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A Profile for Autonomous System Provider Authorization
draft-azimov-sidrops-aspa-profile-00

Abstract

This document defines a standard profile for Autonomous System Provider Authorization in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure. An Autonomous System Provider Authorization is a digitally signed object that provides a means of verifying that a Customer Autonomous System holder has authorized a Provider Autonomous System to be its upstream provider and for the Provider to send prefixes received from the Customer Autonomous System in all directions including providers and peers.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

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1. Introduction

The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is to improve routing security. (See [RFC6480] for more information.) As part of this infrastructure, a mechanism is needed to verify that a Provider AS (PAS) has permission from a Customer AS (CAS) holder to send routes in all directions. The digitally signed Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) object provides this verification mechanism.

The ASPA uses the template for RPKI digitally signed objects [RFC6488], which defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] wrapper for the ASPA content as well as a generic validation procedure for RPKI signed objects. As ASPAs need to be validated with RPKI certificates issued by the current infrastructure, we assume the mandatory-to-implement algorithms in [RFC6485], or its successor.

To complete the specification of the ASPA (see Section 4 of [RFC6488]), this document defines:

1. The object identifier (OID) that identifies the ASPA signed object. This OID appears in the eContentType field of the encapContentInfo object as well as the content-type signed attribute within the signerInfo structure).
 2. The ASN.1 syntax for the ASPA content, which is the payload signed by the CAS. The ASPA content is encoded using the ASN.1 [X680] Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X690].
 3. The steps required to validate an ASPA beyond the validation steps specified in [RFC6488]).
2. The ASPA Content Type

The content-type for an ASPA is defined as id-cct-ASPA, which has the numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.TBD. This OID MUST appear both within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo structure as well as the content-type signed attribute within the signerInfo structure (see [RFC6488]).

3. The ASPA eContent

The content of an ASPA identifies the Customer AS (CAS) as well as the Provider AS (PAS) that is authorized to further propagate announcements received from the customer. If customer has multiple providers, it issues multiple ASPAs, one for each provider AS. An ASPA is formally defined as:

```
ct-ASPA CONTENT-TYPE ::=
  { ASProviderAttestation IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-ASPA }

id-ct-ASPA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct TBD }

ASProviderAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
  version [0] ASPAVersion DEFAULT v0,
  AFI AddressFamilyIdentifier,
  customerASID ASID,
  providerASID ASID }

ASPAVersion ::= INTEGER { v0(0) }

AddressFamilyIdentifier ::= INTEGER

ASID ::= INTEGER
```

Note that this content appears as the eContent within the encapContentInfo as specified in [RFC6488].

3.1. version

The version number of the ASProviderAttestation MUST be v0.

3.2. AFI

The AFI field contains Address Family Identifier for which the relation between customer and provider ASes is authorized. Presently defined values for the Address Family Identifier field are specified in the IANA's Address Family Numbers registry [IANA-AF].

3.3. customerASID

The customerASID field contains the AS number of the Autonomous System that authorizes an upstream provider (listed in the providerASID) to propagate prefixes in the specified address family other ASes.

3.4. providerASID

The providerASID contains the AS number that is authorized to further propagate announcements in the specified address family received from the customer.

4. ASPA Validation

Before a relying party can use an ASPA to validate a routing announcement, the relying party MUST first validate the ASPA object itself. To validate an ASPA, the relying party MUST perform all the validation checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as the following additional ASPA-specific validation step.

- o The autonomous system identifier delegation extension [RFC3779] is present in the end-entity (EE) certificate (contained within the ASPA), and the customer AS number in the ASPA is contained within the set of AS numbers specified by the EE certificate's autonomous system identifier delegation extension.

5. ASN.1 Module for the ASPA Content Type

```
RPKI-ASPA-2018
  { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
    pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-rpki-asma-2018(TBD2) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS

CONTENT-TYPE
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- RFC 6268
  { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
    pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ;

ContentSet CONTENT-TYPE ::= { ct-ASPA, ... }

--
-- ASPA Content Type
--

id-smime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
  us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) 16 }

id-ct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-smime 1 }

id-ct-ASPA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ct TBD }

ct-ASPA CONTENT-TYPE ::=
  { TYPE ASPProviderAttestation IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-ASPA }

ASPProviderAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
  version [0] ASPAVersion DEFAULT v0,
  AFI AddressFamilyIdentifier,
  customerASID ASID,
  providerASID ASID }

ASPAVersion ::= INTEGER { v0(0) }

AddressFamilyIdentifier ::= INTEGER

ASID ::= INTEGER

END
```

6. IANA Considerations

Please add the id-mod-rpki-asma-2018 to the SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) registry (<https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xml#security-smime-0>) as follows:

Decimal	Description	Specification
TBD2	id-mod-rpki-aspa-2018	[ThisRFC]

Please add the ASPA to the SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1) registry (<https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xml#security-smime-1>) as follows:

Decimal	Description	Specification
TBD	id-ct-ASPA	[ThisRFC]

Please add the ASPA to the RPKI Signed Object registry (<https://www.iana.org/assignments/rpki/rpki.xhtml#signed-objects>) as follows:

Name	OID	Specification
ASPA	1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.TBD	[ThisRFC]

7. Security Considerations

8. Acknowledgments

9. References

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June 28, 2018

Verification of AS_PATH Using the Resource Certificate Public Key
Infrastructure and Autonomous System Provider Authorization
draft-azimov-sidrops-aspa-verification-00

Abstract

This document defines the semantics of an Autonomous System Provider Authorization object in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure to verify the AS_PATH attribute of routes advertised in the Border Gateway Protocol.

