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Path Aware Networking: A Bestiary of Roads Not Taken  
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Abstract

At the first meeting of the proposed Path Aware Networking Research Group, Oliver Bonaventure led a discussion of our mostly-unsuccessful attempts to exploit Path Awareness to achieve a variety of goals, over the past decade. At the end of that discussion, the research group agreed to catalog and analyze these ideas, to extract insights and lessons for path-aware networking researchers.

This document contains that catalog and analysis.

Status of This Memo

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## 1. Introduction

At IETF 99, the proposed Path Aware Networking Research Group [PANRG] held its first meeting [PANRG-99], and the first presentation in that session was "A Decade of Path Awareness" [PATH-Decade]. At the end of this discussion, two things were abundantly clear.

- o The Internet community has accumulated considerable experience with many Path Awareness ideas over a long period of time, and
- o Although some Path Awareness ideas have been successfully deployed (for example, Differentiated Services, or DiffServ [RFC2475]), most of these ideas haven't seen widespread adoption. The reasons for this non-adoption are many, and are worthy of study.

The meta-lessons from this experience are

- o Path Aware Networking is more Research than Engineering, so establishing an IRTF Research Group for Path Aware Networking is the right thing to do [RFC7418], and
- o Cataloging and analyzing our experience to learn the reasons for non-adoption is a great first step for the proposed Research Group.

This document contains that catalog and analysis.

#### 1.1. About this Document

This document is not intended to include every idea about Path Aware Networking that we can find. Instead, we include enough ideas to provide background for new lessons to guide researchers in their work, in order to add those lessons to Section 2.

#### 1.2. A Note for Contributors (Consider removing after approval)

There is no shame to having your idea included in this document. When these proposals were made, we were trying to engineer something that was research. The document editor started with a subsection on his own idea. The only shame is not learning from experience, and not sharing that experience with other networking researchers and engineers.

This document is being built collaboratively. To contribute your experience, please send a Github pull request to <https://github.com/panrg/draft-dawkins-panrg-what-not-to-do>.

Discussion of specific contributed experiences and this document in general should take place on the PANRG mailing list.

#### 1.3. A Note for the Editor (Remove after taking these actions)

The to-do list for upcoming revisions includes

- o Rearrange the Summary of Lessons Learned so that it flows (the current revision is more or less in the order of contributions).
- o Tag the Lessons Learned so that they are tied to one or more specific contributions.

#### 1.4. Architectural Guidance

As background for understanding the Lessons Learned contained in this document, the reader is encouraged to become familiar with the Internet Architecture Board's documents on "What Makes for a

Successful Protocol?" [RFC5218] and "Planning for Protocol Adoption and Subsequent Transitions" [RFC8170].

Although these two documents do not specifically target path-aware networking protocols, they are helpful resources on successful protocol adoption and deployment.

## 2. Summary of Lessons Learned

This section summarizes the Lessons Learned from the contributed sections in Section 4.

- o The benefit of Path Awareness has to be great enough to overcome entropy for already-deployed devices. The colloquial American English expression, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it" is in full flower on today's Internet.
- o If intermediate devices along the path can't be trusted, it's difficult to rely on intermediate devices to drive changes to endpoint behaviors.
- o If operators can't charge for a Path Aware technology in order to recover the costs of deploying it, the benefits must be really significant.
- o Impact of a Path Aware technology on operational practices can prevent deployment of promising technology.
- o Per-connection state in intermediate devices is an impediment to adoption and deployment.
- o Providing benefits for early adopters is key - if everyone must deploy a technology in order for the topology to provide benefits, or even to work at all, the technology is unlikely to be adopted.
- o The Internet is a distributed system, so the more a technology relies on information propagated from distant hosts and routers, the less likely that information is to be accurate.
- o Transport protocol technologies may require information from applications, in order to work effectively, but applications may not know the information they need to provide.

