



IRR & RPKI feature parity

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What is this about

- Creating more feature parity between IRR and RPKI
- Making provisioning operations easier
- Enabling South America

An IRR route object: the atom

```
$ whois -h rr.ntt.net 192.147.168.0/24
```

```
route:           192.147.168.0/24  
descr:          Job Snijders  
origin:         AS15562  
notify:         job@instituut.net  
mnt-by:         MAINT-JOB  
changed:        job@ntt.net 20161003  
source:         NTTCOM
```

(only the bold lines are relevant in the process)

Generating a prefix filter

```
job@vurt ~$ whois -h rr.ntt.net '!gAS15562'  
A212  
165.254.255.132/32 165.254.255.26/32  
165.254.255.0/25 165.254.255.144/28  
165.254.255.133/32 192.147.168.0/24  
165.254.255.160/28 165.254.255.149/32  
209.24.0.0/16 204.42.254.192/26  
165.254.255.0/24 67.221.245.0/24  
C  
job@vurt ~$
```

Same example, with bgpq3

```
job@vurt ~$ bgpq3 -h rr.ntt.net -l AS15562-in AS15562  
no ip prefix-list AS15562-in  
ip prefix-list AS15562-in permit 67.221.245.0/24  
ip prefix-list AS15562-in permit 165.254.255.0/24  
ip prefix-list AS15562-in permit 165.254.255.0/26  
ip prefix-list AS15562-in permit 165.254.255.26/32  
ip prefix-list AS15562-in permit 165.254.255.64/26  
ip prefix-list AS15562-in permit 165.254.255.132/32  
ip prefix-list AS15562-in permit 165.254.255.133/32  
ip prefix-list AS15562-in permit 165.254.255.144/28  
ip prefix-list AS15562-in permit 165.254.255.149/32  
ip prefix-list AS15562-in permit 165.254.255.160/28  
ip prefix-list AS15562-in permit 192.147.168.0/24  
ip prefix-list AS15562-in permit 204.2.30.0/23  
ip prefix-list AS15562-in permit 204.42.254.192/26  
ip prefix-list AS15562-in permit 209.24.0.0/16
```



What about RPKI?

- A RPKI ROA kind of looks like a route object
- It has a “prefix” and an “origin”
- RPKI is trustworthy data, we know for sure that the owner of the IP space created the ROA

Provisioning use case for RPKI data?

← → ↻ ⓘ Not secure | localcert.ripe.net:8088/roas ☆

RPKI Validator Home Trust Anchors **ROAs** Ignore Filters Whitelist BGP Preview Export and

Validated ROAs

Validated ROAs from **APNIC from AFRINIC RPKI Root, APNIC from ARIN RPKI Root, APNIC from IANA RPKI Root, LACNIC RPKI Root, APNIC from RIPE RPKI Root, ARIN RPKI Root, AfrinIC RPKI Root, LACNIC RPKI Root, RIPE NCC Pilot (RRDP prefetch), RIPE NCC RPKI Root, RIPE NCC RPKI Root (RRDP prefetch), RIPE NCC prepdev (RRDP prefetch), altca, apnic-testbed.**

Show 10 entries

Search: 2

ASN	Prefix	Maximum Length	Trust Anchor
15562	2001:67c:208c::/48	48	RIPE NCC RPKI Root

Simple example

```
job@vurt ~$ ftp -VM -o - \  
    http://localcert.ripe.net:8088/export.json \  
    | jq '.roas[] | select(.asn | contains("AS15562"))? | .prefix' \  
    | uniq  
"2001:67c:208c::/48"  
job@vurt ~$
```


Grouping ASNs: AS-SETS

```
$ whois -h rr.ntt.net AS15562:AS-SNIJDERS
as-set:                AS15562:AS-SNIJDERS
members:               AS15562                # Me
members:               AS57436                # Samer
members:               AS-KING                # Thomas King
members:               AS-NETHER # Jared
tech-c:                DUMY-RIPE
admin-c:               DUMY-RIPE
notify:                job@instituut.net
org:                   ORG-SNIJ1-RIPE
mnt-by:                SNIJDERS-MNT
created:                2018-01-16T17:54:54Z
last-modified:         2018-01-16T17:58:36Z
source:                RIPE
```



Programmatic access to AS-SETS

```
$ whois -h rr.ntt.net '!iAS15562:AS-SNIJDERS,1'  
A130  
AS15562 AS202539 AS205591 AS205593 AS206479  
AS206499 AS206551 AS234 AS267 AS31451 AS41731  
AS49697 AS51861 AS57436 AS60003 AS61438  
C
```



```
$ irrtree AS15562:AS-SNIJDERS
```

```
Processed: 0 objects (Elapsed Time: 0:00:00)
```

```
IRRTree (1.1.3) report for 'AS15562:AS-SNIJDERS'  
(IPv4), using rr.ntt.net at 2018-01-24 16:23
```

```
AS15562:AS-SNIJDERS (16 ASNs, 25 pfxs)
```

```
+-- AS-KING (12 ASNs, 8 pfxs)
```

```
|   +-- AS205591 (2 pfxs)
```

```
|   +-- AS206499 (2 pfxs)
```

```
|   +-- AS49697 (2 pfxs)
```

```
|   +-- AS51861 (1 pfxs)
```

```
|   +-- AS60003 (1 pfxs)
```

```
+-- AS-NETHER (2 ASNs, 4 pfxs)
```

```
|   +-- AS267 (2 pfxs)
```

```
|   +-- AS234 (2 pfxs)
```

```
+-- AS15562 (12 pfxs)
```

```
+-- AS57436 (1 pfxs)
```

Summary so far:

- An AS-SET is resolved into all its member ASNs
- For each ASN we do a reverse lookup to find all route-objects where the ASN is the “origin:”
- The total list of prefixes from the above 2 steps is the input into `bgpq3` and ends up on routers

Problems with AS-SETs

- What if IRR AS-SET exists in multiple IRRs?
 - AS-STEALTH exists in **both** RIPE and RADB
 - The two are **not** managed by the same company
- How to discover what AS-SET to use?
 - Ask people in the service order form?
 - Look at PeeringDB?
 - (Virtually nobody looks at import:/export: lines)

PeeringDB currently is probably the best source for this data :-/

Secure | <https://www.peeringdb.com/asn/15562>



Search here for a network, IX,

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Job Snijders

Organization	Snijders IT
Also Known As	
Company Website	http://instituut.net/~job/
Primary ASN	15562
IRR Record	AS15562:AS-SNIJDERS
Route Server URL	
Looking Glass IRI	



My wishlist

- Ease of discovery
 - given ASN X – what list of downstreams should I use in my provisioning system?
- Guarantees that only the owner of the ASN could've created that list
- Unilateral declarations (just like AS-SETs)
- Per adjacent ASN granularity:
 - AS 15562 may announce a different set of downstreams to NTT than to GTT



Work in progress: “AS Cones”

Materials here:

<https://github.com/bgp/draft-ss-grow-rpki-as-cones>