  |  |  |  |  +--rw sequence-number? uint32
  |  |  |  +--rw acknowledgement-number? uint32
  |  |  +--rw data-offset? uint8
  |  +--rw reserved? uint8
  |  +--rw flags? bits
  |  +--rw window-size? uint16
  |  +--rw urgent-pointer? uint16
  |  +--rw options? uint32
  |  +--rw flags-bitmask
  |  |  +--rw operator? operator
  |  |  +--rw bitmask uint16
  |  +--rw (source-port)?
  |  |  +--:(source-port-range-or-operator)
  |  |  +--rw source-port-range-or-operator
  |  |  |  +--rw (port-range-or-operator)?
  |  |  |  +--:(range)
  |  |  |  |  +--rw lower-port inet:port-number
  |  |  |  +--rw upper-port inet:port-number
  |  |  |  +--:(operator)
  |  |  |  +--rw operator? operator
  |  |  +--rw port inet:port-number
  |  +--rw (destination-port)?
  |  |  +--:(destination-port-range-or-operator)
  |  |  +--rw destination-port-range-or-operator
  |  +--rw (port-range-or-operator)?
Figure 8: DOTS ACLs Subtree (TCP Match)

Figure 9 shows the UDP and ICMP match subtree.

module: ietf-dots-data-channel
   +++rw dots-data
      +++rw dots-client* [cuid]
         ...
         +++rw acls
            +++rw acl* [name]
               ...
               +++rw aces
                  +++rw ace* [name]
                     +++rw name string
                     +++rw matches
                        +++rw (13)?
                           ...
                        +++rw (14)?
                           +++:(tcp)
                           ...
                           +++:(udp)
                              +++rw udp
                                 +++rw length? uint16
                                 +++rw (source-port)?
                                    +++:(source-port-range-or-operator)
                                       +++rw source-port-range-or-operator
                                       +++rw (port-range-or-operator)?
Figure 9: DOTS ACLs Subtree (UDP and ICMP Match)

DOTS implementations MUST support the following matching criteria:

match based on the IP header (IPv4 and IPv6), match based on the transport header (TCP, UDP, and ICMP), and any combination thereof. The same matching fields are used for both ICMP and ICMPv6.

The following match fields MUST be supported by DOTS implementations (Table 1):
ACL     Mandatory Fields
Match     ------------------------------
------- -------------------------------------------------------------
ipv4     length, protocol, destination-ipv4-network, source-
          ipv4-network, and fragment
ipv6     length, protocol, destination-ipv6-network, source-
          ipv6-network, and fragment
tcp      flags-bitmask, source-port-range-or-operator, and
          destination-port-range-or-operator
udp      length, source-port-range-or-operator, and destination-port-
          range-or-operator
icmp     type and code

Table 1: Mandatory DOTS Channel Match Fields

Implementations MAY support other filtering match fields and actions. The
‘ietf-dots-data-channel’ allows an implementation to expose its
filtering capabilities. The tree structure of the ‘capabilities’ is
shown in Figure 10.

module: ietf-dots-data-channel
  +++rw dots-data
    ...
    +++-ro capabilities
    |     +--ro address-family*    enumeration
    |     +--ro forwarding-actions* identityref
    |     +--ro rate-limit?        boolean
    |     +--ro transport-protocols* uint8
    |     +++-ro ipv4
    |     |     +--ro dscp?           boolean
    |     |     +--ro ecn?            boolean
    |     |     +--ro length?         boolean
    |     |     +--ro ttl?           boolean
    |     |     +--ro protocol?       boolean
    |     |     +--ro ihl?           boolean
    |     |     +--ro flags?         boolean
    |     |     +--ro offset?        boolean
    |     |     +--ro identification? boolean
    |     |     +--ro source-prefix?  boolean
    |     |     +--ro destination-prefix? boolean
    |     |     +--ro fragment?      boolean
    |     +++-ro ipv6
    |     |     +--ro dscp?           boolean
    |     |     +--ro ecn?            boolean
    |     |     +--ro flow-label?     boolean
    |     |     +--ro length?        boolean
    |     |     +--ro hoplimit?      boolean
Figure 10: Filtering Capabilities Sub-Tree

4.3. YANG Module

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-dots-data-channel@2018-07-25.yang"

module ietf-dots-data-channel {
  yang-version 1.1;
  prefix data-channel;

  import ietf-access-control-list {
    prefix ietf-acl;
  }
  import ietf-packet-fields {
    prefix packet-fields;
  }
  import ietf-dots-signal-channel {
    prefix dots-signal;
  }

  organization

This module contains YANG definition for configuring
templates for resources and filtering rules using DOTS
data channel.

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the RFC itself for full legal notices."

revision 2018-07-25

description
typedef operator {
  type bits {
    bit not {
      position 0;
      description "If set, logical negation of operation.";
    }
    bit match {
      position 1;
      description "Match bit. If set, this is a bitwise match operation
defined as '(data & value) == value'; if unset, (data & value) evaluates to TRUE if any of the bits in the value
mask are set in the data.";
    }
  }
  description "How to apply the defined bitmask.";
}

grouping tcp-flags {
  leaf operator {
    type operator;
    default match;
    description "How to interpret the TCP flags.";
  }
  leaf bitmask {
    type uint16;
    mandatory true;
    description "Bitmask values can be encoded as a 1- or 2-byte bitmask.
When a single byte is specified, it matches byte 13
of the TCP header, which contains bits 8 through 15
of the 4th 32-bit word. When a 2-byte encoding is used,
it matches bytes 12 and 13 of the TCP header with
the data offset field having a 'don't care' value.";
  }
  description "Operations on TCP flags.";
}
typedef fragment-type {
  type bits {
    bit df {
      position 0;
      description
      "Don't fragment bit for IPv4. This bit must be set to 0 for IPv6."
    }
    bit isf {
      position 1;
      description
      "Is a fragment."
    }
    bit ff {
      position 2;
      description
      "First fragment."
    }
    bit lf {
      position 3;
      description
      "Last fragment."
    }
  }
  description
  "Different fragment types to match against."
}

grouping fragment-fields {
  leaf operator {
    type operator;
    default match;
    description
    "How to interpret the fragment type."
  }
  leaf type {
    type fragment-type;
    mandatory true;
    description
    "What fragment type to look for."
  }
  description
  "Operations on fragment types."
}

grouping aliases {
  description
  "Top level container for aliases";
list alias {
    key "name";
    description "List of aliases";
    leaf name {
        type string;
        description "The name of the alias";
    }
    uses dots-signal:target;
    leaf pending-lifetime {
        type int32;
        units "minutes";
        config false;
        description "Indicates the pending validity lifetime of the alias entry.";
    }
}

grouping ports {
    choice source-port {
        container source-port-range-or-operator {
            uses packet-fields:port-range-or-operator;
            description "Source port definition.";
        }
        description "Choice of specifying the source port or referring to a group of source ports.";
    }
    choice destination-port {
        container destination-port-range-or-operator {
            uses packet-fields:port-range-or-operator;
            description "Destination port definition.";
        }
        description "Choice of specifying a destination port or referring to a group of destination ports.";
    }
    description "Choice of specifying a source or destination ports.";
}

grouping access-lists {
    description
"Specifies the ordered set of Access Control Lists."

list acl {
  key "name";
  ordered-by user;
  description
  "An Access Control List (ACL) is an ordered list of
  Access Control Entries (ACE). Each Access Control Entry
  has a list of match criteria and a list of actions.";
  leaf name {
    type string {
      length "1..64";
    }
    description
    "The name of the access list.";
    reference
    "RFC ZZZZ: Network Access Control List (ACL)
    YANG Data Model";
  }
  leaf type {
    type ietf-acl:acl-type;
    description
    "Type of access control list. Indicates the primary intended
    type of match criteria (e.g., IPv4, IPv6) used in the list
    instance.";
    reference
    "RFC ZZZZ: Network Access Control List (ACL)
    YANG Data Model";
  }
  leaf activation-type {
    type enumeration {
      enum "activate-when-mitigating" {
        value 1;
        description
        "The ACL is installed only when a mitigation is active.
        The ACL is specific to this DOTS client.";
      }
      enum "immediate" {
        value 2;
        description
        "The ACL is immediately activated.";
      }
    }
    description
    "Indicates whether an ACL is to be installed immediately
    or when a mitigation is active.";
  }
  leaf pending-lifetime {
    type int32;
  }
}
units "minutes";
config false;
description
  "Indicates the pending validity lifetime of the alias entry.";
}
container aces {
  description
  "The Access Control Entries container contains a list of ACEs.";
list ace {
  key "name";
  ordered-by user;
  description
  "List of access list entries.";
  leaf name {
    type string {
      length "1..64";
    }
    description
    "A unique name identifying this Access List Entry (ACE).";
    reference
    "RFC ZZZZ: Network Access Control List (ACL) YANG Data Model";
  }
}
container matches {
  description
  "The rules in this set determine what fields will be matched upon before any action is taken on them.

  If no matches are defined in a particular container, then any packet will match that container.

  If no matches are specified at all in an ACE, then any packet will match the ACE.";
  reference
  "RFC ZZZZ: Network Access Control List (ACL) YANG Data Model";
}
choice l3 {
  container ipv4 {
    when "derived-from(.../../..../../type," + "ietf-acl:ipv4-acl-type')";
    uses packet-fields:acl-ip-header-fields;
    uses packet-fields:acl-ipv4-header-fields;
    container fragment {
      description
      "";
    }
  }
}
"Indicates how to handle IPv4 fragments.";
uses fragment-fields;
}
description
"Rule set that matches IPv4 header.";
}
container ipv6 {
when "derived-from(../../..../..../type,"
"'ietf-acl:ipv6-acl-type')";
uses packet-fields:acl-ip-header-fields;
uses packet-fields:acl-ipv6-header-fields;
container fragment {
   description
   "Indicates how to handle IPv6 fragments.";
   uses fragment-fields;
}
description
"Rule set that matches IPv6 header.";
}
description
"Either IPv4 or IPv6.";
}
choice l4 {
container tcp {
   uses packet-fields:acl-tcp-header-fields;
   container flags-bitmask {
      description
      "Indicates how to handle TCP flags.";
      uses tcp-flags;
   }
}
uses ports;
description
"Rule set that matches TCP header.";
}
container udp {
   uses packet-fields:acl-udp-header-fields;
}
uses ports;
description
"Rule set that matches UDP header.";
}
container icmp {
   uses packet-fields:acl-icmp-header-fields;
}
description
"Rule set that matches ICMP/ICMPv6 header.";
}
description
"Can be TCP, UDP, or ICMP/ICMPv6";
container actions {
    description
    "Definitions of action for this ACE."
leaf forwarding {
    type identityref {
        base ietf-acl:forwarding-action;
    }
    mandatory true;
    description
    "Specifies the forwarding action per ACE."
    reference
    "RFC ZZZZ: Network Access Control List (ACL)
    YANG Data Model";
}
leaf rate-limit {
    when "./.forwarding = 'ietf-acl:accept'" {
        description
        "rate-limit valid only when accept action is used";
    }
    type decimal64 {
        fraction-digits 2;
    }
    description
    "rate-limit traffic";
}
container statistics {
    config false;
    description
    "Aggregate statistics."
    uses ietf-acl:acl-counters;
}
}
}

container dots-data {
    description
    "Main container for DOTS data channel."
list dots-client {
    key "cuid";
    description
    "List of DOTS clients."
leaf cuid {
    type string;
    description
    ""
"A unique identifier that is randomly generated by a DOTS client to prevent request collisions."
reference
"RFC YYYY: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification"
}

leaf cdid {
type string;
description
"A client domain identifier conveyed by a server-domain DOTS gateway to a remote DOTS server."
reference
"RFC YYYY: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification"
}

container aliases {
description
"Set of aliases that are bound to a DOTS client."
uses aliases;
}

container acls {
description
"Access lists that are bound to a DOTS client."
uses access-lists;
}

container capabilities {
config false;
description
"Match capabilities";
leaf-list address-family {
type enumeration {
enum "ipv4" {
description
"IPv4 is supported.";
}
enum "ipv6" {
description
"IPv6 is supported.";
}
}
description
"Indicates the IP address families supported by the DOTS server."
}
leaf-list forwarding-actions {
type identityref {
base ietf-acl:forwarding-action;
leaf rate-limit {
  type boolean;
  description
    "Support of rate-limit action.";
}

leaf-list transport-protocols {
  type uint8;
  description
    "Upper-layer protocol associated with this mapping.
    Values are taken from the IANA protocol registry:
    https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/
    protocol-numbers.xhtml
    For example, this field contains 6 (TCP) for a TCP
    mapping or 17 (UDP) for a UDP mapping.";
}

container ipv4 {
  description
    "Indicates IPv4 header fields that are supported to enforce
    ACLs.";
  leaf dscp {
    type boolean;
    description
      "Support of filtering based on DSCP.";
  }
  leaf ecn {
    type boolean;
    description
      "Support of filtering based on ECN.";
  }
  leaf length {
    type boolean;
    description
      "Support of filtering based on the Total Length.";
  }
  leaf ttl {
    type boolean;
    description
      "Support of filtering based on the TTL.";
  }
  leaf protocol {
    type boolean;
    description
      "Support of forwarding action(s).";
leaf ihl {
  type boolean;
  description
    "Support of filtering based on the Internet Header Length (IHL).";
}

leaf flags {
  type boolean;
  description
    "Support of filtering based on the 'flags'.";
}

leaf offset {
  type boolean;
  description
    "Support of filtering based on the 'offset'.";
}

leaf identification {
  type boolean;
  description
    "Support of filtering based on the 'identification'.";
}

leaf source-prefix {
  type boolean;
  description
    "Support of filtering based on the source prefix.";
}

leaf destination-prefix {
  type boolean;
  description
    "Support of filtering based on the destination prefix.";
}

leaf fragment {
  type boolean;
  description
    "Indicates the capability of a DOTS server to enforce filters on IPv4 fragments. That is 'fragment' clause is supported.";
}

container ipv6 {
  description
    "Indicates IPv6 header fields that are supported to enforce ACLs.";
  leaf dscp {
    type boolean;
    description

"Support of filtering based on DSCP."

leaf ecn {
    type boolean;
    description
        "Support of filtering based on ECN."
}

leaf flow-label {
    type boolean;
    description
        "Support of filtering based on the Flow label."
}

leaf length {
    type boolean;
    description
        "Support of filtering based on the Payload Length."
}

leaf protocol {
    type boolean;
    description
        "Support of filtering based on the Next Header field."
}

leaf hoplimit {
    type boolean;
    description
        "Support of filtering based on the Hop Limit."
}

leaf source-prefix {
    type boolean;
    description
        "Support of filtering based on the source prefix."
}

leaf destination-prefix {
    type boolean;
    description
        "Support of filtering based on the destination prefix."
}

leaf fragment {
    type boolean;
    description
        "Indicates the capability of a DOTS server to
        enforce filters on IPv6 fragments."
}

container tcp {
    description
        "Set of TCP fields that are supported by the DOTS server
        to enforce filters."
leaf sequence-number {
  type boolean;
  description
      "Support of filtering based on the TCP sequence number.";
}
leaf acknowledgement-number {
  type boolean;
  description
      "Support of filtering based on the TCP acknowledgement number.";
}
leaf data-offset {
  type boolean;
  description
      "Support of filtering based on the TCP data-offset.";
}
leaf reserved {
  type boolean;
  description
      "Support of filtering based on the TCP reserved field.";
}
leaf flags {
  type boolean;
  description
      "Support of filtering, as defined in RFC ZZZZ, based on the TCP flags.";
}
leaf flags-bitmask {
  type boolean;
  description
      "Support of filtering based on the TCP flags bitmask.";
}
leaf window-size {
  type boolean;
  description
      "Support of filtering based on the TCP window size.";
}
leaf urgent-pointer {
  type boolean;
  description
      "Support of filtering based on the TCP urgent pointer.";
}
leaf options {
  type boolean;
  description
      "Support of filtering based on the TCP options.";
}
leaf source-port {
leaf destination-port {
    type boolean;
    description
    "Support of filtering based on the destination port number.";
}
leaf port-range {
    type boolean;
    description
    "Support of filtering based on a port range.";
}
}
container udp {
    description
    "Set of UDP fields that are supported by the DOTS server
to enforce filters.";
leaf length {
    type boolean;
    description
    "Support of filtering based on the UDP length.";
}
leaf source-port {
    type boolean;
    description
    "Support of filtering based on the source port number.";
}
leaf destination-port {
    type boolean;
    description
    "Support of filtering based on the destination port number.";
}
leaf port-range {
    type boolean;
    description
    "Support of filtering based on a port range.";
}
}
container icmp {
    description
    "Set of ICMP/ICMPv6 fields that are supported by the DOTS server
to enforce filters.";
leaf type {
    type boolean;
    description
    "Support of filtering based on the source port number.";
}
leaf protocol {
    type boolean;
    description
    "Support of filtering based on the protocol number.";
}
leaf type-code {
    type boolean;
    description
    "Support of filtering based on the type-code.";
}
leaf code {
    type boolean;
    description
    "Support of filtering based on the code.";
}
leaf fragment {
    type boolean;
    description
    "Support of filtering based on the fragmentation.";
}
leaf time-to-live {
    type boolean;
    description
    "Support of filtering based on the time-to-live.";
}
leaf hop-limit {
    type boolean;
    description
    "Support of filtering based on the hop-limit.";
}
leaf options {
    type boolean;
    description
    "Support of filtering based on the options.";
}
5. Managing DOTS Clients

5.1. Registering DOTS Clients

In order to make use of DOTS data channel, a DOTS client MUST register to its DOTS server(s) by creating a DOTS client ('dots-client') resource. To that aim, DOTS clients SHOULD send a POST request (shown in Figure 11).

```plaintext
POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json
{
  "ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data": [
    {
      "cuid": "string"
    }
  ]
}
```

Figure 11: POST to Register

The ‘cuid’ (client unique identifier) parameter is described below:

cuid: A globally unique identifier that is meant to prevent collisions among DOTS clients. This attribute has the same meaning, syntax, and processing rules as the ‘cuid’ attribute defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].
DOTS clients MUST use the same 'cuid' for both signal and data channels.

This is a mandatory attribute.

In deployments where server-domain DOTS gateways are enabled, identity information about the origin source client domain SHOULD be supplied to the DOTS server. That information is meant to assist the DOTS server to enforce some policies. These policies can be enforced per-client, per-client domain, or both. Figure 12 shows an example of a request relayed by a server-domain DOTS gateway.

```plaintext
POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json
{
  "ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-client": [
    {
      "cuid": "string",
      "cdid": "string"
    }
  ]
}
```

Figure 12: POST to Register (DOTS Gateway)

A server-domain DOTS gateway SHOULD add the following attribute:

- **cdid**: This attribute has the same meaning, syntax, and processing rules as the ‘cdid’ attribute defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].

In deployments where server-domain DOTS gateways are enabled, ‘cdid’ does not need to be inserted when relaying DOTS methods to manage aliases (Section 6) or filtering rules (Section 7). DOTS servers are responsible for maintaining the association between ‘cdid’ and ‘cuid’ for policy enforcement purposes.

This is an optional attribute.

A request example to create a ‘dots-client’ resource is depicted in Figure 13. This request is relayed by a server-domain DOTS gateway as hinted by the presence of the ‘cdid’ attribute.
POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data HTTP/1.1  
Host: {host}:{port}  
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json  
{  
  "ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-client": [
    {
      "cuid": "dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw",  
      "cdid": "?eef349529eb55ed50113"
    }
  ]
}  

Figure 13: POST to Register (DOTS gateway)

DOTS servers MUST limit the number of ‘dots-client’ resources to be created by the same DOTS client to 1 per request. Requests with multiple ‘dots-client’ resources MUST be rejected by DOTS servers. To that aim, the DOTS server MUST rely on the same procedure to unambiguously identify a DOTS client as discussed in Section 4.4.1 of [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel].

The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the POST request using status-line codes. Status codes in the range "2xx" codes are success, "4xx" codes are some sort of invalid requests and "5xx" codes are returned if the DOTS server has erred or is incapable of accepting the creation of the ‘dots-client’ resource. In particular,

- "201 Created" status-line is returned in the response, if the DOTS server has accepted the request.

- "400 Bad Request" status-line is returned by the DOTS server, if the request does not include a ‘cuid’ parameter. The error-tag "missing-attribute" is used in this case.

- "409 Conflict" status-line is returned to the requesting DOTS client, if the data resource already exists. The error-tag "resource-denied" is used in this case.

Once a DOTS client registers itself to a DOTS server, it can create/delete/retrieve aliases (Section 6) and filtering rules (Section 7).

A DOTS client MAY use the PUT request (Section 4.5 in [RFC8040]) to register a DOTS client within the DOTS server. An example is shown in Figure 14.
The DOTS gateway that inserted a 'cdid' in a PUT request, MUST strip the 'cdid' parameter in the corresponding response before forwarding the response to the DOTS client.

5.2. Unregistering DOTS Clients

A DOTS client de-registers from its DOTS server by deleting the 'cuid' resource. Resources bound to this DOTS client will be deleted by the DOTS server. An example of de-register request is shown in Figure 15.

DELETE /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data/
dots-client=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}

Figure 15: De-register a DOTS Client

6. Managing DOTS Aliases

The following sub-sections define means for a DOTS client to create aliases (Section 6.1), retrieve one or a list of aliases (Section 6.2), and delete an alias (Section 6.3).

6.1. Create Aliases

A POST or PUT request is used by a DOTS client to create aliases, for resources for which a mitigation may be requested. Such aliases may be used in subsequent DOTS signal channel exchanges to refer more efficiently to the resources under attack.

DOTS clients within the same domain can create different aliases for the same resource.
The structure of POST requests used to create aliases is shown in Figure 16.

POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\  /dots-client=dz6phjaADkaFtbjr0JGBpw HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json
{
  "ietf-dots-data-channel:aliases": {
    "alias": [
      {
        "name": "string",
        "target-prefix": [
          "string"
        ],
        "target-port-range": [
          {
            "lower-port": integer,
            "upper-port": integer
          }
        ],
        "target-protocol": [
          integer
        ],
        "target-fqdn": [
          "string"
        ],
        "target-uri": [
          "string"
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
}

Figure 16: POST to Create Aliases

The parameters are described below:

name: Name of the alias.

This is a mandatory attribute.

target-prefix: Prefixes are separated by commas. Prefixes are represented using Classless Inter-domain Routing (CIDR) notation [RFC4632]. As a reminder, the prefix length must be less than or equal to 32 (resp. 128) for IPv4 (resp. IPv6).
The prefix list MUST NOT include broadcast, loopback, or multicast addresses. These addresses are considered as invalid values. In addition, the DOTS server MUST validate that these prefixes are within the scope of the DOTS client’s domain. Other validation checks may be supported by DOTS servers.

This is an optional attribute.

target-port-range: A range of port numbers.

The port range is defined by two bounds, a lower port number (lower-port) and an upper port number (upper-port).

When only ‘lower-port’ is present, it represents a single port number.

For TCP, UDP, Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) [RFC4960], or Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP) [RFC4340], the range of port numbers can be, for example, 1024-65535.

This is an optional attribute.

target-protocol: A list of protocols. Values are taken from the IANA protocol registry [proto_numbers].

The value ‘0’ has a special meaning for ‘all protocols’.

This is an optional attribute.

target-fqdn: A list of Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs). An FQDN is the full name of a resource, rather than just its hostname. For example, "venera" is a hostname, and "venera.isi.edu" is an FQDN [RFC1983].

How a name is passed to an underlying name resolution library is implementation- and deployment-specific. Nevertheless, once the name is resolved into one or multiple IP addresses, DOTS servers MUST apply the same validation checks as those for ‘target-prefix’.

This is an optional attribute.

target-uri: A list of Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) [RFC3986].

The same validation checks used for ‘target-fqdn’ MUST be followed by DOTS servers to validate a target URI.
This is an optional attribute.

In POST or PUT requests, at least one of the 'target-prefix', 'target-fqdn', or 'target-uri' attributes MUST be present. DOTS agents can safely ignore Vendor-Specific parameters they don’t understand.

Figure 17 shows a POST request to create an alias called "https1" for HTTPS servers with IP addresses 2001:db8:6401::1 and 2001:db8:6401::2 listening on port number 443.

POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data/
dots-client=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.com
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json
{
    "ietf-dots-data-channel:aliases": {
        "alias": [
            {
                "name": "https1",
                "target-protocol": [
                    6
                ],
                "target-prefix": [
                    "2001:db8:6401::1/128",
                    "2001:db8:6401::2/128"
                ],
                "target-port-range": [
                    {
                        "lower-port": 443
                    }
                ]
            }
        ]
    }
}

Figure 17: Example of a POST to Create an Alias

"201 Created" status-line MUST be returned in the response if the DOTS server has accepted the alias.

"409 Conflict" status-line MUST be returned to the requesting DOTS client, if the request is conflicting with an existing alias name. The error-tag "resource-denied" is used in this case.

If the request is missing a mandatory attribute or it contains an invalid or unknown parameter, "400 Bad Request" status-line MUST be
returned by the DOTS server. The error-tag is set to "missing-
attribute", "invalid-value", or "unknown-element" as a function of
the encountered error.

If the request is received via a server-domain DOTS gateway, but the
DOTS server does not maintain a 'cdid' for this 'cuid' while a 'cdid'
is expected to be supplied, the DOTS server MUST reply with "403
Forbidden" status-line and the error-tag "access-denied". Upon
receipt of this message, the DOTS client MUST register (Section 5).

A DOTS client uses the PUT request to modify the aliases in the DOTS
server. In particular, a DOTS client MUST update its alias entries
upon change of the prefix indicated in the 'target-prefix'.

A DOTS server MUST maintain an alias for at least 10080 minutes (1
week). If no refresh request is seen from the DOTS client, the DOTS
server removes expired entries.

6.2. Retrieve Installed Aliases

GET request is used to retrieve one or all installed aliases by a
DOTS client from a DOTS server (Section 3.3.1 in [RFC8040]). If no
'name' is included in the request, this is an indication that the
request is about retrieving all aliases instantiated by the DOTS
client.

Figure 18 shows an example to retrieve all the aliases that were
instantiated by the requesting DOTS client. The 'content' parameter
and its permitted values are defined in Section 4.8.1 of [RFC8040].

GET /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data/
dots-client=dz6pHjaADKaFTbjr0JGBpw/
aliases?content=all HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Accept: application/yang-data+json

Figure 18: GET to Retrieve All Installed Aliases

Figure 19 shows an example of the response message body that includes
all the aliases that are maintained by the DOTS server for the DOTS
client identified by the 'cuid' parameter.
{  
"ietf-dots-data-channel:aliases": {  
"alias": [  
{  
"name": "Server1",  
"target-protocol": [  
6  
],  
"target-prefix": [  
"2001:db8:6401::1/128",  
"2001:db8:6401::2/128"  
],  
"target-port-range": [  
{  
"lower-port": 443  
}  
],  
"pending-lifetime": 3596  
},  
{  
"name": "Server2",  
"target-protocol": [  
6  
],  
"target-prefix": [  
"2001:db8:6401::10/128",  
"2001:db8:6401::20/128"  
],  
"target-port-range": [  
{  
"lower-port": 80  
}  
],  
"pending-lifetime": 9869  
}  
]  
}  
}

Figure 19: An Example of Response Body

Figure 20 shows an example of a GET request to retrieve the alias "Server2" that was instantiated by the DOTS client.
GET /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data/
dots-client=d26pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw/
/aliases/alias=Server2?content=all HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Accept: application/yang-data+json

Figure 20: GET to Retrieve an Alias

If an alias name ('name') is included in the request, but the DOTS server does not find that alias name for this DOTS client in its configuration data, it MUST respond with a "404 Not Found" status-line.

6.3. Delete Aliases

DELETE request is used to delete an alias maintained by a DOTS server.

If the DOTS server does not find the alias name, conveyed in the DELETE request, in its configuration data for this DOTS client, it MUST respond with a "404 Not Found" status-line.

The DOTS server successfully acknowledges a DOTS client’s request to remove the alias using "204 No Content" status-line in the response.

Figure 21 shows an example of a request to delete an alias.

DELETE /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data/
dots-client=d26pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw/
/aliases/alias=Server1 HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}

Figure 21: Delete an Alias

7. Managing DOTS Filtering Rules

The following sub-sections define means for a DOTS client to retrieve DOTS filtering capabilities (Section 7.1), create filtering rules (Section 7.2), retrieve active filtering rules (Section 7.3), and delete a filtering rule (Section 7.4).

7.1. Retrieve DOTS Filtering Capabilities

A DOTS client MAY send a GET request to retrieve the filtering capabilities supported by a DOTS server. Figure 22 shows an example of such request.
GET /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data/
capabilities HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Accept: application/yang-data+json

Figure 22: GET to Retrieve the Capabilities of a DOTS Server

A DOTS client which issued a GET request to retrieve the filtering capabilities supported by its DOTS server, SHOULD NOT request for filtering actions that are not supported by that DOTS server.

Figure 23 shows an example of a response received from a DOTS server which only supports the mandatory filtering criteria listed in Section 4.1.
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json
{
    "ietf-dots-data-channel:capabilities": {
        "address-family": ["ipv4", "ipv6"],
        "forwarding-actions": ["drop", "accept"],
        "rate-limit": true,
        "transport-protocols": [1, 6, 17, 58],
        "ipv4": {
            "length": true,
            "protocol": true,
            "destination-prefix": true,
            "source-prefix": true,
            "fragment": true
        },
        "ipv6": {
            "length": true,
            "protocol": true,
            "destination-prefix": true,
            "source-prefix": true,
            "fragment": true
        },
        "tcp": {
            "flags-bitmask": true,
            "source-port": true,
            "destination-port": true,
            "port-range": true
        },
        "udp": {
            "length": true,
            "source-port": true,
            "destination-port": true,
            "port-range": true
        },
        "icmp": {
            "type": true,
            "code": true
        }
    }
}

Figure 23: Reply to a GET Response with Filtering Capabilities

7.2. Install Filtering Rules

A POST or PUT request is used by a DOTS client to communicate filtering rules to a DOTS server.
Figure 24 shows a POST request example to block traffic from 192.0.2.0/24 and destined to 198.51.100.0/24. Other examples are discussed in Appendix A.

```plaintext
POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data/
dots-client=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json
{
  "ietf-dots-data-channel:acls": {
    "acl": [
      {
        "name": "sample-ipv4-acl",
        "type": "ipv4-acl-type",
        "activation-type": "activate-when-mitigating",
        "aces": {
          "ace": [
            {
              "name": "rule1",
              "matches": {
                "ipv4": {
                  "destination-ipv4-network": "198.51.100.0/24",
                  "source-ipv4-network": "192.0.2.0/24"
                }
              },
              "actions": {
                "forwarding": "drop"
              }
            }
          ]
        }
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

Figure 24: POST to Install Filtering Rules

The meaning of these parameters is as follows:

name: The name of the access list.

This is a mandatory attribute.

type: Indicates the primary intended type of match criteria (e.g., IPv4, IPv6). It is set to 'ipv4-acl-type' in this example.

This is an optional attribute.
activation-type: Indicates whether an ACL has to be installed immediately or during mitigation time. If this attribute is not provided, the DOTS server MUST use ‘activate-when-mitigating’ as default value. Filters that are activated only when a mitigation is in progress MUST be bound to the DOTS client which created the filtering rule.

This is an optional attribute.

matches: Define criteria used to identify a flow on which to apply the rule. It can be "l3" (IPv4, IPv6) or "l4" (TCP, UDP, ..). The detailed match parameters are specified in Section 4.

In this example, an IPv4 matching criteria is used.

This is an optional attribute.

destination-ipv4-network: The destination IPv4 prefix. DOTS servers MUST validate that these prefixes are within the scope of the DOTS client’s domain. Other validation checks may be supported by DOTS servers. If this attribute is not provided, the DOTS server enforces the ACL on any destination IP address that belong to the DOTS client’s domain.

This is a mandatory attribute in requests with an ‘activation-type’ set to ‘immediate’.

source-ipv4-network: The source IPv4 prefix.

This is an optional attribute.

actions: Actions in the forwarding ACL category can be "drop" or "accept". The "accept" action is used to white-list traffic. The "drop" action is used to black-list traffic.

Accepted traffic may be subject to "rate-limit"; the allowed traffic rate is represented in bytes per second indicated in IEEE floating point format [IEEE.754.1985].

This is a mandatory attribute.

The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the POST request using the status-line header. Concretely, "201 Created" status-line MUST be returned in the response if the DOTS server has accepted the filtering rules. If the request is missing a mandatory attribute or contains an invalid or unknown parameter (e.g., a match field not supported by the DOTS server), "400 Bad Request" status-line MUST be returned by the DOTS server in the response. The error-tag is set to...
"missing-attribute", "invalid-value", or "unknown-element" as a function of the encountered error.

If the request is received via a server-domain DOTS gateway, but the DOTS server does not maintain a 'cdid' for this 'cuid' while a 'cdid' is expected to be supplied, the DOTS server MUST reply with "403 Forbidden" status-line and the error-tag "access-denied". Upon receipt of this message, the DOTS client MUST register (Figure 11).

If the request is conflicting with an existing filtering installed by another DOTS client of the domain, the DOTS server returns "409 Conflict" status-line to the requesting DOTS client. The error-tag "resource-denied" is used in this case.

The "insert" query parameter (Section 4.8.5 of [RFC8040]) MAY be used to specify how an access control entry is inserted within an ACL and how an ACL is inserted within an ACL set.

The DOTS client uses the PUT request to modify its filtering rules maintained by the DOTS server. In particular, a DOTS client MUST update its filtering entries upon change of the destination-prefix. How such change is detected is out of scope.

A DOTS server MUST maintain a filtering rule for at least 10080 minutes (1 week). If no refresh request is seen from the DOTS client, the DOTS server removes expired entries. Typically, a refresh request is a PUT request which echoes the content of a response to a GET request with all of the read-only parameters stripped out (e.g. pending-lifetime).

7.3. Retrieve Installed Filtering Rules

The DOTS client periodically queries the DOTS server to check the counters for installed filtering rules. GET request is used to retrieve filtering rules from a DOTS server. In order to indicate which type of data is requested in a GET request, the DOTS client sets adequately the 'content' parameter.

If the DOTS server does not find the access list name conveyed in the GET request in its configuration data for this DOTS client, it responds with a "404 Not Found" status-line.

In order to illustrate the intended behavior, consider the example depicted in Figure 25. In reference to this example, the DOTS client requests the creation of an immediate ACL called "test-acl-ipv6-udp".
PUT /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data/
dots-client=paL8pZqo4SLv64TLPeXxA/acls/acl=test-acl-ipv6-udp HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json
{
  "ietf-dots-data-channel:acls": {
    "acl": [
      {
        "name": "test-acl-ipv6-udp",
        "type": "ipv6-acl-type",
        "activation-type": "immediate",
        "aces": {
          "ace": [
            {
              "name": "test-ace-ipv6-udp",
              "matches": {
                "ipv6": {
                  "destination-ipv6-network": "2001:db8:6401::2/127",
                  "source-ipv6-network": "2001:db8:1234::/96",
                  "protocol": 17,
                  "flow-label": 10000
                },
                "udp": {
                  "source-port": {
                    "operator": "lte",
                    "port": 80
                  },
                  "destination-port": {
                    "operator": "neq",
                    "port": 1010
                  }
                }
              },
              "actions": {
                "forwarding": "accept"
              }
            }
          ]
        }
      }
    ]
  }
}

Figure 25: Example of a PUT Request to Create a Filtering
The peer DOTS server follows the procedure specified in Section 7.2 to process the request. We consider in the following that a positive response is sent back to the requesting DOTS client to confirm that the "test-acl-ipv6-udp" ACL is successfully installed by the DOTS server.

The DOTS client can issue a GET request to retrieve all its filtering rules and the number of matches for the installed filtering rules as illustrated in Figure 26. 'content' parameter is set to 'all'. The message body of the response to this GET request is shown in Figure 27.

GET /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data/
dots-client=dz6phjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw\n/acls?content=all HTTP/1.1
Host: [host]:[port]
Accept: application/yang-data+json

Figure 26: Retrieve the Configuration Data and State Data for the Filtering Rules: GET Request
Figure 27: Retrieve the Configuration Data and State Data for the Filtering Rules: Response

Also, a DOTS client can issue a GET request to retrieve only configuration data related to an ACL as shown in Figure 28. It does so by setting ‘content’ parameter to ‘config’. 
GET /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\
 /dots-client=pAL8p4Zqr4SLv64TLPXrxa/acls\
 /acl=test-acl-ipv6-udp?content=config HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Accept: application/yang-data+json

Figure 28: Retrieve the Configuration Data for a Filtering Rule: GET Request

A response to this GET request is shown in Figure 29.
A DOTS client can also issue a GET request with 'content' parameter to 'non-config' to exclusively retrieve non-configuration data bound to a given ACL as shown in Figure 28. A response to this GET request is shown in Figure 31.
GET /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\ 
dots-client=paL8p4Zqo4SLv64TLPXxA/acls\ 
/acl=test-acl-ipv6-udp?content=non-config HTTP/1.1
 Host: {host}:{port}
 Accept: application/yang-data+json

Figure 30: Retrieve the Non-Configuration Data for a Filtering Rule:
GET Request

{  "ietf-dots-data-channel:acls": {  "acl": [  {  "name": "test-acl-ipv6-udp",  "pending-lifetime": 8000,  "aces": [  {  "ace": [  {  "name": "test-ace-ipv6-udp"  }  ]  ]  }  ]  ] }

Figure 31: Retrieve the Non-Configuration Data for a Filtering Rule:
GET Request

7.4. Remove Filtering Rules

DELETE request is used by a DOTS client to delete filtering rules from a DOTS server.

If the DOTS server does not find the access list name carried in the DELETE request in its configuration data for this DOTS client, it MUST respond with a "404 Not Found" status-line. The DOTS server successfully acknowledges a DOTS client’s request to withdraw the filtering rules using "204 No Content" status-line, and removes the filtering rules accordingly.

Figure 32 shows an example of a request to remove the IPv4 ACL "sample-ipv4-acl" created in Section 7.2.
DELETE  /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data/
dots-client=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw/acis/
/acl=sample-ipv4-acl HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}

Figure 32: Remove a Filtering Rule: DELETE Request

Figure 33 shows an example of a response received from the server to confirm the deletion of "sample-ipv4-acl".

HTTP/1.1 204 No Content
Server: Apache
Date: Fri, 27 Jul 2018 10:05:15 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json
Content-Length: 0
Connection: Keep-Alive

Figure 33: Remove a Filtering Rule: Response

8. IANA Considerations

This document requests IANA to register the following URI in the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:

Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.

This document requests IANA to register the following YANG module in the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC7950].

name: ietf-dots-data-channel
prefix: data-channel
reference: RFC XXXX

9. Security Considerations

RESTCONF security considerations are discussed in [RFC8040]. In particular, DOTS agents MUST follow the security recommendations in Sections 2 and 12 of [RFC8040]. Also, DOTS agents MUST support the mutual authentication TLS profile discussed in Sections 7.1 and 8 of [I-D.ietf-dots-signal-channel]. YANG ACL-specific security considerations are discussed in [I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model].

Authenticated encryption MUST be used for data confidentiality and message integrity. The interaction between the DOTS agents requires
Transport Layer Security (TLS) with a cipher suite offering confidentiality protection and the guidance given in [RFC7525] MUST be followed to avoid attacks on TLS.

An attacker may be able to inject RST packets, bogus application segments, etc., regardless of whether TLS authentication is used. Because the application data is TLS protected, this will not result in the application receiving bogus data, but it will constitute a DoS on the connection. This attack can be countered by using TCP-AO [RFC5925]. If TCP-AO is used, then any bogus packets injected by an attacker will be rejected by the TCP-AO integrity check and therefore will never reach the TLS layer.

In order to prevent leaking internal information outside a client-domain, client-side DOTS gateways SHOULD NOT reveal the identity of internal DOTS clients (e.g., source IP address, client’s hostname) unless explicitly configured to do so.

DOTS servers MUST verify that requesting DOTS clients are entitled to enforce filtering rules on a given IP prefix. That is, only filtering rules on IP resources that belong to the DOTS client’s domain MUST be authorized by a DOTS server. The exact mechanism for the DOTS servers to validate that the target prefixes are within the scope of the DOTS client’s domain is deployment-specific.

Rate-limiting DOTS requests, including those with new ‘cuid’ values, from the same DOTS client defends against DoS attacks that would result in varying the ‘cuid’ to exhaust DOTS server resources. Rate-limit policies SHOULD be enforced on DOTS gateways (if deployed) and DOTS servers.

Applying resources quota per DOTS client and/or per DOTS client domain (e.g., limit the number of aliases and filters to be install by DOTS clients) prevents DOTS server resources to be aggressively used by some DOTS clients and ensures, therefore, DDoS mitigation usage fairness. Additionally, DOTS servers may limit the number of DOTS clients that can be enabled per domain.

The presence of DOTS gateways may lead to infinite forwarding loops, which is undesirable. To prevent and detect such loops, a mechanism is defined in Section 3.5.

All data nodes defined in the YANG module which can be created, modified, and deleted (i.e., config true, which is the default) are considered sensitive. Write operations applied to these data nodes without proper protection can negatively affect network operations. Appropriate security measures are recommended to prevent illegitimate users from invoking DOTS data channel primitives. Nevertheless, an
attacker who can access a DOTS client is technically capable of launching various attacks, such as:

- Set an arbitrarily low rate-limit, which may prevent legitimate traffic from being forwarded (rate-limit).
- Set an arbitrarily high rate-limit, which may lead to the forwarding of illegitimate DDoS traffic (rate-limit).
- Communicate invalid aliases to the server (alias), which will cause the failure of associating both data and signal channels.
- Set invalid ACL entries, which may prevent legitimate traffic from being forwarded. Likewise, invalid ACL entries may lead to forward DDoS traffic.

10. Contributors

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11. Acknowledgements

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[proto_numbers]


Appendix A. Sample Examples: Filtering Fragments

This specification strongly recommends the use of "fragment" for handling fragments.

Figure 34 shows the content of the POST request to be issued by a DOTS client to its DOTS server to allow the traffic destined to 198.51.100.0/24 and UDP port number 53, but to drop all fragmented packets. The following ACEs are defined (in this order):

- "drop-all-fragments" ACE: discards all fragments.

- "allow-dns-packets" ACE: accepts DNS packets destined to 198.51.100.0/24.