## 3. Template for Contributions

There are many things that could be said about the Path Aware networking technologies that have been developed. For the purposes of this document, contributors are requested to provide

- o the name of a technology, including an abbreviation if one was used
- o if available, a long-term pointer to the best reference describing the technology
- o a short description of the problem the technology was intended to solve
- o a short description of the reasons why the technology wasn't adopted
- o a short statement of the lessons that researchers can learn from our experience with this technology.

#### 4. Contributions

The editor has added some suggested subsections as a starting place, but others are solicited and welcome.

##### 4.1. Integrated Services (IntServ)

The suggested references for IntServ are:

- o RFC 1633 Integrated Services in the Internet Architecture: an Overview [RFC1633]
- o RFC 2211 Specification of the Controlled-Load Network Element Service [RFC2211]
- o RFC 2212 Specification of Guaranteed Quality of Service [RFC2212]
- o RFC 2215 General Characterization Parameters for Integrated Service Network Elements [RFC2215]
- o RFC 2205 Resource ReSerVation Protocol (RSVP) [RFC2205]

In 1994, when the IntServ architecture document [RFC1633] was published, real-time traffic was first appearing on the Internet. At that time, bandwidth was a scarce commodity. Internet Service Providers built networks over DS3 (45 Mbps) infrastructure, and sub-rate (< 1 Mbps) access was common. Therefore, the IETF anticipated a need for a fine-grained QoS mechanism.

In the IntServ architecture, some applications require service guarantees. Therefore, those applications use the Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP) [RFC2205] to signal bandwidth reservations across the network. Every router in the network

maintains per-flow state in order to a) perform call admission control and b) deliver guaranteed service.

Applications use Flow Specification (Flow Specs) [RFC2210] to describe the traffic that they emit. RSVP reserves bandwidth for traffic on a per Flow Spec basis.

#### 4.1.1. Reasons for Non-deployment

IntServ was never widely deployed because of its cost. The following factors contributed to cost:

- o IntServ must be deployed on every router within the QoS domain
- o IntServ maintained per flow state

As IntServ was being discussed, the following occurred:

- o It became more cost effective to solve the QoS problem by adding bandwidth. Between 1994 and 2000, Internet Service Providers upgraded their infrastructures from DS3 ( 45 Mbps ) to OC-48 ( 2.4 Gbps )
- o DiffServ [RFC2475] offered a more cost-effective, albeit less fine-grained, solution to the QoS problem.

#### 4.1.2. Lessons Learned.

The following lessons were learned:

- o Any mechanism that requires a router to maintain state is not likely to succeed.
- o Any mechanism that requires an operator to upgrade all of its routers is not likely to succeed.

IntServ was never widely deployed. However, the technology that it produced was deployed for reasons other than bandwidth management. RSVP is widely deployed as an MPLS signaling mechanism. BGP uses Flow Specs to distribute firewall filters.

#### 4.2. Quick-Start TCP

Quick-Start [RFC4782] is an experimental TCP extension that leverages support from the routers on the path to determine an allowed sending rate, either at the start of data transfers or after idle periods. In these cases, a TCP sender cannot easily determine an appropriate sending rate, given the lack of information about the path. The

default TCP congestion control therefore uses the time-consuming slow-start algorithm. With Quick-Start, connections are allowed to use higher sending rates if there is significant unused bandwidth along the path, and if the sender and all of the routers along the path approve the request. By examining Time To Live (TTL) fields, a sender can determine if all routers have approved the Quick-Start request. The protocol also includes a nonce that provides protection against cheating routers and receivers. If the Quick-Start request is explicitly approved by all routers along the path, the TCP host can send at up to the approved rate; otherwise TCP would use the default congestion control. Quick-Start requires modifications in the involved end-systems as well in routers. Due to the resulting deployment challenges, Quick-Start has been being proposed in [RFC4782] for controlled environments such as intranets only.