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

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1. Introduction

The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) was designed with no mechanisms to validate BGP attributes. Two consequences are BGP Hijacks and BGP Route Leaks [RFC7908]. BGP extensions are able to partially solve these problems. For example, ROA-based Origin Validation [RFC6483] can be used to detect and filter accidental mis-originations, and [I-D.ymbk-idr-bgp-eotr-policy] can be used to detect accidental route leaks. While these upgrades to BGP are quite useful, they still rely on transitive BGP attributes, i.e. AS_PATH, that can be manipulated by attackers.

BGPsec [RFC8205] was designed to solve the problem of AS_PATH correctness. But ignoring the complexity of this extension, it has backward support for 'old' BGP-4 that an attacker can use in a downgrade attack to nullify all the work of AS_PATH signing. As a

result, to abuse the AS_PATH or any other transit attribute, an attacker merely needs to downgrade to 'old' BGP-4.

This document defines the semantics of Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) using the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to verify the AS_PATH attribute of routes advertised in BGP. It specifies AS_PATH verification procedures to allow a BGP listener to detect and mitigate malicious hijacks and route leaks.

2. Autonomous System Provider Authorization

As described in [RFC6480], the RPKI is based on a hierarchy of resource certificates that are aligned to the Internet Number Resource allocation structure. Resource certificates are X.509 certificates that conform to the PKIX profile [RFC5280], and to the extensions for IP addresses and AS identifiers [RFC3779]. A resource certificate is a binding by an issuer of IP address blocks and Autonomous System (AS) numbers to the subject of a certificate, identified by the unique association of the subject's private key with the public key contained in the resource certificate. The RPKI is structured so that each current resource certificate matches a current resource allocation or assignment.

ASPAs are digitally signed objects that bind a in a selected AFI Provider AS number to a Customer AS number (in terms of BGP announcements not business), and are signed by the holder of the Customer AS. An ASPA attests that a Customer AS holder (CAS) has authorized a particular Provider AS (PAS) to propagate the Customer's IPv4/IPv6 announcements onward, e.g. to the Provider's upstream providers or peers. The ASPA record profile is described in [#link]. The ASPA mechanism combined with BGP Roles [I-D.ietf-idr-bgp-open-policy] and ROA-based Origin Validation [RFC6483] provide a fully automated solution to detect and filter hijacks and route leaks, including malicious ones.

3. Anomaly Propagation

Both route leaks and hijacks have similar effects on ISP operations - they redirect traffic, resulting in increased latency, packet loss, or possible MiTM attacks. But the level of risk depends significantly on the propagation of these BGP anomalies. For example, a hijack that is propagated only to customers may concentrate traffic in a particular ISP's customer cone; while if the anomaly is propagated through peers, upstreams, or reaches Tier-1 networks, thus distributing globally, traffic may be redirected at the level of entire countries and/or global providers.

The ability to constrain propagation of BGP anomalies to upstreams and peers, without requiring support from the source of the anomaly (which is critical if source has malicious intent), should significantly improve the security of inter-domain routing and solve the majority of problems.

4. Customer-Provider Verification Procedure

This section describes an abstract procedure that checks that pair of ASNs (AS1, AS2) is included in the set of signed ASPAs. The semantics of its usage is defined in next section. The procedure takes (AS1, AS2, ROUTE_AFI) as input parameters and may return three types of results: "valid", "invalid" and "unknown".

A relying party (RP) must have access to a local cache of the complete set of cryptographically valid ASPAs when performing customer-provider verification procedure.

1. Retrieve all cryptographically valid ASPAs in a selected AFI with a customer value of AS1. This selection forms the set of "candidate ASPAs."
2. If the set of candidate ASPAs is empty, then the procedure exits with an outcome of "unknown."
3. If there is at least one candidate ASPA where the provider field is AS2, then the procedure exits with an outcome of "valid."
4. Otherwise, the procedure exits with an outcome of "invalid."

Since an AS1 may have different set providers in different AFI, it should also have different set of corresponding ASPAs. In this case, the output of this procedure with input (AS1, AS2, ROUTE_AFI) may have different output for different ROUTE_AFI values.

5. AS_PATH Verification

The AS_PATH attribute identifies the autonomous systems through which an UPDATE message has passed. AS_PATH may contain two types of components: ordered AS_SEQs and unordered AS_SETs, as defined in [RFC4271].

The value of each AS_SEQ component can be described as set of pairs $\{(AS(I), \text{prepend}(I)), (AS(I-1), \text{prepend}(I-1))\dots\}$. In this case, the sequence $\{AS(I), AS(I-1), \dots\}$ represents different ASNs, that packet should pass towards the destination. We can state that when a route is received from a customer or a literal peer, each pair $(AS(I-1), AS(I))$ MUST belong to customer-provider or sibling relationship. If

there are other types of relationships, it means that the route was leaked or the AS_PATH attribute was malformed. The goal of the above procedure is to check the correctness of this statement.