```json
POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data/
dots-client=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json
{
    "ietf-dots-data-channel:acls": {
        "acl": [
            {
                "name": "dns-fragments",
                "type": "ipv4-acl-type",
                "aces": {
                    "ace": [
                        {
                            "name": "drop-all-fragments",
                            "matches": {
                                "name": "ipv4-fragmentation",
                                "size": "all",
                                "packets": "all"
                            }
                        }
                    ]
                }
            }
        ]
    }
}
```
"ipv4": {
    "fragment": {
        "operator": "match",
        "type": "isf"
    }
},
"actions": {
    "forwarding": "drop"
}
}
"ace": [
    {
        "name": "allow-dns-packets",
        "matches": {
            "ipv4": {
                "destination-ipv4-network": "198.51.100.0/24"
            }
        },
        "udp": {
            "destination-port": {
                "operator": "eq",
                "port": 53
            }
        },
        "actions": {
            "forwarding": "accept"
        }
    }
]
}
}

Figure 34: Filtering IPv4 Fragmented Packets (Recommended)

Figure 35 shows a POST request example issued by a DOTS client to its DOTS server to allow the traffic destined to 2001:db8::/32 and UDP port number 53, but to drop all fragmented packets. The following ACEs are defined (in this order):

- "drop-all-fragments" ACE: discards all fragments (including atomic fragments). That is, IPv6 packets which include a Fragment header (44) are dropped.

"allow-dns-packets" ACE: accepts DNS packets destined to 2001:db8::/32.

POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data/
daots-client=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw HTTP/1.1
Host: {host}:{port}
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json
{
  "ietf-dots-data-channel:acls": {
    "acl": [
      {
        "name": "dns-fragments",
        "type": "ipv6-acl-type",
        "aces": [
          {
            "name": "drop-all-fragments",
            "matches": {
              "ipv6": {
                "fragment": {
                  "operator": "match",
                  "type": "isf"
                }
              }
            },
            "actions": {
              "forwarding": "drop"
            }
          }
        ],
        "ace": [
          {
            "name": "allow-dns-packets",
            "matches": {
              "ipv6": {
                "destination-ipv6-network": "2001:db8::/32"
              },
              "udp": {
                "destination-port": {
                  "operator": "eq",
                  "port": 53
                }
              }
            },
            "actions": {
              "forwarding": "accept"
            }
          }
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
}
Figure 35: Filtering IPv6 Fragmented Packets

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Abstract

This document defines the requirements for the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) protocols enabling coordinated response to DDoS attacks.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction ................................................. 2
   1.1. Context and Motivation ................................. 2
   1.2. Terminology ........................................... 3
2. Requirements ................................................. 5
   2.1. General Requirements ................................. 6
   2.2. Signal Channel Requirements ......................... 7
   2.3. Data Channel Requirements ......................... 12
   2.4. Security Requirements ............................... 13
   2.5. Data Model Requirements ............................ 14
3. Congestion Control Considerations ......................... 15
   3.1. Signal Channel ....................................... 15
   3.2. Data Channel .......................................... 16
4. Security Considerations ................................... 16
5. IANA Considerations ....................................... 17
6. Contributors ................................................ 17
7. Acknowledgments ........................................... 17
8. References .................................................. 17
   8.1. Normative References ................................. 17
   8.2. Informative References ............................... 19
Authors’ Addresses ........................................... 20

1. Introduction

1.1. Context and Motivation

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks afflict networks of all kinds, plaguing network operators at service providers and enterprises around the world. High-volume attacks saturating inbound links are now common, as attack scale and frequency continue to increase.

The prevalence and impact of these DDoS attacks has led to an increased focus on coordinated attack response. However, many enterprises lack the resources or expertise to operate on-premises attack mitigation solutions themselves, or are constrained by local bandwidth limitations. To address such gaps, service providers have begun to offer on-demand traffic scrubbing services, which are designed to separate the DDoS attack traffic from legitimate traffic and forward only the latter.

Today, these services offer proprietary interfaces for subscribers to request attack mitigation. Such proprietary interfaces tie a subscriber to a service while also limiting the network elements
capable of participating in the attack mitigation. As a result of signaling interface incompatibility, attack responses may be fragmented or otherwise incomplete, leaving operators in the attack path unable to assist in the defense.

A standardized method to coordinate a real-time response among involved operators will increase the speed and effectiveness of DDoS attack mitigation, and reduce the impact of these attacks. This document describes the required characteristics of protocols that enable attack coordination and mitigation of DDoS attacks.

DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) communicates the need for defensive action in anticipation of or in response to an attack, but does not dictate the implementation of these actions. The requirements in this document are derived from [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases] and [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture].

1.2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

This document adopts the following terms:

DDoS: A distributed denial-of-service attack, in which traffic originating from multiple sources is directed at a target on a network. DDoS attacks are intended to cause a negative impact on the availability and/or other functionality of an attack target. Denial-of-service considerations are discussed in detail in [RFC4732].

DDoS attack target: A network connected entity with a finite set of resources, such as network bandwidth, memory or CPU, that is the target of a DDoS attack. Potential targets include (but are not limited to) network elements, network links, servers, and services.

DDoS attack telemetry: Collected measurements and behavioral characteristics defining the nature of a DDoS attack.

Countermeasure: An action or set of actions focused on recognizing and filtering out specific types of DDoS attack traffic while passing legitimate traffic to the attack target. Distinct countermeasures can be layered to defend against attacks combining multiple DDoS attack types.
Mitigation: A set of countermeasures enforced against traffic destined for the target or targets of a detected or reported DDoS attack, where countermeasure enforcement is managed by an entity in the network path between attack sources and the attack target. Mitigation methodology is out of scope for this document.

Mitigator: An entity, typically a network element, capable of performing mitigation of a detected or reported DDoS attack. The means by which this entity performs these mitigations and how they are requested of it are out of scope. The mitigator and DOTS server receiving a mitigation request are assumed to belong to the same administrative entity.

DOTS client: A DOTS-aware software module responsible for requesting attack response coordination with other DOTS-aware elements.

DOTS server: A DOTS-aware software module handling and responding to messages from DOTS clients. The DOTS server enables mitigation on behalf of the DOTS client, if requested, by communicating the DOTS client’s request to the mitigator and returning selected mitigator feedback to the requesting DOTS client.

DOTS agent: Any DOTS-aware software module capable of participating in a DOTS signal or data channel. It can be a DOTS client, DOTS server, or, as a logical agent, a DOTS gateway.

DOTS gateway: A DOTS-aware software module resulting from the logical concatenation of the functionality of a DOTS server and a DOTS client into a single DOTS agent. This functionality is analogous to a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261] Back-to-Back User Agent (B2BUA) [RFC7092]. A DOTS gateway has a client-facing side, which behaves as a DOTS server for downstream clients, and a server-facing side, which performs the role of DOTS client for upstream DOTS servers. Client-domain DOTS gateways are DOTS gateways that are in the DOTS client’s domain, while server-domain DOTS gateways denote DOTS gateways that are in the DOTS server’s domain. DOTS gateways are described further in [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture].

Signal channel: A bidirectional, mutually authenticated communication channel between DOTS agents that is resilient even in conditions leading to severe packet loss, such as a volumetric DDoS attack causing network congestion.

DOTS signal: A concise authenticated status/control message transmitted over the signal channel between DOTS agents, used to indicate the client’s need for mitigation, as well as to convey the status of any requested mitigation.
Heartbeat: A message transmitted between DOTS agents over the signal channel, used as a keep-alive and to measure peer health.

Data channel: A bidirectional, mutually authentication communication channel between two DOTS agents used for infrequent but reliable bulk exchange of data not easily or appropriately communicated through the signal channel under attack conditions.

Filter: A specification of a matching network traffic flow or set of flows. The filter will typically have a policy associated with it, e.g., rate-limiting or discarding matching traffic [RFC4949].

Blacklist: A list of filters indicating sources from which traffic should be blocked, regardless of traffic content.

Whitelist: A list of filters indicating sources from which traffic should always be allowed, regardless of contradictory data gleaned in a detected attack.

Multi-homed DOTS client: A DOTS client exchanging messages with multiple DOTS servers, each in a separate administrative domain.

2. Requirements

This section describes the required features and characteristics of the DOTS protocols.

The DOTS protocols enable and manage mitigation on behalf of a network domain or resource which is or may become the focus of a DDoS attack. An active DDoS attack against the entity controlling the DOTS client need not be present before establishing a communication channel between DOTS agents. Indeed, establishing a relationship with peer DOTS agents during normal network conditions provides the foundation for more rapid attack response against future attacks, as all interactions setting up DOTS, including any business or service level agreements, are already complete. Reachability information of peer DOTS agents is provisioned to a DOTS client using a variety of manual or dynamic methods. Once a relationship between DOTS agents is established, regular communication between DOTS clients and servers enables a common understanding of the DOTS agents’ health and activity.

The DOTS protocol must at a minimum make it possible for a DOTS client to request aid mounting a defense, coordinated by a DOTS server, against a suspected attack, signaling within or between domains as requested by local operators. DOTS clients should similarly be able to withdraw aid requests. DOTS requires no justification from DOTS clients for requests for help, nor do DOTS...
clients need to justify withdrawing help requests: the decision is local to the DOTS clients’ domain. Multi-homed DOTS clients must be able to select the appropriate DOTS server(s) to which a mitigation request is to be sent. The method for selecting the appropriate DOTS server in a multi-homed environment is out of scope.

DOTS protocol implementations face competing operational goals when maintaining this bidirectional communication stream. On the one hand, DOTS must include protections ensuring message confidentiality, integrity and authenticity to keep the protocols from becoming additional vectors for the very attacks it is meant to help fight off. On the other hand, the protocol must be resilient under extremely hostile network conditions, providing continued contact between DOTS agents even as attack traffic saturates the link. Such resiliency may be developed several ways, but characteristics such as small message size, asynchronous, redundant message delivery and minimal connection overhead (when possible given local network policy) will tend to contribute to the robustness demanded by a viable DOTS protocol. Operators of peer DOTS-enabled domains may enable quality- or class-of-service traffic tagging to increase the probability of successful DOTS signal delivery, but DOTS does not require such policies be in place, and should be viable in their absence.

The DOTS server and client must also have some standardized method of defining the scope of any mitigation, as well as managing other mitigation-related configuration.

Finally, DOTS should be sufficiently extensible to meet future needs in coordinated attack defense, although this consideration is necessarily superseded by the other operational requirements.

2.1. General Requirements

GEN-001 Extensibility: Protocols and data models developed as part of DOTS MUST be extensible in order to keep DOTS adaptable to operational and proprietary DDoS defenses. Future extensions MUST be backward compatible. DOTS protocols MUST use a version number system to distinguish protocol revisions. Implementations of older protocol versions SHOULD ignore information added to DOTS messages as part of newer protocol versions.

GEN-002 Resilience and Robustness: The signaling protocol MUST be designed to maximize the probability of signal delivery even under the severely constrained network conditions caused by particular attack traffic. The protocol MUST be resilient, that is, continue operating despite message loss and out-of-order or redundant message delivery. In support of signaling protocol robustness,
DOTS signals SHOULD be conveyed over a transport not susceptible to Head of Line Blocking.

GEN-003 Bulk Data Exchange: Infrequent bulk data exchange between DOTS agents can also significantly augment attack response coordination, permitting such tasks as population of black- or white-listed source addresses; address or prefix group aliasing; exchange of incident reports; and other hinting or configuration supplementing attack response.

As the resilience requirements for the DOTS signal channel mandate small signal message size, a separate, secure data channel utilizing a reliable transport protocol MUST be used for bulk data exchange.

GEN-004 Mitigation Hinting: DOTS clients may have access to attack details which can be used to inform mitigation techniques. Example attack details might include locally collected fingerprints for an on-going attack, or anticipated or active attack focal points based on other threat intelligence. DOTS clients MAY send mitigation hints derived from attack details to DOTS servers, in the full understanding that the DOTS server MAY ignore mitigation hints. Mitigation hints MAY be transmitted across either signal or data channel. DOTS server handling of mitigation hints is implementation-specific.

GEN-005 Loop Handling: In certain scenarios, typically involving misconfiguration of DNS or routing policy, it may be possible for communication between DOTS agents to loop. Signal and data channel implementations should be prepared to detect and terminate such loops to prevent service disruption.

2.2. Signal Channel Requirements

SIG-001 Use of Common Transport Protocols: DOTS MUST operate over common widely deployed and standardized transport protocols. While connectionless transport such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) [RFC0768] SHOULD be used for the signal channel, the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [RFC0793] MAY be used if necessary due to network policy or middlebox capabilities or configurations.

SIG-002 Sub-MTU Message Size: To avoid message fragmentation and the consequently decreased probability of message delivery over a congested link, signaling protocol message size MUST be kept under signaling Path Maximum Transmission Unit (PMTU), including the byte overhead of any encapsulation, transport headers, and transport- or message-level security.
DOTS agents SHOULD attempt to learn the PMTU through mechanisms such as Path MTU Discovery [RFC1191] or Packetization Layer Path MTU Discovery [RFC4821]. If the PMTU cannot be discovered, DOTS agents SHOULD assume a PMTU of 1280 bytes. If IPv4 support on legacy or otherwise unusual networks is a consideration and PMTU is unknown, DOTS implementations MAY rely on a PMTU of 576 bytes, as discussed in [RFC0791] and [RFC1122].

SIG-003 Bidirectionality: To support peer health detection, to maintain an active signal channel, and increase the probability of signal delivery during an attack, the signal channel MUST be bidirectional, with client and server transmitting signals to each other at regular intervals, regardless of any client request for mitigation. Unidirectional messages MUST be supported within the bidirectional signal channel to allow for unsolicited message delivery, enabling asynchronous notifications between DOTS agents.

SIG-004 Channel Health Monitoring: DOTS agents MUST support exchange of heartbeat messages over the signal channel to monitor channel health. Peer DOTS agents SHOULD regularly send heartbeats to each other while a mitigation request is active. The heartbeat interval during active mitigation could be negotiable, but SHOULD be frequent enough to maintain any on-path NAT or Firewall bindings during mitigation.

To support scenarios in which loss of heartbeat is used to trigger mitigation, and to keep the channel active, DOTS clients MAY solicit heartbeat exchanges after successful mutual authentication. When DOTS agents are exchanging heartbeats and no mitigation request is active, either agent MAY request changes to the heartbeat rate. For example, a DOTS server might want to reduce heartbeat frequency or cease heartbeat exchanges when an active DOTS client has not requested mitigation, in order to control load.

Following mutual authentication, a signal channel MUST be considered active until a DOTS agent explicitly ends the session, or either DOTS agent fails to receive heartbeats from the other after a mutually agreed upon retransmission procedure has been exhausted. Because heartbeat loss is much more likely during volumetric attack, DOTS agents SHOULD avoid signal channel termination when mitigation is active and heartbeats are not received by either DOTS agent for an extended period. In such circumstances, DOTS clients MAY attempt to reestablish the signal channel, but SHOULD continue to send heartbeats so that the DOTS server knows the session is still alive. DOTS servers are assumed to have the ability to monitor the attack, using feedback from the mitigator and other available sources, and MAY use the absence of
attack traffic and lack of client heartbeats as an indication the signal channel is defunct.

SIG-005 Channel Redirection: In order to increase DOTS operational flexibility and scalability, DOTS servers SHOULD be able to redirect DOTS clients to another DOTS server at any time. DOTS clients MUST NOT assume the redirection target DOTS server shares security state with the redirecting DOTS server. DOTS clients are free to attempt abbreviated security negotiation methods supported by the protocol, such as DTLS session resumption, but MUST be prepared to negotiate new security state with the redirection target DOTS server.

Due to the increased likelihood of packet loss caused by link congestion during an attack, DOTS servers SHOULD NOT redirect while mitigation is enabled during an active attack against a target in the DOTS client’s domain.

SIG-006 Mitigation Requests and Status: Authorized DOTS clients MUST be able to request scoped mitigation from DOTS servers. DOTS servers MUST send status to the DOTS clients about mitigation requests. If a DOTS server rejects an authorized request for mitigation, the DOTS server MUST include a reason for the rejection in the status message sent to the client.

Due to the higher likelihood of packet loss during a DDoS attack, DOTS servers SHOULD regularly send mitigation status to authorized DOTS clients which have requested and been granted mitigation, regardless of client requests for mitigation status.

When DOTS client-requested mitigation is active, DOTS server status messages SHOULD include the following mitigation metrics:

* Total number of packets blocked by the mitigation
* Current number of packets per second blocked
* Total number of bytes blocked
* Current number of bytes per second blocked

DOTS clients MAY take these metrics into account when determining whether to ask the DOTS server to cease mitigation.

A DOTS client MAY withdraw a mitigation request at any time, regardless of whether mitigation is currently active. The DOTS server MUST immediately acknowledge a DOTS client’s request to stop mitigation.
To protect against route or DNS flapping caused by a client rapidly toggling mitigation, and to dampen the effect of oscillating attacks, DOTS servers MAY allow mitigation to continue for a limited period after acknowledging a DOTS client’s withdrawal of a mitigation request. During this period, DOTS server status messages SHOULD indicate that mitigation is active but terminating.

The initial active-but-terminating period is implementation- and deployment- specific, but SHOULD be sufficiently long to absorb latency incurred by route propagation. If the client requests mitigation again before the initial active-but-terminating period elapses, the DOTS server MAY exponentially increase the active-but-terminating period up to a maximum of 300 seconds (5 minutes). After the active-but-terminating period elapses, the DOTS server MUST treat the mitigation as terminated, as the DOTS client is no longer responsible for the mitigation.

SIG-007 Mitigation Lifetime: DOTS servers MUST support mitigations for a negotiated time interval, and MUST terminate a mitigation when the lifetime elapses. DOTS servers also MUST support renewal of mitigation lifetimes in mitigation requests from DOTS clients, allowing clients to extend mitigation as necessary for the duration of an attack.

DOTS servers MUST treat a mitigation terminated due to lifetime expiration exactly as if the DOTS client originating the mitigation had asked to end the mitigation, including the active-but-terminating period, as described above in SIG-005.

DOTS clients MUST include a mitigation lifetime in all mitigation requests.

DOTS servers SHOULD support indefinite mitigation lifetimes, enabling architectures in which the mitigator is always in the traffic path to the resources for which the DOTS client is requesting protection. DOTS clients MUST be prepared to not be granted mitigations with indefinite lifetimes. DOTS servers MAY refuse mitigations with indefinite lifetimes, for policy reasons. The reasons themselves are out of scope. If the DOTS server does not grant a mitigation request with an indefinite mitigation lifetime, it MUST set the lifetime to a value that is configured locally. That value MUST be returned in a reply to the requesting DOTS client.

SIG-008 Mitigation Scope: DOTS clients MUST indicate desired mitigation scope. The scope type will vary depending on the
resources requiring mitigation. All DOTS agent implementations MUST support the following required scope types:

* IPv4 prefixes in CIDR notation [RFC4632]
* IPv6 prefixes [RFC4291][RFC5952]
* Domain names [RFC1035]

The following mitigation scope types are OPTIONAL:

* Uniform Resource Identifiers [RFC3986]

DOTS servers MUST be able to resolve domain names and (when supported) URIs. How name resolution is managed on the DOTS server is implementation-specific.

DOTS agents MUST support mitigation scope aliases, allowing DOTS clients and servers to refer to collections of protected resources by an opaque identifier created through the data channel, direct configuration, or other means. Domain name and URI mitigation scopes may be thought of as a form of scope alias, in which the addresses to which the domain name or URI resolve represent the full scope of the mitigation.

If there is additional information available narrowing the scope of any requested attack response, such as targeted port range, protocol, or service, DOTS clients SHOULD include that information in client mitigation requests. DOTS clients MAY also include additional attack details. DOTS servers MAY ignore such supplemental information when enabling countermeasures on the mitigator.

As an active attack evolves, DOTS clients MUST be able to adjust as necessary the scope of requested mitigation by refining the scope of resources requiring mitigation.

A DOTS client may obtain the mitigation scope through direct provisioning or through implementation-specific methods of discovery. DOTS clients MUST support at least one mechanism to obtain mitigation scope.

SIG-009 Mitigation Efficacy: When a mitigation request is active, DOTS clients SHOULD transmit a metric of perceived mitigation efficacy to the DOTS server. DOTS servers MAY use the efficacy metric to adjust countermeasures activated on a mitigator on behalf of a DOTS client.
SIG-010  Conflict Detection and Notification: Multiple DOTS clients controlled by a single administrative entity may send conflicting mitigation requests as a result of misconfiguration, operator error, or compromised DOTS clients. DOTS servers in the same administrative domain attempting to honor conflicting requests may flap network route or DNS information, degrading the networks attempting to participate in attack response with the DOTS clients. DOTS servers in a single administrative domain SHALL detect such conflicting requests, and SHALL notify the DOTS clients in conflict. The notification SHOULD indicate the nature and scope of the conflict, for example, the overlapping prefix range in a conflicting mitigation request.

SIG-011  Network Address Translator Traversal: DOTS clients may be deployed behind a Network Address Translator (NAT), and need to communicate with DOTS servers through the NAT. DOTS protocols MUST therefore be capable of traversing NATs.

If UDP is used as the transport for the DOTS signal channel, all considerations in "Middlebox Traversal Guidelines" in [RFC8085] apply to DOTS. Regardless of transport, DOTS protocols MUST follow established best common practices established in BCP 127 for NAT traversal [RFC4787][RFC6888][RFC7857].

2.3. Data Channel Requirements

The data channel is intended to be used for bulk data exchanges between DOTS agents. Unlike the signal channel, the data channel is not expected to be constructed to deal with attack conditions. As the primary function of the data channel is data exchange, a reliable transport is required in order for DOTS agents to detect data delivery success or failure.

The data channel provides a protocol for DOTS configuration, management. For example, a DOTS client may submit to a DOTS server a collection of prefixes it wants to refer to by alias when requesting mitigation, to which the server would respond with a success status and the new prefix group alias, or an error status and message in the event the DOTS client's data channel request failed.

DATA-001  Reliable transport: Messages sent over the data channel MUST be delivered reliably, in order sent.

DATA-002  Data privacy and integrity: Transmissions over the data channel are likely to contain operationally or privacy-sensitive information or instructions from the remote DOTS agent. Theft or modification of data channel transmissions could lead to information leaks or malicious transactions on behalf of the
sending agent (see Section 4 below). Consequently data sent over the data channel MUST be encrypted and authenticated using current IETF best practices. DOTS servers MUST enable means to prevent leaking operationally or privacy-sensitive data. Although administrative entities participating in DOTS may detail what data may be revealed to third-party DOTS agents, such considerations are not in scope for this document.

DATA-003  Resource Configuration: To help meet the general and signal channel requirements in Section 2.1 and Section 2.2, DOTS server implementations MUST provide an interface to configure resource identifiers, as described in SIG-007. DOTS server implementations MAY expose additional configurability. Additional configurability is implementation-specific.

DATA-004  Black- and whitelist management: DOTS servers MUST provide methods for DOTS clients to manage black- and white-lists of traffic destined for resources belonging to a client.

For example, a DOTS client should be able to create a black- or whitelist entry, retrieve a list of current entries from either list, update the content of either list, and delete entries as necessary.

How a DOTS server authorizes DOTS client management of black- and white-list entries is implementation-specific.

2.4. Security Requirements

DOTS must operate within a particularly strict security context, as an insufficiently protected signal or data channel may be subject to abuse, enabling or supplementing the very attacks DOTS purports to mitigate.

SEC-001  Peer Mutual Authentication: DOTS agents MUST authenticate each other before a DOTS signal or data channel is considered valid. The method of authentication is not specified, but should follow current industry best practices with respect to any cryptographic mechanisms to authenticate the remote peer.

SEC-002  Message Confidentiality, Integrity and Authenticity: DOTS protocols MUST take steps to protect the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of messages sent between client and server. While specific transport- and message-level security options are not specified, the protocols MUST follow current industry best practices for encryption and message authentication.
In order for DOTS protocols to remain secure despite advancements in cryptanalysis and traffic analysis, DOTS agents MUST be able to negotiate the terms and mechanisms of protocol security, subject to the interoperability and signal message size requirements in Section 2.2.

While the interfaces between downstream DOTS server and upstream DOTS client within a DOTS gateway are implementation-specific, those interfaces nevertheless MUST provide security equivalent to that of the signal channels bridged by gateways in the signaling path. For example, when a DOTS gateway consisting of a DOTS server and DOTS client is running on the same logical device, the two DOTS agents could be implemented within the same process security boundary.

SEC-003 Message Replay Protection: To prevent a passive attacker from capturing and replaying old messages, and thereby potentially disrupting or influencing the network policy of the receiving DOTS agent’s domain, DOTS protocols MUST provide a method for replay detection and prevention.

Within the signal channel, messages MUST be uniquely identified such that replayed or duplicated messages can be detected and discarded. Unique mitigation requests MUST be processed at most once.

SEC-004 Authorization: DOTS servers MUST authorize all messages from DOTS clients which pertain to mitigation, configuration, filtering, or status.

DOTS servers MUST reject mitigation requests with scopes which the DOTS client is not authorized to manage.

Likewise, DOTS servers MUST refuse to allow creation, modification or deletion of scope aliases and black-/white-lists when the DOTS client is unauthorized.

The modes of authorization are implementation-specific.

2.5. Data Model Requirements

A well-structured DOTS data model is critical to the development of successful DOTS protocols.

DM-001 Structure: The data model structure for the DOTS protocol MAY be described by a single module, or be divided into related collections of hierarchical modules and sub-modules. If the data model structure is split across modules, those distinct modules
MUST allow references to describe the overall data model’s structural dependencies.

DM-002 Versioning: To ensure interoperability between DOTS protocol implementations, data models MUST be versioned. How the protocols represent data model versions is not defined in this document.

DM-003 Mitigation Status Representation: The data model MUST provide the ability to represent a request for mitigation and the withdrawal of such a request. The data model MUST also support a representation of currently requested mitigation status, including failures and their causes.

DM-004 Mitigation Scope Representation: The data model MUST support representation of a requested mitigation’s scope. As mitigation scope may be represented in several different ways, per SIG-007 above, the data model MUST be capable of flexible representation of mitigation scope.

DM-005 Mitigation Lifetime Representation: The data model MUST support representation of a mitigation request’s lifetime, including mitigations with no specified end time.

DM-006 Mitigation Efficacy Representation: The data model MUST support representation of a DOTS client’s understanding of the efficacy of a mitigation enabled through a mitigation request.

DM-007 Acceptable Signal Loss Representation: The data model MUST be able to represent the DOTS agent’s preference for acceptable signal loss when establishing a signal channel, as described in GEN-002.

DM-008 Heartbeat Interval Representation: The data model MUST be able to represent the DOTS agent’s preferred heartbeat interval, which the client may include when establishing the signal channel, as described in SIG-003.

DM-009 Relationship to Transport: The DOTS data model MUST NOT depend on the specifics of any transport to represent fields in the model.

3. Congestion Control Considerations

3.1. Signal Channel

As part of a protocol expected to operate over links affected by DDoS attack traffic, the DOTS signal channel MUST NOT contribute significantly to link congestion. To meet the signal channel
requirements above, DOTS signal channel implementations SHOULD support connectionless transports. However, some connectionless transports when deployed naively can be a source of network congestion, as discussed in [RFC8085]. Signal channel implementations using such connectionless transports, such as UDP, therefore MUST include a congestion control mechanism.

Signal channel implementations using TCP may rely on built-in TCP congestion control support.

3.2. Data Channel

As specified in DATA-001, the data channel requires reliable, in-order message delivery. Data channel implementations using TCP may rely on the TCP implementation’s built-in congestion control mechanisms.

4. Security Considerations

This document informs future protocols under development, and so does not have security considerations of its own. However, operators should be aware of potential risks involved in deploying DOTS. DOTS agent impersonation and signal blocking are discussed here. Additional DOTS security considerations may be found in [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture] and DOTS protocol documents.

Impersonation of either DOTS server or DOTS client could have catastrophic impact on operations in either domain. If an attacker has the ability to impersonate a DOTS client, that attacker can affect policy on the network path to the DOTS client’s domain, up to and including instantiation of blacklists blocking all inbound traffic to networks for which the DOTS client is authorized to request mitigation.

Similarly, an impersonated DOTS server may be able to act as a sort of malicious DOTS gateway, intercepting requests from the downstream DOTS client, and modifying them before transmission to the DOTS server to inflict the desired impact on traffic to or from the DOTS client’s domain. Among other things, this malicious DOTS gateway might receive and discard mitigation requests from the DOTS client, ensuring no requested mitigation is ever applied.

As detailed in Section 2.4, DOTS implementations require mutual authentication of DOTS agents in order to make agent impersonation more difficult. However, impersonation may still be possible as a result of credential theft, implementation flaws, or compromise of DOTS agents. To detect misuse, DOTS operators should carefully
monitor and audit DOTS agents, while employing current secure network communications best practices to reduce attack surface.

Blocking communication between DOTS agents has the potential to disrupt the core function of DOTS, which is to request mitigation of active or expected DDoS attacks. The DOTS signal channel is expected to operate over congested inbound links, and, as described in Section 2.2, the signal channel protocol must be designed for minimal data transfer to reduce the incidence of signal blocking.

5. IANA Considerations

This document does not require any IANA action.

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7. Acknowledgments

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8.2. Informative References

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Abstract

This document specifies the DOTS signal channel, a protocol for signaling the need for protection against Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks to a server capable of enabling network traffic mitigation on behalf of the requesting client.

A companion document defines the DOTS data channel, a separate reliable communication layer for DOTS management and configuration purposes.

Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)

Please update these statements with the RFC number to be assigned to this document:

o "This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX;"

o "RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel";

o "| 3.00 | Alternate server | [RFCXXXX] |"

o reference: RFC XXXX

Please update TBD statements with the port number to be assigned to DOTS Signal Channel Protocol.
Status of This Memo

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction ............................................. 3
2. Notational Conventions and Terminology .................. 5
3. Design Overview ....................................... 6
4. DOTS Signal Channel: Messages & Behaviors ............ 8
   4.1. DOTS Server(s) Discovery ........................ 8
   4.2. CoAP URIs ................................... 8
   4.3. Happy Eyeballs for DOTS Signal Channel ....... 9
   4.4. DOTS Mitigation Methods ....................... 10
       4.4.1. Request Mitigation ..................... 11
       4.4.2. Retrieve Information Related to a Mitigation .. 24
       4.4.3. Efficacy Update from DOTS Clients ........ 31
       4.4.4. Withdraw a Mitigation .................. 33
   4.5. DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration ....... 34
       4.5.1. Discover Configuration Parameters ........ 36
1. Introduction

A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack is an attempt to make machines or network resources unavailable to their intended users. In most cases, sufficient scale can be achieved by compromising enough end-hosts and using those infected hosts to perpetrate and amplify the attack. The victim in this attack can be an application server, a host, a router, a firewall, or an entire network.

Network applications have finite resources like CPU cycles, the number of processes or threads they can create and use, the maximum number of simultaneous connections it can handle, the limited resources of the control plane, etc. When processing network traffic, such applications are supposed to use these resources to offer the intended task in the most efficient manner. However, a DDoS attacker may be able to prevent an application from performing
its intended task by making the application exhaust its finite resources.

TCP DDoS SYN-flood, for example, is a memory-exhausting attack while ACK-flood is a CPU-exhausting attack [RFC4987]. Attacks on the link are carried out by sending enough traffic so that the link becomes congested, thereby likely causing packet loss for legitimate traffic. Stateful firewalls can also be attacked by sending traffic that causes the firewall to maintain an excessive number of states that may jeopardize the firewall’s operation overall, besides like performance impacts. The firewall then runs out of memory, and can no longer instantiate the states required to process legitimate flows. Other possible DDoS attacks are discussed in [RFC4732].

In many cases, it may not be possible for network administrators to determine the cause(s) of an attack. They may instead just realize that certain resources seem to be under attack. This document defines a lightweight protocol that allows a DOTS client to request mitigation from one or more DOTS servers for protection against detected, suspected, or anticipated attacks. This protocol enables cooperation between DOTS agents to permit a highly-automated network defense that is robust, reliable, and secure.

An example of a network diagram that illustrates a deployment of DOTS agents is shown in Figure 1. In this example, a DOTS server is operating on the access network. A DOTS client is located on the LAN (Local Area Network), while a DOTS gateway is embedded in the CPE (Customer Premises Equipment).

![Network Diagram](image)

Figure 1: Sample DOTS Deployment (1)

DOTS servers can also be reachable over the Internet, as depicted in Figure 2.
In typical deployments, the DOTS client belongs to a different administrative domain than the DOTS server. For example, the DOTS client is embedded in a firewall protecting services owned and operated by a domain, while the DOTS server is owned and operated by a different domain providing DDoS mitigation services. The latter might or might not provide connectivity services to the network hosting the DOTS client.

The DOTS server may (not) be co-located with the DOTS mitigator. In typical deployments, the DOTS server belongs to the same administrative domain as the mitigator. The DOTS client can communicate directly with a DOTS server or indirectly via a DOTS gateway.

The document adheres to the DOTS architecture [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]. The requirements for DOTS signal channel protocol are documented in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]. This document satisfies all the use cases discussed in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases].

This document focuses on the DOTS signal channel. This is a companion document of the DOTS data channel specification [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel] that defines a configuration and a bulk data exchange mechanism supporting the DOTS signal channel.

2. Notational Conventions and Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

(D)TLS is used for statements that apply to both Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] and Datagram Transport Layer Security [RFC6347]. Specific terms are used for any statement that applies to either protocol alone.
The reader should be familiar with the terms defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture].

The meaning of the symbols in YANG tree diagrams is defined in [I-D.ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams].

3. Design Overview

The DOTS signal channel is built on top of the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252], a lightweight protocol originally designed for constrained devices and networks. The many features of CoAP (expectation of packet loss, support for asynchronous non-confirmable messaging, congestion control, small message overhead limiting the need for fragmentation, use of minimal resources, and support for (D)TLS) makes it a good candidate to build the DOTS signaling mechanism from.

The DOTS signal channel is layered on existing standards (Figure 3).