The Quick-Start protocol is a lightweight, coarse-grained, in-band, network-assisted fast startup mechanism. The benefits are studied by simulation in a research paper [SAF07] that complements the protocol specification. The study confirms that Quick-Start can significantly speed up mid-sized data transfers. That paper also presents router algorithms that do not require keeping per-flow state. Later studies [Sch11] comprehensively analyzes Quick-Start with a full Linux implementation and with a router fast path prototype using a network processor. In both cases, Quick-Start could be implemented with limited additional complexity.

#### 4.2.1. Reasons for Non-deployment

However, the experiments with Quick-Start in [Sch11] reveal several challenges:

- o Having information from the routers along the path can reduce the risk of congestion, but it cannot avoid it entirely. Determining whether there is unused capacity is not trivial in actual router and host implementations. Data about available bandwidth visible at the IP layer may be imprecise, and due to the propagation delay, information can already be outdated when it reaches the sender. There is a trade-off between the speedup of data transfers and the risk of congestion even with Quick-Start.
- o For scalable router fast path implementation, it is important to enable parallel processing of packets, as this is a widely used method e.g. in network processors. One challenge is synchronization of information between different packets, which should be avoided as much as possible.
- o Only selected applications can benefit from Quick-Start. For achieving an overall benefit, it is important that senders avoid

sending unnecessary Quick-Start requests, e.g. for connections that will only send a small amount of data. This typically requires application-internal knowledge. It is a mostly unsolved question how a sender can indeed determine the data rate that Quick-Start shall request for.

After completion of the Quick-Start specification, there have been large-scale experiments with an initial window of up to 10 MSS [RFC6928]. This alternative "IW10" approach can also ramp up data transfers faster than the standard TCP congestion control, but it only requires sender-side TCP modifications. As a result, this approach can be easier and incrementally deployed in the Internet. While theoretically Quick-Start can outperform "IW10", the absolute improvement of data transfer times is rather small in many cases. After publication of [RFC6928], most modern TCP stacks have increased their default initial window. There is no known deployment of Quick-Start TCP.

#### 4.2.2. Lessons Learned

There are some lessons learned from Quick-Start. Despite being a very light-weight protocol, Quick-Start suffers from poor incremental deployment properties, both regarding the required modifications in network infrastructure as well as its interactions with applications. Except for corner cases, congestion control can be quite efficiently performed end-to-end in the Internet, and in modern TCP stacks there is not much room for significant improvement by additional network support.

#### 4.3. Triggers for Transport (TRIGTRAN)

TCP [RFC0793] has a well-known weakness - the end-to-end flow control mechanism has only a single signal, the loss of a segment, and semi-modern TCPs (since the late 1980s) have interpreted the loss of a segment as evidence that the path between two endpoints has become congested enough to exhaust buffers on intermediate hops, so that the TCP sender should "back off" - reduce its sending rate until it knows that its segments are now being delivered without loss [RFC2581]. More modern TCPs have added a growing array of strategies about how to establish the sending rate [RFC5681], but when a path is no longer operational, TCPs can wait many seconds before retrying a segment, even if the path becomes operational while the sender is waiting to retry.

The thinking in Triggers for Transport was that if a path completely stopped working because its first-hop link was "down", that somehow TCP could be signaled when the first-hop link returned to service,



and the sending TCP could retry immediately, without waiting for a full Retransmission Time Out (RTO).

#### 4.3.1. Reasons for Non-deployment

Two TRIGTRAN BOFs were held, at IETF 55 [TRIGTRAN-55] and IETF 56 [TRIGTRAN-56], but this work was not chartered, and there was no interest in deploying TRIGTRAN unless it was chartered in the IETF.

#### 4.3.2. Lessons Learned.

The reasons why this work was not chartered provide several useful lessons for researchers.

- o TRIGTRAN triggers are only provided when the first-hop link is "down", so TRIGTRAN triggers couldn't replace normal TCP retransmission behavior if the path failed because some link further along the network path was "down". So TRIGTRAN triggers added complexity to an already complex TCP state machine, and didn't allow any existing complexity to be removed.
- o The state of the art in the early 2000s was that TRIGTRAN triggers were assumed to be unauthenticated, so they couldn't be trusted to tell a sender to "speed up", only to "slow down". This reduced the potential benefit to implementers.
- o intermediate forwarding devices required modification to provide TRIGTRAN triggers, but operators couldn't charge for TRIGTRAN triggers, so there was no way to recover the cost of modifying, testing, and deploying updated intermediate devices.