If a route from ROUTE_AFI address family is received from a customer or peer, its AS_PATH MUST be verified as follows:

1. If the closest AS in the AS_PATH is not the receiver's neighbor ASN then procedure halts with the outcome "invalid";
2. If in one of AS_SEQ segments there is a pair (AS(I-1), AS(I)), where both AS(I-1), AS(I) are not equal to AS_TRANS and customer-provider verification procedure (Section 4) with parameters (AS(I-1), AS(I), ROUTE_AFI) returns "invalid" then the procedure also halts with the outcome "invalid";
3. If in one of AS_PATH segments there is at least one AS_TRANS (AS23456) then procedure halts with the outcome "unverifiable";
4. If the AS_PATH has at least one AS_SET segment then procedure halts with the outcome "unverifiable";
5. Otherwise, the procedure halts with an outcome of "valid".

If the output of the AS_PATH verification procedure is "invalid" the LOCAL_PREF SHOULD be set to 0 or the route MAY be dropped. If an "invalid" route has no alternative route(s) and it is propagated to other ASes despite the above, it MUST be marked with the GRACEFUL_SHUTDOWN community to avoid possible stable oscillations, when an unchecked route received from a provider becomes preferred over an invalid route received from a customer. This also allows customers to detect malformed routes received from upstream providers.

If the output of the AS_PATH verification procedure is 'unverifiable' it means that AS_PATH can't be fully verified. Such routes should be treated with caution and MAY be processed the same way as "invalid" routes.

The above AS_PATH verification procedure checks routes received from customers and peers. The information about peering relations can be automatically retrieved from BGP roles settings, thus improving reliability and providing the possibility for full automation.

6. Disavowal of Provider Authorizaion

An ASPA is a positive attestation that an AS holder has authorized its provider to redistribute received routes to the provider's providers and peers. This does not preclude the provider AS from redistribution to its other customers. By creating an ASPA where the provider AS is 0, the customer indicates that no provider should further announce its routes. Specifically, AS 0 is reserved to identify provider-free networks, Internet exchange meshes, etc.

An ASPA with a provider AS of 0 is an statement by the customer AS that the its routes should not be received by any relying party AS from any of its customers or peers.

By convention, an ASPA with a provider AS of 0 should be the only ASPA issued by a given AS holder; although this is not a strict requirement. A provider 0 ASPA may coexist with ASPAs that have different provider AS values; though in such cases, the presence or absence of the provider AS 0 ASPA does not alter the AS_PATH verification procedure.

7. Siblings (Complex Relations)

There are peering relationships which can not be described as strictly simple peer-peer or customer-provider; e.g. when both parties are intentionally sending prefixes received from each other to their peers and/or upstreams.

In this case, two symmetric ASPAs records $\{(AS1, AS2), (AS2, AS1)\}$ must be created by AS1 and AS2 respectively.

8. Security Considerations

ASPA issuers should be aware of the verification implication in issuing an ASPA - an ASPA implicitly invalidates all routes passed to upstream providers other than the provider ASs listed in the collection of ASPAs. It is the Customer AS's duty to maintain a correct set of ASPAs.

While the ASPA provides a check of AS_PATH for routes received from customers and peers, it doesn't provide full support for routes that are received from upstream providers. So, this mechanism guarantees detection of both malicious and accidental route leaks and provides partial support for detection of malicious hijacks: upstream transit ISPs will still be able to send hijacked prefixes with malformed AS_PATHs to their customers.

9. Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank authors of [RFC6483] since its text was used as an example while writing this document.

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The Use of Maxlength in the RPKI
draft-ietf-sidrops-rpkimaxlen-00

Abstract

This document recommends that operators avoid using the maxLength attribute when issuing Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). These recommendations complement those in [RFC7115].

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1. Introduction

The RPKI [RFC6480] uses Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) to create a cryptographically verifiable mapping from an IP prefix to a set of autonomous systems (ASes) that are authorized to originate this prefix. Each ROA contains a set of IP prefixes, and an AS number of an AS authorized to originate all the IP prefixes in the set [RFC6482]. The ROA is cryptographically signed by the party that holds a certificate for the set of IP prefixes.

The ROA format also supports a `maxLength` attribute. According to [RFC6482], "When present, the `maxLength` specifies the maximum length of the IP address prefix that the AS is authorized to advertise." Thus, rather than requiring the ROA to list each prefix the AS is authorized to originate, the `maxLength` attribute provides a shorthand that authorizes an AS to originate a set of IP prefixes.

However, measurements of current RPKI deployments have found that use of the `maxLength` in ROAs tends to lead to security problems. Specifically, as of June 2017, 84% of the prefixes specified in ROAs that use the `maxLength` attribute, are vulnerable to a forged-origin subprefix hijack [HARMFUL]. The forged-origin subprefix hijack, as described below, can be launched against any IP prefix that is authorized in ROA but is not originated in BGP. The impact of such an attack is the same as that of a subprefix hijack in the absence of ROA-based protection.

For this reason, this document recommends that, whenever possible, operators SHOULD use "minimal ROAs" that include only those IP prefixes that are actually originated in BGP, and no other prefixes. Operators SHOULD also avoid using the maxLength attribute in their ROAs whenever possible. One ideal place to implement these recommendations is in the user interfaces for configuring ROAs: thus this document further recommends that designers and/or providers of such user interfaces SHOULD provide warnings to draw the user's attention to the risks of using the maxLength attribute.

The recommendations in this document clarify and extend the following recommendation from [RFC7115]:

One advantage of minimal ROA length is that the forged origin attack does not work for sub-prefixes that are not covered by overly long max length. For example, if, instead of 10.0.0.0/16-24, one issues 10.0.0.0/16 and 10.0.42.0/24, a forged origin attack cannot succeed against 10.0.666.0/24. They must attack the whole /16, which is more likely to be noticed because of its size.