```
+---------------------+    +---------------------+    +---------------------+
| DOTS Signal Channel |    |         CoAP         |    |         CoAP         |
+---------------------+    +---------------------+    +---------------------+
|                     |    | TLS               |    | TLS               |
+---------------------+    +----------+----------+    +----------+----------+
|                     |    |   DTLS    |   DTLS    |
+---------------------+    +----------+----------+    +----------+----------+
|                     |    |   TCP    |   UDP    |
+---------------------+    +----------+----------+    +----------+----------+
|                     |    |          IP         |
+---------------------+    +---------------------+
```

Figure 3: Abstract Layering of DOTS Signal Channel over CoAP over (D)TLS

By default, a DOTS signal channel MUST run over port number TBD as defined in Section 9.1, for both UDP and TCP, unless the DOTS server has a mutual agreement with its DOTS clients to use a different port number. DOTS clients may alternatively support means to dynamically discover the ports used by their DOTS servers. In order to use a distinct port number (as opposed to TBD), DOTS clients and servers should support a configurable parameter to supply the port number to use. The rationale for not using the default port number 5684 ((D)TLS CoAP) is to allow for differentiated behaviors in environments where both a DOTS gateway and an IoT gateway (e.g., Figure 3 of [RFC7452]) are present.

The signal channel is initiated by the DOTS client (Section 4.4). Once the signal channel is established, the DOTS agents periodically
send heartbeats to keep the channel active (Section 4.7). At any
time, the DOTS client may send a mitigation request message to a DOTS
server over the active channel. While mitigation is active because
of the higher likelihood of packet loss during a DDoS attack, the
DOTS server periodically sends status messages to the client,
including basic mitigation feedback details. Mitigation remains
active until the DOTS client explicitly terminates mitigation, or the
mitigation lifetime expires.

DOTS signaling can happen with DTLS [RFC6347] over UDP and TLS
[RFC5246] over TCP. Likewise, DOTS requests may be sent using IPv4
or IPv6 transfer capabilities. A Happy Eyeballs procedure for DOTS
signal channel is specified in Section 4.3.

Messages exchanged between DOTS agents are serialized using Concise
Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC7049], CBOR is a binary
encoding scheme designed for small code and message size. CBOR-
encoded payloads are used to carry signal channel-specific payload
messages which convey request parameters and response information
such as errors. In order to allow the use of the same data models,
[RFC7951] specifies the JSON encoding of YANG-modeled data. A
similar effort for CBOR is defined in [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor].

From that standpoint, this document specifies a YANG module for
representing mitigation scopes and DOTS signal channel session
configuration data (Section 5). Representing these data as CBOR data
is assumed to follow the rules in [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor] or those in
[RFC7951] combined with JSON/CBOR conversion rules in [RFC7049].
All parameters in the payload of the DOTS signal channel are mapped
to CBOR types as specified in Section 6.

In order to prevent fragmentation, DOTS agents must follow the
recommendations documented in Section 4.6 of [RFC7252]. Refer to
Section 7.3 for more details.

DOTS agents MUST support GET, PUT, and DELETE CoAP methods. The
payload included in CoAP responses with 2.xx and 3.xx Response Codes
MUST be of content type "application/cbor" (Section 5.5.1 of
[RFC7252]). CoAP responses with 4.xx and 5.xx error Response Codes
MUST include a diagnostic payload (Section 5.5.2 of [RFC7252]). The
Diagnostic Payload may contain additional information to aid
troubleshooting.

In deployments where multiple DOTS clients are enabled in a network
(owned and operated by the same entity), the DOTS server may detect
conflicting mitigation requests from these clients. This document
does not aim to specify a comprehensive list of conditions under
which a DOTS server will characterize two mitigation requests from
distinct DOTS clients as conflicting, nor recommend a DOTS server behavior for processing conflicting mitigation requests. Those considerations are implementation- and deployment-specific. Nevertheless, the document specifies the mechanisms to notify DOTS clients when conflicts occur, including the conflict cause (Section 4.4).

In deployments where one or more translators (e.g., Traditional NAT [RFC3022], CGN [RFC6888], NAT64 [RFC6146], NPTv6 [RFC6296]) are enabled between the client's network and the DOTS server, DOTS signal channel messages forwarded to a DOTS server must not include internal IP addresses/prefixes and/or port numbers; external addresses/prefixes and/or port numbers as assigned by the translator must be used instead. This document does not make any recommendation about possible translator discovery mechanisms. The following are some (non-exhaustive) deployment examples that may be considered:

- Port Control Protocol (PCP) [RFC6887] or Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) [RFC5389] may be used to retrieve the external addresses/prefixes and/or port numbers. Information retrieved by means of PCP or STUN will be used to feed the DOTS signal channel messages that will be sent to a DOTS server.

- A DOTS gateway may be co-located with the translator. The DOTS gateway will need to update the DOTS messages, based upon the local translator's binding table.

4. DOTS Signal Channel: Messages & Behaviors

4.1. DOTS Server(s) Discovery

This document assumes that DOTS clients are provisioned with the reachability information of their DOTS server(s) using a variety of means (e.g., local configuration, or dynamic means such as DHCP). These means are out of scope of this document.

Likewise, it is out of scope of this document to specify the behavior of a DOTS client when it sends requests (e.g., contact all servers, select one server among the list) when multiple DOTS servers are provisioned.

4.2. CoAP URIs

The DOTS server MUST support the use of the path-prefix of "/.well-known/" as defined in [RFC5785] and the registered name of "dots". Each DOTS operation is indicated by a path-suffix that indicates the intended operation. The operation path (Table 1) is appended to the
path-prefix to form the URI used with a CoAP request to perform the
desired DOTS operation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Operation Path</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mitigation</td>
<td>/v1/mitigate</td>
<td>Section 4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Session config</td>
<td>/v1/config</td>
<td>Section 4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Operations and their Corresponding URIs

4.3. Happy Eyeballs for DOTS Signal Channel

[I-D.ietf-dots-requirements] mentions that DOTS agents will have to
support both connectionless and connection-oriented protocols. As
such, the DOTS signal channel is designed to operate with DTLS over
UDP and TLS over TCP. Further, a DOTS client may acquire a list of
IPv4 and IPv6 addresses (Section 4.1), each of which can be used to
contact the DOTS server using UDP and TCP. The following specifies
the procedure to follow to select the address family and the
transport protocol for sending DOTS signal channel messages.

Such procedure is needed to avoid experiencing long connection
delays. For example, if an IPv4 path to reach a DOTS server is
found, but the DOTS server’s IPv6 path is not working, a dual-stack
DOTS client may experience a significant connection delay compared to
an IPv4-only DOTS client. The other problem is that if a middlebox
between the DOTS client and DOTS server is configured to block UDP
traffic, the DOTS client will fail to establish a DTLS session with
the DOTS server and, as a consequence, will have to fall back to TLS
over TCP, thereby incurring significant connection delays.

To overcome these connection setup problems, the DOTS client attempts
to connect to its DOTS server(s) using both IPv6 and IPv4, and tries
both DTLS over UDP and TLS over TCP in a manner similar to the Happy
Eyeballs mechanism [RFC8305]. These connection attempts are
performed by the DOTS client when it initializes. The results of the
Happy Eyeballs procedure are used by the DOTS client for sending its
subsequent messages to the DOTS server.

The order of preference of DOTS signal channel address family and
transport protocol (most preferred first) is: UDP over IPv6, UDP over
IPv4, TCP over IPv6, and finally TCP over IPv4. This order adheres
to the address preference order specified in [RFC6724] and the DOTS
signal channel preference which privileges the use of UDP over TCP
to avoid TCP’s head of line blocking.

In reference to Figure 4, the DOTS client sends two TCP SYNs and two DTLS ClientHello messages at the same time over IPv6 and IPv4. In this example, it is assumed that the IPv6 path is broken and UDP traffic is dropped by a middlebox but has little impact to the DOTS client because there is no long delay before using IPv4 and TCP. The DOTS client repeats the mechanism to discover whether DOTS signal channel messages with DTLS over UDP becomes available from the DOTS server, so the DOTS client can migrate the DOTS signal channel from TCP to UDP. Such probing SHOULD NOT be done more frequently than every 24 hours and MUST NOT be done more frequently than every 5 minutes.

```
+-----------+                                           +-----------+
|DOTS client|                                           |DOTS server|
+-----------+                                           +-----------+
|--DTLS ClientHello, IPv6 ---->X                        |
|--TCP SYN, IPv6-------------->X                        |
|--DTLS ClientHello, IPv4 ---->X                        |
|--TCP SYN, IPv4--------------------------------------->|
|--DTLS ClientHello, IPv6 ---->X                        |
|--TCP SYN, IPv6--------------------------------------->|
|<-TCP SYNACK------------------------------------------------|
|--DTLS ClientHello, IPv4 ---->X                        |
|--TCP ACK--------------------------------------------->|
|<------------Establish TLS Session-------------------->|
|----------------DOTS signal--------------------------->|
```

Figure 4: DOTS Happy Eyeballs

4.4. DOTS Mitigation Methods

The following methods are used by a DOTS client to request, withdraw, or retrieve the status of mitigation requests:

**PUT:** DOTS clients use the PUT method to request mitigation from a DOTS server (Section 4.4.1). During active mitigation, DOTS clients may use PUT requests to carry mitigation efficacy updates to the DOTS server (Section 4.4.3).

**GET:** DOTS clients may use the GET method to subscribe to DOTS server status messages, or to retrieve the list of its mitigations maintained by a DOTS server (Section 4.4.2).

**DELETE:** DOTS clients use the DELETE method to withdraw a request for mitigation from a DOTS server (Section 4.4.4).
Mitigation request and response messages are marked as Non-confirmable messages (Section 2.2 of [RFC7252]).

DOTS agents SHOULD follow the data transmission guidelines discussed in Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8085] and control transmission behavior by not sending more than one UDP datagram per RTT to the peer DOTS agent on average.

Requests marked by the DOTS client as Non-confirmable messages are sent at regular intervals until a response is received from the DOTS server. If the DOTS client cannot maintain an RTT estimate, it SHOULD NOT send more than one Non-confirmable request every 3 seconds, and SHOULD use an even less aggressive rate whenever possible (case 2 in Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8085]).

4.4.1. Request Mitigation

When a DOTS client requires mitigation for some reason, the DOTS client uses the CoAP PUT method to send a mitigation request to its DOTS server(s) (Figure 5, illustrated in JSON diagnostic notation).

If this DOTS client is entitled to solicit the DOTS service, the DOTS server can enable mitigation on behalf of the DOTS client by communicating the DOTS client’s request to the mitigator and relaying selected mitigator feedback to the requesting DOTS client.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "mid=123"
Content-Type: "application/cbor"
{
    "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
        "scope": [
            {
                "target-prefix": [
                    "string"
                ],
                "target-port-range": [
                    {
                        "lower-port": integer,
                        "upper-port": integer
                    }
                ],
                "target-protocol": [
                    integer
                ],
                "target-fqdn": [
                    "string"
                ],
                "target-uri": [
                    "string"
                ],
                "alias-name": [
                    "string"
                ],
                "lifetime": integer
            }
        ]
    }
}

Figure 5: PUT to Convey DOTS Mitigation Requests

The Uri-Path option carries a major and minor version nomenclature to manage versioning; DOTS signal channel in this specification uses ‘v1’ major version.

The order of the Uri-Path options is important as it defines the CoAP resource. In particular, ‘mid’ MUST follow ‘cuid’.
The additional Uri-Path parameters to those defined in Section 4.2 are as follows:

cuid: Stands for Client Unique Identifier. A globally unique identifier that is meant to prevent collisions among DOTS clients, especially those from the same domain. It MUST be generated by DOTS clients.

Implementations SHOULD use the output of a cryptographic hash algorithm whose input is the DER-encoded ASN.1 representation of the Subject Public Key Info (SPKI) of the DOTS client X.509 certificate [RFC5280], the DOTS client raw public key [RFC7250], or the PSK identity used by the DOTS client in the TLS ClientKeyExchange message to set ‘cuid’. In this version of the specification, the cryptographic hash algorithm used is SHA-256 [RFC6234]. The output of the cryptographic hash algorithm is truncated to 16 bytes; truncation is done by stripping off the final 16 bytes. The truncated output is base64url encoded.

The ‘cuid’ is intended to be stable when communicating with a given DOTS server, i.e., the ‘cuid’ used by a DOTS client SHOULD NOT change over time. Distinct ‘cuid’ values MAY be used per DOTS server.

DOTS servers MUST return 4.09 (Conflict) error code to a DOTS peer to notify that the ‘cuid’ is already in-use by another DOTS client. Upon receipt of that error code, a new ‘cuid’ MUST be generated by the DOTS peer.

Client-domain DOTS gateways MUST handle ‘cuid’ collision directly and it is RECOMMENDED that ‘cuid’ collision is handled directly by server-domain DOTS gateways.

DOTS gateways MAY rewrite the ‘cuid’ used by peer DOTS clients. Triggers for such rewriting are out of scope.

This is a mandatory Uri-Path.

mid: Identifier for the mitigation request represented with an integer. This identifier MUST be unique for each mitigation request bound to the DOTS client, i.e., the ‘mid’ parameter value in the mitigation request needs to be unique relative to the ‘mid’ parameter values of active mitigation requests conveyed from the DOTS client to the DOTS server.

This identifier MUST be generated by the DOTS client. This document does not make any assumption about how this identifier is generated.
This is a mandatory Uri-Path parameter.

The parameters in the CBOR body of the PUT request are described below:

**target-prefix:** A list of prefixes identifying resources under attack. Prefixes are represented using Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) notation [RFC4632].

As a reminder, the prefix length must be less than or equal to 32 (resp. 128) for IPv4 (resp. IPv6).

This is an optional attribute.

**target-port-range:** A list of port numbers bound to resources under attack.

A port range is defined by two bounds, a lower port number (lower-port) and an upper port number (upper-port). When only ‘lower-port’ is present, it represents a single port number.

For TCP, UDP, Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) [RFC4960], or Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP) [RFC4340], a range of ports can be, for example, 0-1023, 1024-65535, or 1024-49151.

This is an optional attribute.

**target-protocol:** A list of protocols involved in an attack. Values are taken from the IANA protocol registry [proto_numbers].

The value ‘0’ has a special meaning for ‘all protocols’.

This is an optional attribute.

**target-fqdn:** A list of Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs) identifying resources under attack. An FQDN is the full name of a resource, rather than just its hostname. For example, "venera" is a hostname, and "venera.isi.edu" is an FQDN [RFC1983].

This is an optional attribute.

**target-uri:** A list of Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) [RFC3986] identifying resources under attack.

This is an optional attribute.

**alias-name:** A list of aliases of resources for which the mitigation is requested. Aliases can be created using the DOTS data channel
(Section 6.1 of [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel]), direct configuration, or other means.

An alias is used in subsequent signal channel exchanges to refer more efficiently to the resources under attack.

This is an optional attribute.

**lifetime:** Lifetime of the mitigation request in seconds. The RECOMMENDED lifetime of a mitigation request is 3600 seconds (60 minutes) -- this value was chosen to be long enough so that refreshing is not typically a burden on the DOTS client, while expiring the request where the client has unexpectedly quit in a timely manner. DOTS clients MUST include this parameter in their mitigation requests. Upon the expiry of this lifetime, and if the request is not refreshed, the mitigation request is removed. The request can be refreshed by sending the same request again.

A lifetime of '0' in a mitigation request is an invalid value.

A lifetime of negative one (-1) indicates indefinite lifetime for the mitigation request. The DOTS server MAY refuse indefinite lifetime, for policy reasons; the granted lifetime value is returned in the response. DOTS clients MUST be prepared to not be granted mitigations with indefinite lifetimes.

The DOTS server MUST always indicate the actual lifetime in the response and the remaining lifetime in status messages sent to the DOTS client.

This is a mandatory attribute.

In deployments where server-domain DOTS gateways are enabled, identity information about the origin source client domain SHOULD be supplied to the DOTS server. That information is meant to assist the DOTS server to enforce some policies. These policies can be enforced per-client, per-client domain, or both. Figure 6 shows an example of a request relayed by a server-domain DOTS gateway.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "v1"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "cdid=7eeaf349529eb55ed50113"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "mid=123"
Content-Type: "application/cbor"
{
    "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
        "scope": [
            {
                "target-prefix": [
                    "string"
                ],
                "target-port-range": [
                    {
                        "lower-port": integer,
                        "upper-port": integer
                    }
                ],
                "target-protocol": [
                    integer
                ],
                "target-fqdn": [
                    "string"
                ],
                "target-uri": [
                    "string"
                ],
                "alias-name": [
                    "string"
                ],
                "lifetime": integer
            }
        ]
    }
}

Figure 6: PUT to Convey DOTS Mitigation Request as relayed by a Server-Domain DOTS Gateway

A server-domain DOTS gateway SHOULD add the following Uri-Path parameter:
cdid: Stands for Client Domain IDentifier. The ‘cdid’ is conveyed by a server-domain DOTS gateway to propagate the source domain identity from the gateway’s client-facing-side to the gateway’s server-facing-side, and from the gateway’s server-facing-side to the DOTS server. ‘cdid’ may be used by the final DOTS server for policy enforcement purposes (e.g., enforce a quota on filtering rules). These policies are deployment-specific.

Server-domain DOTS gateways SHOULD support a configuration option to instruct whether ‘cdid’ parameter is to be inserted.

In order to accommodate deployments that require enforcing per-client policies, per-client domain policies, or a combination thereof, server-domain DOTS gateways MUST supply the SPKI hash of the DOTS client X.509 certificate, the DOTS client raw public key, or the hash of the "PSK identity" in the ‘cdid’, following the same rules for generating the hash conveyed in ‘cuid’, which is then used by the ultimate DOTS server to determine the corresponding client’s domain.

If a DOTS client is provisioned, for example, with distinct certificates as a function of the peer server-domain DOTS gateway, distinct ‘cdid’ values may be supplied by a server-domain DOTS gateway. The ultimate DOTS server MUST treat those ‘cdid’ values as equivalent.

The ‘cdid’ attribute MUST NOT be generated and included by DOTS clients.

DOTS servers MUST ignore ‘cdid’ attributes that are directly supplied by source DOTS clients or client-domain DOTS gateways. This implies that first server-domain DOTS gateways MUST strip ‘cdid’ attributes supplied by DOTS clients. DOTS servers SHOULD support a configuration parameter to identify DOTS gateways that are trusted to supply ‘cdid’ attributes.

Only single-valued ‘cdid’ are defined in this document.

This is an optional Uri-Path.

The CBOR key values for the parameters are defined in Section 6. Section 9 defines how the CBOR key values can be allocated for future uses.

Because of the complexity to handle partial failure cases, this specification does not allow for including multiple mitigation requests in the same PUT request. Concretely, a DOTS client MUST NOT include multiple ‘scope’ parameters in the same PUT request.
FQDN and URI mitigation scopes may be thought of as a form of scope alias, in which the addresses to which the domain name or URI resolve represent the full scope of the mitigation.

In the PUT request at least one of the attributes ‘target-prefix’, ‘target-fqdn’, ‘target-uri’, or ‘alias-name’ MUST be present.

Attributes and Uri-Path parameters with empty values MUST NOT be present in a request.

The relative order of two mitigation requests from a DOTS client is determined by comparing their respective ‘mid’ values. If two mitigation requests have overlapping mitigation scopes, the mitigation request with the highest numeric ‘mid’ value will override the other mitigation request. Two mitigation requests from a DOTS client are overlapping if there is a common IP address, IP prefix, FQDN, URI, or alias-name. To avoid maintaining a long list of overlapping mitigation requests from a DOTS client and avoid error-prone provisioning of mitigation requests from a DOTS client, the overlapped lower numeric ‘mid’ MUST be automatically deleted and no longer available at the DOTS server.

Figure 7 shows a PUT request example to signal that ports 80, 8080, and 443 used by 2001:db8:6401::1 and 2001:db8:6401::2 servers are under attack (illustrated in JSON diagnostic notation). The presence of ‘cdid’ indicates that a server-domain DOTS gateway has modified the initial PUT request sent by the DOTS client.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Host: "www.example.com"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "v1"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "cdid=7eeaf349529eb55ed50113"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "mid=123"
Content-Format: "application/cbor"

```json
{
  "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
    "scope": [
      {
        "target-prefix": [
          "2001:db8:6401::1/128",
          "2001:db8:6401::2/128"
        ],
        "target-port-range": [
          {
            "lower-port": 80
          },
          {
            "lower-port": 443
          },
          {
            "lower-port": 8080
          }
        ],
        "target-protocol": [6]
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

Figure 7: PUT for DOTS Mitigation Request

The corresponding CBOR encoding format is shown in Figure 8.
In both DOTS signal and data channel sessions, the DOTS client MUST authenticate itself to the DOTS server (Section 8). The DOTS server may use the algorithm presented in Section 7 of [RFC7589] to derive the DOTS client identity or username from the client certificate. The DOTS client identity allows the DOTS server to accept mitigation requests with scopes that the DOTS client is authorized to manage.

The DOTS server couples the DOTS signal and data channel sessions using the DOTS client identity (e.g., client certificate, ‘cuid’) and optionally the ‘cdid’ parameter value, so the DOTS server can validate whether the aliases conveyed in the mitigation request were indeed created by the same DOTS client using the DOTS data channel session. If the aliases were not created by the DOTS client, the DOTS server MUST return 4.00 (Bad Request) in the response.

The DOTS server couples the DOTS signal channel sessions using the DOTS client identity and optionally the ‘cdid’ parameter value, and the DOTS server uses ‘mid’ and ‘cuid’ Uri-Path parameter values to detect duplicate mitigation requests. If the mitigation request...
contains the ‘alias-name’ and other parameters identifying the target resources (such as ‘target-prefix’, ‘target-port-range’, ‘target-fqdn’, or ‘target-uri’), the DOTS server appends the parameter values in ‘alias-name’ with the corresponding parameter values in ‘target-prefix’, ‘target-port-range’, ‘target-fqdn’, or ‘target-uri’.

The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the PUT request using CoAP response codes. CoAP 2.xx codes are success. CoAP 4.xx codes are some sort of invalid requests (client errors). CoAP 5.xx codes are returned if the DOTS server has erred or is currently unavailable to provide mitigation in response to the mitigation request from the DOTS client.

Figure 9 shows an example response to a PUT request that is successfully processed by a DOTS server (i.e., CoAP 2.xx response codes). This PUT request is assumed to be relayed by a server-domain DOTS gateway.

```json
{
    "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
        "cdid": "7eeaf349529eb55ed50113",
        "scope": [
            {
                "mid": 12332,
                "lifetime": 3600
            }
        ]
    }
}
```

Figure 9: 2.xx Response Body

If the request is missing a mandatory attribute, does not include ‘cuid’ or ‘mid’ Uri-Path options, includes multiple ‘scope’ parameters, or contains invalid or unknown parameters, the DOTS server MUST reply with 4.00 (Bad Request). DOTS agents can safely ignore Vendor-Specific parameters they don’t understand.

A DOTS server that receives a mitigation request with a lifetime set to ‘0’ MUST reply with a 4.00 (Bad Request).

If the DOTS server does not find the ‘mid’ parameter value conveyed in the PUT request in its configuration data, it MAY accept the mitigation request by sending back a 2.01 (Created) response to the DOTS client; the DOTS server will consequently try to mitigate the attack.
If the DOTS server finds the ‘mid’ parameter value conveyed in the
PUT request in its configuration data bound to that DOTS client, it
MAY update the mitigation request, and a 2.04 (Changed) response is
returned to indicate a successful update of the mitigation request.

If the request is conflicting with an existing mitigation request
from a different DOTS client, and the DOTS server decides to maintain
the conflicting mitigation request, the DOTS server returns 4.09
(Conflict) [RFC8132] to the requesting DOTS client. The response
includes enough information for a DOTS client to recognize the source
of the conflict as described below:

conflict-information: Indicates that a mitigation request is
conflicting with another mitigation request(s) from other DOTS
client(s). This optional attribute has the following structure:

    conflict-status: Indicates the status of a conflicting mitigation
    request. The following values are defined:

    1: DOTS server has detected conflicting mitigation requests
       from different DOTS clients. This mitigation request is
currently inactive until the conflicts are resolved.
       Another mitigation request is active.

    2: DOTS server has detected conflicting mitigation requests
       from different DOTS clients. This mitigation request is
       currently active.

    3: DOTS server has detected conflicting mitigation requests
       from different DOTS clients. All conflicting mitigation
       requests are inactive.

    conflict-cause: Indicates the cause of the conflict. The
    following values are defined:

    1: Overlapping targets. ‘conflict-scope’ provides more details
       about the conflicting target clauses.

    2: Conflicts with an existing white list. This code is
       returned when the DDoS mitigation detects source addresses/
       prefixes in the white-listed ACLs are attacking the target.

    3: CUID Collision. This code is returned when a DOTS client
       uses a ‘cuid’ that is already used by another DOTS client.
       This code is an indication that the request has been
       rejected and a new request with a new ‘cuid’ is to be re-
       sent by the DOTS client. Note that ‘conflict-status’,
‘conflict-scope’, and ‘retry-timer’ are not returned in the error response.

conflict-scope: Indicates the conflict scope. It may include a list of IP addresses, a list of prefixes, a list of port numbers, a list of target protocols, a list of FQDNs, a list of URIs, a list of alias-names, or references to conflicting ACLs.

retry-timer: Indicates, in seconds, the time after which the DOTS client may re-issue the same request. The DOTS server returns ‘retry-timer’ only to DOTS client(s) for which a mitigation request is deactivated. Any retransmission of the same mitigation request before the expiry of this timer is likely to be rejected by the DOTS server for the same reasons.

The retry-timer SHOULD be equal to the lifetime of the active mitigation request resulting in the deactivation of the conflicting mitigation request. The lifetime of the deactivated mitigation request will be updated to (retry-timer + 45 seconds), so the DOTS client can refresh the deactivated mitigation request after retry-timer seconds before expiry of lifetime and check if the conflict is resolved.

For a mitigation request to continue beyond the initial negotiated lifetime, the DOTS client has to refresh the current mitigation request by sending a new PUT request. This PUT request MUST use the same ‘mid’ value, and MUST repeat all the other parameters as sent in the original mitigation request apart from a possible change to the lifetime parameter value.

The DOTS gateway that inserted a ‘cdid’ in a request, MUST strip the ‘cdid’ parameter in the corresponding response before forwarding the response to the DOTS client. If we consider the example depicted in Figure 9, the message that will be relayed by the DOTS gateway is shown in Figure 10.

```
{
  "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
    "scope": [
      {
        "mid": 12332,
        "lifetime": 3600
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

Figure 10: 2.xx Response Body Relayed by a DOTS Gateway
4.4.2. Retrieve Information Related to a Mitigation

A GET request is used by a DOTS client to retrieve information (including status) of DOTS mitigations from a DOTS server.

‘cuid’ is a mandatory Uri-Query parameter for GET requests.

Uri-Query parameters with empty values MUST NOT be present in a request.

The same considerations for manipulating ‘cdid’ parameter by server-domain DOTS gateways specified in Section 4.4.1 MUST be followed for GET requests.

If the DOTS server does not find the ‘mid’ Uri-Query value conveyed in the GET request in its configuration data for the requesting DOTS client, it MUST respond with a 4.04 (Not Found) error response code. Likewise, the same error MUST be returned as a response to a request to retrieve all mitigation records (i.e., ‘mid’ Uri-Query is not defined) of a given DOTS client if the DOTS server does not find any mitigation record for that DOTS client. As a reminder, a DOTS client is identified by its identity (e.g., client certificate, ‘cuid’) and optionally the ‘cdid’.

The ‘c’ (content) parameter and its permitted values defined in [I-D.ietf-core-comi] can be used to retrieve non-configuration data (attack mitigation status), configuration data, or both. The DOTS server may support this optional filtering capability. It can safely ignore it if not supported.

The following examples illustrate how a DOTS client retrieves active mitigation requests from a DOTS server. In particular:

- Figure 11 shows the example of a GET request to retrieve all DOTS mitigation requests signaled by a DOTS client.

- Figure 12 shows the example of a GET request to retrieve a specific DOTS mitigation request signaled by a DOTS client. The configuration data to be reported in the response is formatted in the same order as was processed by the DOTS server in the original mitigation request.

These two examples assume the default of "c=a"; that is, the DOTS client asks for all data to be reported by the DOTS server.
Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "v1"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Query: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Observe: 0

Figure 11: GET to Retrieve all DOTS Mitigation Requests

Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "v1"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Query: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Query: "mid=12332"
Observe: 0

Figure 12: GET to Retrieve a Specific DOTS Mitigation Request

Figure 13 shows a response example of all active mitigation requests associated with the DOTS client as maintained by the DOTS server. The response indicates the mitigation status of each mitigation request.
Figure 13: Response Body to a Get Request

The mitigation status parameters are described below:

mitigation-start: Mitigation start time is expressed in seconds relative to 1970-01-01T00:00Z in UTC time (Section 2.4.1 of Reddy, et al. Expires July 26, 2018
The CBOR encoding is modified so that the leading tag 1 (epoch-based date/time) MUST be omitted.

This is a mandatory attribute.

lifetime: The remaining lifetime of the mitigation request, in seconds.

This is a mandatory attribute.

status: Status of attack mitigation. The various possible values of ‘status’ parameter are explained in Table 2.

This is a mandatory attribute.

bytes-dropped: The total dropped byte count for the mitigation request since the attack mitigation is triggered. The count wraps around when it reaches the maximum value of unsigned integer64.

This is an optional attribute.

bps-dropped: The average number of dropped bytes per second for the mitigation request since the attack mitigation is triggered. This SHOULD be a five-minute average.

This is an optional attribute.

pkts-dropped: The total number of dropped packet count for the mitigation request since the attack mitigation is triggered. The count wraps around when it reaches the maximum value of unsigned integer64.

This is an optional attribute.

pps-dropped: The average number of dropped packets per second for the mitigation request since the attack mitigation is triggered. This SHOULD be a five-minute average.

This is an optional attribute.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Attack mitigation is in progress (e.g., changing the network path to re-route the inbound traffic to DOTS mitigator).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Attack is successfully mitigated (e.g., traffic is redirected to a DDoS mitigator and attack traffic is dropped).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Attack has stopped and the DOTS client can withdraw the mitigation request.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Attack has exceeded the mitigation provider capability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>DOTS client has withdrawn the mitigation request and the mitigation is active but terminating.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Attack mitigation is now terminated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Attack mitigation is withdrawn.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Attack mitigation is rejected.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Values of ‘status’ Parameter

The Observe Option defined in [RFC7641] extends the CoAP core protocol with a mechanism for a CoAP client to "observe" a resource on a CoAP server: The client retrieves a representation of the resource and requests this representation be updated by the server as long as the client is interested in the resource. A DOTS client conveys the Observe Option set to '0' in the GET request to receive unsolicited notifications of attack mitigation status from the DOTS server.

Unidirectional notifications within the bidirectional signal channel allows unsolicited message delivery, enabling asynchronous notifications between the agents. Due to the higher likelihood of packet loss during a DDoS attack, the DOTS server periodically sends attack mitigation status to the DOTS client and also notifies the DOTS client whenever the status of the attack mitigation changes. If the DOTS server cannot maintain an RTT estimate, it SHOULD NOT send more than one unsolicited notification every 3 seconds, and SHOULD...
use an even less aggressive rate whenever possible (case 2 in Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8085]).

When conflicting requests are detected, the DOTS server enforces the corresponding policy (e.g., accept all requests, reject all requests, accept only one request but reject all the others, ...). It is assumed that this policy is supplied by the DOTS server administrator or it is a default behavior of the DOTS server implementation. Then, the DOTS server sends notification message(s) to the DOTS client(s) at the origin of the conflict (refer to the conflict parameters defined in Section 4.4.1). A conflict notification message includes information about the conflict cause, scope, and the status of the mitigation request(s). For example,

- A notification message with 'status' code set to '8 (Attack mitigation is rejected)' and 'conflict-status' set to '1' is sent to a DOTS client to indicate that this mitigation request is rejected because a conflict is detected.

- A notification message with 'status' code set to '7 (Attack mitigation is withdrawn)' and 'conflict-status' set to '1' is sent to a DOTS client to indicate that an active mitigation request is deactivated because a conflict is detected.

- A notification message with 'status' code set to '1 (Attack mitigation is in progress)' and 'conflict-status' set to '2' is sent to a DOTS client to indicate that this mitigation request is in progress, but a conflict is detected.

Upon receipt of a conflict notification message indicating that a mitigation request is deactivated because of a conflict, a DOTS client MUST NOT resend the same mitigation request before the expiry of 'retry-timer'. It is also recommended that DOTS clients support means to alert administrators about mitigation conflicts.

A DOTS client that is no longer interested in receiving notifications from the DOTS server can simply "forget" the observation. When the DOTS server sends the next notification, the DOTS client will not recognize the token in the message and thus will return a Reset message. This causes the DOTS server to remove the associated entry. Alternatively, the DOTS client can explicitly deregister itself by issuing a GET request that has the Token field set to the token of the observation to be cancelled and includes an Observe Option with the value set to '1' (deregister).

Figure 14 shows an example of a DOTS client requesting a DOTS server to send notifications related to a given mitigation request.
4.4.2.1. DOTS Clients Polling for Mitigation Status

The DOTS client can send the GET request at frequent intervals without the Observe Option to retrieve the configuration data of the mitigation request and non-configuration data (i.e., the attack status). The frequency of polling the DOTS server to get the mitigation status SHOULD follow the transmission guidelines in Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8085].

If the DOTS server has been able to mitigate the attack and the attack has stopped, the DOTS server indicates as such in the status. In such case, the DOTS client recalls the mitigation request by issuing a DELETE request for this mitigation request (Section 4.4.4).

A DOTS client SHOULD react to the status of the attack as per the information sent by the DOTS server rather than acknowledging by itself, using its own means, that the attack has been mitigated. This ensures that the DOTS client does not recall a mitigation...
request prematurely because it is possible that the DOTS client does not sense the DDoS attack on its resources, but the DOTS server could be actively mitigating the attack because the attack is not completely averted.

4.4.3. Efficacy Update from DOTS Clients

While DDoS mitigation is active, due to the likelihood of packet loss, a DOTS client MAY periodically transmit DOTS mitigation efficacy updates to the relevant DOTS server. A PUT request is used to convey the mitigation efficacy update to the DOTS server.

The PUT request used for efficacy update MUST include all the parameters used in the PUT request to carry the DOTS mitigation request (Section 4.4.1) unchanged apart from the 'lifetime' parameter value. If this is not the case, the DOTS server MUST reject the request with a 4.00 (Bad Request).

The If-Match Option (Section 5.10.8.1 of [RFC7252]) with an empty value is used to make the PUT request conditional on the current existence of the mitigation request. If UDP is used as transport, CoAP requests may arrive out-of-order. For example, the DOTS client may send a PUT request to convey an efficacy update to the DOTS server followed by a DELETE request to withdraw the mitigation request, but the DELETE request arrives at the DOTS server before the PUT request. To handle out-of-order delivery of requests, if an If-Match Option is present in the PUT request and the 'mid' in the request matches a mitigation request from that DOTS client, the request is processed by the DOTS server. If no match is found, the PUT request is silently ignored by the DOTS server.

An example of an efficacy update message, which includes an If-Match Option with an empty value, is depicted in Figure 15.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "v1"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "mid=123"
Content-Format: "application/cbor"
If-Match:
  { "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
    "scope": [
      { "target-prefix": [ "string" ], "target-port-range": [ { "lower-port": integer, "upper-port": integer } ], "target-protocol": [ integer ], "target-fqdn": [ "string" ], "target-uri": [ "string" ], "alias-name": [ "string" ], "lifetime": integer, "attack-status": integer }
    ]
  }
}

Figure 15: Efficacy Update

The ‘attack-status’ parameter is a mandatory attribute when performing an efficacy update. The various possible values contained in the ‘attack-status’ parameter are described in Table 3.
Table 3: Values of ‘attack-status’ Parameter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The DOTS client determines that it is still under attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The DOTS client determines that the attack is successfully mitigated (e.g., attack traffic is not seen).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The DOTS server indicates the result of processing a PUT request using CoAP response codes. The response code 2.04 (Changed) is returned if the DOTS server has accepted the mitigation efficacy update. The error response code 5.03 (Service Unavailable) is returned if the DOTS server has erred or is incapable of performing the mitigation.

4.4.4. Withdraw a Mitigation

DELETE requests are used to withdraw DOTS mitigation requests from DOTS servers (Figure 16).

’cuid’ and ’mid’ are mandatory Uri-Query parameters for DELETE requests.

The same considerations for manipulating ’cdid’ parameter by DOTS gateways, as specified in Section 4.4.1, MUST be followed for DELETE requests. Uri-Query parameters with empty values MUST NOT be present in a request.

