

Yes, This Again

ENCRYPTED SNI

- Hostnames are interesting
 - Alcoholicsanonymous.org
 - Cia.gov
 - Glaad.org
- Encrypting hostnames during connection setup has been a "holy grail" of privacy
- SNI is an obvious place where the hostname leaks





REALITY BITES

- Servers need SNI data to select certificates
- Hard to establish a shared encryption context before TLS
- Observer can see TLS certificate anyway
 - Fixed in TLS 1.3
- Active attacker can get the TLS certificate anyway
 Still true in TLS 1.3



LOTS OF HOLES TO PLUG

DNS leaks the hostname before the connection is even open

Doh!

SNI leaks the hostname in the Client Hello

Secondary Certs

Client doesn't know what innocuous hostnames are available

Alt-Svc SNI parameter

Alt-Svc requires having spoken to the server before

ALTSVC DNS records

DoH Alt-Svc Secondar y Certs

TARGET SCENARIO

Host has many domains, only some of which are sensitive
(If the fact that clients connect to the host at all is sensitive, just use TOR.)
Want client to present an innocuous domain in SNI
Client still needs to validate the real domain
Certificate might be valid for the real domain as well (*.github.io)
0-RTT is possible here
Otherwise, use Secondary Certs to request the certificate
1-RTT best case

ALT-SVC EXTENSION FOR SNI

Hypothetical Alt-Svc records for <u>https://sensitive.example.com</u>:

Colocated Domain h2="innocence.org:443";ma=2635200;persist=true;sni=innocence.org

Wildcard Subdomain h2="www.example.com:443";ma=2635200;persist=true;sni=www.example.com

Omitting SNI
h2="alternative.example.com:443";ma=2635200;persist=true;sni=""

ALTSVC RECORDS IN DNS

Avoids clients making initial requests with "exposed" SNI

Collateral benefits

- HTTP/QUIC connections without TCP exchange first
- Opportunistic Security without cleartext exchange first





OUESTIONS?