This best current practice requires no changes to the RPKI specification and will not increase the number of signed ROAs in the RPKI, because ROAs already support lists of IP prefixes [RFC6482].

1.1. Requirements

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2. Suggested Reading

It is assumed that the reader understands BGP [RFC4271], the RPKI [RFC6480] Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482], RPKI-based Prefix Validation [RFC6811], and BGPSEC [RFC8205].

3. Forged Origin Subprefix Hijack

The forged-origin subprefix hijack is relevant to a scenario in which (1) the RPKI [RFC6480] is deployed, and (2) routers use RPKI origin validation to drop invalid routes [RFC6811], but (3) BGPSEC [RFC8205] (or any similar method to validate the truthfulness of the BGP AS_PATH attribute) is not deployed.

We describe the forged-origin subprefix hijack [RFC7115] [GCHSS] using a running example.

Consider the IP prefix 168.122.0.0/16 which is allocated to an organization that also operates AS 64496. In BGP, AS 64496 originates the IP prefix 168.122.0.0/16 as well as its subprefix 168.122.225.0/24. Therefore, the RPKI should contain a ROA authorizing AS 64496 to originate these two IP prefixes. That is, the ROA should be

```
ROA:(168.122.0.0/16,168.122.225.0/24, AS 64496)
```

This ROA is "minimal" because it includes only those IP prefixes that AS 64496 originates in BGP, but no other IP prefixes [RFC6907].

Now suppose an attacking AS 64511 originates a BGP announcement for a subprefix 168.122.0.0/24. This is a standard "subprefix hijack".

In the absence of the minimal ROA above, AS 64511 could intercept traffic for the addresses in 168.122.0.0/24. This is because routers perform a longest-prefix match when deciding where to forward IP packets, and 168.122.0.0/24 originated by AS 64511 is a longer prefix than 168.122.0.0/16 originated by AS 64496.

However, the minimal ROA renders AS 64511's BGP announcement invalid, because (1) this ROA "covers" the attacker's announcement (since 168.122.0.0/24 is a subprefix of 168.122.0.0/16), and (2) there is no ROA "matching" the attacker's announcement (there is no ROA for AS 64511 and IP prefix 168.122.0.0/24) [RFC6811]. If routers ignore invalid BGP announcements, the minimal ROA above ensures that the subprefix hijack will fail.

Now suppose that the "minimal ROA" was replaced with a "loose ROA" that used maxLength as a shorthand for set of IP prefixes that AS 64496 is authorized to originate. The "loose ROA" would be:

```
ROA:(168.122.0.0/16-24, AS 64496)
```

This "loose ROA" authorizes AS 64496 to originate any subprefix of 168.122.0.0/16, up to length /24. That is, AS 64496 could originate 168.122.225.0/24 as well as all of 168.122.0.0/17, 168.122.128.0/17, ..., 168.122.255.0/24 but not 168.122.0.0/25.

However, AS 64496 only originates two prefixes in BGP: 168.122.0.0/16 and 168.122.255.0/24. This means that all other prefixes authorized by the "loose ROA" (for instance, 168.122.0.0/24), are vulnerable to the following forged-origin subprefix hijack [RFC7115], [GCHSS]:

```
The hijacker AS 64511 sends a BGP announcement "168.122.0.0/24: AS
64511, AS 64496", falsely claiming that AS 64511 is a neighbor of
AS 64496 and falsely claiming that AS 64496 originates the IP
```

prefix 168.122.0.0/24. In fact, the IP prefix 168.122.0.0/24 is not originated by AS 64496.

The hijacker's BGP announcement is valid according to the RPKI, since the ROA (168.122.0.0/16-24, AS 64496) authorizes AS 64496 to originate BGP routes for 168.122.0.0/24. Because AS 64496 does not actually originate a route for 168.122.0.0/24, the hijacker's route is the **only** route to the 168.122.0.0/24. Longest-prefix-match routing ensures that the hijacker's route to the subprefix 168.122.0.0/24 is always preferred over the legitimate route to 168.122.0.0/16 originated by AS 64496. Thus, the hijacker's route propagates through the Internet, the traffic destined for IP addresses in 168.122.0.0/24 will be delivered to the hijacker.

The forged origin **subprefix** hijack would have failed if the "minimal ROA" described above was used instead of the "loose ROA". If the "minimal ROA" had been used instead, the attacker would be forced to launch a forged origin **prefix** hijack in order to attract traffic, as follows:

The hijacker AS 64511 sends a BGP announcement "168.122.0.0/16: AS 64511, AS 64496", falsely claiming that AS 64511 is a neighbor of AS 64496.

This forged-origin **prefix** hijack is significantly less damaging than the forged-origin **subprefix** hijack. With a forged-origin **prefix** hijack, AS 64496 legitimately originates 168.122.0.0/16 in BGP, so the hijacker AS 64511 is not presenting the **only** route to 168.122.0.0/16. Moreover, the path originated by AS 64511 is one hop longer than the path originated by the legitimate origin AS 64496. As discussed in [LSG16], this means that the hijacker will attract less traffic than he would have in the forged origin **subprefix** hijack, where the hijacker presents the **only** route to the hijacked subprefix.

In sum, a forged-origin subprefix hijack has the same impact as a regular subprefix hijack. A forged-origin **subprefix** hijack is also more damaging than forged-origin **prefix** hijack.