```
Header: DELETE (Code=0.04)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "v1"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Query: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Query: "mid=123"
```

Figure 16: Withdraw a DOTS Mitigation

If the DELETE request does not include ’cuid’ and ’mid’ parameters, the DOTS server MUST reply with a 4.00 (Bad Request).
Once the request is validated, the DOTS server immediately acknowledges a DOTS client’s request to withdraw the DOTS signal using 2.02 (Deleted) response code with no response payload. A 2.02 (Deleted) Response Code is returned even if the ‘mid’ parameter value conveyed in the DELETE request does not exist in its configuration data before the request.

If the DOTS server finds the ‘mid’ parameter value conveyed in the DELETE request in its configuration data for the DOTS client, then to protect against route or DNS flapping caused by a DOTS client rapidly removing a mitigation, and to dampen the effect of oscillating attacks, the DOTS server MAY allow mitigation to continue for a limited period after acknowledging a DOTS client’s withdrawal of a mitigation request. During this period, the DOTS server status messages SHOULD indicate that mitigation is active but terminating (Section 4.4.2).

The initial active-but-terminating period SHOULD be sufficiently long to absorb latency incurred by route propagation. The active-but-terminating period SHOULD be set by default to 120 seconds. If the client requests mitigation again before the initial active-but-terminating period elapses, the DOTS server MAY exponentially increase the active-but-terminating period up to a maximum of 300 seconds (5 minutes).

After the active-but-terminating period elapses, the DOTS server MUST treat the mitigation as terminated, as the DOTS client is no longer responsible for the mitigation. For example, if there is a financial relationship between the DOTS client and server domains, the DOTS client stops incurring cost at this point.

4.5. DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration

A DOTS client can negotiate, configure, and retrieve the DOTS signal channel session behavior with its DOTS peers. The DOTS signal channel can be used, for example, to configure the following:

a. Heartbeat interval (heartbeat-interval): DOTS agents regularly send heartbeats (CoAP Ping/Pong) to each other after mutual authentication is successfully completed in order to keep the DOTS signal channel open. Heartbeat messages are exchanged between DOTS agents every ‘heartbeat-interval’ seconds to detect the current status of the DOTS signal channel session.

b. Missing heartbeats allowed (missing-hb-allowed): This variable indicates the maximum number of consecutive heartbeat messages for which a DOTS agent did not receive a response before concluding that the session is disconnected or defunct.
c. Acceptable signal loss ratio: Maximum retransmissions, retransmission timeout value, and other message transmission parameters for the DOTS signal channel.

The same or distinct configuration sets may be used during times when a mitigation is active (‘mitigating-config’) and when no mitigation is active (‘idle-config’). This is particularly useful for DOTS servers that might want to reduce heartbeat frequency or cease heartbeat exchanges when an active DOTS client has not requested mitigation. If distinct configurations are used, DOTS agents MUST follow the appropriate configuration set as a function of the mitigation activity (e.g., if no mitigation request is active, ‘idle-config’-related values must be followed). Additionally, DOTS agents MUST automatically switch to the other configuration upon a change in the mitigation activity (e.g., if an attack mitigation is launched after a peacetime, the DOTS agent switches from ‘idle-config’ to ‘mitigating-config’-related values).

Requests and responses are deemed reliable by marking them as Confirmable (CON) messages. DOTS signal channel session configuration requests and responses are marked as Confirmable messages. As explained in Section 2.1 of [RFC7252], a Confirmable message is retransmitted using a default timeout and exponential back-off between retransmissions, until the DOTS server sends an Acknowledgement message (ACK) with the same Message ID conveyed from the DOTS client.

Message transmission parameters are defined in Section 4.8 of [RFC7252]. The DOTS server can either piggyback the response in the acknowledgement message or, if the DOTS server cannot respond immediately to a request carried in a Confirmable message, it simply responds with an Empty Acknowledgement message so that the DOTS client can stop retransmitting the request. Empty Acknowledgement message is explained in Section 2.2 of [RFC7252]. When the response is ready, the server sends it in a new Confirmable message which in turn needs to be acknowledged by the DOTS client (see Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 of [RFC7252]). Requests and responses exchanged between DOTS agents during peacetime are marked as Confirmable messages.

Implementation Note: A DOTS client that receives a response in a CON message may want to clean up the message state right after sending the ACK. If that ACK is lost and the DOTS server retransmits the CON, the DOTS client may no longer have any state that would help it correlate this response, thereby unexpected the retransmission message. The DOTS client will send a Reset message so it does not receive any more retransmissions. This behavior is normal and not an indication of an error (see Section 5.3.2 of [RFC7252] for more details).
4.5.1. Discover Configuration Parameters

A GET request is used to obtain acceptable (e.g., minimum and maximum values) and current configuration parameters on the DOTS server for DOTS signal channel session configuration. This procedure occurs between a DOTS client and its immediate peer DOTS server. As such, this GET request MUST NOT be relayed by an on-path DOTS gateway.

Figure 17 shows how to obtain acceptable configuration parameters for the DOTS server.

Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "v1"
Uri-Path: "config"

Figure 17: GET to Retrieve Configuration

The DOTS server in the 2.05 (Content) response conveys the current, minimum, and maximum attribute values acceptable by the DOTS server (Figure 18).

Content-Format: "application/cbor"
{
  "ietf-dots-signal-channel:signal-config": {
    "mitigating-config": {
      "heartbeat-interval": {
        "max-value": integer,
        "min-value": integer,
        "current-value": integer
      },
      "missing-hb-allowed": {
        "max-value": integer,
        "min-value": integer,
        "current-value": integer
      },
      "max-retransmit": {
        "max-value": integer,
        "min-value": integer,
        "current-value": integer
      },
      "ack-timeout": {
        "max-value": integer,
        "min-value": integer,
        "current-value": integer
      }
    }
  }
}
"ack-random-factor": {  
  "max-value-decimal": number,  
  "min-value-decimal": number,  
  "current-value-decimal": number
}
},
"idle-config": {
  "heartbeat-interval": {  
    "max-value": integer,  
    "min-value": integer,  
    "current-value": integer
  },
  "missing-hb-allowed": {  
    "max-value": integer,  
    "min-value": integer,  
    "current-value": integer
  },
  "max-retransmit": {  
    "max-value": integer,  
    "min-value": integer,  
    "current-value": integer
  },
  "ack-timeout": {  
    "max-value": integer,  
    "min-value": integer,  
    "current-value": integer
  },
  "ack-random-factor": {  
    "max-value-decimal": number,  
    "min-value-decimal": number,  
    "current-value-decimal": number
  },
  "trigger-mitigation": boolean,
  "config-interval": integer
}

Figure 18: GET Configuration Response Body

The parameters in Figure 18 are described below:

mitigation-config: Set of configuration parameters to use when a mitigation is active. The following parameters may be included:

  heartbeat-interval: Time interval in seconds between two consecutive heartbeat messages.
‘0’ is used to disable the heartbeat mechanism.

This is an optional attribute.

missing hb-allowed: Maximum number of consecutive heartbeat messages for which the DOTS agent did not receive a response before concluding that the session is disconnected.

This is an optional attribute.

max-retransmit: Maximum number of retransmissions for a message (referred to as MAX_RETRANSMIT parameter in CoAP).

This is an optional attribute.

ack-timeout: Timeout value in seconds used to calculate the initial retransmission timeout value (referred to as ACK_TIMEOUT parameter in CoAP).

This is an optional attribute.

ack-random-factor: Random factor used to influence the timing of retransmissions (referred to as ACK_RANDOM_FACTOR parameter in CoAP).

This is an optional attribute.

idle-config: Set of configuration parameters to use when no mitigation is active. This attribute has the same structure as ‘mitigating-config’.

trigger-mitigation: If the parameter value is set to ‘false’, then DDoS mitigation is triggered only when the DOTS signal channel session is lost. Automated mitigation on loss of signal is discussed in Section 3.3.3 of [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture].

If the DOTS client ceases to respond to heartbeat messages, the DOTS server can detect that the DOTS session is lost.

The default value of the parameter is ‘true’.

This is an optional attribute.

config-interval: This parameter is returned to indicate the time interval expressed in seconds, which a DOTS agent must wait for before re-contacting its peer in order to retrieve the signal channel configuration data. This parameter is only valid for a GET response. It MUST NOT be used in a PUT request.
'0' is used to disable this configuration refresh mechanism.

If a non-zero value of 'config-interval' is received by a DOTS client, it has to issue a PUT request to refresh the configuration parameters for the signal channel before the expiry of 'config-interval'. When a DDoS attack is active, refresh requests MUST NOT be sent by DOTS clients and the DOTS server MUST NOT terminate the (D)TLS session after the expiry of 'config-interval'.

This mechanism allows updating the configuration data if a change occurs at the DOTS server side. For example, the new configuration may instruct a DOTS client to cease heartbeats or reduce heartbeat frequency.

If this parameter is not returned, this is equivalent to receiving a 'config-interval' value set to '0'.

If a DOTS server detects that a misbehaving DOTS client does not contact the DOTS server after the expiry of 'config-interval', in order to retrieve the signal channel configuration data, it MAY terminate the (D)TLS session. A (D)TLS session is terminated by the receipt of an authenticated message that closes the connection (e.g., a fatal alert (Section 7.2 of [RFC5246])).

This is an optional attribute.

Figure 19 shows an example of acceptable and current configuration parameters on a DOTS server for DOTS signal channel session configuration. The same acceptable configuration is used during attack and peace times.

Content-Format: "application/cbor"
{
  "ietf-dots-signal-channel:signal-config": {
    "mitigating-config": {
      "heartbeat-interval": {
        "max-value": 240,
        "min-value": 15,
        "current-value": 30
      },
      "missing-hb-allowed": {
        "max-value": 9,
        "min-value": 3,
        "current-value": 5
      },
      "max-retransmit": {
        "max-value": 15,
        "min-value": 2,
        "current-value": 2
      }
    }
  }
}
Figure 19: Example of a Configuration Response Body

4.5.2. Convey DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration

A PUT request is used to convey the configuration parameters for the signal channel (e.g., heartbeat interval, maximum retransmissions). Message transmission parameters for CoAP are defined in Section 4.8 of [RFC7252]. The RECOMMENDED values of transmission parameter values are ack-timeout (2 seconds), max-retransmit (3), ack-random-factor (1.5). In addition to those parameters, the RECOMMENDED specific DOTS transmission parameter values are ‘heartbeat-interval’ (30 seconds) and ‘missing hb allowed’ (5).

Note: heartbeat-interval should be tweaked to also assist DOTS messages for NAT traversal (SIG-010 of [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]). According to [RFC8085], keepalive messages must not be sent more frequently than once every 15 seconds and should use longer intervals when possible. Furthermore, [RFC4787] recommends NATs to use a state timeout of 2 minutes or longer, but experience shows that sending packets every 15 to 30 seconds is necessary to prevent the majority of middleboxes from losing state for UDP flows. From that standpoint, this specification recommends a minimum heartbeat-interval of 15 seconds and a maximum heartbeat-interval of 240 seconds. The recommended value of 30 seconds is selected to anticipate the expiry of NAT state.

A heartbeat-interval of 30 seconds may be seen as too chatty in some deployments. For such deployments, DOTS agents may negotiate longer heartbeat-interval values to prevent any network overload with too frequent keepalives.

Different heartbeat intervals can be defined for ‘mitigation-config’ and ‘idle-config’ to reduce being too chatty during idle times. If there is an on-path translator between the DOTS client (standalone or part of a DOTS gateway) and the DOTS server, the ‘mitigation-config’ heartbeat-interval has to be smaller than the translator session timeout. It is recommended that the ‘idle-config’ heartbeat-interval is also smaller than the translator session timeout to prevent translator transversal issues, or set to '0'. Means to discover the lifetime assigned by a translator are out of scope.

When a confirmable "CoAP Ping" is sent, and if there is no response, the "CoAP Ping" is retransmitted max-retransmit number of times by the CoAP layer using an initial timeout set to a random duration between ack-timeout and (ack-timeout*ack-random-factor) and exponential back-off between retransmissions. By choosing the recommended transmission parameters, the "CoAP Ping" will timeout after 45 seconds. If the DOTS agent does not receive any response
from the peer DOTS agent for 'missing-hb-allowed' number of consecutive "CoAP Ping" confirmable messages, it concludes that the DOTS signal channel session is disconnected. A DOTS client MUST NOT transmit a "CoAP Ping" while waiting for the previous "CoAP Ping" response from the same DOTS server.

If the DOTS agent wishes to change the default values of message transmission parameters, it should follow the guidance given in Section 4.8.1 of [RFC7252]. The DOTS agents MUST use the negotiated values for message transmission parameters and default values for non-negotiated message transmission parameters.

The signal channel session configuration is applicable to a single DOTS signal channel session between DOTS agents, so the 'cuid' Uri-Path MUST NOT be used.

Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "v1"
Uri-Path: "config"
Uri-Path: "sid=123"
Content-Format: "application/cbor"
{
  "ietf-dots-signal-channel:signal-config": {
    "mitigating-config": {
      "heartbeat-interval": {
        "current-value": integer
      },
      "missing-hb-allowed": {
        "current-value": integer
      },
      "max-retransmit": {
        "current-value": integer
      },
      "ack-timeout": {
        "current-value": integer
      },
      "ack-random-factor": {
        "current-value-decimal": number
      }
    },
    "idle-config": {
      "heartbeat-interval": {
        "current-value": integer
      },
      "missing-hb-allowed": {
        "current-value": integer
      }
    }
  }
}
Figure 20: PUT to Convey the DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration Data

The additional Uri-Path parameter to those defined in Table 1 is as follows:

sid: Session Identifier is an identifier for the DOTS signal channel session configuration data represented as an integer. This identifier MUST be generated by DOTS clients. This document does not make any assumption about how this identifier is generated. This is a mandatory attribute.

The meaning of the parameters in the CBOR body is defined in Section 4.5.1.


The PUT request with a higher numeric ‘sid’ value overrides the DOTS signal channel session configuration data installed by a PUT request with a lower numeric ‘sid’ value. To avoid maintaining a long list of ‘sid’ requests from a DOTS client, the lower numeric ‘sid’ MUST be automatically deleted and no longer available at the DOTS server.

Figure 21 shows a PUT request example to convey the configuration parameters for the DOTS signal channel. In this example, heartbeat mechanism is disabled when no mitigation is active, while the heartbeat interval is set to ‘91’ when a mitigation is active.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Host: "www.example.com"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "v1"
Uri-Path: "config"
Uri-Path: "sid=123"
Content-Format: "application/cbor"
{
  "ietf-dots-signal-channel:signal-config": {
    "mitigating-config": {
      "heartbeat-interval": {
        "current-value": 91
      },
      "missing-hb-allowed": {
        "current-value": 3
      },
      "max-retransmit": {
        "current-value": 7
      },
      "ack-timeout": {
        "current-value": 5
      },
      "ack-random-factor": {
        "current-value-decimal": 1.5
      }
    },
    "idle-config": {
      "heartbeat-interval": {
        "current-value": 0
      },
      "max-retransmit": {
        "current-value": 7
      },
      "ack-timeout": {
        "current-value": 5
      },
      "ack-random-factor": {
        "current-value-decimal": 1.5
      }
    }
  },
  "trigger-mitigation": false
}

Figure 21: PUT to Convey the Configuration Parameters
The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the PUT request using CoAP response codes:

- If the request is missing a mandatory attribute, does not include a ‘sid’ Uri-Path, or contains one or more invalid or unknown parameters, 4.00 (Bad Request) MUST be returned in the response.

- If the DOTS server does not find the ‘sid’ parameter value conveyed in the PUT request in its configuration data and if the DOTS server has accepted the configuration parameters, then a response code 2.01 (Created) is returned in the response.

- If the DOTS server finds the ‘sid’ parameter value conveyed in the PUT request in its configuration data and if the DOTS server has accepted the updated configuration parameters, 2.04 (Changed) MUST be returned in the response.

- If any of the ‘heartbeat-interval’, ‘missing-hb-allowed’, ‘max-retransmit’, ‘target-protocol’, ‘ack-timeout’, and ‘ack-random-factor’ attribute values are not acceptable to the DOTS server, 4.22 (Unprocessable Entity) MUST be returned in the response. Upon receipt of this error code, the DOTS client SHOULD request the maximum and minimum attribute values acceptable to the DOTS server (Section 4.5.1).

The DOTS client may re-try and send the PUT request with updated attribute values acceptable to the DOTS server.

4.5.3. Delete DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration

A DELETE request is used to delete the installed DOTS signal channel session configuration data (Figure 22).

Header: DELETE (Code=0.04)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "v1"
Uri-Path: "config"
Uri-Query: "sid=123"

Figure 22: DELETE Configuration

The DOTS server resets the DOTS signal channel session configuration back to the default values and acknowledges a DOTS client’s request to remove the DOTS signal channel session configuration using 2.02 (Deleted) response code.
Upon bootstrapping or reboot, a DOTS client MAY send a DELETE request to set the configuration parameters to default values. Such a request does not include any ‘sid’.

4.6. Redirected Signaling

Redirected DOTS signaling is discussed in detail in Section 3.2.2 of [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture].

If a DOTS server wants to redirect a DOTS client to an alternative DOTS server for a signal session, then the response code 3.00 (alternate server) will be returned in the response to the DOTS client.

The DOTS server can return the error response code 3.00 in response to a PUT request from the DOTS client or convey the error response code 3.00 in a unidirectional notification response from the DOTS server.

The DOTS server in the error response conveys the alternate DOTS server’s FQDN, and the alternate DOTS server’s IP address(es) and time to live values in the CBOR body (Figure 23).

```json
{
  "ietf-dots-signal-channel:redirected-signal": {
    "alt-server": "string",
    "alt-server-record": [ {
      "addr": "string",
      "ttl" : integer
    } ]
  }
}
```

Figure 23: Redirected Server Error Response Body

The parameters are described below:

- alt-server: FQDN of an alternate DOTS server.
- addr: IP address of an alternate DOTS server.
- ttl: Time to live (TTL) represented as an integer number of seconds.

Figure 24 shows a 3.00 response example to convey the DOTS alternate server ‘alt-server.example’, its IP addresses 2001:db8:6401::1 and 2001:db8:6401::2, and TTL values 3600 and 1800.
![Figure 24: Example of Redirected Server Error Response Body](image)

When the DOTS client receives 3.00 response, it considers the current request as failed, but SHOULD try re-sending the request to the alternate DOTS server. During a DDoS attack, the DNS server may be the target of another DDoS attack, alternate DOTS server’s IP addresses conveyed in the 3.00 response help the DOTS client skip DNS lookup of the alternate DOTS server. The DOTS client can then try to establish a UDP or a TCP session with the alternate DOTS server. The DOTS client SHOULD implement a DNS64 function to handle the scenario where an IPv6-only DOTS client communicates with an IPv4-only alternate DOTS server.

4.7. Heartbeat Mechanism

To provide an indication of signal health and distinguish an ‘idle’ signal channel from a ‘disconnected’ or ‘defunct’ session, the DOTS agent sends a heartbeat over the signal channel to maintain its half of the channel. The DOTS agent similarly expects a heartbeat from its peer DOTS agent, and may consider a session terminated in the prolonged absence of a peer agent heartbeat.

While the communication between the DOTS agents is quiescent, the DOTS client will probe the DOTS server to ensure it has maintained cryptographic state and vice versa. Such probes can also keep firewalls and/or stateful translators bindings alive. This probing reduces the frequency of establishing a new handshake when a DOTS signal needs to be conveyed to the DOTS server.

DOTS servers MAY trigger their heartbeat requests immediately after receiving heartbeat probes from peer DOTS clients. As a reminder, it is the responsibility of DOTS clients to ensure that on-path
translators/firewalls are maintaining a binding so that the same external IP address and/or port number is retained for the DOTS session.

In case of a massive DDoS attack that saturates the incoming link(s) to the DOTS client, all traffic from the DOTS server to the DOTS client will likely be dropped, although the DOTS server receives heartbeat requests in addition to DOTS messages sent by the DOTS client. In this scenario, the DOTS agents MUST behave differently to handle message transmission and DOTS session liveliness during link saturation:

- The DOTS client MUST NOT consider the DOTS session terminated even after a maximum ‘missing-hb-allowed’ threshold is reached. The DOTS client SHOULD keep on using the current DOTS session to send heartbeat requests over it, so that the DOTS server knows the DOTS client has not disconnected the DOTS session.

  After the maximum ‘missing-hb-allowed’ threshold is reached, the DOTS client SHOULD try to resume the (D)TLS session. The DOTS client SHOULD send mitigation requests over the current DOTS session, and in parallel, for example, try to resume the (D)TLS session or use 0-RTT mode in DTLS 1.3 to piggyback the mitigation request in the ClientHello message.

  As soon as the link is no longer saturated, if traffic from the DOTS server reaches the DOTS client over the current DOTS session, the DOTS client can stop (D)TLS session resumption or if (D)TLS session resumption is successful then disconnect the current DOTS session.

- If the DOTS server does not receive any traffic from the peer DOTS client, then the DOTS server sends heartbeat requests to the DOTS client and after maximum ‘missing-hb-allowed’ threshold is reached, the DOTS server concludes the session is disconnected.

In DOTS over UDP, heartbeat messages MUST be exchanged between the DOTS agents using the "CoAP Ping" mechanism defined in Section 4.2 of [RFC7252]. Concretely, the DOTS agent sends an Empty Confirmable message and the peer DOTS agent will respond by sending a Reset message.

In DOTS over TCP, heartbeat messages MUST be exchanged between the DOTS agents using the Ping and Pong messages specified in Section 4.4 of [I-D.ietf-core-coap-tcp-tls]. That is, the DOTS agent sends a Ping message and the peer DOTS agent would respond by sending a single Pong message.
5. DOTS Signal Channel YANG Module

This document defines a YANG [RFC7950] module for mitigation scope and DOTS signal channel session configuration data.

This YANG module defines the DOTS client interaction with the DOTS server as seen by the DOTS client. A DOTS server is allowed to update the non-configurable ‘ro’ entities in the responses. This YANG module is not intended to be used for DOTS servers management purposes. Such module is out of the scope of this document.

5.1. Tree Structure

This document defines the YANG module "ietf-dots-signal-channel" (Section 5.2), which has the following tree structure. A DOTS signal message can either be a mitigation or a configuration message.

```
module: ietf-dots-signal-channel
    +--rw dots-signal
        +--rw (message-type)?
        +--:(mitigation-scope)
            |   +--rw cdid? string
            |   +--rw scope* [cuid mid]
            |       +--rw cuid string
            |       +--rw mid uint32
            |       +--rw target-prefix* inet:ip-prefix
            |       +--rw target-port-range* [lower-port upper-port]
            |           +--rw lower-port inet:port-number
            |           +--rw upper-port inet:port-number
            |       +--rw target-protocol* uint8
            |       +--rw target-fqdn* inet:domain-name
            |       +--rw target-uri* inet:uri
            |       +--rw alias-name* string
            |       +--rw lifetime? int32
            |       +--ro mitigation-start? uint64
            |       +--ro status? enumeration
            |       +--ro conflict-information
            |           +--ro conflict-status? enumeration
            |           +--ro conflict-cause? enumeration
            |           +--ro retry-timer? uint32
            |           +--ro conflict-scope
            |               +--ro target-prefix* inet:ip-prefix
            |               +--ro target-port-range* [lower-port upper-port]
            |                 +--ro lower-port inet:port-number
            |                 +--ro upper-port inet:port-number
            |               +--ro target-protocol* uint8
            |               +--ro target-fqdn* inet:domain-name
            |               +--ro target-uri* inet:uri
```
5.2. YANG Module

```xml
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-dots-signal-channel@2018-01-23.yang"

module ietf-dots-signal-channel {
  yang-version 1.1;
  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-signal-channel";
  prefix signal;

  import ietf-inet-types {
    prefix inet;
  }
  import ietf-yang-types {
    prefix yang;
  }
  import ietf-access-control-list {
    prefix ietf-acl;
  }

  organization
    "IETF DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Working Group";
  contact
    "WG Web:  <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dots/>
    WG List:  <mailto:dots@ietf.org>
    Editor:  Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy
    <mailto:TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com>
    Editor:  Mohamed Boucadair
    <mailto:mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
    Author:  Prashanth Patil
    <mailto:praspati@cisco.com>

```
Author: Andrew Mortensen
<mailto:amortensen@arbor.net>
Author: Nik Teague
<mailto:nteague@verisign.com>

description
"This module contains YANG definition for the signaling
messages exchanged between a DOTS client and a DOTS server.

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This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices.

revision 2018-01-23 {
  description
    "Initial revision."
  reference
    "RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
    Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel";
}

/*
 * Groupings
 */

grouping target {
  description
    "Specifies the targets of the mitigation request."
  leaf-list target-prefix {
    type inet:ip-prefix;
    description
    "IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the target."
  }
  list target-port-range {
    key "lower-port upper-port";
    description
    "Port range. When only lower-port is
    present, it represents a single port number."
    leaf lower-port {

type inet:port-number;
mandatory true;
description
"Lower port number of the port range."
);
leaf upper-port {
  type inet:port-number;
  must ". >= ../lower-port"
    { 
      error-message
      "The upper port number must be greater than
                 or equal to lower port number."
    }
  description
  "Upper port number of the port range."
);
}

leaf-list target-protocol {
  type uint8;
  description
  "Identifies the target protocol number.

  The value '0' means 'all protocols'.

  Values are taken from the IANA protocol registry:
  https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/
  protocol-numbers.xhtml

  For example, 6 for TCP or 17 for UDP."
}
leaf-list target-fqdn {
  type inet:domain-name;
  description
  "FQDN identifying the target."
}
leaf-list target-uri {
  type inet:uri;
  description
  "URI identifying the target."
}

grouping mitigation-scope {
  description
  "Specifies the scope of the mitigation request."
  leaf cdid {
    type string;
    description
    "The cdid should be included by a server-domain
DOTS gateway to propagate the client domain identification information from the gateway’s client-facing-side to the gateway’s server-facing-side, and from the gateway’s server-facing-side to the DOTS server.

It may be used by the final DOTS server for policy enforcement purposes.

```yaml
list scope {
  key "cuid mid";
  description "The scope of the request.";
  leaf cuid {
    type string;
    description "A unique identifier that is randomly generated by a DOTS client to prevent request collisions. It is expected that the cuid will remain consistent throughout the lifetime of the DOTS client.";
  }
  leaf mid {
    type uint32;
    description "Mitigation request identifier.
    This identifier must be unique for each mitigation request bound to the DOTS client.";
  }
  uses target;
  leaf-list alias-name {
    type string;
    description "An alias name that points to a resource.";
  }
  leaf lifetime {
    type int32;
    units "seconds";
    default "3600";
    description "Indicates the lifetime of the mitigation request.
    A lifetime of ‘0’ in a mitigation request is an invalid value.
    A lifetime of negative one (-1) indicates indefinite lifetime for the mitigation request.";
  }
```

leaf mitigation-start {
  type uint64;
  config false;
  description
   "Mitigation start time is represented in seconds relative to 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z in UTC time.";
}

leaf status {
  type enumeration {
    enum "attack-mitigation-in-progress" {
      value 1;
      description
       "Attack mitigation is in progress (e.g., changing the network path to re-route the inbound traffic to DOTS mitigator).";
    }
    enum "attack-successfully-mitigated" {
      value 2;
      description
       "Attack is successfully mitigated (e.g., traffic is redirected to a DDoS mitigator and attack traffic is dropped or blackholed).";
    }
    enum "attack-stopped" {
      value 3;
      description
       "Attack has stopped and the DOTS client can withdraw the mitigation request.";
    }
    enum "attack-exceeded-capability" {
      value 4;
      description
       "Attack has exceeded the mitigation provider capability.";
    }
    enum "dots-client-withdrawn-mitigation" {
      value 5;
      description
       "DOTS client has withdrawn the mitigation request and the mitigation is active but terminating.";
    }
    enum "attack-mitigation-terminated" {
      value 6;
      description
       "Attack mitigation is now terminated.";
    }
  }
}
enum "attack-mitigation-withdrawn" {
    value 7;
    description
    "Attack mitigation is withdrawn.";
}

enum "attack-mitigation-rejected" {
    value 8;
    description
    "Attack mitigation is rejected.";
}

config false;

description
"Indicates the status of a mitigation request. It must be included in responses only.";

container conflict-information {
    config false;
    description
    "Indicates that a conflict is detected. Must only be used for responses.";
    leaf conflict-status {
        type enumeration {
            enum "request-inactive-other-active" {
                value 1;
                description
                "DOTS Server has detected conflicting mitigation requests from different DOTS clients. This mitigation request is currently inactive until the conflicts are resolved. Another mitigation request is active.";
            }
            enum "request-active" {
                value 2;
                description
                "DOTS Server has detected conflicting mitigation requests from different DOTS clients. This mitigation request is currently active.";
            }
            enum "all-requests-inactive" {
                value 3;
                description
                "DOTS Server has detected conflicting mitigation requests from different DOTS clients. All conflicting mitigation requests are inactive.";
            }
        }
    }
}

description
leaf conflict-cause {
  type enumeration {
    enum "overlapping-targets" {
      value 1;
      description
      "Overlapping targets. conflict-scope provides
      more details about the exact conflict.";
    }
    enum "conflict-with-whitelist" {
      value 2;
      description
      "Conflicts with an existing white list.
      This code is returned when the DDoS mitigation
detects that some of the source addresses/prefixes
listed in the white list ACLs are actually
attacking the target.";
    }
    enum "cuid-collision" {
      value 3;
      description
      "Conflicts with the cuid used by another
      DOTS client.";
    }
  }
  description
  "Indicates the cause of the conflict.";
}
leaf retry-timer {
  type uint32;
  units "seconds";
  description
  "The DOTS client must not re-send the
  same request that has a conflict before the expiry of
  this timer.";
}
container conflict-scope {
  description
  "Provides more information about the conflict scope.";
  uses target {
    when "/..../conflict-cause = 'overlapping-targets'";
  }
  leaf-list alias-name {
    when "/..../conflict-cause = 'overlapping-targets'";
    type string;
    description
  }
}
"Indicates the conflict status.";
}
"Conflicting alias-name."
}
list acl-list {
  when ".../conflict-cause = 'conflict-with-whitelist'"
  key "acl-name"
  description
  "List of conflicting ACLs as defined in the DOTS data
  channel. These ACLs are uniquely defined by
  cuid and acl-name."
  leaf acl-name {
    type leafref {
      path "/ietf-acl:access-lists/ietf-acl:acl/" +
            "ietf-acl:name"
    }
    description
    "Reference to the conflicting ACL name bound to
    a DOTS client."
  }
  leaf acl-type {
    type leafref {
      path "/ietf-acl:access-lists/ietf-acl:acl/" +
            "ietf-acl:type"
    }
    description
    "Reference to the conflicting ACL type bound to
    a DOTS client."
  }
}
leaf bytes-dropped {
  type yang:zero-based-counter64;
  units "bytes";
  config false;
  description
  "The total dropped byte count for the mitigation
  request since the attack mitigation is triggered.
  The count wraps around when it reaches the maximum value
  of counter64 for dropped bytes."
}
leaf bps-dropped {
  type yang:zero-based-counter64;
  config false;
  description
  "The average number of dropped bits per second for
  the mitigation request since the attack
  mitigation is triggered. This should be a
  five-minute average.";
}
leaf pkts-dropped {
    type yang:zero-based-counter64;
    config false;
    description
        "The total number of dropped packet count for the
        mitigation request since the attack mitigation is
        triggered. The count wraps around when it reaches
        the maximum value of counter64 for dropped packets.";
}
leaf pps-dropped {
    type yang:zero-based-counter64;
    config false;
    description
        "The average number of dropped packets per second
        for the mitigation request since the attack
        mitigation is triggered. This should be a
        five-minute average.";
}
leaf attack-status {
    type enumeration {
        enum "under-attack" {
            value 1;
            description
                "The DOTS client determines that it is still under
                attack.";
        }
        enum "attack-successfully-mitigated" {
            value 2;
            description
                "The DOTS client determines that the attack is
                successfully mitigated.";
        }
    }
    description
        "Indicates the status of an attack as seen by the
        DOTS client.";
}
}
grouping config-parameters {
    description
        "Subset of DOTS signal channel session configuration.";
    container heartbeat-interval {
        description
            "DOTS agents regularly send heartbeats to each other
            after mutual authentication is successfully
completed in order to keep the DOTS signal channel open.

leaf max-value {
    type uint16;
    units "seconds";
    config false;
    description
        "Maximum acceptable heartbeat-interval value.";
}

leaf min-value {
    type uint16;
    units "seconds";
    config false;
    description
        "Minimum acceptable heartbeat-interval value.";
}

leaf current-value {
    type uint16;
    units "seconds";
    default "30";
    description
        "Current heartbeat-interval value.
        ‘0’ means that heartbeat mechanism is deactivated.";
}

container missing-hb-allowed {
    description
        "Maximum number of missing heartbeats allowed.";
    leaf max-value {
        type uint16;
        config false;
        description
            "Maximum acceptable missing-hb-allowed value.";
    }
    leaf min-value {
        type uint16;
        config false;
        description
            "Minimum acceptable missing-hb-allowed value.";
    }
    leaf current-value {
        type uint16;
        default "5";
        description
            "Current missing-hb-allowed value.";
    }
}
container max-retransmit {
  description
  "Maximum number of retransmissions of a Confirmable message.";
  leaf max-value {
    type uint16;
    config false;
    description
    "Maximum acceptable max-retransmit value.";
  }
  leaf min-value {
    type uint16;
    config false;
    description
    "Minimum acceptable max-retransmit value.";
  }
  leaf current-value {
    type uint16;
    default "3";
    description
    "Current max-retransmit value.";
  }
}

container ack-timeout {
  description
  "Initial retransmission timeout value.";
  leaf max-value {
    type uint16;
    units "seconds";
    config false;
    description
    "Maximum ack-timeout value.";
  }
  leaf min-value {
    type uint16;
    units "seconds";
    config false;
    description
    "Minimum ack-timeout value.";
  }
  leaf current-value {
    type uint16;
    units "seconds";
    default "2";
    description
    "Current ack-timeout value.";
  }
}
container ack-random-factor {
    description
    "Random factor used to influence the timing of retransmissions.";
    leaf max-value-decimal {
        type decimal64 {
            fraction-digits 2;
        }
        config false;
        description
        "Maximum acceptable ack-random-factor value.";
    }
    leaf min-value-decimal {
        type decimal64 {
            fraction-digits 2;
        }
        config false;
        description
        "Minimum acceptable ack-random-factor value.";
    }
    leaf current-value-decimal {
        type decimal64 {
            fraction-digits 2;
        }
        default "1.5";
        description
        "Current ack-random-factor value.";
    }
}

grouping signal-config {
    description
    "DOTS signal channel session configuration.";
    leaf sid {
        type uint32;
        mandatory true;
        description
        "An identifier for the DOTS signal channel session configuration data.";
    }
    container mitigating-config {
        description
        "Configuration parameters to use when a mitigation is active.";
        uses config-parameters;
    }
    container idle-config {
description
"Configuration parameters to use when no mitigation
is active.";
uses config-parameters;
}
leaf trigger-mitigation {
type boolean;
default "true";
description
"If false, then mitigation is triggered
only when the DOTS server channel session is lost.";
}
leaf config-interval {
type uint32;
units "seconds";
default "3600";
config false;
description
"This parameter is returned by a DOTS server to
a requesting DOTS client to indicate the time interval
after which the DOTS client must contact the DOTS
server in order to retrieve the signal channel
configuration data.

This mechanism allows the update of the configuration
data if a change occurs.

For example, the new configuration may instruct
a DOTS client to cease heartbeats or reduce
heartbeat frequency.

'0' is used to disable this refresh mechanism.";
}
}
grouping redirected-signal {
description
"Grouping for the redirected signaling.";
leaf alt-server {
type string;
config false;
mandatory true;
description
"FQDN of an alternate server.";
}
list alt-server-record {
key "addr";
config false;
description
"List of records for the alternate server."
leaf addr {
    type inet:ip-address;
    description
    "An IPv4 or IPv6 address identifying the server.";
}
leaf ttl {
    type uint32;
    description
    "TTL associated with this record.";
}

/**<*
/* Main Container for DOTS Signal Channel
*/
container dots-signal {
    description
    "Main container for DOTS signal message.
    A DOTS signal message can be a mitigation, a configuration,
    or a redirected signal message.";
    choice message-type {
        description
        "Can be a mitigation, a configuration, or a redirect
        message.";
        case mitigation-scope {
            description
            "Mitigation scope of a mitigation message.";
            uses mitigation-scope;
        }
        case signal-config {
            description
            "Configuration message.";
            uses signal-config;
        }
        case redirected-signal {
            description
            "Redirected signaling.";
            uses redirected-signal;
        }
    }
}<CODE ENDS>
6. Mapping Parameters to CBOR

All parameters in the payload of the DOTS signal channel MUST be mapped to CBOR types as shown in Table 4 and are assigned an integer key to save space. The recipient of the payload MAY reject the information if it is not suitably mapped.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter Name</th>
<th>YANG Type</th>
<th>CBOR Key</th>
<th>CBOR Major Type &amp; Information</th>
<th>JSON Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope</td>
<td>container</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5 map</td>
<td>Object</td>
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<td>cdid</td>
<td>string</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3 text string</td>
<td>String</td>
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<td>scope</td>
<td>list</td>
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<td>4 array</td>
<td>Array</td>
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<td>String</td>
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<td>lower-port</td>
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<td>enumeration</td>
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<td>String</td>
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<td>Number</td>
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<td></td>
<td>7 bits 21</td>
<td>True</td>
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<td>0 unsigned</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ietf-dots-signal-cha</td>
<td>container</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>5 map</td>
<td>Object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nnel:redirected-signal</td>
<td>container</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>3 text string</td>
<td>String</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alt-server</td>
<td>string</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>4 array</td>
<td>Array</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alt-server-record</td>
<td>list</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Array</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>addr</td>
<td>inet:ip-address</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3 text string</td>
<td>String</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ttl</td>
<td>uint32</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0 unsigned</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: CBOR Mappings Used in DOTS Signal Channel Messages
7. (D)TLS Protocol Profile and Performance Considerations

7.1. (D)TLS Protocol Profile

This section defines the (D)TLS protocol profile of DOTS signal channel over (D)TLS and DOTS data channel over TLS.

There are known attacks on (D)TLS, such as man-in-the-middle and protocol downgrade attacks. These are general attacks on (D)TLS and, as such, they are not specific to DOTS over (D)TLS; refer to the (D)TLS RFCs for discussion of these security issues. DOTS agents MUST adhere to the (D)TLS implementation recommendations and security considerations of [RFC7525] except with respect to (D)TLS version. Since DOTS signal channel encryption relies upon (D)TLS is virtually a green-field deployment, DOTS agents MUST implement only (D)TLS 1.2 or later.

When a DOTS client is configured with a domain name of the DOTS server, and connects to its configured DOTS server, the server may present it with a PKIX certificate. In order to ensure proper authentication, a DOTS client MUST verify the entire certification path per [RFC5280]. The DOTS client additionally uses [RFC6125] validation techniques to compare the domain name with the certificate provided.

A key challenge to deploying DOTS is the provisioning of DOTS clients, including the distribution of keying material to DOTS clients to enable the required mutual authentication of DOTS agents. EST defines a method of certificate enrollment by which domains operating DOTS servers may provide DOTS clients with all the necessary cryptographic keying material, including a private key and a certificate to authenticate themselves. One deployment option is DOTS clients behave as EST clients for certificate enrollment from an EST server provisioned by the mitigation provider. This document does not specify which EST mechanism the DOTS client uses to achieve initial enrollment.

The Server Name Indication (SNI) extension [RFC6066] defines a mechanism for a client to tell a (D)TLS server the name of the server it wants to contact. This is a useful extension for hosting environments where multiple virtual servers are reachable over a single IP address. The DOTS client may or may not know if it is interacting with a DOTS server in a virtual server hosting environment, so the DOTS client SHOULD include the DOTS server FQDN in the SNI extension.

Implementations compliant with this profile MUST implement all of the following items:
DTLS record replay detection (Section 3.3 of [RFC6347]) to protect against replay attacks.

(D)TLS session resumption without server-side state [RFC5077] to resume session and convey the DOTS signal.

Raw public keys [RFC7250] or PSK handshake [RFC4279] which reduces the size of the ServerHello, and can be used by DOTS agents that cannot obtain certificates.

Implementations compliant with this profile SHOULD implement all of the following items to reduce the delay required to deliver a DOTS signal channel message:

- TLS False Start [RFC7918] which reduces round-trips by allowing the TLS second flight of messages (ChangeCipherSpec) to also contain the DOTS signal.

- Cached Information Extension [RFC7924] which avoids transmitting the server’s certificate and certificate chain if the client has cached that information from a previous TLS handshake.

- TCP Fast Open [RFC7413] can reduce the number of round-trips to convey DOTS signal channel message.

7.2. (D)TLS 1.3 Considerations

TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] provides critical latency improvements for connection establishment over TLS 1.2. The DTLS 1.3 protocol [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] is based upon the TLS 1.3 protocol and provides equivalent security guarantees. (D)TLS 1.3 provides two basic handshake modes the DOTS signal channel can take advantage of:

- A full handshake mode in which a DOTS client can send a DOTS mitigation request message after one round trip and the DOTS server immediately responds with a DOTS mitigation response. This assumes no packet loss is experienced.

- 0-RTT mode in which the DOTS client can authenticate itself and send DOTS mitigation request messages in the first message, thus reducing handshake latency. 0-RTT only works if the DOTS client has previously communicated with that DOTS server, which is very likely with the DOTS signal channel.

The DOTS client has to establish a (D)TLS session with the DOTS server during peacetime and share a PSK.
During a DDoS attack, the DOTS client can use the (D)TLS session to convey the DOTS mitigation request message and, if there is no response from the server after multiple retries, the DOTS client can resume the (D)TLS session in 0-RTT mode using PSK.

Section 8 of [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] discusses some mechanisms to implement to limit the impact of replay attacks on 0-RTT data. If TLS1.3 is used, DOTS servers must implement one of these mechanisms.

A simplified TLS 1.3 handshake with 0-RTT DOTS mitigation request message exchange is shown in Figure 25.

DOTS Client                                    DOTS Server

ClientHello
  (Finished)
  (0-RTT DOTS signal message)
  (end_of_early_data)
  -------->                      ServerHello
                                 {EncryptedExtensions}
                                 {ServerConfiguration}
                                 {Certificate}
                                 {CertificateVerify}
                                 {Finished}
  -------<                      [DOTS signal message]
                                 [DOTS signal message]
                                 [DOTS signal message]
                                 [DOTS signal message]
                                 -------->                      -------->

Figure 25: TLS 1.3 handshake with 0-RTT

7.3. MTU and Fragmentation

To avoid DOTS signal message fragmentation and the subsequent decreased probability of message delivery, DOTS agents MUST ensure that the DTLS record MUST fit within a single datagram. If the path MTU is not known to the DOTS server, an IP MTU of 1280 bytes SHOULD be assumed. If UDP is used to convey the DOTS signal messages then the DOTS client must consider the amount of record expansion expected by the DTLS processing when calculating the size of CoAP message that fits within the path MTU. Path MTU MUST be greater than or equal to [CoAP message size + DTLS overhead of 13 octets + authentication overhead of the negotiated DTLS cipher suite + block padding (Section 4.1.1.1 of [RFC6347])]. If the request size exceeds the path MTU then the DOTS client MUST split the DOTS signal into separate messages, for example the list of addresses in the ‘target-prefix’
parameter could be split into multiple lists and each list conveyed in a new PUT request.

Implementation Note: DOTS choice of message size parameters works well with IPv6 and with most of today’s IPv4 paths. However, with IPv4, it is harder to reliably ensure that there is no IP fragmentation. If IPv4 path MTU is unknown, implementations may want to limit themselves to more conservative IPv4 datagram sizes such as 576 bytes, as per [RFC0791]. IP packets whose size does not exceed 576 bytes should never need to be fragmented: therefore, sending a maximum of 500 bytes of DOTS signal over a UDP datagram will generally avoid IP fragmentation.

8. Mutual Authentication of DOTS Agents & Authorization of DOTS Clients

(D)TLS based upon client certificate can be used for mutual authentication between DOTS agents. If a DOTS gateway is involved, DOTS clients and DOTS gateways MUST perform mutual authentication; only authorized DOTS clients are allowed to send DOTS signals to a DOTS gateway. The DOTS gateway and the DOTS server MUST perform mutual authentication; a DOTS server only allows DOTS signal channel messages from an authorized DOTS gateway, thereby creating a two-link chain of transitive authentication between the DOTS client and the DOTS server.

The DOTS server SHOULD support certificate-based client authentication. The DOTS client SHOULD respond to the DOTS server’s TLS certificate request message with the PKIX certificate held by the DOTS client. DOTS client certificate validation MUST be performed as per [RFC5280] and the DOTS client certificate MUST conform to the [RFC5280] certificate profile. If a DOTS client does not support TLS client certificate authentication, it MUST support pre-shared key based or raw public key based client authentication.
In the example depicted in Figure 26, the DOTS gateway and DOTS clients within the 'example.com' domain mutually authenticate with each other. After the DOTS gateway validates the identity of a DOTS client, it communicates with the AAA server in the 'example.com' domain to determine if the DOTS client is authorized to request DDoS mitigation. If the DOTS client is not authorized, a 4.01 (Unauthorized) is returned in the response to the DOTS client. In this example, the DOTS gateway only allows the application server and DDoS attack detector to request DDoS mitigation, but does not permit the user of type 'guest' to request DDoS mitigation.

Also, DOTS gateways and servers located in different domains MUST perform mutual authentication (e.g., using certificates). A DOTS server will only allow a DOTS gateway with a certificate for a particular domain to request mitigation for that domain. In reference to Figure 26, the DOTS server only allows the DOTS gateway to request mitigation for 'example.com' domain and not for other domains.
9. IANA Considerations

This specification registers a service port (Section 9.1), a URI suffix in the Well-Known URIs registry (Section 9.2), a CoAP response code (Section 9.3), a YANG module (Section 9.5). It also creates a registry for mappings to CBOR (Section 9.4).

9.1. DOTS Signal Channel UDP and TCP Port Number

IANA is requested to assign the port number TBD to the DOTS signal channel protocol for both UDP and TCP from the "Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry" available at https://www.iana.org/assignments/service-names-port-numbers/service-names-port-numbers.xhtml.

The assignment of port number 4646 is strongly suggested, as 4646 is the ASCII decimal value for "." (DOTS).

9.2. Well-Known ‘dots’ URI

This document requests IANA to register the ‘dots’ well-known URI in the Well-Known URIs registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris/well-known-uris.xhtml) as defined by [RFC5785]:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>URI suffix</th>
<th>Change controller</th>
<th>Specification document(s)</th>
<th>Related information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>dots</td>
<td>IETF</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: ‘dots’ well-known URI

9.3. CoAP Response Code

IANA is requested to add the following entry to the "CoAP Response Codes" sub-registry available at https://www.iana.org/assignments/core-parameters/core-parameters.xhtml#response-codes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>Alternate Server</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: CoAP Response Code
9.4. DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Mappings Registry

The document requests IANA to create a new registry, entitled "DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Mappings Registry". The structure of this registry is provided in Section 9.4.1.

The registry is initially populated with the values in Section 9.4.2. Values from that registry MUST be assigned via Expert Review [RFC8126].

9.4.1. Registration Template

Parameter name:
Parameter name as used in the DOTS signal channel.

CBOR Key Value:
Key value for the parameter. The key value MUST be an integer in the 1-65536 range. The key values in the 32758-65536 range are assigned to Vendor-Specific parameters.

CBOR Major Type:
CBOR Major type and optional tag for the claim.

Change Controller:
For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG". For others, give the name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.

Specification Document(s):
Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter, preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be included but is not required.

9.4.2. Initial Registry Content

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter Name</th>
<th>CBOR Key Value</th>
<th>CBOR Major Type</th>
<th>Change Controller</th>
<th>Specification Document(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ietf-dots-signal-channel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nel:mitigation-scope</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cdid</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scope</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cuid</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Format</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>target-prefix</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>target-port-range</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lower-port</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>upper-port</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>target-protocol</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>target-fqdn</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>target-uri</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alias-name</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
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<td>lifetime</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0/1</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mitigation-start</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
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<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
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<td>conflict-cause</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>retry-timer</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
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<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acl-list</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acl-name</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acl-type</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pkts-dropped</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pps-dropped</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
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<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sid</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mitigating-config</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>heartbeat-interval</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>min-value</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>max-value</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>current-value</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>missing-hb-allowed</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>max-retransmit</td>
<td>38</td>
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<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
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<td>ack-timeout</td>
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<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ack-random-factor</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
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<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
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<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6tag4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trigger-mitigation</td>
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<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>config-interval</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ietf-dots-signal-chan</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nel:redirected-signal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alt-server</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alt-server-record</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>addr</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9.5. DOTS Signal Channel YANG Module

This document requests IANA to register the following URI in the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:

Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.

This document requests IANA to register the following YANG module in the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC7950].

name: ietf-signal
prefix: signal
reference: RFC XXXX

10. Implementation Status

[Note to RFC Editor: Please remove this section and reference to [RFC7942] prior to publication.]

This section records the status of known implementations of the protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting this Internet-Draft, and is based upon a proposal described in [RFC7942]. The description of implementations in this section is intended to assist the IETF in its decision-making process when progressing drafts to RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information presented here, and which was provided by individuals. This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may exist.

According to [RFC7942], "this will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature. It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as they see fit".
10.1. nttdots

Organization: NTT Communication is developing a DOTS client and DOTS server software based on DOTS signal channel specified in this draft. It will be open-sourced.

Description: Early implementation of DOTS protocol. It is aimed to implement a full DOTS protocol specification in accordance with the nurturing DOTS protocol.

Implementation: https://github.com/nttdots/go-dots

Level of maturity: It is an early implementation of the DOTS protocol. Messaging between DOTS clients and DOTS servers has been tested. Level of maturity will increase in accordance with the nurturing DOTS protocol.

Coverage: Capability of DOTS client: sending DOTS messages to the DOTS server in CoAP over DTLS as dots-signal. Capability of DOTS server: receiving dots-signal, validating received dots-signal, starting mitigation by handing over the dots-signal to DDoS mitigator.

Licensing: It will be open-sourced with BSD 3-clause license.

Implementation experience: It is implemented in Go-lang. Core specification of signaling is mature to be implemented, however, finding good libraries (like DTLS, CoAP) is rather difficult.

Contact: Kaname Nishizuka <kaname@nttv6.jp>

11. Security Considerations

Authenticated encryption MUST be used for data confidentiality and message integrity. The interaction between the DOTS agents requires Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) with a cipher suite offering confidentiality protection and the guidance given in [RFC7525] MUST be followed to avoid attacks on (D)TLS. The (D)TLS protocol profile for DOTS signal channel is specified in Section 7.

A single DOTS signal channel between DOTS agents can be used to exchange multiple DOTS signal messages. To reduce DOTS client and DOTS server workload, DOTS clients SHOULD re-use the (D)TLS session.

If TCP is used between DOTS agents, an attacker may be able to inject RST packets, bogus application segments, etc., regardless of whether TLS authentication is used. Because the application data is TLS
protected, this will not result in the application receiving bogus data, but it will constitute a DoS on the connection. This attack can be countered by using TCP-AO [RFC5925]. If TCP-AO is used, then any bogus packets injected by an attacker will be rejected by the TCP-AO integrity check and therefore will never reach the TLS layer.

Rate-limiting DOTS requests, including those with new ‘cuid’ values, from the same DOTS client defends against DoS attacks that would result in varying the ‘cuid’ to exhaust DOTS server resources. Rate-limit policies SHOULD be enforced on DOTS gateways (if deployed) and DOTS servers.

In order to prevent leaking internal information outside a client-domain, DOTS gateways located in the client-domain SHOULD NOT reveal the identification information that pertains to internal DOTS clients (e.g., source IP address, client’s hostname) unless explicitly configured to do so.

Special care should be taken in order to ensure that the activation of the proposed mechanism will not impact the stability of the network (including connectivity and services delivered over that network).

12. Contributors

The following individuals have contributed to this document:

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- Jon Shallow, NCC Group, Email: jon.shallow@nccgroup.trust

13. Acknowledgements

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Special thanks to Jon Shallow for the careful reviews and inputs that enhanced this specification.
14. References

14.1. Normative References

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Abstract

This document specifies the DOTS signal channel, a protocol for signaling the need for protection against Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks to a server capable of enabling network traffic mitigation on behalf of the requesting client.

A companion document defines the DOTS data channel, a separate reliable communication layer for DOTS management and configuration purposes.

Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)

Please update these statements within the document with the RFC number to be assigned to this document:

- "This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX;"
- "RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification;"
- " | [RFCXXXX] |"
- reference: RFC XXXX

Please update TBD statements with the port number to be assigned to DOTS Signal Channel Protocol.

Also, please update the "revision" date of the YANG module.
Status of This Memo

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction .................................................. 3
2. Terminology .................................................. 5
3. Design Overview .............................................. 6
4. DOTS Signal Channel: Messages & Behaviors .................. 8
   4.1. DOTS Server(s) Discovery ............................... 8
   4.2. CoAP URIs .............................................. 9
   4.3. Happy Eyeballs for DOTS Signal Channel ............... 9
   4.4. DOTS Mitigation Methods .............................. 10
       4.4.1. Request Mitigation ............................. 11
       4.4.2. Retrieve Information Related to a Mitigation .... 27
           4.4.2.1. DOTS Servers Sending Mitigation Status ..... 31
           4.4.2.2. DOTS Clients Polling for Mitigation Status .. 34
       4.4.3. Efficacy Update from DOTS Clients ............... 35
       4.4.4. Withdraw a Mitigation ........................... 37
1. Introduction

A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack is an attempt to make machines or network resources unavailable to their intended users. In most cases, sufficient scale can be achieved by compromising enough end-hosts and using those infected hosts to perpetrate and amplify the attack. The victim in this attack can be an application server, a host, a router, a firewall, or an entire network.

Network applications have finite resources like CPU cycles, the number of processes or threads they can create and use, the maximum number of simultaneous connections it can handle, the limited resources of the control plane, etc. When processing network traffic, such applications are supposed to use these resources to
offer the intended task in the most efficient manner. However, a DDoS attacker may be able to prevent an application from performing its intended task by making the application exhaust its finite resources.

TCP DDoS SYN-flood, for example, is a memory-exhausting attack while ACK-flood is a CPU-exhausting attack [RFC4987]. Attacks on the link are carried out by sending enough traffic so that the link becomes congested, thereby likely causing packet loss for legitimate traffic. Stateful firewalls can also be attacked by sending traffic that causes the firewall to maintain an excessive number of states that may jeopardize the firewall’s operation overall, besides likely performance impacts. The firewall then runs out of memory, and can no longer instantiate the states required to process legitimate flows. Other possible DDoS attacks are discussed in [RFC4732].

In many cases, it may not be possible for network administrators to determine the cause(s) of an attack. They may instead just realize that certain resources seem to be under attack. This document defines a lightweight protocol that allows a DOTS client to request mitigation from one or more DOTS servers for protection against detected, suspected, or anticipated attacks. This protocol enables cooperation between DOTS agents to permit a highly-automated network defense that is robust, reliable, and secure.

An example of a network diagram that illustrates a deployment of DOTS agents is shown in Figure 1. In this example, a DOTS server is operating on the access network. A DOTS client is located on the LAN (Local Area Network), while a DOTS gateway is embedded in the CPE (Customer Premises Equipment).

DOTS servers can also be reachable over the Internet, as depicted in Figure 2.
In typical deployments, the DOTS client belongs to a different administrative domain than the DOTS server. For example, the DOTS client is embedded in a firewall protecting services owned and operated by a customer, while the DOTS server is owned and operated by a different administrative entity (service provider, typically) providing DDoS mitigation services. The latter might or might not provide connectivity services to the network hosting the DOTS client.

The DOTS server may (not) be co-located with the DOTS mitigator. In typical deployments, the DOTS server belongs to the same administrative domain as the mitigator. The DOTS client can communicate directly with a DOTS server or indirectly via a DOTS gateway.

The document adheres to the DOTS architecture [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]. The requirements for DOTS signal channel protocol are documented in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]. This document satisfies all the use cases discussed in [I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases].

This document focuses on the DOTS signal channel. This is a companion document of the DOTS data channel specification [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel] that defines a configuration and a bulk data exchange mechanism supporting the DOTS signal channel.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

(D)TLS is used for statements that apply to both Transport Layer Security [RFC5246] and Datagram Transport Layer Security [RFC6347]. Specific terms are used for any statement that applies to either protocol alone.
The reader should be familiar with the terms defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements].

The meaning of the symbols in YANG tree diagrams is defined in [RFC8340].

3. Design Overview

The DOTS signal channel is built on top of the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252], a lightweight protocol originally designed for constrained devices and networks. The many features of CoAP (expectation of packet loss, support for asynchronous Non-confirmable messaging, congestion control, small message overhead limiting the need for fragmentation, use of minimal resources, and support for (D)TLS) makes it a good candidate to build the DOTS signaling mechanism from.

The DOTS signal channel is layered on existing standards (Figure 3).