#### 4.4. Shim6

The IPv6 routing architecture [RFC1887] assumed that most sites on the Internet would be identified by Provider Assigned IPv6 prefixes, so that Default-Free Zone routers only contained routes to other providers, resulting in a very small routing table.

For a single-homed site, this could work well. A multi-homed site with only one upstream provider could also work well, although BGP multihoming from a single upstream provider was often a premium service (costing more than twice as much as two single-homed sites), and if the single upstream provider went out of service, all of the multi-homed paths could fail simultaneously.

IPv4 sites often multihomed by obtaining Provider Independent prefixes, and advertising these prefixes through multiple upstream providers. With the assumption that any multihomed IPv4 site would

also multihome in IPv6, it seemed likely that IPv6 routing would be subject to the same pressures to announce Provider Independent prefixes, resulting in a global IPv6 routing table that exhibited the same problems as the global IPv4 routing table. During the early 2000s, work began on a protocol that would provide the same benefits for multihomed IPv6 sites without requiring sites to advertise Provider Independent prefixes into the global routing table.

This protocol, called Shim6, allowed two endpoints to exchange multiple addresses ("Locators") that all mapped to the same endpoint ("Identity"). After an endpoint learned multiple Locators for the other endpoint, it could send to any of those Locators with the expectation that those packets would all be delivered to the endpoint with the same Identity. Shim6 was an example of an "Identity/Locator Split" protocol.

Shim6, as defined in [RFC5533] and related RFCs, provided a workable solution for IPv6 multihoming using Provider Assigned prefixes, including capability discovery and negotiation, and allowing end-to-end application communication to continue even in the face of path failure, because applications don't see Locator failures, and continue to communicate with the same Identity using a different Locator.

#### 4.4.1. Reasons for Non-deployment

Note that the problem being addressed was "site multihoming", but Shim6 was providing "host multihoming". That meant that the decision about what path would be used was under host control, not under router control.

Although more work could have been done to provide a better technical solution, the biggest impediments to Shim6 deployment were operational and business considerations. These impediments were discussed at multiple network operator group meetings, including [Shim6-35] at [NANOG-35].

The technology issues centered around scaling concerns that Shim6 relied on the host to track all the TCP connections and the file descriptions with associated HTTP state, while also tracking Identity/Locator mappings in the kernel, and tracking failures to recognize that a backup path has failed.

The operator issues centered around concerns that operators were performing traffic engineering, but would have no visibility or control over hosts when they chose to begin using another path, and relying on hosts to engineer traffic exposed their networks to oscillation based on feedback loops, as hosts move from path to path.

At a minimum, traffic engineering policies must be pushed down to individual hosts. In addition, the usual concerns about firewalls that expected to find a transport-level protocol header in the IP payload, and won't be able to perform firewalling functions because its processing logic would have to look past the Identity header.

The business issues centered removing or reducing the ability to sell BGP multihoming service, which is often more expensive than single-homed connectivity.

#### 4.4.2. Lessons Learned

It is extremely important to take operational concerns into account when a path-aware protocol is making decisions about path selection that may conflict with existing operational practices and business considerations.

We also note that some path-aware networking ideas recycle. Although Shim6 did not achieve significant deployment, the IETF chartered a working group to specify "Multipath TCP" [MP-TCP] in 2009, and Multipath TCP allows TCP applications to control path selection, with many of the same advantages and disadvantages of Shim6.

#### 4.5. Next Steps in Signaling (NSIS)

Write-up of Next Steps in Signaling (NSIS) [RFC5974]

Your description could be here.

#### 5. Security Considerations

This document describes ideas that were not adopted and widely deployed on the Internet, so it doesn't affect the security of the Internet.