4. Measurements of Today's RPKI

Network measurements from June 1, 2017 show that 12% of the IP prefixes authorized in ROAs have a maxLength longer than their prefix length. The vast majority of these (84%) of these are vulnerable to forged-origin subprefix hijacks. Even large providers are vulnerable to these attacks. See [GSG17] for details.

These measurements suggest that operators commonly misconfigure the maxLength attribute, and unwittingly open themselves up to forged-origin subprefix hijacks.

5. Use Minimal ROAs without Maxlength

Operators SHOULD avoid using the maxLength attribute in their ROAs.

Operators SHOULD use "minimal ROAs" whenever possible. A minimal ROA contains only those IP prefixes that are actually originated by an AS in BGP, and no other IP prefixes. (See Section 3 for an example.)

This practice requires no changes to the RPKI specification and will not increase the number of signed ROAs in the RPKI, because ROAs already support lists of IP prefixes [RFC6482]. See also [GSG17] for further discussion of why this practice will have minimal impact on the performance of the RPKI ecosystem.

5.1. When a Minimal ROA Cannot Be Used?

Sometimes, it is not possible to use a "minimal ROA", because an operator wants to issue a ROA that includes an IP prefix that is sometimes (but not always) originated in BGP.

In this case, the ROA SHOULD include (1) the set of IP prefixes that are always originated in BGP, and (2) the set IP prefixes that are sometimes, but not always, originated in BGP. The ROA SHOULD NOT include any IP prefixes that the operator knows will not be originated in BGP. Whenever possible, the ROA SHOULD also avoid the use of the maxlength attribute.

We now extend our running example to illustrate one situation where where it is not possible to issue a minimal ROA.

Consider the following scenario prior to deployment of RPKI. Suppose AS 64496 announced 168.122.0.0/16 and has a contract with a DDoS mitigation service provider that holds AS 64500. Further, assume that the DDoS mitigation service contract applies to all IP addresses covered by 168.122.0.0/22. When a DDoS attack is detected and reported by AS 64496, AS 64500 immediately originates 168.122.0.0/22, thus attracting all the DDoS traffic to itself. The traffic is scrubbed at AS 64500 and then sent back to AS 64496 over a backhaul data link. Notice that, during a DDoS attack, the DDoS mitigation service provider AS 64500 originates a /22 prefix that is longer than than AS 64496's /16 prefix, and so all the traffic (destined to addresses in 168.122.0.0/22) that normally goes to AS 64496 goes to AS 64500 instead.

First, suppose the RPKI only had the minimal ROA for AS 64496, as described in Section 3. But, if there is no ROA authorizing AS 64500 to announce the /22 prefix, then the traffic-scrubbing scheme would not work. That is, if AS 64500 originates the /22 prefix in BGP during a DDoS attack, the announcement would be invalid [RFC6811].

Therefore, the RPKI should have two ROAs: one for AS 64496 and one for AS 64500.

```
ROA:(168.122.0.0/16,168.122.225.0/24, AS 64496)
```

```
ROA:(168.122.0.0/22, AS 64500)
```

Neither ROA uses the maxLength attribute. But, the second ROA is not "minimal" because it contains a /22 prefix that is not originated by anyone in BGP during normal operations. The /22 prefix is only originated by AS 64500 as part of its DDoS mitigation service during a DDoS attack.

Notice, however, that this scheme does not come without risks. Namely, all IP addresses in 168.122.0.0/22 are vulnerable to a forged-origin subprefix hijack during normal operations, when the /22 prefix is not originated. (The hijacker AS 64511 would send the BGP announcement "168.122.0.0/22: AS 64511, AS 64500", falsely claiming that AS 64511 is a neighbor of AS 64500 and falsely claiming that AS 64500 originates 168.122.0.0/22.)

In some situations, the DDoS mitigation service at AS 64500 might want to limit the amount of DDoS traffic that it attracts and scrubs. Suppose that a DDoS attack only targets IP addresses in 168.122.0.0/24. Then, the DDoS mitigation service at AS 64500 only wants to attract the traffic designated for the /24 prefix that is under attack, but not the entire /22 prefix. To allow for this, the RPKI should have two ROAs: one for AS 64496 and one for AS 64500.

```
ROA:(168.122.0.0/16,168.122.225.0/24, AS 64496)
```

```
ROA:(168.122.0.0/22-24, AS 64500)
```

The second ROA uses the maxLength attribute because it is designed to explicitly enable AS 64500 to originate *any* /24 subprefix of 168.122.0.0/22.

As before, the second ROA is also not "minimal" because it contains prefixes that are not originated by anyone in BGP during normal operations. As before, all IP addresses in 168.122.0.0/22 are vulnerable to a forged-origin subprefix hijack during normal operations, when the /22 prefix is not originated.

The use of maxLength in this second ROA also comes with an additional risk. While it permits the DDoS mitigation service at AS 64500 to originate prefix 168.122.0.0/24 during a DDoS attack in that space, it also makes the *other* /24 prefixes covered by the /22 prefix (i.e., 168.122.1.0/24, 168.122.2.0/24, 168.122.3.0/24) vulnerable to a forged-origin subprefix attacks.

6. Acknowledgments

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RPKI signed object for TAL
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Abstract

Trust Anchor Locators (TALs) [I-D.ietf-sidrops-https-tal] are used by Relying Parties in the RPKI to locate and validate Trust Anchor certificates used in RPKI validation. This document defines an RPKI signed object [RFC6488] for a Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) that can be used by Trust Anchors to perform a planned migration to a new key, allowing Relying Parties to discover the new key up to one year after the migration occurred.

