

# REQUIRETLS

## draft-ietf-uta-require-tls-01

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# What's new?

- Now two separate mechanisms:
  - REQUIRETLS SMTP option to require transport security when transmitting a given message
  - RequireTLS: NO header field to override policy-based requirements to use TLS

# RequireTLS: NO header field

- When present, requests that MTA ignore policy-based mechanisms (MTA-STS, DANE) requiring TLS transmission
- Used for messages where delivery is definitely more important than security
- No assurance that header field will be heeded by any particular MTA

# REQUIRETLS SMTP option

- Must be negotiated (with STARTTLS) to send a message tagged as requiring TLS
  - Presence of option represents a promise to require TLS downstream
- Options:
  - Require DNSSEC MX lookup
  - Restrict certificate verification (DANE, cert chain)
  - NO option has been removed

# Issue: Option granularity

- Basic STARTTLS+REQUIRETLS requirement
- Option to require DNSSEC MX lookup
- Option to constrain type of cert verification
  - X.509 trust chain
  - Use of DANE certificates
- Optional constraints on crypto characteristics
  - Minimum TLS version
  - Cipher choices, etc.
- Options can greatly complicate implementation but make protocol robust against additional attackers



**MORE  
REVIEWS  
PLEASE!**

# BACKUP SLIDES

# Review: Problem statement

- Senders (including users) have no idea whether transmission will be TLS protected
  - STARTTLS is opportunistic; delivery takes priority
  - TLS certificate verification typically ignored
  - But this is often what you want
- Some senders want to prioritize security over delivery for (at least) some messages
  - Sensitive message content
  - Sender or recipient in sensitive location



# Review: Goals

- Allow senders to specify when envelope and headers require protection
- Fine-grained
  - Don't affect messages not specifying REQUIRETLS
- Some control over certificate verification
  - Bad actors with root certs
  - Unknown trust by intermediate MTAs
- MTA <-> MTA only
  - But last hop could require secure retrieval?