

Security for Hotspot Lite

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The Problem

- Public Wi-Fi hotspots today: typical security options
 - Semi-public WPA2-Personal
 - No meaningful security (passphrase known to hacker)
 - Open (often combined with captive portal)
 - No security
 - Passpoint, based on WPA2-Enterprise
 - Complex deployment (CA-based PKI security and signup/onboarding); limited to large operators/enterprise
- Lower complexity secure solutions are needed for public Wi-Fi hotspots deployed by smaller operators/entities, for which Passpoint may not be a viable option

Context

- CAPPORT is working on Captive Portal Architecture and API, which is well-suited to many public Wi-Fi hotspots
 - Consider proposing protocols by which the user can trust the network and establish authenticated secure connectivity

Security components

- There are multiple aspects to providing security in these hotspots:
- (1) Trust and authentication of the hotspot network (by the client device)
 - No expectation of pre-provisioning
 - Make “evil-twin AP” attacks HARDER (combine capport API authentication with AP validation)
- (2) Pairwise link encryption
 - Comes for “free” with WPA2/RSN and DPP, also with OWE (RFC8110)
- (3) Network integrity
 - Nothing to do specifically with capport

Complexity to deploy and maintain needs to be low (for user and operator)

Questions to capport

- Can we leverage capport API to “improve” cryptographic binding with the AP’s (and possibly with the NAS)
- Is this of interest to wg?
- Is this within scope ?
- If NO to (1)
 - Would an individual submission be considered?