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1. Requirements notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP

14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2. Introduction

Trust Anchor Locators (TALs) [I-D.ietf-sidrops-https-tal] are used by Relying Parties in the RPKI to locate and validate Trust Anchor certificates used in RPKI validation. This document defines an RPKI signed object [RFC6488] for a Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) that can be used by Trust Anchors to perform a planned migration to a new key, allowing Relying Parties to discover the new key up to one year after the migration occurred. (Note "one year" is arbitrary, and may be changed in a future version of this document)

Note that [RFC5011] describes Automated Updates of DNS Security (DNSSEC) Trust Anchors and can provide some useful insight here as well. However, concepts like a set of Trust Anchors, standby Trust Anchors, and TTLs are not applicable to the RPKI. Therefore, an alternative approach based on already existing concept of the Trust Anchor Locator [I-D.ietf-sidrops-https-tal], and top-down validation of an RPKI Trust Anchor certificate tree, where objects are retrieved from the RPKI repositories, is appropriate.

3. Signed TAL definition

The Signed TAL makes use of the template for RPKI digitally signed objects [RFC6488], which defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652] wrapper for the Signed TAL content as well as a generic validation procedure for RPKI signed objects. Therefore, to complete the specification of the Signed TAL (see Section 4 of [RFC6488]), this document defines:

- o The OID defined in Section 3.1 that identifies the signed object as being a Signed TAL. (This OID appears within the `eContentType` in the `encapContentInfo` object as well as the `content-type` signed attribute in the `signerInfo` object).
- o The ASN.1 syntax for the Signed TAL `eContent` defined in Section 3.2. (This is the payload that specifies the AS being authorized to originate routes as well as the prefixes to which the AS may originate routes.)
- o Additional steps to the validation steps specified in [RFC6488] required to validate Signed TALs, defined in Section 3.3.

3.1. The Signed TAL Content Type

This document requests an OID for signed-Tal as follows:

```
signed-Tal OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
    rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) 16 id-smime (1) TBD }
```

This OID MUST appear both within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo object as well as the content-type signed attribute in the signerInfo object (see [RFC6488])

3.2. The Signed TAL eContent

The content of a Signed TAL is ASN.1 encoded using the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X.690], and is defined as follows:

```
SignedTAL ::= SEQUENCE {
    version          [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
    activationTime   GeneralizedTime,
    certificateURIs  SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateURI,
    subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo }
```

CertificateURI ::= IA5String

SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= IA5String

3.2.1. version

The version number of the SignedTAL MUST be 0.

3.2.2. activationTime

This field contains the time when this TAL is intended to replace any previously known TAL for this Trust Anchor.

3.2.3. certificateURIs

This field is equivalent to the URI section in section 2.1 of [I-D.ietf-sidrops-https-tal]. It MUST contain at least one CertificateURI element. Each CertificateURI element contains the IA5String representation of either an rsync URI [RFC5781], or an HTTPS URI [RFC7230].

3.2.4. subjectPublicKeyInfo

This field is equivalent to the subjectPublicKeyInfo section in section 2.1 of [I-D.ietf-sidrops-https-tal].

3.3. Signed TAL Validation

To determine whether a Signed TAL is valid, the RP MUST perform the following steps in addition to those specified in [RFC6488]:

- o The eContentType OID matches the OID described in Section 3.1
- o The Signed TAL appears as the product of a Trust Anchor CA certificate.
- o This Trust Anchor CA has published only one Signed TAL object in its repository, and this object appears on the Manifest as the only entry using the ".tal" extension (see [RFC6481]). In case more than one Signed TAL object is found, all such objects MUST be considered invalid.
- o The EE certificate of this Signed TAL describes its Internet Number Resources (INRs) using the "inherit" attribute
- o The decoded TAL content conforms to the format defined in Section 3.2.

If the above procedure indicates that the manifest is invalid, then the Signed TAL MUST be discarded and treated as though no Signed TAL were present.

4. Signed TAL Generation

A TA MAY choose to generate a single Signed TAL object to publish in its TA certificate publication point(s) in the RPKI. The TA MUST perform the following steps to generate the Signed TAL:

- o Generate a key pair for a "one-time-use" EE certificate to use for the Signed TAL
- o Generate a one-time-use EE certificate for the Signed TAL
- o This EE certificate MUST have an SIA extension access description field with an accessMethod OID value of id-ad-signedobject, where the associated accessLocation references the publication point of the Signed TAL as an object URL.
- o As described in [RFC6487], an [RFC3779] extension is required in the EE certificate used for this object. However, because the resource set is irrelevant to this object type, this certificate MUST describe its Internet Number Resources (INRs) using the "inherit" attribute, rather than explicit description of a resource set.

- o This EE certificate MUST have a "notBefore" time that is before the moment that the Signed TAL will be published.
- o This EE certificate MUST have a "notAfter" time that reflects the intended time that this Signed TAL will be published. If the EE certificate for a Signed TAL is expired, it MUST no longer be published, but of course it MAY be replaced by a newly generated Signed TAL object with similar content and an updated "notAfter" time.
- o The Signed TAL MUST have an "activationTime" that reflects when Relying Parties MUST use this new TAL in place of any previously known TAL for this Trust Anchor.

5. Signed TAL Publication

A TA MAY publish a single Signed TAL object directly under its CA repository publication points. The TA MUST NOT publish multiple Signed TAL objects at any time. It is RECOMMENDED that a TA publishes a Signed TAL object for its current key and CA certificate publication URIs at all times.