```
+---------------------+
| DOTS Signal Channel |
+---------------------+
| CoAP                |
+----------+----------+
| TLS      | DTLS     |
+----------+----------+
| TCP      | UDP      |
+----------+----------+
| IP       |
```

Figure 3: Abstract Layering of DOTS Signal Channel over CoAP over (D)TLS

By default, a DOTS signal channel MUST run over port number TBD as defined in Section 9.1, for both UDP and TCP, unless the DOTS server has a mutual agreement with its DOTS clients to use a different port number. DOTS clients MAY alternatively support means to dynamically discover the ports used by their DOTS servers. In order to use a distinct port number (as opposed to TBD), DOTS clients and servers SHOULD support a configurable parameter to supply the port number to use. The rationale for not using the default port number 5684 ((D)TLS CoAP) is to allow for differentiated behaviors in environments where both a DOTS gateway and an IoT gateway (e.g., Figure 3 of [RFC7452]) are present.

The signal channel uses the "coaps" URI scheme defined in Section 6 of [RFC7252] and "coaps+tcp" URI scheme defined in Section 8.2 of
[RFC8323] to identify DOTS server resources accessible using CoAP over UDP secured with DTLS and CoAP over TCP secured with TLS.

The signal channel is initiated by the DOTS client (Section 4.4). Once the signal channel is established, the DOTS agents periodically send heartbeats to keep the channel active (Section 4.7). At any time, the DOTS client may send a mitigation request message to a DOTS server over the active channel. While mitigation is active because of the higher likelihood of packet loss during a DDoS attack, the DOTS server periodically sends status messages to the client, including basic mitigation feedback details. Mitigation remains active until the DOTS client explicitly terminates mitigation, or the mitigation lifetime expires.

DOTS signaling can happen with DTLS [RFC6347] over UDP and TLS [RFC5246] over TCP. Likewise, DOTS requests may be sent using IPv4 or IPv6 transfer capabilities. A Happy Eyeballs procedure for DOTS signal channel is specified in Section 4.3.

Messages exchanged between DOTS agents are serialized using Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC7049], a binary encoding scheme designed for small code and message size. CBOR-encoded payloads are used to carry signal channel-specific payload messages which convey request parameters and response information such as errors. In order to allow the use of the same data models, [RFC7951] specifies the JSON encoding of YANG-modeled data. A similar effort for CBOR is defined in [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor].

From that standpoint, this document specifies a YANG module for representing DOTS mitigation scopes, DOTS signal channel session configuration data, and DOTS redirected signalling (Section 5). Representing these data as CBOR data is assumed to follow the rules in [I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor] or those in [RFC7951] combined with JSON/CBOR conversion rules in [RFC7049]. All parameters in the payload of the DOTS signal channel are mapped to CBOR types as specified in Section 6.

In order to prevent fragmentation, DOTS agents must follow the recommendations documented in Section 4.6 of [RFC7252]. Refer to Section 7.3 for more details.

DOTS agents MUST support GET, PUT, and DELETE CoAP methods. The payload included in CoAP responses with 2.xx and 3.xx Response Codes MUST be of content type "application/cbor" (Section 5.5.1 of [RFC7252]). CoAP responses with 4.xx and 5.xx error Response Codes MUST include a diagnostic payload (Section 5.5.2 of [RFC7252]). The Diagnostic Payload may contain additional information to aid troubleshooting.
In deployments where multiple DOTS clients are enabled in a network (owned and operated by the same entity), the DOTS server may detect conflicting mitigation requests from these clients. This document does not aim to specify a comprehensive list of conditions under which a DOTS server will characterize two mitigation requests from distinct DOTS clients as conflicting, nor recommend a DOTS server behavior for processing conflicting mitigation requests. Those considerations are implementation- and deployment-specific. Nevertheless, the document specifies the mechanisms to notify DOTS clients when conflicts occur, including the conflict cause (Section 4.4).

In deployments where one or more translators (e.g., Traditional NAT [RFC3022], CGN [RFC6888], NAT64 [RFC6146], NPTv6 [RFC6296]) are enabled between the client’s network and the DOTS server, DOTS signal channel messages forwarded to a DOTS server MUST NOT include internal IP addresses/prefixes and/or port numbers; external addresses/prefixes and/or port numbers as assigned by the translator MUST be used instead. This document does not make any recommendation about possible translator discovery mechanisms. The following are some (non-exhaustive) deployment examples that may be considered:

- Port Control Protocol (PCP) [RFC6887] or Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) [RFC5389] may be used to retrieve the external addresses/prefixes and/or port numbers. Information retrieved by means of PCP or STUN will be used to feed the DOTS signal channel messages that will be sent to a DOTS server.

- A DOTS gateway may be co-located with the translator. The DOTS gateway will need to update the DOTS messages, based upon the local translator’s binding table.

4. DOTS Signal Channel: Messages & Behaviors

4.1. DOTS Server(s) Discovery

This document assumes that DOTS clients are provisioned with the reachability information of their DOTS server(s) using a variety of means (e.g., local configuration, or dynamic means such as DHCP). The description of such means is out of scope of this document.

Likewise, it is out of scope of this document to specify the behavior to be followed by a DOTS client to send DOTS requests when multiple DOTS servers are provisioned (e.g., contact all DOTS servers, select one DOTS server among the list).
4.2. CoAP URIs

The DOTS server MUST support the use of the path-prefix of "/.well-known/" as defined in [RFC5785] and the registered name of "dots". Each DOTS operation is indicated by a path-suffix that indicates the intended operation. The operation path (Table 1) is appended to the path-prefix to form the URI used with a CoAP request to perform the desired DOTS operation.

| Operation             | Operation Path | Details     |
|-----------------------|----------------+-------------|
| Mitigation            | /v1/mitigate   | Section 4.4 |
| Session configuration | /v1/config     | Section 4.5 |

Table 1: Operations and their Corresponding URIs

4.3. Happy Eyeballs for DOTS Signal Channel

[I-D.ietf-dots-requirements] mentions that DOTS agents will have to support both connectionless and connection-oriented protocols. As such, the DOTS signal channel is designed to operate with DTLS over UDP and TLS over TCP. Further, a DOTS client may acquire a list of IPv4 and IPv6 addresses (Section 4.1), each of which can be used to contact the DOTS server using UDP and TCP. The following specifies the procedure to follow to select the address family and the transport protocol for sending DOTS signal channel messages.

Such procedure is needed to avoid experiencing long connection delays. For example, if an IPv4 path to reach a DOTS server is found, but the DOTS server’s IPv6 path is not working, a dual-stack DOTS client may experience a significant connection delay compared to an IPv4-only DOTS client. The other problem is that if a middlebox between the DOTS client and DOTS server is configured to block UDP traffic, the DOTS client will fail to establish a DTLS session with the DOTS server and, as a consequence, will have to fall back to TLS over TCP, thereby incurring significant connection delays.

To overcome these connection setup problems, the DOTS client attempts to connect to its DOTS server(s) using both IPv6 and IPv4, and tries both DTLS over UDP and TLS over TCP in a manner similar to the Happy Eyeballs mechanism [RFC8305]. These connection attempts are performed by the DOTS client when it initializes. The results of the Happy Eyeballs procedure are used by the DOTS client for sending its subsequent messages to the DOTS server.
The order of preference of the DOTS signal channel address family and transport protocol (most preferred first) is: UDP over IPv6, UDP over IPv4, TCP over IPv6, and finally TCP over IPv4. This order adheres to the address preference order specified in [RFC6724] and the DOTS signal channel preference which privileges the use of UDP over TCP (to avoid TCP’s head of line blocking).

In reference to Figure 4, the DOTS client sends two TCP SYN packets and two DTLS ClientHello messages at the same time over IPv6 and IPv4. In this example, it is assumed that the IPv6 path is broken and UDP traffic is dropped by a middlebox but has little impact to the DOTS client because there is no long delay before using IPv4 and TCP. The DOTS client repeats the mechanism to discover whether DOTS signal channel messages with DTLS over UDP becomes available from the DOTS server, so the DOTS client can migrate the DOTS signal channel from TCP to UDP. Such probing SHOULD NOT be done more frequently than every 24 hours and MUST NOT be done more frequently than every 5 minutes.

```
+-----------+                                           +-----------+
|DOTS client|                                           |DOTS server|
+-----------+                                           +-----------+
    |                                                       |
    |--DTLS ClientHello, IPv6 ---->X                      |
    |--TCP SYN, IPv6-------------->X                     |
    |--DTLS ClientHello, IPv4 ---->X                     |
    |--TCP SYN, IPv4--------------------------------------->|
    |--DTLS ClientHello, IPv6 ---->X                      |
    |--TCP SYN, IPv6-------------->X                     |
    <-TCP SYNACK-------------------------------------------|
    |--DTLS ClientHello, IPv4 ---->X                      |
    |--TCP ACK--------------------------------------------->|
    |<----------------Establish TLS Session------------------>
    |----------------DOTS signal-------------------------->
```

Figure 4: DOTS Happy Eyeballs

4.4. DOTS Mitigation Methods

The following methods are used by a DOTS client to request, withdraw, or retrieve the status of mitigation requests:

PUT: DOTS clients use the PUT method to request mitigation from a DOTS server (Section 4.4.1). During active mitigation, DOTS clients may use PUT requests to carry mitigation efficacy updates to the DOTS server (Section 4.4.3).
GET: DOTS clients may use the GET method to subscribe to DOTS server status messages, or to retrieve the list of its mitigations maintained by a DOTS server (Section 4.4.2).

DELETE: DOTS clients use the DELETE method to withdraw a request for mitigation from a DOTS server (Section 4.4.4).

Mitigation request and response messages are marked as Non-confirmable messages (Section 2.2 of [RFC7252]).

DOTS agents SHOULD follow the data transmission guidelines discussed in Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8085] and control transmission behavior by not sending more than one UDP datagram per round-trip time (RTT) to the peer DOTS agent on average.

Requests marked by the DOTS client as Non-confirmable messages are sent at regular intervals until a response is received from the DOTS server. If the DOTS client cannot maintain an RTT estimate, it SHOULD NOT send more than one Non-confirmable request every 3 seconds, and SHOULD use an even less aggressive rate whenever possible (case 2 in Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8085]).

4.4.1. Request Mitigation

When a DOTS client requires mitigation for some reason, the DOTS client uses the CoAP PUT method to send a mitigation request to its DOTS server(s) (Figure 5, illustrated in JSON diagnostic notation).

If a DOTS client is entitled to solicit the DOTS service, the DOTS server can enable mitigation on behalf of the DOTS client by communicating the DOTS client’s request to a mitigator and relaying the feedback of the thus-selected mitigator to the requesting DOTS client.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "version"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFbtr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "mid=123"
Content-Type: "application/cbor"

{  
"ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
  "scope": [{
    "target-prefix": [
      "string"
    ],
    "target-port-range": [
      {
        "lower-port": integer,
        "upper-port": integer
      }
    ],
    "target-protocol": [integer
    ],
    "target-fqdn": ["string"
    ],
    "target-uri": [
      "string"
    ],
    "alias-name": [
      "string"
    ],
    "lifetime": integer,
    "trigger-mitigation": boolean
  }
}  
}

Figure 5: PUT to Convey DOTS Mitigation Requests

The Uri-Path option carries a major and minor version nomenclature to manage versioning; DOTS signal channel in this specification uses 'v1' major version.
The order of the Uri-Path options is important as it defines the CoAP resource. In particular, ‘mid’ MUST follow ‘cuid’.

The additional Uri-Path parameters to those defined in Section 4.2 are as follows:

cuid: Stands for Client Unique Identifier. A globally unique identifier that is meant to prevent collisions among DOTS clients, especially those from the same domain. It MUST be generated by DOTS clients.

Implementations SHOULD use the output of a cryptographic hash algorithm whose input is the DER-encoded ASN.1 representation of the Subject Public Key Info (SPKI) of the DOTS client X.509 certificate [RFC5280], the DOTS client raw public key [RFC7250], or the “PSK identity” used by the DOTS client in the TLS ClientKeyExchange message to set ‘cuid’. In this version of the specification, the cryptographic hash algorithm used is SHA-256 [RFC6234]. The output of the cryptographic hash algorithm is truncated to 16 bytes; truncation is done by stripping off the final 16 bytes. The truncated output is base64url encoded.

The ‘cuid’ is intended to be stable when communicating with a given DOTS server, i.e., the ‘cuid’ used by a DOTS client SHOULD NOT change over time. Distinct ‘cuid’ values MAY be used per DOTS server.

DOTS servers MUST return 4.09 (Conflict) error code to a DOTS peer to notify that the ‘cuid’ is already in-use by another DOTS client. Upon receipt of that error code, a new ‘cuid’ MUST be generated by the DOTS peer.

Client-domain DOTS gateways MUST handle ‘cuid’ collision directly and it is RECOMMENDED that ‘cuid’ collision is handled directly by server-domain DOTS gateways.

DOTS gateways MAY rewrite the ‘cuid’ used by peer DOTS clients. Triggers for such rewriting are out of scope.

This is a mandatory Uri-Path.

mid: Identifier for the mitigation request represented with an integer. This identifier MUST be unique for each mitigation request bound to the DOTS client, i.e., the ‘mid’ parameter value in the mitigation request needs to be unique relative to the ‘mid’ parameter values of active mitigation requests conveyed from the DOTS client to the DOTS server.
In order to handle out-of-order delivery of mitigation requests, ‘mid’ values MUST increase monotonically.

If the ‘mid’ value has reached 3/4 of (2**32 - 1) (i.e., 3221225471) and it is peace-time, the DOTS client MUST reset ‘mid’ to 0 to handle ‘mid’ rollover. If the DOTS client maintains mitigation requests with pre-configured scopes, it MUST re-create them with the ‘mid’ restarting at 0.

This identifier MUST be generated by the DOTS client.

This is a mandatory Uri-Path parameter.

‘cuid’ and ‘mid’ MUST NOT appear in the PUT request message body.

The parameters in the CBOR body of the PUT request are described below:

target-prefix: A list of prefixes identifying resources under attack. Prefixes are represented using Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) notation [RFC4632].

As a reminder, the prefix length must be less than or equal to 32 (resp. 128) for IPv4 (resp. IPv6).

The prefix list MUST NOT include broadcast, loopback, or multicast addresses. These addresses are considered as invalid values. In addition, the DOTS server MUST validate that target prefixes are within the scope of the DOTS client’s domain. Other validation checks may be supported by DOTS servers.

This is an optional attribute.

target-port-range: A list of port numbers bound to resources under attack.

A port range is defined by two bounds, a lower port number (lower-port) and an upper port number (upper-port). When only ‘lower-port’ is present, it represents a single port number.

For TCP, UDP, Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) [RFC4960], or Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP) [RFC4340], a range of ports can be, for example, 0-1023, 1024-65535, or 1024-49151.

This is an optional attribute.

target-protocol: A list of protocols involved in an attack. Values are taken from the IANA protocol registry [proto_numbers].

The value ‘0’ has a special meaning for ‘all protocols’.

This is an optional attribute.

target-fqdn: A list of Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs) identifying resources under attack. An FQDN is the full name of a resource, rather than just its hostname. For example, "venera" is a hostname, and "venera.isi.edu" is an FQDN [RFC1983].

How a name is passed to an underlying name resolution library is implementation- and deployment-specific. Nevertheless, once the name is resolved into one or multiple IP addresses, DOTS servers MUST apply the same validation checks as those for ‘target-prefix’.

This is an optional attribute.

target-uri: A list of Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) [RFC3986] identifying resources under attack.

The same validation checks used for ‘target-fqdn’ MUST be followed by DOTS servers to validate a target URI.

This is an optional attribute.

alias-name: A list of aliases of resources for which the mitigation is requested. Aliases can be created using the DOTS data channel (Section 6.1 of [I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel]), direct configuration, or other means.

An alias is used in subsequent signal channel exchanges to refer more efficiently to the resources under attack.

This is an optional attribute.

lifetime: Lifetime of the mitigation request in seconds. The RECOMMENDED lifetime of a mitigation request is 3600 seconds -- this value was chosen to be long enough so that refreshing is not typically a burden on the DOTS client, while expiring the request where the client has unexpectedly quit in a timely manner. DOTS clients MUST include this parameter in their mitigation requests. Upon the expiry of this lifetime, and if the request is not refreshed, the mitigation request is removed. The request can be refreshed by sending the same request again.

A lifetime of ‘0’ in a mitigation request is an invalid value.
A lifetime of negative one (-1) indicates indefinite lifetime for the mitigation request. The DOTS server MAY refuse indefinite lifetime, for policy reasons; the granted lifetime value is returned in the response. DOTS clients MUST be prepared to not be granted mitigations with indefinite lifetimes.

The DOTS server MUST always indicate the actual lifetime in the response and the remaining lifetime in status messages sent to the DOTS client.

This is a mandatory attribute.

trigger-mitigation: If the parameter value is set to ‘false’, DDoS mitigation will not be triggered for the mitigation request unless the DOTS signal channel session is lost.

If the DOTS client ceases to respond to heartbeat messages, the DOTS server can detect that the DOTS session is lost.

The default value of the parameter is ‘true’ (that is, the mitigation starts immediately). If ‘trigger-mitigation’ is not present in a request, this is equivalent to receiving a request with ‘trigger-mitigation’ set to ‘true’.

This is an optional attribute.

In deployments where server-domain DOTS gateways are enabled, identity information about the origin source client domain SHOULD be supplied to the DOTS server. That information is meant to assist the DOTS server to enforce some policies such as correlating DOTS clients that belong to the same DOTS domain, limiting the number of DOTS requests, and identifying the mitigation scope. These policies can be enforced per-client, per-client domain, or both. Also, the identity information may be used for auditing and debugging purposes.

Figure 6 shows an example of a request relayed by a server-domain DOTS gateway.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "v1"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "cdid=7eeaf349529eb55ed50113"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkAFtbr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "mid=123"
Content-Type: "application/cbor"
{
  "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
    "scope": [
      {
        "target-prefix": ["string"],
        "target-port-range": [
          {
            "lower-port": integer,
            "upper-port": integer
          }
        ],
        "target-protocol": [integer],
        "target-fqdn": ["string"],
        "target-uri": ["string"],
        "alias-name": ["string"],
        "lifetime": integer
      }
    ]
  }
}

Figure 6: PUT to Convey DOTS Mitigation Request as relayed by a Server-Domain DOTS Gateway

A server-domain DOTS gateway SHOULD add the following Uri-Path parameter:
cdid: Stands for Client Domain IDentifier. The 'cdid' is conveyed by a server-domain DOTS gateway to propagate the source domain identity from the gateway’s client-facing-side to the gateway’s server-facing-side, and from the gateway’s server-facing-side to the DOTS server. 'cdid' may be used by the final DOTS server for policy enforcement purposes (e.g., enforce a quota on filtering rules). These policies are deployment-specific.

Server-domain DOTS gateways SHOULD support a configuration option to instruct whether 'cdid' parameter is to be inserted.

In order to accommodate deployments that require enforcing per-client policies, per-client domain policies, or a combination thereof, server-domain DOTS gateways MUST supply the SPKI hash of the DOTS client X.509 certificate, the DOTS client raw public key, or the hash of the "PSK identity" in the 'cdid', following the same rules for generating the hash conveyed in 'cuid', which is then used by the ultimate DOTS server to determine the corresponding client's domain. The 'cdid' generated by a server-domain gateway is likely to be the same as the 'cuid' except if the DOTS message was relayed by a DOTS gateway or was generated from a rogue DOTS client.

If a DOTS client is provisioned, for example, with distinct certificates as a function of the peer server-domain DOTS gateway, distinct 'cdid' values may be supplied by a server-domain DOTS gateway. The ultimate DOTS server MUST treat those 'cdid' values as equivalent.

The 'cdid' attribute MUST NOT be generated and included by DOTS clients.

DOTS servers MUST ignore 'cdid' attributes that are directly supplied by source DOTS clients or client-domain DOTS gateways. This implies that first server-domain DOTS gateways MUST strip 'cdid' attributes supplied by DOTS clients. DOTS servers SHOULD support a configuration parameter to identify DOTS gateways that are trusted to supply 'cdid' attributes.

Only single-valued 'cdid' are defined in this document.

This is an optional Uri-Path. When present, 'cdid' MUST be positioned before 'cuid'.

A DOTS gateway may add the following CoAP option:

hop-limit: This option (see Section 9.4) is used to detect and prevent infinite loops. This option is typically inserted by a
DOTS gateway. Only one single instance of the option is allowed in a message.

The length of the hop-limit option is 1 byte.

The value of the hop-limit option is encoded as an unsigned integer (see Section 3.2 of [RFC7252]).

Each intermediate DOTS agent involved in the handling of a DOTS message MUST decrement the hop-limit option value by 1 prior to forwarding upstream if this parameter exists. DOTS messages MUST NOT be forwarded if the hop-limit option is set to ‘0’ after decrement. Messages that cannot be forwarded because of exhausted hop-limit SHOULD be logged with a 5.06 (Hop Limit Reached) error message sent back to the DOTS peer. It is RECOMMENDED that DOTS clients and gateways support means to alert administrators about loop errors so that appropriate actions are undertaken.

To ease debugging and troubleshooting, the DOTS gateway which detects a loop SHOULD include its information (e.g., server name, alias, IP address) in the diagnostic payload under the conditions detailed in Section 5.5.2 of [RFC7252]. Each intermediate DOTS gateway involved in relaying a 5.06 (Hop Limit Reached) error message SHOULD prepend its own information in the diagnostic payload with a space character used as separator. Only one information per DOTS gateway MUST appear in the diagnostic payload. The ultimate DOTS gateway MAY remove the diagnostic payload before forwarding the 5.06 (Hop Limit Reached) error message to a DOTS client domain.

The initial hop-limit value SHOULD be configurable. If no initial value is explicitly provided, the default initial hop-limit value of 16 MUST be used.

Because forwarding errors may occur if inadequate hop-limit values are used, DOTS agents at the boundaries of an administrative domain MAY be instructed to rewrite the value of hop-limit carried in received messages (that is, ignore the value of hop-limit received in a message).

This is an optional CoAP option.

Because of the complexity to handle partial failure cases, this specification does not allow for including multiple mitigation requests in the same PUT request. Concretely, a DOTS client MUST NOT include multiple ‘scope’ parameters in the same PUT request.
FQDN and URI mitigation scopes may be thought of as a form of scope alias, in which the addresses associated with the domain name or URI represent the full scope of the mitigation.

In the PUT request at least one of the attributes ‘target-prefix’, ‘target-fqdn’, ‘target-uri’, or ‘alias-name’ MUST be present.

Attributes and Uri-Path parameters with empty values MUST NOT be present in a request.

Figure 7 shows a PUT request example to signal that ports 80, 8080, and 443 used by 2001:db8:6401::1 and 2001:db8:6401::2 servers are under attack (illustrated in JSON diagnostic notation). The presence of ‘cdid’ indicates that a server-domain DOTS gateway has modified the initial PUT request sent by the DOTS client. Note that ‘cdid’ MUST NOT appear in the PUT request message body.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Host: "www.example.com"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "v1"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "cdid=7eeaf349529eb55ed50113"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "mid=123"
Content-Format: "application/cbor"
{
  "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
    "scope": [
      {
        "target-prefix": [
          "2001:db8:6401::1/128",
          "2001:db8:6401::2/128"
        ],
        "target-port-range": [
          {
            "lower-port": 80
          },
          {
            "lower-port": 443
          },
          {
            "lower-port": 8080
          }
        ],
        "target-protocol": [6]
      },
      "lifetime": 3600
    ]
  }
}

Figure 7: PUT for DOTS Mitigation Request

The corresponding CBOR encoding format is shown in Figure 8.
In both DOTS signal and data channel sessions, the DOTS client MUST authenticate itself to the DOTS server (Section 8). The DOTS server MAY use the algorithm presented in Section 7 of [RFC7589] to derive the DOTS client identity or username from the client certificate. The DOTS client identity allows the DOTS server to accept mitigation requests with scopes that the DOTS client is authorized to manage.

The DOTS server couples the DOTS signal and data channel sessions using the DOTS client identity and optionally the 'cdid' parameter value, so the DOTS server can validate whether the aliases conveyed in the mitigation request were indeed created by the same DOTS client using the DOTS data channel session. If the aliases were not created by the DOTS client, the DOTS server MUST return 4.00 (Bad Request) in the response.

The DOTS server couples the DOTS signal channel sessions using the DOTS client identity and optionally the 'cdid' parameter value, and

![Figure 8: PUT for DOTS Mitigation Request (CBOR)](image-url)
the DOTS server uses ‘mid’ and ‘cuid’ Uri-Path parameter values to detect duplicate mitigation requests. If the mitigation request contains the ‘alias-name’ and other parameters identifying the target resources (such as ‘target-prefix’, ‘target-port-range’, ‘target-fqdn’, or ‘target-uri’), the DOTS server appends the parameter values in ‘alias-name’ with the corresponding parameter values in ‘target-prefix’, ‘target-port-range’, ‘target-fqdn’, or ‘target-uri’.

The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the PUT request using CoAP response codes. CoAP 2.xx codes are success. CoAP 4.xx codes are some sort of invalid requests (client errors). COAP 5.xx codes are returned if the DOTS server has erred or is currently unavailable to provide mitigation in response to the mitigation request from the DOTS client.

Figure 9 shows an example response to a PUT request that is successfully processed by a DOTS server (i.e., CoAP 2.xx response codes). This version of the specification forbids ‘cuid’ and ‘cdid’ (if used) to be returned in a response.

```
{
  "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
    "scope": [
      {
        "mid": 12332,
        "lifetime": 3600
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

Figure 9: 2.xx Response Body

If the request is missing a mandatory attribute, does not include ‘cuid’ or ‘mid’ Uri-Path options, includes multiple ‘scope’ parameters, or contains invalid or unknown parameters, the DOTS server MUST reply with 4.00 (Bad Request). DOTS agents can safely ignore Vendor-Specific parameters they don’t understand.

A DOTS server that receives a mitigation request with a lifetime set to ‘0’ MUST reply with a 4.00 (Bad Request).

If the DOTS server does not find the ‘mid’ parameter value conveyed in the PUT request in its configuration data, it MAY accept the mitigation request by sending back a 2.01 (Created) response to the DOTS client; the DOTS server will consequently try to mitigate the attack.
If the DOTS server finds the ‘mid’ parameter value conveyed in the
PUT request in its configuration data bound to that DOTS client, it
MAY update the mitigation request, and a 2.04 (Changed) response is
returned to indicate a successful update of the mitigation request.

The relative order of two mitigation requests, having the same
‘trigger-mitigation’ type, from a DOTS client is determined by
comparing their respective ‘mid’ values. If two mitigation requests
with the same ‘trigger-mitigation’ type have overlapping mitigation
scopes, the mitigation request with the highest numeric ‘mid’ value
will override the other mitigation request. Two mitigation requests
from a DOTS client have overlapping scopes if there is a common IP
address, IP prefix, FQDN, URI, or alias-name. To avoid maintaining a
long list of overlapping mitigation requests (i.e., requests with the
same ‘trigger-mitigation’ type and overlapping scopes) from a DOTS
client, the overlapped lower numeric ‘mid’ MUST be
automatically deleted and no longer available at the DOTS server.

For example, if the DOTS server receives a mitigation request which
overlaps with an existing mitigation with a higher numeric ‘mid’, the
DOTS server rejects the request by returning 4.09 (Conflict) to the
DOTS client. The response includes enough information for a DOTS
client to recognize the source of the conflict as described below:

conflict-information: Indicates that a mitigation request is
conflicting with another mitigation request. This optional
attribute has the following structure:

collection: Indicates the cause of the conflict. The
following values are defined:

1: Overlapping targets. ‘conflict-scope’ provides more details
about the conflicting target clauses.

collection: Indicates the conflict scope. It may include a
list of IP addresses, a list of prefixes, a list of port
numbers, a list of target protocols, a list of FQDNs, a list of
URLs, a list of alias-names, or a ‘mid’.

If the DOTS server receives a mitigation request which overlaps with
an active mitigation request, but both having distinct ‘trigger-
mitigation’ types, the DOTS server MUST deactivate (absent explicit
policy/configuration otherwise) the mitigation request with ‘trigger-
mitigation’ set to false. Particularly, if the mitigation request
with ‘trigger-mitigation’ set to false is active, the DOTS server
withdraws the mitigation request (i.e., status code is set to ‘?’ as
defined in Table 2) and transitions the status of the mitigation request to ‘8’.

Upon DOTS signal channel session loss with a peer DOTS client, the DOTS server MUST withdraw (absent explicit policy/configuration otherwise) any active mitigation requests overlapping with mitigation requests having ‘trigger-mitigation’ set to false from that DOTS client. Note that active-but-terminating period is not observed for mitigations withdrawn at the initiative of the DOTS server.

DOTS clients may adopt various strategies for setting the scopes of immediate and pre-configured mitigation requests to avoid potential conflicts. For example, a DOTS client may tweak pre-configured scopes so that the scope of any overlapping immediate mitigation request will be a subset of the pre-configured scopes. Also, if an immediate mitigation request overlaps with any of the pre-configured scopes, the DOTS client sets the scope of the overlapping immediate mitigation request to be a subset of the pre-configured scopes.

