Token Binding Overview

- Enables a long-lived binding of cookies or other security tokens to a client generated public-private key pair
- Use is negotiated in TLS handshake via TLS extension
- Possession of key is proven by signing the TLS exported keying material (EKM) and sending as an HTTP header in every request
- Cookies and tokens can be bound to the key
- Key is scoped to the effective top-level domain + 1
- Federated/cross-domain use-cases supported via referred token binding (vs. provided)
OAuth 2.0 Token Binding in a Nutshell

- Provide an OAuth 2.0 proof-of-possession mechanism based on Token Binding to defeat (re)play of lost or stolen tokens
  -Bind access tokens with referred Token Binding ID
    - Representation in JWT access tokens and introspection responses (“cnf” confirmation claim with a “tbh” token binding hash member)
  -Bind refresh tokens with provided Token Binding ID
  -Bind authorization codes via PKCE
    - Native app clients
    - Web server clients
  - Binding for JWT Authorization Grants and JWT Client Authentication
Changes since Singapore

- Draft -06
  - Use the boilerplate from RFC 8174
  - Update refs: draft-ietf-tokbind-https to -12 & draft-ietf-oauth-discovery to -09
  - Minor editorial fixes
Looking Ahead

- Token Binding documents progress to RFC
  - For real this time (maybe)
- Implementation experience and feedback
  - This stuff should be really easy once the hard parts are done