A non-normative guideline for naming this object is that the filename chosen for the signed TAL in the publication repository be a value derived from the public key part of the entity's key pair, using the algorithm described for CRLs in section 2.2 of [RFC6481] for generation of filenames. The filename extension of ".tal" MUST be used to denote the object as a signed TAL. Note that this is in-line with filename extensions defined in section 7.2 of [RFC6481]

6. Performing a planned Key Roll as a Trust Anchor

A Signed TAL SHOULD be used to communicate a planned key roll by a Trust Anchor. From the Trust Anchor perspective a planned key roll consists of the following steps:

- o Prepare a new Trust Anchor key and CA certificate, see Section 6.1
- o Publish the new CA certificate, see Section 6.2
- o Verify the validity of the new CA certificate, see Section 6.3
- o Publish the objects under the current key under the new key, see Section 6.4
- o Verify that the validity of objects under the new key, see Section 6.5

- o Publish a Signed TAL as the only object under the current key, see Section 6.6
- o Delete the current key, see Section 6.7

6.1. Prepare a new Trust Anchor key and CA certificate

The Trust Anchors MUST generate a new key pair and generate a new TA Certificate. For the Subject Information Access (see section 4.8.8.1 of [RFC6487]) this MUST use URIs that will be used by the new key to publish objects. These URIs MUST be unique for use by this new key only. The Internet Number Resources on this new certificate MUST be equivalent to those found on the current certificate.

6.2. Publish the new CA certificate

The new CA certificate MUST be published under one or more new Certificate URIs for use by this new key only.

6.3. Verify the validity of the new CA certificate

The Trust Anchor MUST generate a new (unsigned) TAL file [I-D.ietf-sidrops-https-tal] and verify with RP software that the new Trust Anchor certificate can be retrieved from all locations and that it matches the subjectPublicKeyInfo

6.4. Publish the objects under the current key under the new key

ALL current signed certificates and other objects, with the exception of the CRL, Manifest and existing Signed TAL, must be re-issued by the new key and published under the new publication point(s).

It is RECOMMENDED that a new Signed TAL object is generated and published, listing the Certificate URIs for this new key, the subjectPublicKeyInfo of this new key, and using an "activationTime" that is effective immediately. Note that Relying Parties will not discover this new Signed TAL object until they have effectively switched over from the current key.

6.5. Verify that the validity of objects under the new key

The Trust Anchor MUST verify that validation using the new TAL file generated in Section 6.3 results in the set of valid objects as when the current TAL file is used.

6.6. Publish a Signed TAL as the only object under the current key

The Trust Anchor MUST publish a new Signed TAL, CRL and Manifest as the only objects under the current, to be deleted, key. The "nextUpdate" values of the Manifest and CRL objects SHOULD use a date that is set at least one year into the future. (arbitrary value, open to suggestions). The "notValidAfter" date on the Manifest and Signed TAL EE certificate SHOULD use this same date. The Trust Anchor MUST ensure that this Signed TAL, CRL and Manifest remain available for download for this full period. Note that this is done to give RPs the opportunity to discover the new key up to one year after the key roll occurred.

6.7. Delete the current key

As the final step the current key, which has been replaced now, SHOULD be deleted. The new key can now be marked as the current key.

7. Relying Party Use

When an RP discovers a valid Signed TAL signed under a TA, and it notices that the "subjectPublicKeyInfo" has changed and/or the set of "Certificate URIs" has changed from the values it knew for this TA, and the "activationTime" is in the past, then the RP MUST accept these new values for this TA, abort the current top-down validation operation, and initiate a new top-down validation operation using the updated information.

Note that the Trust Anchor MUST have verified that all objects are available under the new key (Section 6.5) and that that the TA CA certificate can be retrieved and validated for all new URIs (Section 6.3).

8. Deployment Considerations

Including Signed TAL objects while RP tools do not support this standard will result in these RPs rejecting these objects. It is not expected that this will result in the invalidation of any other object under a Trust Anchor.

That said, the flagging mechanism introduced here can only be trusted on once a majority of RPs support it. Defining when that moment arrives is by definition something that cannot be established at the time of writing this document.

However, once the majority of RPs support this mechanism it would be RECOMMENDED that Trust Anchor operators perform key rolls regularly.

The most assured way to know that such planned rolls will work is by making them a part of normal operations.

9. Unplanned Key Roll operations

The mechanism described in this document is not applicable to unplanned key rolls. Unplanned key rolls could theoretically be supported by a mechanism where a new key is introduced before it's used, with the power to revoke the current key. This would have to be signalled from the new key, as the TA may have lost access to its current key.

However, this introduces a great amount of operational complexity as well as a new vulnerability: an adversary would need access to only one of these keys in order to compromise a TA.

With that in mind we believe, for now, that unplanned key rolls should not be covered here, and would need to be communicated to Relying Parties in some other out-of-band fashion.

10. Changing a Trust Anchor Certificate URIs

Earlier versions of this document included a description of how Signed TAL objects could be used to signal a change of Certificate URIs only; i.e. where the key is not changed.

However, Relying Parties that do not support the mechanism described in this document would not be able to learn about the changes in URIs. While for RPs that do support this mechanism a planned key roll will be a normal part of RPKI validation.

Therefore we believe that a planned key roll should be used in cases like this, and that the set of Certificate URIs for any given key must never be changed.