If the request is conflicting with an existing mitigation request from a different DOTS client, the DOTS server may return 2.01 (Created) or 4.09 (Conflict) to the requesting DOTS client. If the DOTS server decides to maintain the new mitigation request, the DOTS server returns 2.01 (Created) to the requesting DOTS client. If the DOTS server decides to reject the new mitigation request, the DOTS server returns 4.09 (Conflict) to the requesting DOTS client. For both 2.01 (Created) and 4.09 (Conflict) responses, the response includes enough information for a DOTS client to recognize the source of the conflict as described below:

conflict-information: Indicates that a mitigation request is conflicting with another mitigation request(s) from other DOTS client(s). This optional attribute has the following structure:

  conflict-status: Indicates the status of a conflicting mitigation request. The following values are defined:

  1: DOTS server has detected conflicting mitigation requests from different DOTS clients. This mitigation request is currently inactive until the conflicts are resolved. Another mitigation request is active.

  2: DOTS server has detected conflicting mitigation requests from different DOTS clients. This mitigation request is currently active.
3: DOTS server has detected conflicting mitigation requests from different DOTS clients. All conflicting mitigation requests are inactive.

conflict-cause: Indicates the cause of the conflict. The following values are defined:

1: Overlapping targets. 'conflict-scope' provides more details about the conflicting target clauses.

2: Conflicts with an existing white list. This code is returned when the DDoS mitigation detects source addresses/prefixes in the white-listed ACLs are attacking the target.

3: CUID Collision. This code is returned when a DOTS client uses a 'cuid' that is already used by another DOTS client. This code is an indication that the request has been rejected and a new request with a new 'cuid' is to be resent by the DOTS client. Note that 'conflict-status', 'conflict-scope', and 'retry-timer' are not returned in the error response.

conflict-scope: Indicates the conflict scope. It may include a list of IP addresses, a list of prefixes, a list of port numbers, a list of target protocols, a list of FQDNs, a list of URIs, a list of alias-names, or references to conflicting ACLs.

retry-timer: Indicates, in seconds, the time after which the DOTS client may re-issue the same request. The DOTS server returns 'retry-timer' only to DOTS client(s) for which a mitigation request is deactivated. Any retransmission of the same mitigation request before the expiry of this timer is likely to be rejected by the DOTS server for the same reasons.

The retry-timer SHOULD be equal to the lifetime of the active mitigation request resulting in the deactivation of the conflicting mitigation request. The lifetime of the deactivated mitigation request will be updated to (retry-timer + 45 seconds), so the DOTS client can refresh the deactivated mitigation request after retry-timer seconds before expiry of lifetime and check if the conflict is resolved.

As an active attack evolves, DOTS clients can adjust the scope of requested mitigation as necessary, by refining the scope of resources requiring mitigation. This can be achieved by sending a PUT request with a new 'mid' value that will override the existing one with overlapping mitigation scopes.
For a mitigation request to continue beyond the initial negotiated lifetime, the DOTS client has to refresh the current mitigation request by sending a new PUT request. This PUT request MUST use the same ‘mid’ value, and MUST repeat all the other parameters as sent in the original mitigation request apart from a possible change to the lifetime parameter value.

4.4.2. Retrieve Information Related to a Mitigation

A GET request is used by a DOTS client to retrieve information (including status) of DOTS mitigations from a DOTS server.

‘cuid’ is a mandatory Uri-Path parameter for GET requests.

Uri-Path parameters with empty values MUST NOT be present in a request.

The same considerations for manipulating ‘cdid’ parameter by server-domain DOTS gateways specified in Section 4.4.1 MUST be followed for GET requests.

The ‘c’ (content) parameter and its permitted values defined in [I-D.ietf-core-comi] can be used to retrieve non-configuration data (attack mitigation status), configuration data, or both. The DOTS server MAY support this optional filtering capability. It can safely ignore it if not supported.

The following examples illustrate how a DOTS client retrieves active mitigation requests from a DOTS server. In particular:

- Figure 10 shows the example of a GET request to retrieve all DOTS mitigation requests signaled by a DOTS client.

- Figure 11 shows the example of a GET request to retrieve a specific DOTS mitigation request signaled by a DOTS client. The configuration data to be reported in the response is formatted in the same order as was processed by the DOTS server in the original mitigation request.

These two examples assume the default of "c=a"; that is, the DOTS client asks for all data to be reported by the DOTS server.
Figure 10: GET to Retrieve all DOTS Mitigation Requests

Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "v1"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Observe: 0

If the DOTS server does not find the ‘mid’ Uri-Path value conveyed in the GET request in its configuration data for the requesting DOTS client, it MUST respond with a 4.04 (Not Found) error response code. Likewise, the same error MUST be returned as a response to a request to retrieve all mitigation records (i.e., ‘mid’ Uri-Path is not defined) of a given DOTS client if the DOTS server does not find any mitigation record for that DOTS client. As a reminder, a DOTS client is identified by its identity (e.g., client certificate, ‘cuid’) and optionally the ‘cdid’.

Figure 12 shows a response example of all active mitigation requests associated with the DOTS client as maintained by the DOTS server. The response indicates the mitigation status of each mitigation request.
The mitigation status parameters are described below:

mitigation-start: Mitigation start time is expressed in seconds relative to 1970-01-01T00:00Z in UTC time (Section 2.4.1 of Reddy, et al. Expires February 8, 2019 [Page 29]
The CBOR encoding is modified so that the leading tag 1 (epoch-based date/time) MUST be omitted.

This is a mandatory attribute when an attack mitigation is triggered. Particularly, 'mitigation-start' is not returned for a mitigation with 'status' code set to 8.

lifetime: The remaining lifetime of the mitigation request, in seconds.

This is a mandatory attribute.

status: Status of attack mitigation. The various possible values of 'status' parameter are explained in Table 2.

This is a mandatory attribute.

bytes-dropped: The total dropped byte count for the mitigation request since the attack mitigation is triggered. The count wraps around when it reaches the maximum value of unsigned integer64.

This is an optional attribute.

bps-dropped: The average number of dropped bytes per second for the mitigation request since the attack mitigation is triggered. This SHOULD be a five-minute average.

This is an optional attribute.

pkts-dropped: The total number of dropped packet count for the mitigation request since the attack mitigation is triggered. The count wraps around when it reaches the maximum value of unsigned integer64.

This is an optional attribute.

pps-dropped: The average number of dropped packets per second for the mitigation request since the attack mitigation is triggered. This SHOULD be a five-minute average.

This is an optional attribute.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Attack mitigation is in progress (e.g., changing the network path to redirect the inbound traffic to a DOTS mitigator).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Attack is successfully mitigated (e.g., traffic is redirected to a DDoS mitigator and attack traffic is dropped).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Attack has stopped and the DOTS client can withdraw the mitigation request. This status code will be transmitted for immediate mitigation requests till the mitigation is withdrawn or the lifetime expires. For mitigation requests with pre-configured scopes (i.e., ‘trigger-mitigation’ set to ‘false’), this status code will be transmitted 4 times and then transition to &quot;8&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Attack has exceeded the mitigation provider capability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>DOTS client has withdrawn the mitigation request and the mitigation is active but terminating.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Attack mitigation is now terminated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Attack mitigation is withdrawn. If a mitigation request with ‘trigger-mitigation’ set to false is withdrawn because it overlaps with an immediate mitigation request, this status code will be transmitted 4 times and then transition to &quot;8&quot; for the mitigation request with pre-configured scopes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Attack mitigation will be triggered for the mitigation request only when the DOTS signal channel session is lost.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Values of ‘status’ Parameter

4.4.2.1. DOTS Servers Sending Mitigation Status

The Observe Option defined in [RFC7641] extends the CoAP core protocol with a mechanism for a CoAP client to "observe" a resource on a CoAP server: The client retrieves a representation of the
resource and requests this representation be updated by the server as long as the client is interested in the resource. DOTS implementations MUST use the Observe Option for both ‘mitigate’ and ‘config’ (Section 4.2).

A DOTS client conveys the Observe Option set to ‘0’ in the GET request to receive unsolicited notifications of attack mitigation status from the DOTS server.

Unidirectional mitigation notifications within the bidirectional signal channel allows unsolicited message delivery, enabling asynchronous notifications between the agents. [RFC7641] indicates that (1) a notification can be sent in a Confirmable (CON) or a Non-confirmable (NON) message, and (2) the message type used is typically application dependent and may be determined by the server for each notification individually. For DOTS server application, the message type MUST always be set to Non-confirmable even if the underlying COAP library elects a notification to be sent in a Confirmable message.

Due to the higher likelihood of packet loss during a DDoS attack, the DOTS server periodically sends attack mitigation status to the DOTS client and also notifies the DOTS client whenever the status of the attack mitigation changes. If the DOTS server cannot maintain an RTT estimate, it SHOULD NOT send more than one unsolicited notification every 3 seconds, and SHOULD use an even less aggressive rate whenever possible (case 2 in Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8085]).

When conflicting requests are detected, the DOTS server enforces the corresponding policy (e.g., accept all requests, reject all requests, accept only one request but reject all the others, ...). It is assumed that this policy is supplied by the DOTS server administrator or it is a default behavior of the DOTS server implementation. Then, the DOTS server sends notification message(s) to the DOTS client(s) at the origin of the conflict (refer to the conflict parameters defined in Section 4.4.1). A conflict notification message includes information about the conflict cause, scope, and the status of the mitigation request(s). For example,

- A notification message with ‘status’ code set to ‘7 (Attack mitigation is withdrawn)’ and ‘conflict-status’ set to ‘1’ is sent to a DOTS client to indicate that an active mitigation request is deactivated because a conflict is detected.

- A notification message with ‘status’ code set to ‘1 (Attack mitigation is in progress)’ and ‘conflict-status’ set to ‘2’ is sent to a DOTS client to indicate that this mitigation request is in progress, but a conflict is detected.
Upon receipt of a conflict notification message indicating that a mitigation request is deactivated because of a conflict, a DOTS client MUST NOT resend the same mitigation request before the expiry of ‘retry-timer’. It is also recommended that DOTS clients support means to alert administrators about mitigation conflicts.

A DOTS client that is no longer interested in receiving notifications from the DOTS server can simply "forget" the observation. When the DOTS server sends the next notification, the DOTS client will not recognize the token in the message and thus will return a Reset message. This causes the DOTS server to remove the associated entry. Alternatively, the DOTS client can explicitly deregister itself by issuing a GET request that has the Token field set to the token of the observation to be cancelled and includes an Observe Option with the value set to '1' (deregister).

Figure 13 shows an example of a DOTS client requesting a DOTS server to send notifications related to a mitigation request. Note that for mitigations with pre-configured scopes (i.e., ‘trigger-mitigation’ set to 'false'), the state will need to transition from 3 (attack-stopped) to 8 (attack-mitigation-signal-loss).
4.4.2.2. DOTS Clients Polling for Mitigation Status

The DOTS client can send the GET request at frequent intervals without the Observe Option to retrieve the configuration data of the mitigation request and non-configuration data (i.e., the attack status). The frequency of polling the DOTS server to get the mitigation status SHOULD follow the transmission guidelines in Section 3.1.3 of [RFC8085].

If the DOTS server has been able to mitigate the attack and the attack has stopped, the DOTS server indicates as such in the status. In such case, the DOTS client recalls the mitigation request by issuing a DELETE request for this mitigation request (Section 4.4.4).

A DOTS client SHOULD react to the status of the attack as per the information sent by the DOTS server rather than acknowledging by itself, using its own means, that the attack has been mitigated.
This ensures that the DOTS client does not recall a mitigation request prematurely because it is possible that the DOTS client does not sense the DDoS attack on its resources, but the DOTS server could be actively mitigating the attack because the attack is not completely averted.

4.4.3. Efficacy Update from DOTS Clients

While DDoS mitigation is in progress, due to the likelihood of packet loss, a DOTS client MAY periodically transmit DOTS mitigation efficacy updates to the relevant DOTS server. A PUT request is used to convey the mitigation efficacy update to the DOTS server. This PUT request is treated as a refresh of the current mitigation.

The PUT request used for efficacy update MUST include all the parameters used in the PUT request to carry the DOTS mitigation request (Section 4.4.1) unchanged apart from the ‘lifetime’ parameter value. If this is not the case, the DOTS server MUST reject the request with a 4.00 (Bad Request).

The If-Match Option (Section 5.10.8.1 of [RFC7252]) with an empty value is used to make the PUT request conditional on the current existence of the mitigation request. If UDP is used as transport, CoAP requests may arrive out-of-order. For example, the DOTS client may send a PUT request to convey an efficacy update to the DOTS server followed by a DELETE request to withdraw the mitigation request, but the DELETE request arrives at the DOTS server before the PUT request. To handle out-of-order delivery of requests, if an If-Match Option is present in the PUT request and the ‘mid’ in the request matches a mitigation request from that DOTS client, the request is processed by the DOTS server. If no match is found, the PUT request is silently ignored by the DOTS server.

An example of an efficacy update message, which includes an If-Match Option with an empty value, is depicted in Figure 14.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "v1"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "mid=123"
Content-Format: "application/cbor"
If-Match:

```
{
  "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
    "scope": [
      {
        "target-prefix": [
          "string"
        ],
        "target-port-range": [
          {
            "lower-port": integer,
            "upper-port": integer
          }
        ],
        "target-protocol": [
          integer
        ],
        "target-fqdn": [
          "string"
        ],
        "target-uri": [
          "string"
        ],
        "alias-name": [
          "string"
        ],
        "lifetime": integer,
        "attack-status": integer
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

Figure 14: Efficacy Update

The ‘attack-status’ parameter is a mandatory attribute when performing an efficacy update. The various possible values contained in the ‘attack-status’ parameter are described in Table 3.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The DOTS client determines that it is still under attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The DOTS client determines that the attack is successfully mitigated (e.g., attack traffic is not seen).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Values of 'attack-status' Parameter

The DOTS server indicates the result of processing a PUT request using CoAP response codes. The response code 2.04 (Changed) is returned if the DOTS server has accepted the mitigation efficacy update. The error response code 5.03 (Service Unavailable) is returned if the DOTS server has erred or is incapable of performing the mitigation.

4.4.4. Withdraw a Mitigation

DELETE requests are used to withdraw DOTS mitigation requests from DOTS servers (Figure 15).

'cuid' and 'mid' are mandatory Uri-Path parameters for DELETE requests.

The same considerations for manipulating 'cdid' parameter by DOTS gateways, as specified in Section 4.4.1, MUST be followed for DELETE requests. Uri-Path parameters with empty values MUST NOT be present in a request.

Header: DELETE (Code=0.04)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "v1"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "mid=123"

Figure 15: Withdraw a DOTS Mitigation

If the DELETE request does not include 'cuid' and 'mid' parameters, the DOTS server MUST reply with a 4.00 (Bad Request).
Once the request is validated, the DOTS server immediately acknowledges a DOTS client’s request to withdraw the DOTS signal using 2.02 (Deleted) response code with no response payload. A 2.02 (Deleted) Response Code is returned even if the ‘mid’ parameter value conveyed in the DELETE request does not exist in its configuration data before the request.

If the DOTS server finds the ‘mid’ parameter value conveyed in the DELETE request in its configuration data for the DOTS client, then to protect against route or DNS flapping caused by a DOTS client rapidly removing a mitigation, and to dampen the effect of oscillating attacks, the DOTS server MAY allow mitigation to continue for a limited period after acknowledging a DOTS client’s withdrawal of a mitigation request. During this period, the DOTS server status messages SHOULD indicate that mitigation is active but terminating (Section 4.4.2).

The initial active-but-terminating period SHOULD be sufficiently long to absorb latency incurred by route propagation. The active-but-terminating period SHOULD be set by default to 120 seconds. If the client requests mitigation again before the initial active-but-terminating period elapses, the DOTS server MAY exponentially increase the active-but-terminating period up to a maximum of 300 seconds (5 minutes).

Once the active-but-terminating period elapses, the DOTS server MUST treat the mitigation as terminated, as the DOTS client is no longer responsible for the mitigation. For example, if there is a financial relationship between the DOTS client and server domains, the DOTS client stops incurring cost at this point.

If a mitigation is triggered due to a signal channel loss, the DOTS server relies upon normal triggers to stop that mitigation (typically, receipt of a valid DELETE request, expiry of the mitigation lifetime, or observation of traffic to the attack target). In particular, the DOTS server MUST NOT consider the signal channel recovery as a trigger to stop the mitigation.

4.5. DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration

A DOTS client can negotiate, configure, and retrieve the DOTS signal channel session behavior with its DOTS peers. The DOTS signal channel can be used, for example, to configure the following:

a. Heartbeat interval (heartbeat-interval): DOTS agents regularly send heartbeats (CoAP Ping/Pong) to each other after mutual authentication is successfully completed in order to keep the DOTS signal channel open. Heartbeat messages are exchanged
between DOTS agents every 'heartbeat-interval' seconds to detect the current status of the DOTS signal channel session.

b. Missing heartbeats allowed (missing-hb-allowed): This variable indicates the maximum number of consecutive heartbeat messages for which a DOTS agent did not receive a response before concluding that the session is disconnected or defunct.

c. Acceptable signal loss ratio: Maximum retransmissions, retransmission timeout value, and other message transmission parameters for the DOTS signal channel.

The same or distinct configuration sets may be used during times when a mitigation is active (‘mitigating-config’) and when no mitigation is active (‘idle-config’). This is particularly useful for DOTS servers that might want to reduce heartbeat frequency or cease heartbeat exchanges when an active DOTS client has not requested mitigation. If distinct configurations are used, DOTS agents MUST follow the appropriate configuration set as a function of the mitigation activity (e.g., if no mitigation request is active, ‘idle-config’-related values must be followed). Additionally, DOTS agents MUST automatically switch to the other configuration upon a change in the mitigation activity (e.g., if an attack mitigation is launched after a peacetime, the DOTS agent switches from ‘idle-config’ to ‘mitigating-config’-related values).

Requests and responses are deemed reliable by marking them as Confirmable messages. DOTS signal channel session configuration requests and responses are marked as Confirmable messages. As explained in Section 2.1 of [RFC7252], a Confirmable message is retransmitted using a default timeout and exponential back-off between retransmissions, until the DOTS server sends an Acknowledgement message (ACK) with the same Message ID conveyed from the DOTS client.

Message transmission parameters are defined in Section 4.8 of [RFC7252]. The DOTS server can either piggyback the response in the acknowledgement message or, if the DOTS server cannot respond immediately to a request carried in a Confirmable message, it simply responds with an Empty Acknowledgement message so that the DOTS client can stop retransmitting the request. Empty Acknowledgement message is explained in Section 2.2 of [RFC7252]. When the response is ready, the server sends it in a new Confirmable message which in turn needs to be acknowledged by the DOTS client (see Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 of [RFC7252]). Requests and responses exchanged between DOTS agents during peacetime are marked as Confirmable messages.
Implementation Note: A DOTS client that receives a response in a CON message may want to clean up the message state right after sending the ACK. If that ACK is lost and the DOTS server retransmits the CON, the DOTS client may no longer have any state that would help it correlate this response: from the DOTS client’s standpoint, the retransmission message is unexpected. The DOTS client will send a Reset message so it does not receive any more retransmissions. This behavior is normal and not an indication of an error (see Section 5.3.2 of [RFC7252] for more details).

4.5.1. Discover Configuration Parameters

A GET request is used to obtain acceptable (e.g., minimum and maximum values) and current configuration parameters on the DOTS server for DOTS signal channel session configuration. This procedure occurs between a DOTS client and its immediate peer DOTS server. As such, this GET request MUST NOT be relayed by an on-path DOTS gateway.

Figure 16 shows how to obtain acceptable configuration parameters for the DOTS server.

Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "v1"
Uri-Path: "config"

Figure 16: GET to Retrieve Configuration

The DOTS server in the 2.05 (Content) response conveys the current, minimum, and maximum attribute values acceptable by the DOTS server (Figure 17).

Content-Format: "application/cbor"
{
  "ietf-dots-signal-channel:signal-config": {
    "mitigating-config": {
      "heartbeat-interval": {
        "max-value": integer,
        "min-value": integer,
        "current-value": integer
      },
      "missing-hb-allowed": {
        "max-value": integer,
        "min-value": integer,
        "current-value": integer
      }
    }
  }
}
"max-retransmit": {
  "max-value": integer,
  "min-value": integer,
  "current-value": integer
},
"ack-timeout": {
  "max-value-decimal": number,
  "min-value-decimal": number,
  "current-value-decimal": number
},
"ack-random-factor": {
  "max-value-decimal": number,
  "min-value-decimal": number,
  "current-value-decimal": number
}
},
"idle-config": {
  "heartbeat-interval": {
    "max-value": integer,
    "min-value": integer,
    "current-value": integer
  },
  "missing-hb-allowed": {
    "max-value": integer,
    "min-value": integer,
    "current-value": integer
  },
  "max-retransmit": {
    "max-value": integer,
    "min-value": integer,
    "current-value": integer
  },
  "ack-timeout": {
    "max-value-decimal": number,
    "min-value-decimal": number,
    "current-value-decimal": number
  },
  "ack-random-factor": {
    "max-value-decimal": number,
    "min-value-decimal": number,
    "current-value-decimal": number
  }
}
}

Figure 17: GET Configuration Response Body
The parameters in Figure 17 are described below:

```
mitigating-config: Set of configuration parameters to use when a mitigation is active. The following parameters may be included:

heartbeat-interval: Time interval in seconds between two consecutive heartbeat messages.

‘0’ is used to disable the heartbeat mechanism.

This is an optional attribute.

missing-hb-allowed: Maximum number of consecutive heartbeat messages for which the DOTS agent did not receive a response before concluding that the session is disconnected.

This is an optional attribute.

max-retransmit: Maximum number of retransmissions for a message (referred to as MAX_RETRANSMIT parameter in CoAP).

This is an optional attribute.

ack-timeout: Timeout value in seconds used to calculate the initial retransmission timeout value (referred to as ACK_TIMEOUT parameter in CoAP).

This is an optional attribute.

ack-random-factor: Random factor used to influence the timing of retransmissions (referred to as ACK_RANDOM_FACTOR parameter in CoAP).

This is an optional attribute.

idle-config: Set of configuration parameters to use when no mitigation is active. This attribute has the same structure as 'mitigating-config'.

Figure 18 shows an example of acceptable and current configuration parameters on a DOTS server for DOTS signal channel session configuration. The same acceptable configuration is used during attack and peace times.
```

Content-Format: "application/cbor"

```json
{
  "ietf-dots-signal-channel:signal-config": {
    "mitigating-config": {
```
"heartbeat-interval": {
  "max-value": 240,
  "min-value": 15,
  "current-value": 30
},
"missing-hb-allowed": {
  "max-value": 9,
  "min-value": 3,
  "current-value": 5
},
"max-retransmit": {
  "max-value": 15,
  "min-value": 2,
  "current-value": 3
},
"ack-timeout": {
  "max-value-decimal": 30.0,
  "min-value-decimal": 1.0,
  "current-value-decimal": 2.0
},
"ack-random-factor": {
  "max-value-decimal": 4.0,
  "min-value-decimal": 1.1,
  "current-value-decimal": 1.5
}
},
"idle-config": {
  "heartbeat-interval": {
    "max-value": 240,
    "min-value": 15,
    "current-value": 30
  },
  "missing-hb-allowed": {
    "max-value": 9,
    "min-value": 3,
    "current-value": 5
  },
  "max-retransmit": {
    "max-value": 15,
    "min-value": 2,
    "current-value": 3
  },
  "ack-timeout": {
    "max-value-decimal": 30.0,
    "min-value-decimal": 1.0,
    "current-value-decimal": 2.0
  },
  "ack-random-factor": {

"max-value-decimal": 4.0,
"min-value-decimal": 1.1,
"current-value-decimal": 1.5
}
}
}

Figure 18: Example of a Configuration Response Body

4.5.2. Convey DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration

A PUT request is used to convey the configuration parameters for the signal channel (e.g., heartbeat interval, maximum retransmissions). Message transmission parameters for CoAP are defined in Section 4.8 of [RFC7252]. The RECOMMENDED values of transmission parameter values are ack-timeout (2 seconds), max-retransmit (3), ack-random-factor (1.5). In addition to those parameters, the RECOMMENDED specific DOTS transmission parameter values are ‘heartbeat-interval’ (30 seconds) and ‘missing-hb-allowed’ (5).

Note: heartbeat-interval should be tweaked to also assist DOTS messages for NAT traversal ([I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]). According to [RFC8085], keepalive messages must not be sent more frequently than once every 15 seconds and should use longer intervals when possible. Furthermore, [RFC4787] recommends NATs to use a state timeout of 2 minutes or longer, but experience shows that sending packets every 15 to 30 seconds is necessary to prevent the majority of middleboxes from losing state for UDP flows. From that standpoint, this specification recommends a minimum heartbeat-interval of 15 seconds and a maximum heartbeat-interval of 240 seconds. The recommended value of 30 seconds is selected to anticipate the expiry of NAT state.

A heartbeat-interval of 30 seconds may be considered as too chatty in some deployments. For such deployments, DOTS agents may negotiate longer heartbeat-interval values to prevent any network overload with too frequent keepalives.

Different heartbeat intervals can be defined for ‘mitigating-config’ and ‘idle-config’ to reduce being too chatty during idle times. If there is an on-path translator between the DOTS client (standalone or part of a DOTS gateway) and the DOTS server, the ‘mitigating-config’ heartbeat-interval has to be smaller than the translator session timeout. It is recommended that the ‘idle-config’ heartbeat-interval is also smaller than the translator session timeout to prevent translator traversal issues, or set to
'0'. Means to discover the lifetime assigned by a translator are out of scope.

When a Confirmable "CoAP Ping" is sent, and if there is no response, the "CoAP Ping" is retransmitted max-retransmit number of times by the CoAP layer using an initial timeout set to a random duration between ack-timeout and (ack-timeout*ack-random-factor) and exponential back-off between retransmissions. By choosing the recommended transmission parameters, the "CoAP Ping" will timeout after 45 seconds. If the DOTS agent does not receive any response from the peer DOTS agent for 'missing-hb-allowed' number of consecutive "CoAP Ping" Confirmable messages, it concludes that the DOTS signal channel session is disconnected. A DOTS client MUST NOT transmit a "CoAP Ping" while waiting for the previous "CoAP Ping" response from the same DOTS server.

If the DOTS agent wishes to change the default values of message transmission parameters, it SHOULD follow the guidance given in Section 4.8.1 of [RFC7252]. The DOTS agents MUST use the negotiated values for message transmission parameters and default values for non-negotiated message transmission parameters.

The signal channel session configuration is applicable to a single DOTS signal channel session between DOTS agents, so the 'cuid' Uri-Path MUST NOT be used.

Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Host: "host"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "v1"
Uri-Path: "config"
Uri-Path: "sid=123"
Content-Format: "application/cbor"

{  "ietf-dots-signal-channel:signal-config": {
    "mitigating-config": {
      "heartbeat-interval": {
        "current-value": integer
      },
      "missing-hb-allowed": {
        "current-value": integer
      },
      "max-retransmit": {
        "current-value": integer
      },
      "ack-timeout": {
        "current-value-decimal": number
      }
    }
  }
The additional Uri-Path parameter to those defined in Table 1 is as follows:

**sid**: Session Identifier is an identifier for the DOTS signal channel session configuration data represented as an integer. This identifier MUST be generated by DOTS clients. 'sid' values MUST increase monotonically.

This is a mandatory attribute.

The meaning of the parameters in the CBOR body is defined in Section 4.5.1.

At least one of the attributes 'heartbeat-interval', 'missing-hb-allowed', 'max-retransmit', 'ack-timeout', and 'ack-random-factor' MUST be present in the PUT request. Note that 'heartbeat-interval', 'missing-hb-allowed', 'max-retransmit', 'ack-timeout', and 'ack-random-factor', if present, do not need to be provided for both 'mitigating-config', and 'idle-config' in a PUT request.
The PUT request with a higher numeric ‘sid’ value overrides the DOTS signal channel session configuration data installed by a PUT request with a lower numeric ‘sid’ value. To avoid maintaining a long list of ‘sid’ requests from a DOTS client, the lower numeric ‘sid’ MUST be automatically deleted and no longer available at the DOTS server.

Figure 20 shows a PUT request example to convey the configuration parameters for the DOTS signal channel. In this example, the heartbeat mechanism is disabled when no mitigation is active, while the heartbeat interval is set to ‘91’ when a mitigation is active.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Host: "www.example.com"
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "v1"
Uri-Path: "config"
Uri-Path: "sid=123"
Content-Format: "application/cbor"

```
{
  "ietf-dots-signal-channel:signal-config": {
    "mitigating-config": {
      "heartbeat-interval": {
        "current-value": 91
      },
      "missing-hb-allowed": {
        "current-value": 3
      },
      "max-retransmit": {
        "current-value": 3
      },
      "ack-timeout": {
        "current-value-decimal": 2.0
      },
      "ack-random-factor": {
        "current-value-decimal": 1.5
      }
    },
    "idle-config": {
      "heartbeat-interval": {
        "current-value": 0
      },
      "max-retransmit": {
        "current-value": 3
      },
      "ack-timeout": {
        "current-value-decimal": 2.0
      },
      "ack-random-factor": {
        "current-value-decimal": 1.5
      }
    }
  }
}
```

Figure 20: PUT to Convey the Configuration Parameters

The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the PUT request using CoAP response codes:
If the request is missing a mandatory attribute, does not include a ‘sid’ Uri-Path, or contains one or more invalid or unknown parameters, 4.00 (Bad Request) MUST be returned in the response.

If the DOTS server does not find the ‘sid’ parameter value conveyed in the PUT request in its configuration data and if the DOTS server has accepted the configuration parameters, then a response code 2.01 (Created) MUST be returned in the response.

If the DOTS server finds the ‘sid’ parameter value conveyed in the PUT request in its configuration data and if the DOTS server has accepted the updated configuration parameters, 2.04 (Changed) MUST be returned in the response.

If any of the ‘heartbeat-interval’, ‘missing-hb-allowed’, ‘max-retransmit’, ‘target-protocol’, ‘ack-timeout’, and ‘ack-random-factor’ attribute values are not acceptable to the DOTS server, 4.22 (Unprocessable Entity) MUST be returned in the response. Upon receipt of this error code, the DOTS client SHOULD request the maximum and minimum attribute values acceptable to the DOTS server (Section 4.5.1).

The DOTS client may re-try and send the PUT request with updated attribute values acceptable to the DOTS server.

A DOTS client may issue a GET message with ‘sid’ Uri-Path parameter to retrieve the negotiated configuration. The response does not need to include ‘sid’ in its message body.

4.5.3. Configuration Freshness and Notifications

Max-Age Option (Section 5.10.5 of [RFC7252]) SHOULD be returned by a DOTS server to associate a validity time with a configuration it sends. This feature allows the update of the configuration data if a change occurs at the DOTS server side. For example, the new configuration may instruct a DOTS client to cease heartbeats or reduce heartbeat frequency.

It is NOT RECOMMENDED to return a Max-Age Option set to 0.

Returning a Max-Age Option set to 2**32-1 is equivalent to associating an infinite lifetime with the configuration.

If a non-zero value of Max-Age Option is received by a DOTS client, it MUST issue a GET request with ‘sid’ Uri-Path parameter to retrieve the current and acceptable configuration before the expiry of the value enclosed in the Max-Age option. This request is considered by the client and the server as a means to refresh the configuration.
parameters for the signal channel. When a DDoS attack is active, refresh requests MUST NOT be sent by DOTS clients and the DOTS server MUST NOT terminate the (D)TLS session after the expiry of the value returned in Max-Age Option.

If Max-Age Option is not returned in a response, the DOTS client initiates GET requests to refresh the configuration parameters each 60 seconds (Section 5.10.5 of [RFC7252]). To prevent such overload, it is RECOMMENDED that DOTS servers return a Max-Age Option in GET responses. Considerations related to which value to use and how such value is set, are implementation- and deployment-specific.

If an Observe Option set to 0 is included in the configuration request, the DOTS server sends notifications of any configuration change (Section 4.2 of [RFC7641]).

If a DOTS server detects that a misbehaving DOTS client does not contact the DOTS server after the expiry of Max-Age, in order to retrieve the signal channel configuration data, it MAY terminate the (D)TLS session. A (D)TLS session is terminated by the receipt of an authenticated message that closes the connection (e.g., a fatal alert (Section 7.2 of [RFC5246])).

4.5.4. Delete DOTS Signal Channel Session Configuration

A DELETE request is used to delete the installed DOTS signal channel session configuration data (Figure 21).

| Header: DELETE (Code=0.04) |
| Uri-Host: "host"           |
| Uri-Path: ".well-known"    |
| Uri-Path: "dots"           |
| Uri-Path: "v1"             |
| Uri-Path: "config"         |
| Uri-Path: "sid=123"        |

Figure 21: Delete Configuration

The DOTS server resets the DOTS signal channel session configuration back to the default values and acknowledges a DOTS client’s request to remove the DOTS signal channel session configuration using 2.02 (Deleted) response code.

Upon bootstrapping or reboot, a DOTS client MAY send a DELETE request to set the configuration parameters to default values. Such a request does not include any ‘sid’.
4.6. Redirected Signaling

Redirected DOTS signaling is discussed in detail in Section 3.2.2 of [I-D.ietf-dots-architecture].

If a DOTS server wants to redirect a DOTS client to an alternative DOTS server for a signal session, then the response code 3.00 (alternate server) will be returned in the response to the DOTS client.

The DOTS server can return the error response code 3.00 in response to a request from the DOTS client or convey the error response code 3.00 in a unidirectional notification response from the DOTS server.

The DOTS server in the error response conveys the alternate DOTS server’s FQDN, and the alternate DOTS server’s IP address(es) and time to live values in the CBOR body (Figure 22).

```
{  
  "ietf-dots-signal-channel:redirected-signal": {  
    "alt-server": "string",  
    "alt-server-record": [  
      "string"  
    ],  
    "alt-server-ttl": integer  
  }  
}
```

Figure 22: Redirected Server Error Response Body

The parameters are described below:

alt-server: FQDN of an alternate DOTS server.

This is a mandatory attribute.

alt-server-record: A list of IP addresses of an alternate DOTS server.

This is an optional attribute.

alt-server-ttl: Time to live (TTL) of the alternate DOTS server, represented as an integer number of seconds. That is, the time interval that the alternate DOTS server may be cached for use by a DOTS client.

A value of negative one (-1) indicates indefinite TTL. This value means that the alternate DOTS server is to be used until the
alternate DOTS server redirects the traffic with another 3.00 response.

If no ‘alt-server-ttl’ is returned in a redirect response, this is equivalent to returning a ‘alt-server-ttl’ parameter set to ‘-1’.

A ‘alt-server-ttl’ parameter set to ‘0’ may be returned for redirecting mitigation requests. Such value means that the redirection applies only for the mitigation request in progress. Returning short ‘alt-server-ttl’ may adversely impact DOTS clients on slow links. Returning short values should be avoided under such conditions.

If the alternate DOTS server TTL has expired, the DOTS client MUST use the DOTS server(s), that was provisioned using means discussed in Section 4.1. This fall back mechanism is triggered immediately upon expiry of the TTL, except when a DDoS attack is active.

Requests issued by misbehaving DOTS clients which do not honor the TTL or react to explicit re-direct messages can be rejected by DOTS servers.

This is an optional attribute.

Figure 23 shows a 3.00 response example to convey the DOTS alternate server ‘alt-server.example’, its IP addresses 2001:db8:6401::1 and 2001:db8:6401::2, and ‘alt-server-ttl’ value 3600.

