Detection and Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks

ietf-idr-route-leak-detection-mitigation-08

(Route leak definition: RFC 7908)

K. Sriram, D. Montgomery, B. Dickson, K. Patel, and A. Robachevsky

IDR Working Group Meeting, IETF-101 March 2018

Acknowledgements: The authors are grateful to many folks in various IETF WGs for commenting, critiquing, and offering very helpful suggestions (see acknowledgements section in the draft.)

Changes in -08 compared to the -07 version

- The draft now focuses on the RLP solution which is inter-AS (multi-hop)
 - Note: The intra-AS (local AS) solution with iOTC Attribute is provided in ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy draft
- The main body is now concise since several sections have moved into the Appendices

Changes in -08 compared to the -07 version

- The Appendices now contain:
 - Related prior-work review
 - Design rationale and discussion
 - Questions raised in IDR/GROW and the discussions captured here
 - Stopgap solution
 - Intra-AS route leak prevention with Community (includes inputs from NANOG list)

Route Leak: The Tale of Two Culprits



• Intra-AS and Inter-AS solutions are necessary.

Hathway / Airtel Route Leaks of Google Prefixes March 12, 2015



Incident analysis: http://research.dyn.com/2015/03/routing-leak-briefly-takes-google/

Route Leak Protection (RLP) Field Encoding by Sending Router

- RLP is a 2-bit field set by each AS along the path
- Can be carried as a transitive per hop attribute in BGP or in the existing Flags field in BGPsec
- The RLP field value MUST be set to one of two values as follows:
 - **00: Default value** (i.e. "nothing specified")
 - 01: 'Do not Propagate Up or Lateral' indication
 - Sender indicates that the route SHOULD NOT be subsequently forwarded Up towards a transitprovider or to a lateral (non-transit) peer

Inter-AS Solution – RLP Attribute



Format of RLP Attribute

Optional Transitive Attribute



Effectiveness of the Proposed Solution



Building Blocks

		Security: Include RLP in BGPsec Flags field	
		Der see nags neid	
	Intra-AS route leak	Inter-AS route leak	
	prevention (iBGP	detection/mitigation	
	messaging)	 Optional transitive 	
	iOTC Attribute	RLP attribute	
	Set peering relation for each peer (per prefix)		
	BGP OPEN / BGP Role Capability negotiations – re-		
	confirming the role stated in OOB communication		
	OOB communication bet	B communication between operators:	
i	Peering relation, ASN, interface IP		
idr-bgp-open-policy			

No Single Point of Failure & Large ISPs' Ring of Security

