# Recommendations for DNS Privacy Service Operators

draft-dickinson-bcp-op-00

Sara Dickinson <u>sara@sinodun.com</u>

Roland van Rijswijk-Deij, Allison Mankin, Benno Overeinder

#### Overview

- Operational, policy and security considerations for DNS operators who offer DNS Privacy services
  - Include, but are not limited to, DNS-over-TLS.

- Framework to assist writers of DNS Privacy Policy and Practices Statements
  - Analogous DNSSEC Policies and DNSSEC
    Practice Statements described in RFC6841.

#### Status

- First cut, lots of TODOs
- Submitted here for initial review and for feedback on the best forum for future versions of this document.
  - RIPE BCP WG?
- Feedback from Stéphane (thanks!)

### Existing Implementation Guidance

- Note that draft-ietf-dprive-dtls-and-tls-profiles (RFC8310) already specifies a bunch of things
  - MUST: RFC7525 (TLS BCP), TLS session resumption, Raw public keys, etc.
  - SHOULD: EDNS(0) Padding, EDNS(0) Client Subnet
- Bits and pieces in RFC7858 (SPKI)

#### Definitions

**Privacy-enabling DNS server**: From RFC8310

- A DNS server that implements DNS- over-TLS and may optionally implement DNS-over-DTLS.
- The server should also offer at least one of the credentials described in Section 8 of RFC8310 (Cert, SPKI)
- Implement the (D)TLS profile described in Section 9 of RFC8310.
- DNS privacy service:

The service that is offered via a privacy-enabling DNS server and is documented either in an informal statement of policy and practice with regard to users privacy or a formal DPPPS.

#### Operational Guidance

- Server capabilities to maximise DNS privacy:
  - **SHOULD**: QNAME min, Connection management (Keepalive/DSO), not require TLS SR, etc.
  - MAY: Port 443, Root zone on loopback,
    Aggressive Use of DNSSEC-Validated Cache, etc.
- Client query obfuscation mix with generated traffic

### Certificate management

- RECOMMEND:
  - Choose a short, memorable authentication name
  - Automate the generation and publication of certificates
  - Monitor certificates to prevent accidental expiration of certificates

### Operational management

- Limitations of using a pure TLS proxy
- Anycast

•

Might seem obvious but....

#### Data Handling

- Logging and Monitoring (minimise and/or anonymise)
- Data retention (minimise and/or anonymise)
- Access to stored data (minimise)
- User tracking (don't)
- Share data with third parties (don't)

# Psuedo-anonymisation and de-identification methods

- ipcipher for psuedo-anonymisation
- Bloom fliters for monitoring
  - Identify so-called Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) originating from specific subnets without storing information about queries of an individual user.
- Expect more here....

## DNS Privacy Policy + Practice Statement DP-PPS

#### Policy:

 Specify data collection + retention, shared, exceptions, third-party affiliations, data correlation

#### Practice:

- Temp or perm deviations
- What capabilities are provided on address/ports
  - Filtering, EDNS(0) Client subnet usage
- Authentication credentials
- Contact + support

## DNS Privacy Policy + Practice Statement DP-PPS

Very often no technical solutions to validate the Policy or Practice

- Enforcement/accountability:
  - Independent monitoring of capabilities, filtering, etc.
  - Technical vs Social vs Third-party
- TODO:
  - Compare Google, Quad9, OpenDNS
  - Trusted vs Trustworthy

#### Major questions

- Scope: Authoritative section, Research Data
- Generality:
  - Are data handling practices issues generic (not limited to DNS Privacy... GDPR)?
  - Filtering ('Normal' DNS vs 'Private' DNS)
- Approach: Currently very prescriptive, could be more contextual/discursive (threat analysis, options, mitigations)
- Does the WG want to work on this?