If this document meets its goals, we may develop new ideas for Path Aware Networking that would affect the security of the Internet, but security considerations for those ideas will be described in the corresponding RFCs that propose them.

#### 6. IANA Considerations

This document makes no requests of IANA.

## 7. Acknowledgements

The section on IntServ was provided by Ron Bonica.

The section on Quick-Start TCP was provided by Michael Scharf.

The section on Shim6 builds on input provided by Erik Nordmark, with background added by Spencer Dawkins.

The section on Triggers for Transport (TRIGTRAN) was provided by Spencer Dawkins.

Review comments were provided by (your name could be here).

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Open Questions in Path Aware Networking  
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Abstract

This document poses open questions in path-aware networking, as a background for framing discussions in the Path Aware Networking proposed Research Group (PANRG). These are split into making properties of Internet paths available to endpoints, and allowing endpoints to select paths through the Internet for their traffic.

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## 1. Introduction to Path-Aware Networking

In the current Internet architecture, the network layer provides an unverifiable, best-effort service: an application can assume that a packet with a given destination address will eventually be forwarded toward that destination, but little else. A transport layer protocol such as TCP can provide reliability over this best-effort service, and a protocol above the network layer such as IPsec AH [RFC4302] or TLS [RFC5246] can authenticate the remote endpoint. However, no explicit information about the path is available, and assumptions about that path sometimes do not hold, sometimes with serious impacts on the application, as in the case with BGP hijacking attacks.

By contrast, in a path-aware networking architecture, endpoints have the ability to select or influence the path through the network used by any given packet, and the network layer explicitly exposes information about the path or paths available between two endpoints to those endpoints so that they can make this selection. Path control at the packet level enables new transport protocols that can leverage multipath connectivity across maximally-disjoining paths through the Internet, even over a single interface. It also provides transparency and control for applications and end-users to specify constraints on the paths its traffic should traverse, for instance to confound pervasive passive surveillance in the network core.

## 2. Questions

Realizing path-aware networking requires answers to a set of open research questions. This document poses these questions, as a starting point for discussions about how to realize path awareness in the Internet, and to direct future research efforts within the Path Aware Networking Research Group.

### 2.1. A Vocabulary of Path Properties

In order for information about paths to be exposed to the endpoints, and for those endpoints to be able to use that information, it is necessary to define a common vocabulary for path properties. The elements of this vocabulary could include relatively static properties, such as the presence of a given node on the path; as well as relatively dynamic properties, such as the current values of metrics such as loss and latency.

This vocabulary must be defined carefully, as its design will have impacts on the expressiveness of a given path-aware internetworking architecture. This expressiveness also exhibits tradeoffs. For example, a system that exposes node-level information for the topology through each network would maximize information about the individual components of the path at the endpoints at the expense of making internal network topology universally public, which may be in conflict with the business goals of each network's operator.

The first question is therefore: how are path properties defined and represented?

### 2.2. Discovery, Distribution, and Trustworthiness of Path Properties

Once endpoints and networks have a shared vocabulary for expressing path properties, the network must have some method for distributing those path properties to the endpoint. Regardless of how path property information is distributed to the endpoints, the endpoints require a method to authenticate the properties - to determine that they originated from and pertain to the path that they purport to. The end goal of authentication is not necessarily to establish that a given property is actually bound to a given path, but to ensure that the information is trustworthy, that actions taken based on it will have the predicted result.

Choices in an distribution and authentication methods will have impacts on the scalability of a path-aware architecture. Possible dimensions in the space of distribution methods include in-band versus out-of-band, push versus pull versus publish-subscribe, and so on. There are temporal issues with path property dissemination as

well, especially with dynamic properties, since the measurement or elicitation of dynamic properties may be outdated by the time that information is available at the endpoints, and interactions between the measurement and dissemination delay may exhibit pathological behavior for unlucky points in the parameter space.

The second question: how do endpoints get access to trustworthy path properties?