```
{
    "ietf-dots-signal-channel:redirected-signal": {
        "alt-server": "alt-server.example",
        "alt-server-record": [
            "2001:db8:6401::1",
            "2001:db8:6401::2"
        ],
        "alt-server-ttl": 3600
    }
}
```

Figure 23: Example of Redirected Server Error Response Body

When the DOTS client receives 3.00 response, it considers the current request as failed, but SHOULD try re-sending the request to the alternate DOTS server. During a DDoS attack, the DNS server may be the target of another DDoS attack, alternate DOTS server’s IP addresses conveyed in the 3.00 response help the DOTS client skip DNS lookup of the alternate DOTS server. The DOTS client can then try to establish a UDP or a TCP session with the alternate DOTS server. The DOTS client MAY implement a method to construct IPv4-embedded IPv6.
addresses [RFC6052]; this is required to handle the scenario where an IPv6-only DOTS client communicates with an IPv4-only alternate DOTS server.

If the DOTS client has been redirected to a DOTS server to which it has already communicated with within the last five (5) minutes, it MUST ignore the redirection and try to contact other DOTS servers listed in the local configuration or discovered using dynamic means such as DHCP or SRV procedures. It is RECOMMENDED that DOTS clients support means to alert administrators about redirect loops.

4.7. Heartbeat Mechanism

To provide an indication of signal health and distinguish an ‘idle’ signal channel from a ‘disconnected’ or ‘defunct’ session, the DOTS agent sends a heartbeat over the signal channel to maintain its half of the channel. The DOTS agent similarly expects a heartbeat from its peer DOTS agent, and may consider a session terminated in the prolonged absence of a peer agent heartbeat.

While the communication between the DOTS agents is quiescent, the DOTS client will probe the DOTS server to ensure it has maintained cryptographic state and vice versa. Such probes can also keep firewalls and/or stateful translators bindings alive. This probing reduces the frequency of establishing a new handshake when a DOTS signal needs to be conveyed to the DOTS server.

DOTS servers MAY trigger their heartbeat requests immediately after receiving heartbeat probes from peer DOTS clients. As a reminder, it is the responsibility of DOTS clients to ensure that on-path translators/firewalls are maintaining a binding so that the same external IP address and/or port number is retained for the DOTS session.

In case of a massive DDoS attack that saturates the incoming link(s) to the DOTS client, all traffic from the DOTS server to the DOTS client will likely be dropped, although the DOTS server receives heartbeat requests in addition to DOTS messages sent by the DOTS client. In this scenario, the DOTS agents MUST behave differently to handle message transmission and DOTS session liveliness during link saturation:

- The DOTS client MUST NOT consider the DOTS session terminated even after a maximum ‘missing-hb-allowed’ threshold is reached. The DOTS client SHOULD keep on using the current DOTS session to send heartbeat requests over it, so that the DOTS server knows the DOTS client has not disconnected the DOTS session.
After the maximum ‘missing-hb-allowed’ threshold is reached, the DOTS client SHOULD try to resume the (D)TLS session. The DOTS client SHOULD send mitigation requests over the current DOTS session, and in parallel, for example, try to resume the (D)TLS session or use 0-RTT mode in DTLS 1.3 to piggyback the mitigation request in the ClientHello message.

As soon as the link is no longer saturated, if traffic from the DOTS server reaches the DOTS client over the current DOTS session, the DOTS client can stop (D)TLS session resumption or if (D)TLS session resumption is successful then disconnect the current DOTS session.

- If the DOTS server does not receive any traffic from the peer DOTS client, then the DOTS server sends heartbeat requests to the DOTS client and after maximum ‘missing-hb-allowed’ threshold is reached, the DOTS server concludes the session is disconnected.

In DOTS over UDP, heartbeat messages MUST be exchanged between the DOTS agents using the "CoAP Ping" mechanism defined in Section 4.2 of [RFC7252]. Concretely, the DOTS agent sends an Empty Confirmable message and the peer DOTS agent will respond by sending a Reset message.

In DOTS over TCP, heartbeat messages MUST be exchanged between the DOTS agents using the Ping and Pong messages specified in Section 4.4 of [RFC8323]. That is, the DOTS agent sends a Ping message and the peer DOTS agent would respond by sending a single Pong message.

5. DOTS Signal Channel YANG Module

This document defines a YANG [RFC7950] module for DOTS mitigation scope, DOTS signal channel session configuration data, and DOTS redirected signalling.

This YANG module defines the DOTS client interaction with the DOTS server as seen by the DOTS client. A DOTS server is allowed to update the non-configurable ‘ro’ entities in the responses. This YANG module is not intended to be used for DOTS server management purposes. Such module is out of the scope of this document.

5.1. Tree Structure

This document defines the YANG module "ietf-dots-signal-channel" (Section 5.2), which has the following tree structure. A DOTS signal message can either be a mitigation or a configuration message.

module: ietf-dots-signal-channel
---rw dots-signal
  +--rw (message-type)?
    +--:(mitigation-scope)
      +--rw scope* [cuid mid]
        +--rw cdid? string
        +--rw cuid string
        +--rw mid uint32
        +--rw target-prefix* inet:ip-prefix
        +--rw target-port-range* [lower-port upper-port]
                  +--rw lower-port inet:port-number
                  +--rw upper-port inet:port-number
        +--rw target-protocol* uint8
        +--rw target-fqdn* inet:domain-name
        +--rw target-uri* inet:uri
        +--rw alias-name* string
        +--rw lifetime? int32
        +--rw trigger-mitigation? boolean
        +--rw mitigation-start? uint64
        +--ro status? enumeration
        +--ro conflict-information
          +--ro conflict-status? enumeration
          +--ro conflict-cause? enumeration
          +--ro retry-timer? uint32
          +--ro conflict-scene
            +--rw target-prefix* inet:ip-prefix
            +--rw target-port-range* [lower-port upper-port]
              +--rw lower-port inet:port-number
              +--rw upper-port inet:port-number
            +--rw target-protocol* uint8
            +--rw target-fqdn* inet:domain-name
            +--rw target-uri* inet:uri
            +--ro alias-name* string
            +--ro acl-list* [acl-name]
              +--ro acl-name -> /ietf-acl:acls/acl/name
              +--ro acl-type? -> /ietf-acl:acls/acl/type
            +--ro mid? -> ../../../mid
            +--ro bytes-dropped? yang:zero-based-counter64
            +--ro bps-dropped? yang:zero-based-counter64
            +--ro pkts-dropped? yang:zero-based-counter64
            +--ro pps-dropped? yang:zero-based-counter64
            +--rw attack-status? enumeration
    +--:(signal-config)
      +--rw sid uint32
      +--rw mitigating-config
        +--rw heartbeat-interval
          +--ro max-value? uint16
          +--ro min-value? uint16
          +--rw current-value? uint16
5.2. YANG Module

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-dots-signal-channel@2018-08-07.yang"

module ietf-dots-signal-channel {
  yang-version 1.1;

namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-signal-channel";
prefix signal;

import ietf-inet-types {
  prefix inet;
}
import ietf-yang-types {
  prefix yang;
}
import ietf-access-control-list {
  prefix ietf-acl;
}

organization
  "IETF DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Working Group";
contact
  "WG Web:  <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dots/>
     WG List:  <mailto:dots@ietf.org>
   Editor:   Konda, Tirumaleswar Reddy
             <mailto:TirumaleswarReddy_Konda@McAfee.com>
   Editor:   Mohamed Boucadair
             <mailto:mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
   Author:   Prashanth Patil
             <mailto:praspati@cisco.com>
   Author:   Andrew Mortensen
             <mailto:amortensen@arbor.net>
   Author:   Nik Teague
             <mailto:nteague@verisign.com>";
description
  "This module contains YANG definition for the signaling
   messages exchanged between a DOTS client and a DOTS server.

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   authors of the code. All rights reserved.

   Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
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   Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).

   This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see

the RFC itself for full legal notices.

revision 2018-08-07 {
  description
    "Initial revision.";
  reference
    "RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
    Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification";
}

/
* Groupings
*/

grouping target {
  description
    "Specifies the targets of the mitigation request.";
  leaf-list target-prefix {
    type inet:ip-prefix;
    description
        "IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the target.";
  }
  list target-port-range {
    key "lower-port upper-port";
    description
        "Port range. When only lower-port is
        present, it represents a single port number.";
    leaf lower-port {
      type inet:port-number;
      mandatory true;
      description
        "Lower port number of the port range.";
    }
    leaf upper-port {
      type inet:port-number;
      must ". >= ../lower-port" {
        error-message
            "The upper port number must be greater than
            or equal to lower port number.";
      }
      description
        "Upper port number of the port range.";
    }
  }
  leaf-list target-protocol {
    type uint8;
    description
        "Identifies the target protocol number.

The value '0' means 'all protocols'.

Values are taken from the IANA protocol registry:
https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/protocol-numbers.xhtml

For example, 6 for TCP or 17 for UDP.

leaf-list target-fqdn {
    type inet:domain-name;
    description
    "FQDN identifying the target.";
}

leaf-list target-uri {
    type inet:uri;
    description
    "URI identifying the target.";
}

grouping mitigation-scope {
    description
    "Specifies the scope of the mitigation request.";
    list scope {
        key "cuid mid";
        description
        "The scope of the request.";
        leaf cdid {
            type string;
            description
            "The cdid should be included by a server-domain
            DOTS gateway to propagate the client domain
            identification information from the
            gateway’s client-facing-side to the gateway’s
            server-facing-side, and from the gateway’s
            server-facing-side to the DOTS server.

            It may be used by the final DOTS server
            for policy enforcement purposes.";
        }
        leaf cuid {
            type string;
            description
            "A unique identifier that is randomly
            generated by a DOTS client to prevent
            request collisions. It is expected that the
            cuid will remain consistent throughout the
            lifetime of the DOTS client.";
    }
}
leaf mid {
    type uint32;
    description
    "Mitigation request identifier. This identifier must be unique for each mitigation request bound to the DOTS client."
}

uses target;
leaf-list alias-name {
    type string;
    description
    "An alias name that points to a resource."
}

leaf lifetime {
    type int32;
    units "seconds";
    default "3600";
    description
    "Indicates the lifetime of the mitigation request. A lifetime of ‘0’ in a mitigation request is an invalid value. A lifetime of negative one (-1) indicates indefinite lifetime for the mitigation request."
}

leaf trigger-mitigation {
    type boolean;
    default "true";
    description
    "If set to ‘false’, DDoS mitigation will not be triggered unless the DOTS signal channel session is lost."
}

leaf mitigation-start {
    type uint64;
    config false;
    description
    "Mitigation start time is represented in seconds relative to 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z in UTC time."
}

leaf status {
    type enumeration {
        enum "attack-mitigation-in-progress" {
            value 1;
            description
        }
    }
}
"Attack mitigation is in progress (e.g., changing the network path to re-route the inbound traffic to DOTS mitigator).";

enum "attack-successfully-mitigated" {
  value 2;
  description
  "Attack is successfully mitigated (e.g., traffic is redirected to a DDoS mitigator and attack traffic is dropped or blackholed).";
}

enum "attack-stopped" {
  value 3;
  description
  "Attack has stopped and the DOTS client can withdraw the mitigation request.";
}

enum "attack-exceeded-capability" {
  value 4;
  description
  "Attack has exceeded the mitigation provider capability.";
}

enum "dots-client-withdrawn-mitigation" {
  value 5;
  description
  "DOTS client has withdrawn the mitigation request and the mitigation is active but terminating.";
}

enum "attack-mitigation-terminated" {
  value 6;
  description
  "Attack mitigation is now terminated.";
}

enum "attack-mitigation-withdrawn" {
  value 7;
  description
  "Attack mitigation is withdrawn.";
}

enum "attack-mitigation-signal-loss" {
  value 8;
  description
  "Attack mitigation will be triggered for the mitigation request only when the DOTS signal channel session is lost.";
}
config false;
description
"Indicates the status of a mitigation request.
It must be included in responses only."
);
container conflict-information {
config false;
description
"Indicates that a conflict is detected.
Must only be used for responses.";
leaf conflict-status {
type enumeration {
enum "request-inactive-other-active" {
  value 1;
description
  "DOTS Server has detected conflicting mitigation
  requests from different DOTS clients.
  This mitigation request is currently inactive
  until the conflicts are resolved. Another
  mitigation request is active.";
}
enum "request-active" {
  value 2;
description
  "DOTS Server has detected conflicting mitigation
  requests from different DOTS clients.
  This mitigation request is currently active.";
}
enum "all-requests-inactive" {
  value 3;
description
  "DOTS Server has detected conflicting mitigation
  requests from different DOTS clients. All
  conflicting mitigation requests are inactive.";
}
}
description
"Indicates the conflict status.";
}
leaf conflict-cause {
type enumeration {
enum "overlapping-targets" {
  value 1;
description
  "Overlapping targets. conflict-scope provides
  more details about the exact conflict.";
}
enum "conflict-with-whitelist" {
value 2;
description
"Conflicts with an existing white list.
This code is returned when the DDoS mitigation
detects that some of the source addresses/prefixes
listed in the white list ACLs are actually
attacking the target."
}
enum "cuid-collision" {
  value 3;
  description
  "Conflicts with the cuid used by another
  DOTS client."
}
description
"Indicates the cause of the conflict."
}
leaf retry-timer {
  type uint32;
  units "seconds";
  description
  "The DOTS client must not re-send the
  same request that has a conflict before the expiry of
  this timer."
}
container conflict-scope {
  description
  "Provides more information about the conflict scope."
  uses target {
    when ".../conflict-cause = 'overlapping-targets'"
  }
  leaf-list alias-name {
    when ".../../conflict-cause = 'overlapping-targets'"
    type string;
    description
    "Conflicting alias-name."
  }
  list acl-list {
    when ".../../conflict-cause = 'conflict-with-whitelist'"
    key "acl-name";
    description
    "List of conflicting ACLs as defined in the DOTS data
    channel. These ACLs are uniquely defined by
    cuid and acl-name."
    leaf acl-name {
      type leafref {

leaf acl-name {
  type leafref {
    path "/ietf-acl:acls/ietf-acl:acl/ + 
      "ietf-acl:name";
  }
  description
  "Reference to the conflicting ACL name bound to 
   a DOTS client.";
}
leaf acl-type {
  type leafref {
    path "/ietf-acl:acls/ietf-acl:acl/ + 
      "ietf-acl:type";
  }
  description
  "Reference to the conflicting ACL type bound to 
   a DOTS client.";
}
leaf mid {
  when "/../conflict-cause = 'overlapping-targets'";
  type leafref {
    path "/../../mid";
  }
  description
  "Reference to the conflicting 'mid' bound to 
   the same DOTS client.";
}
leaf bytes-dropped {
  type yang:zero-based-counter64;
  units "bytes";
  config false;
  description
  "The total dropped byte count for the mitigation 
   request since the attack mitigation is triggered. 
   The count wraps around when it reaches the maximum value 
   of counter64 for dropped bytes.";
}
leaf bps-dropped {
  type yang:zero-based-counter64;
  config false;
  description
  "The average number of dropped bits per second for 
   the mitigation request since the attack 
   mitigation is triggered. This should be a 
   five-minute average.";
}
leaf pkts-dropped {
type yang:zero-based-counter64;
config false;
description "The total number of dropped packet count for the mitigation request since the attack mitigation is triggered. The count wraps around when it reaches the maximum value of counter64 for dropped packets.";
}
leaf pps-dropped {
  type yang:zero-based-counter64;
  config false;
  description "The average number of dropped packets per second for the mitigation request since the attack mitigation is triggered. This should be a five-minute average.";
}
leaf attack-status {
  type enumeration {
    enum "under-attack" {
      value 1;
      description "The DOTS client determines that it is still under attack.";
    }
    enum "attack-successfully-mitigated" {
      value 2;
      description "The DOTS client determines that the attack is successfully mitigated.";
    }
  }
  description "Indicates the status of an attack as seen by the DOTS client.";
}
}
}
grouping config-parameters {
  description "Subset of DOTS signal channel session configuration.";
  container heartbeat-interval {
    description "DOTS agents regularly send heartbeats to each other after mutual authentication is successfully completed in order to keep the DOTS signal channel open.";
  }
}
leaf max-value {
  type uint16;
  units "seconds";
  config false;
  description
    "Maximum acceptable heartbeat-interval value.";
}
leaf min-value {
  type uint16;
  units "seconds";
  config false;
  description
    "Minimum acceptable heartbeat-interval value.";
}
leaf current-value {
  type uint16;
  units "seconds";
  default "30";
  description
    "Current heartbeat-interval value.
    '0' means that heartbeat mechanism is deactivated.";
}
}
container missing-hb-allowed {
  description
    "Maximum number of missing heartbeats allowed.";
  leaf max-value {
    type uint16;
    config false;
    description
      "Maximum acceptable missing-hb-allowed value.";
  }
  leaf min-value {
    type uint16;
    config false;
    description
      "Minimum acceptable missing-hb-allowed value.";
  }
  leaf current-value {
    type uint16;
    default "5";
    description
      "Current missing-hb-allowed value.";
  }
}
container max-retransmit {
  description

"Maximum number of retransmissions of a Confirmable message."
leaf max-value {
  type uint16;
  config false;
  description
    "Maximum acceptable max-retransmit value.";
}
leaf min-value {
  type uint16;
  config false;
  description
    "Minimum acceptable max-retransmit value.";
}
leaf current-value {
  type uint16;
  default "3";
  description
    "Current max-retransmit value.";
}

container ack-timeout {
  description
    "Initial retransmission timeout value.";
  leaf max-value-decimal {
    type decimal64 {
      fraction-digits 2;
    }
    units "seconds";
    config false;
    description
      "Maximum ack-timeout value.";
  }
  leaf min-value-decimal {
    type decimal64 {
      fraction-digits 2;
    }
    units "seconds";
    config false;
    description
      "Minimum ack-timeout value.";
  }
  leaf current-value-decimal {
    type decimal64 {
      fraction-digits 2;
    }
    units "seconds";
    default "2";
description
  "Current ack-timeout value.";
}
}

container ack-random-factor {
  description
  "Random factor used to influence the timing of retransmissions.";
  leaf max-value-decimal {
    type decimal64 {
      fraction-digits 2;
    }
    config false;
    description
    "Maximum acceptable ack-random-factor value.";
  }
  leaf min-value-decimal {
    type decimal64 {
      fraction-digits 2;
    }
    config false;
    description
    "Minimum acceptable ack-random-factor value.";
  }
  leaf current-value-decimal {
    type decimal64 {
      fraction-digits 2;
    }
    default "1.5";
    description
    "Current ack-random-factor value.";
  }
}
}

grouping signal-config {
  description
  "DOTS signal channel session configuration.";
  leaf sid {
    type uint32;
    mandatory true;
    description
    "An identifier for the DOTS signal channel session configuration data.";
  }
  container mitigating-config {
    description
    "Configuration parameters to use when a mitigation
is active.");
uses config-parameters;
}
container idle-config {
  description
  "Configuration parameters to use when no mitigation
  is active.";
  uses config-parameters;
}
}
grouping redirected-signal {
  description
  "Grouping for the redirected signaling.";
  leaf alt-server {
    type string;
    config false;
    mandatory true;
    description
    "FQDN of an alternate server.";
  }
  leaf-list alt-server-record {
    type inet:ip-address;
    config false;
    description
    "List of records for the alternate server.";
  }
  leaf alt-server-ttl {
    type int32;
    config false;
    description
    "TTL associated with alt-server records."
    A value of negative one (-1) indicates indefinite TTL. This value means that the alternate DOTS server is to be used until the alternate DOTS server redirects the traffic with another 3.00 response.";
  }
}
/*
* Main Container for DOTS Signal Channel
*/
container dots-signal {
  description
  "Main container for DOTS signal message."
A DOTS signal message can be a mitigation, a configuration, or a redirected signal message.

```yml
choice message-type {
  description
  "Can be a mitigation, a configuration, or a redirect message.";
  case mitigation-scope {
    description
    "Mitigation scope of a mitigation message.";
    uses mitigation-scope;
  }
  case signal-config {
    description
    "Configuration message.";
    uses signal-config;
  }
  case redirected-signal {
    description
    "Redirected signaling.";
    uses redirected-signal;
  }
}

6. Mapping Parameters to CBOR

All parameters in the payload of the DOTS signal channel MUST be mapped to CBOR types as shown in Table 4 and are assigned an integer key to save space. The recipient of the payload MAY reject the information if it is not suitably mapped.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter Name</th>
<th>YANG Type</th>
<th>CBOR Key</th>
<th>CBOR Major Type &amp; Information</th>
<th>JSON Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope</td>
<td>container</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5 map</td>
<td>Object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cdid</td>
<td>string</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4 array</td>
<td>Array</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cuid</td>
<td>string</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3 text string</td>
<td>String</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mid</td>
<td>uint32</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3 text string</td>
<td>String</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>target-prefix</td>
<td>leaf-list</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0 unsigned</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>target-port-range</td>
<td>ip-prefix</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4 array</td>
<td>Array</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>list</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4 array</td>
<td>Array</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lower-port</td>
<td>port-number</td>
<td>8 unsigned Number</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>upper-port</td>
<td>port-number</td>
<td>9 unsigned Number</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>target-protocol</td>
<td>leaf-list</td>
<td>10 4 array Array</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>target-fqdn</td>
<td>leaf-list</td>
<td>11 4 array Array</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>target-uri</td>
<td>leaf-list</td>
<td>12 4 array Array</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alias-name</td>
<td>leaf-list</td>
<td>13 3 text string String</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lifetime</td>
<td>int32</td>
<td>14 0 unsigned Number</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mitigation-start</td>
<td>uint64</td>
<td>15 1 negative Number</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>status</td>
<td>enumeration</td>
<td>16 0 unsigned String</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflict-information</td>
<td>container</td>
<td>17 5 map Object</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflict-status</td>
<td>enumeration</td>
<td>18 0 unsigned String</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflict-cause</td>
<td>enumeration</td>
<td>19 0 unsigned String</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>retry-timer</td>
<td>uint32</td>
<td>20 0 unsigned Number</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflict-scope</td>
<td>container</td>
<td>21 5 map Object</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acl-list</td>
<td>list</td>
<td>22 4 array Array</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acl-name</td>
<td>leafref</td>
<td>23 3 text string String</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acl-type</td>
<td>leafref</td>
<td>24 3 text string String</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bytes-dropped</td>
<td>counter64</td>
<td>25 0 unsigned String</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bps-dropped</td>
<td>counter64</td>
<td>26 0 unsigned String</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pkts-dropped</td>
<td>counter64</td>
<td>27 0 unsigned String</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pps-dropped</td>
<td>counter64</td>
<td>28 0 unsigned String</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attack-status</td>
<td>enumeration</td>
<td>29 0 unsigned String</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ietf-dots-signal-channel:</td>
<td>container</td>
<td>30 5 map Object</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sid</td>
<td>uint32</td>
<td>31 0 unsigned Number</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mitigating-config</td>
<td>container</td>
<td>32 5 map Object</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>heartbeat-interval</td>
<td>container</td>
<td>33 5 map Object</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>max-value</td>
<td>uint16</td>
<td>34 0 unsigned Number</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>min-value</td>
<td>uint16</td>
<td>35 0 unsigned Number</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>current-value</td>
<td>uint16</td>
<td>36 0 unsigned Number</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>missing-hb-allowed</td>
<td>container</td>
<td>37 5 map Object</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>max-retransmit</td>
<td>container</td>
<td>38 5 map Object</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4: CBOR Mappings Used in DOTS Signal Channel Messages

7. (D)TLS Protocol Profile and Performance Considerations

7.1. (D)TLS Protocol Profile

This section defines the (D)TLS protocol profile of DOTS signal channel over (D)TLS and DOTS data channel over TLS.

There are known attacks on (D)TLS, such as man-in-the-middle and protocol downgrade attacks. These are general attacks on (D)TLS and, as such, they are not specific to DOTS over (D)TLS; refer to the (D)TLS RFCs for discussion of these security issues. DOTS agents MUST adhere to the (D)TLS implementation recommendations and security considerations of [RFC7525] except with respect to (D)TLS version. Since DOTS signal channel encryption relies upon (D)TLS is virtually a green-field deployment, DOTS agents MUST implement only (D)TLS 1.2 or later.

When a DOTS client is configured with a domain name of the DOTS server, and connects to its configured DOTS server, the server may present it with a PKIX certificate. In order to ensure proper authentication, a DOTS client MUST verify the entire certification path per [RFC5280]. The DOTS client additionally uses [RFC6125] validation techniques to compare the domain name with the certificate provided.
A key challenge to deploying DOTS is the provisioning of DOTS clients, including the distribution of keying material to DOTS clients to enable the required mutual authentication of DOTS agents. EST defines a method of certificate enrollment by which domains operating DOTS servers may provide DOTS clients with all the necessary cryptographic keying material, including a private key and a certificate to authenticate themselves. One deployment option is DOTS clients behave as EST clients for certificate enrollment from an EST server provisioned by the mitigation provider. This document does not specify which EST mechanism the DOTS client uses to achieve initial enrollment.

The Server Name Indication (SNI) extension [RFC6066] defines a mechanism for a client to tell a (D)TLS server the name of the server it wants to contact. This is a useful extension for hosting environments where multiple virtual servers are reachable over a single IP address. The DOTS client may or may not know if it is interacting with a DOTS server in a virtual server hosting environment, so the DOTS client SHOULD include the DOTS server FQDN in the SNI extension.

Implementations compliant with this profile MUST implement all of the following items:

- DTLS record replay detection (Section 3.3 of [RFC6347]) to protect against replay attacks.
- (D)TLS session resumption without server-side state [RFC5077] to resume session and convey the DOTS signal.
- Raw public keys [RFC7250] or PSK handshake [RFC4279] which reduces the size of the ServerHello, and can be used by DOTS agents that cannot obtain certificates.

Implementations compliant with this profile SHOULD implement all of the following items to reduce the delay required to deliver a DOTS signal channel message:

- TLS False Start [RFC7918] which reduces round-trips by allowing the TLS second flight of messages (ChangeCipherSpec) to also contain the DOTS signal.
- Cached Information Extension [RFC7924] which avoids transmitting the server’s certificate and certificate chain if the client has cached that information from a previous TLS handshake.
- TCP Fast Open [RFC7413] can reduce the number of round-trips to convey DOTS signal channel message.
7.2. (D)TLS 1.3 Considerations

TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] provides critical latency improvements for connection establishment over TLS 1.2. The DTLS 1.3 protocol [I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13] is based upon the TLS 1.3 protocol and provides equivalent security guarantees. (D)TLS 1.3 provides two basic handshake modes the DOTS signal channel can take advantage of:

- A full handshake mode in which a DOTS client can send a DOTS mitigation request message after one round trip and the DOTS server immediately responds with a DOTS mitigation response. This assumes no packet loss is experienced.

- 0-RTT mode in which the DOTS client can authenticate itself and send DOTS mitigation request messages in the first message, thus reducing handshake latency. 0-RTT only works if the DOTS client has previously communicated with that DOTS server, which is very likely with the DOTS signal channel.

The DOTS client has to establish a (D)TLS session with the DOTS server during peacetime and share a PSK.

During a DDoS attack, the DOTS client can use the (D)TLS session to convey the DOTS mitigation request message and, if there is no response from the server after multiple retries, the DOTS client can resume the (D)TLS session in 0-RTT mode using PSK.

Section 8 of [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] discusses some mechanisms to implement to limit the impact of replay attacks on 0-RTT data. If TLS1.3 is used, DOTS servers must implement one of these mechanisms.

A simplified TLS 1.3 handshake with 0-RTT DOTS mitigation request message exchange is shown in Figure 24.
7.3. MTU and Fragmentation

To avoid DOTS signal message fragmentation and the subsequent decreased probability of message delivery, DOTS agents MUST ensure that the DTLS record MUST fit within a single datagram. If the path MTU is not known to the DOTS server, an IP MTU of 1280 bytes SHOULD be assumed. If UDP is used to convey the DOTS signal messages then the DOTS client must consider the amount of record expansion expected by the DTLS processing when calculating the size of CoAP message that fits within the path MTU. Path MTU MUST be greater than or equal to [CoAP message size + DTLS overhead of 13 octets + authentication overhead of the negotiated DTLS cipher suite + block padding] (Section 4.1.1.1 of [RFC6347]). If the request size exceeds the path MTU then the DOTS client MUST split the DOTS signal into separate messages, for example the list of addresses in the ‘target-prefix’ parameter could be split into multiple lists and each list conveyed in a new PUT request.

Implementation Note: DOTS choice of message size parameters works well with IPv6 and with most of today’s IPv4 paths. However, with IPv4, it is harder to safely make sure that there is no IP fragmentation. If IPv4 path MTU is unknown, implementations may want to limit themselves to more conservative IPv4 datagram sizes such as 576 bytes, as per [RFC0791]. IP packets whose size does not exceed 576 bytes should never need to be fragmented: therefore, sending a maximum of 500 bytes of DOTS signal over a UDP datagram will generally avoid IP fragmentation.
8. Mutual Authentication of DOTS Agents & Authorization of DOTS Clients

(D)TLS based upon client certificate can be used for mutual authentication between DOTS agents. If a DOTS gateway is involved, DOTS clients and DOTS gateways MUST perform mutual authentication; only authorized DOTS clients are allowed to send DOTS signals to a DOTS gateway. The DOTS gateway and the DOTS server MUST perform mutual authentication; a DOTS server only allows DOTS signal channel messages from an authorized DOTS gateway, thereby creating a two-link chain of transitive authentication between the DOTS client and the DOTS server.

The DOTS server SHOULD support certificate-based client authentication. The DOTS client SHOULD respond to the DOTS server’s TLS certificate request message with the PKIX certificate held by the DOTS client. DOTS client certificate validation MUST be performed as per [RFC5280] and the DOTS client certificate MUST conform to the [RFC5280] certificate profile. If a DOTS client does not support TLS client certificate authentication, it MUST support pre-shared key based or raw public key based client authentication.

Figure 25: Example of Authentication and Authorization of DOTS Agents

In the example depicted in Figure 25, the DOTS gateway and DOTS clients within the ‘example.com’ domain mutually authenticate. After
the DOTS gateway validates the identity of a DOTS client, it communicates with the AAA server in the ‘example.com’ domain to determine if the DOTS client is authorized to request DDoS mitigation. If the DOTS client is not authorized, a 4.01 (Unauthorized) is returned in the response to the DOTS client. In this example, the DOTS gateway only allows the application server and DDoS attack detector to request DDoS mitigation, but does not permit the user of type ‘guest’ to request DDoS mitigation.

Also, DOTS gateways and servers located in different domains MUST perform mutual authentication (e.g., using certificates). A DOTS server will only allow a DOTS gateway with a certificate for a particular domain to request mitigation for that domain. In reference to Figure 25, the DOTS server only allows the DOTS gateway to request mitigation for ‘example.com’ domain and not for other domains.

9. IANA Considerations

This specification registers a service port (Section 9.1), a URI suffix in the Well-Known URIs registry (Section 9.2), a CoAP response code (Section 9.3), a YANG module (Section 9.6). It also creates a registry for mappings to CBOR (Section 9.5).

9.1. DOTS Signal Channel UDP and TCP Port Number

IANA is requested to assign the port number TBD to the DOTS signal channel protocol for both UDP and TCP from the "Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number Registry" available at https://www.iana.org/assignments/service-names-port-numbers/service-names-port-numbers.xhtml.

The assignment of port number 4646 is strongly suggested, as 4646 is the ASCII decimal value for "." (DOTS).

9.2. Well-Known ‘dots’ URI

This document requests IANA to register the ‘dots’ well-known URI in the Well-Known URIs registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris/well-known-uris.xhtml) as defined by [RFC5785]:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>URI suffix</th>
<th>Change controller</th>
<th>Specification document(s)</th>
<th>Related information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>dots</td>
<td>IETF</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: 'dots' well-known URI

9.3. CoAP Response Code

IANA is requested to add the following entries to the "CoAP Response Codes" sub-registry available at https://www.iana.org/assignments/core-parameters/core-parameters.xhtml#response-codes:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>Alternate Server</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.06</td>
<td>Hop Limit Reached</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: CoAP Response Codes

9.4. CoAP Option Number

IANA is requested to add the following entry to the "CoAP Option Numbers" sub-registry available at https://www.iana.org/assignments/core-parameters/core-parameters.xhtml#option-numbers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Hop-Limit</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: CoAP Option Number

9.5. DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Mappings Registry

The document requests IANA to create a new registry, entitled "DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Mappings Registry". The structure of this registry is provided in Section 9.5.1.

The registry is initially populated with the values in Section 9.5.2.

Values from that registry MUST be assigned via Expert Review [RFC8126].
9.5.1. Registration Template

Parameter name:
Parameter name as used in the DOTS signal channel.

CBOR Key Value:
Key value for the parameter. The key value MUST be an integer in the 1-65535 range. The key values in the 32768-65535 range are assigned to Vendor-Specific parameters.

CBOR Major Type:
CBOR Major type and optional tag for the claim.

Change Controller:
For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG". For others, give the name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.

Specification Document(s):
Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter, preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be included but is not required.

9.5.2. Initial Registry Content

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter Name</th>
<th>CBOR Key Value</th>
<th>CBOR Major Type</th>
<th>Change Controller</th>
<th>Specification Document(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ietf-dots-signal-chan nel:mitigation-scope</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scope</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cdid</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cuid</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mid</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>target-prefix</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>target-port-range</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lower-port</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>upper-port</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>target-protocol</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>target-fqdn</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>target-uri</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alias-name</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lifetime</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0/1</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mitigation-start</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>status</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 8: Initial DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Mappings Registry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Object Path</th>
<th>Registration Authority</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>conflict-information</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflict-status</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflict-cause</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>retry-timer</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflict-scope</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acl-list</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acl-name</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acl-type</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bytes-dropped</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bps-dropped</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pkts-dropped</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pps-dropped</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attack-status</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ietf-dots-signal-channel</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sid</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mitigating-config</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>heartbeat-interval</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>min-value</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>max-value</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>current-value</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>missing-hb-allowed</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>max-retransmit</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ack-timeout</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ack-random-factor</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>min-value-decimal</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>6tag4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>max-value-decimal</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>6tag4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>current-value-decimal</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6tag4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>idle-config</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trigger-mitigation</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ietf-dots-signal-chan</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nel:redirected-signal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alt-server</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alt-server-record</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alt-server-ttl</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0/1</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 9.6. DOTS Signal Channel YANG Module

This document requests IANA to register the following URI in the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:

Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.
This document requests IANA to register the following YANG module in the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC7950].

```
name: ietf-signal
prefix: signal
reference: RFC XXXX
```

10. Security Considerations

Authenticated encryption MUST be used for data confidentiality and message integrity. The interaction between the DOTS agents requires Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) with a cipher suite offering confidentiality protection and the guidance given in [RFC7525] MUST be followed to avoid attacks on (D)TLS. The (D)TLS protocol profile for DOTS signal channel is specified in Section 7.

A single DOTS signal channel between DOTS agents can be used to exchange multiple DOTS signal messages. To reduce DOTS client and DOTS server workload, DOTS clients SHOULD re-use the (D)TLS session.

If TCP is used between DOTS agents, an attacker may be able to inject RST packets, bogus application segments, etc., regardless of whether TLS authentication is used. Because the application data is TLS protected, this will not result in the application receiving bogus data, but it will constitute a DoS on the connection. This attack can be countered by using TCP-AO [RFC5925]. If TCP-AO is used, then any bogus packets injected by an attacker will be rejected by the TCP-AO integrity check and therefore will never reach the TLS layer.

Rate-limiting DOTS requests, including those with new 'cuid' values, from the same DOTS client defends against DoS attacks that would result in varying the 'cuid' to exhaust DOTS server resources. Rate-limit policies SHOULD be enforced on DOTS gateways (if deployed) and DOTS servers.

In order to prevent leaking internal information outside a client-domain, DOTS gateways located in the client-domain SHOULD NOT reveal the identification information that pertains to internal DOTS clients (e.g., source IP address, client’s hostname) unless explicitly configured to do so.

DOTS servers MUST verify that requesting DOTS clients are entitled to trigger actions on a given IP prefix. That is, only actions on IP resources that belong to the DOTS client’ domain MUST be authorized by a DOTS server. The exact mechanism for the DOTS servers to
validate that the target prefixes are within the scope of the DOTS client’s domain is deployment-specific.

The presence of DOTS gateways may lead to infinite forwarding loops, which is undesirable. To prevent and detect such loops, this document specifies the 'hop-limit' option (Section 4.4.1).

CoAP-specific security considerations are discussed in Section 11 of [RFC7252], while CBOR-related security considerations are discussed in Section 8 of [RFC7049].

11. Contributors

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12. Acknowledgements

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13. References

13.1. Normative References


13.2. Informative References

[I-D.ietf-core-comi]

[I-D.ietf-core-yang-cbor]
[I-D.ietf-dots-architecture]

[I-D.ietf-dots-data-channel]

[I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]

[I-D.ietf-dots-use-cases]

[I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13]

[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]

[proto_numbers]


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Use cases for DDoS Open Threat Signaling
draft-ietf-dots-use-cases-09

Abstract

The DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) effort is intended to provide a protocol to facilitate interoperability between multivendor DDoS mitigation solutions and services. This document presents use cases which describe the interactions expected between the DOTS components as well as DOTS messaging exchanges. The purpose of describing use cases is to identify the interacting DOTS components, how they collaborate and what are the types of information to be exchanged.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on May 17, 2018.
1. Introduction

Currently, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack mitigation solutions are largely based upon siloed, proprietary communications schemes which result in vendor lock-in. As a side-effect, this makes the configuration, provisioning, operation, and activation of these
solutions a highly manual and often time-consuming process. Additionally, coordination of multiple DDoS mitigation solutions simultaneously engaged in defending the same organization (resources) against DDoS attacks is fraught with both technical and process-related hurdles. This greatly increase operational complexity and often results in suboptimal DDoS attack mitigation efficacy.

The DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) effort is intended to specify a protocol that facilitates interoperability between multivendor DDoS mitigation solutions and ensures more automation in term of mitigation requests and attack characterization patterns. As DDoS solutions are broadly heterogeneous among vendors, the primary goal of DOTS is to provide high-level interaction amongst differing DDoS solutions, such as initiating or terminating DDoS mitigation assistance.

It should be noted that DOTS is not intended to perform orchestration functions; rather, DOTS is intended to allow devices, services, and applications to request DDoS attack mitigation assistance and receive mitigation status updates.

These use cases are expected to provide inputs for the design of the DOTS protocol(s).

2. Terminology and Acronyms

This document makes use of the terms defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements].

In addition, this document introduces the following terms:

Inter-domain: a DOTS communications relationship between distinct organizations with separate spans of administrative control. Typical inter-domain DOTS communication relationships would be between a DDoS mitigation service provider and an end-customer who requires DDoS mitigation assistance; between multiple DDoS mitigation service providers coordinating mutual defense of a mutual end-customer; or between DDoS mitigation service providers which are requesting additional DDoS mitigation assistance in for attacks which exceed their inherent DDoS mitigation capacities and/or capabilities.

Intra-domain: a DOTS communications relationship between various (network) elements that are owned and operated by the same administrative entity. A typical intra-domain DOTS communications relationship would be between DOTS agents [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements] within the same organization.
2.1. Requirements Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

3. Use Cases Scenarios

This section provides a high-level description of scenarios addressed by DOTS. In both sub-sections, the scenarios are provided in order to illustrate the use of DOTS in typical DDoS attack scenarios. They are not definitive, and other use cases are expected to emerge with widespread DOTS deployment.

All scenarios present a coordination between the targeted organization, the DDoS attack telemetry and the mitigator. The coordination and communication between these entities depends, for example, on the characteristic or functionality of the entity itself, the reliability of the information provided by DDoS attack telemetry, and the business relationship between the DDoS target domain and the mitigator.

More explicitly, in some cases, the DDoS attack telemetry may simply activate a DDoS mitigation, whereas in other cases, it may collaborate by providing some information about an attack. In some cases, the DDoS mitigation may be orchestrated, which includes selecting a specific appliance as well as starting/ending a mitigation.

3.1. Inter-domain Use Cases

Inter-domain DOTS deployment scenarios encompass two or more distinct spans of administrative control. A typical inter-domain DOTS deployment may consist of an endpoint network such as an Internet-connected enterprise requesting DDoS mitigation assistance from one or more upstream transit providers offering DDoS mitigation services, or from a topologically-distant MSSP offering cloud-based overlay DDoS mitigation services. DOTS may also be used to facilitate coordination of DDoS mitigation activities between mitigation providers.

Coordination between organizations making use of DOTS in such scenarios is necessary. Along with DOTS-specific tasks such as DOTS peering and validating the exchange of DOTS messaging between the relevant organizations, externalities relating to routing advertisements, authoritative DNS records (for DNS-based diversion), network access policies for DOTS nodes, service-level agreements (SLAs), and DDoS mitigation provisioning are required.
3.1.1. Upstream Transit Providers Offering DDoS Mitigation Services

The use-cases in this section reflect scenarios in which the immediate upstream transit network(s) offer DDoS mitigation services to their end-customers. The DOTS communications models in these use-cases are largely identical with that described in Section 3.1.1.1, with the exceptions of Section 3.1.1.4 and Section 3.1.1.5. These variations are mainly of interest from the operational point of view, as they illustrate processes, procedures, and topological details which are externalities from the standpoint of the DOTS ecosystem, but which are of great importance for network operators and DDoS mitigation service providers.

3.1.1.1. End-customer with a single upstream transit provider offering DDoS mitigation services

In this scenario, an enterprise network with self-hosted Internet-facing properties such as Web servers, authoritative DNS servers, and VoIP PBXes has an intelligent DDoS mitigation system (IDMS) deployed to protect those servers and applications from DDoS attacks. In addition to their on-premise DDoS defense capability, they have contracted with their Internet transit provider for DDoS mitigation services which threaten to overwhelm their transit link bandwidth.

The IDMS is configured such that if the incoming Internet traffic volume exceeds 50% of the provisioned upstream Internet transit link capacity, the IDMS will request DDoS mitigation assistance from the upstream transit provider.

The requests to trigger, manage, and finalize a DDoS mitigation between the enterprise IDMS and the transit provider is performed using DOTS. The enterprise IDMS implements a DOTS client while the transit provider implements a DOTS server which is integrated with their DDoS mitigation orchestration system.

When the IDMS detects an inbound DDoS attack targeting the enterprise servers and applications, it immediately begins mitigating the attack.

During the course of the attack, the inbound traffic volume exceeds the 50% threshold; the IDMS DOTS client signals the DOTS server on the upstream transit provider network to initiate DDoS mitigation. The DOTS server signals the DOTS client that it can service this request, and mitigation is initiated on the transit provider network.

Over the course of the attack, the DOTS server on the transit provider network periodically signals the DOTS client on the enterprise IDMS in order to provide mitigation status information,
Internet-Draft               DOTS Use Cases                November 2017

statistics related to DDoS attack traffic mitigation, and related
information. Once the DDoS attack has ended, the DOTS server signals
the enterprise IDMS DOTS client that the attack has subsided.

The enterprise IDMS then requests that DDoS mitigation services on
the upstream transit provider network be terminated. The DOTS server
on the transit provider network receives this request, communicates
with the transit provider orchestration system controlling its DDoS
mitigation system to terminate attack mitigation, and once the
mitigation has ended, confirms the end of upstream DDoS mitigation
service to the enterprise IDMS DOTS client.

Note that communications between the enterprise DOTS client and the
upstream transit provider DOTS server may take place in-band within
the main Internet transit link between the enterprise and the transit
provider; out-of-band via a separate, dedicated wireline network link
utilized solely for DOTS signaling; or out-of-band via some other
form of network connectivity such as a third-party wireless 4G
network link.

The following is an overview of the DOTS communication model for this
use-case:

(a) A DDoS attack is initiated against online properties of an
organization which has deployed a DOTS-client-capable IDMS.

(b) The IDMS detects, classifies, and begins mitigating the DDoS
attack.

(c) The IDMS determines that its capacity and/or capability to
mitigate the DDoS attack is insufficient, and utilize its DOTS client
functionality to send a DOTS mitigation service initiation request to
one or more DOTS servers residing on the upstream transit networks.
This DOTS mitigation service initiation request is automatically
initiated by the DOTS client.

(d) The DOTS servers which receive the DOTS mitigation service
initiation requests determine that they have been configured to honor
requests from the requesting DOTS client, and initiate situationally-
appropriate DDoS mitigation service.

(e) The DOTS servers transmit a DOTS service status message to the
DOTS client indicating that upstream DDoS mitigation service has been
initiated.

(f) While DDoS mitigation services are active, the DOTS servers
regularly transmit DOTS mitigation status updates to the DOTS client.
(g) While DDoS mitigation services are active, the DOTS client may optionally regularly transmit DOTS mitigation efficacy updates to the DOTS server.

(h) When the upstream DDoS mitigators determine that the DDoS attack has ceased, they indicate this change in status to the DOTS server.