11. IANA Considerations

11.1. OID

IANA is to add the following to the "RPKI Signed Objects" registry:

Decimal	Description	References
TBD	signed-Tal	[section 3.1]

11.2. File Extension

IANA is to add an item for the Signed TAL file extension to the "RPKI Repository Name Scheme" created by [RFC6481] as follows:

Extension	RPKI Object	References
.tal	Signed TAL	[this document]

12. Security Considerations

TBD

13. Acknowledgements

TBD

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Origin Validation Signaling
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Abstract

Within a trust boundary, e.g. an operator's PoP, it may be useful to have only a few central devices do full Origin Validation using the Resource Public Key Infrastructure, and be able to signal to an internal sender that a received route fails Origin Validation. E.g. route reflectors could perform Origin Validation for a cluster and signal back to a sending client that it sent an invalid route. Routers capable of sending and receiving this signal can use the extended community described in [RFC8097]

Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] only when they appear in all upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed case as English words, without normative meaning.

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1. Introduction

Within a routing trust boundary, e.g. an operator's Point of Presence (PoP), it may not be desirable or necessary for all routers to perform Origin Validation using the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) per [RFC6811]. A good example is route reflectors (see [RFC4456]).

An RPKI-enabled device, an Evaluator, SHOULD signal receipt of an Invalid route back to the sender by announcing that route back to the sender marked with the BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community as defined in [RFC8097] with a last octet having the value 2, meaning "Invalid." In the rest of this document we take the liberty of calling it the "community."

We use the term "Sender" to refer to the router announcing routes to the device evaluating the Origin Validation of the announcements. Beware that the Sender receives signaling back from the Evaluator, which can be somewhat confusing.

We use the term "Evaluator" to describe the device receiving routing announcements from senders, applying RPKI-based Origin Validation, and possibly signaling route Invalidity back to the sender(s).

2. Suggested Reading

It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI, [RFC6480], RPKI-based Prefix Validation, [RFC6811], and the BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community as described in [RFC8097].

3. Trust Boundary

As a general rule, we discourage 'outsourcing trust,' i.e. letting others make security decisions for us. But there are operational environments with a somewhat wide trust boundary, a single operator's PoP for example.

This is not outsourcing trust; this is remote decision making. It is not letting a third party make the decision; it is simply doing it on a different computer. It's trust in a distributed system, where what is (sometimes) called the Policy Decision Point is not the same as the Policy Enforcement Point.

As described in [RFC7115], a PoP might have a single RPKI Cache, hence all trust is vested in it. So it is reasonable that routers in that PoP could share Origin Validation results instead of each doing full validation.

An [RFC4456] Route Reflector Cluster is an obvious candidate for this approach. The route reflector(s) would perform Origin Validation and signal an Invalid route back to the sending client.

[RFC8097] provides the obvious signaling mechanism, the BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community. The device performing OV SHOULD signal back to the sender by announcing the offending prefix marked with the extended community with the last octet having the value 2, indicating an Invalid route.

4. The OV Signaling Capability

Unfortunately, the router sending the Invalid announcement is not normally expecting to receive it back. Therefore, both parties MUST agree on this feature by using a BGP Capability [RFC5492].

To advertise the OV Signaling Capability to a peer, a BGP speaker uses BGP Capabilities Advertisement [RFC5492]. By advertising the OV Signaling Capability to a peer, a BGP speaker conveys that it is able to send, receive, and properly handle OV Signaling using the community.

A peer which does not advertise this capability MUST NOT send OV Signaling, and BGP OV Signaling MUST NOT be sent to it.

The OV Signaling Capability is a new BGP Capability defined with Capability code [TBD] and Capability length 0.

5. Recommended Action

This section assumes that the OV Signaling Capability has been negotiated by the sending and receiving routers.

An Evaluating device which performs Origin Validation on a route received from a capable sender and finds a prefix with a particular origin AS to be Invalid (in the [RFC6811] sense), MUST announce that prefix back to the sending router from which it was received with the Invalid origin AS and the addition of the community with the last octet being 2.

A sender receiving the returned prefix announcement so marked MUST treat it the way it would treat an Invalid origin that it itself detected. It should withdraw all routes it had announced to that prefix with the Invalid origin AS. This includes withdrawing any instances of additional paths with that origin AS advertised under [RFC7911].

For a sender to properly evaluate the community returned by the evaluator, the sender MUST recognize the community before loop detection. This is a change to the Phase 2 Route Selection process of [RFC4271] Section 9.1.2.

If a sender originally received the Invalid route from an evaluator within its trust boundary with which it has negotiated the OV Signaling Capability, it MAY also propagate that signal to the original sender.

6. Security Considerations

As with all communities which cause semantic change, this use of the community may be abused as an attack vector. Therefore the operator MUST configure their incoming external border to strip the community.

As the BGP sessions are already established using whatever channel security the operator chooses or not, this change specifies no additional channel or object security. Of course, the BGP transport should be protected for integrity and authentication. TCP-MD5 [RFC2385] is available on almost all platforms. If more modern methods are available, they should be used.

Outsourcing security is usually considered bad policy. Section Section 3 above discusses why that is not really the case here.

Otherwise, this document does not create security considerations beyond those of [RFC6811].

7. IANA Considerations

This document requests the IANA assign the "OV Signaling Capability" to the BGP Capabilities described in Section 2.1 in the "Capability Codes" registry's "IETF Review" range [RFC8126].. This document is the reference for the new capability.

8. Acknowledgments

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