### 2.3. Supporting Path Selection

Access to trustworthy path properties is only half of the challenge in establishing a path-aware architecture. Endpoints must be able to use this information in order to select paths for traffic they send. As with path property distribution, choices made in path selection methods will also have an impact on the scalability and expressiveness of a path-aware architecture, and dimensions included in-band versus out-of-band, as well. Paths may also be selected on multiple levels of granularity - per packet, per flow, per aggregate - and this choice also has impacts on the scalability/expressiveness tradeoff.

The third question: how can endpoints select paths to use for traffic in a way that can be trusted by the network?

### 2.4. Interfaces for Path Awareness

In order for applications to make effective use of a path-aware networking architecture, the interfaces presented by the network and transport layers must also expose path properties to the application in a useful way, and provide a useful selection for path selection. Path selection must be possible based not only on the preferences and policies of the application developer, but of end-users as well.

The fourth question: how can interfaces to the transport and application layers support the use of path awareness?

### 2.5. Implications of Path Awareness for the Data Plane

In the current Internet, the basic assumption that at a given time  $t$  all traffic for a given flow will traverse a single path, for some definition of path, generally holds. In a path aware network, this assumption no longer holds. The failure of this assumption has implications for the design of protocols above a path-aware network layer.

For example, one advantage of multipath communication is that a given end-to-end flow can be "sprayed" along multiple paths in order to

confound attempts to collect data or metadata from those flows for pervasive surveillance purposes [RFC7624]. However, the benefits of this approach are reduced if the upper-layer protocols use linkable identifiers on packets belonging to the same flow across different paths. Clients may mitigate linkability by opting to not re-use cleartext connection identifiers, such as TLS session IDs or tickets, on separate paths. The privacy-conscious strategies required for effective privacy in a path-aware Internet are only possible if higher-layer protocols such as TLS permit clients to obtain unlinkable identifiers.

The fifth question: how should transport-layer and higher layer protocols be redesigned to work most effectively over a path-aware networking layer?

## 2.6. What is an Endpoint?

The vision of path-aware networking articulated so far makes an assumption that path properties will be disseminated to endpoints on which applications are running (terminals with user agents, servers, and so on). However, incremental deployment may require that a path-aware network "core" be used to interconnect islands of legacy protocol networks. In these cases, it is the gateways, not the application endpoints, that receive path properties and make path selections for that traffic. The interfaces provided this gateway are necessarily different than those a path-aware networking layer provides to its transport and application layers, and the path property information the gateway needs and makes available over those interfaces may also be different.

The sixth question: how is path awareness (in terms of vocabulary and interfaces) different when applied to tunnel and overlay endpoints?

## 2.7. Operating a Path Aware Network

The network operations model in the current Internet architecture assumes that traffic flows are controlled by the decisions and policies made by network operators, as expressed in interdomain routing protocols. In a path-aware network with effective path selection, however, this assumption no longer holds, as endpoints may react to path properties by selecting alternate paths. Competing control inputs from path-aware endpoints and the interdomain routing control plane may lead to more difficult traffic engineering or nonconvergent routing, especially if the endpoints' and operators' idea of the "best" path for given traffic differs significantly.

The seventh question: how can a path aware network in a path aware internetwork be effectively operated, given control inputs from the network administrator as well as from the endpoints?

## 2.8. Deploying a Path Aware Network

The vision presented in the introduction discusses path aware networking from the point of view of the benefits accruing at the endpoints, to designers of transport protocols and applications as well as to the end users of those applications. However, this vision requires action not only at the endpoints but within the interconnected networks offering path aware connectivity. While the specific actions required are a matter of the design and implementation of a specific realization of a path aware protocol stack, it is clear that any path aware architecture will require network operators to give up some control of their networks over to endpoint-driven control inputs. The incentives for network operators and equipment vendors to do this must be made clear.

The eighth question: how can the incentives of network operators and end-users be aligned to realize the vision of path aware networking?

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## 4. References

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