(i) The DOTS server transmits a DOTS mitigation status update to the DOTS client indicating that the DDoS attack has ceased.

(j) The DOTS client transmits a DOTS mitigation service termination request to the DOTS server.

(k) The DOTS server terminates DDoS mitigation service.

(l) The DOTS server transmits a DOTS mitigation status update to the DOTS client indicating that DDoS mitigation services have been terminated.

(m) The DOTS client transmits a DOTS mitigation termination status acknowledgement to the DOTS servers.

3.1.1.2. End-customer with multiple upstream transit providers offering DDoS mitigation services

This scenario shares many characteristics with Section 3.1.1.1, but with the key difference that the enterprise in question is multi-homed, i.e., has two or more upstream transit providers, and that they all provide DDoS mitigation services.

In most cases, the communications model for a multi-homed model would be the same as in the single-homed model, merely duplicated in parallel. However, if two or more of the upstream transit providers have entered into a mutual DDoS mitigation agreement and have established DOTS peering relationships, DDoS mitigation status messages may exchanged between their respective DOTS servers in order to provide a more complete picture of the DDoS attack scope. This will also allow for either automated or operator-assisted programmatic cooperative DDoS mitigation activities on the part of the DOTS-peered transit providers.

The additional DOTS communications between the upstream transit providers will consist of mitigation start, mitigation status, and mitigation termination messages.
3.1.1.3. End-customer with multiple upstream transit providers, but only a single upstream transit provider offering DDoS mitigation services

This scenario is similar to that outlined in Section 3.1.1.2; however, only one of the upstream transit providers in question offers DDoS mitigation services. In this situation, the enterprise would cease advertising the relevant network prefixes via the transit providers which do not provide DDoS mitigation services - or, in the case where the enterprise does not control its own routing, request that the upstream transit providers which do not offer DDoS mitigation services stop advertising the relevant network prefixes on their behalf.

Once it has been determined that the DDoS attack has ceased, the enterprise once again announces the relevant routes to the upstream transit providers which do not offer DDoS mitigation services, or requests that they resume announcing the relevant routes on behalf of the enterprise.

Note that falling back to a single transit provider has the effect of reducing available inbound transit bandwidth during a DDoS attack. Without proper planning and sufficient provisioning of both the link capacity and DDoS mitigation capacity of the sole transit provider offering DDoS mitigation services, this reduction of available bandwidth could lead to network link congestion caused by legitimate inbound network traffic. Therefore, careful planning and provisioning of both upstream transit bandwidth as well as DDoS mitigation capacity is required in scenarios of this nature.

The withdrawal and announcement of routing prefixes described in this use-case falls outside the scope of DOTS, although they could conceivably be triggered as a result of provider-specific orchestration triggered by the receipt of specific DOTS messages from the enterprise in question.

3.1.1.4. End-customer with an upstream transit provider offering DDoS mitigation services on an ongoing basis

This scenario is similar to that described in Section 3.1.1.1, except that due to the lack of a capable local IDMS solution, strict uptime requirements, or other considerations, the end-customer has previously arranged for continuous active DDoS mitigation coverage; thus, the concepts of initiating or terminating DDoS mitigation services do not apply.

During an attack, the DOTS server on the upstream transit provider network immediately notifies the DOTS client on the enterprise
network about the attack and periodically signals the DOTS client in order to provide mitigation status information and related information. The end-customer may then use this information to add capacity or implement configuration changes intended to increase resilience, to plan maintenance windows or changes to routing policies, etc.

3.1.1.5. End-customer with an upstream transit provider offering DDoS mitigation services, but DDoS mitigation service is refused

This scenario is similar to that described in Section 3.1.1.1, except that the upstream transit provider is unable to honor the DDoS mitigation service request from the end-customer due to mitigation capacity limitations, technical faults, or other circumstances. The end-customer DOTS client may be configured to make repeated attempts to engage DDoS mitigation service from the refusing provider, or alternately may be configured to request DDoS mitigation service from alternate providers.

The following is an overview of the DOTS communication model for this use-case:

(a) A DDoS attack is initiated against online properties of an organization which has deployed a DOTS-client-capable IDMS.

(b) The IDMS detects, classifies, and begins mitigating the DDoS attack.

(c) The IDMS determines that its capacity and/or capability to mitigate the DDoS attack is insufficient, and utilizes its DOTS client functionality to send a DOTS mitigation service initiation request to a DOTS server residing on an upstream transit network.

(d) The DOTS servers which receives the DOTS mitigation service initiation requests determines that it has been configured to honor requests from the requesting DOTS client, and attempts to initiate situationally-appropriate DDoS mitigation service.

(e) The DDoS mitigators on the upstream network report back to the DOTS server that they are unable to initiate DDoS mitigation service for the requesting organization due to mitigation capacity constraints, bandwidth constraints, functionality constraints, hardware casualties, or other impediments.

(f) The DOTS servers transmits a DOTS service status message to the DOTS client indicating that upstream DDoS mitigation service cannot be initiated as requested.
(g) The DOTS client may optionally regularly re-transmit DOTS mitigation status request messages to the DOTS server until receiving acknowledgement that DDoS mitigation services have been initiated.

(h) The DOTS client may optionally transmit a DOTS mitigation service initiation request to a DOTS server associated with a configured fallback upstream DDoS mitigation service. Multiple fallback DDoS mitigation services may optionally be configured.

(i) The process describe above cyclically continues until the DDoS mitigation service request is fulfilled; the DOTS client determines that the DDoS attack volume has decreased to a level and/or complexity which it can successfully mitigate; the DDoS attack has ceased; or manual intervention by personnel of the requesting organization has taken place.

3.1.2. Overlay MSSPs Offering DDoS Mitigation Services

The use-cases in this section reflect scenarios in which topologically-distant managed security service providers (MSSPs) offer DDoS mitigation services to end-customers. The DOTS communications models in these use-cases are largely identical with that described in Section 3.1.1.1. These variations are mainly of interest from the operational point of view, as they illustrate processes, procedures, and topological details which are externalities from the standpoint of the DOTS ecosystem, but which are of great importance for network operators and DDoS mitigation service providers.

3.1.2.1. End-customer with an overlay DDoS mitigation managed security service provider (MSSP)

This use case details an enterprise that has a local DDoS detection and classification capability and may or may not have an on-premise mitigation capability. The enterprise is contracted with an overlay DDoS mitigation MSSP, topologically distant from the enterprise network (i.e., not a direct upstream transit provider), which can redirect (divert) traffic away from the enterprise, provide DDoS mitigation services services, and then forward (re-inject) legitimate traffic to the enterprise on an on-demand basis. In this scenario, diversion of Internet traffic destined for the enterprise network into the overlay DDoS mitigation MSSP network is typically accomplished via eBGP announcements of the relevant enterprise network CIDR blocks, or via authoritative DNS subdomain-based mechanisms (other mechanisms are not precluded, these are merely the most common ones in use today).
The enterprise determines thresholds at which a request for mitigation is triggered indicating to the MSSP that inbound network traffic should be diverted into the MSSP network and that DDoS mitigation should be initiated. The enterprise may also elect to manually request diversion and mitigation via the MSSP network as desired.

The communications required to initiate, manage, and terminate active DDoS mitigation by the MSSP is performed using DOTS. The enterprise DDoS detection/classification system implements a DOTS client, while the MSSP implements a DOTS server integrated with its DDoS mitigation orchestration system. One or more out-of-band methods for initiating a mitigation request, such as a Web portal, a smartphone app, or voice support hotline, may also be made available by the MSSP.

When an attack is detected, an automated or manual DOTS mitigation request is generated by the enterprise and sent to the MSSP. The enterprise DOTS mitigation request is processed by the MSSP DOTS server, which validates the origin of the request and passes it to the MSSP DDoS mitigation orchestration system, which then initiates active DDoS mitigation. This action will usually involve the diversion of all network traffic destined for the targeted enterprise into the MSSP DDoS mitigation network, where it will be subjected to further scrutiny, with DDoS attack traffic filtered by the MSSP. Successful mitigation of the DDoS attack will not only result in preserving the availability of services and applications resident on the enterprise network, but will also prevent DDoS attack traffic from ingressing the networks of the enterprise upstream transit providers and/or peers.

The MSSP should signal via DOTS to the enterprise that a mitigation request has been received and acted upon, and should also include an update of the mitigation status. The MSSP may respond periodically with additional updates on the mitigation status to in order to enable the enterprise to make an informed decision on whether to maintain or terminate the mitigation. An alternative approach would be for the DOTS client mitigation request to include a time to live (TTL) for the mitigation, which may also be extended by the client should the attack still be ongoing as the TTL reaches expiration.

A variation of this use case may be that the enterprise is providing a DDoS monitoring and analysis service to customers whose networks may be protected by any one of a number of third-party providers. The enterprise in question may integrate with these third-party providers using DOTS and signal accordingly when a customer is attacked - the MSSP may then manage the life-cycle of the attack mitigation on behalf of the enterprise.
3.1.2.2. MSSP as an end-customer requesting overflow DDoS mitigation assistance from other MSSPs

This is a more complex use-case involving multiple DDoS MSSPs, whether transit operators, overlay MSSPs, or both. In this scenario, an MSSP has entered into a pre-arranged DDoS mitigation assistance agreement with one or more other DDoS MSSPs in order to ensure that sufficient DDoS mitigation capacity and/or capabilities may be activated in the event that a given DDoS attack threatens to overwhelm the ability of a given DDoS MSSP to mitigate the attack on its own.

BGP-based diversion (including relevant Letters of Authorization, or LoAs), DNS-based diversion (including relevant LoAs), traffic re-injection mechanisms such as Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) tunnels, provisioning of DDoS orchestration systems, et. al., must be arranged in advance between the DDoS MSSPs which are parties to the agreement. They should also be tested on a regular basis.

When a DDoS MSSP which is party to the agreement is nearing its capacity or ability to mitigate a given DDoS attack traffic, the DOTS client integrated with the MSSP DDoS mitigation orchestration system signals partner MSSPs to initiate network traffic diversion and DDoS mitigation activities. Ongoing attack and mitigation status messages may be passed between the DDoS MSSPs, and between the requesting MSSP and the ultimate end-customer of the attack.

Once the requesting DDoS MSSP is confident that the DDoS attack has either ceased or has fallen to levels of traffic/complexity which they can handle on their own, the requesting DDoS MSSP DOTS client sends mitigation termination requests to the participating overflow DDoS MSSPs.

3.1.3. Examples of DOTS clients integrated with applications, services, and network infrastructure devices

The use-cases in this section reflect scenarios in which DOTS clients are integrated into devices and services which have heretofore been unable to request DDoS mitigation services on an as-needed basis. The DOTS communications models in these use-cases are largely identical with those described in (interdomain-use-cases). These variations are mainly of interest because they illustrate how DOTS allows DDoS mitigation services to expand in scope and utility.
3.1.3.1. End-customer operating an application or service with an integrated DOTS client

In this scenario, a Web server has a built-in mechanism to detect and classify DDoS attacks, which also incorporates a DOTS client. When an attack is detected, the self-defense mechanism is activated, and local DDoS mitigation is initiated.

The DOTS client built into the Web server has been configured to request DDoS mitigation services from an upstream transit provider or overlay MSSP once specific attack traffic thresholds have been reached, or certain network traffic conditions prevail. Once attack traffic subsides below configured thresholds and/or the specified network traffic conditions no longer apply, the DOTS client requests the termination of DDoS mitigation services.

3.1.3.2. End-customer operating a CPE network infrastructure device with an integrated DOTS client

Similar to the above use-case featuring applications or services with built-in DDoS attack detection/classification and DOTS client capabilities, in this scenario, an end-customer network infrastructure CPE device such as a router, layer-3 switch, firewall, IDS/IPS, Web application firewall or load-balancer incorporates both the functionality required to detect and classify incoming DDoS attacks as well as DOTS client functionality.

3.1.3.3. End-customer with an out-of-band smartphone application featuring DOTS client capabilities

This scenario would typically apply in a small office or home office (SOHO) setting, where the end-customer does not have CPE equipment or software capable of detecting/classifying/mitigating DDoS attack, yet still has a requirement for on-demand DDoS mitigation services. A smartphone application containing a DOTS client would be provided by the upstream transit mitigation provider or overlay DDoS MSSP to the SOHO end-customer; this application would allow a manual ‘panic-button’ to request the initiation and termination of DDoS mitigation services. The end-customer DOTS client application will display mitigation status information while DDoS mitigation activities are taking place.

3.2. Intra-domain Use Cases

While many of the DOTS-specific elements of inter-domain DOTS deployment scenarios apply to intra-domain scenarios, it is expected that many externalities such as coordination of and authorization for routing advertisements and authoritative DNS updates may be automated.
to a higher degree than is practicable in inter-domain scenarios, given that the scope of required activities and authorizations are confined to a single organization. In theory, provisioning and change-control related both to DOTS itself as well as relevant externalities may require less administrative overhead and less implementation lead-times.

The scope of potential DDoS mitigation actions may also be broader in intra-organizational scenarios, as presumably an organization will have a higher degree of autonomy with regards to both technically and administratively feasible activities.

The DOTS communications model in these scenarios are largely identical to that described in Section 3.1, except that all the DOTS communications take place within the same span of administrative control and the same network. These variations are mainly of interest from the operational point of view, as they illustrate processes, procedures, and topological details which are externalities from the standpoint of the DOTS ecosystem, but which are of great importance for network operators and DDoS mitigation service providers.

3.2.1. Suppression of outbound DDoS traffic originating from a consumer broadband access network

While most DDoS defenses concentrate on inbound DDoS attacks ingressing from direct peering links or upstream transit providers, the DDoS attack traffic in question originates from one or more Internet-connected networks. In some cases, compromised devices residing on the local networks of broadband access customers are used to directly generate this DDoS attack traffic; in others, misconfigured devices residing on said local customer networks are exploited by attackers to launch reflection/amplification DDoS attacks. In either scenario, the outbound DDoS traffic emanating from these devices can be just as disruptive as an inbound DDoS attack, and can cause disruption for substantial proportions of the broadband access network operator’s customer base.

Some broadband access network operators provide CPE devices (DSL modems/routers, cablemodems, FTTH routers, etc.) to their end-customers. Others allow end-customers to provide their own CPE devices. Many will either provide CPE devices or allow end-customers to supply their own.

Broadband access network operators typically have mechanisms to detect and classify both inbound and outbound DDoS attacks, utilizing flow telemetry exported from their peering/transit and customer aggregation routers. In the event of an outbound DDoS attack, they
may make use of internally-developed systems which leverage their subscriber-management systems to de-provision end-customers who are sourcing outbound DDoS traffic; in some cases, they may have implemented quarantine systems to block all outbound traffic sourced from the offending end-customers. In either case, the perceived disruption of the end-customer’s Internet access often prompts a help-desk call, which erodes the margins of the broadband access provider and can cause end-customer dissatisfaction.

Increasingly, CPE devices themselves are targeted by attackers who exploit security flaws in these devices in order to compromise them and subsume them into botnets, and then leverage them to launch outbound DDoS attacks. In all of the described scenarios, the end-customers are unaware that their computers and/or CPE devices have been compromised and are being used to launch outbound DDoS attacks – however, they may notice a degradation of their Internet connectivity as a result of outbound bandwidth consumption or other disruption.

By deploying DOTS-enabled telemetry systems and CPE devices (and possibly requiring DOTS functionality in customer-provided CPE devices), broadband access providers can utilize a standards-based mechanism to suppress outbound DDoS attack traffic while optionally allowing legitimate end-customer traffic to proceed unmolested.

In order to achieve this capability, the telemetry analysis system utilized by the broadband access provider must have DOTS client functionality, and the end-customer CPE devices must have DOTS server functionality. When the telemetry analysis system detects and classifies an outbound DDoS attack sourced from one or more end-customer networks/devices, the DOTS client of the telemetry analysis system sends a DOTS request to the DOTS server implemented on the CPE devices, requesting local mitigation assistance in suppressing either the identified outbound DDoS traffic, or all outbound traffic sourced from the end-customer networks/devices. The DOTS server residing within the CPE device(s) would then perform predefined actions such as implementing on-board access-control lists (ACLs) to suppress the outbound traffic in question and prevent it from leaving the local end-customer network(s).

Broadband access network operators may choose to implement a quarantine of all or selected network traffic originating from end-customer networks/devices which are sourcing outbound DDoS traffic, redirecting traffic from interactive applications such as Web browsers to an internal portal which informs the end-customer of the quarantine action, and providing instructions for self-remediation and/or helpdesk contact information.
Quarantine systems for broadband access networks are typically custom-developed and -maintained, and are generally deployed only by a relatively small number of broadband access providers with considerable internal software development and support capabilities. By requiring the manufacturers of operator-supplied CPE devices to implement DOTS server functionality, and requiring customer-provided CPE devices to feature DOTS server functionality, broadband access network operators who previously could not afford the development expense of creating custom quarantine systems to integrate DOTS-enabled network telemetry systems to act as DOTS clients and perform effective quarantine of end-customer networks and devices until such time as they have been remediated.

The DOTS communications model in this scenario resembles that described in Section 3.1.1.1, except that all the DOTS communications take place within the same span of administrative control and the same network.

3.2.2. Home Network DDoS Detection Collaboration for ISP network management

Home networks run with (limited) bandwidth as well as limited routing resources, while they are expected to provide services reachable from the outside [RFC7368]. This makes such networks some easy targets to DDoS attacks via their WAN interface. As these DDoS attacks are easy to perform, they may remain undetected by the upstream ISP. When the CPE is congested, the customer is likely to call the ISP hotline. In order to improve the quality of experience of the connectivity as well as to automate the request for DDoS mitigation, ISPs are likely to consider a standard mean for CPEs to automatically inform a dedicated service mitigation platform when they are under a suspected DDoS.

Note also that this section only considers DDoS attacks CPE or services in the home network are encountering. This differs from DDoS attacks the CPE or any device within the home network may take part of - such as botnets. In the later attacks, the home network generates traffic under the control of a botmaster. Such attacks may only be detected once the attacks have been characterized. It would be tempting to consider a feature in the DOTS protocol to allow a DOTS server to inform a CPE that some suspect traffic is being sent by the CPE so that appropriate actions are undertaken by the CPE/user. Nevertheless, this feature would require some interaction with the CPE administrator. Such scenario is outside the scope of this document.

In this use case, ISPs are willing to prevent their customer undergoing DDoS attacks in order to enhance the quality of experience
of their customers, to avoid unnecessary costly call on hot lines as well as to optimize the bandwidth of their network. A key challenge for the ISP is to detect DDoS attacks. In fact, DDoS detection is not only fine grained but is also expected to be different for each home network or small businesses networks (SOHO), and the ISP is unlikely to have sufficient resource to inspect the traffic of all its customers.

In order to address these challenges, ISPs are delegating the DDoS detection to CPE of home network or SOHO. Outsourcing the detection on the CPE provides the following advantages to the ISP: 1) Avoid the ISP to dedicate a huge amount of resource for deep packet inspection over a large amount of traffic with a specific security policies associated to each home network. It is expected that such traffic only constitutes a small fraction of the total traffic the ISP is responsible for. 2) DDoS detection is deployed in a scalable way. 3) Provide more deterministic DDoS attack detection. For example, what could be suspected to be an UDP flood by the ISP may be consented by the terminating point hosted in the home network or SOHO. In fact, without specific home network security policies, the ISP is likely to detect DDoS attack over regular traffic or to miss DDoS attacks targeting a specific home network or CPE. In the first case, this would result in the ISP spending unnecessary resources and in the second case this would directly impact the quality of experience of the customer.

Note that in this scenario slightly differs from the "Enterprise with an upstream transit provider DDoS mitigation Service" scenario described in Section 3.1.1. In this scenario, the detection DDoS is motivated by the ISP in order to operate appropriately its network.

For that purpose, it requires some collaboration with the home network. In Section 3.1.1, the target network requests a mitigation service from the upstream transit provider in order to operate its services.

Even though the motivations differ, there are still significant advantages for the home network to collaborate. On the home network or SOHO perspective such collaboration provides the following advantages: 1) If it removes the flows contributing to a DDoS attacks, then it enhances the quality of experience of the users of the targeted services or the entire home network. 2) If mitigation is being handled by the ISP rather then the home network, then it reduces the management of DDoS attacks by the network administrator which involves detection as well as mitigation as well as the provisioning of extra resources. 3) If the DDoS detection is based on information specific to the home network, such as for example the description of the services, the hosts capacities or the network
topology, then performing the DDoS detection by the home network instead of the ISP avoids the home network to leak private information to the ISP. In that sense, it better preserves the home network or SOHO privacy while enabling a better detection. However, the request for mitigation may still leak some informations. ISPs must not retrieve sensitive data without the consent of the user. This is usually captured in administrative contracts that are out of scope of this document.

When the CPE suspects an attack, it notifies automatically or the ISP. The contact address of the DDoS Mitigation service of the ISP may be hard coded or may be configured manually or automatically (e.g., eventually the DHCP server may provide the DDoS mitigation service via specific DHCP options).

The communication to trigger a DDoS mitigation between the home network and the ISP is performed using DOTS. The home network CPE implements a DOTS client while the ISP implements a DOTS server.

The DOTS client on the CPE monitors the status of CPE’s resource and WAN link bandwidth usage. If something unusual happens based on preconfigured throughput, traffic patter, explicit action from the user, or some heuristics methods, the DOTS client sends a DOTS mitigation request to the ISP DOTS server. Typically, a default configuration with no additional information associated to the DOTS mitigation request is expected. The ISP derives traffic to mitigate from the CPE IP address.

In some cases, the DOTS mitigation request contains options such as some IP addresses or prefixes that belongs to a whitelist or a blacklist. In this case, the white and black lists are not associated to some analysis performed by the CPE - as the CPE is clearly not expected to analyze such attacks. Instead these are part of some configuration parameters. For example, in the case of small business, one may indicate specific legitimate IP addresses such as those used for VPNs, or third party services the company is likely to set a session. Similarly, the CPE may provide the IP addresses targeting the assets to be protected inside the network. Note that the IP address is the IP address used to reach the asset from the internet, and as such is expected to be globally routable. Such options may include the IP address as well as a service description. Similarly to the previous blacklist and whitelist, such information are likely not derived from a traffic analysis performed by the CPE, but instead are more related to configuration parameters.

Upon receiving the DOTS mitigation request, the DOTS server acknowledges its reception and confirms DDoS mitigation starts or
not. Such feedback is mostly to avoid retransmission of the request.

Note that the ISP is connected to multiple CPEs and as such the CPE can potentially perform DDoS attack to the DOTS server. ISP may use gateways to absorb the traffic. These gateways, will typically aggregate a smaller number of CPEs and retransmit to the destination DOTS Server a selected information. Note that such gateways may somehow act as a DOTS relay, which is implemented with a DOTS Server and a DOTS Client. Note also that the case of a large DDoS attack targeting simultaneously multiple CPEs is expected to be detected and mitigated by the upstream architecture, eventually without DOTS alerts sent by each single CPE.

ISP may activate mitigation for the traffic associated to the CPE sending the alert or instead to the traffic associated to all CPE. Such decisions are not part of DOTS, but instead depend on the policies of the ISP.

It is unlikely the CPE will follow the status of the mitigation. The ISP is only expected to inform the CPE the mitigation has been stopped.

Upon receipt of such notification the CPE may, for example, reactivate the monitoring jobs and thus is likely to provide some further DOTS alert.

3.2.3. DDoS Orchestration

In this use case, one or more DDoS telemetry systems or monitoring devices such as a flow telemetry collector monitor a network -- typically an ISP network. Upon detection of a DDoS attack, these telemetry systems alert an orchestrator in charge of coordinating the various DDoS mitigation systems within the domain. The telemetry systems may be configured to provide necessary and useful pieces of information, such as a preliminary analysis of the observation to the orchestrator.

The orchestrator analyses the various information it receives from specialized equipment, and elaborates one or multiple DDoS mitigation strategies. In some case, a manual confirmation may also be required to choose a proposed strategy or to initiate a DDoS mitigation. The DDoS mitigation may consist of multiple steps such as configuring the network, various hardware, or updating already instantiated DDoS mitigation functions. In some cases, some specific virtual DDoS mitigation functions must be instantiated and properly ordered. Eventually, the coordination of the mitigation may involve
external DDoS resources such as a transit provider (Section 3.1.1.1) or an MSSP (Section 3.1.2.1).

The communications used to trigger a DDoS mitigation between the telemetry and monitoring systems and the orchestrator is performed using DOTS. The telemetry systems implements a DOTS client while the orchestrator implements a DOTS server.

The communication between a network administrator and the orchestrator is also performed using DOTS. The network administrator via its web interfaces implements a DOTS client, while the Orchestrator implements a DOTS server.

The communication between the Orchestrator and the DDoS mitigation systems is performed using DOTS. The Orchestrator implements a DOTS client while the DDoS mitigation systems implement a DOTS server.

The configuration aspects of each DDoS mitigation system, as well as the instantiations of DDoS mitigation functions or network configuration is not part of DOTS. Similarly, the discovery of available DDoS mitigation functions is not part of DOTS.

* C is for DOTS client functionality
* S is for DOTS server functionality

Figure 1: DDoS Orchestration
The telemetry systems monitor various traffic network and perform their measurement tasks. They are configured so that when an event or some measurements reach a predefined level to report a DOTS mitigation request to the Orchestrator. The DOTS mitigation request may be associated with some element such as specific reporting.

Upon receipt of the DOTS mitigation request from the telemetry system, the Orchestrator responds with an acknowledgement, to avoid retransmission of the request for mitigation. The status of the DDoS mitigation indicates the Orchestrator is in an analysing phase. The Orchestrator begins collecting various information from various telemetry systems in order to correlate the measurements and provide an analysis of the event. Eventually, the Orchestrator may ask additional information to the telemetry system, however, the collection of these information is performed outside DOTS.

The orchestrator may be configured to start a DDoS mitigation upon approval from a network administrator. The analysis from the orchestrator is reported to the network administrator via a web interface. If the network administrator decides to start the mitigation, she orders through her web interface a DOTS client to send a request for DDoS mitigation. This request is expected to be associated with a context that identifies the DDoS mitigation selected.

Upon receiving the DOTS request for DDoS mitigation from the network administrator, the orchestrator orchestrates the DDoS mitigation according to the specified strategy. Its status indicates the DDoS mitigation is starting while not effective.

Orchestration of the DDoS mitigation systems works similarly as described in Section 3.1.1.1 and Section 3.1.2.1. The Orchestrator indicates with its status whether the DDoS Mitigation is effective.

When the DDoS mitigation is finished on the DDoS mitigation systems, the orchestrator indicates to the Telemetry systems as well as to the network administrator the DDoS mitigation is finished.

4. Security Considerations

DOTS is at risk from four primary forms of attack: DOTS agent impersonation, traffic injection, signal-blocking, and DDoS attacks. Associated security requirements and additional ones are defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements].

These security risks can be managed through current secure communications best practices.

DOTS is not subject to anything new or unique in this area.
5. IANA Considerations

No IANA considerations exist for this document at this time.

6. Acknowledgments

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7. References

7.1. Normative References


7.2. Informative References


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Use cases for DDoS Open Threat Signaling
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Abstract

The DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) effort is intended to provide protocols to facilitate interoperability across disparate DDoS mitigation solutions. This document presents use cases which describe the interactions expected between the DOTS components as well as DOTS messaging exchanges. These use cases are meant to identify the interacting DOTS components, how they collaborate and what are the typical information to be exchanged.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 20, 2019.
1. Introduction

At the time of writing, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack mitigation solutions are largely based upon siloed, proprietary communications schemes with vendor lock-in as a side-effect. This can result in the configuration, provisioning, operation, and activation of these solutions being a highly manual and often time-consuming process. Additionally, coordinating multiple DDoS mitigation solutions simultaneously is fraught with both technical and process-related hurdles. This greatly increases operational complexity which, in turn, can degrade the efficacy of mitigations.

The DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) effort is intended to specify protocols that facilitate interoperability between diverse DDoS mitigation solutions and ensure greater integration in term of mitigation requests and attack characterization patterns. As DDoS solutions are broadly heterogeneous among vendors, the primary goal...
of DOTS is to provide high-level interaction amongst differing DDoS solutions, such as initiating, terminating DDoS mitigation assistance or requesting the status of a DDoS mitigation.

This document provides use cases to provide inputs for the design of the DOTS protocol(s). The use cases are not exhaustive and future use cases are expected to emerge as DOTS is adopted and evolves.

2. Terminology and Acronyms

This document makes use of the same terminology and definitions as [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]. In addition it uses the terms defined below:

- DDoS Mitigation Service Provider: designates the administrative entity providing the DDoS Mitigation Service.
- DDoS Mitigation System (DMS): A system that performs DDoS mitigation. The DDoS Mitigation System may be composed by a cluster of hardware and/or software resources, but could also involve an orchestrator that may take decisions such as outsourcing partial or more of the mitigation to another DDoS Mitigation System.
- DDoS Mitigation: The action performed by the DDoS Mitigation System.
- DDoS Mitigation Service: designates a DDoS mitigation service provided to a customer and which is scoped to mitigate DDoS attacks. Services usually involve Service Level Agreement (SLA) that have to be met. It is the responsibility of the DDoS Service provider to instantiate the DDoS Mitigation System to meet these SLAs.
- Internet Transit Provider (ITP): designates the entity that delivers the traffic to the network. It can be an Internet Service Provider (ISP), or an upstream entity delivering the traffic to the ISP.

3. Use Cases

3.1. Upstream DDoS Mitigation by an Upstream Internet Transit Provider

This use case describes how an enterprise or a residential customer network may take advantage of a pre-existing relation with its Internet Transit Provider (ITP) in order to mitigate a DDoS attack targeting its network. To improve the clarity of our purpose, the targeted network will be designated as enterprise network, but the
same scenario applies to any downstream network, including residential network and cloud hosting network. As the ITP provides connectivity to the enterprise network, it is already on the path of the inbound or outbound traffic of the enterprise network and well aware of the networking parameters associated to the enterprise network connectivity. This eases both the configuration and the instantiation of a DDoS Mitigation Service. This section considers two kind of DDoS Mitigation Service between an enterprise network and an ITP:

- The upstream ITP may instantiate a DDoS Mitigation System (DMS) upon receiving a request from the enterprise network. This typically corresponds to the case when the enterprise network is under attack.

- On the other hand, the ITP may identify an enterprise network as the source of an attack and send a mitigation request to the enterprise DMS to mitigate this at the source.

In the first scenario, as depicted in Figure 1, an enterprise network with self-hosted Internet-facing properties such as Web servers, authoritative DNS servers, and VoIP servers has a DMS deployed to protect those servers and applications from DDoS attacks. In addition to on-premise DDoS defense capability, enterprises have contracted with their ITP for DDoS Mitigation Services which threaten to overwhelm their WAN link(s) bandwidth.
The enterprise DMS is configured such that if the incoming Internet traffic volume exceeds 50% of the provisioned upstream Internet WAN link capacity, the DMS will request DDoS mitigation assistance from the upstream transit provider.

The requests to trigger, manage, and finalize a DDoS Mitigation between the enterprise DMS and the ITP is performed using DOTS. The enterprise DMS implements a DOTS client while the ITP implements a DOTS server which is integrated with their DMS.

When the enterprise DMS detects an inbound DDoS attack targeting its resources (e.g. servers, hosts or applications), it immediately begins a DDoS Mitigation.

During the course of the attack, the inbound traffic volume exceeds the 50% threshold; the DMS DOTS client signals the DOTS server on the upstream ITP to initiate DDoS Mitigation. The DOTS server signals the DOTS client that it can serve this request, and mitigation is initiated on the ITP network by the ITP DMS.
Over the course of the attack, the DOTS server of the ITP periodically informs the DOTS client on the enterprise DMS mitigation status, statistics related to DDoS attack traffic mitigation, and related information. Once the DDoS attack has ended, or decreased to the certain level that the DOTS client can handle by itself, the DOTS server signals the enterprise DMS DOTS client that the attack has subsided.

The enterprise DMS then requests the ITP to terminate the DDoS Mitigation. The DOTS server on the ITP receives this request and once the mitigation has ended, confirms the end of upstream DDoS Mitigation to the enterprise DMS DOTS client.

The following is an overview of the DOTS communication model for this use-case:

(o) A DDoS attack is initiated against resources of a network organization which has deployed a DOTS-capable DMS - typically a DOTS client.

(o) The enterprise DMS detects, classifies, and begins the DDoS Mitigation.

(o) The enterprise DMS determines that its capacity and/or capability to mitigate the DDoS attack is insufficient, and sends via its DOTS client a DOTS DDoS Mitigation request to one or more DOTS servers residing on the upstream ITP.

(o) The DOTS server which receives the DOTS Mitigation request determines that it has been configured to honor requests from the requesting DOTS client, and honored its DDoS Mitigation by orchestrating its DMS.

(o) While the DDoS Mitigation is active, DOTS server regularly transmits DOTS DDoS Mitigation status updates to the DOTS client.

(o) Informed by the DOTS server status update that the attack has ended or subsided, the DOTS client transmits a DOTS DDoS Mitigation termination request to the DOTS server.

(o) The DOTS server terminates DDoS Mitigation, and sends the notification to the DOTS client.

Note that communications between the enterprise DOTS client and the upstream ITP DOTS Server may take place in-band within the main Internet WAN link between the enterprise and the ITP; out-of-band via a separate, dedicated wireline network link utilized solely for DOTS
signaling; or out-of-band via some other form of network connectivity such as a third-party wireless 4G network connectivity.

Note also that a DOTS client that sends a DOTS Mitigation request may be also triggered by a network admin that manually confirms the request to the upstream ITP, in which case the request may be sent from an application such as a web browser or a dedicated mobile application.

Note also that when the enterprise is multihomed and connected to multiple upstream ITPs, each ITP is only able to provide a DDoS Mitigation Service for the traffic it transits. As a result, the enterprise network may require to coordinate the various DDoS Mitigation Services associated to each link. More multi-homing considerations are discussed in [I-D.boucadair-dots-multihoming].

3.2. DDoS Mitigation by a Third Party DDoS Mitigation Service Provider

This use case differs from the previous use case described in Section 3.1 in that the DDoS Mitigation Service is not provided by an upstream ITP. In other words, as represented in Figure 2, the traffic is not forwarded through the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider by default. In order to steer the traffic to the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider, some network configuration changes are required. As such, this use case likely to match large enterprises or large data centers, but not exclusively. Another typical scenario for this use case is the relation between DDoS Mitigation Service Providers forming an overlay of DMS. When a DDoS Mitigation Service Provider mitigating a DDoS attack reaches its resources capacities, it may chose to delegate the DDoS Mitigation to another DDoS Mitigation Service Provider.
In this scenario, an Enterprise Network has entered into a pre-arranged DDoS mitigation assistance agreement with one or more other DDoS Mitigation Service Providers in order to ensure that sufficient DDoS mitigation capacity and/or capabilities may be activated in the event that a given DDoS attack threatens to overwhelm the ability of a given DMS to mitigate the attack on its own.

The pre-arrangement typically includes the agreement on the mechanisms used to redirect the traffic to the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider, as well as the mechanism to re-inject the traffic back to the Enterprise Network. Redirection to the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider typically involves BGP prefix announcement or DNS redirection, while re-injection of the scrubbed traffic to the enterprise network may be performed via tunneling mechanisms such as GRE for example. These exact mechanisms used for traffic steering are out of scope.
When the Enterprise Network is under attack or at least is reaching its capacity or ability to mitigate a given DDoS attack traffic, the DOTS client sends a DOTS request to the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider to initiate network traffic diversion - as represented in Figure 3 - and DDoS mitigation activities. Ongoing attack and mitigation status messages may be passed between the Enterprise Network and the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider. If the DDoS attack has stopped or the severity of the attack has subsided, the DOTS client can request the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider to stop the DDoS Mitigation.

3.3. DDoS Orchestration

In this use case, one or more DDoS telemetry systems or monitoring devices monitor a network - typically an ISP network, an Enterprise network, or a data center. Upon detection of a DDoS attack, these DDoS telemetry systems alert an orchestrator in charge of coordinating the various DMS within the domain. The DDoS telemetry systems may be configured to provide required information, such as a preliminary analysis of the observation to the orchestrator.
The orchestrator analyses the various information it receives from DDoS telemetry system, and initiates one or multiple DDoS mitigation strategies. For example, the orchestrator could select the DDoS mitigation system in the Enterprise network or one provided by the ITP. DDoS Mitigation System selection and DDoS Mitigation technique may depend on the type of DDoS attack. In some case, a manual confirmation or selection may also be required to choose a proposed strategy to initiate a DDoS Mitigation. The DDoS Mitigation may consist of multiple steps such as configuring the network, or updating already instantiated DDoS mitigation functions. Eventually, the coordination of the mitigation may involve external DDoS mitigation resources such as a transit provider or a Third Party DDoS Mitigation Service Provider.

The communication used to trigger a DDoS Mitigation between the DDoS telemetry and monitoring systems and the orchestrator is performed using DOTS. The DDoS telemetry system implements a DOTS client while the orchestrator implements a DOTS server.

The communication between a network administrator and the orchestrator is also performed using DOTS. The network administrator via its web interfaces implements a DOTS client, while the Orchestrator implements a DOTS server.

The communication between the orchestrator and the DDoS mitigation systems is performed using DOTS. The orchestrator implements a DOTS Client while the DDoS mitigation systems implement a DOTS Server.

The configuration aspects of each DDoS mitigation system, as well as the instantiations of DDoS mitigation functions or network configuration is not part of DOTS. Similarly, the discovery of available DDoS mitigation functions is not part of DOTS; and as such is out of scope.
The DDoS telemetry systems monitor various network traffic and perform some measurement tasks.

These systems are configured so that when an event or some measurement indicators reach a predefined level to send DOTS mitigation request to the orchestrator. The DOTS mitigation request may be associated with some optional mitigation hints to let the orchestrator know what has triggered the request.

Upon receipt of the DOTS mitigation request from the DDoS telemetry system, the orchestrator responds with an acknowledgment, to avoid retransmission of the request for mitigation. The orchestrator may begin collecting additional fined grain and specific information from various DDoS telemetry systems in order to correlate the measurements and provide an analysis of the event. Eventually, the orchestrator may ask additional information to the DDoS telemetry system, however, the collection of these information is out of scope.

The orchestrator may be configured to start a DDoS Mitigation upon approval from a network administrator. The analysis from the orchestrator is reported to the network administrator via a web interface. If the network administrator decides to start the
mitigation, the network administrator triggers the DDoS mitigation request using the web interface of a DOTS client connected to the orchestrator. This request is expected to be associated with a context that provides sufficient information to the orchestrator to infer the DDoS Mitigation to elaborate and coordinate.

Upon receiving a request to mitigate a DDoS attack performed over a target, the orchestrator, may evaluate the volumetry of the attack as well as the value that represent the target. The orchestrator may select the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider based on the attack severity. It may also coordinate the DDoS Mitigation performed by the DDoS Mitigation Service Provider with some other tasks such as for example, moving the target to another network so new sessions will not be impacted. When DDoS Mitigation is requested, the status indicates the DDoS Mitigation is starting while not effective. The DOTS client of the orchestrator will later be notified that the DDoS Mitigation is effective.

Orchestration of the DDoS mitigation systems works similarly as described in Section 3.1. The orchestrator indicates with its status whether the DDoS Mitigation is effective.

When the DDoS attack has stopped, the orchestrator indicates to the DDoS telemetry systems as well as to the network administrator the end of the DDoS Mitigation.

4. Security Considerations

The document does not describe any protocol.

DOTS is at risk from three primary attacks: DOTS agent impersonation, traffic injection, and signaling blocking.

Impersonation and traffic injection mitigation can be mitigated through current secure communications best practices.

Additional details of DOTS security requirements can be found in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements].

5. IANA Considerations

No IANA considerations exist for this document at this time.

6. Acknowledgments

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7. Informative References

[I-D.boucadair-dots-multihoming]

[I-D.ietf-dots-requirements]

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